Today, In this episode of A View from Afar political scientist, and former Pentagon analyst, Dr Paul Buchanan, and Selwyn Manning will analyse the question:

What does the Geopolitical balancing that is taking place in the West and South-West Pacific mean for the region and the globe?

Paul and Selwyn will consider this question from several angles, and provide a context to the headlines that suggest both global powers, the USA and the Peoples Republic of China, are on a collision-course toward conflict.

Paul will take us through the US-PNG and Japan-NZ bilateral security/military agreements as a balancing response to the PRC-Solomons security agreement.

In addition, Paul will consider the question: Does the PRC have legitimate interests in the Pacific and, as a great power, should those interests be understood and respected?

Selwyn will consider whether China’s ascendancy as a global power threatens the United States’ position as the ‘preeminent defender’ of the Global Order?

And Selwyn will raise for debate, highlighting what the two global powers’ messaging was at the Shangri-La security dialogue that took place over last weekend.

Paul will then analyse what this all means for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

They recommended the audience does so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, as Facebook has undergone significant changes. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
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If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here, also YouTube podcasts and the Podcast hosts below.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar – In this podcast, Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning analyse the AUKUS Alliance and deep-dive into:

• How the AUKUS Alliance has triggered a geopolitical realignment.
• Why has this Anglophone AUKUS alliance formed? And what’s the fallout?
• What does China do now?
• How will Australia assert itself as the Southern Hemisphere’s military great power?
• How does the AUKUS Alliance impact on the applied foreign policies of regional independent nations like New Zealand and indeed the ASEAN economies?
• Where to from here for France and Europe, China and South East Asian nations, and New Zealand?

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar – LIVE @ MIDDAY Thursday September 30: In this podcast, Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will analyse the AUKUS Alliance and will deep-dive into:

• How the AUKUS Alliance has triggered a geopolitical realignment.
• Why has this Anglophone AUKUS alliance formed? And what’s the fallout?
• What does China do now?
• How will Australia assert itself as the Southern Hemisphere’s military great power?
• How does the AUKUS Alliance impact on the applied foreign policies of regional independent nations like New Zealand and indeed the ASEAN economies?
• Where to from here for France and Europe, China and South East Asian nations, and New Zealand?

Join Paul and Selwyn for this LIVE recording of this podcast and remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar – LIVE @ MIDDAY Thursday September 30: In this podcast, Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will analyse the AUKUS Alliance and will deep-dive into:

• How the AUKUS Alliance has triggered a geopolitical realignment.
• Why has this Anglophone AUKUS alliance formed? And what’s the fallout?
• What does China do now?
• How will Australia assert itself as the Southern Hemisphere’s military great power?
• How does the AUKUS Alliance impact on the applied foreign policies of regional independent nations like New Zealand and indeed the ASEAN economies?
• Where to from here for France and Europe, China and South East Asian nations, and New Zealand?

Join Paul and Selwyn for this LIVE recording of this podcast and remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

• The US Electoral College Vote confirms Joe Biden as president-elect
• What does this mean for the South-Pacific?
• China + US are global powers operating in the SOPAC. But how does France fit into this mix?

LIVE COMMENTS: If you join us while we are live via Facebook, Twitter or Youtube, do comment as we will be able to bring your comments, questions and views into the live programme.

Here are the interaction accounts:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

News reports on Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s quick trip to China yesterday would suggest that it’s all been a triumph, and the New Zealand-China relationship is in good health. Digging a bit deeper, however, shows that things are much less rosy than some are letting on.

There’s no doubt that Ardern’s trip was a success. It was set up as a symbolic and straightforward whirlwind diplomatic excursion from which no great substance was expected to emerge. Instead, it allowed the Government to reach out to both the Chinese Government as well as the New Zealand public and say “everything is fine”. This much has all been achieved: mission accomplished.

But the bar was set quite low. As Audrey Young says today, “It was a mission made for success, the more so because it was only one day. It sent the clear signal to the Chinese leadership that Ardern really, really wanted to get there” – see: Was Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s 24 hours in China worth it?.

Young draws attention to the effort that Ardern went to in order to impress the Chinese: “That fact that Ardern brought partner Clarke Gayford with her – the first time they have left New Zealand together without baby Neve – was an added level of commitment when such gestures carry meaning.”

Like other political journalists, Young pronounces the PM’s trip a success: “Having endured a winter of discontent from China over irritants last year, there appears to be a fresh commitment from both sides for a new phase of growth… So was it worth it, just for one day? Undoubtedly.”

Similarly, Newshub political editor Tova O’Brien says Ardern made a big impact, which is especially notable given she was only there for less than a day: “She was originally supposed to be here for a week, but I think she’s achieved in the 12 hours that she was on the ground in Beijing what she could have with that original itinerary” – see: Jacinda Ardern’s China trip ‘quality over quantity’.

But clearly, not everything is fine. The whole trip had been delayed for many months because Beijing was angry and upset with Wellington. A number of opaque but highly significant messages had been sent to New Zealand over this. While some trade and diplomatic cheerleaders, as well as the Government, have attempted to present it as otherwise, Wellington insiders have been adamant that the relationship was highly strained.

This meant that Ardern had to plan her trip quickly when the Chinese Government were suddenly open to a visit in the wake of the Christchurch terrorist attacks. And despite the Prime Minister’s presence being required in this country at the moment, she decided it was worth making the dash in order to try to seize back the narrative over the relationship.

These issues were covered well by Barry Soper, prior to the Ardern’s departure for China, with him explaining that it would be naïve to disregard the signs of Chinese unhappiness – see: What Jacinda Ardern’s trip to China will achieve.

Here’s Soper’s key point: “The delay in Jacinda Ardern taking up her withheld invitation to visit the Chinese capital and the delay in the Chinese tourism launch in Wellington, was more than just scheduling. To even publicly suggest that is in itself seen here as insulting, as though the Chinese, meticulous when it comes to planning, are somehow incompetent when it comes to following through. The Chinese were sending us a message and we should have taken it on the diplomatic chin.”

Soper also explains that although the visit didn’t have many tangible outcomes, it was symbolically important: “The meeting in the Chinese capital today, on a trip that’ll see the Prime Minister in the air for longer than she’ll be on the ground, won’t achieve much in terms delivering the goods which are a given anyway, but it’s the symbolism that counts. And like all damaged friendships, meeting the aggrieved on their home turf, is a start.”

But in a subsequent column today, Soper, laments the “meaningless” signing ceremony that took place between the two governments, describing it as “the obligatory signing of documents that are always brought out on these occasions to at least make it look as though we’re making progress” – see: Bewildered in Beijing – Jacinda Ardern’s personal charm eases anxiety in China.

He also draws attention to the major discussion topic between the two governments: Huawei, and President Xi Jinping’s very pointed comment that “our two sides must trust each other”. Soper points out that “when it all comes down to it, distrust on our side of Huawei is what it’s all about and of course the Chinese know it.”

The notion that the decision-making process about the Huawei “ban” is made entirely by the GCSB officials without any influence from the politicians or Five Eyes partners was pushed strongly by Ardern in her meetings with the Chinese politicians.

But according to Soper, such an idea would be dismissed by the Chinese: “To the Communist leaders it’s unthinkable that an arm of the government, and not just any arm, its leading spy arm, makes decisions independent of the politicians. And of course the Chinese are right. A spy agency taking a decision which could have a significant impact on the economy and end up affecting the wellbeing of the very people this government claims it cares more about than anything else, is unthinkable, not just to the Communists but to most people who believe it’s a government’s job to govern.”

The PM’s lines on Huawei are also examined today by Richard Harman in his post-trip evaluation, saying that “she repeats a sort of mantra that the decision is for the GCSB alone under the Telecommunications Interceptions and Capability legislation. This, however, glosses over the opportunity that the GCSB has under the legislation to refer the decision to their Minister (Andrew Little) which means that the whole issue has the potential to become political” – see: China: it’s a matter of trust.

Although Harman sees the trip as a success, he also emphasises the Chinese President’s comments about “trust” being a pointed statement. And he identifies hurdles in Ardern’s search for an upgrade of the free trade agreement with China: “China is said to be wanting more access for investment in New Zealand. That will be difficult for the current coalition government to agree to. Asked about it at her press conference, her reply was opaque.”

And as an indication of how the China-NZ relationship is still strained, Harman relays: “there was no joint press conferences with either the Premier and the President which foreign journalists said China usually agrees to with particular friends.”

In his pre-trip analysis of Ardern’s tasks in Beijing, Harman argued that Ardern is now re-asserting herself over Winston Peters on this crucial foreign affairs area. Previously the foreign minister had been pushing New Zealand much closer diplomatically and strategically towards the United States, and was more critical of China and its trade and military expansionism. Ardern, in contrast, is now re-embracing China, toning down criticisms, and displaying more enthusiasm for that country’s much-vaunted Belt and Road initiative – see: Ardern in China: the big test.

On the issue of whether the New Zealand Government is being pressured by Five Eyes concerns about Huawei, Stacey Kirk asserts that “it’s an entirely domestic decision” – see: Rushed but not hurried: Jacinda Ardern makes most of single-day visit to China.

In this article, Kirk also puts forward what is essentially the official line on China-NZ relations and Ardern’s trip, lamenting the “the overblown angst at the state of the relationship emanating from some commentators a few months ago”, and she suggests that New Zealand’s changing relationship with China is simply due to other factors in the global environment, such as the growing US-China rivalry.

In terms of the Beijing trip, Kirk argues that Ardern has gone there, rather heroically, to “look for new ways to strengthen the relationship, but explain New Zealand’s position on matters of concern, and respectfully, not give an inch.” In conclusion, Kirk argues that New Zealand’s reputation for foreign policy independence has been reinforced by the PM’s trip: “On that, Ardern left little doubt.”

Indeed, Kirk praises Ardern for winning some tangible outcomes from the trip, even if they are “far harder to measure in terms of the deals signed and pretty words”. One of the biggest achievements for Ardern, according to Kirk, is that “Ardern’s proactive diplomacy” has ensured that when the final decision against Huawei is made by the Government, “it will have hopefully blunted the delivery” of China’s economic repercussions.

But just in case the public has any unreasonable expectations that NZ-China relations have been fixed, Kirk insists that “No-one expected Rome to be built in a day”, and that it would be unrealistic to “expect a return to the Halcyon days” of 2008 when the free trade agreement was signed.

The other major question about Ardern’s visit has been whether she would make a stand behalf of the Uighur Muslims who are being persecuted in the Xinjiang region of China. There has been pressure on Ardern to both speak out and to keep quiet, and this is best covered by Zane Small’s Jacinda Ardern’s balancing act: Appeasing China while standing up for Muslims.

Finally, for an indication of the strained relationship that this Government has with China, Newshub’s Tova O’Brien has been researching how many official government trips have been taken by the Labour-led Government compared to the previous National Government – see: Sharp decline in official trips to China since Labour took power.

by Dr Bryce Edwards

This week might come to be seen as a turning point in New Zealand’s complex trading and political relations with China. Suddenly there is a very strong awareness of the deteriorating relations between the capitals of Wellington and Beijing. And although there is plenty of confusion and contention about the details, it’s clear that the Chinese Government has initiated a type of political blowback against New Zealand. This is based on what the Beijing government see as a betrayal by its formerly-close trading partner.

Three factors have been discussed this week as signalling that China has initiated a campaign of retaliation against New Zealand: 1) the sudden announcement that China is postponing the long-planned launch of tourism initiative in Wellington next week, 2) the mysterious turning back of an Air New Zealand flight to Shanghai in the weekend, and 3) the long-running inability of Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to arrange a diplomatic visit to China.

The story about the postponement of the tourism launch was broken by Barry Soper on the frontpage of the Herald on Tuesday, explaining that: “The 2019 China-New Zealand Year of Tourism was meant to be launched with great fanfare at Wellington’s Te Papa museum next week, but that has been postponed by China” – see: China, New Zealand links sink to new low: PM Jacinda Ardern’s visit on hold, tourism project postponed.

In a second piece on Tuesday, Soper points out that the diplomatic explanations for the postponement aren’t credible: “the lame excuse from Wellington officials that there was a change of schedule. Given the Year was announced two years ago by the Key Government when the Chinese Premier visited here, Beijing’s had plenty of time to schedule it in” – see: NZ feeling the heat of the Chinese dragon.

This article also delves into the long-running difficulties that Ardern is having in getting an official visit agreed to by Beijing. Soper says: “The invitation for Jacinda Ardern to visit Beijing early this year’s been put on ice and all her talk at the end of last year about neither side being able to coordinate their diaries was baloney.”

In addition, Soper points to the third issue – the “turning back of the new Air New Zealand plane over the weekend, which was half way to Shanghai, because it wasn’t registered”. These three incidents illustrate, according to Soper that “New Zealand is feeling the heat of the Chinese dragon’s breath and if we’re not careful it could incinerate us.” He reports that “word from the Chinese capital is that retaliation is being worked on.”

And Soper points out that it’s easy to understand why the Chinese have become upset with New Zealand, after the Government here essentially decided late last year to ban the Chinese company Huawei from being involved in the new 5G telecommunications network.

I covered this at the time in my column, Huawei decision is the price of being in Five Eyes, pointing out that the decision was widely seen as fulfilling a US Government request to help it its geopolitical battle against China and Huawei. I predicted, “There is certainly going to be a cost for the ban… this country’s economic and diplomatic ties with the superpower of China will now be strained as a result.”

Of course, it wasn’t just the Huawei decision that soured relations with China – Wellington has been edging away from a close friendship with Beijing for a few years. This is all explained in a must-read column today by Victoria University of Wellington’s strategic studies specialist, Robert Ayson, who goes through the deterioration of the Wellington-Beijing relationship, saying that even under John Key “New Zealand was raising concerns about China’s behaviour in the South China Sea” and in return received some messages “suggesting that Wellington should stay quiet if it wanted an FTA upgrade” – see: New Zealand and China: time for clarity in a hall of mirrors.

According to Ayson, New Zealand’s criticisms of China have been increasing, especially with Ron Mark as Minister of Defence, and with the Government “calling out” China “for nefarious cyber activities”.

The Labour-led Government is still denying, or at least downplaying, the serious pushback that is now coming from Beijing. For the most recent examples of this, see Jo Moir’s news report, Winston Peters dismisses claims govt visits to China stalling.

The best quote in this story is from Shane Jones who declares: “I don’t think I’m one of these losery politicians that’s apparently not allowed to go to China, in fact I’m very popular with the Chinese – I think they see a kindred industrial spirit.” And David Parker is also reported as having visited China and seen no signs of trouble in the relationship.

But there’s clearly now a consensus amongst political commentators and journalists that the political blowback from China is real, many of who are complaining that the Prime Minister and Government are either failing to be upfront or else simply being delusional about the relationship.

Veteran political journalist Richard Harman reports that “the foreign affairs community” is certainly asking questions about China’s retaliation against New Zealand, and says diplomats and officials even see the incident with the Air New Zealand flight as evidence that the relationship has soured – see his column, Why was the AirNZ plane turned back?.

The suggestion is made that China is now cracking down “on technical infringements of its laws” when it comes to New Zealand exporters or the national carrier. In this regard he reports that Victoria University’s David Capie “suggested that what the incident showed was that New Zealand no longer had a special relationship with China. In other words, all things being equal previously, China would have found a way to let the plane land.”

China is prone to using this type of ambiguous retaliation, according to Newsroom’s Sam Sachdeva: “China has a history of operating with plausible deniability when it comes to meting out punishments” – see: NZ-China ‘scheduling issues‘ cause for concern.

Sachdeva reports, “One observer noted that blowback often begins with tourism numbers, moving onto international education before spreading to the wider trade and economic relationship – a script into which the postponement of the Year of Tourism launch sits uneasily.”

The problem, according to the New Zealand Herald, is that New Zealand appears to have chosen sides in the growing US-China rivalry – see the editorial: Has our govt antagonised China?. It points out that “it is not hard to see why China would have the impression this country is not the friend it used to be. The new Government’s ‘reset’ of policy towards the Pacific Islands is strongly tinged with support for the US and suspicion of China’s interests in the region.”

New Zealand observers in Beijing are also commenting on what’s going on. The most interesting is businessman David Mahon, who is interviewed by Liam Dann, saying that the decision to ban Huawei was “seen as a Five Eyes stitch up” and “a breach of trust” – see: NZ/China relationship: ‘We have a big problem’.

Mahon suggests that New Zealand had been building a much closer relationship with China for the last four decades, with the Chinese having huge respect for this country, but “In the last 12 months or so that has almost reversed. So there is now a very different view, almost an opposite view of New Zealand.”

There are real dangers of the China-NZ relationship getting much worse. Geopolitical and security analyst Paul Buchanan says that he’s now warning his clients against going to China due to risks to their safety as a result of what’s going on at the governmental level. On Newstalk ZB, Buchanan said “if you are a New Zealand resident in China, you need to be cognisant of the fact that there could be a knock on your door and you could be taken away on corruption charges or turpitude charges” – see: Kiwis warned over ‘hostage diplomacy’ from China.

Slowly but surely, the current government has engineered a major reorientation of foreign policy according to Audrey Young, who labels the Relationship with China a diplomatic mess. She complains that this “was never foreshadowed before the last election”.

The shift appears to lie with New Zealand First and Winston Peters: “Peters has been an irritant. A year ago Peters framed his Pacific Reset in terms of a response to counter China’s growing influence in the region, and he challenged China’s most important foreign policy strategy, the Belt and Road initiative. He ended the year with a speech in Washington, almost a love-letter to America, practically begging them to get more involved in the Pacific to counter China’s influence. A National Party Foreign Minister could not have made such a speech without being accused of wanting to rejoin Anzus.”

According to Young, the onus is now on the Government, and the Prime Minister, to fix the deterioration. They need to “to take a lot more care in preserving the relationship New Zealand had and to be less cavalier.”

Similarly, the Prime Minister needs to sort out her long-promised trip to Beijing, according to economics journalist Hamish Rutherford – see: Until Jacinda Ardern visits China, questions about the relationship will only deepen.

Rutherford discusses the on-again-off-again trip: “Ardern is left trotting out the line that this is a scheduling issue, and the only thing keeping her from an official visit is scheduling clashes. This has been the case for some time; journalists were asked to prepare for a trip in December, however this was abruptly cancelled. The longer the situation goes on, the more it appears that the excuse that the problems are caused by scheduling issues are simply a subtle diplomatic slap. For weeks there have been rumours that officials at the Chinese Embassy have warned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that the trip is not happening until other issues are resolved, something Mfat denies.”

Herald business editor Fran O’Sullivan is also calling for the Government to quickly fix the problems – see: Chinese relations must get back on track. Her suggestion, however, is that the “postponed” tourism event needs to be sorted out by the Minister of Tourism Kelvin Davis getting “on the first plane up to China to sort out the debacle”.

But perhaps it’s the Minister of Foreign Affairs that needs to be sorted out. Richard Harman suggests that this might already be happening: “The Prime Minister appeared yesterday to deliver a subtle message to Foreign Minister Winston Peters telling him, she, not him, ran foreign policy. This contrasts with her admission last year that she had not read a speech he gave in Washington directly criticising China and calling for more American involvement in the Pacific” – see: Ardern takes the lead on China.

Could Peters even be shifted on from his portfolio, in order to satisfy the Chinese? It seems unlikely, but that’s the hint that security specialist Robert Ayson is making when he says that fixing the NZ-China relations “may also mean a change in the pecking order within the politburo in Wellington.”

Ayson’s column, cited above, also has plenty of other suggestions for how the mess might be fixed – and these include providing the Chinese government with greater clarity about the Huawei decision, showing that New Zealand is not simply “a willing member of a new Cold War”, stop cosying up to the US, and pull back from Winston Peters’ anti-China Pacific Reset strategy.

Finally, last month Matthew Hooton wrote an important and prescient column about New Zealand’s changing relationship with China and US, and this is well worth reading as background for what is happening now – see: Is Jacinda Ardern on board with the Winston Peters Reset?.