to ensure that inflation in Australia returns to the target over time
Some increase in interest rates is justified simply because with higher inflation, real interest rates are now negative. But the idea of returning to the old target range does not stand up to scrutiny.
Once the current spike in inflation is over, we need to reconsider both the target range and the whole idea of inflation targeting.
How much inflation are we aiming for now?
The Reserve Bank’s inflation target is consumer price inflation of 2-3%, on average, over time.
Yet for most of the past ten years that target has been missed, on the downside, as you can see below.
But, just recently, consumer price inflation has jumped to 5.1%, and the so-called “trimmed mean” measure of underlying inflation watched closely by the bank has jumped to 3.7%.
Recent inflation is partly a sign of success
While too much inflation can be a problem, it is important to remember that the jump is partly an unintended consequence of success. Massive public spending offset the impact of COVID and lockdowns on household outcome, and set the stage for a rapid economic recovery.
This spending was necessary, but inevitably went to businesses that didn’t need it.
Further, the success of working from home meant many households suffered no reduction in income and were freed of the need to spend as much on travel and clothes, and things such as make-up that go with travelling to work.
As restrictions have eased, households and businesses have been keen to spend some of their accumulated savings, at a time when goods production has been disrupted, especially by the anti-COVID measures in China.
The result has been classic inflation of the kind where “too much money chases too few goods”.
It is very different from Australia’s last major episode of inflation, in the 1960s and 1970s, which was commonly seen as a “wage-price spiral” or “cost-push inflation”.
This isn’t wage-driven inflation
Cost-push inflation was generally seen as arising when powerful unions demanded large wage rises, which were passed on to consumers by corporations with monopoly power.
In the current environment, while monopoly power is still a problem, unions are a shadow of their former selves, with little power to extract out-sized increases.
The result is that wages, as measured by the Bureau of Statistics wage price index, grew by only 2.4% in the year to March, well behind inflation of 5.1%.
This has continued a long downward trend in the wage share of national income.
Despite the obvious absence of wage-push, many commentators are still working on the wage-price spiral model, and arguing against allowing wages to rise in line with inflation.
Such a policy would not only be unfair, it would be economically disastrous – similar to the austerity policies introduced in many countries in the wake of the global financial crisis, and earlier, when Britain returned to the gold standard in the wake of World War I, helping precipitate and deepen the great depression.
In the current context, real wage cuts brought about by less than full compensation for inflation would lead workers to quit and seek new jobs, worsening labour shortages.
It is striking that many of the same employer representatives who are saying wage increases are unaffordable are also complaining it’s hard to find workers.
The correct response to the huge expansion in the amount of money in the economy during the crisis is to accept a once-off increase in prices and wages, as well as incomes indexed to wages and prices, such as pensions.
For now, prices should flow through into wages
This would share the real costs of the pandemic spending more evenly across the community than if wage-earners were expected to bear the burden.
Later, we can return to the use of monetary policy, based on adjustments in the Reserve Bank cash rate, to maintain inflation at an acceptable level. But what should that level be?
For the past 30 years or so, the RBA has targeted an inflation rate of 2-3%, but the rationale for a rate that low was always weak, and has since broken down.
In the 1990s, the main argument for a low target rate of inflation was the need to break expectations created by decades of high inflation.
By contrast, the current inflationary episode is more like the brief inflationary bursts of the 1950s, which vanished once the drivers of inflation were removed.
Even during the heyday of inflation targeting, critics argued that low inflation in goods and services prices contributed to asset price instability, potentially giving rise to financial crises.
Many, including myself, have long preferred an inflation target of 4%. Now there’s a new argument for it.
In time, we will need a new target
A central concept in monetary policy is the neutral real rate of interest: that is, the interest rate adjusted for inflation at which monetary policy is neither expansionary nor contractionary.
Over the past twenty years the neutral real rate is believed to have fallen to close to zero, or possibly even less, meaning that if inflation is 2-3%, the neutral actual rate should be 2-3%.
But the nail is hard to hit. Actual rates of interest set by central banks tend to vary around the neutral rate, by as much as three percentage points either way.
This raises the prospect of the target cash rate going negative, and interest rates can’t usually go far below zero. We’ve seen this “zero lower bound” operating in Australia and elsewhere for years now.
So, if we are to continue with inflation targeting, and get it right, it will be necessary to raise the 2-3% inflation target.
Given the obvious political difficulties of doing this, it may be better to abandon inflation targeting altogether, as suggested for some time by myself and economists backed by former Senator Nick Zenophon.
It’s one of a number of ideas likely to be put to the independent review of the Reserve Bank promised by Treasurer Jim Chalmers during the election.
John Quiggin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
How does an image become an icon? It is estimated that we now produce more images in two minutes than we did in the entire 19th century. How, then, can one image be so powerful it can symbolise the horror of war and help mobilise anti-war sentiment?
June 8 marks the 50 year anniversary since Associated Press photographer Hyung Cong “Nick” Út captured one of the Vietnam War’s defining images.
Titled “Accidental Napalm”, the black-and-white still photograph has since been repeatedly reproduced and continues to survive in collective memory.
Despite its age, the image continues to retain the capacity to shock. A little girl is naked and running directly towards the spectator. She is leaning slightly forward, and her arms are held out from her body.
Her proximity to the camera’s lens is a direct address to the viewer: her agony and terror is unambiguous.
Phan Thị Kim Phúc
A battle was underway in South Vietnam between the South Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.
Several journalists had assembled just outside the village of Trảng Bàng, which had been occupied by North Vietnamese forces. South Vietnamese planes flew overhead and dropped four napalm bombs.
A few moments later, a group of terrified survivors – including children – came running through the smoke and down the road towards the group of journalists.
In the immediate left foreground, there is a boy screaming in terror. To the right, holding hands, two more children are running.
The spectator’s eye moves restlessly around the photograph, searching for details. A photographer reloads film into his camera.
Holding hands, two children are running. A photographer reloads film into his camera. AP Photo/Nick Ut
Soldiers are walking casually behind the children, seemingly indifferent to their distress. The juxtaposition is striking and raises the photograph’s emotional register: soldiers are expected to help and provide assistance.
The image has a grainy texture very different to the smoothness of contemporary digital photography. The depth of field is truncated due to the screen of billowing smoke. With no horizon to offer respite, the spectator’s gaze is forced to return to the little girl.
After taking the photographs, Út was able to take the girl to a local hospital where she received treatment for her burns.
Gradually, details surrounding the children began to emerge: the little girl’s name was Phan Thị Kim Phúc and she was nine years old. She had been hiding with her family and other village members. She tore her clothes off when they caught fire in the strike.
Initially the photograph was rejected because of the girl’s nakedness. AP Photo/Nick Ut
Informally known as “Napalm Girl”, the confronting image almost didn’t reach the rest of the world. Initially the photograph was rejected by the Associated Press because of the girl’s nakedness. Newspapers are bound by strict conventions, and frontal nudity was considered a breach in propriety.
A few hours later, this decision overruled by Horst Faas, Associated Press’s chief photo editor in Vietnam and the photograph was reproduced by newspapers across the world.
The war in Vietnam was the first to be televised. Television crews documented Kim Phúc’s escape, but Út’s still image achieved notoriety and became embedded in collective memory.
The photograph had an immediate and widespread impact. It appeared in influential newspapers and magazines including Life and Newsweek. Its place in the history of photojournalism was secured when it won both the Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography and the World Press Photo in 1973.
As art historian Julian Stallabrass has observed, very few napalm victims reached a hospital. It was the broad circulation of Út’s photograph that led to Kim Phúc receiving the advanced medical treatment that saved her life.
Kim Phúc visited by Associated Press photographer Ut in 1973. AP Photo
Kim Phúc has become the subject of television documentaries, as well as a biography documenting her life and defection from Vietnam to Canada.
In her book Regarding the Pain of Others Susan Sontag argued the photograph “belongs to the realm of photographs that cannot possibly be posed.”
In the 50 years that have passed, our attitudes towards photography have shifted.
Today, with phone photography so ubiquitous, most of us can take reasonable images. Our trust in photography’s “truth” status has declined. This can partly be attributed to the ubiquity of social media content that is regularly “embellished” or “enhanced”.
In 2016, the photograph was in the news again, this time for violating Facebook’s censorship rules on nudity.
In 1972, “Accidental Napalm” became the generation-defining image that captured the futility of the war in Vietnam.
When we turn our attention to Ukraine, it is perhaps still too early in the conflict for one photograph to emerge as the iconic symbol of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion.
Chari Larsson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Lettuce prices are skyrocketing. Twitter users are posting photos of iceberg lettuces for A$10 and $11.99, well above the more usual $2.80.
It’s not new, and it’s not only lettuce. The peak body for Australian vegetable producers, AUSVEG, says between 2006 and 2016 costs – and most likely prices – more than doubled.
Some of what’s happening now is due to transport. Vegetables are moved by truck and are sensitive to diesel prices, pushed high by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
A US Department of Agriculture study found a doubling in the diesel price would lead to a short-term increase in wholesale prices of 20% to 28%.
Australia’s increase in diesel prices has been nearer 60%. Since mid-2020 they have climbed from $1.30 a litre to $2.10 a litre.
Also hitting vegetable prices has been the price of fertiliser, again pushed up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Fertiliser accounts for about 10% of the cost of vegetables.
Austrade reports that throughout 2021 the price of urea, a key ingredient in fertiliser, climbed from $256/tonne to $1,026/tonne. Phosphate and potassium prices more than doubled.
The most important cost in farming is labour, accounting for one quarter of total cash costs. It has been hit three ways.
On April 28 the Fair Work Commission changed the horticulture award to guarantee farm workers a minimum rate of pay, something they hadn’t been entitled to before.
And agriculture is facing labour shortages as workers have fallen ill with COVID and foreign workers have been denied entry for the almost two years.
Farmers are selling up
Vegetable farming doesn’t pay much in Australia. The average return is just short of 4%, less than the average super fund.
As a result, small farmers have been selling up to larger producers.
Transport, fertilisers, labour and industry concentration all point to a step up in prices, with little relief in sight. But combined they probably explain no more than half of what’s happened. The other half is the climate.
Climate change is not only reflected in global warming, it is also reflected in the increased frequency of extreme weather events such as bushfires and draughts, and most recently in extreme floods across NSW and Queensland.
Extreme weather is more commmon
What were once once-in-a-century weather events are happening more often.
Australia can help slow the pace of climate change by controlling carbon emissions, but that will take a lot of time. There is something else we can do.
The lettuce price featured in election campaign advertisements. Campaign Edge
Hydroponic farming, thriving in Europe, can allow an 8,000 square metre vertical farm to produce as many as 15 million lettuce in a year.
If located near clean energy sources such as wind farms, as Sundrop Farms is near Port Augusta in South Australia, costs can drop. If located near cities, transportation costs can go down as well.
Controlled environments are conducive to automation and remove the need to follow the seasons. Hydroponic farms can cut produce times by half for some vegetables, enabling up to 13 growth cycles a year.
For the moment, shop around
While hydroponic farms look like the future, there is little they can do right now to contain prices.
Be prepared to pay more. Shop around. Different supermarkets source products from different locations, affected by the elements in different ways. And consider buying local, helping farmers close to you stay in business.
Also, think about switching vegetables, at least for a while. Not all of them are doubling in price.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of Melbourne
Indonesian President Joko Widowi takes Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for a tour of Bogor Palace in West Java. Alex Ellinghausen/SMH pool via AAP
A new Australian prime minister flying to Indonesia to “reset” relations is now so routine it would probably raise hackles in Jakarta if it didn’t happen.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s determination to go there as quickly as he could is therefore laudable – and necessary – if he wants to do better than the outgoing government in dealing with Indonesia.
But the visit is so essential because most previous “resets” have not lasted. The government-to-government relationship between Australia and Indonesia is a fragile one, easily broken when tensions arise. There are many differences – from history, religion, ethnicity, and language, to legal systems, political systems, global alliances, and strategic interests.
In fact, very few Australian governments in recent years have made it to the end of their term without a bust-up with Indonesia of some kind. This is not all Australia’s fault. Like Albanese, most Australian leaders since Paul Keating have accepted a strong relationship with Indonesia is critically important to our foreign policy.
But Indonesia is much less concerned about its neighbours – its relations with Singapore and Malaysia are equally bumpy – and that is unlikely to change any time soon.
Indonesia does not need Australia
Indonesia is a huge country of more than 270 million people and has the world’s largest Muslim population. It dominates ASEAN and this year is chair of the G20. If it returns to its pre-COVID levels of 5% annual economic growth, it will be back on track to be a top five economy by 2050. It is located across key air and sea lanes and will be strategically vital if conflict breaks out in the South China Sea.
Rightly or wrongly, this means Indonesians now see their country as a rising global player that can go it alone. Many will tell you that they don’t see why Australia deserves their attention. They see us as a low-ranked trade and investment partner more focused on the United States and United Kingdom than Southeast Asia.
And why wouldn’t they? Australia does not rank within Indonesia’s top ten trading partners. Moreover, the recent AUKUS agreement only served to reinforce the view in Indonesia that Australia will always put its relations with Anglophone countries ahead of those with its closest neighbours.
That is why the ritual reset visit by Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong will not be enough to get Indonesia’s attention and build deep engagement between our countries.
Albanese is right to say he wants the relationship to be about more than symbolism and his announcement he will attend the G20 summit in Bali in November was a smart move. But rhetoric is not enough: everyone has heard it before and it rings hollow without action, and that means expenditure.
The prime minister’s new A$200 million “climate and infrastructure partnership” with Indonesia is good start – improving Indonesia’s patchy infrastructure is a project close to Jokowi’s heart.
Climate change is also a pressing concern for Indonesia. However, its record on efforts to reduce deforestation and emissions means there will be challenges. For example, in 2021, Indonesia terminated a US$1 billion (A$1.4 billion) deal with Norway aimed at preserving its forests.
What Albanese should do now
But there are other ways Australia can make meaningful investments in the bilateral relationship. There are plenty of proposals that have been kicked about for years and are well known to policymakers in Canberra. They need to be acted on now. Here are just five:
1. Increase aid to Indonesia
Indonesia is understandably hostile to any attempts to use aid as leverage, but the once-generous programs we ran in Indonesia did provide us with extraordinary access and respect in Jakarta.
Albanese and Widodo have a drink after a bike ride around Bogor Palace. Alex Ellinghausen/SMH pool via AAP
This has been diminished by savage cuts over the past decade. And there is real need. Indonesia may be an emerging middle-class country but it has tens of millions still living in poverty, an inadequate social safety net, and a struggling health system. While the amount of aid Australia can offer will always be tiny compared to Indonesia’s budgets, our aid can help Indonesia test new approaches, and ensure its most marginalised communities are not left behind.
The new Labor government has promised an extra $470 million of aid over four years for South East Asia. A significant portion of this needs to be committed to Indonesia.
2. Focus on soft diplomacy
Despite the occasional problems in the government-to-government relationship, there are strong people-to-people links in the arts, education, academic, and community sectors that create cohesion in the relationship. They need to be increased ten-fold or more up to have real impact, and that will mean returning the funding stripped out of soft diplomacy over the last decade, tripling it and then some.
3. Open an Australia Centre
The Australian embassy in Jakarta is a fortress, closed to the public. Australia needs an accessible place where we can showcase our arts and culture, with theatres, cafes, libraries, and where Indonesians can get information about education and business in Australia in a casual, welcoming environment. European countries on the other side of the globe like Germany and the Netherlands have set these up in Jakarta – it is crazy that we have not.
4. Make it easier for Indonesians to visit
Australians can get a visa on arrival in Indonesia but even Indonesians wanting to visit Australia on a tourist visa face an expensive, complicated and demeaning application process. This means few make it here. We need easy-access, cheap visas for Indonesians, including for working holidays.
And as we try to wean our education sector off China, we need to make it much easier for Indonesians to study here. We already offer scholarships to study in our universities, and Albanese’s announcement of ten more is good news, but it is a drop in the ocean.
5. Start funding Indonesian studies again
Much has been written about the collapse of Indonesian studies in schools and universities in Australia. The number of Australians with language skills and deep knowledge of the country is now tiny, even though we need a pool of Indonesia expertise to engage effectively.
The lessons of the Keating and Rudd programs on Asian languages in schools are clear: only funding support can revive Indonesian studies. Keating did it with the equivalent of about $100 million annually, but Rudd’s $20 million per year was not enough.
Albanese has announced support for the The Australian Consortium for ‘In-Country’ Indonesian Studies – a program that gives Australian university students chances to study and complete short courses in Indonesia. But that is nowhere near enough to fix the lack of language expertise. Albanese must dig deeper.
The free trade agreement
A longer-term challenge is implementing the long-awaited free trade agreement with Indonesia, the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which Albanese has made a focus of his visit, bringing with him a large delegation of Australian business leaders and Trade Minister Don Farrell.
Anthony Albanese has a breakfast meeting with Australian business leaders in Jakarta on Monday. Lukas Coch/AAP
There are no quick fixes here. Australian businesses are very nervous about investing in Indonesia. Although big profits are possible, setting up in Indonesia is complex and expensive, and they don’t trust the Indonesian legal system to protect them, especially against Indonesia’s powerful oligarchs.
While Australian businesses are perhaps too cautious, Indonesia also has a lot of work to do its reform its systems before it can expect Australian businesses to help it meet its ambitious and elusive foreign investment targets. The free trade agreements needs to be a priority for both countries.
So, while Albanese and Wong’s meetings in Jakarta matter, they are just the start of the work needed for deeper engagement with Indonesia. And without a real budget commitment to back that up, we can expect things to revert to the usual stalemate soon enough – at least until the next new prime minister gets on the plane to Jakarta again.
Tim Lindsey has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Tim Mann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of Melbourne
Indonesian President Joko Widowi takes Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for a tour of Bogor Palace in West Java. Alex Ellinghausen/SMH pool via AAP
A new Australian prime minister flying to Indonesia to “reset” relations is now so routine it would probably raise hackles in Jakarta if it didn’t happen.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s determination to go there as quickly as he could is therefore laudable – and necessary – if he wants to do better than the outgoing government in dealing with Indonesia.
But the visit is so essential because most previous “resets” have not lasted. The government-to-government relationship between Australia and Indonesia is a fragile one, easily broken when tensions arise. There are many differences – from history, religion, ethnicity, and language, to legal systems, political systems, global alliances, and strategic interests.
In fact, very few Australian governments in recent years have made it to the end of their term without a bust-up with Indonesia of some kind. This is not all Australia’s fault. Like Albanese, most Australian leaders since Paul Keating have accepted a strong relationship with Indonesia is critically important to our foreign policy.
But Indonesia is much less concerned about its neighbours – its relations with Singapore and Malaysia are equally bumpy – and that is unlikely to change any time soon.
Indonesia does not need Australia
Indonesia is a huge country of more than 270 million people and has the world’s largest Muslim population. It dominates ASEAN and this year is chair of the G20. If it returns to its pre-COVID levels of 5% annual economic growth, it will be back on track to be a top five economy by 2050. It is located across key air and sea lanes and will be strategically vital if conflict breaks out in the South China Sea.
Rightly or wrongly, this means Indonesians now see their country as a rising global player that can go it alone. Many will tell you that they don’t see why Australia deserves their attention. They see us as a low-ranked trade and investment partner more focused on the United States and United Kingdom than Southeast Asia.
And why wouldn’t they? Australia does not rank within Indonesia’s top ten trading partners. Moreover, the recent AUKUS agreement only served to reinforce the view in Indonesia that Australia will always put its relations with Anglophone countries ahead of those with its closest neighbours.
That is why the ritual reset visit by Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong will not be enough to get Indonesia’s attention and build deep engagement between our countries.
Albanese is right to say he wants the relationship to be about more than symbolism and his announcement he will attend the G20 summit in Bali in November was a smart move. But rhetoric is not enough: everyone has heard it before and it rings hollow without action, and that means expenditure.
The prime minister’s new A$200 million “climate and infrastructure partnership” with Indonesia is good start – improving Indonesia’s patchy infrastructure is a project close to Jokowi’s heart.
Climate change is also a pressing concern for Indonesia. However, its record on efforts to reduce deforestation and emissions means there will be challenges. For example, in 2021, Indonesia terminated a US$1 billion (A$1.4 billion) deal with Norway aimed at preserving its forests.
What Albanese should do now
But there are other ways Australia can make meaningful investments in the bilateral relationship. There are plenty of proposals that have been kicked about for years and are well known to policymakers in Canberra. They need to be acted on now. Here are just five:
1. Increase aid to Indonesia
Indonesia is understandably hostile to any attempts to use aid as leverage, but the once-generous programs we ran in Indonesia did provide us with extraordinary access and respect in Jakarta.
Albanese and Widodo have a drink after a bike ride around Bogor Palace. Alex Ellinghausen/SMH pool via AAP
This has been diminished by savage cuts over the past decade. And there is real need. Indonesia may be an emerging middle-class country but it has tens of millions still living in poverty, an inadequate social safety net, and a struggling health system. While the amount of aid Australia can offer will always be tiny compared to Indonesia’s budgets, our aid can help Indonesia test new approaches, and ensure its most marginalised communities are not left behind.
The new Labor government has promised an extra $470 million of aid over four years for South East Asia. A significant portion of this needs to be committed to Indonesia.
2. Focus on soft diplomacy
Despite the occasional problems in the government-to-government relationship, there are strong people-to-people links in the arts, education, academic, and community sectors that create cohesion in the relationship. They need to be increased ten-fold or more up to have real impact, and that will mean returning the funding stripped out of soft diplomacy over the last decade, tripling it and then some.
3. Open an Australia Centre
The Australian embassy in Jakarta is a fortress, closed to the public. Australia needs an accessible place where we can showcase our arts and culture, with theatres, cafes, libraries, and where Indonesians can get information about education and business in Australia in a casual, welcoming environment. European countries on the other side of the globe like Germany and the Netherlands have set these up in Jakarta – it is crazy that we have not.
4. Make it easier for Indonesians to visit
Australians can get a visa on arrival in Indonesia but even Indonesians wanting to visit Australia on a tourist visa face an expensive, complicated and demeaning application process. This means few make it here. We need easy-access, cheap visas for Indonesians, including for working holidays.
And as we try to wean our education sector off China, we need to make it much easier for Indonesians to study here. We already offer scholarships to study in our universities, and Albanese’s announcement of ten more is good news, but it is a drop in the ocean.
5. Start funding Indonesian studies again
Much has been written about the collapse of Indonesian studies in schools and universities in Australia. The number of Australians with language skills and deep knowledge of the country is now tiny, even though we need a pool of Indonesia expertise to engage effectively.
The lessons of the Keating and Rudd programs on Asian languages in schools are clear: only funding support can revive Indonesian studies. Keating did it with the equivalent of about $100 million annually, but Rudd’s $20 million per year was not enough.
Albanese has announced support for the The Australian Consortium for ‘In-Country’ Indonesian Studies – a program that gives Australian university students chances to study and complete short courses in Indonesia. But that is nowhere near enough to fix the lack of language expertise. Albanese must dig deeper.
The free trade agreement
A longer-term challenge is implementing the long-awaited free trade agreement with Indonesia, the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which Albanese has made a focus of his visit, bringing with him a large delegation of Australian business leaders and Trade Minister Don Farrell.
Anthony Albanese has a breakfast meeting with Australian business leaders in Jakarta on Monday. Lukas Coch/AAP
There are no quick fixes here. Australian businesses are very nervous about investing in Indonesia. Although big profits are possible, setting up in Indonesia is complex and expensive, and they don’t trust the Indonesian legal system to protect them, especially against Indonesia’s powerful oligarchs.
While Australian businesses are perhaps too cautious, Indonesia also has a lot of work to do its reform its systems before it can expect Australian businesses to help it meet its ambitious and elusive foreign investment targets. The free trade agreements needs to be a priority for both countries.
So, while Albanese and Wong’s meetings in Jakarta matter, they are just the start of the work needed for deeper engagement with Indonesia. And without a real budget commitment to back that up, we can expect things to revert to the usual stalemate soon enough – at least until the next new prime minister gets on the plane to Jakarta again.
Tim Lindsey has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Tim Mann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
We used to believe the world’s resources were almost limitless. But as we spread out across the planet, we consumed more and more of these resources. For decades, scientists have warned we are approaching the limits of what the environment can tolerate.
In 2009, the influential Stockholm Resilience Centre first published its planetary boundaries framework. The idea is simple: outline the global environmental limits within which humanity could develop and thrive. This concept has become popular as a way to grasp our impact on nature.
For the first time, we have taken these boundaries – which can be hard to visualise on a global scale – and applied them to Australia. We found Australia has already overshot three of these: biodiversity, land-system change and nitrogen and phosphorus flows. We’re also approaching the boundaries for freshwater use and climate change.
The nation’s land use is a key contributor to these trends, with natural systems under increasing pressure as a result of many land management practices. Luckily, we already know many of the solutions for living within our limits, such as waste management, conservation and restoration of natural lands in conjunction with agriculture, and shifts in food production.
What are planetary boundaries?
In 2015, scientists took stock of how humanity was tracking, warning four of nine boundaries had already been crossed.
While such warnings make global headlines, they can also leave people wondering, “What does this actually mean for me?”
This TED talk on planetary boundaries has helped popularise this approach.
This is the question we have sought to answer for Australia and its land use sector. We took five of these global boundaries and calculated what Australia’s “share” of those would be in our new technical report.
We then went one step further, breaking down what these boundaries mean for Australia’s land use industries, such as agriculture and forestry.
Logging and other land-system change can pose major threats for nature. Shutterstock
These limits are not abstractions – they’re real
These are real-world limits. Pushing past them has real-world consequences.
Take nitrogen and phosphorus flows, which refers to the levels of these chemicals in the nation’s waterways.
In around 50% of our river catchments, we already have concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus past the safe level for the health of the environment. These chemicals are applied as fertiliser to cropland and pasture. If there’s too much, it can run off into waterways. Once in our rivers, these chemicals can fuel dangerous algal blooms which can force the closure of popular recreational areas, fill lakes with weeds and hurt fish and other wildlife.
Tackling one environmental issue often has benefits for others. Improving water quality has benefits for biodiversity, because the plants and animals supported by those rivers have better water to live off and in.
Why does biodiversity matter? The diversity of life on our continent plays a critical role in keeping ecosystems stable and sustaining vital services – such as fresh air and water – they provide to wildlife and to us.
It’s well known areas with lower numbers of species and lower genetic diversity prove generally less resilient to shocks. That means these environments are at higher risk of tipping into a state where they can no longer provide the services vital to life.
Different species occupy different niches within ecosystems, meaning the loss of one or two can erode the functioning of the system as a whole.
Protecting and restoring biodiversity is therefore critical to achieving planetary health. Unfortunately, biodiversity is among the boundaries Australia has already overshot. The number of species threatened by our activities is growing, and many of our endangered animals are at risk of extinction.
Fertiliser overuse can trigger algal blooms and kill fish and other water species. Shutterstock
We know what we need to do
With this report, we contribute to the national conversation about how Australia can stay within its fair share of planetary limits and contribute to the global effort for sustainable development.
Agriculture, forestry and other land use industries also have a critical role to play in reducing emissions and sequestering carbon. But the land use sector is under increasing pressure from growing populations, the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events.
Understanding what sustainability means in practical, measurable terms for Australia’s land use sector is vital to enable humanity to continue to prosper.
Romy Zyngier does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
While there is widespread nervousness at the victory of Ferdinand Marcos junior in the Philippines, for many of us it was a reminder that “blood” is still an important element in the politics of the developing world.
Before you get smug, it’s called “political dynasties” in the developed world. In the US, it’s the Kennedy, Bush and Clinton families.
In much of Southeast Asia, the idea of political blood is taken much more seriously. Despite the modernisation process, politics is still stuck in the old ways.
A brief look is disturbing. In the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III both succeeded their parents as president of the Philippines. In Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri is the daughter of the country’s first president, Sukarno. In Thailand, Yingluck Shinawatra succeeded her brother Thaksin as prime minister. Singapore is ruled by Lee Hsien Loong, son of Lee Kuan Yew. Najib Razak is the son of Malaysia’s second prime minister, Abdul Razak Hussein. And Hun Manet, the son of Hun Sen, is almost certain to take over Cambodia soon.
These are the most prominent ones. The truth is thousands of others in the region hold high political office due to their bloodline.
Others are waiting: Mahathir Mohamad’s son Mukhriz in Malaysia, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of former Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Panthongtae Shinawatra, the only son of Thaksin, all have a shot at their nation’s highest office. Hishammuddin Hussein, son of Malaysia’s third prime minister, is in the same boat. If they did not come from rich and powerful families, it is unlikely they would ever attain high office.
Are they simply a natural product of political families? The argument goes that if you grow up in that kind of household you cannot escape your “calling”. Some even liken it to “national service”. The other argument is that since it’s a democracy, if the polity voted for them, that should be the end of the argument.
But the reality is that political dynasties are created, and often accompanied by formalities steeped in custom and traditional political culture. They are nothing to do with meritocracy. In Southeast Asia, it’s often linked to “patron-clientism”, where a powerful person (patron) and a follower (client) mutually benefit from the relationship.
In a nutshell, why should you hold high office just because you are born with a certain surname or lucky enough to be born into a particular family?
In almost all cases, political dynasty members use their superior wealth, connections and education to rise. Along the way, they attract the followers of their forebears and keep them loyal with patronage, sometimes called the “coat-tail effect”. I take the view that political dynasties, in all societies, are bad in the long run and have negative consequences for political development.
First, political dynasties hinder meritocracy and fair competition. In rural areas of Southeast Asia, it is extremely rare for a political unknown to defeat a “name” that has been in power for generations. This explains why the power bases of many political dynasties are often found in rural constituencies.
Second, political dynasties promote the idea of political elitism. That is, the selection process is closed and the leaders are drawn from the same pool of people.
Third, political dynasties are closely linked to economic power. Concentration of political power among a few families benefits a narrow set of economic interests. This process institutionalises economic and income inequalities and creates a culture in which “connections” become the most important criteria for everything. These political families are able to claim a major portion of the state’s resources legally through their control of the political system, leaving the country vulnerable to corrupt practices.
However, it seems political dynasties’ hold on politics in Southeast Asia remains unshakeable. Some countries have “term limits” to stop political dynasties, but they are totally ineffective in practice. For example, there is nothing to stop a brother or sister from the same political family succeeding each other.
Will social media and the internet change the situation? It is very unlikely. The most important criterion for political change is probably education, which means an education system that teaches citizens to be critical and think in a rational way.
But in Southeast Asia, state education is about producing citizens who obey authority – in bureaucratic speak they are called “loyal” or “patriotic” citizens.
So, should we be surprised by Bong-Bong Marcos’s victory? Not in the least. There will be similar victories by people with very familiar names in the future.
James Chin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Daniel Boyd’s solo exhibition Treasure Island, now on at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, is a deeply political and personal interrogation of Australia’s colonial history.
Boyd is a Kudjala, Ghungalu, Wangerriburra, Wakka Wakka, Gubbi Gubbi, Kuku Yalanji, Yuggera and Bundjalung man, with ni-Vanuatu heritage. His work knocks over the apple cart of accepted white Australian history and presents the tumbled mess of bruised fruit.
For many, the true tales of racism, exploitation and violence towards First Nations people in Australia will not be a surprise, but Boyd charges the data with emotion and affect.
One of the featured artworks presents a large Aboriginal map showing multiple language group areas, and with the words “Treasure Island” across its flank. This refers to the imperial notion of Australia as Terra Nullius, a land of free resources to steal or extract.
Drawing on iconic tales of Robert Louis Stevenson (author of Treasure Island and collector of what Boyd describes as “Pacific fetish objects”) and countless ethnographic images from archives, Boyd creates his disruptions.
The works on display reflect the range of Boyd’s critical inquiry into the cosmos, patterned navigational maps, Plato’s cave allegory and dark matter in space and history.
We Call Them Pirates Out Here (2006) presents the viewer with a familiar image of Cook’s first landing at Kamay (Botony Bay), in 1770. Boyd re-presents Cook as a pirate, unlawfully stealing unceded land.
In Boyd’s hands the scene becomes chaotic rather than messianic. But the stain of power is still there.
The false truth can be disrupted, but the violence has already been done. De-colonialism has not yet been achieved.
I asked Daniel Boyd if non-Indigenous people will ever be able to understand life in the same way that First Nations people do – as multiple and complex, as holistic and connected and as poetic? He replied:
when Indigenous people situate themselves with place, with the sea, the land and the sky, then that knowledge can be transferred.
Boyd’s exhibition is exactly that transference of knowledge to audiences. He presents a middle room of artworks dedicated to the period of “blackbirding” in Australia, where people from South Sea Islands were brought to Queensland as slave labour to work on sugarcane plantations.
Boyd tells me that his own great-great-grandfather Samuel Pentecost was forcibly taken from Malakula Island, Vanuatu, and brought to Queensland to work for no pay.
In Secret Cures of Slaves, historian Londa Schiebinger writes about slaves being tossed into mass graves at the end of cotton or sugarcane rows if they died from exhaustion or malnutrition on site. I’ve read of slaves being only fed bananas or dumb cane which made their tongues swell and stopped verbal backlash.
As Boyd tells me, the Queensland economy was built on the backbone of free labour of First Nations and Pacific Island peoples. Wages were stolen and people were exploited.
Along with domestic servitude, this free labour created capital and profit for generations of white Australians.
Boyd continues these disturbing tales with a painting of an imperial ship, full of produce. The artist tells me that Joseph Banks “discovered” Tahitian breadfruit as a useful species to feed to plantation slaves, so the breadfruit was transported aboard the Bounty ship to Jamaica, another site of plantation slavery.
The brutality continued through Australian history and in Boyd’s own family lineage. Samuel’s son, Boyd’s great-grandfather, was stolen from his parents up in Mossman Gorge and taken to Yarrabah Mission.
Boyd transfers an image of Harry Mossman, photographed by anthropologist Norman Tindale, for this exhibition. This is one of the most unadorned and plain portraits of the exhibition: it has a calm, proud and direct appeal.
Adjusting our focus
Boyd’s use of tiny glue dots on the surface of his artworks references traditional painting but also acts as lenses. These adjust our focus and help us see the true stories, painful and sorrowful and shameful as they are.
They are emblematic of the way light (western knowledge) can blind us from what we need to see (Black truth). The mostly white dots are portals to better see the hidden stories.
Boyd’s art dispels white Australian propaganda that erases information about slavery, the stolen generation and the early years of white settlement. He encourages audiences to see the true stories lurking in the shadows.
It’s not easy, but facing the truth is the first step to decolonising our Australian history.
Daniel Boyd Treasure Island is at the Art Gallery of New South Wales until January 2023.
Prudence Gibson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Netflix’s nostalgia-laden thriller Stranger Things returned last month and with it came the revival of another classic from the 1980s, Running Up That Hill by Kate Bush. The song plays a prominent part in the narrative connected to one of the show’s leading teen cast members and is featured in a climatic, and visually stunning scene that has been making the rounds on the internet.
In a post shared to her website over the weekend, Kate Bush showered praise on the show and Netflix:
You might’ve heard that the first part of the fantastic, gripping new series of Stranger Things has recently been released on Netflix… It features the song, ‘Running Up That Hill’ which is being given a whole new lease of life by the young fans who love the show – I love it too!
Making a deal with TikTok
One thing missing from the acknowledgement is mention of another digital platform helping to boost the song’s presence: TikTok. A thirty-second version of the Stranger Things clip has been posted and reposted on TikTok, gaining millions of views in just over a week, and Kate Bush’s song has been used in over 500,000 short videos.
Videos featuring the song depict teens cosplaying as characters, acting out scenes from the shows, and making humorous meme videos (“my friends playing my favourite song trying to save me… my airpods die”).
Others engage less with Stranger Things and more with Kate Bush, in videos depicting connecting with parents over a shared love, recommending more of Bush’s music, and sharing joy that a new generation of audiences might be discovering the influential artist for the first time. The song speaks to misfits and of desperation, themes as relevant to teens in 2022 as they were in 1985.
Running up that hill and going viral
The runaway resurgence of Bush’s 1985 classic could be a signal to film and TV producers to make clips more “TikTokable”.
Songs with short catchy hooks that are attached to eye-grabbing visual sequences in clips that are sixty, or better yet thirty, seconds maximum are more likely to be picked up on and shared on TikTok.
The chances of going viral can be improved by choosing classic chart-toppers that may find a revival among younger audiences. Naturally when a beloved artist is found by Gen-Z audiences, it leads to gatekeeping by longtime fans as well as counter-gatekeeping by fans who are thrilled to see a younger audience connecting with one of their favourite artists’ music.
Stranger Things is not the first to capitalise on the power of musical nostalgia. The success of films like Guardians of the Galaxy have proven to be powerful tools to give older a reprisal on the radio and popular charts. TikTok challenges and audio memes have helped catapult other classics back into vogue such as Harry Belafonte’s Jump in the Line, The Shangri-Las’s Leader of the Pack remixed into Oh No by Kreepa, and, of course, Fleetwood Mac’s Dreams.
TikTok is a music-centric platform. It takes advantage of musical innovations pioneered on earlier short video platforms, like Flipagram, Dubsmash, and Musical.ly. These platforms allowed users to draw from an internal library of popular songs, creatively add them to video creations, and use features like Duet to place themselves side-by-side their favourite artists.
Unlike streaming services like Apple Music or Spotify, users can take a more active and playful role interacting with music on TikTok.
As with other musical TikTok phenomena, Running Up That Hill might be more than a momentary flash in the pan. In 2020, TikTok claimed over 70 artists who first emerged on the platform had secured record deals an the Billboard charts now frequently feature songs that went viral.
Kate Bush being reserviced to radio, physically or digitally delivering music to radio stations by her label, is a significant development. In the past much money and influence has been involved in getting music onto the radio. For a song that has not received play for decades to spontaneously reappear is a “watershed moment” according to a Warner Music label executive. Despite the growth and dominance of streaming, radio still plays a pivotal role for curation and discover in music markets such as the US, Australia, and around the world.
Radio play brings songs like to those who might not use TikTok or haven’t gotten around to watching the new season of Stranger Things.
While much focus in the music industry has centred on how to make songs go viral on TikTok, labels and artists might want to reconsider the radio as the true measure of success for songs traveling through the pipeline from TV to TikTok to Top 40.
D. Bondy Valdovinos Kaye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Recently developed artificial intelligence (AI) models are capable of many impressive feats, including recognising images and producing human-like language. But just because AI can perform human-like behaviours doesn’t mean it can think or understand like humans.
As a researcher studying how humans understand and reason about the world, I think it’s important to emphasise the way AI systems “think” and learn is fundamentally different to how humans do – and we have a long way to go before AI can truly think like us.
Developments in AI have produced systems that can perform very human-like behaviours. The language model GPT-3 can produce text that’s often indistinguishable from human speech. Another model, PaLM, can produce explanations for jokes it has never seen before.
Most recently, a general-purpose AI known as Gato has been developed which can perform hundreds of tasks, including captioning images, answering questions, playing Atari video games, and even controlling a robot arm to stack blocks. And DALL-E is a system which has been trained to produce modified images and artwork from a text description.
These breakthroughs have led to some bold claims about the capability of such AI, and what it can tell us about human intelligence.
For example Nando de Freitas, a researcher at Google’s AI company DeepMind, argues scaling up existing models will be enough to produce human-level artificial intelligence. Others have echoed this view.
In all the excitement, it’s easy to assume human-like behaviour means human-like understanding. But there are several key differences between how AI and humans think and learn.
Neural nets vs the human brain
Most recent AI is built from artificial neural networks, or “neural nets” for short. The term “neural” is used because these networks are inspired by the human brain, in which billions of cells called neurons form complex webs of connections with one another, processing information as they fire signals back and forth.
Neural nets are a highly simplified version of the biology. A real neuron is replaced with a simple node, and the strength of the connection between nodes is represented by a single number called a “weight”.
With enough connected nodes stacked into enough layers, neural nets can be trained to recognise patterns and even “generalise” to stimuli that are similar (but not identical) to what they’ve seen before. Simply, generalisation refers to an AI system’s ability to take what it has learnt from certain data and apply it to new data.
Being able to identify features, recognise patterns, and generalise from results lies at the heart of the success of neural nets – and mimics techniques humans use for such tasks. Yet there are important differences.
Neural nets are typically trained by “supervised learning”. So they’re presented with many examples of an input and the desired output, and then gradually the connection weights are adjusted until the network “learns” to produce the desired output.
To learn a language task, a neural net may be presented with a sentence one word at a time, and will slowly learns to predict the next word in the sequence.
This is very different from how humans typically learn. Most human learning is “unsupervised”, which means we’re not explicitly told what the “right” response is for a given stimulus. We have to work this out ourselves.
For instance, children aren’t given instructions on how to speak, but learn this through a complex process of exposure to adult speech, imitation, and feedback.
Childrens’ learning is assisted by adults, but they’re not fed massive datasets the way AI systems are. Shutterstock
Another difference is the sheer scale of data used to train AI. The GPT-3 model was trained on 400 billion words, mostly taken from the internet. At a rate of 150 words per minute, it would take a human nearly 4,000 years to read this much text.
Such calculations show humans can’t possibly learn the same way AI does. We have to make more efficient use of smaller amounts of data.
Neural nets can learn in ways we can’t
An even more fundamental difference concerns the way neural nets learn. In order to match up a stimulus with a desired response, neural nets use an algorithm called “backpropagation” to pass errors backward through the network, allowing the weights to be adjusted in just the right way.
Some researchers have proposed variations of backpropagation could be used by the brain, but so far there is no evidence human brains can use such learning methods.
Instead, humans learn by making structured mental concepts, in which many different properties and associations are linked together. For instance, our concept of “banana” includes its shape, the colour yellow, knowledge of it being a fruit, how to hold it, and so forth.
As far as we know, AI systems do not form conceptual knowledge like this. They rely entirely on extracting complex statistical associations from their training data, and then applying these to similar contexts.
Efforts are underway to build AI that combines different types of input (such as images and text) – but it remains to be seen if this will be sufficient for these models to learn the same types of rich mental representations humans use to understand the world.
There’s still much we don’t know about how humans learn, understand and reason. However, what we do know indicates humans perform these tasks very differently to AI systems.
As such, many researchers believe we’ll need new approaches, and more fundamental insight into how the human brain works, before we can build machines that truly think and learn like humans.
James Fodor is a PhD candidate at the Brain, Mind & Markets Laboratory, Department of Finance, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne.
An indigenous legal challenge in a bid to annul the result of last December’s referendum on New Caledonia’s independence from France has failed.
The highest administrative court in Paris has rejected a claim by the Kanak customary Senate that the impact of the covid-19 pandemic was such that the referendum outcome was illegitimate.
More than 96 percent voted against independence in the third and last referendum under the Noumea Accord, but more than 56 percent of voters abstained.
The pro-independence parties had called for a boycott of the referendum after France had rejected pleas for the vote to be postponed until this year.
When the first community outbreak of the pandemic was recorded in September, a lockdown was imposed, which was extended into October, as thousands contracted the virus and hundreds needed hospital care.
The court in Paris found that the epidemiological situation had improved in October and November and that by the time of the referendum on December 12, more than 77 percent of the population had been vaccinated.
It also said the year-long mourning declared by the Kanak customary Senate in September was not such as to affect the sincerity of the vote.
No minimum turnout The court added that neither constitutional provisions nor the organic law make the validity of the vote conditional on a minimum turnout.
In the week before the referendum, 146 voters and three organisations filed an urgent submission to the same court, seeking to postpone the vote.
They said given the impact of the pandemic, it was “unthinkable” to proceed with such an important plebiscite.
They said because of the lockdown, campaigning had been unduly hampered as basic freedoms impinged.
However, the court rejected the challenge and voting went ahead as intended by the French government.
Rejecting the referendum outcome, the pro-independence side said apart from court action, it would seek to win the support for its position from the Pacific Islands Forum and the United Nations.
A pro-independence delegate to last month’s UN decolonisation meeting said French President Emmanuel Macron had declared after the referendum that New Caledonia showed it wanted to stay French although it was known that 90 percent of Kanaks wanted independence.
French Senate mission planned The French Senate is hearing experts this week as its law commission prepares work on a new statute for New Caledonia following last year’s rejection of independence.
The commission, which is chaired by François-Noel Buffet, has also formed a team that will travel to New Caledonia in two weeks for talks with all stakeholders.
The team is expected to stay for a week and complete its work by the end of July.
In December, more than 96 percent voted against independence in the third and last referendum under the Noumea Accord, which had been the decolonisation roadmap since 1998.
However, the pro-independence parties refuse to recognise the result, saying their abstention had rendered the outcome of the process illegitimate.
Paris plans to hold a referendum next June on a new statute for a New Caledonia within the French republic.
Buffet said his mission to Noumea was to consider the institutional situation by consolidating the dialogue initiated by the Matignon and Noumea Accords between France and New Caledonia.
Electoral rolls issue A key issue will be the fate of the electoral rolls.
The Noumea Accord, whose provisions have been enshrined in the French constitution, restricts voting rights to indigenous people and long-term residents.
Migration this century has added about 40,000 French citizens who remain excluded from referendums and from provincial elections.
The anti-independence parties want the rolls to be unfrozen, but the pro-independence side is strongly opposed to this.
It told the UN Decolonisation Committee that France’s intention to open the electoral rolls to French people who arrived after 1998 was the ultimate weapon to “drown” the Kanak people and “recolonise” New Caledonia.
It warned the Kanaks would be made to disappear, which would not be accepted but inevitably lead to conflict.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
A flurry of peaceful rallies and protests erupted in West Papua and Indonesia on Friday, June 3.
Papuan People’s Petition (PRP), the National Committee for West Papua (Komite Nasional Papua Barat-KNPB) and civil society groups and youth from West Papua marched in protest of Jakarta’s plan to create more provinces.
Thousands of protesters marched through the major cities and towns in each of West Papua’s seven regions, including Jayapura, Wamena, Paniai, Sorong, Timika/Mimika, Yahukimo, Lanny Jaya, Nabire, and Merauke.
As part of the massive demonstration, protests were organised in Indonesia’s major cities of West Java, Central Jakarta, Jogjakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, and Bali.
Demonstrators said Papuans wanted an independence referendum, not new provinces or special autonomy.
3/6/22 Wamena, West Papua
“Papua: freedom!” “Referendum: yes!”
Thousands of protestors are rejecting Jakarta’s arbitrary plan to create new provinces and Special Autonomy status. They are demanding an independence referendum. pic.twitter.com/QnxBu8egHp
— Veronica Koman 許愛茜 (@VeronicaKoman) June 3, 2022
According to Markus Haluk, one of the key coordinators of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), almost all Papuans took to the streets to show Jakarta and those who want to wipe out the Papuan people that they do not need special autonomy or new provinces.
[CW: blood]
This student protestor is the embodiment of West Papuan spirit. Indonesian forces beat him bloody but he will not be silenced.
— Veronica Koman 許愛茜 (@VeronicaKoman) June 3, 2022
Above is a text image that captures the spirit of the demonstrators. A young man is shown being beaten on the head and blood running down his face during a demonstration in Jayapura city of Papua on Friday.
The text urges Indonesia’s president Jokowi to be tagged on social media networks and calls for solidarity action.
Numerous protesters were arrested and beaten by Indonesian police during the demonstration.
Security forces brutalised demonstrators in the cities of Sorong, Jayapura, Yahukimo, Merauke, and elsewhere where demonstrations were held.
Hi Prof. Dr. MAHFUD….. where you get 82% people of West Papua supporting your government’s DOB and Otsus Jilid Il? Even in these pictures can tell you the real fact that 99, 99% of indigenous West Papuans REJECTED your DOB and the Otonomi Jilid Il. pic.twitter.com/e9SS1QTi71
An elderly mother is seen been beaten on the head during the demonstration in Sorong. Tweet: West Papua Sun
People who are beaten and arrested are treated inhumanely and are not followed up with proper care, nor justice, in one of Asia-Pacific’s most heavily militarised areas.
Among those injured in Sorong, these people have been named Aves Susim (25), Sriyani Wanene (30), Mama Rita Tenau (50), Betty Kosamah (22), Agus Edoway (25), Kamat (27), Subi Taplo (23), Amanda Yumte (23), Jack Asmuru (20), and Sonya Korain (22).
Root of the protests in the 1960s The protests and rallies are not merely random riots, or protests against government corruption or even pay raises. The campaign is part of decades-old protests that have been carried out against what the Papuans consider to be an Indonesian invasion since the 1960s.
The Indonesian government claims West Papua’s fate was sealed with Indonesia after a United Nations-organised 1969 referendum, known as the Pepera or Act of Free Choice, something Papuans consider a sham and an Act of No Choice.
In spite of Indonesia’s claim, the Indonesian invasion of West Papua began in 1963, long before the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969.
It was well documented that the 1025 Papuan elders who voted for Indonesian occupancy in 1969 were handpicked at gunpoint.
In the six years between 1963 and 1969, Indonesian security forces tortured and beat these elders into submission before the vote in 1969 began.
Friday’s protesters were not merely protesting against Jakarta’s draconian policy of drawing yet another arbitrary line through Papuan ancestral territory, but also against Indonesia’s illegal occupation.
The Papuans accuse Jakarta of imposing laws, policies, and programmes that affect Papuans living in West Papua, while it is illegally occupying the territory.
Papuans will protest indefinitely until the root cause is addressed. On the other hand, the Indonesian government seems to care little about what the Papuans actually want or think.
Markus Haluk said Indonesia did not view Papuans as human beings equal to that of Indonesians, and this mades them believe that what Papuans want and think, or how Jakarta’s policy may affect Papuans, had no value.
Jakarta, he continued, will do whatever it wants, however, it wishes, and whenever it wishes in regard to West Papua. In light of this sharp perceptual contrast, the relationship between Papuans and the Indonesian government has almost reached a dead end.
Fatal disconnect The Lowy Institute, Australia’s leading think-tank, published an article entitled What is at stake with new provinces in West Papua? on 28 April 2022 that identifies some of the most critical terminology regarding this dead-end protracted conflict — one of which is “fatal disconnect”.
The conclusion of the article stated, “On a general level, this means that there is a fatal disconnect between how the Indonesian government view their treatment of the region, and how the people actually affected by such treatment see the arrangement.”
It is this fatal disconnect that has brought these two states — Papua and Indonesia — to a point of no return. Two states are engaged in a relationship that has been disconnected since the very beginning, which has led to so many fatalities.
The author of the article, Eduard Lazarus, a Jakarta-based journalist and editor covering media and social movements, wrote:
That so many indigenous West Papuans expressed their disdain against renewing the Special Autonomy status … is a sign that something has gone horribly wrong.
The tragedy of this irreconcilable relationship is that Jakarta does not reflect on its actions and is willfully ignorant of how its rhetoric and behaviour in dealing with West Papua has caused such human tragedy and devastation spanning generations.
The way that Jakarta’s leaders talk about their “rescue” plans for West Papua displays this fatal disconnect.
KOMPAS.com reported on June 2 that Vice-President Ma’ruf Amin had asked Indonesian security forces to use a “humanist approach” in Papua rather than violence.
Ma’ruf expressed this view also in a virtual speech made at the Declaration of Papua Peace event organised by the Papuan Indigenous Peoples Institute on June 6.
In a press release, Ma’ruf said he had instructed the combined military and police officials to use a humanist approach, prioritise dialogical efforts, and refrain from violence.
Ma’ruf believes that conducive security conditions are essential to Papua’s development, and that the government aims to promote peace and unity in Papua through various policies and regulations.
The Papua Special Autonomy Law, he continued, regulates the transfer of power from provinces to regencies and cities, as well as increasing the percentage of Papua Special Autonomy Funds transferred to 2.25 percent of the National General Allocation Fund.
Additionally, according to the Vice-President, the government is drafting a presidential regulation regarding a Papuan Development Acceleration Master Plan (RIPPP) and establishing the Papuan Special Autonomy Development Acceleration Steering Agency (BP3OKP) directly headed by Ma’ruf himself.
He also underscored the importance of a collaboration between all parties, including indigenous Papuans. Ma’ruf believes that Papua’s development will speed up soon since the traditional leaders and all members of the Indigenous Papuan Council are willing to work together and actively participate in building the Land of Papua.
Indonesia’s new military commander
General Andika Perkasa. Image: File
Recently, Indonesia’s newly appointed Commander of Armed Forces, General Andika Perkasa, proposed a novel, humanistic approach to handling political conflict in West Papua.
Instead of removing armed combatants with gunfire, he has vowed to use “territorial development operations” to resolve the conflict. In these operations, personnel will conduct medical, educational, and infrastructure-building missions to establish a rapport with Papuan communities in an effort to steer them away from the independence movement.
In order to accomplish Perkasa’s plans, the military will have to station a large number of troops in West Papua in addition to the troops currently present.
When listening to these two countries’ top leaders, they appear full of optimism in the words and new plans they describe.
But the reality behind these words is something else entirely. There is, as concluded by Eduard Lazarus, a fatal disconnect between West Papuan and Jakarta’s policymakers, but Jakarta is unable to recognise it.
Jakarta seems to suffer from cognitive dissonance or cognitive disconnect when dealing with West Papua — a lack of harmony between its heart, words, and actions.
Cognitive dissonance is, by definition, a behavioural dysfunction with inconsistency in which the personal beliefs held, what has been said, and what has been done contradict each other.
Vice-chair of Papuan People’s Representative Council Yunus Wonda. Image: File
This contradiction, according to Yunus Wonda, deputy chair of the Papuan People’s Representative Council, occurs when the government changes the law and modifies and amends it as they see fit.
What is written, what is practised, and what is in the heart do not match. Papuans suffer greatly because of this, according to Yunus Wonda.
Mismanagement of a fatalistic nature Jakarta continues to mismanage West Papua with fatalistic inconsistent policies, which, according to the article, “might already have soured” to an irreparable degree.
The humanist approach now appears to be another code in Indonesia’s gift package, delivered to the Papuans as a Trojan horse.
The words of Indonesia’s Vice-President and the head of its Armed Forces are like a band aid with a different colour trying to cover an old wound that has barely healed.
According to Wonda, the creation of new provinces is like trying to put the smoke out while the fire is still burning.
Jakarta had already tried to bandage those old wounds with the so-called “Special Autonomy” 20 years ago. The Autonomy gift was granted not out of goodwill, but out of fear of Papuan demands for independence.
However, Jakarta ended up making a big mess of it.
The same rhetoric is also seen here in the statement of the Vice-President. Even though the semantic choices and construction themselves seem so appealing, this language does not translate into reality in the field.
This is the problem — something has gone very wrong, and Jakarta isn’t willing to find out what it is. Instead, it keeps imposing its will on West Papua.
Jakarta keeps preaching the gospel of development, prosperity, peace, and security but does not ask what Papuans want.
The 2001 Special Autonomy Law was supposed to allow Papuans to have greater power over their fate, which included 79 articles designed to protect their land and culture.
Furthermore, under this law, one important institution, the Papuan People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua-MRP), together with provincial governments and the Papuan People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua-DPRP), was given the authority to deal with matters that are most important to them, such as land, population control, cultural identity, and symbols.
Section B of the introduction part of the Special Autonomy law contains the following significant provisions:
That the Papua community is God’s creation and is a part of a civilised people, who hold high human rights, religious values, democracy, law and cultural values in the adat (customary) law community and who have the right to fairly enjoy the results of development.
Three weeks after these words were written into law, popular independence leader Theys H. Eluay was killed by Indonesian special forces (Kopassus). Ryamizard Ryacudu, then-army chief-of-staff, who in 2014 became Jokowi’s first Defence Minister, later called the killers “heroes” (Tempo.co, August 19, 2003).
In 2003, the Megawati Soekarnoputri government divided the province into two, violating a provision of the Special Autonomy Law, which was based on the idea that Papua remains a single territory. As prescribed by law, any division would need to be approved by the Papuan provincial legislature and MRP.
Over the 20 years since the Autonomy gift was granted, Jakarta has violated and undermined any legal and political framework it agreed to or established to engage with Papuans.
Governor Lukas Enembe … not enough resources to run the five new provinces being created in West Papua. Image: West Papua Today
Papuan Indigenous leaders reject Jakarta’s band aid On May 27, Governor Lukas Enembe of the settler province of Papua, told Reuters there were not enough resources to run new provinces and that Papuans were not properly consulted.
As the governor, direct representative of the central government, Enembe was not even consulted about the creation of new provinces.
Yunus Wonda and Timotius Murid, two Indigenous Papuan leaders entrusted to safeguard the Papuan people and their culture and customary land under two important institutions — the Papuan People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua-MRP) and People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua-DPRP) — were not consulted about the plans.
Making matters worse, Jakarta stripped them of any powers they had under the previous autonomous status, which set the precedent for Jakarta to amend the previous autonomous status law in 2021.
This amendment enables Jakarta to create new provinces.
The aspirations and wishes of the Papuan people were supposed to be channelled through these two institutions and the provincial government, but Jakarta promptly shut down all avenues that would enable Papuans to have their voices heard.
Governor Enembe faces constant threats, terrorism Governor Enembe has also been terrorised and intimidated by unknown parties over the past couple of years. He said, “I am an elected governor of Indonesia, but I am facing these constant threats and terror. What about my people? They are not safe.”
This is an existential war between the state of Papua and the state of Indonesia. We need to ask not only what is at stake with the new provinces in West Papua, but also, what is at stake in West Papua under Indonesia’s settler-colonial rule?
Four critical existential issues facing West Papua There are four main components of Papuan culture at stake in West Papua under Indonesia’s settler-colonial rule:
1. Papuan humans 2. Papuan languages 3. Papuan oral cultural knowledge system 4. Papuan ancestral land and ecology
Papua’s identity was supposed to be protected by the Special Autonomy Law 2001.
However, Jakarta has shown no interest or intention in protecting these four existential components. Indonesia continues to amend, create, and pass laws to create more settler-colonial provincial spaces that threaten Papuans.
The end goal isn’t to provide welfare to Papuans or protect them, but to create settlers’ colonial areas so that new settlers — whether it be soldiers, criminal thugs, opportunists, poor improvised Indonesian immigrants, or colonial administrators — can fill those new spaces.
Jakarta is, unfortunately, turning these newly created spaces into new battlegrounds between clans, tribes, highlanders, coastal people, Papua province, West Papua province, families, and friends, as well as between Papuans and immigrants.
Media outlets in Indonesia are manipulating public opinion by portraying one leader as a proponent of Jakarta’s plan and the other as its opponent, further fuelling tension between leaders in Papua.
Yamin Kogoya is a West Papuan academic who has a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University and who contributes to Asia Pacific Report. From the Lani tribe in the Papuan Highlands, he is currently living in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.
Good news, Australia – the environment is back. Our new government has introduced a new super-department covering climate change, energy, the environment and water.
But while the ministry move sounds great in theory, it’s risky in practice. Having one super-department supporting two ministers – Tanya Plibersek in environment and water, and Chris Bowen for climate change and energy – is likely to stretch the public service too far.
If a policy area is important enough to warrant its own cabinet minister, it also warrants a dedicated secretary and department. This is especially true for the shrunken environment department, which has to rebuild staff and know-how after having over a third of its budget slashed in the early Coalition years.
Supporting two cabinet ministers stretches department secretaries too thinly. It makes it hard for them to engage in the kind of deep policy development we need in such a difficult and fast-moving policy environment.
What are the politics behind this move?
Tanya Plibersek’s appointment last week as minister for the environment and water was the surprise of the new ministerial lineup.
Even if Plibersek’s move from education in opposition to environment in government was a political demotion for her, as some have suggested, placing the environment portfolio in the hands of someone so senior and well-regarded is a boon for the environment.
Having the environment in the broadest sense represented in Cabinet by two experienced and capable ministers is doubly welcome. It signifies a return to the main stage for our ailing natural world after years of relative neglect under the Coalition government.
It also makes good political sense, given the significant electoral gains made by the Greens on Labor’s left flank. While ‘climate’ rather than ‘environment’ was the word on everybody’s lips, other major environmental issues need urgent attention. Threatened species and declining biodiversity are only one disaster or controversy away from high political urgency.
When released at last, the 2021 State of the Environment Report will make environmental bad news public. Former environment minister Sussan Ley sat on the report for five months, leaving it for her successor to release it.
Now comes the avalanche of policy
Both ministers have a packed policy agenda, courtesy of Labor’s last minute commitment to creating an environmental protection agency, as well as responding to the urgent calls for change in the sweeping [2020 review] of Australia’s national environmental law (https://epbcactreview.environment.gov.au/resources/final-report).
That’s not half of it. Bowen is also tasked with delivering the government’s high-profile 43% emissions cuts within eight years, which includes the Rewiring the Nation effort to modernise our grid. He will also lead Australia’s bid to host the world’s climate summit, COP29, in 2024, alongside Pacific countries.
Plibersek also has to tackle major water reforms in the Murray Darling basin and develop new Indigenous heritage laws to respond to the parliamentary inquiry into the destruction of ancient rock art site Juukan Gorge by Rio Tinto.
Can one big department cope with this workload?
Creating a super-department is a bad idea. That’s because the agenda for both ministers is large and challenging. It will be a nightmare job for the department secretary tasked with supporting two ministers. It’s no comfort that the problem will be worse elsewhere, with the infrastructure department supporting four cabinet ministers.
Giving departmental secretaries wide responsibilities crossing lines of ministerial responsibility encourages them to reconcile policy tensions internally rather than putting them up to ministers, as they should.
The tension between large renewable energy projects and threatened species is a prime example of what can go wrong. Last year, environment minister Sussan Ley ruled a $50 billion renewable megaproject in the Pilbara could not proceed because of ‘clearly unacceptable’ impacts on internationally recognised wetlands south of Broome.
Ley’s ‘clearly unacceptable’ finding stopped the project at the first environmental hurdle. That’s despite the fact the very same project was awarded ‘major project’ status by the federal government in 2020.
The problem here is what might have been the right answer on a narrow environmental basis was the wrong answer more broadly.
If Australia is to achieve its potential as a clean energy superpower and as other renewable energy megaprojects move forward, we will need more sophisticated ways of avoiding such conflicts. This will require resolution of deep policy tensions – and that’s best done between ministers rather than between duelling deputy secretaries.
Super-departments also struggle to maintain coherence across the different programs they run. While large departments bring economies of scale, these benefits are more than offset by coordination and culture issues.
An early task for Glyn Davis, the new head of the prime minister’s department, will be to recommend a secretary for this new super-department of climate change, energy, the environment and water. In addition to the ability to absorb a punishing workload, the successful appointee will need high level juggling skills to support Plibersek and Bowen simultaneously.
Ironically, in dividing time between two ministers, she or he will be the least able to accept Plibersek’s call for staff of her new department to be ‘all in’ in turning her decisions into action.
Peter Burnett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
“Chronic conditions” and “disability” are not just words. They can determine the funding and supports we can access, how we’re treated and how we feel about ourselves.
For population data purposes, disability is defined as a limitation or impairment lasting at least six months that impacts everyday activities. Using this definition, 18% of Australians have a disability. But nearly half of all Australians (47%) have at least one chronic condition that restricts ability, and 19% have two or more.
Although definitions serve an important administrative purpose, they can also be misleading, discriminatory, dehumanising, distressing, and even dangerous. They oversimplify complex issues with significant ramifications.
It turns out people do not fit neatly into categories – but these boxes can determine who receives support and who does not.
What’s the difference?
Chronic conditions are long-lasting health issues with persistent impacts that are likely to worsen over time.
They are not immediately life-threatening, but they are a leading cause of premature death. The management of chronic conditions typically rests with state and territory health systems and general practice funded via Medicare.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme was implemented in 2013 to address serious disability, which they define as as a permanent and medically diagnosed impairment that substantially reduces what a person can do.
Physical and psychological injury – which may or may not result in permanent disability – is addressed through state and territory schemes such as the National Injury Insurance Scheme, Transport Accident Commission and Workcover. These injury schemes focus on loss of economic capacity (or earning potential) and provide the supports needed for a person to recover to their most productive state.
People may also hold private health insurance, which they can use to fund preventative or therapeutic services.
It sounds like a comprehensive system that should address everyone’s needs. But schemes don’t always match up, and eligibility gaps can raise insurmountable challenges. In extreme cases, the gaps can mean the difference between life and death.
Ironically, disability definitions that are meant to help can promote harmful stereotypes and low expectations by incentivising “deficit models” of thinking that focus on what a person can’t do, rather than what they can do.
The physical and social barriers that exclude people from society affect all people with impairments, whether they are labelled as chronic conditions or disability.
The reality for many Australians is there is no clear distinction between the two labels and, in fact, they often co-exist. Chronic conditions can result in disability and disability can increase vulnerability to a range of chronic conditions.
Separate definitions lead to misunderstandings about the reality of impairment in Australia, leaving us poorly prepared to manage its consequences.
If we consider common impairments that are rarely labelled as disability (deafness, visual decline, allergy, and chronic pain), then a massive 79% of Australians experience impairment. So, it makes little sense to refer to, and plan for, this population as though it is a minority.
Doing so promotes the marginalisation of disability and reduces any real pressure to redesign the way we support and engage with all members of our society.
People are messy
Even the most tangible aspect of these definitions – permanence – is not consistently or clearly determined.
People are not labels, but systems find that hard to absorb. Getty/Jessie Casson
In the NDIS, the disability label can only be applied to people who are under 65 years, but where does that leave the 50% of over 65s with disability? They contend with the Aged Care system and its equally complex criteria.
As a participant in the Dignity Project, a disability citizen science initiative, said:
[…] my age makes my disability invisible. I don’t have the same rights as under 65s.
The way in which disability occurs (and when) seems to determine how “deserving” an individual is of services – but this is not just and equitable.
Forcing people into categories removes humanity – but these are people whose lives have been affected by impairment, illness or trauma. The use of labels belittles people, dehumanises their experiences and homogenises their unique needs, interests, and sociocultural circumstances.
Our understanding of disability should be underpinned by the desire for everyone to enjoy dignified and personally meaningful lives. To achieve this, we need to harmonise definitions and build a deliberately inclusive society that can accommodate everyone.
We need to de-emphasise prescribed differences, join up fragmented systems and focus on universal design, while simultaneously acknowledging each person’s context, nature and needs.
Angel Dixon: ‘It’s really important for the people with lived experience, of our experiences, to be involved and help researchers without disability’.
Kelsey Chapman receives funding from The Motor Accident Insurance Commission, The Department of Transport and Main Roads, and the Gold Coast Hospital Collaborative Grant Scheme.
Connie Allen, Elizabeth Kendall, and Maretta Mann do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Greens supporters celebrate on election night. James Ross/AAP
The 2022 federal election saw a significant move away from the two major parties, with a host of independent and Greens candidates taking seats from Labor and the Coalition.
Amid predictions about a “youthquake” before May 21, what role did young voters play in this radical electoral shift? And how important could they be by the next election?
The trend was there
Even before the election, researchers had noted major differences between younger and older voters.
Long-term voting patterns showed Labor was more likely to attract young voters. But surveys also showed how both the major parties have been losing their youth vote to the Greens.
Younger voters were trending away from the major parties before the 2022 poll. Dean Lewins/AAP
As the Australian Election Study found after the 2019 election, 42% of voters under 24 did not vote for Labor or the Coalition. Of those aged 25 to 34, 35% did not vote for Labor or the Coalition. This compares to just 12% of those aged over 65.
We also know younger voters were more concerned about environmental issues and property prices than older voters. None of these were adequately addressed during the last term of parliament, which was marred by frightening bushfires, heat waves and floods, and saw inadequate action on climate change and rising intergenerational inequality.
So it is not surprising that electorates with the highest rate of voters under 30 saw unprecedented support for Greens in 2022. An analysis of AEC enrolment data shows seats with four of the top five highest proportions of young voters (18-29 year-olds) went to the Greens. This includes:
Melbourne with a youth vote of 26.9% (Greens retain)
Brisbane with a youth vote of 25.7% (Greens gain from the Liberal Party)
Griffith with a youth vote of 24.7% (Greens gain from Labor)
Ryan with a youth vote of 22.5% (Greens gain from the Liberal Party)
Also in the top five was the seat of Canberra with a youth vote of 23.1%. This was an easy Labor retain. However, here the Greens primary vote was almost 25% and the Greens, not the Liberal Party, were used for the two-party-preferred calculations.
There were also a relatively high rate of youth enrolment in key seats likes Kooyong (20.8%, independent gain from Liberals) and Fowler (19.5%, independent gain from Labor). There were other Liberal-turned-teal seats with a relatively lower proportion of youth voters (Curtin 17.7%, Wentworth 17.1%, Goldstein 16.3%, North Sydney 16.3% and Mackellar 15.6%). But it is important to acknowledge the women’s vote may have been a stronger driving force in these seats.
So, what does this mean electorally going forward?
The big debate about young voters
Leading up to the election there was a lot of speculation about young people’s voting behaviour. As other countries recorded a worrying decline in youth electoral participation, I argued young Australians are different.
Still, there was concern the backdrop of COVID suffering, economic inequality, climate inaction and decaying trust in political leaders would culminate in youth political disengagement. Clearly, this did not happen.
Parties and politicians now are on notice
The election shows how the centre of gravity of Australian politics has shifted. The various swings away from the major parties revealed just how discerning voters can be. It also showed voters are likely to act based on policy concerns, rather than political allegiances.
The oldest millennial voters were 42 at this election, while first-time voters of 18 years of age included members of Generation Z. So, some of this can be attributed to generational replacement as the polls populate with more progressive, apartisan younger voters.
Ahead of the election, there were fears young people would disengage with voting. Dean Lewins/AAP
This trend is only going to increase. A basic analysis of current enrolments, plus expected future enrolments suggests that by the next election, millennial voters and younger (those under 45) will make up about 44% of the voting population. This is similar to this election – where they made up 43% – but significantly up from ten or 20 years ago. That means what we consider to be younger generations are replacing their older counterparts – and their more conservative values – over time in the electorate.
The 2022 election also sends a crucial political signal to the younger voters. The results show them the power of their actions to affect change in Australia’s democracy – and that the vote, in an aggregate sense, is an effective tool to do so. The 2022 federal election was one to restore young people’s hope and faith in the Australian democratic system.
Major parties need to acknowledge that younger voters do not like what they are offering, especially in response to climate change. If Labor is hoping to woo them back in 2025, it is interesting that “Minister for Youth” is not a cabinet position.
In the lead-up to their electoral success, the Greens worked hard in Brisbane – courting voters with young, personable candidates who went door-to-door to speak to voters directly. But they need to keep working. The Greens and teal victories were a virtue of issue-based voters, who will be watching whether these new MPs make change in Canberra.
Young voters in Australia can no longer be ignored.
Intifar Chowdhury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
By age 44, endometriosis affects around one in nine women and people assigned female at birth in Australia.
It’s caused by the presence of tissue similar to the lining of the uterus found outside the uterus. While endometriosis is most commonly found in the pelvic cavity, it can sometimes be found in the diaphragm, lungs and elsewhere.
Symptoms include severe period pain, pain below the belly button when not menstruating, fatigue, digestive problems (often mistaken for irritable bowel syndrome), pain with bowel motions and/or urination, painful intercourse, and infertility.
It previously took, on average, 6.4–8 years for endometriosis to be diagnosed with surgery. But with doctors now able to give a clinical diagnosis of “suspected endometriosis” based on symptoms and a physical examination, the time to diagnosis is likely to reduce.
The most common surgical procedure for endometriosis is laparoscopy (or key-hole surgery). A thin telescope (called a laparoscope) is inserted into the belly button to see and access the organs inside the abdomen and pelvis.
Ideally, when the surgeon sees abnormal tissue during the procedure, they biopsy or remove a sample and send it to a lab. The pathologist then looks for endometrial-like cells under a microscope to provide confirmation of endometriosis. Occasionally, what a surgeon sees is not confirmed to be endometriosis but something else or normal tissue.
Sometimes endo will be diagnosed and treated in the same surgery, but this isn’t always the case. Shutterstock
The endometriosis might be fully treated during that same diagnostic surgical procedure, or it might be incompletely treated or not treated at all. This depends on the extent of the endometriosis and the surgical skill of the surgeon, among other things.
However surgery is a very expensive way to achieve a diagnosis, both for the patient and the health system.
Laparoscopic surgery also comes with the risks of infection, major bleeding, and injury to important structures like the bowels or bladder. Recovery takes about four weeks.
How is the diagnostic process changing?
Some experts have argued surgery shouldn’t be used as a diagnostic test. This has prompted a move in recent years towards a “clinical diagnosis”, where a doctor makes an assessment based on symptoms and/or abnormal findings during a physical examination.
For most people, endometriosis symptoms begin with cyclical pain with their periods. That pain process evolves and pain can exist every day, with bowel motions or urination (often worse during the period), and during intercourse.
On physical examination, the doctor can sometimes feel endometriosis nodules in the vagina with the tips of their fingers. The lack of movement of the uterus as the doctor tries to move it with two hands may also raise suspicion, as can tenderness during this examination.
There are some drawbacks to clinical diagnosis. Most notably, the wrong diagnosis may lead a person down an incorrect treatment plan, inevitably delaying treatment for the true diagnosis.
People who receive a clinical diagnosis may also feel less able to access surgery, if that’s their preferred treatment, as a clinical diagnosis usually prioritises hormonal medications and other drug treatments in place of or before surgery.
Imaging techniques
Over the past five to ten years, there has been an increasing ability to “see” endometriosis using imaging such as transvaginal ultrasound (an internal scan where the ultrasound wand is inserted into the vagina) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).
Diagnosing endometriosis through medical imaging is gaining popularity because it allows doctors and patients to understand the diagnosis and extent of the endometriosis without having to perform surgery.
Some endometriosis can be see on MRIs. Shutterstock
The ability to see endometriosis relies heavily on the expertise of the person doing and interpreting the imaging test, just as seeing endometriosis at surgery relies on the expertise of the surgeon.
Not all types of endometriosis are yet reliably seen on an imaging test. For example, severe endometriosis with deep nodules and adhesions (bands of scarring which can attach to other organs) is easier to see than superficial endometriosis, which sometimes consists of a few deposits no larger than a few millimetres.
If the imaging is done by someone with expertise, it is generally possible to “rule out” moderate to severe endometriosis but minimal to mild disease may not be detected.
Ideally, an imaging-based diagnosis should eliminate the need to have a two-step surgery (diagnostic surgery followed by treatment surgery), as the surgeon has a better understanding of the location and extent of the disease before starting the first surgery. This increases the likelihood of success with a single treatment surgery.
However, there are legitimate concerns that a move to use an imaging-based diagnosis will leave those with a “normal scan” falsely reassured because the disease is not visible on the scan. So, doctors should never tell someone they don’t have endometriosis based on an imaging test alone.
Mike Armour is the chair of the Endometriosis Australia research committee. He reports receiving funding from Metagenics, Canopy Growth, and Sci-Chem, outside the submitted work.
Cecilia Ng receives funding from the Medical Research Future Fund (MRFF).
ML reports receiving grant funding from OZWAC, Endometriosis Australia, AbbVie, CanSAGE, MRFF, HHS; honoraria for lectures/writing from GE Healthcare, Bayer, AbbVie, TerSera, consulting fees from Imagendo, outside the submitted work.
When COVID forced Melburnians to isolate during large parts of 2020 and 2021, many took the opportunity to walk around parks, creeks or remnant bush.
In your walks, you may have noticed the wonderful and diverse range of fungal fruiting bodies on display. Victoria’s display of puff balls, bracket fungi and fairy rings has been nothing short of splendid.
The fun’s not over, either. This year has been a particularly good one for fungus too, and here’s why. As you may recall, the harsh 2019-20 summer dried our soils, stressed much of our vegetation and led to major bushfires. In 2021, this switched abruptly to one of the wettest starts to a year on record in many places, courtesy of the La Niña climate pattern.
With the rains, the weather became ideal for fungal reproduction. We had warm, very moist soils and lovely warm and sunny autumnal days, perfect for fungi to send up their reproductive structures (you might know these as mushrooms and toadstools) and spread their spores. Conditions this good may not occur again for years so seize the opportunity to see them.
Puffball mushrooms emit a cloud of spores into the air when stepped on. Shutterstock
What you can see in a walk in the park
Fungi are not just for adults. Oh no! They can entertain children for hours.
In 2020, our family group took a walk in Brimbank Park, in Melbourne’s northwest. The five year old leader waved his lucky stick/sword/wand in the air as we entered, declaring, “today we hunt fungus!” He was still doing so two hours later, closely followed by his younger brother.
Their first findings were puff balls, some brown and others like little white pebbles. If you squeeze these puff balls, a fine dust of spores can emerge like a mist. You don’t want to breathe them in but at a distance they are mostly harmless.
We spotted some like ordinary field mushrooms, but when you scratched their light tan surface a bright yellow colour emerged. If you were to eat these yellow-staining mushrooms you would be sick and potentially seriously ill. Some contain very powerful toxins and can prove to be deadly if eaten. Unless you know exactly what fungus you have, don’t even think of eating them. It’s advisable to wash hands well after handling any kind of fungi.
Yellow-staining mushrooms are the most common cause of mushroom poisoning in Australia, given their resemblance to field mushrooms. Shutterstock
Spores are the means by which fungi reproduce themselves. Most are tiny but they can be dry like powder, damp and sticky, dull or brightly coloured, plain or ornately decorated and sometimes quite smelly. The dry spores can easily be dispersed by even a gentle breeze, but the sticky ones often adhere to an unsuspecting passer-by such as a bird, rabbit, dog or human sock.
We gave the little ones extra points if they looked at the fungus but left it intact, even if they couldn’t resist giving one or two a poke. Their next discovery gained even more points because you had to look up: it was a bracket fungus growing on a dead branch. Some of these are snowy white, but others are yellow or bright orange, almost like traffic lights. Some have an almost velvety outer texture while others appear to be made of woody rings like the tree upon which they are growing.
On dead trees, bracket fungi have the role of recycling old dead wood. Some don’t even wait until the tree dies. They gain access to the old wood at the tree’s centre and begin the decay process while the tree is still living. The fruiting bodies of these fungi look like little shelves on the trunk of the tree and can persist for decades. On some trees, multiple brackets form a veritable stairway to heaven. If you have a large bracket fungus on a large old branch or tree, it’s a good idea to get arboricultural advice about the safety of the tree.
Fairy rings, basket fungus and symbiotic relationships
Our little posse of fungal hunters had travelled 100 metres into the park, but in the zigzag pattern of explorers, it had taken us an hour. A brown dried star-like structure was revealed as a dried puff ball, its spores well and truly blown and what was once a ball had peeled back as it dried into a near perfect star. In a section of mown grass, we come across the delicate mushrooms of a fairy ring. Excitement ensues.
Why is it a ring?
Where are the fairies?
Can you eat them?
Not the fairies, the mushrooms!
The fairies of course heard us coming and so they are hiding.
No, you can’t eat them because they might be poisonous and make you sick.
Fairy rings form into a circle because they came from a single starting point and expanded outward from the centre at more or less the same rate.
Fairy rings of mushrooms come from a common source. Shutterstock
Is that a pebble? No it’s a fungus doing a brilliant impression of a pebble. We were camouflage experts now, and it couldn’t hide from us. Then a squeal. What is that? A soccer ball? No, old plastic. No, a dome. It’s a magnificent white basket fungus shaped like an intricate geodesic sphere. We left it for others to discover. With the mighty stick/sword/wand high in the air, we head for home.
Fungi are always there in our soils. Their fine thread structures, called hyphae, lie underfoot all year, but their fruiting bodies only appear under the right conditions. Many of these fungi entwine around the roots of specific plants and in many cases into the plant root cells themselves. The fungus offers water and nutrients to the plants and in return the plants give the fungus some of the carbohydrates they produce from photosynthesis. It’s a marvellously beneficial relationship.
The smooth cage stinkhorn (Ileodictyon gracile) has a fruiting body like a geodesic dome. Michael Jefferies/Flickr, CC BY
We went a-hunting several more times, and the young ones never tired of the sport. Interacting closely with plants and fungi meets basic physical, mental and psychological needs hailing back to our early travel through natural ecosystems.
Finding and poring over plants and fungi engages all our senses – sight, hearing, smell, touch – and for experts only, taste. It’s no wonder all of us in the hunt feel the better for this purposeful forest bathing.
Spotting fungi above ground is a rare treat. If the weather gets too chilly, or if La Niña gives way to hot and dry El Niño, the fungi will vanish. But if we get a mild, wet winter, the fungal season can just roll on. That’s the thing about fungi, you can never be sure. They play by their own rules.
Gregory Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In general, taking this time to get policy right and build support for it is a good approach. But when current policy is causing problems and lacks significant support there is a case for acting more quickly. This is the situation with the previous government’s Job-ready Graduates student funding policy enacted in late 2020.
Job-ready Graduates imposes unfair HELP debts on some students, adds to the government’s costs of running the HELP loan scheme, and distorts university incentives in distributing student places between courses.
The government sets Commonwealth contributions, which vary by academic discipline. The government pays universities according to their enrolments up to a capped total grant amount.
Universities set student contributions up to a legal maximum, which also varies by discipline. Universities are paid directly by students or through HECS-HELP loans. Total student contribution revenue is not capped.
Once universities reach their maximum Commonwealth contribution grant they can still increase enrolments, but on student contribution revenue only. These extra students are called “over-enrolments”. Historically, over-enrolments have been an important source of flexibility in meeting student demand.
In its basic architecture, Job-ready Graduates has similarities with previous funding policies, other than the demand-driven system, which uncapped both Commonwealth and student contributions.
Where Job-ready Graduates differs is in the setting of Commonwealth and student contributions.
Job-ready Graduates increases student places by keeping total university grants at roughly the same level but reducing the average Commonwealth contribution. Universities need to deliver more student places for each million dollars in public funding.
Labor has already promised a small, and possibly temporary, increase in total Commonwealth contribution funding. Given the government’s overall budget position, a significant increase per student may not be feasible.
For universities, increases in student contributions at least partly offset reductions in Commonwealth contributions under Job-ready Graduates.
Student contributions changed radically
The most radical element of Job-ready Graduates was a further change to student contributions. Before this policy took effect, a mix of assumed private financial benefits and course costs explained student contribution levels by discipline. The price gap between the cheapest and most expensive discipline was about $4,500 a year.
Job-ready Graduates abandoned this system. Instead, it uses student contributions to manipulate student demand.
In nursing and teaching, “job-ready” courses the previous government favoured, student contributions were cut by about $2,700 a year. In disfavoured courses they went up. The biggest increases of $7,800 a year were in humanities other than languages.
The gap between the cheapest and most expensive course more than doubled, to $10,550 a year.
Higher or lower Commonwealth contributions partly offset these changes to student contributions, so overall funding rates changed by less than the student contribution levels.
The Job-ready Graduates assumption that students would respond to these price signals and change enrolment patterns was never sound. Course preferences still depend on student interests. For financially motivated students, differences in job and salary prospects are also more significant than how much they pay for their course.
Job-ready Graduates annually shuffles hundreds of millions of dollars in HELP debt between students. Some students, like those in nursing or teaching, will owe less than previously and repay their debt earlier.
Others, like those taking humanities courses, will owe much more and keep repaying for years longer than before. Some may never fully repay their HELP debt.
While HELP is designed to allow slow or incomplete repayment, this should reflect varying individual circumstances. It is not sensible or fair to assign repayment periods and risks based on course choices.
Slow or no repayment increases the cost of HELP to the government. This is not prudent when it already faces large budget deficits.
The system also affects the economics of over-enrolment.
In fields such as arts, law or business, the student contribution covers more than 90% of the maximum revenue a university could get per student. These fields are close to a de facto demand-driven system, with only minor financial constraints on increased enrolments for universities already earning their maximum Commonwealth grant.
In fields such as education and nursing, less than 25% of maximum per student revenue comes from the student. Over-enrolments in these fields are almost certainly loss-making, creating a deterrent to accepting more students.
How can this system be fixed?
To fix the system we need student and Commonwealth contributions that vary within a narrower range.
This change can be close to budget-neutral. Course that are too expensive, relative to other fields, would have student contributions decreased and Commonwealth contributions increased. Courses that are too cheap would have student contributions increased and Commonwealth contributions decreased.
Estimates of 2022 enrolments could be used to ensure contribution increases and decreases balance each other, leaving the government and universities in the same financial position.
A fast or slow change?
Student contribution increases are normally “grandfathered”, so only new students are affected and continuing students are retained on the old rates.
Grandfathering is generally preferable, so students partway through their course are not suddenly hit with unexpected extra charges to finish it. But Job-ready Graduates creates so many problems that it should be ended as quickly and comprehensively as possible.
If the new student pricing system was introduced for 2023, students facing higher charges would have benefited from up to two years of discounted student contributions. Their total course cost at graduation would still be lower than for other students.
A fast fix for the problems of Job-ready Graduates does not preclude later changes coming from the accord process. It is an interim measure to correct errors rather than a long-term policy.
Andrew Norton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Coalition’s debt truck from 2009, when net government debt was 6% of GDP – instead of the 30% of GDP it climbed to under the Coalition.Andrea Hayward/AAP
The Australian Labor Party is Australia’s oldest political party, and Anthony Albanese is only its seventh prime minister.
He would do well to recall the experiences of his predecessors.
Incoming Labor prime ministers have invariably faced immediate and serious economic challenges, some of them bequeathed by conservative governments that styled themselves as superior economic managers.
In October 1929, Labor leader James Scullin defeated the conservative Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 12 days before Wall Street began the great crash that set off the Great Depression.
The reverberations put the skids under the new government.
Even its brightest star, mercurial treasurer Edward Theodore, could not save it from annihilation two years later as the grip of the depression tightened.
It didn’t help that the prices of Australia’s major export commodities, wool and wheat, were in free-fall while the Commonwealth and the states owed millions in foreign loans and servicing costs to London.
Bruce wouldn’t have been the only politician – before or since – to have thought privately that the election he won was a good one to lose.
Labor often inherits problems
The Albanese government faces economic challenges of its own.
When the Reserve Bank board meets on Tuesday June 7, it is likely that interest rates will climb yet again. It will be part of a reckoning neither side faced up to squarely during the campaign.
Like Scullin and Theodore in 1929, Albanese and his treasurer Jim Chalmers have inherited a mountain of public debt and a stubborn budget deficit.
In Scullin’s time the Commonwealth and states had borrowed heavily for projects such as railways. The debt was mostly owed to British banks, and had to be honoured.
At least for the moment Albanese will enjoy high commodity prices.
But what if overseas credit agencies decide to send a message about what they believe to be overspending? They have done it before during the 1980s, removing Australia’s AAA credit rating under (Labor) Prime Minister Bob Hawke, restoring it under (Coalition) Prime Minister John Howard.
It would fit in with the widely-held belief (even in financial markets) that Labor governments are spendthrift, and push up the cost of borrowing.
It is here we see the great asymmetry in Australian politics at play. Labor governments are perceived to be poor economic managers, regardless of what circumstances require them to do, compared to Coalition governments who are supposedly superior, regardless of what circumstances require them to do.
The sentiment has plagued Labor since Scullin’s day.
The Whitlam Labor government had the misfortune to come to power just as the long post-war boom was about to end. Within a year, a 1973 oil price hike by members of the Middle East oil producing cartel supercharged inflation and unemployment, derailing the Labor’s planned spending on social programs and solidifying the perception that it couldn’t manage money.
Labor has a history of managing well
But the necessary cutbacks in spending began with Labor itself, in Treasurer Bill Hayden’s contractionary August 1975 budget, implemented months later by the Fraser Coalition government after it took office in November 1975.
Bob Hawke wound back spending as a share of the economy. National Archives of Australia
In March 1983, the Hawke Labor government took power only to be informed by Treasury Secretary John Stone that the budget deficit was far greater than the figure which departing Coalition treasurer John Howard had claimed.
Treasurer Paul Keating faced the need to restrain expenditure to relieve pressure on borrowing and on interest and exchange rates.
A fall in Australia’s terms of trade in early 1985 made the need for deep budget cuts more urgent.
The Hawke cut government spending as a proportion of gross domestic product while putting in place a prices and incomes accord, which successfully moderated pay rises in return for Medicare and superannuation.
Months after being elected in late 2007, the Rudd Labor government was warned of a looming financial crisis in the United States. It held off on its plans to slash government spending and developed a stimulus package that prevented mass unemployment, avoided recession, and kept Australia’s financial institutions alive.
The Coalition is treated more gently as economic managers
This success didn’t deter the Coalition from demonising the borrowing required to fund the package, even though Labor left office with net debt of 10% of GDP, compared to the 31% of GDP forecast in the Coalition’s 2022 budget.
Like Scullin in 1929, Albanese has been bequeathed a formidable list of problems. They include rising interest rates, stagnating wages and soaring inflation.
He also has to attend to a stubborn budget deficit while fulfilling his promises of increased funding for childcare, education, housing and aged care.
As has become the norm in Australia, these challenges have been made harder by the different ways in which the Coalition and Labor are judged.
Alex Millmow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Angus Taylor will take the key shadow treasury post in a 24-member shadow cabinet containing 10 women and six Nationals.
The lineup was announced by opposition leader Peter Dutton and Nationals leader David Littleproud on Sunday.
In a sign the opposition may consider throwing its weight behind nuclear power, Queensland Liberal Ted O’Brien, a supporter of nuclear energy, becomes shadow minister for climate change and energy.
O’Brien chaired a parliamentary inquiry into nuclear power and wrote in 2020: “Rather than being perpetually divisive, I believe nuclear technology has the capacity to unite Australians. It is a proposition that brings together progressives and conservatives within the Coalition.”
Julian Leeser, from NSW, is promoted from the backbench to shadow attorney-general and shadow minister for Indigenous Australians. This will give him a key role in the opposition’s response to the government’s planned referendum to enshrine an Indigenous Voice to Parliament.
Leeser has had a long term interest and involvement in the Indigenous affairs area. He co-chaired with Labor’s Patrick Dodson a parliamentary inquiry on the constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians where he was involved in the co-design process for a Voice to Parliament.
The Coalition has only one indigenous member of the federal parliament, Jacinta Price, who will sit with the Nationals. Asked about her at his news conference, Dutton pointed out she had only just been elected, but signalled her likely future elevation.
The Nationals will have six members of the 24 member shadow cabinet – compared to five in the Morrison cabinet – reflecting their larger proportion of the Coalition, thanks to holding their seats and gaining a senator.
They have also seized back trade, a long term ambition, and a portfolio they had held in earlier times. Trade and tourism goes to NSW Nationals Kevin Hogan.
Littleproud, who chose his frontbenchers, has included in shadow cabinet Barnaby Joyce, whom he defeated for the leadership. Littleproud’s decision was presumably partly driven by his desire to keep the outspoken Joyce from making too much trouble. Joyce will be spokesman on veterans’ affairs.
Another former Nationals leader, Michael McCormack, is spokesman for international development and the Pacific in the outer shadow ministry.
Having 10 women matches the number in the Albanese 23-member cabinet.
Deputy Liberal leader Sussan Ley will be shadow minister for industry, skills and training, and for small and family business, as well shadow minister for women, where she will be charged with trying to win back the support of female voters who deserted the Coalition at the election.
A notable absence from the frontbench is former immigration minister Alex Hawke, a factional numbers man for Scott Morrison. Stuart Robert, another close ally of Morrison, has been demoted to the outer shadow ministry, becoming shadow assistant treasurer and shadow minister for financial services.
Morrison had indicated publicly he did not want a frontbench post. Colleagues do not expect him to serve out the full term.
Former Nationals resources minister Keith Pitt is off the frontbench. The shadow resources minister will be Queensland Nationals senator Susan McDonald.
Darren Chester, who ran for Nationals leader, remains on the backbench, to which Joyce consigned him last year.
Dutton prevailed on former foreign minister Marise Payne, who had not sought a frontbench position, to become shadow cabinet secretary.
Littleproud will continue in agriculture, an area he held in government.
Foreign Affairs goes to opposition Senate leader Simon Birmingham, where he will shadow his Senate opposition number, Foreign Minister Penny Wong. Birmingham is the leader of the diminished band of moderates in the Liberal party, after several fell to “teal” independents.
Former attorney-general and industrial relations minister Michaelia Cash becomes shadow minister for employment and workplace relations.
Karen Andrews will shadow her old area of home affairs, and also become shadow minister for child protection and the prevention of family violence.
Deputy Nationals leader Perin Davey takes water and emergency management.
Former trade minister Dan Tehan becomes shadow minister for immigration and citizenship.
Health and aged care goes to Anne Ruston, who in the election campaign was nominated by Morrison for the health portfolio if the government remained in office.
The Nationals leader in the senate, Bridget McKenzie, will be shadow minister for infrastructure, transport and regional development.
Sarah Henderson – a one-time ABC journalist who has become a strong critic of the public broadcaster – will become shadow minister for communications.
Former member of the SAS, Andrew Hastie, becomes defence spokesman. He was assistant minister for defence before the election.
Victorian Jane Hume will be shadow minister for finance and shadow special minister of state.
Alan Tudge, whose status became confused in government after he stood aside following claims made by a former staffer, will be education spokesman.
Paul Fletcher becomes shadow minister for science, the digital economy and government services. He will also have responsibility for the arts.
Michael Sukkar takes social services, the NDIS, housing and homelessness.
The environment shadow will be Jonathon Duniam, a senator from Tasmania.
Dutton said the opposition had “incredible depth of talent”. “I’m cognisant of trying to bring people through for an opportunity,” he said.
Littleproud said the Nationals team he brought forward was “about renewal and generational change”.
He was enthusiastic about getting trade back: “The trade portfolio has had a long and proud history with the Nationals, including with party greats John McEwen and Doug Anthony”.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Timor-Leste, the youngest independent nation and the most fledgling press in the Asia-Pacific, has finally shown how it’s done — with a big lesson for Pacific island neighbours.
Tackle the Chinese media gatekeepers and creeping authoritarianism threatening journalism in the region at the top.
In Dili on the final day of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s grand Pacific tour to score a multitude of agreements and deals — although falling short of winning its Pacific region-wide security pact for the moment — newly elected (for the second time) President José Ramos-Horta won a major concession.
Under pressure from the democrat Ramos-Horta, a longstanding friend of a free media, Wang’s entourage caved in and allowed more questions like a real media conference.
Lusa newsagency correspondent in Dili Antonió Sampaio summed up the achievement in the face of the Pacific-wide secrecy alarm in a Facebook post: “After the controversy, the Chinese minister gave in and agreed to speak with journalists. A small victory for the media in Timor-Leste!”
Small victory, big tick A small victory maybe. But it got a big tick from Timor-Leste Journalists Association president Zevonia Vieira and her colleagues. He thanked President Ramos Horta for his role in ending the ban on local media and protecting the country’s freedom of information.
Media consultant Bob Howarth, a former PNG Post-Courier publisher and longtime adviser to the Timorese media, hailed the pushback against Chinese secrecy, saying the Chinese minister answering three questions — elsewhere in the region only one was allowed and that had to be by an approved Chinese journalist — as a “press freedom breakthrough”.
On the eve of Wang’s visit, Timor-Leste’s Press Council had denounced the restrictions being imposed on journalists before Horta’s intervention.
“In a democratic state like East Timor not being able to have questions is unacceptable,” said president Virgilio Guterres. “There may be limits for extraordinary situations where there can be no coverage, but saying explicitly that there can be no questions is against the principles of press freedom.”
The pre-tour Chinese restrictions on the Timorese media … before President Jose Ramos-Horta’s intervention. Image: Antonio Sampaio/FB
The Chinese delegation justified the decision to ban questions from journalists or to exclude from the agenda any statements with “lack of time” and the “covid-19 pandemic” excuses.
However, Ramos-Horta was also quietly supportive of the Chinese overtures in the region.
According to Sampiaio, when questioned in the media conference about fears in the West about China’s actions in the Pacific, Ramos-Horta said “there is no reason for alarm” and noted that Beijing had always had interests in the region, for example in fishing.
Timor-Leste’s President Jose Ramos-Horta with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Dili … “is no reason for alarm” over Chinese lobbying in the Pacific. Image: Lusa
‘A lot of lobbying’ “These Pacific countries have done a lot of lobbying with China to get more support and China is responding to that. These one-off agreements with one country or another, they don’t affect the long-standing interests of countries like Australia and the United States,” he said.
An article by The Guardian’s Pacific Project editor Kate Lyons highlighted China’s authoritarian approach to the media this week, saying “allegations raise press freedom concerns and alarm about the ability of Pacific journalists to do their jobs, particularly as the relationship between the region and China becomes closer.”
But one of the most telling criticisms came from Fiji freelance journalist Lice Movono, whose television crew reporting for the ABC, was deliberately blocked from filming. Pacific Islands Forum officials intervened.
“From the very beginning there was a lot of secrecy, no transparency, no access given,” she told The Guardian.
“I was quite disturbed by what I saw. When you live in Fiji you kind of get used to the militarised nature of the place, but to see the Chinese officials do that was quite disturbing.
“To be a journalist in Fiji is to be worried about imprisonment all the time. Journalism is criminalised. You can be jailed or the company you work for can be fined a crippling amount that can shut down the operation … But to see foreign nationals pushing you back in your own country, that was a different level.”
Media soul-searching
Google headlines on China and Pacific media freedom. Image: Screenshot APR
China was moderately successful in signing multiple bilateral agreements with almost a dozen Pacific Island nations during Wang’s visit to the region. The tour began 11 days ago in Solomon Islands — where a secret security pact with China was leaked in March — and since then Wang has met Pacific leaders from Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Niue (virtually), Cook Islands (virtually) and Vanuatu.
However, the repercussions from the visit on the media will lead to soul searching for a long time. Some brief examples of the interaction with Beijing’s authoritarianism:
Solomon Islands: The level of secrecy and selective media overtures surrounding Wang’s meetings with the government sparked the Media Association of the Solomon Islands (MASI) to call on local media to boycott coverage of the visit in protest over the “ridiculous” restrictions.
Samoa: Samoan journalist Lagipoiva Cherelle Jackson criticised the Chinese restrictions on the media with only a five-minute photo-op allowed and no questions or individual interviews. There was also no press briefing before or after Wang’s visit.
Chinese Ambassador Qian Bo’s article in the Fiji Sun on May 26. Image: China Digital Times
Examples of local media publishing propaganda were demonstrated by the pro-government Fiji Sun, with a full page “ocean of peace” op-ed written by Chinese Ambassador Qian Bo claiming China’s engagement with Pacific Island countries was “open and transparent”. The Sun followed up with report written by the Chinese embassy in Fiji touting the “great success” of Wang’s visit.
Tonga:Matangi Tonga also published an article by Chinese Ambassador Cao Xiaolin a day before Wang’s visit claiming how “China has never interfered in the internal affairs of [Pacific Island countries]” and would “adhere to openness.”
Global condemnation The secrecy and media control surrounding Wang’s tour was roundly condemned by the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists and Paris-based Reporters Without Borders and other media freedom watchdogs.
“The restriction of journalists and media organisations from the Chinese delegation’s visit … sets a worrying precedent for press freedom in the Pacific,” said the IFJ in a statement.
“The IFJ urges the governments of Solomon Islands and China to ensure all journalists are given fair and open access to all press events.”
Likewise, RSF’s Asia-Pacific director Daniel Bastard said the actions surrounding the events organised by the Chinese delegation with several Pacific island states “clearly contravenes the democratic principles of the region’s countries”.
He added: “We call on officials preparing to meet Wang Yi to resist Chinese pressure by allowing local journalists and international organisations to cover these events, which are of major public interest.”
University of the South Pacific journalism head Associate Professor Shailendra Singh also criticised the Chinese actions, saying “we have two different systems here. China has a different political system — a totalitarian system, and in the Pacific we have a democratic system.”
In Papua New Guinea, the last country to be visited in the Pacific before Timor-Leste, “there appeared to be little resistance” to the authoritarian screen, according to independent journalist Scott Waide, a champion of press freedom in his country.
“There’s not a lot of awareness about the visit,” he admits. “I would have liked to have seen a visible expression of resistance at least of some sort. But from Hagen, where I was this week. I didn’t see much.”
Waide has been training journalists as part of the ABC’s Media for Development Initiative (MDI) programme as a prelude to the PNG’s general election in July. https://www.abc.net.au/abc-international-development/projects/
The #WangYi Pacific tour reached #Fiji to tight security and a clear message that #China doesn’t welcome foreign media coverage around its officials. Were it not for Pacific media solidarity that is inclusive of ANZ press, today would have been (even more) interesting. #FijiNewspic.twitter.com/C3xwARRGuc
‘Problems to be resolved’ “We have problems that need to be resolved. Over the last month, I’ve tried to impart as much as possible through training workshops on the elections,” he told Pacific Media Watch But there are huge gaps in terms of journalism training. I believe that is a contributor to the lack of obvious pushback over Wang’s visit.”
Reflecting on China’s Pacific tour, Lice Movono, said: “At the time of my interview with The Guardian, I think I was still pretty rattled. Now I think the best way to describe my response is that I feel extremely disturbed.”
She expressed concerns that mostly women journalists from the region noted “but that didn’t get enough traction when other media covered the incident(s) — that China was able to behave that way because the governments of the Pacific allowed it, or in the case of Fiji, preferred it that way.
Movono said that since her criticisms, she had come in for nasty attention by trolls.
“I’m getting some hateful trolling from Chinese twitter accounts – got called a ‘fat pig’ yesterday,” she told Pacific Media Watch.
“Also I’m being accused of lying because some photos have come out of the doorstop we did on the Chinese ambassador here and some have purported that to be an accurate portrayal of Chinese ‘friendliness’ toward media.”
So the pushback from President Ramos-Horta is a welcome sign for media freedom in the region.
Timor-Leste rose to 17th in the 2022 RSF World Press Freedom Index listing of 180 countries — the highest in the Pacific region — while both Fiji and Papua New Guinea fell in the rankings. There are some definite lessons there for media freedom defenders.
Frustrated Pacific journalists hope that there will be a more concerted effort to defend media freedom in the future against creeping authoritarianism.
Indonesian police have been accused of beating two Papuan students with rattan sticks – severely injuring them — while 20 other students have been injured and the Morning Star flag seized in a crackdown on separate protests yesterday across the two Melanesian provinces of Papua and West Papua.
The protesters were blocked by police during a long march in the provincial capital of Jayapura opposing planned new autonomous regions in Papua.
The police have denied the rattan beating claims.
Papuan human rights activist Younes Douw said almost 3000 students and indigenous Papuans (OAP) took to the streets for the action.
“Around 650 students took to the streets today. Added to by the Papuan community of around 2000 people,” Douw told CNN Indonesia.
Douw said that the actions yesterday were held at several different points in Jayapura such as Yahukimo, Waena and Abepura.
Almost every single gathering point, however, was blockaded by police.
Police blockade “Like this morning there was a police blockade from Waena on the way to Abepura,” he said.
Douw said that two students were injured because of the repressive actions by police.
The two were named as Jayapura Science and Technology University (USTJ) student David Goo and Cendrawasih University (Unas) student Yebet Tegei.
Both suffered serious head injuries.
“They were beaten using rattan sticks,” Douw said.
Jayapura district police chief Assistant Superintendent Victor Mackbon denied the reports from the students.
“It’s a hoax. So please, if indeed they exist, they [should] report it. But if they don’t exist, that means it’s not true,” Mackbon told CNN Indonesia.
Demonstration banned The police had earlier banned the demonstration against new autonomous regions being organised by the Papua People’s Petition (PRP).
The Papua Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) said that by last night at least 20 people had been injured as a result of police violence in in breaking up the protests.
“In Sorong, 10 people were injured. In Jayapura, 10 were also injured,” LBH Papua chair Emanuel Gobay told Kompas.com.
“The injuries were a consequence of the repressive approach by police against demonstrators when they broke up the rallies,” he said.
Police also arrested several people during the protests.
“In Nabire, 23 people were arrested then released later in the afternoon.
“Two people were also arrested in Jayapura and released later,” Gobay said.
When this article was published, however, local police were still denying that any protesters had been injured.
Tear gas fired at protesters as police break up a demonstration in Sorong, West Papua. Image: ILN/Kompas
Fires, flag seized in Sorong In Sorong, police broke up a demonstration against the autonomous regions at the Sorong city Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) office, reports Kompas.com.
Earlier, the demonstrators had asked DPRD Speaker Petronela Kambuaya to meet with them but there was no response.
The demonstrators then became angry and set fire to tyres on the DPRD grounds and police fired teargas into the rally.
Sorong district police operations division head Police Commander Moch Nur Makmur said that the action taken was following procedure.
“We had already appealed to the korlap [protest field coordinator], saying that if there were fires we would break up [the rally], but they (the protesters) started it all so we took firm action and broke it up,” said commander Makmur.
Police also seized a Morning Star independence flag during the protest. The flag was grabbed when the demonstrators were holding a long march from the Remu traffic lights to the Sorong DPRD.
Makmur said that when police saw somebody carrying the Morning Star flag, they seized it.
“The flag was removed immediately, officers were quick to seize the flag,” he said.
Headline: The PRC’s Two Level Game. – 36th Parallel Assessments, Analysis by Dr Paul G. Buchanan.
Coming on the heels of the recently signed Solomon Islands-PRC bilateral economic and security agreement, the whirlwind tour of the Southwestern Pacific undertaken by PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi has generated much concern in Canberra, Washington DC and Wellington as well as in other Western capitals. Wang and the PRC delegation came to the Southwestern Pacific bearing gifts in the form of offers of developmental assistance and aid, capacity building (including cyber infrastructure), trade opportunities, economic resource management, scholarships and security assistance, something that, as in the case of the Solomons-PRC bilateral agreement, caught the “traditional” Western patrons by surprise. With multiple stops in Kiribati, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, PNG, Vanuatu and East Timor and video conferencing with other island states, Wang’s visit represents a bold outreach to the Pacific Island Forum community.
It is worth pausing to consider the broader context in which these developments have played out, both in terms of background context as well as some of the specific issues canvassed during the junket. First, we must address some key concepts. Be forewarned: this is long.
China on the Rise and Transitional Conflict.
For the last three decades the PRC has been a nation on the ascent. Great in size, it is now a Great Power with global ambitions. It has the second largest economy in the world and the largest active duty military, including the largest navy in terms of ships afloat. It has a sophisticated space program and is a high tech world leader. It is the epicenter of consumer non-durable production and one of the largest consumers of raw materials and primary goods in the world. Its GDP growth during that time period has been phenomenal and even after the Covid-induced contraction, it has averaged well over 7 percent yearly growth in the decade since 2011.
The list of measures of its rise are many so will not be elaborated upon here. The hard fact is that the PRC is a Great Power and as such is behaving on the world stage in self-conscious recognition of that fact. In parallel, the US is a former superpower that has now descended to Great Power status. It is divided domestically and diminished when it comes to its influence abroad. Some analysts inside and outside both countries believe that the PRC will eventually supplant the US as the world’s superpower or hegemon. Whether that proves true or not, the period of transition between one international status quo (unipolar, bipolar or multipolar) is characterised by competition and often conflict between ascendent and descendent Great Powers as the contours of the new world order are thrashed out. In fact, conflict is the systems regulator during times of transition. Conflict may be diplomatic, economic or military, including war. As noted in previous posts, wars during moments of international transition are often started by descendent powers clinging or attempting a return to the former status quo. Most recently, Russia fits the pattern of a Great Power in decline starting a war to regain its former glory and, most importantly, stave off its eclipse. We shall see how that turns out.
Spheres of Influence.
More immediate to our concerns, the contest between ascendent and descendent Great Powers is seen in the evolution of their spheres of influence. Spheres of influence are territorially demarcated areas in which a State has dominant political, economic, diplomatic and military sway. That does not mean that the areas in question are as subservient as colonies (although they may include former colonies) or that this influence is not contested by local or external actors. It simply means at any given moment some States—most often Great Powers—have distinct and recognized geopolitical spheres of influence in which they have primacy of interest and operate as the dominant regional actor.
In many instances spheres of influence are the object of conquest by an ascendent power over a descendent power. Historic US dominance of the Western Hemisphere (and the Philippines) came at the direct expense of a Spanish Empire in decline. The rise of the British Empire came at the expense of the French and Portuguese Empires, and was seen in its appropriation of spheres of influence that used to be those of its diminished competitors. The British and Dutch spheres of influence in East Asia and Southeast Asia were supplanted by the Japanese by force, who in turn was forced in defeat to relinquish regional dominance to the US. Now the PRC has made its entrance into the West Pacific region as a direct peer competitor to the US.
Peripheral, Shatter and Contested Zones.
Not all spheres of influence have equal value, depending on the perspective of individual States. In geopolitical terms the world is divided into peripheral zones, shatter zones and zones of contestation. Peripheral zones are areas of the world where Great Power interests are either not in play or are not contested. Examples would be the South Pacific for most of its modern history, North Africa before the discovery of oil, the Andean region before mineral and nitrate extraction became feasible or Sub-Saharan Africa until recently. In the modern era spheres of influence involving peripheral zones tend to involve colonial legacies without signifiant economic value.
Shatter zones are those areas where Great Power interests meet head to head, and where spheres of influence clash. They involve territory that has high economic, cultural or military value. Central Europe is the classic shatter zone because it has always been an arena for Great Power conflict. The Middle East has emerged as a potential shatter zone, as has East Asia. The basic idea is that these areas are zones in which the threat of direct Great Power conflict (rather than via proxies or surrogates) is real and imminent, if not ongoing. Given the threat of escalation into nuclear war, conflict in shatter zones has the potential to become global in nature. That is a main reason why the Ruso-Ukrainian War has many military strategists worried, because the war is not just about Russia and Ukraine or NATO versus Russian spheres of influence.
In between peripheral and shatter zones lie zones of contestation. Contested zones are areas in which States vie for supremacy in terms of wielding influence, but short of direct conflict. They are often former peripheral zones that, because of the discovery of material riches or technological advancements that enhance their geopolitical value, become objects of dispute between previously disinterested parties. Contested zones can eventually become part of a Great Power’s sphere of influence but they can also become shatter zones when Great Power interests are multiple and mutually disputed to the point of war.
Strategic Balancing.
The interplay of States in and between their spheres of influence or as subjects of Great Power influence-mongering is at the core of what is known as strategic balancing. Strategic balancing is not just about relative military power and its distribution, but involves the full measure of a State’s capabilities, including hard, soft, smart and sharp powers, as it is brought to bear on its international relations.
That is the crux of what is playing out in the South Pacific today. The South Pacific is a former peripheral zone that has long been within Western spheres of influence, be they French, Dutch, British and German in the past and French, US and (as allies and junior partners) Australia and New Zealand today. Japan tried to wrest the West Pacific from Western grasp and ultimately failed. Now the PRC is making its move to do the same, replacing the Western-oriented sphere of influence status quo with a PRC-centric alternative.
The reason for the move is that the Western Pacific, and particularly the Southwestern Pacific has become a contested zone given technological advances and increased geopolitical competition for primary good resource extraction in previously unexploited territories. With small populations dispersed throughout an area ten times the size of the continental US covering major sea lines of communication, trade and exchange and with valuable fisheries and deep water mineral extraction possibilities increasingly accessible, the territory covered by the Pacific Island Forum countries has become a valuable prize for the PRC in its pursuit of regional supremacy. But in order to achieve this objective it must first displace the West as the major extra-regional patron of the Pacific Island community. That is a matter of strategic balancing as a prelude to achieving strategic supremacy.
Three Island Chains and Two Level Games.
The core of the PRC strategy rests in a geopolitical conceptualization known as the “three island chains” This is a power projection perspective based on the PRC eventually gaining control of three imaginary chains of islands off of its East Coast. The first island chain, often referred to those included in the PRC’s “Nine Dash Line” mapping of the region, is bounded by Japan, Northwestern Philippines, Northern Borneo, Malaysia and Vietnam and includes all the waters within it. These are considered to be the PRC’s “inner sea” and its last line of maritime defense. This is a territory that the PRC is now claiming with its island-building projects in the South China Sea and increasingly assertive maritime presence in the East China Sea and the straits connecting them south of Taiwan.
The second island chain extends from Japan to west of Guam and north of New Guinea and Sulawesi in Indonesia, including all of the Philippines, Malaysian and Indonesian Borneo and the island of Palau. The third island chain, more aspirational than achievable at the moment, extends from the Aleutian Islands through Hawaii to New Zealand. It includes all of the Southwestern Pacific island states. It is this territory that is being geopolitically prepared by the PRC as a future sphere of influence, and which turns it into a contested zone.
The 3 Island Chains.
The PRC approach to the Southwestern Pacific can be seen as a Two Level game. On one level the PRC is attempting to negotiate bilateral economic and security agreements with individual island States that include developmental aid and support, scholarship and cultural exchange programs, resource management and security assistance, including cyber security, police training and emergency security reinforcement in the event of unrest as well as “rest and re-supply” and ”show the flag” port visits by PLAN vessels. The Solomon Island has signed such a deal, and Foreign Minister Wang has made similar proposals to the Samoan and Tongan governments (the PRC already has this type of agreement in place with Fiji). The PRC has signed a number of specific agreements with Kiribati that lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive pact of this type in the future. With visits to Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and East Timor still to come, the approach has been replicated at every stop on Minister Wang’s itinerary. Each proposal is tailored to individual island State needs and idiosyncrasies, but the general blueprint is oriented towards tying development, trade and security into one comprehensive package.
None of this comes as a surprise. For over two decades the PRC has been using its soft power to cultivate friends and influence policy in Pacific Island states. Whether it is called checkbook or debt diplomacy (depending on whether developmental aid and assistance is gifted or purchased), the PRC has had considerable success in swaying island elite views on issues of foreign policy and international affairs. This has helped prepare the political and diplomatic terrain in Pacific Island capitals for the overtures that have been made most recently. That is the thrust of level one of this strategic game.
That opens the second level play. With a number of bilateral economic and security agreements serving as pillars or pilings, the PRC intends to propose a multinational regional agreement modeled on them. The first attempt at this failed a few days ago, when Pacific Island Forum leaders rejected it. They objected to a lack of detailed attention to specific concerns like climate change mitigation but did not exclude the possibility of a region-wide compact sometime in the future. That is exactly what the PRC wanted, because now that it has the feedback to its initial, purposefully vague offer, it can re-draft a regional pact tailored to the specific shared concerns that animate Pacific Island Forum discussions. Even if its rebuffed on second, third or fourth attempts, the PRC is clearly employing a “rinse, revise and repeat” approach to the second level aspect of the strategic game.
An analogy the captures the PRC approach is that of an off-shore oil rig. The bilateral agreements serve as the pilings or legs of the rig, and once a critical mass of these have been constructed, then an overarching regional platform can be erected on top of them, cementing the component parts into a comprehensive whole. In other words, a sphere of influence.
Vietnamese Oil Rig in a contested zone.
Western Reaction: Knee-Jerk or Nuanced?
The reaction amongst the traditional patrons has been expectedly negative. Washington and Canberra sent off high level emissaries to Honiara once the Solomon Islands-PRC deal was leaked before signature, in a futile attempt to derail it. The newly elected Australian Labor government has sent its foreign minister, sworn into office under urgency, twice to the Pacific in two weeks (Fiji, Tonga and Samoa) in the wake of Minister Wang’s visits. The US is considering a State visit for Fijian Prime Minister (and former dictator) Frank Baimimarama. The New Zealand government has warned that a PRC military presence in the region could be seriously destabilising and signed on to a joint US-NZ statement at the end of Prime Minister Ardern’s trade and diplomatic junket to the US re-emphasising (and deepening) the two countries’ security ties in the Pacific pursuant to the Wellington and Washington Agreements of a decade ago.
The problem with these approaches is two-fold, one general and one specific. If countries like New Zealand and its partners proclaim their respect for national sovereignty and independence, then why are they so perturbed when a country like the Solomon Islands signs agreements with non-traditional patrons like the PRC? Besides the US history of intervening in other countries militarily and otherwise, and some darker history along those lines involving Australian and New Zealand actions in the South Pacific, when does championing of sovereignty and independence in foreign affairs become more than lip service? Since the PRC has no history of imperialist adventurism in the South Pacific and worked hard to cultivate friends in the region with exceptional displays of material largesse, is it not a bit neo-colonial paternalistic of Australia, NZ and the US to warn Pacific Island states against engagement with it? Can Pacific Island states not find out themselves what is in store for them should they decide to play the Two Level Game?
More specifically, NZ, Australia and the US have different security perspectives regarding the South Pacific. The US has a traditional security focus that emphasises great power competition over spheres of influence, including the Western Pacific Rim. It has openly said that the PRC is a threat to the liberal, rules-based international order (again, the irony abounds) and a growing military threat to the region (or at least US military supremacy in it). As a US mini-me or Deputy Sheriff in the Southern Hemisphere, Australia shares the US’s traditional security perspective and emphasis when it comes to threat assessments, so its strategic outlook dove-tails nicely with its larger 5 Eyes partner.
New Zealand, however, has a non-traditional security perspective on the Pacific that emphasises the threats posed by climate change, environmental degradation, resource depletion, poor governance, criminal enterprise, poverty and involuntary migration. As a small island state, NZ sees itself in a solidarity position with and as a champion of its Pacific Island neighbours when it comes to representing their views in international fora. Yet it is now being pulled by its Anglophone partners into a more traditional security perspective when it comes to the PRC in the Pacific, something that in turn will likely impact on its relations with the Pacific Island community, to say nothing of its delicate relationship with the PRC.
In any event, the Southwestern Pacific is a microcosmic reflection of an international system in transition. The issue is whether the inevitable conflicts that arise as rising and falling Great Powers jockey for position and regional spheres of influence will be resolved via coercive or peaceful means, and how one or the other means of resolution will impact on their allies, partners and strategic objects of attention such as the Pacific Island community.
In the words of the late Donald Rumsfeld, those are the unknown unknowns.
The Albanese government has this week thrown its support behind what’ll be one of Australia’s most polluting developments: the Scarborough-Pluto gas project in Western Australia.
We calculate that the emissions from this project and all of its related activities will add about 41 megatonnes per year to Australia’s national emissions by 2030. That is a materially relevant number – it’s nearly 7% of our emissions in 2005, which is the year we use as a baseline for emissions targets.
To put it another way, it’s nearly twice as much as the emissions avoided by all the rooftop solar panels in Australia each year.
It comes as the new minister for climate and energy Chris Bowen yesterday reiterated his commitment to Labor’s 2030 climate target of reducing Australia’s emissions by 43% on 2005 levels.
But as Bowen doubled down on this vow, the new resources minister, Madeleine King, was reassuring the gas giants their climate-wrecking projects were here to stay.
Woodside’s calculations don’t tell the full story
Ours was the first study that put together the total greenhouse gas implications of the entire Scarborough-Pluto project.
The project is made up of the Scarborough gasfield (located offshore) and the Pluto processing plant (on land).
Woodside Energy projects the offshore Scarborough gasfield expansion will release 878 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent over its lifetime. This projection is derived from its federal government approval assessment.
But this doesn’t tell the full story. State government approvals looked at emissions from the entire project, including the Pluto processing plant and its extension.
We put state and federal numbers together for the first time to find emissions for the whole Scarborough-Pluto project would be nearly 60% larger than Woodside’s reported projections for Scarborough alone.
In a statement to The Conversation, a Woodside Energy spokesperson said its “data is in accepted regulatory approval documents”, which notes that a Environmental Resources Management study from 2020 examined the emissions intensity of Scarborough gas, processed through Pluto, and then used to generate electricity in selected markets.
Our own work, along with a CSIRO report for Woodside, debunks the argument that LNG from this project will reduce emissions globally. The bottom line is that adding the amount of LNG planned from this project is likely to slow down decarbonization in key markets and add significantly to global emissions.
Woodside’s Scarborough-Pluto project is just one of many fossil fuel projects in the pipeline. Overall there are 114.
We added up the emissions of 46 liquefied natural gas and coal mines officially classified as “new projects” by the federal government. By 2030 these would add at least 8-10% to Australia’s projected emissions for 2030.
Including the Scarborough-Pluto project and all its related activities in this mix would add 15-17% to Australia’s 2030 emissions.
We can’t lower emissions using gas
It’s difficult to see how Labor can both embrace the gas industry and reduce emissions to its target of 43% by 2030. It could try using controversial carbon offset schemes, but this wouldn’t go down well with the public nor with Labor’s emphasis on restoring integrity and trust in government.
While Australia’s domestic emissions account for 2% of global emissions, we calculate that adding emissions from our fossil fuel exports would increase our total greenhouse gas footprint to around 4-5% of global emissions. And those exports, thanks to the gas (and coal) industry, look set to balloon.
It’s clear the Scarborough-Pluto project is not compatible with the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5℃ this century.
Last year the International Energy Agency (IEA) released a roadmap for bringing global emissions to net zero. It found gas use would need to depend on a large roll-out of carbon capture and storage technologies: 14% of total energy supplied by gas would be captured and stored in 2040, increasing to 30% by 2050.
But carbon capture and storage is flawed. WA’s Gorgon gas project’s attempt at using the technology is testament to that. Gorgon has blown its budget and fallen short of its targets by around 50%.
It should be noted there are no current or proposed plans to utilise carbon capture and storage for Scarborough.
The Woodside spokesperson says IEA modelling shows there’s an important role for oil, gas and hydrogen in the world’s future.
Woodside argues that in the IEA’s net zero emissions scenario, the forecast cumulative global investment in oil and gas needed to meet the world’s energy needs is approximately US$10 trillion by 2050. But this obscures the fact new and additional fossil fuel infrastructure at the scale of Scarborough-Pluto expansions is not consistent with net zero emissions.
The IEA modelling also shows a rapid decline of demand for gas over the next five to ten years. Its net zero roadmap projects the potential for a rapid collapse in Australia’s major liquefied natural gas markets (South Korea, Japan, China) by the mid-2020s, as they implement Paris compatible climate targets.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced the whole world to rethink its relationship with gas, as prices rise here and overseas largely due to sanctions on Russia’s supply.
Woodside claims the shift away from Russian energy sources strengthens the case for Browse – a proposed A$30 billion gas development north of Broome, WA. But phasing out gas, in fact all fossil fuels, is not only a climate question. It is a security matter.
We must fully embrace renewables
Those who will now fully embrace renewables as a way to ensure energy independence will also be at the forefront of the inevitable global energy transformation, gaining competitive advantage.
And Australia, with such vast renewables resources, could be a world leader in green hydrogen exports.
Gas simply has no place in the fight to stop global warming beyond 1.5℃ this century. The big question is whether the Albanese government, if it wants to be taken seriously on climate change, will take that on board.
Right now, given the high-profile intervention from the resources minister providing “absolute” support for Woodside and gas developments, the jury unfortunately is well and truly out.
Bill Hare receives funding from the European Climate Foundation, Climate Works Foundation, Bloomberg Philanthropy, and Solutions for Climate, a project of Climate Action Network Australia.
University of Canberra Professorial Fellow Michelle Grattan and University of Canberra Vice-Chancellor Professor Paddy Nixon talk about this week in politics.
They discuss Anthony Albanese’s newly sworn in cabinet, the Liberals and Nationals new leadership team, the energy crisis currently facing Australia and the Labor Governments plan to make parliament better behaved.
Michelle Grattan ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
Australia is in the grips of an energy crisis, with electricity generation prices roughly 115% above the previous highest average wholesale price ever recorded.
The price for electricity in New South Wales for this quarter (March to June), for instance, is currently at a staggering A$300 per megawatt hour.
Future electricity prices are also increasing to previously unimaginable levels. The market is pricing electricity contracts for next financial year at $238 per megawatt hour – around 180% higher than what it traded at the beginning of this year.
The Labor government yesterday ruled out triggering an emergency mechanism to restrict gas exports, a mechanism many say would help ease household prices. In any case, we propose three additional ways it can start to ease the pressure on prices.
Wait, what’s going on?
The Australian Energy Regulator recently approved household electricity price rises of up to 20%. The regulator noted prices are increasing due to a jump in wholesale prices (which we predicted back in March).
Wholesale prices are the price of generating electricity and have historically represented around 35% of the final bill for households. There are three key drivers of wholesale prices:
the cost of building new generation: if capital costs and financing costs for new projects increase, then wholesale prices are also likely to increase
supply and demand: how much generation is available relative to demand
the cost of operating existing generation: if input costs, such as coal and gas prices, increase then electricity prices are also likely to increase.
Contrary to much of the existing commentary, it is a combination of the second and third drivers that has resulted in prices increasing to unprecedented levels.
Coal units within power stations have been going offline this year. Shutterstock
First, let’s look at input costs. The price of coal and gas has surged as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Due to formal sanctions and informal shunning of Russian exports, thermal coal prices have increased five-fold to an unprecedented $A500 per tonne. This has increased the cost of energy from coal-fired generation to over $150 per megawatt hour.
Gas prices have also increased substantially as a consequence of sanctions against Russia. Prices jumped from $6-12 per gigajoule in the first three months of 2022, to around $50 per gigajoule at the end of May.
They’ve been so high that governments and regulators have intervened and capped prices at $40 per gigajoule. This means electricity generation from gas has increased in cost to around $300 per megawatt hour.
But the second – and less spoken about – impact is the significant reduction in supply of generation during April, May and now June.
Many coal power stations were partially or totally taken offline in April. We saw a step change in pricing overnight on April 1, when prices changed from around $100 per megawatt hour in March to around $200 per megawatt hour in April.
Whether offline for maintenance or to maximise generator profits, it’s not clear why so many coal generation units have not been available to generate.
The chart below (sourced from Australian Energy Market Operator operational data) shows the total black coal generation offered at various prices in April and May is materially lower than the previous 18 months (and, in particular, relative to the previous April and May).
Black coal generation offered into the market by price. Joel Gilmore and Tim Nelson, Author provided
The fact so many coal units have been unavailable has led to a significant increase in gas-fired generation to fill the gaps, despite it being so expensive to run.
As such, the generator setting the price in the wholesale electricity market during April, May and now June was almost always a gas-fired plant, resulting in prices rising to such unprecedented levels.
How should Australia deal with these horror prices?
1. An inquiry into why so many coal plants weren’t available
At the very least it would seem prudent to task the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission with an inquiry into why so much coal generated power has been unavailable during April, May and June.
If it is for maintenance purposes, it will be important to learn how better to schedule this to ensure similar outcomes don’t occur in the future.
An inquiry will also be able to determine if a coal plant has been unavailable due to market power driving prices higher. To be clear, the problem is not with removing coal over time – just that in this case, the shortage of capacity was unexpected.
2. Turbocharge renewable energy efforts
The new government should accelerate investment in new electricity supply by increasing the legislated renewable energy target, which has delivered 20% renewable energy, but can be increased substantially to reduce our exposure to high fuel costs.
This should also involve amalgamating emerging state-based initiatives, such as the New South Wales government’s 12 gigawatt energy roadmap, making it easier for investors to coordinate across different states.
An updated national target could also create room for emerging projects, such as offshore wind, to accelerate their development.
Offshore wind has huge potential for supplying energy in Australia. Shutterstock
A stronger renewable energy target will increase electricity supply, and place downward pressure on prices.
3. Implement a capacity reserve
The new government should work with the Energy Security Board to implement a reserve mechanism for new “dispatchable” capacity – such as batteries, pumped hydro, hydrogen-ready turbines – to drive investment and ensure they’re in place before coal is phased out.
This is much more efficient than recent proposals for a capacity mechanism suggested by coal-fired power station owners to pay existing coal generators for their capacity. It’s clear from the current situation that Australia’s ageing coal plants cannot be relied upon.
We all need to remember electricity is an essential service. Acting quickly is crucial to avoid households falling into hardship, and businesses closing their doors.
Tim Nelson is an Associate Professor at Griffith University and the EGM, Energy Markets at Iberdrola Australia, that develops renewable projects and batteries.
Joel Gilmore is an Associate Professor at Griffith University and General Manager Energy Policy & Planning at Iberdrola Australia, that develops renewable projects and batteries.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ivano Bongiovanni, Lecturer in Information Security, Governance and Leadership / Design Thinking, The University of Queensland
Lukas Coch/AAP
On Tuesday, Australia’s new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced his government’s first full ministry, with Victorian member Clare O’Neil appointed Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Cyber Security. It’s the first time cyber security has had its own portfolio in the Australian cabinet.
Former Minister for Home Affairs Karen Andrews was in charge of most of the implementation of the previous government’s cyber security policies, and often shared these duties with former Assistant Defence Minister Andrew Hastie. No other government in the G20 has a dedicated minister for cyber security.
Albanese anticipated this move prior to the election. During an address at the Lowy Institute on March 10, he hinted his intent to appoint a dedicated cyber security role. Details on the role are yet to be defined, as is the associated budget.
O’Neil was previously Shadow Minister for Innovation, Technology and the Future of Work. With education in history, law and public policy, and a previous stint in management consulting with McKinsey & Company, she has a multifaceted background.
This puts her in a good position to promote a multidisciplinary approach to cyber security – something that has been called upon for a long time.
Her appointment is expected to strengthen Australia’s commitment to cyber security, which was first systematically set out in the 2016 Cyber Security Strategy, and re-emphasised in the 2020 strategy.
Cyber risk is only increasing
According to the Australian Cyber Security Centre, there had been a nearly 13% increase in cyber crime reports in the 2020-21 financial year, compared to the year prior.
With some 67,500 reports, that’s one incident reported nearly every eight minutes. Self-reported losses totalled more than A$33 billion, with more than a quarter of the incidents associated with critical infrastructure. Year to year, these numbers are on the rise.
The growth in cyber security budgets over the past few years has signalled how seriously Australia is taking this. Allocated funds grew from $230 million in 2016, to $1.67 billion in 2020, to $9.9 billion in this year’s budget to implement the REDSPICE program.
This has been accompanied by policy changes. Between December 2021 and April 2022, the previous government strengthened the Security of Critical Infrastructure regime in two phases. In the first phase, it expanded the definition of critical infrastructures from four to 11 sectors.
It introduced positive security obligations, such as mandatory cyber incident reporting by certain entities to the Australian Cyber Security Centre, and expanded the provision of information to the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets. This register helps the government track ownership of key cyber infrastructure, among other important information.
Beyond this, it included government assistance to industry as a potential last resort in cyber incidents. This opens the possibility for the Secretary of Home Affairs to direct an affected entity to take certain actions in response to an incident.
In the second phase, it introduced enhanced cyber security obligations for the country’s most critical assets, or “systems of national significance” – and made it obligatory for them to have risk management programs.
The new government has yet to indicate whether new cyber security policies will be promoted, or existing ones modified. However, before his election Albanese emphasised the importance of strengthening cyber resilience, as a complement to the offensive cyber measures introduced in the previous government’s REDSPICE program.
A trailblazing move for the sector
The appointment of O’Neil as a dedicated Minister for Cyber Security sends two important signals.
First, it demonstrates cyber security has become an important matter for politicians and business leaders alike, not just for IT departments. It also has the potential to strengthen Australia’s position in the Asia-Pacific cyber context, and in response to possible threats from the Ukraine war.
Second, in line with Albanese’s efforts to increase gender balance in the cabinet, the newly appointed minister is a woman. This is a powerful signal in the cyber security world.
There are several reasons for women’s under-representation in the cyber space. They include a 24/7 “always on” work culture, gender-based discrimination, stereotype biases, wage inequality, issues with perceived self-efficacy, and a lack of women role models.
However, recent initiatives have been taken to break the barriers. We’ve seen more dedicated university scholarships, industry mentorship programs, flexible work arrangements and “positive discrimination” (such as hiring to fill quotas). Although views on the latter remain controversial.
Regardless, the appointment of a woman to a top cyber security position could certainly go some way towards empowering other women in the space, and those wanting to join. This will hold particularly true if O’Neil decides to address Australia’s gender gap in cyber talent.
Recent forecasts show the country will need nearly 17,000 more cyber security professionals by 2026.
Ivano Bongiovanni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Johnny Depp has won his defamation suit against his ex-wife Amber Heard for her Washington Post op-ed article published in 2018, which stated she was a “public figure representing domestic abuse”.
The facts in every case are unique, and the jury is always in a better position to judge these facts than commentators relying on media reports.
Nevertheless in such a high profile case as this, the verdict has a ripple effect that can go beyond the facts. The unfortunate reality is the Depp Heard case is likely to reinforce the fear that women who come forward with claims of sexual and domestic abuse will encounter a system in which they are unlikely to be believed.
Reform is needed to better balance the protection of men’s individual reputations with the rights of women to speak about their experiences.
After the verdict, Heard commented she was “heartbroken that the mountain of evidence still was not enough to stand up to the disproportionate power, influence, and sway” of her famous ex-husband.
Historically, the common law of defamation was built to protect public men in their professions and trades. It worked to both defend their reputations individually and shut down speech about them as a group.
As legal scholar Diane Borden has noted, the majority of libel plaintiffs are “men engaged in corporate or public life who boast relatively elite standing in their communities”.
Defamation trials – which run according to complex and idiosyncratic rules – are often lengthy and expensive, thus favouring those with the resources to instigate and pursue them.
Various defences exist, including arguing that the comments are factually true, or that they were made on occasions of “qualified privilege”, where a person has a duty to communicate information and the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving it.
But in one way or another, disputes concerning allegations of sexual and domestic abuse usually come down to matters of credibility and believability that play on gendered stereotypes.
It becomes another version of “he said, she said”, and as we’ve seen from the social media response to Amber Heard, women making these types of allegations are often positioned as vengeful or malicious liars before their cases even reach the courts. This is despite the fact sexual assault and intimate partner violence are common, and false reportingis rare.
In fact, most victims don’t tell the police, their employer or others what happened to them due to fears of not being believed, facing professional consequences, or being subject to shaming and further abuse.
Heard has received thousands of death threats and suffered relentless mockery on social media.
The global #MeToo movement and recent Australian campaigns, such as those instigated by Grace Tame and Brittany Higgins, encourage survivors to speak out and push collectively for change.
But now, ruinous and humiliating defamation suits could further coerce and convince women to keeping their experiences quiet and private. Measures must be taken to better protect public speech on such matters.
One potential way forward is for defamation trials involving imputations of gendered abuse to incorporate expert evidence about the nature of sexual and domestic violence in our society.
For decades, feminist legal scholars fought for the inclusion of such evidence in criminal trials, especially those relating to matters of self-defence in domestic homicides and issues of consent in rape proceedings.
Expert sociological and psychological evidence can combat and discredit ingrained patriarchal assumptions and myths – comments and questions such as “what was she wearing?”; “why didn’t she fight back?”; “why didn’t she just leave him?”; “why was she nice to him afterwards?” or “why didn’t she tell people at the time?”
Otherwise, pervasive gender bias – often held by both men and women, judge and jury – can undermine the voices and accounts of women before they even set foot in court, before they even open their mouths.
Defamation trials have not traditionally included such expert evidence. But now that they have become a powerful forum for silencing speech about gendered harm, perhaps it’s time they did so.
Jessica Lake does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Around 25,000 people visit hospital emergency departments across Australia every day. Many of them are reporting waiting for hours to be seen. Some give up and leave, only to have their condition deteriorate.
“Ambulance ramping” – where ambulances queue outside hospitals to hand over patients – has become more common and means some people wait long periods before they even arrive at emergency.
Of the 8.8 million presentations at emergency departments each year, one in three people wait more than four hours to be treated and admitted to a ward for further care, or to be discharged.
Our fragile public health system and its staff need urgent attention before emergency departments can recover.
Not a new problem
Demand for urgent hospital care is increasing Australia-wide, placing prolonged strain on the acute care services provided by emergency departments. But demand has been building over decades, not months.
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, the number of people presenting at public emergency departments increased by 3.2% on average each year from 2014–2019, mostly due to an ageing population that is experiencing more complex health issues.
Perhaps surprisingly – and despite ups and downs in some cities over shorter periods – overall demand on emergency departments decreased during the peak COVID period as people chose to stay home or were in lockdown. Volumes have only recently recovered to normal levels.
Two key issues stand in the way of people getting emergency care.
First, the public health system is already at capacity, so even small increases in demand send it into gridlock.
Second, with more and more staff unable to work due to illness, including COVID infection, burnout and now influenza, there are not enough staff to look after patients.
Emergency departments are in the business of preparing for the unexpected, whether it’s a surge in COVID infections or mass injuries from natural disasters, large-scale accidents or a terrorist attack.
The surge becomes magnified when the event also affects health-care staff or facilities, taking away care capacity as demand increases. We are currently facing an early influenza surge, with rates around what’s typically seen in late June.
Systems can cope with unexpected events by allowing “slack” or holding excess capacity in normal times. Unfortunately, our health-care systems have been stripped of excess capacity. Cuts in the name of efficiency have been implemented by successive governments, without fully appreciating the implications on health-care supply in times of need.
Around 8% of paramedics suffer post-traumatic stress disorder, twice the average for Australian workers. Almost one third are diagnosed with depression.
The addition of “more beds” sounds like a practical solution – but hospital beds rely on staff (particularly nurses) to take care of the patients in them.
Addressing hospital staff shortages is less straightforward. There is a long lead time to train additional nurses and we can’t rely solely on importing them from overseas. New Zealand is already concerned we’re going to take many of its nurses to help our aged care sector and other countries are competing for skilled hospital staff.
In an attempt to relieve pressure, governments want to divert those with less severe illnesses or injury away from emergency departments to urgent care centres or 24-hour GPs. This may improve access to care for some patients, but it may not substantially reduce emergency demand. New South Wales data shows surprisingly few people went to emergency when they could have gone to a GP.
Improving flow
The long-term solution to emergency department blockages is to increase throughput.
Imagine the hospital as a bathtub, and the patients as the water streaming into the bath. Increasing the bath size is a temporary fix. If you can’t turn off the tap, it will quickly fill. We need to work on the drainage system – increasing the size of the drain and unblocking any pipes that are clogged.
Hospitals have a duty of care to discharge patients to a safe environment. To quicken hospital discharges, we need more community capacity to house people with disability, people with mental health conditions who need supported care, older people who can no longer live alone without assistance, and homeless people.
Processes often follow a “one size fits all” model, yet patients are diverse in their preferences and needs. Some groups have more complex needs, which mean they may spend longer in the emergency department.
We know, for example, emergency departments perform worse for older adults with multiple health conditions, people who have a disability or mental health condition, people who are Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander, or who come from a culturally and linguistically diverse background.
We are about to embark on a project with three large Sydney hospitals. We will work with patients, clinicians and community groups to co-design emergency care improvements and reduce wait times. Examples might include strengthening connections between GPs and the emergency department, and greater use of technology to streamline care pathways and help patients navigate the journey.
For now, everyone can help alleviate stress on emergency departments by taking better care of their health, addressing problems early with their GP, and taking advantage of immunisation programs such as for COVID and influenza.
Robyn Clay-Williams receives funding from the Medical Research Future Fund and the Australian Research Council.
Henry Cutler receives funding from the Medical Research Future Fund, National Health and Medical Research Council and the Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has condemned a media blackout imposed on events during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s 10-day tour of Pacific island countries.
Wang is today in Papua New Guinea at the end of an eight-country tour that began on May 26, but a “Chinese state media reporter is so far the only journalist to be allowed to ask him a question”, says the Paris-based global media freedom watchdog.
On the second day of his two days in Fiji this week, “the media briefing itself was run by the visiting government [and] the press passes were issued by the Chinese government,” Fiji journalist Lice Movono told The Guardian.
Movono and her cameraman, and a crew with the Australian TV broadcaster ABC, were prevented from filming a meeting between Wang and the Pacific Islands Forum’s secretary-general shortly after Wang’s arrival in Fiji the day before, although they all had accreditation.
She also observed several attempts by Chinese officials to restrict journalists’ ability to cover the event.
“From the very beginning there was a lot of secrecy, no transparency, no access given,” Movono said.
During Wang’s first stop in the Solomon Islands on May 26, covid restrictions were cited as grounds for allowing only a limited number of media outlets to attend the press conference and only two questions were allowed – one to the Solomon Islands’ foreign minister by a local reporter and one to Wang by a Chinese media outlet.
Resist Chinese pressure “The total opacity surrounding the events organised by the Chinese delegation with several Pacific island states clearly contravenes the democratic principles of the region’s countries,” said Daniel Bastard, head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk.
“We call on officials preparing to meet Wang Yi to resist Chinese pressure by allowing local journalists and international organisations to cover these events, which are of major public interest.”
Following the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa and Fiji, Wang visited Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste with the same aim of signing free trade and security agreements.
RSF has previously condemned the Chinese delegation’s discrimination against local and international media during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in November 2018 in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, with President Xi Jinping attending.
China is among the world’s worst countries for media freedom, ranked 175th out of 180 nations in the 2022 RSF World Press Freedom Index.
Pacific Media Watch collaborates with Reporters Without Borders.
Indonesia’s Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) has criticised the appointment of Central Sulawesi State Intelligence Agency (BIN) regional chief (Kabinda) Brigadier-General Andi Chandra As’aduddin as the acting (Pj) regent of Seram Bagian Barat in Maluku province.
The appointment of As’aduddin was based on Home Affairs Ministry Decree Number 113.81-1164, 2022 on the Appointment of an Acting Seram Bagian Barat Regent in Maluku.
Kontras coordinator Fatia Maulidiyanti said that placing TNI (Indonesian military) or Polri (Indonesian police) officers in civilian positions indicates that the state has no interest in the mandate of reformasi — the political reform process that began in 1998.
One of these was abolishing the dual socio-political function of the armed forces (then called ABRI) and upholding civilian supremacy over the military.
Yet, according to Maulidiyanti, empty regional leadership posts can be filled by state civil servants with experience in administrative management.
She also questioned why the position had to be filled by a TNI officer.
“This is a betrayal of the mandate of reformasi and democratic values,” Maulidiyanti told Tribune News.
She said that what was frightening was the potential abuse of power.
This, she said, was because TNI officers had their own powers which were then augmented by the civilian position they occupied.
“Instead of promoting democracy, it is instead a return back to the New Order [the ousted regime of former president Suharto],” said Maulidiyanti.
Note: The next regional elections will not take place until November 27, 2024. Regional heads who end their terms in office before this will be replaced by acting regional heads appointed directly by President Widodo in the case of governors and the Home Affairs Ministry in the case of regents and mayors. In total, there will be 271 regions led by acting regional heads, including 27 governors.
Tairāwhiti tā moko artists Maia Gibbs and Henare Brooking designed the jersey the Warriors wore in their Indigenous Round National Rugby League match against Newcastle Knights last Saturday.
The jersey, called Te Amokura, is a powerful expression of connection, unity and identity developed in partnership with Puma and Gisborne’s Toi Ake Maori art gallery.
Maia Gibbs (Ngāi Tāmanuhiri, Rongowhakaata, Ngāti Kahungungu) and Henare Brooking (Ngāti Porou, Rongowhakaata, Te Whānau-ā-Apanui, Ngāti Kahungunu, Ngāti Tūwharetoa) run the gallery located in Ballance Street Village.
It was set up about two years ago following the first covid-19 lockdown.
Gibbs said the jersey needed to “encompass what the club and team represent”.
“We are the paintbrushes and pencils that put it together but the players are the ones that live their lives under a microscope. This is about them and what they want to represent.
“It’s pretty cool to see our tohu holding its own,” he said.
Powerful expression “I’m humbled to have had the opportunity to work on this project and see it come to life — even more so to do it along side taku tuakana Henare Brooking.
“To have the support of our iwi, hapū and whānau throughout is really special and we thank you all,” he said.
Te Amokura is a powerful expression of the Warriors’ connection, unity and identity. It takes its inspiration from the manu (bird) of the same name, known across the Pacific, Australia and Aotearoa.
The amokura helped the great navigators of the Pacific chart the largest body of water in the world.
It is known for its two distinct red elongated tail feathers which were highly prized by foremost warriors and chiefs throughout Te moana nui a Kiwa.
These are represented by two red strips on the back of the jersey.
The colours represent significant elements of the club’s identity but also the journey over the last three seasons, and the sacrifices made by players and staff to base themselves away from home, their families and their fans.
The Warriors jersey designers Maia Gibbs and Henare Brooking with Michaela Brooking. Image: The Gisborne Herald
The collective whakapapa Blue represents mana moana — the ocean — that connects Aotearoa, Australia and the Pacific, carrying the collective whakapapa.
Green represents mana whenua — the land — Aotearoa acknowledging the Warriors’ true home and importantly Australia’s mana whenua, the Aboriginal whanaunga and the original people of Australia who hosted the team over the last three seasons.
Red represents mana tāngata — the people — connecting players past, present and future, and interweaving the whakapapa of each individual as they move into the field of battle.
The black represents Te Pō — a place of development and learning — while the white is Te Ao — a place of expression and action.
The jersey is like a korowai (cloak) that adorns the wearer, not just as a jersey but as a representation of their own journey.
It is a celebration of the Warriors’ cultural identity and a representation of the connection they share as indigenous people across the world.
This year’s NRL Indigenous Round focused on creating a space for learning and educating Australians about Indigenous culture as well as encouraging the rugby league community to take three key actions to be part of the change — learn the land; learn the history; support an Indigenous business.
The Te Amokura | Pacific Media Centre logo.
Note: Te Amokura is also the Te Reo Māori name of the Pacific Media Centre, which launched this website Asia Pacific Report in 2016. Asia Pacific Report is now published independently in association with Evening Report and Pacific Journalism Review.
Republished with permission by The Gisborne Herald and NZ On Air.
New Zealand’s Te Pāti Māori has handed over its petition — with 70,000 signatures — calling for the country to officially be named Aotearoa.
It is on our passports, on our money, and in our national anthem. But Aotearoa is not our official name, yet.
The petition was delivered to Parliament today. It calls to change the country’s official name to Aotearoa, and begin a process to restore te reo Māori names for all towns, cities, and places by 2026.
“Whether you’re for or against, the thing is everyone knows that Aotearoa is a legitimate name given to this country by Kupe — not by Governor Grey or any written book, this is well before any of those things,” Te Pāti Māori co-leader Rawiri Waititi said.
Te Reo fluency among Māori dropped from 90 percent in 1910 to 26 percent in 1950.
Today, just 20 percent of the Māori population speak it. That’s three percent of the whole country.
Waititi said the only way to restore the language was to make it visible in as many places as possible.
‘Pebble being dropped in the water’ “This is the pebble being dropped in the water, the initial pebble hitting the water. And what it’ll do, from now for many years to come, is those ripples will continue to get bigger and bigger.”
The petition now goes to a select committee, which will decide what to do next. Whether that was a bill or even a public referendum, it had already succeeded, Waititi said.
“It’s starting the dialogue, it’s building awareness. It has started a wananga across the country.”
National leader Christopher Luxon said changing the name was a constitutional issue.
“I think those are decisions for the New Zealand people, if there’s widespread support it should go to referendum and it should be a decision that they get to make. It’s not something the government makes,” he said.
But just last week Luxon posted a tribute in te reo Māori to kaumatua Joe Hawke, resulting in a tirade of anti-Māori remarks from National supporters.
Waititi brushed off any backlash the petition, and by extension he, received.
“If they’re getting their undies in a twist, that’s their undies, not my undies,” he said.
Time for a discussion Government ministers said it was time for a discussion over changing the name, but were not actually committing to one.
“These things evolve over time, but it’s up to every New Zealander to be part of the debate,” Andrew Little said.
“I’m mindful that representatives from Ngāi Tahu have pointed out that Aotearoa tends to focus on the North Island, but that’s a debate that can rightly happen,” David Clark said.
Associate Health Minister Ayesha Verrall admitted she had not given it any thought.
“But I’m very comfortable having the country referred to as Aotearoa-New Zealand,” she said.
Deputy Prime Minister Grant Robertson said it was not something the Labour caucus had discussed, while Michael Wood called for open-mindedness.
“I think any question like that needs to be worked through really carefully. It’s the name of our country, the identity of our country,” he said.
Labour’s Māori caucus divided Labour’s Māori caucus was somewhat divided
“I think we should have a good conversation about it. I’ve personally got no problems with us using Aotearoa but it’s a question for the whole country,” Kelvin Davis said.
Minister of Māori Development Willie Jackson supported the use of Aotearoa, but said he had recently been travelling around the country, speaking to Māori communities, and changing the country’s name never came up.
“We have other kaupapa more important right now,” he said.
Peeni Henare believed the country was ready.
“I’m encouraging one and all to have a very mature debate over what I think is a pretty cool kaupapa,” he said.
Artist Hohepa Thompson, also known as Hori, backed the petition.
Hori’s Pledge response Hori’s Pledge is a response to billboards popping up around the country saying “New Zealand, not Aotearoa”, funded by lobby group Hobson’s Pledge.
Thompson had been driving across Te Ika a Maui, with his own billboard in tow, to call for change.
He believed a hyphenated ‘Aotearoa-New Zealand’ would not go far enough.
“Māori have taken the backseat for many, many times. So when it comes to Aotearoa-New Zealand, let’s have this. Aotearoa, boom.”
The most positive conversations on his trip came from people who did not even know Pākehā history, he said.
“The only renaming that happened here was from that side. So we’re not trying to create ‘change’, were just re-instating what was already here.”
He pointed out a similar subject that took place recently.
Three years ago, some said a national holiday for Matariki would never happen. Later this month, it will be officially celebrated for the first time.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
By the time Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s ten-day tour of the Pacific is over in early June, he will have met with leaders from all ten Pacific island countries that have diplomatic relations with China.
This tour is the second of its kind since 2006 (his predecessor Li Zhaoxing visited the region that year). It follows a meeting of Pacific foreign ministers with China last year.
But what does China want from the region and why is it showing such strong interest in the Pacific?
China wants two main things
China seeks two main things from the region – one diplomatic and one strategic.
Diplomatically, it needs the voting support of Pacific islands at the United Nations. These countries, most of which are small, have an equal vote at the UN.
Their support – on issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, South and East China Seas, and human rights – matters to China.
For example, during Wang’s visit, Pacific leaders pledged to stick to the “One China” policy. This means they will recognise the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of China (Taiwan).
However, the China-Taiwan diplomatic battle is far from over. In the Pacific, Palau, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru still recognise Taiwan.
Strategically, China sees Pacific islands as a target of what’s known as “South-South co-operation” – partnerships between developing countries.
China’s mistrust of developed countries is deep rooted and has persisted since the founding of the communist regime in 1949. To reduce the strategic pressure from developed countries, China strives to forge close ties with the developing world.
In this sense, Wang’s Pacific visit is largely prompted by recent heightened competition between China and the US-led traditional powers.
The Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) recently released a joint leaders statement promising to increase their support to countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
It is hardly a coincidence that on the same day, China’s ministry of foreign affairs revealed the itinerary for Wang’s Pacific visit. Details of concrete achievements arising from the provinces of Chinese Guangdong, Fujian and Shandong’s engagement with Pacific islands were released the following day.
China is signalling it will not recede in its competition with traditional powers. It also wants to send a message that a closer relationship with China will benefit Pacific islands.
Security significance for China
In the long run, the Pacific islands have great security significance for China.
China’s People’s Liberation Army, especially the navy, has aimed to break the “island chains” (in particular, there are a series of military bases on islands near China and in the Pacific, which Beijing believes the US and its allies are using to encircle China).
The Pacific islands sit along one of these island chains. Little wonder, then, the Chinese military is keen to gain a foothold in the Pacific in the long run – this would be crucial if competition between China and the US deteriorates into rivalry and even military conflict.
This is why traditional powers are alarmed by the China-Solomon Islands security pact – despite clarification from Beijing and Honiara China will not establish a military base in Solomon Islands.
To achieve these objectives, China has worked hard to foster a closer relationship with Pacific islands. In particular, it has highlighted its respect of Pacific islands as equal partners, economic opportunities for Pacific commodities to enter the massive Chinese market, and the benefits of Chinese aid for the region.
Proposed agreements
In this context, China proposed two broad agreements to be signed by all its Pacific partner countries during Wang’s visit.
However, this plan was shelved due to the lack of consensus among Pacific leaders on the nature of these agreements and potential negative implications for regional security.
For example, prior to Wang’s visit, President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo wrote to leaders of all Pacific island countries and territories warning that signing these agreements may drag Pacific islands into conflicts between China and the US in future.
This may have taken China by surprise; President Panuelo paid a successful state visit to China in 2019 and lauded his country’s relationship with China as “great friendship taken to a new high”.
This was a clear setback for China. As a suboptimal solution, China’s ministry of foreign affairs turned the two agreements into a position paper and published it on May 30.
A main difference is that in the position paper, China only briefly states its readiness to co-operate with Pacific islands to promote regional security, combat transnational crimes and tackle non-traditional security threats.
By contrast, the original two agreements had more details on security co-operation such as providing police training for the region and strengthening co-operation on cyber security.
Apparently, China has learnt to downplay its planned co-operation with Pacific islands on security, an increasingly sensitive area amid the competition.
Looking into the near future, it is likely China will be more cautious in expanding its engagement with the Pacific region.
It will likely focus on pragmatic co-operation in less sensitive areas like climate change, poverty reduction, agriculture and disaster relief.
China will lobby for more support from Pacific islands before it is willing to reintroduce the broad agreements.
Denghua Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This week’s White House meeting between Jacinda Ardern and Joe Biden reflected a world undergoing rapid change. But of all the shared challenges discussed, there was one that kept appearing in the leaders’ joint statement – China in the Pacific.
Tucked within the statement, with all its promises of increased co-operation and partnership, was this not-so-subtle declaration:
In particular, the United States and New Zealand share a concern that the establishment of a persistent military presence in the Pacific by a state that does not share our values or security interests would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the region and pose national-security concerns to both our countries.
Unsurprisingly, this upset Chinese officials, with a foreign ministry spokesperson accusing Ardern and Biden of trying to “deliberately hype up” the issue.
But hopefully the statement will also prompt New Zealand to put its money where its mouth is when it comes to increasing assistance in the Pacific region. Expressing “concern” about China’s influence means little otherwise.
Shared concerns: Joe Biden meets Jacinda Ardern in the Oval Office on May 31. Getty Images
Aid and influence
While New Zealand and Australia are responsible for around 55% of all of the aid flowing into the region, that contribution needs to be seen in perspective.
There are two obvious shortcomings. First, more needs to be done to promote democracy in the Pacific, which means supporting anti-corruption initiatives and a free press. Second, both countries simply need to give more.
Neither spends anywhere near the 0.7% of gross national income on development assistance recommended by the United Nations (UN).
It’s against this backdrop of under-spending that China has come to be seen as an attractive alternative to the traditional regional powers. It has no colonial baggage in the Pacific and is a developing country itself, having made impressive leaps in development and poverty reduction.
Three states in the region (Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu) are in the UN’s “least developed countries” category. Two others (Samoa and Vanuatu) are just above the threshold. Most are at high risk of debt distress, increasing the risk of poor policy decisions simply to pay bills.
The average debt-to-GDP ratio for Pacific states has risen from 32.9% in 2019 to 42.2% in 2021. Vanuatu, Palau and Fiji have debt-to-GDP ratios greater than 70%.
China currently accounts for only about 6% of all aid in the region, but supplements this with grants and loans, some commercial and some interest-free. These overlap with grand infrastructure plans such as the Belt and Road Initiative aimed at connecting many regions of the world.
While it might not have secured its desired regional multilateral trade and security agreement with Pacific nations, China is clearly in the Pacific for the long haul.
This presence need not be seen entirely negatively. In the right circumstances, Chinese assistance can have a positive impact on economic and social outcomes in recipient countries, according to the International Monetary Fund. (The same study also found a negative but negligible effect on governance.)
Overall, Chinese influence in the Pacific is not necessarily something that must be “countered”. For the good of the region, countries should seek ways to work together, especially given that aid to the Pacific is often fragmented, volatile, unpredictable and opaque.
Co-ordinated, efficient and effective partnerships between donors, recipients and regional institutions will be vital, and co-operation with China could be part of this.
New Zealand and Australia need to expand their work on the vast infrastructure and development needs of the Pacific. Transparency should be a priority with all projects and spending, and co-operation should be tied to shared benchmarks such as the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.
For its part, China should give more aid rather than loans (especially to the least developed countries) to avoid the risk of poor countries becoming beholden to lenders or even bankrupted.
Peace and security
Above all, peace and security between and within countries should be an agreed fundamental principle. The good news is that South Pacific nations have already taken steps towards this by agreeing to the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
This could be complemented by an agreement banning foreign military bases in the region to maintain its independence. If needed, peacekeeping or outside security assistance should be multilateral through the UN, not bilateral through secret arrangements.
Co-operation for the good of the Pacific should be the goal, but this is only possible if the region is not militarised.
Chinese influence and power in the Pacific is a reality that cannot be wished away or easily undermined. With the US similarly determined to assert itself, the stakes are rising. All nations should work together to ensure no small, independent Pacific country becomes a pawn in what could be a very dangerous game.
Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jacqueline Wesson, Senior Lecturer (Teaching and Research), Discipline of Occupational Therapy, School of Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine and Health, University of Sydney
It can be hard to know what to say, or who to talk to, if you notice something isn’t right for you or a loved one in residential aged care.
You might have concerns about personal or medical care, being adequately consulted about changes to care, or be concerned about charges on the latest bill. You could also be concerned about theft, neglect or abuse.
Here’s how you can raise issues with the relevant person or authority to improve care and support for you or your loved one.
You can complain about any aspect of care or service. For instance, if medical care, day-to-day support or financial matters do not meet your needs or expectations, you can complain.
It is best to act as soon as you notice something isn’t right. This may prevent things from escalating. Good communication helps get better results.
Make written notes about what happened, including times and dates, and take photos. Try to focus on facts and events. You can also keep a record of who was involved and their role.
Keep track of how the provider responded or steps taken to resolve the issue. Write notes of conversations and keep copies of emails.
Who do I complain to?
Potential criminal matters
If you have concerns about immediate, serious harm of a criminal nature then you should contact the police, and your provider immediately. These types of serious incidents include unreasonable use of force or other serious abuse or neglect, unlawful sexual contact, stealing or unexpected death.
The provider may have already contacted you about this. They are required to report such serious incidents to both the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission within 24 hours, and to the police.
Other matters
For other matters, talk to the care staff involved. Try to find out more detail about what happened and why things went wrong. Think about what you expect in the situation.
Then talk to the most senior person in charge, to see if they can make changes so things don’t go wrong in the future. This person may be called the nursing unit manager, care manager or care director.
Providers must acknowledge and investigate your complaint, tell you their findings and actions taken, and follow up to see if you are satisfied.
If you would like support to talk to the provider, the Older Persons Advocacy Network can help. This free service provides independent and confidential support to help find solutions with the aged-care provider. The network can also help you lodge a formal complaint.
Be prepared to submit the facts and events, plus emails and correspondence, you have already collected. Think about what you want to happen to resolve the complaint.
Each complaint is handled individually and prioritised depending on the risks to you or your loved one. The commission will start its processes within one business day when complaints are urgent. The resolution process took an average 40 days in 2020-21.
You can complain confidentially, or anonymously if you feel safer. But the commission may not be able to investigate fully if it’s anonymous. Also, there are limits to what the commission can do. It cannot ask providers to terminate someone’s employment, or provide direct clinical advice about treatment.
You can complain confidentially or anonymously if you feel safer. Shutterstock
Sometimes the commission has issued a “non-compliance” notice to the provider (for a failure to meet quality standards), and action may again be limited. So it is a good idea to check the non-compliance register beforehand to see if your provider is listed.
What do others complain about?
From October to December 2021, about a third of Australian nursing homes had a complaint made to the commission against them. Some had more than one complaint. More than half of these complaints were lodged by family, friends or other consumers.
The top reasons for complaints were about:
adequacy of staffing
medication administration or management
infectious diseases or infection control
personal and oral hygiene
how falls are prevented and managed
consultation or communication with representatives and/or family members.
What if I’m still not happy?
If you’re not happy when you receive the commission’s outcome, you can request a review with 42 days.
You can also request the Commonwealth Ombudsman to review the complaint if you’re not satisfied with the commission’s decision or the way the commission handled your complaint.
You or your loved one can ask for a review if you’re still not happy with the outcome. Shutterstock
Residents, and their representatives or families, have a legal right to speak up and complain, free from reprisal or negative consequences. This right is also reflected in the Charter of Aged Care Rights, which providers are legally required to discuss with you and help you understand.
Moving to another facility
If you have exhausted all avenues of complaint or feel conditions have not improved, you may decide to move to another provider or facility, if available. This option may not be possible in rural areas.
This is a difficult decision. It takes time, as well as financial and emotional resources. Starting again with a new provider can also be disruptive for everyone, but sometimes it may be the right choice.
Jacqueline Wesson has previously worked at Montefiore Residential Care and continues to have a professional link with them. She has previously received funding from Dementia Australia, and has provided advice about restrictive practice legislation via a local PHN.
Lee-Fay Low receives funding from the NHMRC and Dementia Australia. She has previously received research funding from aged care providers including HammondCare and The Whiddon Group, as well as state and federal governments. She has also received honorarium from Roche. She has provided input and advice to multiple aged care providers and government bodies including to the Royal Commission into Quality and Safety in Aged Care, and the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission.
Tranby is an Indigenous adult education school in the inner-city Sydney suburb of Glebe. Founded in 1957, its graduates include Eddie Mabo, who went on to win the most significant land rights legal battle in Australian history – overturning the fiction of terra nullius.
What makes Tranby special is not just being Australia’s oldest not-for-profit independent Indigenous education provider. It is the type of education it provides – teaching the skills needed to manage organisations and communities democratically.
It teaches co-operation, and the skills to run co-operative organisations.
This makes it a rarity in business education.
Tranby Aboriginal Co-Operative is Australia’s oldest Indigenous adult dducation provider. Tranby, CC BY-NC-ND
Though co-operatives exist throughout Australian society, making a hugely valuable economic contribution, their distinctive nature and management requirements are largely ignored by university business schools.
This neglect is costing us all.
Part of the social fabric
Australia has a rich history of communities forming co-operatives to provide services where for-profit businesses or the state have been unwilling or unable.
They run shops and schools, offer banking and mortgage services, and provide housing and health services.
The first co-operative in Australia is thought to be the Brisbane Co-operative Society, which set up a store in 1859.
Over the next century came many agricultural co-ops. In the 1950s and 1960s, co-workers and communities pooled funds to form building societies and credit unions when banks were unwilling to lend money.
When the northern Victorian town of Sea Lake was left without a pub after one hotel shut and the other burnt down, locals formed a co-operative to reopen and run the Royal Hotel. Kerry Anderson, CC BY
Co-ops range in size from small neighbourhood operations, such the Gymea community preschool in Sydney to major enterprises such as Cooperative Bulk Handling in Western Australia, which reported a $133 million surplus in 2021.
All up there are more than 1,700 in Australia. It’s possible you’re a member of one – or a closely aligned “mutual” organisation (such as the NRMA or RACV). About eight in ten Australians are, yet fewer than two in ten realise it.
Improving co-operative education
This general lack of recognition is reflected by the sector’s almost complete invisibility in educational courses.
In 2016 a Senate committee inquiry found neglect of co-operative and mutual businesses in high-school and university courses was a clear impediment for the sector.
It could easily be concluded this neglect has also actively damaged the sector – notably through the 1980s and 1990s with “demutualisation”
of big member-owned organisations such as AMP and the St George Bank.
This effectively involved privatising these organisations for the benefit of existing members, who got windfall profits at the expense of future members.
Demutualisation was pushed by managers and consultants educated in business, but not in the distinctive values of co-operative business.
They often regarded the co-operative and mutual structure as less competitive than an investor-shareholder model focused on maximising profits.
Subsequent developments have proven how flawed these assumptions were. AMP, for example, featured heavily among the wrongdoings exposed by the Hayne royal commission into financial services. No co-operative or mutual business did.
Levelling the playing field
The Senate inquiry report recommended the federal government look to improve understanding of co-operatives and mutual through secondary school curriculum. It also recommended universities include topics on co-operatives in their business and law programs.
In 2017 the University of Newcastle established Australia’s first postgraduate program in co-operative management and organisation.
But it axed the program in 2020 due to pandemic-related cutbacks and insufficient student numbers.
What’s needed are both specialist courses and recognition within general business or law courses. You’d be hard placed to find a business degree that gives co-operatives more than fleeting attention.
The focus instead is on individual entrepreneurship, investor-owned businesses and vague ideas of social business.
Economic viability with social responsibility
The 2016 Senate inquiry report noted co-operatives have an important economic role to play. They increase competition in highly concentrated markets (such as banking). They provide services in areas where investor-owned or state enterprises do not work.
It singled out Tranby College as an excellent example of what can be achieved – both for members and the broader community:
Evidence suggests the co-operative model is ideal in delivering services in remote areas, such as Indigenous communities, where issues can be complex and service provision through the private sector is often not suitable or available.
As former United Nations secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said, co-operatives show “it is possible to pursue both economic viability and social responsibility”.
It is important students at all levels be aware of what makes co-operative businesses different and valuable.
Hopefully the Albanese government will not neglect them. They have a lot to offer communities and reinforce democratic values.
Gregory Patmore received funding from the Australian Research Council Discovery Program (DP170100573) for the main research underlying this contribution and has received funding from the Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals for a specific project on COVID-19 and co-operatives.
It’s fair to say that drinking alcohol is popular among Kiwis, to the point of potential harm.
According to the latest New Zealand Health Survey, one in five adults – or 824,000 people – have an established drinking pattern that “carries a high risk of future damage to physical or mental health”.
In 2016, data showed heavy drinking sessions were much more common in New Zealand than in the UK, the US, Canada and even countries like Finland, Norway and Sweden.
Alcohol abuse is also a major contributor to crime. In 2010, the New Zealand Police estimated about one-third of all police apprehensions involved alcohol and half of serious violent crimes had alcohol as a contributing factor.
Dropping the purchasing age
However, in a landmark alcohol reform enacted in 1999, New Zealand reduced the minimum purchasing age from 20 to 18 years old.
Politicians in favour of the change argued that an 18-year-old could vote and marry and should therefore be given the chance to drink in a safe environment.
Since then, there has been an ongoing debate among social and political commentators, including health professionals, over whether the legal purchasing threshold should be raised back to 20.
Critics of the 1999 reform usually cite a potential increase in public health risks to support their point of view.
Last year, in an unprecedented move, the heads of the district health boards released a joint statement calling for the reform of the 2012 Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act.
The statement proposed numerous changes to reduce easy access to alcohol, including increasing the legal purchasing age from 18 to 20.
New Zealand’s drinking culture is well known, but data show dropping the drinking age increased only some types of alcohol-related crime. Tim Clayton/Getty Images
Does alcohol access cause a jump in crime?
In a recent study, researchers found monthly consumption jumped drastically when individuals turned 18 and could legally purchase alcohol.
The researchers used Statistics New Zealand’s integrated data infrastructure (IDI) to test whether this change in drinking behaviour prompted a corresponding spike in alcohol-related criminal behaviour among 18- and 19-year-olds.
The analysis also took advantage of the detailed crime register administered by the Ministry of Justice.
The spectrum of offences is broad, ranging from minor incidents, such as bringing alcohol into an alcohol banned area, to severe crimes like causing injury through excess alcohol.
The authors considered convictions a more accurate measure of crime than arrests, as not every arrest leads to a conviction.
Researchers looked at the difference in alcohol-related criminal behaviour for ages just below the minimum legal purchasing age versus ages right above the mandated age threshold.
Put simply, the research compared the criminal outcomes of youths who had just gained the right to buy alcohol to those who were close to turning 18 and therefore unable to legally buy it.
There was a slight increase in traffic violations by drivers around the currently mandated age of 18. However, the analysis found little evidence that 18- and 19-year-olds committed more alcohol-related crimes after reaching the legal purchasing age.
From 2014 to 2018, the average number of alcohol-induced offences for those aged 17 years and 11 months stood at 53 convictions per 100,000 people and increased by four convictions in the month turning 18. This equals an increase of 8% but is not statistically significant.
However, similar to previous research, the analysis indicated that gaining easier access to alcohol was associated with an immediate spike in other crimes, particularly dangerous acts and property damage.
The average number of property damage convictions (per 100,000 people) where alcohol was involved increased from 40 to 51 (28%), and dangerous acts increased from 47 to 60 convictions (27%) in the month of turning 18.
There was a slight increase in alcohol-related traffic offences after the legal drinking age dropped to 18 years old. Getty Images
Alcohol purchasing age of 20
The researchers also examined how criminal behaviour changed in the period between 1994 and 1998 when the legal alcohol purchasing age was 20.
They found that all alcohol-related convictions dropped from 203 to 163 (19%) in the month of turning 20.
This surprising pattern is caused by changes in the legal breath and blood alcohol limit, which takes place at the same age and permits higher blood alcohol levels for drivers aged 20 and above.
When removing those types of convictions, the researchers find no observable jump in alcohol-related crimes. That said, there was an increase in offences against public order and other traffic-related convictions.
A US study looked at how crime rates changed around the minimum legal drinking age of 21 in the states where drinking and purchasing alcohol below the age of 21 is not permitted.
The authors found individuals aged just over 21 were 5.9% more likely to be arrested than individuals just under 21. However, crime levels for this age group were substantially higher compared to New Zealand.
In Canada, where the minimum legal drinking age for most states sits at 18, and 19 in Alberta, Manitoba and Québec, a sharp increase of 7.6% in all crimes was observed – with a large jump of 29.4% for disorderly conduct.
As two decades of data shows, allowing younger people to drink has resulted in upticks in some types of crime, but not all of them. Understanding the impact of lowering New Zealand’s drinking age can inform the ongoing policy debate and offers decision makers an insight into how these sorts of thresholds can change society in unexpected ways.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michael Kearney, Associate Professor in Ecophysiology and Evolutionary Biology, The University of Melbourne
Michael Kearney, Author provided
Most animals on Earth have two sexes, male and female, that combine and mix their genes when they reproduce. We are so accustomed to this state of affairs that the existence of all-female species that don’t have sex, but instead reproduce by cloning, comes as a great surprise.
The beautiful green grasshopper Warramaba virgo is one of these rare “parthenogenetic” species, in which an egg can develop into an embryo without being fertilised by a sperm. It lives in the southern parts of the Australian arid zone, where it feeds on mulga trees and other shrubs and bushes in the summertime.
The grasshopper Warramaba virgo reproduces asexually. Michael Kearney, Author provided
We have studied these grasshoppers for the past 18 years to understand how they developed asexual reproduction, and how the change has affected their ability to survive and reproduce.
Our new research published in Science shows W. virgo arose about 250,000 years ago from a cross between two different sexually reproducing species of grasshopper, and giving up sex appears to have had no negative repercussions for them whatsoever.
The puzzle of parthenogenesis
Biologists studying evolution have often considered the rarity of parthenogenetic species like W. virgo as a major puzzle.
This is because sex imposes big costs on animal reproduction. First, there is the “two-fold cost of sex”: half a creature’s offspring (the males) are unable to produce their own offspring alone, so they are often seen as “evolutionary wastage”.
Moreover, finding a mate takes energy and mating animals are often at greater risk of attack by predators. Doing away with males also removes these drawbacks.
Warramaba virgo feeds on mulga trees (many of which also reproduce asexually). Michael Kearney, Author provided
So why does sex exist at all? The main reason, biologists think, relates to the mixing or “recombination” of genes as a consequence of sex. This can speed up the rate of adaptation by bringing favourable combinations of genes together and also helps to purge a population of combinations of bad mutations.
Parthenogenetic species don’t have these processes: instead, all members of the species have virtually identical genes. This means they might be less able to adapt when the environment changes. What’s more, parthenogens could accumulate bad mutations that reduce their fitness.
But are these costs real? Do they result in the rapid extinction of any parthenogens that happen to form?
What’s the secret of W. virgo?
Over the past 18 years we have been investigating these questions in W. virgo.
This grasshopper was first studied in 1962 by the eminent evolutionary biologist and geneticist Michael White. White’s young son Nicholas first discovered them near the New South Wales town of Hillston, when he noted that only females of a particular species could be found.
White then went on to show that the same species was present 2,000 km away in Western Australia, along with a sexual species (recently named W. whitei).
W. virgo turned out to have a hybrid origin: a cross between W. whitei and another species, W. flavolineata, many thousands of years in the past.
Warramaba virgo (middle) and its ‘parent species’, W. flavolineata (left) and W. whitei (right) Michael Kearney, Author provided
A parthenogenetic species might have an advantage if its genetic diversity is boosted by repeated hybridisations between the two parent species, producing an army of different clones. Combining the genomes of the two species might also make the parthenogens more vigorous.
Such “hybrid vigour” does occur in some animals, such as mules (crosses between a horse and a donkey). The mule has much greater strength and endurance than its parent species.
Could it be that the hybrid origins of W. virgo generated a diverse clone army with special abilities compared to its sexual relatives, or a hybrid with high level of vigour?
Few benefits to giving up sex, but also no drawbacks
The answers to these questions were a resounding “No”!
We examined more than 1,500 genetic markers in W. virgo and found almost no variation in the parthenogens compared with the parent species.
This showed clearly that only one hybrid mating between W. whitei and W. flavolineata was responsible for producing W. virgo in the first place. Based on the number and nature of mutations that have occurred in W. virgo, we estimate the mating occurred some 250,000 years ago.
We also showed that the parthenogen had no advantage over its parent species in a range of physiological traits including tolerance to heat and cold, rate of metabolism, how many eggs they lay, the size of their eggs, how long they take to mature and how long they live.
Meanwhile, W. virgo naturally produced twice as many female offspring as the sexual species. It retained its two-fold advantage over sexual species despite 250,000 years for low fitness mutations to accumulate in this species.
The conclusion from our research then is that W. virgo has become parthenogenic but without costs. It has also successfully spread all the way from the west side of the country to the east side, unlike its parent species.
Why don’t more species give up on sex?
So why then do we see sexual species everywhere despite their two-fold reproductive cost? We suspect it must be very difficult to develop parthenogenesis in the first place.
Indeed, we have tried experimentally crossing the same sexual species that gave rise to W. virgo and only created a few hybrids, none of which were able to produce offspring. The hybrid state may disturb the normal processes of egg development sufficiently to make parthenogenesis an extremely uncommon phenomenon in animals more generally.
A lab-made cross of W. whitei and W. flavolineata. She produced few eggs, none of which hatched. Michael Kearney, Author provided
We think future research into the paradox of sexual reproduction should focus on barriers that prevent sex from being lost, rather than only focusing on the advantages of sex.
Ary Hoffmann receives funding from the Australian Research Council.
Michael Kearney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The queen’s royal title and duties will one day be transferred to Prince Charles, the 73-year-old Prince of Wales.
Although the timing of this transition remains uncertain, it may prompt many Commonwealth nations such as Australia to reconsider the legacy and legitimacy of the monarchy itself.
The precarity of succession
Succession has long been the weak link in the system of hereditary monarchy.
Sometimes this is because the current ruler produces no surviving heirs, as in the case of Queen Anne, or Carlos II of Spain.
Alternatively, it may be because others dispute the line of succession, as was seen in the war-provoking disputes over succession in the cases of William the Conqueror and “Bonnie Prince Charlie”.
Sometimes, succession has not been successful because the new monarch has practised the “wrong” religion, or married the “wrong” sort of woman – as was thought of James VII and II and Edward VIII, respectively.
Perhaps most memorably the objection to the principle is so violently held, no succession is possible at all. This was true in the cases of Charles I of Great Britain, Louis XVI of France, and Nicholas II of Russia.
Across the Commonwealth, the monarch plays a crucial role in legitimatising systems of government.
Historical continuity denotes stability, an attribute that monarchies are supposed to embody. Hence the idea of the “king’s two bodies”: the physical form of the monarch may perish, but the idea of monarchy continues in the body of the new king or queen.
Our current queen holds the title of Queen Elizabeth II to associate her in line of succession with Elizabeth I. However, Queen Elizabeth is not, in fact, the second Elizabeth to reign in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, or even Scotland.
Instead, this continuity of title serves to imbue the monarchy with a sense of stability independent of party, faction, nation, or ideology.
This is not to say the monarchy is “above politics”, as is often claimed.
The emphasis on political stability and historical continuity puts it, as an institution, firmly in the conservative camp.
Conservatives tend not to write down their rules of operation in one place. One notable exception is Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution. Published in 1867, this influential book distinguishes between the “efficient” and “dignified” parts of the constitution.
Bagehot viewed the “efficient” part of the constitution as responsible government, primarily concerned with statecraft, grand strategy, and the day-to-day running of kingdoms.
The “dignified” part, in contrast, provided a symbolic focus for the the notions of unity and loyalty across Britain and its Empire – of which the monarchy was a central element.
According to Bagehot, having a popular monarch is crucial to upholding the legitimacy of the political system.
However, the popularity of a monarch can cut both ways.
If a monarch is unpopular, the legitimacy of the system can suffer. This is exemplified by public perceptions of Queen Victoria in the 1870s.
Following Prince Albert’s death in 1861, Queen Victoria remained largely absent from public life during an extended period of mourning. Meanwhile, republicanism gained significant political traction in England.
Similarly, neither Elizabeth II nor the monarchy were particularly popular in either the UK or Australia during the 1990s. Moreover, the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997 further damaged the monarchy’s public image.
Significant political resources were mobilised in the UK to rectify this situation. As a result, the monarchy was largely rehabilitated by the time of the Queen’s Golden Jubilee celebrations in 2002.
Yet, attitudes towards the monarchy can be equivocal – not least in Australia.
Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott, the most open promoter of monarchy among Australia’s recent prime ministers, came under intense criticism for his decision to appoint Prince Philip a Knight of Australia in 2015.
And the ABC received complaints after the announcement of Prince Philip’s death interrupted an episode of TV drama Vera, indicating ambivalent attitudes towards the monarchy as an institution.
Yet republicanism in Australia currently remains muted. This is in part because, as per the script-writing in the Netflix drama The Crown, the nonagenarian Queen can do no wrong.
The same cannot be said for the rest of the family.
Prince Andrew’s court case in the US, the internal feuding concerning the Duke and Duchess of Sussex (Harry and Meghan), and even William and Kate’s problematic reception during their tour of the Caribbean have harmed public perceptions of the monarchy across the Commonwealth.
In Australia, proponents of republicanism assert Prince Charles’ future ascension to the throne could signify a critical juncture in the realisation of an Australian republic.
Such “constitutional wrangling” may be overshadowed by more pressing matters – pestilence and war being two current examples.
Nevertheless, the imminent transition from Elizabeth II to Charles III across the Commonwealth entails certain risks.
Barbados became a republic last year. Perhaps it may be time for Australia to reconsider the place of the monarchy in our own political system.
Ben Wellings does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.