Keith Rankin Essay – War Trophies: Considering USA, Iran, and Japan

April 20, 2026

20201212_KeithRankin — Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Essay by Keith Rankin, 20 April 2026

Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

It’s commonplace, especially in The West, to think of wars in binary terms. In those terms, wars are either won or lost, like a sports match. And the symbol of victory is a trophy. In a match-up, the symbol of defeat is the loss of a trophy.

In the days of the Roman Empire, the trophy might be a ‘barbarian’ leader being paraded in chains; or maybe his head in a box. ‘Decapitation’ is a crude trophy word, still very much in vogue.

In the present Iran War, the trophy of victory might have been the ‘head’ of the 86-year-old ‘Supreme Leader’; Iran’s former equivalent of the United Kingdom’s late Queen Elizabeth II. But in reality, the Iranians were waiting for Ali Khamenei to die; and all the signs were, so long as Iran was left in relative peace, that a liberalisation process was already in place.

Further the assassination of Khamanei could never have been an adequate trophy for the United States. Because it was actually done by Israel, another country, another nuclear power, indeed a highly secretive nuclear power, a genocidal power which terrorises its part of the world. And we note that it has always been in Israel’s interest to keep Iran on a war-footing; to keep it from being anything other than an enemy. A progressive Iran would have very much stymied the Greater Israel project. Hence the need to assassinate Khamanei before he died of natural causes.

For the United States, another trophy had to be found. Having co-started the present war, the United States needs to end it, and with a victory trophy.

It would seem that the trophy being demanded is Iran’s enriched uranium. Apparently, the United States wants to be allowed to go into Iran, excavate the enriched uranium, and then to truck it and ship it to some undisclosed destination. To facilitate this, the United States is trying to make its victory arrangements with ‘negotiations’ brokered by an actual pro-China nuclear power in Southwest Asia; namely Pakistan, a country over which the United States has intruded upon its political sovereignty on a number of occasions, a country with no popular love for the United States and its proxies.

We need to note that, for Iran to allow the United States to acquire its trophy would represent a military defeat; a capitulation in the eyes of the world in general, the Iranian population (both those in favour of the present Pezeshkian regime, and those opposed to it) in particular, and to the global community of Shia Muslims. (The total Shia population is estimated to be 350 million, 250 million of whom are faithful, and 90 million of whom are resident in Iran.)

Japan

On the matter of understanding the shortcomings of binary victory and binary defeat, we may turn to the matter of Japan in 1945. The trophy at stake was Emperor Hirihito. And, on the basis of this binary, it was Japan, not the United States, which was victorious. Japan retained its trophy.

On 9 March 1945, the United States embarked on its campaign for unconditional victory; meaning that Japan had to unconditionally surrender, which in turn would mean that Hirohito would be Japan’s last emperor, and that his reign would end in 1945.

For starters, the United States slaughtered 100,000 residents of Tokyo in four hours of one night; the wee hours of 10 March. Total Japanese deaths from that spring and summer bombing campaign – including the nuclear deaths – was between 500,000 and one million people.

None of these bombings came close to resulting in Japan conceding its Emperor. The United States was preparing to drop three more atomic bombs on Japan that year – production criteria meant that these bombs were scheduled for November and December 1945. If Japan still refused to give up its trophy, the city of Kyoto was scheduled for removal from the United States’s non-hit list. Also, to note, the United States kept up its non-nuclear aerial assault on Japan until the day before the deal was signed.

In August 1945, communications were not good in Japan. The leadership in Tokyo had heard that there was an unusually large explosion at Hiroshima, and then another in Nagasaki, but they didn’t really have time to process their limited information. They had already been hit by plenty of other big bombs. Meanwhile, the people on the ground in Hiroshima were able to restore electrical power within three days of that explosion; locals did what locals do everywhere, pick themselves up if they can, and try to keep living.

What happened to finish the war was the threat from the Soviet Union. After the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union returned its attention to the East. There had been longstanding territorial disputes – and cold dispute still continues in the Kuril Islands – between Japan and Russia. Russia, having been embarrassed in the 1904/05 Russia-Japan War, potentially had a score to settle; Manchuria, for much of the first half of the twentieth century, had been territory contested between Russia, China and Japan.

But it was the United States which most feared the Soviet Union’s advance into Northeast Asia. In Europe, the United States was pushing the narrative that the Soviet Union, which had ‘liberated’ Eastern Europe from the German Nazi regime, was intent on pushing Communism onto Western Europe, and would use military means to do that. The hoary trope in Paris and London, that the Russians would soon be at their front-doors if they could not be held behind an iron curtain within Germany, was a narrative very much adhered to by the Americans with regard to the Far East as well as to the Far West. Indeed, by the time of the end of hostilities in August 1945, Soviet Russia had already ‘liberated’ half of the Korean Peninsula; Korea was a mirror image of the emergent East-West faultline within Europe.

So, the Americans caved in. They agreed that Japan could keep its Emperor. Japan saved face. Hostilities in the Pacific War ended the next day.

Iran again

2026 hostilities could end as soon as the United States removes its demand for a trophy which the Americans know the Iranians cannot accept. The barrier to ending the war is that the American regime would lose face without a compelling victory trophy. In the earlier Japan situation, by contrast, the American occupation after August 1945 meant that the United States could easily obscure the fact that it had had to make a major concession to secure the end of that war.

Enemies of Convenience: On the matter of Non-Binary War

At one level there is the matter of stated and unstated goals, criteria for ‘success’ (which is not necessarily ‘winning’), and knowing how and when to ‘vacate the arena’. Re the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, they contributed very little to ending World War Two, but were successful examples of ‘live testing’, and had the huge impact on the new Cold War arena in Europe as ‘demonstration devices”. With the Cold War setting in, Japan proved to be a World War Two enemy of convenience.

Of particular interest is Is war more profitable than peace? David Keen explains, Talk to Al Jazeera, 5 April 2026 (and on YouTube).

Introduction: “What if ‘who is winning’ is the wrong question? Because in many modern conflicts victory is not the only or even the main objective. … It opens streams of profit, and, for many, it creates a constant state of threat that justifies its own continuation. … Wars evolve, adapt, and sometimes sustain the very actors fighting them. … To understand why some wars don’t end, we turn to a leading voice in the political economy of conflict, Professor of Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics, David Keen.”

Keen suggests that some of the benefits of war include “making money”, “suppressing dissent under the cover of war”, “divide and rule”, “painting dissent as disloyalty”, “turning your enemy into the image that you’ve put about in your propaganda”, … “taking actions that are predictably counterproductive”. For certain aims “the enemy can be surprisingly useful”.

David Keen (unassuming, quiet, thoughtful): “This division of people into ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ is incredibly simplistic, and goes back as far as the Vietnam War.” (And further, of course!)

The Soviet Union had proved so useful to the West, that from 1991, after the Cold War, a new bogeyman – convenient enemy – had to be invented. (Note Samuel Huntingdon’s influential 1992 thesis, The Clash of Civilizations, which facilitated the multi-decade employment of many people in high-paid jobs in Washington DC, and no doubt other federal capital cities with otherwise underemployed think tanks.) Iran had already become the enemy-in-waiting in the 1980s, albeit with a degree of secrecy, when a proxy leader for American interests (called Saddam Hussein) was called upon to deal to Iran. Saddam obliged; indeed, he over-obliged, taking his cut in the form of Kuwait.

In the midst of that Iraq-Iran War, in 1987, there was the Irangate scandal.

‘”Soon after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly changed United States policy.” Secret Israeli arms sales and shipments to Iran began in that year, even as, in public, the Reagan administration presented a different face, and “aggressively promoted a public campaign […] to stop worldwide transfers of military goods to Iran”. … After a leak by Mehdi Hashemi, a senior official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa exposed the arrangement on 3 November 1986″.’ From Wikipedia.

Revolutionary Iran (the new Islamic Republic of Iran, under Ayatollah Khomeini) was becoming an enemy of convenience. It was, in the 1980s, being armed by Israel and the United States. Some of those arms will have gone to Hezbollah, established as a Shia resistance movement in 1982, in response to an Israel-led genocide in Lebanon. We note that, today, Hezbollah is a critical and convenient element justifying Israel’s grand expansionist venture.

Today, Russia and Iran – even China – are enemies of convenience to a few; and of great inconvenience to the many. Indeed, re Russia and China, there is talk of the New Cold War. See, for example, The New Cold War: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, Fred Saberi, The Times of Israel, 19 April 2026.

Re Russia, the Cold War of the twentyfirst century represents the Third Cold War. In The First Cold War, historian Barbara Emerson discusses the ‘war’ against Russia that led to New Zealand’s fortifications on North Head and other places in 1885. (I also draw attention to this 2016 extended critique of President Obama’s ‘weakness’: War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, by Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, and its unsavoury ‘adversaries of convenience’ premise.)

Modern history (which includes 1885) matters very much; Biblical history (or even the slightly more recent Koranic history) matters less. But ancient history can still matter; it tells us some pithy stories about war trophies.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin Analysis – Marooned in the Pacific Ocean: Famine Down-Under?

By Keith Rankin -

April 20, 2026

Analysis by Keith Rankin, 17 April 2026

My first paragraphs here feature Steve Keen, Australian economist, who was a panellist on Al Jazeera’s Inside Story 12 April 2026 (Could the Iran war pose lasting risks to global food security?, or here on YouTube):

Interviewer: “You’ve warned that the world could face famine within months … an extraordinarily stark prediction.”

Keen: “Thirty percent of the world’s fertiliser passes through the Strait, which has now been disrupted for over a month. There’s no sign of this war stopping any time. … There’s not going to be enough fertiliser available. Without fertiliser the carrying capacity of the world is about two billion people. Six billion of us are alive because fertiliser flows freely. … This could have catastrophic effects in all sorts of countries which could not ever imagine that they might face a famine. … That could apply to places like England. … The usual bias we have is that it’s always going to be a problem for brown people; let’s be frank, we’ve got masses of racism in the way we think about the world, and the West doesn’t worry when brown people die; well, what will happen when white people start dying; people might pay more attention.”

While Keen overstates the case, given that seventy percent of the world’s fertiliser flows through other pathways or is used near to where it is produced (though high transport costs, more generally, impede fertiliser flows; not just the blockade of the Hormuz Strait). Thirty percent of six billion is potentially 1,800,000,000 people at risk. And of course there is much food wastage at present. And many people, indeed most people in ‘England’, could survive eating less than half of what they do eat; they may even be less malnourished, by eating better food. Keen later acknowledged the issue of first world food wastage.

Nevertheless, when there are food shortages, ‘rational’ market behaviour – as understood by ‘game theory’ – means that much food would be bought up by speculators and hoarded; profiteering, in other words, a not uncommon feature of famines. (This is similar to the issue of ‘ticket scalping’.) Keen is correct to point out the problem of Euro-supremacism. One feature of the new world food order, noted by the Indian panellist on the program – Avinash Kishore – will be export bans. India, for example, is an important exporter of wheat and rice.

Keen: “Because it has such a market-oriented non-government approach to virtually everything, the United Kingdom has insufficient stocks of fertiliser, diesel fuel, and it imports about forty percent or more of its food. It’s very vulnerable to being told ‘we cannot supply you’. And it doesn’t really have any bargaining ploy in the opposite direction [unlike Australia].”

People assume that, whatever happens, Aotearoa could always feed itself; after all it’s a ‘specialist’ food producer, isn’t it? I’ll come back to that. But we note that the United Kingdom could survive foodwise with a reduction of 40% of its food supply, given that its domestic food production is in better domestic-international balance than is New Zealand’s. The fertiliser question becomes the bigger issue for the United Kingdom, and I’m guessing that it has nearly enough fertiliser stocks for 2026 spring planting, and could redirect some food exports to the domestic market. 2027 though? Incidentally, in the later 1980s, under pressure from Rogernomics, New Zealand got by for a few years with substantially reduced fertiliser usage.

Interviewer: “Just how vulnerable are modern food systems to international shocks like this?’

Keen: “The Trump administration [ie regime] had no idea what it was blundering into when it started this war. … We have a mindset of ‘perfect competition’ which implies numerous different sources, if one supplier gets knocked out then others can [immediately] take its place [as in the case of the New Zealand apple crop after Cyclone Gabrielle in 2023]; there’s no sense of urgency for the physical imports to production. … [Most] economists are completely naïve about the production systems. … There is such a thing as a critical input, and four of them pass through the Strait of Hormuz. … Yes, it’s too late to fix it, you cannot make up for missing ships.”

Keen: “I’m not overstating the potential. It might not happen, we might be lucky, shipments might arrive just in time. … The other possibility is still there. Now what happens if you don’t talk about it. … I would rather have people be too alarmed than too ignorant.”

Keen: “We think we eat green stuff. Ever since we invented fertiliser, we’ve been eating brown stuff. The green wrapping on the outside is basically us turning fossil fuels into food. … We think we have enormous resilience, but in fact we have enormous fragility. This was going to be exposed by global warming, but Donald Trump is like a Force Six cyclone coming in before the natural ones start turning up. … Our production systems are very dependent on specific inputs from specific locations. They cannot be easily replaced once damaged, and at the moment the supply is shut down completely.

Avinash Kishore, from the Indian ‘Food Policy Research Institute’: “The worst outcome would be if production itself suffers and then trade also suffers; [for example] with export bans. … China is the largest producer of fertilisers. If it restricts exports of both urea and phosphate … that makes the situation [much] worse. If trade keeps flowing, we’ll have less vulnerability, as we saw after the Ukraine crisis.”

Interviewer: “If the Strait of Hormuz were somehow to open tomorrow, and calm somehow holds, does this crisis end quickly, or has lasting damage already been done?”

Keen: “Lasting damage. One of the urea plants has already been damaged, and is not producing urea. We have to replace that facility, and these things take time. … This is showing the danger of the ‘just in time’ efficiency versus robustness [business model].’

I would note that ‘just-in-time’ can be robust, given the prevalence of the specific conditions which Keen mentioned; the conditions that most economists presume to be almost always true.

But geography can be capricious, and so can concentration of production reflecting the giant international economies of scale we see in production and transport; economies which minimise cost when disruptive forces are not at play. I would also note that many components of supply chains come as complements; thus, air freight remains largely a complement of passenger movements, fertiliser is a complement of fuel, and shipping works best when ships can carry a return load or an onward load.

New Zealand’s food security depends on its exports continuing to justify high two-way shipping capacity. What if, due to consumer prioritisation, demand in say China for New Zealand’s exports falls away; the reverse of the recent booms? This is the capriciousness of ‘income elasticity of demand’.

Some sobering statistics about New Zealand’s food and fertiliser imports

New Zealand’s Food and Fertiliser Imports
$NZ million	World				% Australia
three years ended:	1990	2001	2025	2001 to 2025	1990	2001	2025
				multiple
wheat	41	65	311	4.8	82.8%	77.2%	100.0%
rice	10	27	105	3.8	69.0%	71.9%	25.6%
prepared cereal	41	181	722	4.0	78.3%	76.7%	45.5%
incl. pasta	8	33	153	4.6	64.6%	58.5%	17.4%
prepared vegetables	59	143	529	3.7	54.9%	49.4%	16.8%
fodder	25	113	1,531	13.6	78.9%	46.6%	20.3%
ALL FOOD	778	1,937	8,637	4.5	41.2%	46.3%	29.2%
fertiliser	55	260	839	3.2	1.7%	3.0%	3.6%
ALL IMPORTS	12,759	27,966	77,306	2.8	20.9%	23.0%	10.9%

These ‘harmonised trade’ data (from Statistics New Zealand’s soon-to-be discontinued Infoshare database) cover, for us, in particular the period from 2000 to 2025. Inflation for imported food has been low for that period, given that the exchange rate for the $NZ was at an all-time low in 2000, and that not-so-high New Zealand inflation has been consistently dominated by non-tradable items. We also note that New Zealand’s population has grown by 40% since 2000.

These data are ‘value-for-duty’, meaning for our purposes (and given that New Zealand is a free-trading nation) that they are exclusive of transport and insurance costs. Of course, we now know that transport and insurance costs are going to increase dramatically; especially for a geographically marooned population.

New Zealand’s spending on imported staples has increased from 3½-fold to five-fold since 2000. Annual increases in spending on food imports were even more dramatic in the 1990s, though tradable CPI-inflation will have been higher then. (New Zealand’s data on tradable inflation only commences in the late 1990s.)

New Zealand is dependent on Australian wheat. For other staple food items, the huge increases in food imports have come from other countries. Rice, the best staple food of all, soon will become much harder to get from the non-Australian sources we now prevail upon. Pasta, rice, and pre-prepared vegetables have become dinner-staples of student flats and other income-poor or time-poor households. Further, firms which process New Zealand grown vegetables – Watties and McCain – are planning to scale back their domestic operations. (See my Frozen Vegetables, Food Security, and the New Zealand Dollar, Scoop, 312 March 2026.)

Three other points are noteworthy.

First, spending on imported fodder – imported animal food – has increased dramatically, nearly fourteen-fold, since the three years centred on 2000.

Second, most imports of fertiliser, which have increased more than threefold since 2000, are not from our neighbour across the ditch. (They – the unassembled food matter which underpins the supermarket food we eat – are byproducts of the petroleum industry; hence they come to us from Singapore and South Korea.)

Third, total imported food is now 12% of all imports, up from 6% in 1990 and from 7% in 2001; and now less than 30% of it comes from Australia. ‘Total food’ includes a huge category of imported food simply labelled ‘miscellaneous’. (We also note that little more than ten percent of New Zealand’s total goods’ imports now come from Australia.)

New Zealand’s ‘Perfect Storm’ of food vulnerability

New Zealand’s worst – or at least most immediate – problem might not be fertiliser. Rather, it might be dependence on imports of both human food staples and animal feed. New Zealand’s food production system is now so specialised re the international marketplace, that the short-run and even medium-run supply costs of pivoting to a robust more domestically-oriented model are probably prohibitive.

New Zealand’s main source of staple food is still Australia, but to a much lesser extent than in the 1990s. (Before the 1980s, New Zealand produced most of its own starch-carbohydrates.) How well will we be able to persuade Australia to keep sending us food when there will be many more other mouths to feed in the Indo-Pacific region? And how much will Australia’s food production be curtailed by restricted fertiliser and other supplies?

In terms of the Indo-Pacific food and fuel supply chain, we already see most other (indeed much bigger) nations facing major impacts from the supply-chain crisis, and putting their domestic interests ahead of international considerations; they are effectively queue-jumping, undermining the rationing process by reducing fuel taxes and by increasing food subsidies and export barriers. (Note RNZ today about Asia.)

Not all governments are as complacent as New Zealand’s. The reduced fuel taxes do not only lead to queue-jumping; they also constitute a fiscal stimulus which may help in the process of a reorientation towards more secure staple food supplies. The New Zealand government is obsessively and irrationally opposed to any kind of fiscal stimulus.

Since 2000, New Zealand has enjoyed an export windfall and rising terms of trade, thanks to the high income elasticity of demand for dairy and other protein-rich foods. That’s due in particular to high per capita growth in East and South Asia. The problem for New Zealand is that when those economies stop growing – indeed when they recess – the fall in demand for luxury foods can be equally dramatic.

On RNZ’s Business News this morning, Corran Dann noted: “For a country like New Zealand, we’re a trading nation, we need to see growth in our trading partners because they buy our goods. That is how we make our way in the world. And likewise, for them.”

Reciprocal trade – ie multilateral exchange – is economics’ foremost example of a win-win ‘game’. But humans can be capricious, narcissist, supremacist. ‘Win-win’ competitive games can be disrupted by stupid players, or even by advocates of disruption as a greater good; giving way to rivalrous zero-sum, negative-sum, or ‘lose-lose’ games. (On ‘stupid players’, we may note, in passing, Carlo Cipolla’s 1976 essay – recently republished – The Basic Laws of Human Stupidity.)

New Zealand’s highly specialised export-oriented food production system can be expected to face sudden and simultaneous supply and demand shocks. Supply shock because New Zealand farming is now so dependent on imported fuel, fertiliser, and fodder. Demand shock because New Zealand specialises in the production of luxury foods, not staples, and faces a steep fall in the demand for luxury foods.

So, in terms of Steve Keen’s comments, New Zealand is arguably much more food-vulnerable than the United Kingdom, which Keen cites. And note Avinash Kishore’s comment about the food consequences of a general breakdown in international trade. (Unlike Keen, Kishore is an optimist!)

A crisis on top of a crisis

On present food insecurity in New Zealand, this from Google’s AI overview (search: ‘NZ food insecurity’): “Food insecurity is a widespread issue in New Zealand, affecting 1 in 3 households (33%) in 2025, with 18% facing severe insecurity.” See One in Three New Zealand Households Faced Food Insecurity in 2025, IPSOS, published by Scoop15 April 2026.

It can only be regarded as disgraceful that when, under the most favourable of circumstances in the food-supply system, a food-specialising country such as New Zealand has such record-high levels of food insecurity before the coming food crisis. This ‘insecurity despite abundance’ reality is not helped by Australia also having higher levels of food insecurity than most so-called developed nations. Continued access to Australian-produced staples is New Zealand’s main means to famine-avoidance.

Another part of the possible perfect storm is New Zealand’s lack of inclination and ability to queue-jump. When staples are scarce, ‘game theory’ comes into play. The staples of game theory are scarce-product-hoarding, joining queues to gain access to these staples, and a willingness to pay a bounty for such scarce essentials. New Zealand – marooned in the South Pacific – can expect to be at the end of the queues this country finds itself having to join.

(Other concepts of game theory include: ‘arms race’, ‘race to the bottom’, ‘prisoners dilemma’, ‘tragedy of the commons’, ‘survival of the fittest’, and Hobbes’ ‘war of all against all’. Game theory assumes that individuals and nations adopt ‘economic man’ postures of ‘rational self-interest’; meaning selfish strategies. Other thought perspectives suggest that such strategies are ‘stupid’ rather than ‘rational’, and that they miss out the widely-held concept of enlightened self-interest which incorporates visions of the public good and the public interest. Adherents of rationalism usually dismiss their academic adversaries as ‘altruist’; whereas they are really public-minded, not the same thing.)

Historical Points of Reference

New Zealand faced a similar trading and shipping crisis almost exactly 100 years ago. Though it was not a food crisis then; New Zealand was not then reliant on imported food staples, though it was reliant on other imports.

The issue was the 1926 British General Strike, which focussed minds in New Zealand then on how dependent New Zealand had become in its crucial trading relationship with the far-side if not the dark-side of the world. The New Zealand economy started to tank in late-1926. 1927 then became New Zealand’s own particular annus horribilus.

New Zealand already faced very high levels of private debt, falling export prices, and a tightwad government. With the shipping constraints tipping the country over the edge, farmers walked off their farms in greater numbers than during the later Great Depression, rural New Zealand depopulated, bank balances plummeted, and the country went into a sharp recession.

The Reform (think National) government had been elected in 1925 with 47% of the votes and 69% of the seats. In the 1928 election, that government was unceremoniously turfed out of power, falling to 34% of the vote and 34% of the seats. The faded Liberal Party – under the new name of United – formed a government with the support of the new Labour Party. The economy recovered. Though the new governing arrangements didn’t last; Reform came back into government as the junior coalition partner. Eventually – in 1936 – United and Reform joined forces to create the National Party.

Another historical story of relevance is about how Germany lost World War One, through hunger. That war, in full, lasted 4¼ years; an amount of time the present Russia-Ukraine War will soon surpass. Essentially, Germany – on the battlefield, and with its lethal submarines – won the first four years (including a comprehensive defeat of its main adversary, the Russian Empire) but lost the last three months.

The critical factors in the end were the British Royal Navy blockade on German shipping, a staunch French fightbackin July 1918, and an influenza pandemic arising from an existing battlefield flu strain combining with a new strain brought over by greenhorn the American latecomers. The shipping blockade induced severe famine in Germany. That famine was so severe that it was later used to justify carpet bombing (aka area bombing) in World War Two, on the basis that no amount of RAF bombing could be as bad for German civilians as that blockade-induced famine.

Finally

The supply chokepoints around the Arabian Peninsula – the southwest of Southwest Asia – might ease sooner rather than later. Though I, unlike New Zealand’s Prime Minister, wouldn’t bet on it. New Zealand has engaged in a slow game of Russian roulette; there is now an extra bullet in the revolver’s chambers, and the pace of the game has quickened.

Will New Zealand, having played its game of chance, become collateral damage? New Zealand almost certainly was not Binyamin Netanyahu’s target.

Steve Keen focussed on the fertiliser chokehold; the core of the world’s food supply which is in fact a byproduct of the petroleum industry (and of the discussion about refined oil supplies). New Zealand’s plight is actually significantly worse than that; it’s a potential and dramatic shortfall of imported human and animal feed – a shortfall that would precede a fertiliser shortage.

What happens if or when the food ships are redirected elsewhere? Those ships burn a lot of fuel coming to and going from New Zealand. Would the world prioritise five million whitish lives, marooned in the South Seas, over ten million brown lives more easily saved? Should it? I guess not. Will future historians refer to the Great Aotearoa Famine of 2027?

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin Essay – Crusaders; the Crass, the Past, and the Present

By Keith Rankin -

April 20, 2026

Essay by Keith Rankin, 16 April 2026.

On 14 April, TV3 News ran an item (15 minutes in, not in the sports section) about how the Crusaders rugby team will, with the new Christchurch stadium, no longer be able to parade its horses and knights circuiting the sportsfield. Many of the fans, despite now having a more spectator-friendly stadium, were quite upset about this; they loved the pageantry of medieval knights heading off to invade the Levantine lands occupied by the infidel (meaning Arabic people whose ancestors had converted to Islam).

At the end of the story, the reporter said: “The horses’ symbolism has created controversy. The sword-wielding knights represent the Crusades, a series of religious wars between Christians and Muslims dating back to the 11th and 13th centuries. In 2019 the Crusaders dropped the horses following the Christchurch Mosque attacks, but reinstated them later that year minus the knights.”

So, from 2011 to 2026 they have been cowboy knight-lookalikes brandishing flags rather than swords. It was never enough to cleanse Canterbury rugby of its imagery of religious imperialism. At the very least, the Crusaders needed to change their name – and image – immediately after the 2011 terror attack. The new stadium has given them another opportunity to remove the crassness from the Crusader brand, by no longer using the ‘Crusader’ moniker.

In the twentyfirst century, the crusader-problem continues to be more real than ever to the Muslim populations of the ‘Middle East’; of Southwest Asia. And those present populations continue to understand the occupiers and interferers of their lands as Crusaders. The Crusader issue is far from being an issue confined to the Middle Ages.

We can think of there being three series of Crusades: in the Middle Ages, the Modern Age, and the Current Age.

Crusader History: Medieval Era

The first series of Crusades were the Catholic Crusades of the late Middle Ages.

The first of these – which was largely a French crusade – ran from 1096 to 1099, and resulted in the conquest and brutal genocide of Jerusalem; and the establishment of a Crusader-state – Outremer – which lasted in its full form for 88 years.

The next crusade – ‘Second’ Crusade (1147 to 1149) – was a major failure, led by the French King and the Holy Roman Emperor, in response to the Crusader State’s loss of some of its northern territory. It was a major failure.

The ‘Third’ Crusade was waged in the time of Robin Hood (1189 to 1192), by the French king of England Richard Coeur de Lion. It was an attempt to resuscitate the Crusader State, and was partially successful, though failed to recapture Jerusalem.

The ‘Fourth’ Crusade of 1202 to 1204, waged largely by the Doge of Venice, was the most historically consequential of all the Medieval Crusades. It was effectively diverted to the one city which had been the beacon for western civilisation for over 1,000 years; Constantinople, formerly Byzantium – only half the way from Venice to Jerusalem – now Istanbul.

Constantinople was the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, and the religious centre of Orthodox Christianity, the dominant branch of the Christian Church before 1204. Constantinople was comprehensively sacked by the Crusaders in that year. So, from 1204, the Roman Catholic branch of Christianity became dominant within Christendom. And the now latinised Christian ‘Middle East’ became so weakened that it was only a matter of time before the Ottoman or some other Muslim warlord conquered the lands of the Eastern Roman Empire; creating – in 1453 – the Ottoman Empire. The 1204 inter-Christian ‘event’ became Christianity’s eastern suicide debacle.

From 1453 to 1915, the Muslim Ottomans reigned in that part of the world; a Turkic Muslim caliphate.

Crusader History: the modern British Era

The next epoch of Western Crusading was the Anglo-French era of 1915 to 1948. It started with the Dardanelles Campaign (Gallipoli); meaning that the ANZAC soldiers had effectively become mercenary Crusaders, enlisted by Winston Churchill. Gallipoli was a failed Anglo-French operation, whose aim was the reconquest of Constantinople/Istanbul. New Zealand soldiers fighting for Britain’s crusade fought alongside, among others, Senegalese solders (fighting under the banner of France) in the bloody Second Battle of Krithia (6 May to 8 May, 1915).

There was much British Empire action in the whole of the ‘Middle East’ during World War One. This included Kiwi troops (who were heavily involved in at least one massacre of Muslims; at Surafend in 1918), Australian ‘Light Horsemen’, and Britain’s successful invasion of Iraq in 1917.

After WW1, Britain – the United Kingdom – formally occupied the lands that are now Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq. Iraq was occupied by Britain, in various guises, from 1917 to 1947, with a brief intermission from 1 April to 2 May 1941. And Iran from 1941 (with the Soviet Union) and, among other things, creating the conditions for a famine in 1943 which killed perhaps 300,000 Iranians.

France’s interests were particularly in the lands that are now Lebanon and Syria; the Northern Levant; including the early bronze and iron age Phoenician ports of antiquity, Tyre and Sidon, which are now being battered to a pulp by Israel.

This series of Crusades was a less overt religious conflict than the earlier and the more recent series. The major ‘religions’ were Empire and Oil; with the whole of Southwest Asia being of strategic significance to the United Kingdom in the context of India being the Jewel in the Crown of the British Empire.

Crusader History: the current Israeli-American Era

In 1948, the British/French crusader imperium gave way to the creation – with massive impetus from the United States – the new Crusader State of Israel. In many ways, 1948 was a repeat of 1099.

Like its Christian forebear (1099-1187) the present Crusader State has never considered itself to be secure; and once again the main reason for its insecurity is its overt belligerence towards both its indigenous population and its neighbours; a belligerence which precedes the formation of the stroppy United States’ client state. As in the 1099 to 1187 case, the present Crusader State has tenuous trumped-up historical claims to exclusive ownership of the site it occupies, and has deep financial and technical support from the furthest reaches of the (then and now) West.

In the case of the present Judeo-Christian Crusader Empire, the Americans have deep presence beyond the periphery of the formal Crusader State; as the British did from 1915 to 1948 re Mandatory Palestine. In particular the countries of the Arabian Peninsula have been deeply penetrated by the United States and/or Israel; most particularly the Gulf States, and noting that the United Arab Emirates presently acts very much as an under-the-radar proxy of Israel. These states – ‘beyond the periphery’ of Lebanon and Jordan – now constitute the present American Crusader Empire. They are the most significant Eastern Hemisphere components of the United States’ contemporary geopolitical empire, a Southwest Asian empire that it’s currently trying to expand.

The events of this decade constitute the most momentous events since 1948 in the history of the current Crusader State and Crusader Empire.

Property Rights

The Crusader meme is far from a nostalgic looking back to the times of Robin Hood. It’s today’s very consequential conflict of religion, theft, unipolar ideology, and naked technological power. For the city whose mosques featured New Zealand’s worst ever terrorist attack, direct association with crusader Judeo-Christendom is not a good look. That association is illiberal, insensitive, disrespectful, and Euro-supremacist.

Western crusaders – including religious and secular imperialists – have been a major source of trouble for West Asia and West Asians, through the ages. The DNA of present-day Palestinians is remarkably close to the ancient DNA of people who died in the Levant thousands of years ago.

Indigenous Southwest Asians deserve better today, including freedom of choice of religion; and the established political right to resist, and defend themselves. Today, almost all New Zealanders respect the Ottoman (Turkish and Syrian) forces (and their leaders, such as Ataturk) which, in 1915, resisted ANZAC attempts to conquer them.

————-

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin Analysis – Aggravating an Aggravated Cost of Living Crisis

By Keith Rankin -

April 20, 2026

Analysis by Keith Rankin, 15 April 2026.

On 14 April 2026 I heard this on TV3 News (about 8 minutes in):

Sharon Zollner, ANZ Bank chief economist: “We were earlier picking that the Reserve Bank wouldn’t need to hike until December, but the news out of the Middle East has kept getting worse. It does seem clear that disruption is going to continue for quite some time. Oil prices are going to remain elevated. It is counterintuitive that you would raise interest rates when the economy is already struggling, but that’s why these people are appointed, they don’t need to worry about getting elected because they are basically paid to take the longer-term view; to accept the short-term pain for the long-term gain.”

What!!! We should have been thoroughly alarmed by such anti-democratic anti-liberal pro-bureaucratic sentiment, justifying reckless technocratic adventurism. And we note that the long-term gain never seems to come for the populace; only for the elites who inflict the pain. (Zollner, by the way, has had a past record of pressurising the Reserve Bank to go early, by making similar ‘predictions’, and has been willing to apologise later for inaccurate predictions.)

Towards the end of an earlier interview Zollner (RNZ, Morning Report, 14 April 2026) said: “How high inflation goes in the initial direct impact isn’t the key point for the Reserve Bank. The key point for the Reserve Bank is how quickly it comes down again.”

Let’s look at some facts, using Trading Economics’ 10-year charts for interest rates and inflation. Take United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway. Their interest rates stayed high after their 2024 peak, and their CPI-inflation rates stayed high too. Now consider New Zealand, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. Their interest rates came down much more from their 2024 highs, and their CPI-inflation rates came down much more as well. This is simple comparative economics; economics that any schoolgirl could do. This directly contradicts what Zollner has been saying.

There’s more. On RNZ’s Business News this morning:

John Campbell: “Kiwibank is coming out swinging against interest rate hikes. They are essentially having a go at the ANZ, right, and Sharon Zollner in a way; the economists.”

Coran Dann: “Yes, sort of the hawks versus the doves, and Kiwibank would sit in that dove category. They are basically saying that it’s way too soon to be calling the potential interest rate hike in July, there’s not enough data, it runs the risk of throwing New Zealand back into a recession, it’s just too fragile to do that. The Kiwibank chief economist, he’s saying that it would heap pressure on already struggling households and businesses.”

Kiwibank chief economist [Jarrod Kerr]: “I think that, given the shock that we’re feeling, what we are hearing from our customers – businesses and households – is that this is just another cost that they [must] absorb; this is not a demand-push [sic; should have said ‘demand-pull’], this is a supply-shock, and its hurting … So, to increase interest rates at this time we think could be reckless [emphasis added], actually, and it’s definitely unwarranted.”

Two-and-a-half years of government idleness, following one very bad call

The worst thing the present NZ Government did was the first thing it did; ie after the 2023 election. The government changed the (monetary) Policy Targets Agreement to require the Reserve Bank to do what it believed it had to do to keep CPI-inflation between one and three percent, and to follow no other objective.

The government knew that the Reserve Bank (and most of the other banks’ economists) believed that – and as a matter of faith, not evidence – whatever the actual state of the economy was, CPI-inflation rates above three percent should trigger a policy intervention in the capital market to raise the cost of capital. So, it was the government’s intent that, in the event of a situation like we have at present, the Reserve Bank should override an otherwise efficient market to raise one of the most critical costs in any capitalist economy. As the common-sense ‘schoolgirl’ data mentioned above shows, this policy increases CPI-inflation (or keeps it high when it otherwise would fall) when we are fraudulently told that it will decrease inflation. It’s a wonderful game for the loud-squawking hawks within the economic-policy community; their policy generates the very inflation expectations that the policy is supposed to snuff out. It keeps them in work; at the centre of public attention as ‘experts paid [well] to inflict pain for long-term objectives which never seem to materialise.

The government does not know that such interest-raising policies raise CPI-inflation (above what it would otherwise have been) – not lower it. But it should know that; this is the ignorance of convenience. Like Donald Trump, on certain matters our governments just listen to a very close coterie of self-promoted advisers. A coterie whose advice would have been considered mad by most mid-twentieth-century economists. A coterie who waged a successful academic coup d’etat in the United States and United Kingdom in the 1970s, and in New Zealand in the 1980s.

This kind of monetary policy doublethink and groupthink is an example of orwellian tyranny. See my Binyamin, Adolf, and Benito, Scoop, 10 April 2026. War is peace. ‘Higher costs’ is ‘lower inflation’. Israel is conducting a defensive war.

Don’t believe the veracity of what Binyamin Netanyahu says. Don’t believe what Donald Trump says. And don’t believe Sharon Zollner either. All three talk the totalitarian talk, while pretending to be in some sense liberal or democratic.

PS: Heavy Lifting

Some other strange language came from that same TV3 story. This time it is the suggestion that increased ‘fuel costs’ have done ‘heavy lifting’! Zane Small: “The retail association … has looked at electronic card spending data … which showed a 0.5% increase in spending in March. Their analysis has found that it’s actually fuel costs that are doing the heavy lifting. After accounting for that rise in fuel costs, retail spending has actually dropped by 1.2%.”

At least Zane Small did not try to deceive TV3 viewers. But the framing here was quite confused.

The story is that, while retail purchases have decreased by 1.2% in March, higher prices have created the illusion of a spending increase. While more money may have been parted with, that’s entirely illusory and largely misses the point. Consumers spent more to buy less; inflation and recession in one hit. Stagflation.

————-

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

AVFA Podcast: The End of the Liberal Internationalist Order and the Rise of Illiberalism

By Selwyn Manning -

April 20, 2026

Screenshot 2026-04-20 at 2.42.49 PM — Paul G Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deliver their podcast, A View from Afar.

A View from Afar

AVFA Podcast: The End of the Liberal Internationalist Order and the Rise of Illiberalism

00:00 / 1:18:01

Recorded Live – A View from Afar podcast. Series 06, Episode 03 – In this episode, political scientist and former Pentagon Analyst Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deep-dive into: The End of the Liberal Internationalist Order and the Rise of Illiberalism.

The topics discussed include:

A Global Transition Process – What is this exactly and Why is this happening?
Why is conflict used as a global systems regulator and agent of change? And what does this mean for 2026?
The US has been the core of two pillars of liberal internationalism – its security system and system of trade.
Why then has the United States decided to break the very system it has benefitted from, and risk advancing its own demise?

Paul and Selwyn invite you to subscribe, like, and click notifications in the YouTube link so that you don’t miss another live episode.

Remember, if you are joining us live , you can comment and lodge questions but remember we may include your comments and questions in our programmes.

Also, we encourage you to join us via YouTube, as on YouTube live interaction is especially efficient. See you there.

You can also follow this podcast via the following podcast platforms:

Fiji defends its isolated UN stance supporting Israel

By Asia Pacific Report -

April 20, 2026

By Anish Chand in Suva

Fiji’s Ambassador to Israel, Jesoni Vitusagavulu, has defended his country’s voting record at the United Nations, saying it is guided by principle, not pressure.

In an interview with The Jerusalem Post, Vitusagavulu said Fiji carefully assessed each resolution on its merits rather than aligning with majority positions.

“Fiji votes at the United Nations on principle. We’ve consistently been one of the few nations to stand up against one-sided, anti-Israel resolutions,” he said.

“We don’t just follow the crowd; we evaluate every measure on its merits. For us, it’s about fairness and sovereign equality.”

He said Fiji’s approach reflected a broader commitment to balanced diplomacy.

“We believe that isolating Israel through lopsided resolutions is counterproductive to peace, and we choose instead to be a consistent voice for balanced dialogue,” Vitusagavulu said.

The ambassador stressed that Fiji maintained an “inclusive” foreign policy stance.

“We are ‘friends to all.’ Fiji is transparent about its values, so our partners know exactly where we stand.”

He added that supporting Israel did not equate to opposing other nations.

“Supporting Israel doesn’t mean we’re ‘against’ anyone else… It’s not a blanket endorsement of another country’s policies,” he said, referencing remarks by Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka.

Vitusagavulu said Fiji aimed to play a constructive role on the global stage.

“We believe that by keeping our doors open to everyone, Fiji can act as a moderate, honest voice for engagement in a very polarised world.”

Republished from The Fiji Times with permission.

Asia Pacific Report: The UN General Assembly continues to pass resolutions critical of Israel, including a March 2026 resolution demanding an end to occupation and a December 2025 vote (123-7) directing withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights. Recent resolutions consistently emphasise the illegality of settlements, demand humanitarian access in Gaza, and act on International Court of Justice findings regarding the occupied territories.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Fiji military faces questions after death of Jone Vakarisi in custody

By Asia Pacific Report -

April 20, 2026

RNZ Pacific

The Fiji military has found itself at the centre of a national firestorm following the death of a wellknown drug peddler, Jone Vakarisi, in army custody last Thursday.

Conflicting reports have emerged over the weekend regarding the death of Vakarisi, who was reportedly linked to major criminal networks.

News of his death broke while top military and police brass were gathered on Bau Islands, paying their final respects to the late President Ratu Epeli Nailatikau.

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) said in a statement on Saturday that Vakarisi’s death was due to “a sudden and severe emergency” during questioning at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks in Nabua, approximately 10 minutes’ drive from Suva City.

RFMF commander Ro Jone Kalouniwai said Vakarisi, in his late 30s, had “voluntarily presented” himself alongside three others to the RFMF headquarters “to assist with investigations”.

Kalouniwai pinned Vakarisi’s death to “a pre-existing condition”. However, Vakarisi’s family has disputed the military’s account, telling local media that he was “not a sickly person at all”.

Queenie Osbourne, the mother of Vakarisi’s children, told The Fiji Times, that Vakarisi and others were taken from their home to the army barracks on Thursday night without any formal explanations.

Leaked death certificate
A leaked death certificate, which first appeared on Fiji social media on Saturday, has now been verified by Fiji Police Commissioner Rusiate Tudravu to be an official police document.

According to the document, the causes of Vakarisi’s death are listed as asphyxia, aspiration of gastric contents, severe traumatic head injuries, and blunt force trauma to both the head and chest.

“No one informed us of his death from the night he died. We found out when he was in the morgue,” Osbourne was quoted as saying by The Fiji Times.

Vakarisi’s family is calling for justice.

Commisioner Tudravu said heads of the RFMF and Fiji Folice Force “are both in consensus of letting the law take its course, through the conduct of the investigation which is currently underway”.

According to the RFMF statement, at least one military officer has already been placed in military custody for internal disciplinary investigations.

Fiji’s Human Rights Commission said it was “concerned” about the death in military custody and has called for “a prompt [and] independent investigation”.

Aman Ravindra-Singh, a Fiji human rights lawyer who is in exile in Australia, said that based on other similar deaths in custody matters that he has looked at in the past, the injuries listed in Vakarisi’s death certificate “are consistent with torture, where a person is brutally beaten repeatedly to the head and chest resulting in death”.

‘A matter of grave concern’ – minister
Fiji Defence Minister Pio Tikoduadua has described Vakarisi’s death as “a serious matter”.

Tikoduadua said it would be inappropriate for him to comment on the circumstances of the case while police inquiries were ongoing.

“The proper process must be allowed to take its course, and all relevant facts must be established independently and professionally. Any loss of life in such circumstances is a matter of grave concern,” he said in a statement.

“I expect the full cooperation of all relevant authorities with the police investigation. Accountability, adherence to the rule of law, and respect for due process must remain paramount.

He also urged the public to allow the investigation to proceed without speculation or the spread of misinformation.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

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Mount Cook

Brooklyn

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Ōwhiro Bay

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Where we’re getting stuck

‘Hugely concerning’

No plan bee

Turning collections into data

A global pattern

A window to the past

National ministers stress unity and discipline

Scott O’Donnell would have been paid tens of thousands of dollars to be on KiwiRail’s board. But he missed large chunks of its meetings and quit after only eight months.

‘Frankly unmanageable’ conflicts of interest

Resolve poll

Spectre Strategy poll is more like DemosAU

Freshwater poll from late March