Are wars affordable? The answer of course is ‘yes and no’.

Affording a war is different from financing a war. To make any new thing affordable, either there must be a reallocation of resources or a deployment of resources not otherwise in use. Or a mix of both. Further, resources get destroyed, and not only the resources of the ‘loser’.

Wars may be fully tax-funded – that is, by increased taxation – by one or more belligerents; but most usually they are not. Otherwise, wars are financed. Financing is a mechanism which enables the distribution of spending to differ from the distribution of income. Typically, spending by warring parties exceeds their incomes, so must be financed through government ‘fiscal’ deficits.

Income is the rights to current goods and services; that is, to current output. Present tense. In particular wages, profits, rents, royalties. Finance is the principal mechanism whereby such rights to current output are transferred by some people (including businesses and governments) to other people. By giving up a right to current output, a party either gains a right (ie a ‘claim’) to future output or is fulfilling an obligation – a debt – incurred in the past. Thus, giving up rights to current output is called either ‘saving’ or ‘debt repayment’. Saving, conceding such rights in return for claims on future output, is commonly understood as lending or ‘advancing’ funds.

We note that in many cases, debtors – parties holding obligations incurred in the past – have discretion over when they fulfil their obligations. Likewise, savers (creditors) have some discretion over when they call in (ie realise, spend) their savings; that is, discretion over when they exercise – ie liquidate – their historical claims to current output. As a general matter, is it a good thing if those two matters of debtor and creditor discretion balance out, creating a sense of ‘equilibrium’.

Historically, however, creditors have often failed to liquidate their claims at all; many creditors like to hold onto their claims for indefinite periods, thereby enabling debts to be merely ‘serviced’ rather than repaid. Unrealised claims are called ‘wealth’, and many people like to hold wealth until they die, rather than spend it.

If insufficient current output is purchased by past savers, it becomes a systemic requirement that new debts are contracted and spent.

When sovereign governments contract new debts to fulfil this systemic requirement (possibly as ‘debtors of last resort’), this is ‘fiscal accommodation’. When governments refuse to contract new debts to fulfil this systemic requirement, we may call this either ‘fiscal consolidation’ or ‘public austerity’.

Wars – and preparations for war – may be destructive (or at least non-productive) examples of fiscal accommodation; such accommodating militarisation may achieve that purpose without specific intent to do so. (In the 1930s the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes offered, as an example of contextually beneficial non-productive fiscal accommodation, governments paying workers to dig up holes and fill them in again!)

Wars

Medieval wars were often short-term affairs, because of seasonal patterns of labour demand. Wars have for the most part been labour intensive; and that’s still the case today, even if the casualties of post-modern wars are more likely to be civilians and less likely to be soldiers and sailors.

Medieval sieges often had to be terminated around August because the soldiers in the sieging army had to return to collect the harvest. September was the time of the year when there was virtually zero unemployment. Siege defence was made possible because harvest labour requirements would likely break the stalemate. The corollary is that medieval wars could be afforded because, in late-spring and early-summer, there was seasonally unemployed labour.

In the modern period (approximately 1490 to 1990), especially in Europe, labour became increasingly divorced from agriculture, making it possible to have ever larger standing armies (and navies), making bigger and longer wars possible. Further, the modern period saw the emergence of sovereign nation states; so, increasingly, war finance became intrinsically connected to public finance. Wars of exploitation and territorial expansion became a central feature of the emergent mercantile States.

Public finance and war finance were essentially the same thing in the golden eras of merchant capitalism (roughly 1550 to 1800) and subsequent industrial capitalism. That financial conflation is re-emerging as a new reality of the twentyfirst century, as sovereigns (and their foreign state and non-state proxies) up their military spending while simultaneously diminishing their commitments to the peacetime provision of public goods.

Fast forward to the years from 1989 to 2011

This transition period from modern to post-modern may be seen as a particularly peaceful period – after the Great World War of 1914 to 1945; after the wars of recolonisation and decolonisation which may be seen to have ended in 1979 with the revolution in Iran and Vietnam ending the post-colonial genocide in Cambodia; after the wars in Lebanon, the Falkland Islands, and Iran-Iraq; and after the fall of the empire of the Soviet Union.

The millennial years 1989 to 2011 are sometimes called the ‘unipolar moment’, when the United States could and would call the shots; typically with a foolhardy and exceptionalist perspective of the world as a kind of playpen for Washington and New York largesse. And with a neoliberal outlook through which narratives about the Great Depression and World War Two were recast. In the latter case, World War Two became a grand narration of ‘Hitler versus the Jews’; most of the many other lessons arising from the years 1914 to 1945 were largely forgotten.

I am particularly interested in the affording and financing of the Second Gulf War (essentially 2003 to 2009, an asymmetric war between United States and Iraq); although good starting points are the post-Tiananmen (after 1989) emergence of China and the execution in 1990 by the United States of the First Gulf War.

These charts of financial balances for China and the United States give some important clues about who paid for the Gulf Wars. (For the United States in particular, it is necessary for now, to not be distracted by the dramatic financial accommodations between 2009 and 2021, relating to the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid19 Pandemic.) They show variations over time in private saving and spending, government deficit spending, and these nations’ saver/spender relationships with their outside worlds.

We note that most of the economic and financial cost of war comes after the main event (eg after 1990, and after 2003); as military equipment needs to be replenished, armies need to be expanded, and destruction zones need to be rebuilt. Indeed, the costs of a standing defence force are high whether or not there is a war.

1990, the middle of a period of both economic and financial flux in the world, came at the end of a recovery in the United States following the 1987 sharemarket crash. So, almost unusually, there was no speculative bubble in place, there was increased saving as people looked more to future spending than present spending, and the labour market remained weak.

For the United States, we see in the years from 1991 to 1993, high saving in the private sector – largely household saving – and comparably high spending in the government sector. Thus, domestic private savings directly funded the war. Unemployment in the United States was lower than it otherwise would have been. While savers were not asked whether they were happy that their caution was being translated into government military spending, it’s unlikely that they minded too much; the ‘war against Saddam’ was not an unpopular war in the United States.

In times of recession, when more people than usual are unemployed or underemployed, affording a war is easier but financing a war is harder. Liberal governments must make financial accommodations by departing from the standard fiscal rules they impose upon themselves. (We note that, just this year, 2025, the German Bundestag has made such an accommodation, and abandoned its self-set and dearly-held fiscal rule; giving itself a blank cheque to pursue debt-funded military spending.)

Most modern wars have been afforded through a process of restrained consumption, financed through the mechanism of new government debt and a build-up of household credits; governments owing, and households owning new debt. As a side-effect, and considering the United States, this affording and funding enlarges the combined balance sheet of American banks: more assets (government debts) and more liabilities (private savings).

Affording wars is always a matter of economic resources being deployed into military theatres, whether that is redeployed from civilian production or a reduction of resource underemployment. From a financing point of view, the four options are that wars are funded by taxes (which would not show up on this type of chart), by domestic saving (as happened in the United States from 1991 to 1993), by foreign saving (as happened in the mid-2000s), or by foreign aid from patron to proxy.

War financed by foreign saving may mean direct or indirect foreign funding. Much of the Allies funding in the Great World War was financed by American debt which, in the fullness of time, would be written off; making that war significantly American gift funded, even if at the time the advances were only intended and consented as loans. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom afforded their war only with substantial reductions in normal consumption; this was even more true for most of the other participating nation states.

In the United States chart above, we see (in green) that in every year shown except 1991, the United States has incurred debts to the rest of the world. Though these foreign advances were unusually low in the early 1990s. America’s war in 1990 was domestically funded, and relatively easily afforded.

(We note that that Gulf War involved both an invasion by Iraq and an invasion of Iraq. I make no attempt to discuss the affording or financing of the war from the point of view of either Iraq or Kuwait. Clearly, however, there was a substantial loss and degradation of life in Iraq, and degradation of land and infrastructure.)

The Wars of the 2000s, especially the Second Gulf War from 2003

The United States economy changed dramatically with the birth of the Internet-Age, just after the First Gulf War. Private balances follow a classic ‘bubble’ formation from 1994 to 2000/01; this came to be known as the dotcom bubble, and was characterised by a new ‘information technology’ sector being speculatively debt-financed. Government tax revenues ballooned, leading to unheard-of government budget surpluses. In addition, the United States economy attracted increased foreign credits before the turn of the millennium, though not much then from China.

We can see the collapse of the dotcom bubble in 2001, with a marked reduction in private debt spending, and the ensuing unusually high foreign financing of the United States economy.

The wars of the new-millennium began with the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, followed by the bigger United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. These wars were foreign-funded, the US chart shows, and lasted – in their predominant phase – throughout the Bush presidency. (Refer Iraq War troop surge of 2007.)

We can trace this funding of the Bush-wars by examining the China chart. From 2002, we see a clear rise in Chinese private saving and of ‘foreign investment’. The ‘rest of the world’ percentages represent spending in the rest of the world (from China’s perspective) made possible by non-spending in China.

At its peak, China’s foreign investment ‘current account surplus’ – for our purpose, China’s excess of exports over imports – reached almost 10% of GDP in 2007. This co-dependency of Chinese exports and American imports has been called by some Chimerica; the best known proponent of this concept is the British global historian Niall Ferguson.

As well as considering the percentages, we remind ourselves that Chinese supercharged annual economic growth, which bottomed-out at 8% in 1999-2001, climbed to 14% in 2007. Given earlier growth in the 1980s and 1990s, China was no longer starting from a low base. These were massively increased levels of Chinese economic output in the 2000s; output sent from China rather than spent in China.

The result was that industrial capacity within the United States was freed up to supply military goods rather than civilian goods. While China provided the ‘butter’ (ie consumer goods), Uncle Sam was freed to specialise in the production and deployment of ‘guns’.

While China paid for the Second Gulf War through its massive export surpluses, for the West in general and the United States in particular, the war was fought for free; a ‘free lunch’ so to speak. Of course it wasn’t technically free; China built up a massive amount of financial claims on the United States, though it was never clear how or when China might exercise those claims. China is yet to show any desire to acquire the American imports which would constitute the settlement of China’s claims on the United States.

China will only be reimbursed for its massive lending to the United States in 2003 to 2008 when we see, in its future financial balances’ chart, a whole lot of green on the upper ‘savers’ side. Otherwise, China’s loans to the United States will morph into gifts. An export surplus can only be reimbursed in the form of an export deficit; not China’s style in current or near-future times.

Tax Cuts

Not only did the United States wage two major wars in West Asia, close to America’s Indian Ocean antipodes, it did the unheard-of for a nation at war; it reduced its tax rates. While the most obvious way to fund a war is to raise taxes, the United States did the precise opposite; to not fund the wars ‘because it could’. China was happily paying for those American wars. For many Americans not directly involved, these wars were more than a ‘free lunch’; they were, through tax cuts, a ‘sugar hit’.

Indeed, this detachment of fighting from cost-bearing has become the most dangerous facet of the emergent ‘Warrior epoch’. Western elites have come to believe that they can undertake wars – be they ‘good wars’ or ‘bad wars’ – without themselves facing up to the reality that all wars are costly.

The United States legislated two major rounds of tax cuts, in 2001 and 2003. The first round was undertaken in the light of the Clinton budget surpluses (see the year 2000), and without awareness that war was coming. Those Clinton fiscal surpluses were unsustainable, a consequence of the dotcom bubble mini-boom, though the tax cuts (ill-targeted as they were) helped to fiscally accommodate the recovery from the 2000/01 dotcom bust.

The 2003 federal tax cuts were inexcusable. Initiated just as the pre-Gulf-War hype was peaking, these tax cuts passed through Congress and the Senate during the peak initial phases of the war. The incongruence of simultaneous military aggression at scale and tax decreases was astounding in its brazenness.

After 2011

The principal wars in the 2010s were located in Afghanistan and Syria; there was additional militarisation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, associated with the eastward expansion of Nato.

China played a constructive new role in that decade.

An important feature of global financial imbalances – very clear in the American chart – was the Global Financial Crisis, showing resurgent American private saving (mainly debt repayment) and the spectacular (and necessary) US Government accommodation of that dramatic change in private behaviour. Then we see a return to normality from 2013 to 2019. Higher than usual United States government deficits were a critical part of the global recovery from the financial crisis. (We may mention in passing that the New Zealand government’s fiscal policy – under National and Labour – has been and still is non-accommodating; the pandemic year 2020 being the exception that ‘proves’ the rule.)

For the second critical component of the 2010s’ global economic recovery, we can see a big change in China’s financial balances. In particular, we see the emergence of the Chinese consumer and taxpayer (much less blue and less red). And Chinese net exports substantially diminished as a share of the Chinese economy. Consumer spending and government spending in China and the other BRICsrevived global demand for non-military goods and services.

Although the United States incurred a specific debt to China during the Second Gulf War in the 2000s, subsequently the whole West ‘owes’ China a considerable debt of gratitude for its role in restarting the global economy around 2010. Thankyous to China have been considerably lacking, however, as the West increasingly seeks to point its military hardware at China.

The West – led by the United States – has gamified war, and has become indifferent to non-western lives. There are also too many signs that western elites are becoming indifferent to western working-class lives; starting with indifference to the many immigrants who are already performing so much of the necessary labour to support higher-middle-class living standards.

China, already on the verge of a balance-sheet recession in the view of Richard Koo, may now be following in the financial and economic footsteps of Japan in the 1990s (see my Red Gold; Japan’s lesson for the world). Certainly China’s financial balances’ chart (above) is starting to look very Japanese, with a smallish and stable export surplus, and large government deficits.

2020s’ Wars

After the 2020 Covid19 Financial Crisis, which, as in 2009, required huge fiscal accommodations – especially by the United States federal government – wars have become proxy affairs whereby the means of war have been largely gifted by patrons to their proxies. Such financing leaves only small marks on countries’ financial balances charts. Though the patron nations will have larger-than-otherwise government deficits; see the United States’ government balance (above) for 2023 and 2025 (and the 2025 forecast).

The financing of the two sides of the Sudan ‘Civil War’ appears too convoluted to examine here. It would seem to involve proxies of proxies, and to be an important outlet for internationally traded military goods.

For the West, the affording of the wars in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine would appear to be mainly through a mix of gifts and loans by patron governments, meaning involved governments undersupplying too few peacetime public goods. (Too little ‘butter’, to use that metaphor, and too many guns.)

Russian citizens will be incurring substantial opportunity costs, mainly through higher taxes, a reallocation of government spending, and reduced opportunities for its citizens to live international lives. Ukraine seems to be funding its war through a mix of foreign gifting and government debt; though its people – like Russians – have been paying a high price through reductions in their living standards.

Israel continues to be a net exporter, so its deliveries of military hardware from the United States should definitely be regarded as aid rather than imports. Lucky Israel! To be able to fight its neighbours on such favourable terms is a privilege rarely granted.

In Retrospect

Wars are costly. Very intensive and extensive in the use of resources and the destruction of resources; let alone the loss of quantity and quality of life.

In all wars, all parties incur costs; significant costs. Sometimes, a party to a war can avoid most of those costs through having someone else pay. Of course, the United States paid to some extent for the wars against Iraq in terms of American lives lost and degraded; little cost was borne by those Americans who propagated those wars, though.

The material costs of the wars in the 2000s were paid – indirectly – by Chinese households not consuming large swathes of the goods they produced; Chinese workers and capitalists were, on an increasingly massive scale, exporting the fruits of their labour and their capital to the United States. More sending than spending. Much more. (A Marxian analysis would attribute the seemingly costless affording of the US-Iraq war to the extraction of ‘surplus value’ from the Chinese working class by the American capitalist class.)

Yet these Chinese costpayers didn’t much mind, because – while their abilities to enjoy the increasing fruits of their labours were highly constrained by China’s export policy – they were happily stacking up claims on future production; deferred enjoyment, rather than the pure exploitation which occurred in the early years of Chinese Communism.

China bore the West’s costs in other ways too; in those years Chinese people suffered huge environmental costs, at a time when natural environments were improving in the deindustrialising West.

There was a wider set of ongoing costs, however, arising from the ensuing highly unbalanced global capitalism. United States’ industrial survival is now largely dependent on its specialisation in military hardware and software; meaning that the United States’ economic deformation has made that country into a predatory warrior state. Violences, especially upon non-Americans, are today directly committed by the American state; and through both exported and gifted military goods and services, and through violations committed directly by America’s proxies (and, as in Sudan, by its proxies’ proxies).

Wars, when they happen, are affordable because they happened. They are very costly, both in terms of their opportunity costs (the loss of other uses to which the deployed resources could have been put) and the human misery of death, destruction of habitat and taonga, and injury. They are commonly financed by third parties – eg Chinese households – who may or may not enjoy reimbursement for their credit advanced.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Analysis by Geoffrey Miller – This analysis was first published by Democracy Project.

Don’t put it all at risk.

That’s likely to be the take-home message for New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon in his meetings with Li Qiang, the Chinese Premier.

Li’s visit to Wellington this week is the highest-ranking visit by a Chinese official since 2017. The trip down under – Li is also visiting Australia – constitutes something of a charm offensive by Beijing. Pandas are on the agenda for Li’s stop in Adelaide.

China’s advance publicity for the trip has accentuated the positives and downplayed points of disagreement. The Chinese foreign ministry’s official spokesperson reminded journalists of the ‘enormous benefits’ of Wellington’s relationship with Beijing.

A pledge to discuss ‘international and regional issues of mutual interest’ was the only faint hint that thornier issues – such as New Zealand’s contemplation of joining ‘Pillar II’ of the AUKUS pact – might also be discussed behind the scenes.

This ‘good cop’ approach continued after Li touched down in Wellington. In his first comments made after his arrival in New Zealand, released in a written statement, the Chinese Premier was upbeat about the health of the bilateral relationship.

Showering New Zealand with praise – ‘China-New Zealand relations have always stood at the forefront of China’s relations with the developed world’ – Li suggested there could be ‘an even brighter future’ if the momentum between the two countries were maintained.

Coincidentally, a promise of ‘brighter future’ was also the theme of the New Zealand National Party’s 2008 election campaign that ushered in John Key as New Zealand’s Prime Minister. That vote heralded the start of the golden years for trade with China, riding the waves of a pioneering free trade agreement signed by Helen Clark’s Labour-led Government just before Key’s victory.

Xi Jinping visited New Zealand in 2014, resulting in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Meanwhile, China became New Zealand’s biggest trading partner in 2017, the same year that Li Qiang’s predecessor visited the country.

Key was famously bullish on China and has maintained personal relationships with the country’s leaders since he resigned in 2016 and resumed a business career.

But while the 2010s boom brought talk of New Zealand being a ‘rockstar economy’, seven years on, New Zealand is now in recession. And new trade figures for the year ending in March 2024 show that New Zealand’s trade with China has – relatively speaking – hit turbulence.

The numbers show that trade in both directions fell for the first time since the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed. Most troubling for Christopher Luxon will be that New Zealand’s goods exports to China – which are dominated by primary products such as dairy, meat and wood products – fell by almost nine per cent, from $NZ20.07 billion to $NZ18.34 billion.

In the overall trade figures, this fall was somewhat masked by a post-pandemic recovery in the export of services – particularly travel, as Chinese tourists regained the ability to visit New Zealand. Nevertheless, overall exports still fell by around two per cent, from $NZ21.39 to $NZ20.09 billion.

There will be no better opportunity than Li’s visit for Christopher Luxon to talk to about ways to turn this somewhat troubling economic trend around. After all, Luxon focused heavily on economic matters during his election campaign in 2023 – pledging to get New Zealand ‘back on track’.

And while Luxon has also focused on the need for trade diversification – which has included programmes to boost ties with India and the Gulf states – a sudden drop in trade with China during a recessionary climate and rising unemployment is probably not what the New Zealand Prime Minister had in mind.

As would be expected, the Chinese Premier’s visit to Wellington is a carefully-choreographed and economically-focused mission – at least on the surface. For the charm offensive to work, it has to be genuine.

But behind the scenes, New Zealand’s position on Aukus will remain the elephant in the room. The pact was not specifically mentioned in China’s official accounts of foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to Wellington in March – but New Zealand counterpart Winston Peters later confirmed that Wang had raised the matter.

And in May, Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand Wang Xiaolong was unusually forthright on Aukus. The Ambassador repeatedly referred to the arrangement as a ‘military alliance’ – a label clearly at odds with Aukus-friendly characterisations of the pact as a technology-sharing partnership.

The Ambassador said Aukus was ‘clearly and unabashedly designed to maintain US hegemony and contain other countries’ development’, adding that ‘joining such an alliance will not make any country more secure or make the Asia-Pacific region more stable’. He closed by noting his hope that any decision by New Zealand on Aukus would be ‘taking fully into account its own long-term fundamental interests’.

This is undoubtedly plain speaking. China would not be happy if New Zealand became involved with Aukus, to put it mildly.

But Li Qiang’s trip to New Zealand is about the big picture.

Its chief purpose is to remind Christopher Luxon of just how important China is to New Zealand, both economically and beyond.

It is a goodwill tour with a subtext.

There is also a lot to lose.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

Political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning examine: The United States and how the world is engaging with it geopolitically.

Specifically, Paul and Selwyn analyse what has changed in this regard in 2024, and consider whether some leaders of global, regional, and even small powers are preparing for the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency.

And, importantly, at this juncture, they assess whether some leaders who are central to conflict in the world today, regard the Biden Administration as having entered a lame-duck period.

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Today, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will examine: The United States and how the world is engaging with it geopolitically.

Specifically, we will analyse what has changed in this regard in 2024. And we will consider whether some leaders of global, regional, and even small powers are preparing for the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency.

And, importantly, at this juncture, are some leaders who are central to conflict in the world today, regarding the Biden Administration as having entered a lame-duck period?

Live Audience: Remember, if you are joining us live via the social media platforms, feel free to comment as we can include your comments and questions in this programme.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Timing is everything. And from China’s perspective, this week’s visit by its foreign minister to New Zealand could be coming at just the right moment. The visit by Wang Yi to Wellington will be his first since 2017.

Anniversaries are important to Beijing. It is more than just a happy coincidence that the visit is taking place during the tenth anniversary year of the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and New Zealand.

That agreement, signed during a visit to Wellington by Xi Jinping in November 2014, marked the start of glory days for bilateral trade. New Zealand’s exports to China have roughly doubled in value since Xi’s visit. They now stand at nearly $NZ21 billion annually. Imports are not far behind, but there is still a trade surplus of some $NZ3 billion in New Zealand’s favour.

Indeed, China has been New Zealand’s biggest two-way trading partner since 2017. A consistent flow of agricultural exports to China – especially milk powder and meat – helped to keep New Zealand afloat during the Covid-19 pandemic while both countries’ borders were closed.

However, New Zealand’s exports to China fell last year for the first time (except for covid-affected 2020) since the 2014 pact was signed. Goods exports took a particular tumble, falling $NZ1.7 billion from 2022 levels in the year to December 2023. Only a post-pandemic recovery in services exports, driven by travel, was able to mask a greater fall. But it was not enough to prevent a $NZ500 million drop overall.

The removal of China’s last remaining tariffs on New Zealand dairy products at the start of 2024 may provide some hope for improvement this year.

But forecasts for China’s economy are mixed and a bumpy post-Covid 19 recovery seems likely. After an expansion of 5.2 per cent in 2023, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts China’s economy will grow by only 4.6 per cent this year and 4.1 per cent in 2025.

Given its food-focused exports, New Zealand is particularly vulnerable to sluggish Chinese economic growth. Tourism is also affected: visitor numbers from China for November 2023 were just 52 per cent of those seen during the same month four years earlier, before the pandemic.

A visit by Wang Yi cannot solve these wider macroeconomic problems. But it will put New Zealand’s crucial relationship with China in the spotlight.

There is every chance the trip could set the stage for an anniversary year visit to Wellington by Xi Jinping later in 2024.

However, whether this occurs will be highly dependent on New Zealand’s next steps in relation to Aukus.

It can be taken as read that Wang will have strong words for Winston Peters, his New Zealand counterpart, about Wellington’s apparent enthusiasm to entertain joining ‘Pillar II’ of the new pact.

The tea leaves are still being read after Labour lost power in the October 2023 election and a new three-way, centre-right coalition led by the National Party’s Christopher Luxon took office the following month.

A joint statement issued by Australia and New Zealand after the countries’ foreign and defence ministers met in Melbourne in early February claimed Aukus was making ‘a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.’

Reaction from the Chinese Embassy in Wellington to the text was typically furious. In an apparent reference to another section of the joint statement which expressed ‘grave concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang’, a spokesperson argued that ‘groundless accusations have been made on China’s internal affairs’.

Meanwhile, on Aukus, the Embassy asserted that the pact ran counter to ‘the common interests of regional countries pursuing peace, stability and common security’. The spokesperson asked ‘relevant countries’ to ‘cherish the hard-won environment for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and be prudent with their words and action to maintain peace, stability and development’.

An indirect, yet ultimately harder-hitting rebuke came from the Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand himself, Wang Xiaolong. Lamenting a lack of options after a last-minute cancellation of a flight to Auckland the day after the joint statement was issued, the Ambassador posted on X: ‘Stuck at Wellington airport clueless as to what to do due to the cancellation of my flight to Auckland and the lack of alternatives. Right now, I am really missing the high-speed trains back in China.’

The displeasure could not be clearer.

Earlier, New Zealand’s new government had sought to move swiftly on Aukus, particularly after Labour itself had laid the groundwork for the new Government by issuing a set of three hawkish defence blueprints just months before the election.

In December, Judith Collins, the defence minister, said that a failure to join Aukus in some form was ‘a real opportunity lost by the previous government’. Christopher Luxon then appeared to back her, telling media: ‘we’re interested in exploring Pillar II, particularly in Aukus, and the new technologies and the opportunities that may mean for New Zealand’. Meanwhile, Winston Peters called for greater NZ-US cooperation in the Pacific, saying ‘we will not achieve our shared ambitions if we allow time to drift’.

However, the Aukus tide may be turning.

Bonnie Jenkins, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, visited New Zealand in early March and told media: ‘we’re still in the process of having discussions about additional partners’, adding ‘that’s not where we’re at right now’.

Speech notes for an address to be given by Jenkins also seemed restrained.

The lack of a concrete Aukus membership offer is not a new argument. In May 2023, New Zealand’s then Labour Prime Minister Chris Hipkins called the idea of joining ‘purely hypothetical’.

However, gradual shifts in language since then – culminating with Luxon’s comments in December – had suggested that a more specific proposal was afoot.

A looming US election was also a logical reason for New Zealand to act on Aukus sooner rather than later.

But perhaps nothing had ever really changed. A new government in Wellington might have been getting ahead of itself.

Alternatively, it could be that a rethink is now going on in Canberra, London and Washington over the merits of asking Wellington – or others – to become involved with Aukus at all.

In New Zealand itself, opposition to the deal also appears to be increasing in intensity. Labour is appearing to back away from its ‘open to conversations’ approach to Aukus that was set by former Prime Minister Chris Hipkins during a visit by Anthony Blinken to New Zealand in July.

In February, Phil Twyford, the party’s associate foreign affairs spokesperson, described Aukus as an ‘offensive warfighting alliance against China’. And David Parker, Labour’s main spokesperson, said ‘we’re not convinced we should be positioning China as a foe’.

The same month, high-profile former Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark co-wrote an opinion piece in the New Zealand Herald newspaper with Don Brash, a former right-wing rival. The strongly-worded article called on Luxon to ‘reassert New Zealand’s independent foreign policy by making it clear that we want no part of Aukus’.

Finally, questions are being asked in Australia about the future of the original purpose of Aukus – to give Canberra nuclear-powered submarines – following a US decision to cut production of ‘Virginia’ class submarines in half from 2025.

Adding to the uncertainty is Donald Trump’s presumptive nominee status in the US presidential election campaign. A survey conducted in August 2023 found 37 per cent of Australians thought Canberra should pull out of the wider Anzus alliance if Trump wins in November. Meanwhile, Trump’s own stance on the Aukus deal remains unknown.

If all is not well with ‘Pillar I’ of Aukus, it is hard to see an expansion to ‘Pillar II’ in the short-term.

For China’s Wang Yi, the potential wavering over Aukus is an opportunity.

The clock is certainly ticking, but no final decisions have been made.

There is still time for Beijing to make its case to Wellington.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

This article can be republished for free under a Creative Commons copyright-free license. Attributions should include a link to the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

The chart above shows Aotearoa New Zealand’s exports and imports of coal. First, note that the emphasis is on timing, not absolute amounts; Imports have a different scale to Exports. Essentially, imports have been around 10% of exports.

It’s also important to note that most Aotearoan coal is exported, while coal used to generate electricity at the Huntly power station is mainly imported. These are two different grades of coal. So it is to be not unexpected that coal imports will have been high at the same times that coal exports also have been high.

And it’s important to note that these data are for values of coal, not volumes. Values will be affected by fluctuations in world coal prices and by fluctuations in the $NZ exchange rate. (Increases in coal exports from 2000 to 2002 will have reflected the historically low exchange rate then.)

Coal exports actually increased after the November 2010 Pike River explosion; that coalfield was still in development in 2010.

Generally, from 2005 to 2012 the export expansion reflected the world market; noting dips for the 2008 global financial crisis, with a subsequent export of stockpiled coal in 2009. During that coal boom period, more than half New Zealand’s coal exports were to India. There was a resurgence of coal exports to India at the end of the 2010s’ decade.

The lull in 2020/21 reflected to Covid19 crisis. Again, we see an exporting of stockpiles after the crisis eased. In 2023 coal exports plummeted, probably a mix of falling world demand as well as falling New Zealand supply. This is a good sign for global transitioning away from coal, though China’s domestic production and consumption of coal will be rising as it transitions from petrol and diesel cars to electric cars. China will be happy to be using fewer imported fossil fuels.

On the import side, New Zealand’s demand for coal from 2003 to 2020 seems to have reflected the global trend, and it will have reflected a lack of growth in renewable energy generation during the later years of the Clark-led Labour-led government. It was under National that the big fall in coal imports took place.

Coal consumption in New Zealand stabilised in the mid-2010s, but resurged again in 2018, again under a Labour-led government; although, to be fair, 2018 and 2019 mainly reflect economic growth rather than the new government’s priorities.

Coal consumption at Huntly in recent years also reflects drought, meaning less hydro-generation of electricity. There is likely to be a lull in coal imports over the next few months, given that the hydro lakes are full, and the El Niño weather forecast is for a strong contribution from wind generation.

My sense is that increased use of electric vehicles – and increased charging capacity – will lead to another temporary resurgence in coal imports. The 2023 quasi-recession, engineered by the Reserve Bank, may however lead to some offsetting reductions in energy demand. My guess, though, is that there will be a short-lived consumption boom in Aotearoa in 2024 and 2025, as high interest rates pull in hot-money from overseas, holding up the $NZ exchange rate, and leading to a further ‘blow-out’ in New Zealand’s current account deficit; a 30.6 billion dollar annual deficit (7.6% of GDP), slightly less than the record high of nearly 9% of GDP earlier this year.

I look forward to hearing about the new government’s plans for expanded renewable electricity generation, and hope that these plans will not mean the loss of wild rivers such as the Mokihinui. Time will tell; soon, in 2024. This government needs ‘runs on the board’ – outcomes, not just proposals – if it is to survive beyond 2026.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

In this the sixth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning present a two-part episode to analyse what to make of New Zealand Prime Minister, Chris Hipkins’ bilateral meetings with People’s Republic of China’s President Xi JinPing and other leaders of the PRC.

In part one, Paul and Selwyn also consider how the PRC-NZ trade relationship is seen in the eyes of New Zealand’s security partners.

Then, in the second half of today’s podcast, Paul and Selwyn analyse the most recent events in Russia – events that have taken shape since Wagner Commander Yevgeny Prigozhin’s pronounced intent to mobilise his mercenaries against the Russian Federation’s top two military heads, and, while doing so, pronounced that the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine was based on falsehoods.

What should we expect next? What is the real state of Putinism? What do the political and power elites in Russia make of President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the matter?

Weeks prior to this event happening inside Russia, Paul and Selwyn analysed the question: How stable is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power? It’s a question that all those who watch Russian affairs have now been confronted with.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn unpack the complexity, look at what has changed as opposed to what has been said.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recordings of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this the sixth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will present a two-part episode to analyse what to make of New Zealand Prime Minister, Chris Hipkins’ bilateral meetings with People’s Republic of China’s President Xi JinPing and other leaders of the PRC.

In part one, we will also consider how the PRC-NZ trade relationship will be seen in the eyes of New Zealand’s security partners.

Then, in the second half of today’s podcast, Paul and Selwyn will analyse the most recent events in Russia – events that have taken shape since Wagner Commander Yevgeny Prigozhin’s pronounced intent to mobilise his mercenaries against the Russian Federation’s top two military heads, and, while doing so, pronounced that the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine was based on falsehoods.

What should we expect next? What is the real state of Putinism? What do the political and power elites in Russia make of President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the matter?

Weeks prior to this event happening inside Russia, Paul and Selwyn analysed the question: How stable is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power? It’s a question that all those who watch Russian affairs have now been confronted with.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn will unpack the complexity, look at what has changed as opposed to what has been said, and consider the effect Russian instability has on NATO and BRICS aligned states.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Warm and constructive.

That’s how Chris Hipkins wanted his meeting with Xi Jinping on Tuesday to be remembered.

The New Zealand Prime Minister deployed the ‘warm and constructive’ phrase at least eight times in a subsequent press conference with New Zealand media.

Hipkins was also keen to note that ‘the meeting was at no point adversarial’. This served to reinforce the impression of warmth.

It also matched with opening public comments by Xi, who said Hipkins’ visit was of ‘great significance’. Xi pointed to the ‘tangible benefits to the two peoples’ that had emerged since China entered into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with New Zealand in 2014.

Xi added ‘we will continue to see each other as partners instead of rivals’, according to a Reuters report that cited Chinese state media.

By emphasising the friendliness of the meeting, Hipkins was also drawing a contrast with claims that his foreign minister, Nanaia Mahuta, had received an ‘epic haranguing’ when she met her Chinese counterpart in Beijing in March.

The timing of the leaked description to ‘The Australian’ newspaper was strategic and threatened to derail Hipkins’ much sought-after appointment with Xi.

The reporting has not been denied, with Mahuta since confirming her meeting with Qin Gang was ‘very robust’.

Against this, Hipkins’ refusal to sign up to Joe Biden’s description of Xi as a ‘dictator’ would have been well received by Beijing.

Hipkins refused to say whether the ‘dictator’ issue had been brought up by Xi – but said he did not raise it himself.

China has yet to release its own account of the Xi-Hipkins meeting, leaving New Zealand’s version of the private section of the encounter largely to stand as the initial record.

But some intriguing insights into the thinking of the Chinese leadership in relation to New Zealand can be found in the semi-official Global Times newspaper.

In an article published late on Tuesday that focused on a range of diplomatic visits to China this week, New Zealand took centre-stage – even overshadowing analysis of Mongolia and Vietnam, China’s neighbours.

The newspaper depicted New Zealand as something of a role model for other Western countries, noting Wellington’s reputation for ‘independent policymaking’ and bipartisan consensus on ‘how to get along with China’. According to the paper, New Zealand showed how ‘Western countries can withstand the pressures of unilateralism, Cold War mentality and hegemony’.

The praise from the Global Times referenced approvingly Hipkins’ stance on the recent ‘dictator’ spat. The paper said the incident was an example of New Zealand’s ‘non-interference when dealing with China’ and contrasted sharply with the ‘arrogant and offensive attitude of Washington’.

After his meeting with Xi, Hipkins appeared somewhat nervous and at times uncharacteristically tongue-tied when answering questions from the New Zealand media – a sign that he was aware of the diplomatic stakes of the bilateral meeting.

Hipkins carefully declined to be drawn on what views Xi expressed during the private meeting, saying that ‘wouldn’t be diplomatic or appropriate’.

But the New Zealand PM did reveal that AUKUS ‘wasn’t specifically discussed’ during the meeting.

When asked, Hipkins also disclosed that New Zealand’s growing ties with NATO were not canvassed.

However, the meeting with Xi was a big picture one and it would not be unusual for these issues of detail to be addressed in a more indirect fashion.

Hipkins said the main focus of the meeting was on New Zealand’s economic ties with China.

But he added that issues such as the US-China relationship, the Pacific, the war in Ukraine and human rights were also covered in a ‘free-flowing dialogue’.

The official statement issued by the New Zealand PM’s office used softer language than the press conference.

For example, there is no direct mention of ‘human rights’ in the readout. Instead, it was noted that the pair ‘engaged on areas where our cultures and political systems differ’.

There was only one, relatively minor faux pas from Hipkins.

During the initial portion of the meeting that was open to media, Xi called New Zealand a ‘friend and partner’.

But when asked by media whether he would reciprocate this assessment, Hipkins initially dodged, responding ‘I would describe the relationship between New Zealand and China as an incredibly important one’.

Hipkins appeared to realise the ramifications of his answer as the questioning on the ‘friend and partner’ issue continued. He later added ‘it depends on the context, but yes, by and large’.

In length, Hipkins’ 40-minute meeting with Xi ran for ten minutes longer than scheduled.

Jacinda Ardern, Hipkins’ predecessor, received 50 minutes for her own meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Bangkok last November.

We should not read too much into this discrepancy.

After all, it is a busy week for China, which is also hosting its first summer meetings of the World Economic Forum since 2019.

On Tuesday, Xi also met with the prime ministers of Barbados, Mongolia and Vietnam.

Moreover, Hipkins’ counterparts from the other ‘Five Eyes’ countries – Australia, Canada, the UK and US – are not currently being hosted in Beijing at all.

Chris Hipkins has passed his first major diplomatic test.

His first meeting with Xi Jinping was a success.

It genuinely was warm and constructive.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

Timing is everything.

After months of mixed signals, Chris Hipkins will head to China at the end of June.

The New Zealand Prime Minister’s long-awaited visit to Beijing will come shortly before he attends July’s NATO summit in Vilnius.

The careful timing of the PM’s China trip – billed as a trade mission – offers advantages to both the Chinese and New Zealand sides.

For Beijing, the tour will provide a valuable opportunity to influence the leader of a ‘Five Eyes’ country, just before Hipkins takes his seat at the NATO table in Lithuania.

NATO last year launched a new ‘Strategic Concept’ that called out China for its ‘stated ambitions and coercive policies’ and pinpointed the country as a source of ‘systemic challenges’ for the alliance.

For Wellington, the fact that Hipkins is choosing to visit China first – immediately prior to the NATO summit – will be a chance to balance up its recent foreign policy trajectory.

Since Hipkins took over as Prime Minister in January, New Zealand has generally sailed a more hawkish, pro-US course.

The latest instalment in that story came on Friday, when New Zealand signed up to a joint statement with Japan and the other four Five Eyes countries – Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States – this time condemning economic coercion.

Interestingly, the joint declaration did not explicitly name China.

The decision to omit an explicit reference to Beijing – which was the clear and obvious target – might have been a concession to the more sensitive countries in the grouping, especially New Zealand.

After all, the US now no longer shies away from openly criticising China. Traditional diplomatic niceties now frequently seem to be a thing of the past – as demonstrated by the sharp language used recently by Lloyd Austin, the US defence secretary.

Whatever the motivations, the wording of the joint statement failed to stave off a typically swift and sharp reaction from the Chinese Embassy in Wellington.

Wang Xiaolong, the Ambassador, published a series of tweets which began: ‘Smearing other countries, either directly or indirectly, won’t whitewash one’s own dismal record on coercion’.

The embassy later issued a statement that said ‘certain countries tend to overstretch or abuse the concept of national security to impose protectionist policies’.

China is still New Zealand’s biggest trading partner by some margin – although the value of New Zealand’s exports to the country largely flatlined over the past year. The total now sits at $NZ21.6 billion.

In the year to March 2023, exports to China made up only 23 per cent of New Zealand’s total exports of goods and services, according to Statistics New Zealand.

During his time in China, Chris Hipkins will be seeking to rekindle and rebuild the trading relationship, especially after Covid-19. Reviving Chinese tourism to New Zealand will be one obvious major focus.

But he can also expect to hear more about China’s frustrations with both the joint declaration on economic coercion and other recent New Zealand foreign policy developments.

A meeting between Hipkins and Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, has yet to be officially confirmed, but – again – this seems to be only a question of timing.

Beijing’s concerns are likely to centre on New Zealand’s potential role in AUKUS, the elite-level military pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Andrew Little, New Zealand’s defence minister, has said New Zealand is ‘willing to explore’ joining the next stage of AUKUS, which is focused on advanced technologies and is commonly referred to as ‘Pillar II’.

Little has also been at the forefront of other recent decisions that might have irritated China.

These include the recent signing of a new military agreement with Japan and a forthcoming upgrade of New Zealand’s defence ties with Fiji, as well as the boost in New Zealand’s military aid to Ukraine that was announced in early May.

Chris Hipkins and foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta appear to be less enthusiastic about New Zealand joining AUKUS.

After Mahuta visited Beijing herself in March, she said ‘we don’t want to see the militarisation of the Pacific, we’re not part of the AUKUS arrangements’, while Hipkins called the Pillar II issue ‘purely hypothetical’ when questioned in May.

It is difficult to work out the true extent of any divisions on foreign policy within Chris Hipkins’ Labour cabinet.

But recent speeches given a week apart by Little and Mahuta provide a useful case-study.

At the ‘Shangri-La Dialogue’ in Singapore on June 2, Little told fellow defence ministers that New Zealand viewed the global situation with ‘clear eyes’ and would ‘maintain the military capability necessary to contribute to the rules-based international order and protection of our free and democratic way of life’.

By contrast, Nanaia Mahuta’s speech to last week’s conference of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) in Auckland was more nuanced.

The foreign minister addressed the risks of a ‘more contested environment’, which she listed as ‘poverty levels, indebtedness, conflict, economic exclusion and human rights abuses’.

But Mahuta also told attendees that New Zealand did not cooperate ‘exclusively with those mirroring our views’ and argued ‘binary choices’ were unnecessary.

Perhaps most significantly, Mahuta argued there was no ‘new Cold War’ – a reference that would have been carefully chosen for its likelihood of a positive reception in Beijing.

China regularly warns countries – including New Zealand – against taking what it calls a ‘Cold War mentality’.

If avoiding superpower confrontation is the priority, Hipkins’ visit at the end of June may come at just the right time.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to visit Beijing on June 18, in a much-awaited top-level trip. If it happens, Blinken’s mission will go against the grain of deteriorating US-China relations.

China’s defence minister Li Shangfu declined to meet with his US counterpart, Lloyd Austin, when the pair were in Singapore – a response to the US refusing to lift old sanctions on Li.

Not long after this diplomatic failure, the US released a video of an apparent near-collision of US and Chinese warships in the Taiwan Strait – which in turn came not long after claims of a similar incident involving aircraft.

Last but not least, US officials claimed at the weekend China had been spying on the US for years from Cuba. Unsurprisingly, China has rejected the allegations.

With New Zealand still being China’s best friend in the West, Hipkins has the potential to build on any progress made by Blinken in establishing proverbial ‘guardrails’ to prevent tensions between the superpowers from spiralling out of control.

Ultimately, the most likely role to be played by Chris Hipkins is that of messenger.

NATO leaders will be keen to hear what the New Zealand PM has to say about his China trip when he arrives in Europe in early July.

Chris Hipkins is going to China.

The timing is crucial.

And only time will tell just how successful his trip will be.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. Disclosure: Geoffrey attended the Global Media Congress in 2022 as a guest of the organisers, the Emirates News Agency.

What does the Geopolitical balancing that is taking place in the West and South-West Pacific mean for the region and the globe?

Analysis: Paul and Selwyn consider the question from several angles, and provide a context to the headlines that suggest both global powers, the USA and the Peoples Republic of China, are on a collision-course toward conflict.

Paul takes us through the US-PNG and Japan-NZ bilateral security/military agreements as a balancing response to the PRC-Solomons security agreement.

In addition, Paul considers the question: Does the PRC have legitimate interests in the Pacific and, as a great power, should those interests be understood and respected?

Selwyn considers whether China’s ascendancy as a global power threatens the United States’ position as the perceived ‘preeminent defender’ of the Global Order?

And Selwyn raises for debate, highlighting what the two global powers’ messaging was at the Shangri-La security dialogue that took place over last weekend.

Paul then analyses what this all means for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Recommended Links:

•  KiwiPolitico.com Ref. https://www.kiwipolitico.com/2023/06/…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; General Li Shangfu, State Councilor; Minister of National Defense, China Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; Lloyd J Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

They recommended the audience does so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, as Facebook has undergone significant changes. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here, also YouTube podcasts and the Podcast hosts below.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Today, In this episode of A View from Afar political scientist, and former Pentagon analyst, Dr Paul Buchanan, and Selwyn Manning will analyse the question:

What does the Geopolitical balancing that is taking place in the West and South-West Pacific mean for the region and the globe?

Paul and Selwyn will consider this question from several angles, and provide a context to the headlines that suggest both global powers, the USA and the Peoples Republic of China, are on a collision-course toward conflict.

Paul will take us through the US-PNG and Japan-NZ bilateral security/military agreements as a balancing response to the PRC-Solomons security agreement.

In addition, Paul will consider the question: Does the PRC have legitimate interests in the Pacific and, as a great power, should those interests be understood and respected?

Selwyn will consider whether China’s ascendancy as a global power threatens the United States’ position as the ‘preeminent defender’ of the Global Order?

And Selwyn will raise for debate, highlighting what the two global powers’ messaging was at the Shangri-La security dialogue that took place over last weekend.

Paul will then analyse what this all means for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

They recommended the audience does so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, as Facebook has undergone significant changes. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here, also YouTube podcasts and the Podcast hosts below.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this the first episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning examine the pros and cons of New Zealand, and other APAC nations, joining the AUKUS security defence pact.

Specifically, Paul and Selwyn examine the following questions:

* What is AUKUS’s purpose?

* What are the risks to New Zealand’s national and public interest?

* What does AUKUS ‘success’ look like? What could its failure look like?

Paul presents the reasons why he believes New Zealand will not join AUKUS, and Selwyn delivers his assessment of why New Zealand must not join the Anglophile security pact.

ALSO, Paul and Selwyn will headline:

* The latest on the US Pentagon leaks. What really is happening here?

* The Global Geopolitical Theatre and how stable is Russian Federation’s president, Vladimir Putin’s regime?

INTERACTION: Paul and Selwyn invite and encourage you to interact with your questions and comments.

They recommend you do so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, or via Facebook. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

You can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

You can see this episode as video-on-demand, and engage with earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

LIVE@MIDDAY NZ Time – 8pm US EDT – In this the first episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning will examine the pros and cons of New Zealand, and other APAC nations, joining the AUKUS security defence pact.

Specifically, Paul and Selwyn will examine the following questions:

* What is AUKUS’s purpose?

* What are the risks to New Zealand’s national and public interest?

* What does AUKUS ‘success’ look like? What could its failure look like?

ALSO, Paul and Selwyn will headline:

* The latest on the US Pentagon leaks. What really is happening here?

* The Global Geopolitical Theatre and how stable is Russian Federation’s president, Vladimir Putin’s regime?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn invite and encourage you to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

They recommend you do so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, as Facebook is undergoing significant changes. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

You can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this, the 23rd episode of A View from Afar for 2022 political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning analyse the significance of public protests that have challenged authoritarian rule in both the People’s Republic of China and in the Republic of Iran.

Paul takes us through the causes of the resistance, and how, in each nation, the reasons differ, but the impact is the same.

In 2022, authoritarian leadership is being challenged by the rise of street protest and resistance to centralised control.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn welcome interaction while live with questions and comments. They recommend you can keep the debate going via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, as Facebook is undergoing significant changes. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

You can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.