Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mehmet Ozalp, Professor of Islamic Studies, Head of School, The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation, Charles Sturt University

The death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, during the holy month of Ramadan marks one of the most consequential turning points in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

His successor, widely expected to be his son Mojtaba Khamenei, represents both continuity and contradiction in the revolutionary system established after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

At stake is not only who leads Iran, but what the Islamic Republic has become, nearly half a century after the revolution that promised an end to dynastic rule.

Who is Mojtaba Khamenei?

Mojtaba Khamenei is a cleric who has spent most of his career outside public office but close to power, working within the Office of the Supreme Leader. He was often seen as a gatekeeper and powerbroker rather than a public political figure with a formal portfolio.

At 17, he briefly served in the Iran–Iraq war. He only began attracting public attention in the late 1990s, by which time his father’s authority as supreme leader was firmly established.

Over time, his reputation has centred on two key features. The first is a close relationship with Iran’s security establishment, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and its hardline networks.

The second is a strong opposition to reformist politics and Western engagement.

Critics have linked him to the suppression of protests following the disputed 2009 presidential election. He is also believed to have wielded influence over Iran’s state broadcasting organisation, giving him indirect control over parts of the country’s information landscape and state narrative.

In 2019, the first Trump administration sanctioned Mojtaba, accusing him of acting in an official capacity on behalf of the supreme leader despite holding no formal government position.

Mojtaba’s legitimacy as leader

Iran’s constitution dictates that the Assembly of Experts (an 88-member clerical body) selects the supreme leader.

The assembly lists the religious, political and leadership qualifications of possible candidates. But in practice, it is not a neutral electoral body. Candidates for the assembly itself are vetted through institutions ultimately shaped by the supreme leader’s orbit, and its deliberations are opaque.

This creates a familiar Iranian scenario – the constitution supplies the choreography, while the security-clerical establishment supplies the music.

That matters when assessing why Mojtaba is seen as a viable supreme leader amid critiques he lacks the senior religious standing traditionally associated with the office.

A mid-ranking cleric, he was only given the title ayatollah in 2022. The title is necessary to become supreme leader, so the promotion signalled he was being groomed to take over from his ageing and ill father.

The revolution’s founding myth was clearly anti-dynastic. After toppling the shah, the revolution’s leaders rejected hereditary rule.

To many Iranians, a son following his father as supreme leader looks like an ideological backslide. The regime appears more like a theocratic monarchy, less the famous “guardianship of the jurist”.

Yet, it is also important to be precise. Mojtaba cannot inherit the position by bloodline alone. The assembly must select him.

Still, political systems can become dynastic without rewriting constitutions. Dynastic outcomes emerge when informal power networks, such as family ties, political patronage, security ties, and control over the media, can make one candidate appear more natural, safe or inevitable.

That has essentially been the Mojtaba story in Iran for years: a man who built influence not by winning elections, but by managing the gate to the most powerful office in the country.

The circumstances of Ali Khamenei’s death add another layer of significance and, ironically, legitimacy to Mojtaba’s ascension.

For many Shi’a Muslims, being killed during Ramadan carries deep symbolic resonance. The first imam of Shi’ism, Ali ibn Abi Talib, was assassinated during the dawn prayer in Ramadan in 661 CE, an event still commemorated each year by Shi’ite Muslims.

Shi’ite historical memory places strong emphasis on martyrdom. In particular, the death of Husayn ibn Ali, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, at Karbala in 680 CE, symbolises the struggle between justice and oppression.

Because of this tradition, violent deaths of leaders in the past and today are framed within a broader narrative of sacrifice and resistance.

Iran’s revolutionary ideology has long drawn on these themes. If the state presents Khamenei’s death in this light, it could strengthen a narrative of martyrdom and defiance.

This, in turn, gives his son Mojtaba an aura of religious legitimacy that is very strong in the Shi’ite Muslim psyche.

How different would he be from his father?

This is the most consequential question for Iran. The answer is likely less different than many might expect.

Ali Khamenei was a figure of the revolutionary generation. His authority rested on ideological legitimacy, decades spent amassing and consolidating power, and his ability to arbitrate between competing factions. Over time, he became the system’s final referee.

Mojtaba Khamenei, by contrast, is often portrayed as a product of the security establishment, rather than a public theologian or statesman. He is known less for speeches or religious authority than for his influence and the networks he has built behind-the-scenes coordination.

If that assessment is correct, the shift would be from a leader who balanced institutions to one who may lean more heavily on the might of the IRGC. This would deepen an existing trend toward the securitisation of Iranian politics.

In a period of war and instability, regimes typically prioritise continuity and control. Mojtaba’s appeal to the establishment, therefore, appears to rest on several factors:

• his close ties to the IRGC and intelligence networks
• his long experience inside the supreme leader’s office
• his ideological alignment with hardline positions sceptical of reform and Western engagement.

A figure trusted by the most powerful security institutions also reduces the chance of power struggles or fragmentation at the top.

What might this mean for the war?

A new supreme leader rarely produces an abrupt ideological shift, especially during a military conflict. Continuity is the more likely outcome.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s profile suggests a more security-centred style of leadership with three possible ways forward.

First, domestic control may harden. Given Mojtaba’s reported ties to the security establishment, unrest is more likely to be met with swift repression rather than political accommodation.

Second, the IRGC could expand its influence in regional affairs, given how closely aligned Mojtaba is with the guards.

Third, any negotiations with the West would likely be tactical rather than transformative. They would be framed as a strategic necessity rather than an ideological shift.

And given the fact his father was killed in US-Israeli airstrikes, this will only reinforce a more hardline posture toward both countries.

In short, Iran under Mojtaba Khamenei would likely remain confrontational in rhetoric, but pragmatic when regime survival is at stake.

– ref. Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s presumed next supreme leader? And would he bring change – or more brutal suppression? – https://theconversation.com/who-is-mojtaba-khamenei-irans-presumed-next-supreme-leader-and-would-he-bring-change-or-more-brutal-suppression-277483

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

South Australians are heading to the ballot box on March 21. If polls are correct, Peter Malinauskas’s Labor government will win in a landslide.

Polling also indicates One Nation has pulled ahead of the Liberal Party in the state, making it the first test of whether One Nation’s recent surge in national polls can translate into votes – and seats.

To talk about how the campaign is going so far and to explain some distinct features of the South Australian system, we speak to four locals:

• Flinders University’s Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy, Rob Manwaring
• former federal minister and incoming national Labor president, Kate Ellis
• Opposition Leader Ashton Hurn
• former Liberal Senator turned One Nation’s lead upper house candidate, Cory Bernardi.

A ‘once-in-a-generation premier’: Manwaring

Flinders University’s Rob Manwaring says Labor is not taking the election win for granted and was still “trying to pinch strategic moments”, like poaching the MotoGP from Victoria. Manwaring says the premier’s personal popularity has been a key to Labor’s success.

I just wouldn’t underestimate just the charisma and the political leadership of Peter Malinauskas. He has been described by others as a sort of once-in-a-generation style politician.

[…] Largely he’s been sort of quite untouchable [… although] the debacle over, for example, Adelaide Writers Week and the disinvitation to a particular writer and the fallout from that, that actually proved perhaps there was some overreach by the premier […] But politically, there’s no damage.

As for One Nation, Manwaring predicts the party could win one or two seats in the lower house and “at least two spots” in the upper house, based on current polling. But he says seats alone are not the only way to measure One Nation’s success at this election.

I think that One Nation nationally will be looking at South Australia as a test bed to say they are riding high nationally […] I think they will be looking at the South Australian campaign to see what’s working and what’s not. And it’s a striking development too, because One Nation has had so little […] history in South Australia.

Voters ‘flirting’ with One Nation should think again: Hurn

Ashton Hurn, who took over as Liberal leader with only around 100 days before the election, says she and her team “are working to ensure that everyone knows what we stand for”.

You just have to be focused on speaking with as many people as you possibly can. Something that I’m always mindful of is Winston Churchill. He said that a politician complaining about the media is like a sailor complaining about the sea, or thereabouts. And so I just try and focus on what I can control and that’s my movements on the ground, getting to businesses, getting to every corner of the state as much as I possibly can.

The opposition leader says that while “the polls are pointing in a certain direction […] it’s not over until it’s over”.

I’m focused on […] getting the important things right, like affordability in SA, the healthcare system, which, of course, was such a dominant issue at the last election that the premier went to the election urging people to vote like their life depends on it and now he barely mentions the ramping word. So just getting back to the basics, I feel that’s what people are wanting.

As for the challenge from the Liberals’ right flank from One Nation, Hurn says:

We’re dealing with One Nation in the same way that we would deal with all minor parties. And I say that not because I’m ignorant to what I see in the polls. But it’s one thing to be sending a message to the major parties. It’s another thing to vote for minor parties come election day.

So we’re really clear about what we stand for. We’re the only party that is interested in defeating the ALP. And I just encourage anyone who’s flirting with the idea of voting One Nation to give the Liberals another look.

Aiming for ‘a couple’ of upper house seats: Bernardi

Cory Bernardi, One Nation’s lead upper house candidate, says he and his team are “running to give a voice to a great many South Australians who think the major parties have left them behind”.

They think the Liberal and Labor parties are basically the same, they care more about themselves than they care about outcomes for the electorate, and we’re giving them a strong voice. But we’ve also got a solid policy backing behind us. We know what we want to do, we know what we want to influence.

Bernardi says One Nation’s priorities include opposing “all race-based legislation”, including repealing South Australia’s Voice to Parliament; abandoning “net zero”; and lowering the cost of living, such as by removing state government stamp duty from general insurance contracts.

Bernardi also defends recent comments One Nation leader Pauline Hanson made about no “good” Muslims. He says “I’m 100% supportive about her comments in respect to the cultural integration and immigration mix in this country”.

Bernardi says while “predictions are fraught with error”, he won’t be surprised if a likely Labor government can get their legislation through the next parliament. But he says “I’d like to think we might be able to get a couple [of seats] in the upper house”.

With so many in the race, expect complicated results: Ellis

Incoming national Labor president Kate Ellis says “a huge split in the right and a number of independents and a fracturing of the vote […] makes this a little more unpredictable than other elections”.

Asked about the SA premier’s pro-immigration stance, Ellis says Malinauskas hasn’t been “kowtowing to One Nation”, despite the party’s surging support in the polls.

He’s actually leading an intelligent conversation about the fact that we need immigration, our economy needs immigration. But also everyday families need immigration across a whole range of employment areas, where otherwise we just wouldn’t find the workers.

[…] The rise of One Nation here is really interesting, in that I’m seeing it in metropolitan areas where I see people that were once locked-in Liberal voters wearing One Nation t-shirts and caps when they’re at the local farmers market. Like it’s quite noticeable and quite new and different.

I think the thing we don’t know is we’ve seen the polls, but we also know that it’s going to be really complex here in terms of results. We have a huge number of candidates, I think it’s a record high, the number of candidates running in seats across the state. But we also have a number of independents and some quite strong independents. So we know that disillusioned voters may be looking elsewhere. But I don’t know where those votes are going to land in the end.

– ref. Politics with Michelle Grattan: South Australian election special – https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-south-australian-election-special-277502

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed federal parliament on Thursday his well-crafted speech had one gaping hole. It did not mention the huge issue dominating world attention – the United States-Israeli strikes on Iran and the subsequent ever-widening conflict that has engulfed the region.

Both Carney and Anthony Albanese were quick to back the action at the weekend. But their endorsements would have been given reluctantly. Despite Australia and Canada being close American allies and members, with the US, of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement, neither leader was accorded any prior notice of the attack.

Elaborating after his initial reaction, Carney said: “we took a position because we view the nuclear threat and the export of terrorism of Iran over decades as one of the gravest threats to international peace and security. In that limited sense we supported that aspect. That is not a blank cheque. That is not us participating.”

Albanese has been equally anxious to keep a distance while providing backing. He has refused, for example, to be drawn into the debate about the strikes seeming to flout international law.

Rewind to 2003 and the Iraq war. Labor was in opposition and came out strongly against the action. Albanese said at the time: “we do need regime change in some places of the world – it would certainly be good thing in Iraq – but it should be brought about peacefully”.

We might ask: if Labor were in opposition now, would it be against the American-Israeli action? Quite possibly.

In power, however, Albanese would have judged his government had no viable choice but to back Donald Trump’s action.

Critics argue that, given the nature of the Trump administration, Australia should unwind its alliance with the US. The Albanese government rejects that view as not in Australia’s long term interests – even if it were practical, given the now-advanced integration of our defence forces, to say nothing of AUKUS.

When Albanese finally secured a meeting with the US President last year, he established what seemed a reasonable rapport.

(Of course this can disappear in an instant, as British Prime Minister Keir Starmer found this week. When Starmer didn’t cooperate with Trump’s wishes in the Middle East conflict Trump turned nasty, saying, “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with”.)

In deciding his government’s stand on the US-Israeli action, Albanese would have been mindful of not harming the relationship he has established. An angry Trump could lash out – as he did against Spain. Trump declared “we’re going to cut off all trade with Spain” after that country said it would not allow the US to use jointly-run air bases in Spain for the Iran operation.

Albanese knew quiescent caucus members would suck up any doubts they had about backing the war. Politically, the main issue the government has had to cope with is some criticism of whether it has been doing enough to help stranded Australians get home.

As petrol prices started to rise – a hot button for the average person – Treasurer Jim Chalmers, who received some good news this week with a small uptick in Australia’s growth, quickly turned his attention to the economic implications of the conflict, amid work on the May 12 budget.

“The full consequences of this conflict are uncertain, but they’re likely to be substantial,” Chalmers said. “We already had challenges in our economy with inflation and global economic uncertainty, and what we’re seeing in the Middle East will make those challenges harder rather than easier, and this will be a key focus of the budget.”

Independent economist Chris Richardson’s judgement is that the conflict will be “a small economic negative and a smaller budget positive”.

“Conflict in the Middle East leads to spikes in both uncertainty and energy prices,” Richardson said in a social media post.

“Both of those will lower world growth, though perhaps not much.

“They’ll also drag on the Australian economy, though we do get a couple of offsets. The weaker world will weigh on industrial commodity prices, such as iron ore. But there are boosts underway to both energy commodities such as gas (where we are big producers) and fear commodities such as gold (ditto).

”[In net terms] that leaves the Australian economy feeling some pain (growth and jobs both a tad weaker), while still adding to overall national income (income from gas and gold both higher). The Australian economy is running faster than it can sustain right now, so a mild growth negative isn’t much of a problem.“

The new war has predictably worsened the fraying of social cohesion we’ve seen since 2023.

There was celebration among the local Iranian community, who welcomed the US-Israel strikes and fervently hope the conflict will lead to regime change.

But some mosques held or planned memorials for Iran’s slain Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. New South Wales premier Chris Minns strongly condemned them. That invited an extraordinary blast from the Liberal mayor of Liverpool Ned Mannoun who accused Minns of having a “fetish with attacking the Islamic community”.

There were calls for funding to be halted to Muslim bodies involved in the memorials. A $670,000 grant to a Melbourne organisation was cancelled.

Weeks before, Minns had cancelled the premier’s Iftar dinner. The state government said this was after consultation with Muslim community leaders. The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils this week said the decision “reflects the growing breakdown in the relationship between the Minns Government and the Muslim community” in the state.

“The reality is that the event would likely have faced a significant boycott from community leaders and organisations, which speaks volumes about the depth of frustration within the community,” the federation said.

Minns, questioned about police last month moving on praying Muslims, this week admitted to a “strained” relationship with the Muslim community.

“We want to rebuild the relationship, not just with me personally or the government or the Labor party, but with the civic institutions […] I don’t want to be in a situation where I’m antagonising the Muslim community, particularly during Ramadan.”

The sentiment is right, but overseas and local events have become wrecking balls for social harmony, and there are no obvious answers for repairing the damage.

– ref. Grattan on Friday: would Labor be supporting this war if it were in opposition? – https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-would-labor-be-supporting-this-war-if-it-were-in-opposition-277242

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

The byelection for the regional New South Wales seat of Farrer, vacated by former opposition leader Sussan Ley, will be held on May 9.

the date was announced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives on Thursday.

The main contenders for the seat with be the Liberal Party, the Nationals, One Nation and at least one high-profile independent, Michelle Milthorpe. The Labor party is not running.

The byelection, just days before the May 12 budget, is being regarded as a major test for new opposition leader Angus Taylor.

Importantly, it will also indicate whether the surge for One Nation in the opinion polls translates to votes. One Nation will select it’s candidate this weekend, from a shortlist of three.

The Liberal and National parties are yet to select candidates but Milthorpe who polled 20% at the last election, is already campaigning.

The Liberals will hold a rank-and-file pre-selection in about a week. The Nationals’ candidate will be chosen on Sunday.

The key dates are:

• Issue of writ Wednesday April 1
• close of rolls Wednesday April 8
• close of nominations Monday April 13
• declaration of nominations Tuesday April 14
• date of polling Saturday May 9
• return of writ on or before Friday July 10

– ref. Farrer byelection will be on May 9 – https://theconversation.com/farrer-byelection-will-be-on-may-9-277621

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By James Dwyer, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania

A US submarine sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena off the southern coast of Sri Lanka on Wednesday, killing 87 people.

The submarine struck the ship with a torpedo, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said, resulting in “quiet death”.

The event marks the first time a US submarine has launched a torpedo in combat or engaged and destroyed a ship since the second world war.

Why is this old weapon reappearing now? And for that matter, what are torpedoes? Can ships defend against them, or even see them coming?

What are torpedoes, and how do they work?

Torpedoes have changed little over the years in terms of their concept and their operation. Simply put, a torpedo is effectively a small, unmanned submersible – a kind of hybrid of a mini-submarine and a missile, designed to attack both submarines and surface ships.

However, they have been modernised to an extent. Torpedoes today are generally “dual purpose”, designed to attack and destroy both ships and submarines. Single-purpose torpedoes are less commonly seen, but given their specialised nature are often more lethal.

Torpedoes are initially connected to the launching submarine by a wire or fibre-optic cable transmitting targeting data. These wires are designed to be “cut” as the torpedo gets close to its target, with the torpedo then switching on its own active sonar to steer the rest of the way.

Exactly how far torpedoes can be fired is highly classified information, but it may be tens of kilometres. It depends partly on how the torpedo is propelled – either with an electric motor (more common) or a fuel-powered one.

Electric motors are generally preferable, given their ability to accelerate instantly and achieve higher speeds. However, the range is generally considered to be lower than fuel-propelled torpedoes.

Why torpedoes are still in use today

Torpedoes are quite old and in many ways quite simple compared with more modern weaponry. However, they remain the primary armament of attack submarines.

As the name suggests, attack subs are designed to hunt and destroy other submarines, surface combatants (warships) and, if necessary, commercial vessels.

Other types of submarines such as ballistic missile submarines (designed for retaliatory nuclear strikes) and guided missile submarines (designed to fire guided missiles) also generally carry torpedoes for self-defence.

Submarines are by their nature stealthy. They are designed to sneak in close to their target undetected, and launch surprise attacks while remaining submerged.

To fire an air missile, a submarine needs to surface and risk detection. So torpedoes, which can be fired underwater, remain the perfect offensive weapon for submarines.

Torpedoes can also be delivered by aircraft, usually to strike at submarines where airborne missiles can’t reach. Aircraft typically use missiles to strike surface ships, as an aircraft would need to make a risky close approach to get within torpedo range.

How do warships detect and protect themselves from torpedo attack?

Beneath the sea, visibility is low and the radio waves used for radar don’t travel far. The primary tool for detecting submerged objects is sonar.

Sonar systems use sound, which travels faster and further through water than air.

There are two kinds of sonar: passive and active. Passive sonar listens quietly for engine noise, or transient sounds such as a torpedo tube being opened.

Active sonar generates a loud “ping” or series of pings and then listens for echoes. The initial pulses of noise reflects off objects to effectively paint an image, in a process known as echolocation.

The use of active sonar is generally avoided unless absolutely necessary, as it gives away the sonar user’s location. It can also be detected further away than it can itself detect objects such as submarines.

Submarine warfare plays out as a game of cat and mouse. The submarine attempts to sneakily move in close to its target undetected using passive sonar, and attack up close where the target has less chance of evading.

In turn, warships are constantly attempting to listen with passive sonar to avoid sneak attacks. If suspicious of close submarine contact, they will turn to active sonar to more accurately locate and attack first.

Active defences

If they know a torpedo is coming their way, surface ships and submarines have a few options up their sleeves for defence.

The first option is often to immediately accelerate and undertake radical changes of direction. The idea here is to make the torpedo manoeuvre in such a way as to break its guidance wires, or throw off its sonar.

If the guidance wires are cut prematurely, the torpedo’s active sonar may not be able to accurately detect the target (and could even possibly target the submarine that launched it if it were to manoeuvre in such a way as to accidentally cross the torpedo’s path).

Failing this, both warships and submarines are equipped with decoy noise makers, either towed or standalone. These generate bubbles and noise to try and get the torpedo to attack them instead of the target vessel.

As a last resort, warships are generally “compartmentalised” so damaged sections can be sealed off, meaning the vessel can still float even if a large amount of damage occurs.

An old weapon but hard to beat

Given the stealthy nature of submarines, in reality it is unlikely that they will be detected. It is also unlikely a torpedo will be detected until the final stage when it switches to active sonar to reach its target.

As a result, ships and submarines are likely to be first aware they are under attack when the torpedo detonates.

While torpedoes are still an old technology, there is still little in the way of active defences against them. This is quite different to the situation in the air, for example, where missile interceptors can often detonate an incoming missile in flight.

For the foreseeable future, torpedoes will still be the main weapon for submarine and anti-submarine warfare.

– ref. The US just torpedoed an Iranian ship. Here’s why this old tech is hard to defend against – https://theconversation.com/the-us-just-torpedoed-an-iranian-ship-heres-why-this-old-tech-is-hard-to-defend-against-277615

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hussein Dia, Professor of Transport Technology and Sustainability, Swinburne University of Technology

Petrol prices began rising even before the conflict in Iran drove oil prices higher. Australia imports around 80% of its fuel, which means prices can spike when geopolitical shocks ripple through supply chains.

As motorists face long queues in Australian cities, some will wonder whether it’s time to join the increasing numbers going electric to prevent hip-pocket pain.

Avoiding the weekly petrol fill-up is appealing. But the sticking point for many motorists has long been the higher upfront cost of an EV. As competition has increased, EV prices have fallen. Even so, most EVs still cost several thousand dollars more than a comparable conventional car.

Over time, cheaper running costs and less maintenance mean EV owners should recoup some of this money. But how long does it take? To answer this, I helped develop a public EV payback calculator, comparing five popular EVs with closely matched hybrid cars in the Australian market. Here, you can estimate how long it will take to pay back the price difference between EV and a conventional car.

It turns out the biggest factor is how you charge your EV. For drivers who rely on pricier public fast chargers, payback will take much longer. But drivers who charge mostly at home can see payback in a few years.

What makes EVs cheaper to run?

Battery electric vehicles are generally cheaper to run for three main reasons.

1. Electricity is typically cheaper than petrol or diesel per kilometre driven – especially when charging at home using off-peak grid power or rooftop solar. EVs convert energy to motion far more efficiently than internal combustion engines, so less energy is wasted as heat.

2. Maintenance costs are usually lower. EVs have far fewer moving parts, no oil changes, and less wear on brake pads, given regenerative braking does more work to slow the car – and recharges the battery. Over time, this translates into lower servicing bills. Early fears about battery degradation are vanishing, as batteries generally last longer than the lifespan of the car and last longer in the real world than during testing.

3. Running costs are more predictable. Petrol prices change daily, while electricity prices usually change more slowly. EV drivers able to charge at home usually choose to charge cheaply at off-peak times or off home solar.

These advantages are real. But they don’t mean EVs are cheaper for everyone in every situation.

How does the calculator work?

At present, the MG4 Excite electric hatch retails at roughly A$42,000 drive-away, while a Toyota Corolla hybrid costs about $40,000.

The question is how fast the EV’s lower running costs recover this gap (in this case, $1,900).

My EV payback calculator models three annual distances: 10,000km (light use), 15,000km (average) and 20,000km (heavy). It also tests three patterns of charging: mostly home charging, a mix of home and public charging, and mostly public fast charging.

The calculator models five vehicle pairs, reflecting the choice many Australians are weighing up: battery EV or hybrid combustion engine vehicle in the same size class and price bracket. This is a conservative choice, because hybrids tend to have lower running costs than traditional cars.

For each pair, the calculator takes the price difference and annual running costs, and then calculates how long it would take for the lower energy and servicing costs of the battery EV to recover the higher purchase price.

These are not predictions or financial advice. They are indicative comparisons using conservative, transparent assumptions.

What does this look like?

The payback time shows how long it takes an EV to recover its higher upfront price under different driving and charging patterns.

Shorter payback times mean savings accumulate quickly, while longer periods indicate the extra upfront cost lasts a long time or is never recovered.

Payback time is useful, but it helps to see what it means in annual savings. Here, the big takeaway is charging behaviour matters as much as the car itself. Charging mostly at home delivers consistent savings, while relying heavily on public fast charging shrinks or even erases the advantage.

Home charging at off-peak times might cost 20 cents a kilowatt-hour, while the same charge at an ultrafast public charger might cost 60c/kWH. For a car with a 60kWH battery, that means a charge could cost A$12 at home or $36 at the public charger.

This means EV affordability is partly a question of charging access and electricity prices, not just sticker price. The economics are shaped less by the badge on the bonnet than by the charging pattern.

Payback time isn’t the only consideration. Many buyers also consider safety features, performance, convenience and likely resale value. But this shows whether an EV is cheaper to run and whether it repays its premium quickly are not the same question.

Home charging makes the biggest difference

When charged mostly at home, all five EVs save money on running costs when driven the typical 15,000km a year. In some cases, savings are large enough that payback arrives well within the typical ownership period of around ten years.

The clearest EV examples are the MG4 Excite and BYD Atto 3. These two battery EVs have moderate upfront premiums, and energy costs are meaningfully lower than hybrid equivalents. Under baseline assumptions, the MG4 can pay back in 3–5 years and the Atto 3 in 5–8 years. Payback is faster for higher-mileage drivers. This shows a lower upfront premium matters as much as efficiency.

Reliance on fast chargers can wipe out savings

Once charging shifts towards more expensive public fast chargers, the running-cost advantage narrows and payback takes longer. This is particularly visible when EVs are compared against efficient hybrids, which already have lower fuel costs.

That does not mean EVs are “bad”. It means more expensive public charging can eat up much of the running-cost advantage, especially when petrol prices are low. For prospective EV drivers without access to home charging, it’s worth checking the cost of nearby public chargers.

What does this mean for you?

My calculator shows EVs save most money and recoup their premium fastest when charging happens mostly at home, especially for people who drive more. But when motorists rely heavily on public fast charging, payback is less certain.

As Australian drivers consider going electric to save money – and end reliance on imported fuels – the key is not to focus only on the sticker price. It’s more useful to think through where you will charge your EV most of the time and estimate the costs and savings from doing so.

– ref. Petrol prices too high? Here’s how quickly an EV could save you money – https://theconversation.com/petrol-prices-too-high-heres-how-quickly-an-ev-could-save-you-money-272165

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rebecca Strating, Director, La Trobe Centre for Global Security, and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made an impassioned pitch in the Australian parliament for middle powers like Canada and Australia to build new coalitions in the “ruptured” global order that are less reliant on the United States.

In a post-rupture world, the nations that are trusted and can work together will be quicker to the punch, more effective in their responses, more proactive in shaping outcomes, and ultimately more secure and prosperous.

The question for middle powers like us is whether we preserve existing rules, write new rules to determine our security and prosperity, or let the great powers increasingly dictate outcomes.

Carney made a compelling case. So, how exactly would new coalitions of middle powers work, and which countries could Australia work with more closely?

The world order has “ruptured”, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has warned – so it’s time for countries like Australia and New Zealand to forge a new, less US-reliant future. In this six-part series, we’ve asked top experts to explain what that future could look like – and the challenges that lie ahead.

Why middle powers need to work together

This enthusiasm for middle power coalitions poses some uncomfortable questions for Australia, given it requires a re-examination of our most important ally, the United States.

In defence terms, Australia remains reliant on Washington’s presence and military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of our own military hardware simply cannot function without the US.

Stepping away from the US alliance completely is not an option. This is why Canberra has expressed support for recent US and Israeli strikes in Tehran, while not participating in them.

Yet, Canberra can – and should – build up other relationships to hedge against dependence on an increasingly unreliable US. We can do this in areas such as trade, conflict prevention and international law.

And with great powers increasingly willing to breach international law, middle powers have a great responsibility. By working together to safeguard international institutions, they can keep the global order functioning and try to restrain the behaviours of great powers when need be.

What would middle power alliances look like?

We need to be careful not to romanticise “middle powers”. The term often refers to countries that are not great powers, but can still exert influence and agency on the global stage through diplomacy or economic and military strength. This can include countries whose values or interests don’t align with Australia’s, such as Iran.

With that in mind, Australia should engage with other middle and smaller powers with a clear understanding of shared priorities:

• avoiding coercion by great powers

• shaping the architecture of international cooperation

• holding great powers to account as “responsible stakeholders” of the international order.

So, how would these arrangements work, practically speaking?

In his speech in Canberra, Carney advocated for a “dense web of connections” with other middle powers. He called it “variable geometry”, or creating different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests.

Variable geometry is not a retreat from multilateralism. It is its evolution.

Bilateral ties

Let’s start by looking at Australia’s ties with individual countries.

Of course, Australia has a strong alliance with New Zealand.

Beyond this, Canberra has signed a number of “comprehensive strategic partnerships” in recent years with countries in the region, including the ASEAN bloc of Southeast Asian countries, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, South Korea, and most recently, Vietnam.

These agreements can deepen cooperation in a range of areas of mutual concern, including security.

Australia also signed a new defence agreement with Japan in 2023 that allows for each country’s forces to operate in the other. This is a big deal – it was Japan’s first defence treaty with an international partner since 1960.

More recently, Australia has agreed to bilateral defence agreements with Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Timor-Leste. These pacts appear focused on “strategic denial” – preventing potential adversaries from achieving a foothold in our immediate region.

These bilateral agreements are regionally focused. A key question for Australia is whether it can also cooperate with countries like Canada, the UK, Germany and France in the Indo-Pacific region. This relies in part on their appetite to engage more here.

As Carney mentioned in Canberra, one potential area of cooperation is the Critical Minerals Production Alliance – an initiative launched by Canada to expand critical minerals production and processing capacity and diversify supply chains.

‘Lattice-work’ arrangements

Australia also has small coalitions in the region that allow for more flexible models of security cooperation.

Coalitions, rather than alliances with firm defence commitments, are more likely to flourish in a region as geo-strategically, economically and politically complex as the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s key “minilateral” partnerships include:

• the Quad (Australia, US, Japan, India) and emerging “Squad” (Australia, Japan, Philippines, US)

• AUKUS (Australia, UK, US)

• the Trilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, Japan, US)

• Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US).

These all centre on US participation for a reason. Strategic minilateralism has long been Canberra’s way of anchoring Washington to the Indo-Pacific to provide a counterweight to China’s regional influence.

It is important to note that many middle powers hedging their bets by not aligning with either the US or China – such as Indonesia – still have strategies that rely on the US not withdrawing from the region.

The challenge now is how to cultivate new small-group arrangements for an uncertain future. Two new groupings that make a lot of sense are:

• Japan, South Korea and Australia These three US allies have been growing closer in recent years. Now, it makes even more sense for them to collaborate in ways that may not involve the US, including in economic security, maritime security and supporting international rules.

• Australia, Japan and the Philippines Like Japan, Australia is increasing its defence cooperation with the Philippines, another US ally. The Philippines is at the coalface of a number of security challenges involving China.

Larger alliances

Australia can also deepen relationships with larger groupings in areas other than security.

In fact, there’s already a successful group of middle and small powers in the region that doesn’t include either the US or China: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (or CPTPP).

This is a free-trade agreement originally for Pacific Rim countries, comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. (Trump pulled the US out in 2017.)

The United Kingdom became the first non-Pacific nation to join in 2024; others like Uruguay, Costa Rica, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and the Philippines are interested in joining next.

The CPTPP has been successful in eliminating most tariffs among member countries, while also providing a platform for economic cooperation more broadly.

This agreement could expand even further to include the European Union, South Korea, Norway and Switzerland. Carney wants to “broker a bridge” between the EU and the CPTPP to “create a trading bloc of 1.5 billion people, grounded in common standards and shared values”.

The premature death of the global order

We need to avoid simplistic narratives about the state of the international order. Multilateralism isn’t dead. Global institutions still matter.

And people risk misunderstanding Carney’s call if they use it to suggest we need to funnel all of our efforts and resources into military deterrence alone. Middle and small powers play important roles in preserving international norms and creating new ones. This is more pressing in the current security environment.

And though the US is less interested in multilateralism at the moment, there is still a place – and a need – to encourage the great powers to cooperate on a wide range of issues, from trade to climate change to AI governance.

– ref. In a ‘ruptured’ world order, here’s how Australia can forge new middle-power partnerships – https://theconversation.com/in-a-ruptured-world-order-heres-how-australia-can-forge-new-middle-power-partnerships-276367

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Heather Bray, Senior Lecturer in Science Communication, The University of Western Australia

Last month, the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court determined that plant-based drink maker Oatly could not trademark the phrase “Post Milk Generation” – effectively banning the use of the word “milk” on their cartons.

The decision marked the end of a long-running legal battle between the Swedish drink maker and Britain’s dairy industry. Dairy UK, representing the country’s dairy farmers, objected to Oatly trademarking the “post milk” phrase on the basis that the use of the term “milk” was deceptive.

The UK Supreme Court upheld Dairy UK’s case, citing UK regulations that limit “milk” to only being used to describe food derived from “mammalian secretions”. In the UK and European Union, only cow’s milk can be called “milk”.

But what are the rules for plant-based drinks in Australia and New Zealand? And are consumers here confused by the word “milk” on everything from soy to almond and oat drink cartons?

What are other countries’ rules on ‘milk’ labelling?

The UK regulations referred to in the Oatly case were actually based on European Union rules, adopted by the UK before Brexit.

The EU regulations have been in place for more than a decade. The words “milk”, as well as other dairy words such as “cheese”, “butter”, and “cream”, are all banned from being used to describe plant-based products sold in the EU.

Under the EU rules, only cow’s milk can be called just “milk”. Any other species of mammal milk has to be identified – such as “sheep’s milk” or “goat’s milk”.

In contrast, in the United States some plant-based drinks are allowed to be labelled as “soy milk” or “almond milk” as those names have been established by common usage.

But there is a long-running bipartisan campaign to ban the word “milk” being used for anything other than dairy there, too.

Critics argue the US Food and Drug Administration has failed to enforce its own detailed standards, defining milk as “the lacteal secretion […] obtained by the complete milking of one or more healthy cows”.

US Democrat Senator Tammy Baldwin, who’s led a nearly decade-long campaign, says:

calling non-dairy imitation products “milk” or “yogurt” that do not contain dairy and are instead from a plant, nut, or grain, hurts dairy farmers […] and causes consumer confusion about the nutritional value of dairy versus imitation products.

What’s allowed in Australia and NZ?

Demand for plant-based drinks has been growing in both Australia and New Zealand.

Australia and New Zealand have a shared food regulator, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). In 2016, the regulator updated the trans-Tasman Food Code to allow plant-based foods and drinks to use terms like milk.

Using soy milk as an example, the regulations say:

The context within which foods such as soy milk or soy ice cream are sold is indicated by use of the name soy; indicating that the product is not a dairy product to which a dairy standard applies.

That’s why you’ll see “almond milk” in Australia and New Zealand sold in supermarkets. Those same products have to be sold as almond “drink” in the EU and UK.

However, that decision has been under review again in recent years.

Consumer research on plant milks

One of the main concerns raised by the dairy industry is that using “milk” for plant-based drinks can mislead consumers. As Australian Dairy Farmers’ President Ben Bennett said last week:

Words matter. When consumers pick up a product labelled ‘milk’, it should come from a cow – not a marketing department.

Responding to those longstanding concerns, the food regulator undertook several studies, including a 2025 consumer research report, involving nearly 3,000 Australians aged 18 to 90 years.

That report found those consumers were generally able to quickly and confidently identify plant-based drinks from their dairy counterparts. It also showed Australians were largely aware of the nutritional value difference between dairy milk and plant-based products.

So ‘oat milk’ is here to stay

On January 30 this year – less than a fortnight before the UK court ruling – Australia’s agriculture minister Julie Collins announced the government would work with the Alternative Proteins Council to “strengthen existing voluntary labelling guidelines” into a new industry code of practice.

Those existing guidelines give examples of how plant-based drinks can be labelled in Australia and New Zealand, such as “oat milk” or “almond milk ice cream”.

So if you’re ever out shopping the UK or Europe, look out for oat “drinks” on the supermarket shelves. But in Australia and New Zealand, expect to see those cartons continuing to say oat milk.

– ref. How Australia and NZ rules on plant milks differ from overseas, where cows make the only ‘milk’ – https://theconversation.com/how-australia-and-nz-rules-on-plant-milks-differ-from-overseas-where-cows-make-the-only-milk-275923

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By T.J. Thomson, Associate Professor of Visual Communication & Digital Media, RMIT University

Why do you see the results you do when you search for information online? It’s a complex mix of what the source is, its relationships to other sources online, and your own past browsing history and device settings.

But this formula is changing. Rather than being passively served content that search engines decide is most relevant (or businesses have paid to have promoted), some big tech platforms have started providing users more control over what they see online.

Earlier this year, Google launched the Preferred Sources feature in Australia and New Zealand. Through it, users can select organisations that are “preferred” and whose content they’d like to see more of in relevant search results.

In response, a raft of organisations, from news outlets to big banks, have started inviting their audiences and customers to choose them, with instructions on how to use this feature. News outlets such as the ABC, News.com.au, RNZ and The Conversation have all done so, among many others.

If you decide to use this new feature, there are potential benefits – but there can be unintended outcomes as well.

Where do you get your news?

In Australia, more adults say they get news from social media (26%) than from online news websites (23%). This means that a feature like “preferred sources” might influence readers who get their news from search engines. But it won’t affect users who primarily get their news from social media apps.

Trading phones with someone and looking at their browsing history or recommended YouTube videos reveals just how much personalisation influences what we see online.

Big tech companies are known to harvest large amounts of data, making money in an attention economy from audience engagement. They also make money from knowing more about their users so they can sell this information to advertisers.

Much of the internet is governed by invisible algorithms – hidden rules dictating who sees what, for which reasons. Algorithms often prioritise content that is engaging and sensational, which is one reason why misinformation can flourish online.

As helpful as it can be to get recommendations of products to buy or Netflix shows to watch, based on your history, when it comes to voting and politics, recommendations become much more fraught.

Our own research has shown people’s online news and information environments are fragmented, complex, opaque, chaotic and polluted, and that users desire more control over what they see. But what are the potential impacts of this?

More control is good

At face value, more control over what we see online is a positive and empowering thing.

This rebalances the equation from the loudest, most popular, or wealthiest voices – or ones that manipulate algorithms the most – to the ones users are actually interested in hearing from.

It potentially also helps with cognitive overload. Rather than having to spend the time and mental energy to decide on a case-by-case basis whether each source you encounter is trustworthy, making this decision once for particular news brands or organisations can make engaging with search results more relevant and efficient.

But a lack of balance is risky

However, the voices people want to hear from aren’t necessarily the ones that are best for them. As with any choice, you need a level of maturity and critical thinking to act responsibly.

As data companies, search engines benefit from knowing ever more information about user behaviour and preferences. Knowing which media outlet you prefer may in some cases indicate your political party preferences. Knowing that you prefer sports news over celebrity news can help companies target you with advertising more effectively.

In addition, more choice could potentially affect the diversity of people’s media diets. Just like with food diets, if people rely too much on low-quality media, over time that may affect their opinions, attitudes and behaviours. This has important implications for democracies that rely on well-informed and engaged citizens to cast votes.

There’s also a risk in conflating news sources with other types of sources. Journalists at news organisations are often held accountable to professional codes of conduct that, for example, aim to prevent reporters from personally benefiting from their reporting.

In theory, this allows audiences to receive independent analysis on important topics with confidence that the source has fact-checked claims and doesn’t have a vested interest in the reporting.

But if you select a business – such as the blog of a hardware store or a bank – as a source, you don’t have those same guarantees around editorial codes of conduct and professional ethics.

Should you use this feature?

Overall, allowing users more control over what they see is a good thing. But appropriate governance and regulation – possibly championed by Australia’s Digital Platform Regulators Forum – is needed to ensure people’s privacy and that their source preferences aren’t unfairly monetised.

Being more involved in your media diet is a positive step, as is thinking about its balance and diversity.

Ensuring a mix of sources across types (think local, regional, national, and international) and varieties (political, social, sports, entertainment news, and so on) can lead to a better balance.

Also think about whether the sources you are relying on are based on opinions or on facts. Doing this and actively creating a high-quality media diet is better for you and for others in your community.

– ref. Are Google’s ‘preferred sources’ a good thing for online news? – https://theconversation.com/are-googles-preferred-sources-a-good-thing-for-online-news-277372