Analysis by Keith Rankin.

This chart shows total deaths in a number of comparable countries with high or highish life expectancies. The countries with most deaths have older populations.

New Zealand should perhaps be compared most with Ireland, Scotland, Denmark and Finland; all countries with just over five million people. And with Australia.

Australian mortality has been similar to New Zealand’s in recent years, though, as more New Zealand citizens migrate to Australia, in the next few years New Zealand will age faster than Australia.

Ireland is exceptional because of its relationship with United States’ high technology companies and its full membership of the European Union. Thus Ireland has many elite ‘tech’ workers at present. Further, in past years of difficulty – especially 2008 to 2014 – Ireland was able to unload much of its underclass to other countries. While the health and financial circumstances of Ireland’s sixty- and seventy-somethings requires further investigation, Ireland will neither have had as big a baby bust as New Zealand in the 1930s nor as intense a baby boom from 1946 to 1965. So, it is likely that the numbers of deaths in New Zealand will rise faster in coming years than the number of deaths in Ireland.

The high death numbers in Scotland, Denmark and Finland do not reflect lower life expectancies in those countries. Rather, they reflect populations with comparatively fewer younger people compared to older people. These countries’ mortality numbers in 2018-2022 are the best guide we have to what death numbers will be like in New Zealand in coming years, as the baby bust generation passes on and the 1940s’ and 1950s’ baby boomers reach the days in which they dominate death data.

Most importantly, the experience of these three countries suggests that we will see the demand for health care in New Zealand surge from now on – peaking in the 2030s and 2040s – at a time when current projections show that New Zealand’s healthcare workforce will trough. There seems to have been minimal, if any, demographic analysis of the implication in New Zealand of a baby bust generation giving way to baby boom generations. This is despite record numbers of policy analysts and cost analysts contracted by government.

Some Particular Comments about other countries

I have included Qatar and its near-neighbour Oman to show how low death numbers are at present in small Arabian countries with relatively large numbers of working-age residents. I think that this observation also applies to Israel.

We note also the death incidence in the higher life expectancy countries of Latin America – Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile – on account of their relatively low numbers of people in their eighties.

We note that Portugal and Japan have relatively high numbers of elderly people in their populations. Portugal has been a retirement magnet within Europe, with strong links to the United Kingdom. I have generally been puzzled as to why Japan has so many older people, though we should note that the generation which fought in World War II has largely passed on. I guess that, as in England, many Japanese children in the war were transported into the countryside so that they were not in the cities which suffered very intense bombing from the United States. Overall, Japan is one of the most age imbalanced countries; the low birth rates in recent decades contribute most to this.

Germany is a country which suffered particularly from Covid19 and similar diseases in 2022. But its high 2018 death tally suggests demographic causes which still need unravelling. Despite Germany being a major labour inflow country in Europe, it still has a median age about ten years higher than New Zealand’s (47 compared to 37).

On the flipside of Germany’s role as a labour-inflow country within the European Union, we have Finland and the other Baltic states as outflow countries. Hence the high death tallies in Finland and the Baltics relative to their resident populations.

Neither Finland nor Denmark look particularly happy in this chart. I predict that New Zealand’s death tally will soon be like Finland’s, given both countries’ propensities to lose labour to bigger neighbours. The situation of Greece is similar to that of the Baltic counties; too great a loss of their younger people to the employment centres of the European Union.

Re a few countries not in the chart, I can affirm that both England and Netherlands have population-adjusted death tallies very similar to the United States. And Canada’s adjusted numbers are very similar to Norway’s.

Finally, we should note Sweden, which was neutral in World War II. So Sweden does not have the extreme demographics of older people which New Zealand and other war participant countries exhibit. And, Sweden was less impacted by Covid19.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

The Pandemic can be assessed a bit like games of football, with deaths being the score. (Or, given that there are many ‘teams’ competing together, a better analogy may be a Marathon race. Nevertheless, I will use the language of the football metaphor.)

The winning country would be that with the fewest number of deaths attributable to Covid19. While this football metaphor is indeed useful, our perceptions of ‘who did best’ are strongly coloured by the pandemic’s first year, when media attention was greatest, when public health measures were most ‘in our faces’, and when the pandemic response was at its most bureaucratic.

As a result, the half-time scores are the scores that most seeped into public consciousness. Then, deaths which were classed as ‘covid-deaths’ were implicitly seen as more tragic, more requiring of daily tallying, than other deaths.

The two Tables below look at this Pandemic ‘World Cup’ through the simple demographic criteria of increases in deaths, all deaths. We may note four ‘ordinary-time’ phases of the pandemic. Together, they add up to a period of four years.

First, the warm-up, from May 2019 to February 2020. The warm-up, going back to 2019, is important to include because countries with unusually low numbers of deaths due to respiratory illnesses in 2019 would typically have higher death tallies in the next respiratory epidemic, whatever virus that might be.

Second is the first half of the Pandemic proper, which I would date as March 2020 to March 2021. Third is the second half, from April 2021 to April 2022, which includes the waves associated with the Greek-alphabet variants (especially Alpha, Delta and Omicron).

Following ‘ordinary-time’, there was ‘extra-time’ which I define as May 2022 to April 2023. We may note that the WHO declared the Pandemic to be over at around the end of April this year. So, we may formally categorise the period from May 2023 as ‘post-pandemic’.

Table 1 below indicates the score at the end of ordinary-time. It shows the percentage increase in deaths for a number of countries for the three years from May 2019 to April 2022, compared to the three years from May 2015 to April 2018. In the right-hand column is a counterfactual which is a best estimate of what the increase in deaths would have been in the pandemic period had there been no pandemic. (The counterfactual is calculated by comparing deaths in the 24 months ending April 2019 with deaths in the 24 months ending April 2017. I have used April years because, in both hemispheres, the period in late April and early May is generally free from epidemic respiratory deaths. This method minimises the impact to this calculation of the severe influenza global epidemic which lasted from late 2016 to early 2018.)

Table 2 indicates the ‘extra-time score’, comparing the year-to-April 2023 with the year-to-April 2019. It uses the same ‘trend’ counterfactual as Table 1. Whereas Table 1 is sorted to place the ordinary-time ‘winners’ at the top, Table 2 is sorted to place the ‘extra-time losers’ at the top. (We note that, for Table 2, some countries are laggards in publishing their mortality data; and also that the most recently published numbers are subject to upwards revision. The countries which are problematic in this regard have their data marked with asterisks, the number of asterisks indicating the degree of estimation required.)

In the pandemic proper, the two countries with easily the least increases in deaths were Norway and Sweden. The others in the ‘Top Eight’ (the ‘quarterfinalists’, to use the football metaphor) were the other Nordic countries, Australia and New Zealand, and Taiwan.

Based on the media coverage in New Zealand and the world news channels that New Zealanders mainly follow, the only surprise in that Top Eight would be Sweden, which pursued a very different policy response, especially in the ‘first-half’ of the Pandemic. In the 2020 New Zealand election campaign, political parties generally agreed that Taiwan was the exemplar for other countries to follow.

We may note that only New Zealand and Taiwan had counterfactuals showing higher projected increases in deaths than what actually happened. Thus, these two may be declared the ‘ordinary-time’ winners. The problem is that the Pandemic World Cup had ‘extra-time’. (It must also be noted, however, when we take the ‘non-death costs’ of the pandemic and its associated health policies, Sweden’s non-death costs were easily the lowest. So, on this basis, it could be argued that Sweden was the true ordinary-time winner, despite having been way behind at ‘half-time’.)

Extra-Time

When we look at Table 2 we see clearly that the East Asian countries performed very poorly. Most of these were deemed to be success stories in ordinary time. Taiwan is very prominent here. So is South Korea which has a conservative estimate in this table for its ‘extra-time’ increase in deaths. Macao is very important here, because it is the best proxy we have for China. Taiwan has had a recent resurgence in deaths in May 2023, and Macao has had a resurgence of Covid19 cases in recent weeks. So, these countries’ pandemic problems are far from over. (There are also signs that New Zealand’s seasonal death tally is picking up early this year.) The Macao situation, combined with other reports that all is not well in China right now, suggest that China may be presently going through a significant third wave of Covid19. This will add to global supply-chain problems.

New Zealand and Australia are in the top (ie worst) half of Table 2. So are two of the Nordic countries, Iceland and Finland, the Nordic countries which imposed more restrictive health mandates than their neighbours. So is Ireland near the worst, more restrictive in its public health mandates than the United Kingdom countries. Norway, top of Table 1, is in the middle of the Table 2 pack. Of the Nordic countries, only Sweden – easily the least restrictive in Europe, especially in the first-half of the Pandemic – performed well.

Quirky Counterfactuals

Creating consistent counterfactuals for each country is difficult because there are quirky demographics at play. First, we note that there are three main reasons why death increases might trend high for a given country. The first is a general increase in the population of a country: more people, more deaths. Second is the aging of a country, represented by increases in the median age of living persons. Third is a deterioration of general health, especially of those middle-age cohorts whose deaths ‘come under the radar’, given that deaths are dominated in most countries by people aged over 75.

It is likely that the high counterfactual for New Zealand is due to a mix of these. We know that New Zealand has some of the same issues of underclass deprivation as the United States, which include obesity, diabetes, and substance abuse. And we know that the United States has a lower life expectancy than other ‘western’ countries; a life expectancy now known to be falling.

The other two main quirks to look out for are birth rates in the troubled second quarter of the twentieth century. The Great Depression and World War Two were the main events that impacted on birth rates. There was also warfare in the 1950s in Korea and Malaysia. Sweden is an interesting case, comparable with Switzerland, neutral in World War Two, so having a lesser demographic impact from the War. Also, Sweden came out of the Great Depression early, meaning it will have had comparatively high birth numbers in the 1930s; Sweden’s peak deaths since 2015 will have been higher than otherwise, on that account.

While New Zealand is possibly the western country with the fastest population growth this century, this is offset by the fact that low birth numbers in the 1930s are translating to lower deaths since 2015. (See my recent ‘Smithometer’ analysis, in Granny Smith.) Aging and population growth are not the whole story of New Zealand’s upper quartile trend of increasing deaths. (Unlike, say Portugal, which is known to attract retirees in Europe as Florida does in the United States.)

New Zealand also has the additional factor of having, in June and July 2022, too many vulnerable people who were denied, for unexplained political reasons, a timely second booster Covid19 vaccination. The July 2002 mortality peak, almost entirely experienced by older European-ethnic New Zealanders – the Granny Smiths – came to a prompt end once these people became eligible for second-boosters. This sharp July peak – and drop-off – appears to have been a New Zealand specific phenomenon.

High counterfactual notwithstanding, New Zealand performed very poorly in extra-time, though not as badly as the East Asian countries which imposed the most ‘sterile’ public health policies on their people.

East Europe

I would like to note two other groups of countries. First, it was Eastern Europe which had the highest reported per-capita Covid19 death tolls. These countries do not look as bad in this analysis, though they (except the Baltic states) still look bad in Table 1, especially in light of their often negative counterfactual death trends. The main demographic problem that these countries have been facing is emigration of working-age adults, especially those Eastern European countries in the European Union. Generally, these countries look much better in Table 2, in extra-time.

Most of these countries successfully imposed severe public health restrictions in the first half of 2020, but abandoned those restrictions – or were unable to easily reimpose them – in the later stages of ‘the game’. The result was that these countries’ populations had substantially compromised immunity going into the winter of 2020/21. Their death peaks were much higher than the death peaks in the west earlier in 2020. The second problem was that, on account of their departed youth, their populations were aging as well as falling. Hence the high Covid19 per capita death tolls that savage winter.

In ‘extra time’, East Europe has ‘performed’ best. This would appear to be in part because so many of their most vulnerable people had already died; respiratory viruses had lost much of their human ‘fuel’. Also, these countries had re-established (the hard way) high levels of natural immunity to respiratory illnesses.

Russia continues to supply mortality data, though it excludes deaths in the Ukraine conflict zone; so its not included in the tables. And Ukraine has certainly stopped supplying data, due to governmental priorities as well as a lack of will to publicise its present demographic plight. Kazakhstan is probably the best proxy for assessing the impact of the Pandemic in Russia.

South America

These countries (plus Mexico) are among the worst performers in both Tables. Typically, they exhibit many of the ‘underclass’ socio-economic problems apparent in the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand: inequality, poverty, homelessness, obesity, crime, violence. It is likely that they will see ongoing increases in annual mortality on account of these factors; factors exacerbated by both the Pandemic and its associated mandates.

While Latin American populations are much younger than Eastern European populations – due to both higher births and less emigration – there will also have been a significant growth of numbers of people of peak-dying-age (over 75) contributing to ‘trend’ counterfactuals in some cases as high as New Zealand’s.

Another factor in these American countries is the high proportions of people living in or near the tropics at high altitudes. Under normal circumstances, these are unusually healthy environments, in which seasonal respiratory illnesses do not circulate as much as in temperate climes. But, it makes people living in these zones more vulnerable to pandemic respiratory illnesses when they do happen. It’s an old story that goes back to the time of Spanish colonisation in the sixteenth century.

This last factor is only apparent here in Colombia and Ecuador. Other similarly affected countries – Peru and Bolivia – had very high early death tolls, but (presumably due to political crises) have not released ‘extra-time’ data. Venezuela was even less forthcoming with useful data.

Africa including Qatar

Mortality statistics from Africa are rare. Egypt is now the best, and it certainly suffered. South Africa, which in ‘ordinary-time’ had a similar experience to that of East Europe, used to supply good quality data; but no more as its present economic crisis deepens. Signs are that the African continent was less impacted directly by Covid19 than other regions, though its more fragile economic supply-chains have become victims of the Pandemic’s ‘extra-time’ environment.

Qatar is an interesting case, because of its unusual demographics. Qatar’s resident population is heavily weighted towards the younger working-age population. So, while its death rates per capita have been very low, its percentage increases in deaths have not been low. We do need a good comparative analysis of the health impact of Covid19 on working-age populations, though made difficult by demographic data today still focusing on sex and ethnicity rather than age or occupation or labour force status.

South Asia

After China, the biggest Pandemic uncertainties relate to South Asia, with Inda being the largest country. We may also add the very populous country that is Indonesia. This region is a demographic black hole, which experiences high levels of emigration as well as of death. (We may note here – see Hundreds of Pakistanis dead in Mediterranean migrant boat disaster, CNN 19 June 2023 – that the majority of victims of the overcrowded refugee boat which sank last week off the coast of Greece were from Pakistan.) This region has suffered a huge upheaval since 2020, with the Pandemic a significant contributing factor.

Conclusion

There remains a lack of competent demographic analysis of recent and former pandemics, partly due to poor (sometimes politically-motivated) record-keeping, and partly due to the low status of demography among the social sciences. Analyses like mine here – amateur in the sense of being unpaid, but not in the sense of quality – help to fill the gap.

The most striking conclusion is that the ‘extra-time’ of the Pandemic gives a very different picture of the Pandemic’s human cost. The imposition by governments of sterile environments for long periods is not a recipe for good health outcomes, although it may give good headlines in the early phases of a pandemic when the Press is at its most attentive.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Analysis by Keith Rankin.

A pandemic can end in three ways. Either the death rates attributed to the pandemic disease cease, or at least drop back to pre-pandemic levels. Or normality is re-established, with the pandemic disease still present, but displacing other causes of death. Or a ‘new normal’ is established, with higher ongoing rates of death normalised.

So, to some extent, a pandemic’s duration is a state-of-mind; meaning that the post-pandemic period is when that ’emergency’ mindset has departed. To a large extent, that happens when the most burdensome public health restrictions become untenable; in New Zealand’s case, that was when the substantive closure of the international border finished. Deaths, covid or otherwise, may still be a problem, but they cease to be newsworthy!

For most of the world, the post-pandemic period started around February 2022. East Asia was the principal exception. Table 1 below shows mortality in the first year of the new normal.

Table 1: Back to Normal?
total deaths:	2018/19*	2022/23**	increase
Macau	2199	3596	63.53%
Hong Kong	47056	62056	31.88%
Singapore	21323	26829	25.82%
Taiwan	170483	212665	24.74%
Thailand	484272	603662	24.65%
Iceland	2180	2702	23.94%
South Korea	291529	357298	22.56%
Chile	107408	130970	21.94%
Colombia	236488	285944	20.91%
Ireland	30051	35650	18.63%
Brazil	1325677	1569617	18.40%
Japan	1360950	1607011	18.08%
Northern Ireland	14998	17504	16.71%
Australia	161466	188155	16.53%
Scotland	55633	64807	16.49%
Malaysia	171015	199069	16.40%
Finland	53458	62112	16.19%
New Zealand	33310	38682	16.13%
Netherlands	148356	171826	15.82%
Germany	925309	1069924	15.63%
England & Wales	515610	592677	14.95%
Norway	39819	45650	14.64%
Austria	80544	92325	14.63%
Canada	279510	319140	14.18%
Uruguay	34655	39512	14.02%
United States	2812658	3193088	13.53%
Greece	122940	139406	13.39%
Mexico	726738	819268	12.73%
Portugal	111815	124757	11.57%
Spain	415025	458846	10.56%
Switzerland	66396	73311	10.41%
Italy	641280	705564	10.02%
Israel	45488	49996	9.91%
Denmark	53578	58826	9.80%
Peru	157650	172825	9.63%
France	591364	647762	9.54%
Czechia	110671	120448	8.83%
Slovenia	20603	22307	8.27%
Belgium	107810	116284	7.86%
Slovakia	54017	58196	7.74%
Poland	405241	435401	7.44%
Sweden	88633	94436	6.55%
South Africa	527630	561992	6.51%
Egypt	570015	605500	6.23%
Croatia	52144	55093	5.66%
Albania	21717	22900	5.45%
Hungary	131229	135090	2.94%
Kazakhstan	131089	134709	2.76%
Bulgaria	109175	112080	2.66%
Serbia	101699	104390	2.65%
Romania	263338	270222	2.61%
Moldova	37314	36554	-2.04%
*	year ended April 2019
**	latest available 12-month period

Table 1 shows a number of countries’ most recent annual death tallies compared with the year ended April 2019, the best baseline period available. May 2018 to April 2019 was chosen because it represents the first full year after the silent influenza pandemic of November 2016 to April 2018. While not a media event, that largely invisible 2017 pandemic was a substantial mortality event, at least in the ‘global north’. A pandemic does not require an authentication from WHO to be an actual pandemic. A pandemic is simply a globally widespread experience of a disruptive contagious disease.

Broadly, Table 1 shows the countries which followed ‘elimination strategies’ near the top for post-pandemic mortality. Not only did countries in the east of the eastern hemisphere (including Aotearoa New Zealand) pursue the most stringent anti-covid policies (and practiced them for the longest time periods), some  prematurely claimed to have eliminated (though not eradicated) the disease. For some in East Asia, the 2003 experience of SARS was uppermost in health officials’ minds.

Table 1 also shows that some of the countries worst-hit by the pandemic (especially those in the Southeast European ‘Balkans’) have returned to death tallies comparable with base-year numbers. If South Africa and Egypt are a suitable guide, that return to health normality applies to Africa as well.

The only West European countries with post-pandemic deaths under nine percent more than pre-pandemic deaths are Sweden and Belgium, both countries with high covid death tallies in the first wave of the pandemic, but well below European mortality averages in the second year of the pandemic. Sweden’s 6.55% increase actually overstates its situation by about two percentage points, because, more than in most other countries, deaths there were particularly and unusually low from May 2018 until the start of the pandemic. Also, Australia’s 16.53% is an overstatement, probably by at least two percentage points; this is because tardy Australia’s most recent annual deaths’ data includes the months of December 2021 and January 2022, both high mortality months compared to the following December and January.

New Zealand’s most recent death data uses December 2022 and January 2023, not December 2021 and January 2022. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand’s Table 1 increased mortality experience is understated by a percentage point, because March and April 2019 (included in the pre-pandemic baseline year) had somewhat higher deaths than those same months in 2018. If we had used a baseline year from March 2018 to February 2019, then New Zealand would have had a mortality increase of 17.40%, not 16.13%.

Re East Asia, the numbers for Macau and Hong Kong give a hint of the recent reality in China. For that region we should note also that the South Korea increase in Table 1 (22.56%) is a substantial understatement of reality, because South Korea has not reported ‘total deaths’ after July 2022, and we know that Korea has had many covid cases since then.

We also note that post-pandemic death tallies are high for Japan, Ireland, Scotland, Iceland, and Finland. These are all countries which, for their regions, were known for their more restrictive public health policies. Finland was widely acclaimed for being the most restrictive of the Nordic countries during the pandemic years. (We also note that Finland had many more deaths than Norway both pre-pandemic and post-pandemic, despite having about the same population as Norway; it suggests that many more young Finns are working abroad than young Norwegians. Likewise, we see that New Zealand has more deaths than Ireland, despite both countries having essentially the same population.)

Germany, which has had a particularly worrying recent run of deaths, in Table 1 is not out of step with its western neighbours; although we should note that southern Western Europe has generally had a post-pandemic more normal than northern Western Europe (Sweden excepted).

The critical question, looking to 2023 and 2024, is whether, for the countries towards the top of Table 1, the pandemic has triggered a new normal with persistently higher mortality than in the 2010s’ decade. Or have these countries simply experienced a delayed pandemic mortality experience which will soon subside? If the latter, then we should expect a substantial mortality drop in East Asia and West Europe in the year to April 2024.

Demography and the challenges of predicting the pandemic’s influence on 2020s’ mortality

Demography is a complex subject. Pandemic death rates per capita were high in Eastern Europe because those countries have lost many of their young people to emigration. Increases in death tallies, however, were never so high in those countries. The demography of Europe is particularly complex because many of their older people were born either side of, or during, World War Two; a war with substantial demographic consequences which have not yet fully played out.

The Scandinavian countries in particular had diverse experiences in that war. Sweden was neutral, Norway and Denmark were occupied, while Finland was successively friend and foe to the allied powers. So the change in the number of older people may differ in Sweden compared to the others. Nevertheless, Sweden still compares well with the other neutral countries: Switzerland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. (Though noting that Spain had its own especially large demographic trauma in 1936 to 1939.)

Another problem in unravelling the demographics of Europe is the substantial international migration between present and former European Union countries, and immigration from former (or present) empire countries. So many people these days die in different countries from which they were born. We know little about the different pandemic and post-pandemic death experiences of immigrants compared to people born in the country of their death.

In most countries deaths in 2022/23 would have been higher compared to 2018/19. The main determinant of death rates is the numbers of people in the oldest age cohorts. About half of all deaths in most countries are of people in their eighties. So the biggest increases, for reasons other than the pandemic, would be due to the rate of increase or decrease of a country’s population of octogenarians. Some countries will have significantly fewer octogenarians after the pandemic, because the pandemic itself took so many.

The second most important reason for changing death tallies is the underlying health of the people. Pandemics take more people in countries which already have substantial populations – especially populations in the 65 to 74 age group – with compromised pre-pandemic health or compromised general immunity. In pandemic years, the main reason for more death is worse underlying health. In other years changes in health status may either accentuate or offset changes in the numbers of people over eighty. While there are health-compromised people of all ages, compromised health – high morbidity or low general immunity – is more likely to have prematurely fatal consequences for people aged 65 to 74.

To summarise the two previous paragraphs, I would argue that the two main predictors of a country’s normal death tally are the numbers of octogenarians in the population, and the numbers of people in the population aged 65 to 74 with compromised health or general immunity. (In addition, some developing countries still have unacceptably high levels of infant mortality.)

The two key aspects of the health status of living populations are morbidity and immunity. The countries which fare best in a novel virus pandemic (or from wave pandemics of pathogens which induce only-short-lived specific immunity) are those with low morbidity and high general immunity. With respect to the present post-pandemic period, the covid coronavirus increased both the morbidity and the immunity of populations. Where these two increases balance out, then a new normal appears which looks substantially like the old normal.

Before the twentieth century, people living rurally were more likely to experience longevity. That changed in the twentieth century, when people living in metropolises gained super-high-immunity levels from living in close proximity to each other (improving immunity); and urbanised populations experienced reduced morbidity as a result of access to a wider range of foods, from more timely access to healthcare services, less exposure to conditions such as malaria, and safer supplies of drinking water.

Big cities still reduce life outcomes for people immigrating from rural areas; for people not yet adapted to city levels of exposure to pathogens, and often having to settle for inferior housing and employment experiences. When governments tamper with the finely-tuned immunity equilibria in our big cities, the potential for deadly unintended consequences has always been there. Such tampering may include the required overuse of facemasks, and the creation of fear around the use of public transport.

The post-pandemic experience of East Asia is not a particularly good advertisement for disruptive public health practices. Sweden was conspicuous by taking the opposite policy tack from that taken in East Asia, minimising disruptions from normal social interaction. Sweden’s different approach was not a result of its greater wisdom or greater laisse-faire liberality; rather it was a result of a mistaken assumption that, by mid-March 2020, many more people had already been infected by the new coronavirus (making it too late for restrictive policies) than actually had been infected.

The interregnum between the two recent respiratory pandemics

Finally, it is worthwhile to suggest reasons why deaths in much of the developed world were especially low from May 2018 to February 2020; a phenomenon particularly marked in Sweden. This was most likely because of the 2017 influenza pandemic – the invisible pandemic (invisible even to demographers, then more attentive to issues other than heightened seasonal mortality). This world disease event left populations more immune, and (because that pandemic took so many) it meant that the post-influenza 2018 population was more healthy and had more immunity than the pre-pandemic 2016 population.

It is normal for post-pandemic death rates to be low for a couple of years. Indeed, it was true around 1919 and 1920, after the great influenza pandemic of 1918. Will it prove to be so this time, from 2023 to say 2025? We should be watching aggregate mortality – in our own countries and other countries – with as great interest as we watch the inflation, unemployment and economic growth data.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

On 7 March 2023 I published a summary table of death tallies in a wide range of countries, comparing 2019‑2022 with 2015‑2018. (Covid19 Pandemic-era Facts: Irrefutable, Inconvenient, Important, Evening Report.)

I let the data stand on its own, largely without interpretation. The most important findings to explain are the reasons why Sweden weathered the Covid19 pandemic so well, and why East Asian countries fared so poorly. These facts run counter to the mainstream narrative; a narrative which has presumed that the truth is the precise opposite of what the recently available data shows. East Asian countries relied very heavily on government mandates and the compulsory wearing of facemasks for extended time periods. Sweden, on the other hand, came to be known for adopting one of the least interventionist public health policies during this early-2020s’ pandemic.

This is the main issue that needs to be explained. The demographic data, of course throws up other issues as well – including the high death tolls in the USA and the remainder of the Americas, and the lower toll in Eastern Europe than might have been expected given earlier health data. Demographic imbalances may be contributing to countries’ different experiences; imbalances relating to diverse and changing birth rates and economic migration, in addition to life expectancy issues.

Interpretation

To answer a question such as the main query posed here, we need data, at least one hypothesis, and at least one counterfactual. We also need a contestable academic environment, whereby multiple interpretations can be freely posited and reasonably argued.

We have an important set of data in my report in Evening Report.

The hypothesis that I posit is that pandemic-related mortality in general has been lowest in societies which have good balances with respect to pathogenic exposure and hygiene, that imbalances lead to reduced levels of general immunity and/or raised levels of morbidity, and that societies with high levels of general morbidity will have more excess deaths during an event such as a pandemic; indeed, during any catastrophic event.

It is possible to have too little (as well as too much) exposure to environmental pathogens. In these situations, there are two types of risk – which statisticians, prosaically, call Type 1 and Type 2 – and the reduction of one type of risk in itself raises the other type of risk. The recently oft-said phrase ‘an abundance of caution’ is an example of attempts to reduce Type 1 risk.

In teaching statistics, it is commonplace to use a criminal courtroom setting to explain these risks. A ‘risk-averse’ approach (ie an ‘abundance of caution approach’) is to acquit an accused person if there is any doubt whatsoever about the person’s guilt of the crime in question. The expression ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ expresses balance; the expression ‘beyond all doubt’ expresses an abundance of caution.

It is easy to see that, minimising the risk of an innocent person being convicted also increases the risk of a guilty person not being convicted (and thereby being ‘free’ to commit further crimes); this is the ‘Type 2’ risk. Reduced risk to the defendant means an enhanced risk to society.  ‘An abundance of caution’ simultaneously means ‘a scarcity of caution’; more caution with respect to pathogen exposure means less caution re general immunity deficiency. (The quality of the evidence – eg the data – minimises both types of risk; it also minimises the quality of interpretative reasoning in relation to that evidence.) In pandemics, a good practical compromise is to adopt ‘Type 1’ caution for a brief period of acute danger associated with an unknown threat, and to as soon as possible to revert to a normal ‘balanced caution’ approach.

The most straightforward counterfactuals are purely demographic. And comparative. This is why we need much better, and more comprehensive, demographic information. Demography is the statistical analysis of births, deaths, and migrations. The most important demographic variable is a person’s ‘age’. While race/ethnicity/ancestry, sex/gender, and (to a lesser extent) religion are also demographic attributes, ‘age’ is more important to understanding outcomes (noting that the most important demographic ‘outcome’ is death). Age is the most important predictor of a person’s likelihood of dying; after that, it is socio-economic and lifestyle attributes such as income, housing, education, happiness (leading a meaningful life) and access to healthcare services which determine the likelihood of both mature and premature death.

In the context of Covid19 pandemic mortality, the counterfactual is what levels of mortality would have occurred had there been no Covid19 and hence no pandemic. The usual ways to establish such a pandemic counterfactual is to evaluate and project normal patterns of mortality in the previous few years; if necessary making comparative-country adjustments for any abnormal events in those prior years. And then to use those normal data to predict an ‘alternative present’; in essence, this process of forecasting the immediate past is a valuable use of forecasting techniques.

The next process is, if possible, to compare your (affected) place (eg country) with some other place (or places) which were unaffected (or lesser affected) by the phenomenon you are seeking to evaluate. Some countries are better comparators than others. While Australia – with its many cultural and economic similarities –  is the most widely used comparator for New Zealand, Scandinavian countries are also widely used.

With a pandemic, no country is unaffected. But countries pursuing different public health policies become useful comparators; they help to answer the question as to what would have happened had one country followed another country’s policy. Thus, Sweden’s experience can be built into a counterfactual for New Zealand, because Sweden’s policies were different in both substance and in style. Australia is less useful because its pandemic public policies were very similar to New Zealand’s.

So, a simple counterfactual for New Zealand would be to project 2015‑2018 mortality data into the 2019‑2022 period. The documented excess of deaths compared to that counterfactual represents an estimate of New Zealand’s ‘quantity of life’ pandemic outcome. Then, repeating the exercise for Sweden yields a comparable quantity of life outcome for that country. The country with the smaller percentage excess of deaths probably pursued the better set of policies, noting that two quite different policy approaches could yield similar outcomes.

A well-reasoned counterfactual is an essential part of any interpretation of historical facts. In a scientific process, for which the reasoned use of counterfactuals is an example, a counterfactual is commonly called a ‘control’. It was widely noted (eg in the book The Herd) in 2020 and 2021 that Sweden potentially contributed substantially to the scientific understanding of the Covid19 pandemic, by providing demographers and epidemiologists with a control. So far, however, I have seen little evidence that Sweden’s value as a control – as an important policy counterfactual – has been well-utilised.

The quality of demographic information throughout the world is rather poor. While New Zealand is better than most countries, getting good information about the ages of the population (and where people of different ages live) is difficult. Indeed, until a few years ago, demographic information about immigrants and emigrants was collected somewhat casually as an accessory to tourist data. (Indeed, re yesterday’s ‘compulsory’ population census, the government’s target was only ninety percent compliance; meaning it is regarded as acceptable to ignore the 500,000 ‘harder to reach’ people in this country.) Travellers were assessed as immigrants – rather than visitors – based on their stated intentions on arrival, and not on the actual outcomes of their travel. Many of the people who die in New Zealand are not born in New Zealand, and vice versa.

This makes it hard to create good projections of what mortality in any country, let alone the world, would have been from 2020 in the absence of the Covid19 pandemic. Nevertheless, indications are that, in the absence of the pandemic, New Zealand would have had a higher increase in mortality (maybe a four percent increase from 2015‑2018 to 2019‑2022) than most other countries in the world would have had. This finding relates in particular to New Zealand’s particular pattern of aging, noting some substantial variations in birth rates in the years from 1930 to 1960; and, also variations in the age distribution of older foreign-born New Zealanders.

There are other indications, based on the use of the United States as a comparator country, that some of the increases in morbidity occurring in the USA before 2020 were also occurring in New Zealand; for example, reasons around income inequality, housing, and mental health. The pandemic in USA was substantially more severe than in Sweden, with New Zealand falling in between.

Evaluation of the Hypothesis

In New Zealand, an excessive emphasis on hygiene – including the mandated wearing of facemasks in many public settings – most likely contributed to a loss of general immunity to infectious diseases. New Zealand, by in large, followed the East Asian public health policy model.

This loss of general immunity was countered by a comprehensive, though belated, Covid19 vaccination programme. Vaccination immunity almost certainly contributed to low excess mortality in the period from October 2021 to March 2022. But specific immunity (whether arising from infection or vaccination) to coronavirus diseases – which include around ten percent of ‘common colds’ – and influenzas has always been known to be short-lasting. So general immunity that arises from lifestyle factors remains an important protector of life; general immunity is enhanced by balanced diets (avoiding excesses of foods that create morbidity, such as alcohol, sugar, some fats, and salt) and some ongoing exposure to a range of less-dangerous pathogens.

People living in West European urban environments probably have had closer than most other people to ideal levels of balanced nutrition and general immunity. So these countries have generally had the least pandemic mortality, and (if my hypothesis is correct) probably have the best outlook for the next few years with respect to deaths arising from respiratory infections. People living in Eastern Europe, especially in the European Union, seem to have regained high levels of general immunity, though they bore a high cost in 2021; and membership of the European Union gives them lifestyle options not available in many other countries.

My hypothesis, if correct, suggests that excess deaths will continue in East Asia for another year or so, due to compromised general immunity arising from excessive hygiene. And, in the Americas, increased morbidity seems to be a growing socio-economic problem, making those populations particularly vulnerable to respiratory pandemics. Both of these regions will experience increased levels of morbidity arising from the after-effects of Covid19 infections.

Africa and South Asia are hard to evaluate due to lack of data. But, for Africa at least, indications are that Covid19 excess deaths have been less than in the Americas, and maybe even comparable to Western Europe. Lifestyle morbidity remains less in Africa as a whole than in the Americas. And general immunity levels in Africa have always been high; it is a continent widely associated with ongoing pathogenic exposures. The critical factor for Africa in the coming years will be nutrition. South Asia most likely the same, though with complications arising from substantial air and water pollution.

New Zealand and Australia? Harder to predict, based on my hypothesis, because both countries contain elements of the East Asian, American and Western European experiences. I just hope that New Zealanders are able to get their pre-winter boosters in time. There is every reason to anticipate a dangerous new outbreak of Covid19 in the early winter, much as occurred in Western Europe in the three months to mid-January 2023.

To get to the truth we need reasoned argument, scientific argument. The pandemic has touched on our lives sufficiently to deserve mainstream media attention be given to contestable analysis of its impact; and to question politicised narratives of the form ‘the science says this’ when in fact science is a contestable and argumentative process.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

In many ways the world has moved on from the Covid19 pandemic. And excess mortality from Covid19 mingles with excess mortality from other causes, from heatwaves to other diseases. The summer is useful because it is generally the low season for infectious respiratory illnesses.

Covid19 is a disease that is spread through air travel, and through air; not so much in airplanes or even airports, but by travellers and the people who mingle with them and who provide services to them. West Europe is the world’s preeminent tourist destination, especially in summer.

People come to the Mediterranean coastal tourist destinations in particular, but also to the places with spectacular mountain scenery. In addition, the United Kingdom, France and Germany are strong all-round summer tourist destinations. Of the Mediterranean destinations, Spain in particular has a strong ‘shoulder season’, especially for people travelling from or via the United Kingdom. Travel from North America to Europe surges in late June and peaks in July.

Travel by northern Europeans to southern Europe tends to peak in August, long regarded as the ‘silly season’ in Europe. We should note that, as a result of this ‘silly season’, the releases of mortality and other data are delayed, and data released in September may be revised upwards by more than data released in other months. So deaths in August in particular may be higher than is shown here for those countries which have released August data.

Looking at the Mediterranean countries, we see Spain with significant and unusual mortality since April 2022, with a substantial peak in early July, just before this summer’s big wildfire peak. The excess deaths look, in the main, more like Covid19 deaths than weather-related deaths. Portugal shows a similar (if less dramatic) pattern to Spain.

Italy is as dramatic as Spain, but peaking at the end of July, and without the earlier plateau of deaths from April to June. It has the look of a wave starting in Spain and moving on to Italy. The chart for Greece reinforces this perception. (And note how different Greece is from Spain and Italy in 2020 and 2021; Greece has been very vulnerable in the later part of the ongoing pandemic.) We should also note that Malta and Cyprus show the same patterns as Italy and Greece.

This pattern of west to east travel mortality suggests, in particular the impact of tourism from North America, and also tourism from places like Australia and South America. Trips to Europe from Australia and New Zealand tend to start in the United Kingdom in April and May, and then move to Spain (before it gets too hot) and then to other destinations in Europe.

Looking at the mountain tourist countries, Switzerland certainly shows a July peak, and it looks (as in 2015) to be a bout of epidemic illnesses. Austria looks much like Switzerland this year. Finally, Norway also shows those same patterns (more like Switzerland than Sweden or Denmark). And we should note that Iceland, now a tourist darling, shows a similar pattern to Norway.

Looking at the big-three, the United Kingdom shows significant excess deaths from late April. United Kingdom data can be a bit hard to read, because it seems to show dates of registration of deaths rather than actual dates of death. The data shows lulls in the registration of deaths around public holidays, and especially the lead-up to Christmas. France shows the July mortality peak seen elsewhere (covering its peak tourism from United Kingdom and United States); otherwise, 2022 in France has been mainly a normal year. Germany also shows that peak, while showing signs that late summer deaths will also be higher in 2022 than in 2020 and 2021.

The charts overall suggest that travellers themselves may have been dying away from their home countries in significantly greater numbers than usual. And we should note that travellers include seasonal workers (including ‘backpackers’). Travellers face danger when populations in their countries of origin have reduced immunity from diseases endemic in destination countries.

This raises the issue of one big hole in demographic data, affecting the world as a whole, and especially countries (such as New Zealand) with large flows of people – as tourists and as migrants – relative to the normally resident population. For example, New Zealand’s ‘life expectancy at birth’ estimates (based on mortality data) cannot take into account many of the many New Zealand born people who die overseas. And they do include people – many people – not actually born in New Zealand.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Demographic information is starting to filter through again, after a slowdown in the Northern Hemisphere. And New Zealand now has reliable mortality data up to the end of July 2022. Australia continues to lag.

In the last week of July, New Zealand reached a record number of deaths in a single week; at least a record for the years since World War One. Those 957 deaths represent a 50% excess above the January to March low-mortality baseline. This puts our peak deaths in New Zealand’s ‘year of covid’ at above the huge influenza peak of 2017; and this peak follows a disastrous autumn.

Comparisons

The four charts below all follow the same scale, allowing for excess seasonal and epidemic deaths to range from -10% to +60% of ‘baseline’ deaths. We note that, in most countries, the (unseen) baseline moves due to both general increases in the population and due to aging populations. The chart above includes the projection for 2022, based on pre-pandemic data. It shows a summer baseline for 2022, of about 630 weekly deaths.

We also note that, in additional to seasonal and epidemic mortality, any chronic increases in mortality from 2020 – ie non-seasonal nor epidemic deaths – will also show up, given that baseline estimates are drawn from 2015 to 2019 data. A slight flaw in the analysis – ie something not corrected for – is diminishing population growth from 2020 resulting from reduced immigration, reduced birth rates, and from the covid toll. Indeed, in some countries Covid19 may be reversing pre-covid aging trends (especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America where many older people have died, and from where youth emigration has decreased).

In Australia, the 2017 influenza peak lasted longer, though was less ‘peaky’. This is typical of a larger country, where different regions naturally peak at different times. Australia is likely to sea a 2022 peak of excess deaths between 30% and 40%.

Finland is a good country to compare with New Zealand, because it has the same size population, and because its government tried very hard to keep Covid19 out for as long as possible. Finland has two influenza peaks, comparable with New Zealand and Australia in 2017. And Finland’s covid peak of 35% is likely to be the same height as Australia’s. Of particular significance is its long mortality tail in the spring of 2022; and also the significant and sustained excess covid mortality in the autumn of 2021. My expectation is that Finland, as a good lead indicator so far for New Zealand and Australia, will continue to be a good predictor for us ‘down-under’.

Germany is also interesting, with none of its covid epidemic outbreaks as ‘high’ as its influenza peak; though its covid peaks have been wider than its influenza peaks, as well as being earlier in the season (ie late autumn rather than winter). (The winter downturns will have ben due to public health mandates.) Germany, however, has a history of summer mortality outbreaks. This year, summer excess mortality is starting to look more chronic. One way or another, baseline mortality in Germany is itself rising in the wake of the pandemic.

I finish with United Kingdom and United States, which require a different scale mainly due to the United Kingdom’s initial covid outbreak in early 2020.

In the United Kingdom we see particularly high influenza peaks in the Januarys of 2015, 2017 and 2018. The winter covid peak of 2021 had that same timing, and reached 95% of excess deaths (ie excess compared to summer). From March 2021, however, we see nothing in excess of 40%. Though we do sense an emergent pattern of chronic autumn mortality, comparable with Germany.

The United States has updated its recent mortality statistics, now showing a summer excess of around 6%. This may prove to continue into the autumn, in line with what appears to be happening in Germany and United Kingdom. The peaks in the United States are not nearly as high as those of the United Kingdom, reflecting its larger size and more dispersed population. Instead of being high, the American peaks of seasonal and epidemic mortality are wide, resulting in more overall excess mortality there than in the United Kingdom.

2020 does appear to represent a demographic turning point in these countries, and probably in the world as a whole. New Zealand should not be too self-congratulatory; the mortality patterns we are now seeing are not exceptional, only delayed by two years. (Even 2021 in New Zealand is concerning; normal seasonal mortality took place despite some particularly strong public health restrictions. 2021 was a year with few covid or influenza deaths. So what were people dying of?)

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

I try to write about general issues of importance, in a general – indeed global – context. This time I will write just about me.

I am the same age as Phil Goff, Mayor of Auckland. And I want to be appropriately protected from Covid19. I have had three shots of the Pfizer Covid19 vaccine. My most recent vaccination – the so-called booster – was on the first of February this year. On 27 June I enquired about getting another ‘booster’ shot on Tuesday 28 June, before going away ‘on holiday’ on 30 June. I was not allowed to, because of a set of rules that have never been adequately explained. (RNZ‘s Kathryn Ryan tried to ask an expert on 13 July, but gave up in frustration.) The best I could do was to get a vaccination booking at my local Health Centre, for Wednesday 3 August.

(Between 28 June and 3 August, about 700 people in New Zealand will have died with Covid19. The substantial majority of these are Pakeha aged over 70 who received a booster vaccination ahead of the March wave of Covid19, and who have died (or will soon die) of Covid19. How many of these are dying for want of a vaccine booster?A rhetorical question. But the answer will be that at least one of these would have had a booster had they been allowed.)

I am classed as being in the ‘vulnerable age group’. Now, I’m not ‘very old’. But if I was the same age as Joe Biden, or even Jimmy Carter, I would also have been refused. I’ll bet that Jimmy Carter faced no impediments in getting a fourth vaccination shot. But Jim Bolger will have had to wait.

Anyway, I continue to be one of the dwindling number of people who has yet to get Covid19. Today, I asked if I could get my vaccination booking brought forward to Monday 1 August. “No”, they said, “we only do Covid19 vaccinations on Wednesdays and Thursdays”.

So I went to the local shopping mall. At the first pharmacy, I asked if I could come in for a vaccine on Monday 1 August? They said I could ‘walk-in’ any time from Tuesday 2 August. Why not Monday I asked; after-all Monday will be six months since my previous shot. They said I had to wait six months plus one day!! I asked why the Ministry of Health (MoH) requires that I wait that extra day. They had no answer.

So I went to another pharmacy and asked the same question. They said that “I could try coming in on Monday”, and that they can sometimes override the MoH computer. It was a roundabout way of confirming that I am meant to wait ‘six months plus one day’. I further questioned the Ministry of Health’s reason for this extra day’s wait, but the pharmacist had no explanation. He did say, though, to come in on Monday 1 August, implying that he would be able to do the system override.

At first impression, this situation – the needlessly long six-month wait – is a case of ‘bureaucracy gone mad’, killing a significant number of New Zealanders. And, regardless of the answer to that question, why must I wait that extra day beyond the six months?

MoH: Please just answer – not necessarily to me personally, but preferably to this publisher – these three questions? [Reminder: I got my third ‘first booster shot ‘ on 1 February 2022.]

• What is the medical reason why I cannot get my Covid19 ‘second booster’ on Friday 29 July?
• Why was I told by a health professional that I will not be allowed to get my Covid19 ‘second booster’ on Monday 1 August?
• Given the large number of people who become eligible for another vaccination in August, when and how will you tell the vaccination-willing New Zealand public that the rule is that they must wait ‘six months plus one day’?

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

For the first time in more than two years, New Zealand’s border will reopen to international visitors at midnight tonight.

On 19 March 2020, New Zealand snapped its border shut to anyone without citizenship or residency, before any covid-19-related deaths were recorded.

It was the first time in our history such a move was made, with the ban also including those from the Pacific.

Today, the countdown is on to welcome back vaccinated visitors from 60 visa-waiver countries.

New Zealand’s already reopened the border to vaccinated Australians and some international students.

Air New Zealand chief executive Greg Foran said almost 1000 people will arrive on the first three flights, which will come from Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Fiji.

The airline has been struggling to prepare for the influx in international visitors due to staff recruitment issues.

The Ministry of Health reported 14 more more deaths with covid-19 and a further 8242 new community cases on Friday.

The seven-day rolling average of case numbers was 7540, down from last week’s 8166.

The total number of reported deaths with covid-19 rose to 737

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Within a month of the first community exposure to omicron in Aotearoa New Zealand, the variant has already become the dominant strain of covid-19.

We are yet to see the rapid and steep rise in new omicron cases that has been predicted. This could be because of asymptomatic transmission, but it is equally likely because public health measures included in the first phase of the “stamp it out strategy” have been effective.

For now, managed isolation and quarantine (MIQ) at the border is successfully stopping hundreds of cases from entering the community.

While MIQ may soon change in purpose, border restrictions may not lift until the Omicron wave passes.

The country-wide return to red settings under the covid-19 protection framework has bought New Zealand time to learn from experiences abroad. The most challenging phase is yet to come but New Zealand could be well placed to tackle it.

The best way forward is to limit widespread transmission for as long as possible. This reduces opportunities for the virus to replicate, which is when mutations occur, potentially extending the pandemic.

What we know about omicron
Omicron is more transmissible than earlier variants. New Zealand can expect a rapid and steep rise in infections, especially as we’ve already had several potential superspreading events.

As shown below, omicron quickly replaces earlier variants.

Omicron’s transmission advantage is thought to be due to its ability to evade immunity (acquired through infection or vaccination) and quickly infect the upper respiratory tract.

The risk of reinfection also appears higher than for delta, particularly in the unvaccinated and those with lower viral loads during previous infections.

Symptoms to watch out for
Omicron symptoms include a runny nose, headache, fatigue, sneezing and a sore throat.

However, New Zealand’s high vaccination rates mean some people may not have any symptoms at all. The danger here is that they will still be able to pass on the virus to others, unaware they have omicron.

Given a choice, would you rather enter a room with Delta or Omicron?
Modeller, Professor @MichaelPlankNZ uses this scenario to explain differences between the #Covid-19 variants, while UC Health’s Dr @hobbs_PA reminds us Omicron isn’t ‘mild’. @UCNZMaths https://t.co/4dgnOSZUJC

— University of Canterbury (@UCNZ) January 31, 2022

It is best to assume that any symptoms, especially a sore throat, are covid-19 until proven otherwise through a test.

For omicron, this may require saliva swab tests as recent evidence suggests they are more sensitive than nasal swabs because the viral load peaks earlier in saliva than nasal mucus.

By testing and isolating, we can avoid spreading it to others who may be at higher risk of severe illness.

Compared to delta, omicron has caused lower hospitalisation and death rates in many countries. This may be because it reproduces in the upper respiratory tract instead of the lungs.

Omicron is also meeting populations with immunity acquired through previous infection or vaccination.

In New Zealand, 67 percent of eligible people have now received their booster, which offers high levels of protection from hospitalisation and death. Boosted individuals are up to 92 percent less likely to be hospitalised with omicron, compared with unvaccinated people.

Vaccination is especially important in New Zealand as we have had minimal prior exposure to covid-19 in the community.

Where to from here
Omicron is a “double-edged sword”. It is vastly more transmissible but less severe. However, it is not a mild infection and there is no guarantee the next variant will be less severe.

In a poorly controlled outbreak, a small percentage of a large number of cases risks overwhelming healthcare systems, increasing inequities and disrupting essential services.

This should still be true even now (with the right measures)
The kicker is that with omicron, lots of HCW sickness will drop the capacity line lower. This will be much more pronounced for the fast red surge than the slow blue wave so in fact the red surge is worse than modelled pic.twitter.com/5hfk4uSMCt

— Alex Kazemi (@KazemiAlex) January 12, 2022

Healthcare workers are already over-burdened and exhausted from previous outbreaks, which have distracted from other services and exacerbated entrenched inequities.

There are several things each of us can do:

• Anybody eligible should prioritise getting boosted
• we should all continue using the COVID-19 tracer app
• we should keep indoor spaces well ventilated by opening windows and doors
• mask wearing remains important, especially where physical distancing is difficult.
• and anybody who feels unwell, should get tested and isolate.

Vaccinating children
As children return to school, we need equitable vaccinations and ventilation.

Data out of Australia indicate children aged five to 11 tolerated the vaccine well, with fewer side effects than adults.

Unfortunately, our analysis, along with other evidence, documents a concerning trend with lower childhood vaccination rates for Māori and Pasifika, as well as large variation between regions.

This is concerning as some countries, including the US, have seen increases in childhood hospitalisation rates for covid-19. In the UK, one in eight pupils have missed school as covid-related absences rise.

The success story of the delta outbreak
Unfortunately, there’s been little time to celebrate the rather remarkable demise of delta. Even as Auckland opened up, hospitalisations and case numbers dropped.

Summer will have helped as people spent more time outdoors. However, public health measures such as border closures, managed isolation and quarantine and contact tracing have no doubt helped stamp out much of delta, allowing a relatively normal summer holiday period for many.

Continuing to keep delta low also means we should not have to deal with a “double epidemic”.

This success may also fill us with some hope that, just perhaps, we might be able to avoid the worst of omicron during this next phase of the pandemic response, with robust and continually refined public health measures in place.

Dr Matthew Hobbs is senior lecturer in public health and co-director of the GeoHealth Laboratory, University of Canterbury; Anna Howe is a research fellow, University of Auckland, and Lukas Marek is a researcher and lecturer in spatial data science, University of Canterbury. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

This Government has a problem with urgency. Critics from both left and right have long complained about their lack of urgency on issues such as climate change, housing, and inequality.

Likewise, in terms of the Covid response, there’s been a chorus of criticism that Labour has been complacent and sluggish on key elements of New Zealand’s pandemic plan. From the very late vaccination rollout – which critics say led to the need for the lockdown, costing $10bn – through to equipping the health system, issues around MIQ, the border, contact tracing, and saliva testing.

Yet on some aspects of governing they have displayed extreme haste – rushing legislation through under parliamentary urgency. Such speed might be seen by the Government’s supporters as partially making up for the lack of action in other areas. But without proper debate, consultation and evaluation, such rushed lawmaking invariably leads to poor policy and democratic deficits that harm us all.

Rushing through the traffic lights

Today in Parliament the Government is railroading its “traffic light” and vaccine mandate bill through the third and final reading. The legislation is officially named “The Covid-19 Response (Vaccinations) Legislation Bill”, and it comes into effect next week. The legislation sets out how businesses and individuals can operate under the new Covid regime that will replace the current alert levels. It will have a huge impact on the rights and lives of the public over summer and potentially further into the future – especially determining who can participate and work in other activities. As such, it deals with some extremely important and fraught aspects of Covid management.

Herald political editor Claire Trevett has explained today what this means: “a law change that is estimated to result in vaccine mandates over 40 per cent of the country’s workforce will be pushed through this week under urgency, without any space for public submissions and without time for select committees to knuckle out any fishhooks or flaws. Even the Ministry of Justice did not get time to vet it properly” – see: Government rams through ‘no jab, no job’ law at its peril (paywalled).

So, is the legislation so straightforward and uncontroversial that urgency can be justified, given that there has been no real chance for public scrutiny of the details?

The Minister pushing it through, Chris Hipkins (who also happens to be the Minister for Open Government) says this about the bill’s process: “It is quite a significant piece of legislation, and it’s quite a technical piece of legislation, and so that takes some time to work through”.

Many commentators have pointed out that Hipkins’ justification is an own goal that actually underlines how much more scrutiny this particular legislation requires. And few seem to believe there wasn’t time for at least a brief select committee process, even if this meant bringing Parliament back into session next week (when a recess is scheduled).

The Government, on the other hand, is claiming that consultation has occurred, especially behind the scenes with iwi, unions, and business.

Condemnation of the Government’s process

Legal academics have been particularly aggrieved by the Government’s seemingly unnecessary haste. Writing for the Spinoff today, Andrew Geddis of the Otago Law School says the legislation is too important to be dealt with like this: “A bill that allows the state to say ‘put this in your body or else largely forgo social interactions’ should be given time for proper scrutiny and debate” – see: In rushing through the ‘traffic light’ legislation, the government has failed us.

Likewise, Victoria University of Wellington law professor Dean Knight has come out swinging, labelling Labour’s latest manoeuvre a “constitutional disgrace”. He has explained that “Legislative change seriously implicating rights like this needs much more time to breathe, to be interrogated and for its legitimacy to be built through dialogue.”

Chief Human Rights Commissioner Paul Hunt has stated that the process is “highly problematic both constitutionally and in terms of the state’s human rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations”. As a remedy, he wants the Government to agree to set up a retrospective select committee to scrutinise the new law and how it works.

The Government has already rejected this option, and is unlikely to change its mind without significant pressure to do so. The pressure isn’t likely to come from their coalition partner the Greens, who have voted for the rushed legislation. That party have been conspicuously silent on the use of urgency, unlike when the last National Government made frequent use of it. Critics say the Greens are trampling on the memory of former co-leader Rod Donald, who was highly principled on such matters.

Defenders of the Government on social media are doing their best to justify Labour’s actions – pointing to the fact that National carried out similar constitutional outrages when in Government, with the implicit suggestion that Labour should therefore be able to as well.

Information on the bill withheld by the Government

The speed of the passage of the traffic light bill wouldn’t be so bad if the Government had released the background information about the new framework and rules – but this has been deliberately withheld – see Ben Strang’s Government refuses to release policy advice on vaccine passes and certificates.

According to this article, the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties made an Official Information Act request to Chris Hipkins for the relevant documents on 9 October, but the Minister failed to comply within the stated 20 working days, and then eventually denied the request saying that the information would be released proactively next year.

The Council’s chair Thomas Beagle says Hipkins’ response is “a disgraceful affront to open government and Aotearoa New Zealand’s democracy. It is unacceptable that MPs and the public won’t be able to read these crucial policy documents before considering the legislation to impose the vaccination certificate system.”

The whole episode will, once again, have critics querying how this marries with Labour’s promise to be “the most open and transparent government ever”. The problem is that the Government appears to be disingenuously using the OIA and its proactive publication clause as a way of delaying the release of information that is pertinent to public debate and scrutiny of Government decisions.

Consequences of the traffic light rush

Some are arguing that the abuse of Parliamentary Urgency will have important negative consequences – particularly because it will increase distrust in government and might entrench anti-vaccine views. As Beagle says, the Covid response relies on high trust, and this erodes that.

Andrew Geddis also thinks it has the potential to inflame and polarise those already sceptical about the legitimacy of the Government’s health response to Covid: “This is, to put it mildly, simply not good enough. Indeed, if you were trying to construct a lawmaking process to set off the conspiracy minded and undermine the social licence needed for success, it would look something like this. Hide the information that’s informed your legislation, introduce it at the very last moment, whip it through the House overnight, and present it as a fait accompli the next day.”

And Claire Trevett adds: “Public trust in the Government response is already faltering and ramming through such a law change with no public input will do little to help that.” She says: “Such a process gives the perception of human rights being easily trampled over and will do little to quell the concerns of those worried about the mandates. It also invites legal challenges to the law.”

How did the Government get into this situation?

Is it just the case that sometimes governments need to move with extreme speed due to emergencies? This is what Labour and its supporters have suggested. And Hipkins has even justified the urgency by saying that he doesn’t want the public to have to wait weeks more before these important changes are implemented.

However, it appears the Government clearly left the drafting of its legislation too late. Most commentators suggest there shouldn’t have been any rush at all and that the Government has had many months to develop the legislation for this change, but it simply chose not to. Even once the Government announced the new traffic lights system five weeks ago, that would have given officials time to draft the bill, but this obviously didn’t occur.

So, has the Government been tardy due to arrogance, incompetence, or something else? Rightwing commentator Brigitte Morten says today in the NBR that she thinks it’s a case of overwhelm: “The reasons for the wilful delay in introduction are difficult to understand. It cannot be arrogance as this outbreak response could not have increased their confidence. Nor can it be ignorance. Ardern, Hipkins, and Robertson are all former parliamentary staffers and have been around long enough to know better. Simple; it is most likely that this is a government overwhelmed. Which does not bode well for our holiday plans” – see: Speeding through traffic lights dangerous in any context (paywalled).

Andrew Geddis gives another view: “the reasons for the government’s behaviour are far more depressingly mundane. It has a parliamentary majority that allows it to act as it pleases. And, I suspect it thinks that the overwhelming public mood is one of ‘give me my summer and I don’t care how it is done, as long as it is done’. I also suspect that it is suffering from Covid fatigue as much as the rest of us.”

One key minister in the process, Michael Woods, had to defend the manoeuvres today on RNZ saying “I’m really comfortable that there’s a high level of debate and scrutiny over this legislation. There’s certainly no lack of debate about it in the public arena, and we take those comments on board as we develop these things.”

Political commentator Matthew Hooton disagrees, saying “ramming through legislation under urgency stripping employment and other rights from unvaccinated workers” is draconian when done without adequate process, and he suggests that the Government is taking on anti-democratic leanings – see: Ruling by decree (paywalled).

Hooton also thinks it relates to the Government expecting Chris Hipkins to do too much: “Hipkins is visibly exhausted. The lack of talent in the Ardern regime means he also serves as Minister of Education and Leader of the House. He is clearly no longer thinking straight and needs a holiday.”

Finally, this Labour Government – like the National one before it – has actually over-used and abused parliamentary urgency and speed on plenty of other occasions recently. Another particularly important example at the moment is the new bi-partisan law on housing intensification. Nicole Moreham is a professor of law at Victoria University of Wellington, and has written a very good column on this – see: Undue haste on housing bill.

In particular, Buchanan and Manning examine whether we are witnessing a fundamental change to global economics and consider:

• How since the Covid-19 pandemic arrived even neo-liberal state economies have embraced an expansionist government strategy and significant degrees of stimulus.
• It would appear that the excesses of small government, market driven economies have, at this time, run their course.
• But what will replace the earlier systems?
• From a political economy point of view, what can we expect to take shape as the Pandemic grinds on, even while we all have had a glimpse of what a post-Pandemic new normal may mean?

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
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Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A vaccine certificate will be central to the new framework.

The system will involve three settings – green, orange and red.

“If you want to be guaranteed that no matter the setting that we are in, that you can go to bars, restaurants and close-proximity businesses like a hairdresser, then you will need to be vaccinated,” Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern told media today.

She was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Grant Robertson, Covid-19 Response Minister Chris Hipkins and Associate Health Minister Peeni Henare as the government also announced enhanced:

Ardern said the vaccination certificates would allow businesses to be able to open and operate at any level.

Targeted local lockdowns
If cases start to climb in areas with lower vaccination rates in lower-income communities, much more highly targeted and localised lockdowns could be used if needed, she said.

The red setting would allow hospitality to open with vaccine certificates, but gathering limits and physical distancing, masks and other public health measures would be used.

“This will still feel like a huge amount of freedom relative to what Auckland has now,” Ardern said.

Today’s covid-19 strategy announcement. Video: RNZ News

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A View from Afar – In this podcast, Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning analyse how supply-chain bottlenecks, a global economic reset, and post-pandemic security are about to trigger a new era in geo-economics.

Wherever you are around the world, if you haven’t yet experienced the impact of supply-chain pressures, then you soon will.

As 2021 edges toward a conclusion, everyone and everything is impacted by supply-chain pressures. This problem laps at your front door with you waiting for your online-ordered-product to be delivered. And, it scales up to monumental proportions as global super economies wait for the latest shipment of iron ore or semi-conductors to dock in port.

At this stage along the global-pandemic timeline, supply-chain bottlenecks are a huge problem that impacts on every sector of our lives from the petrol our vehicles consume to the rice we have with our meals.

And this problem is going to get more challenging as countries move to seek a best-case-economic-advantage as the world slowly emerges out from the shadow of Covid-19.

We have all heard a lot about a new world emerging in the post-pandemic period.

• But what will this look like?
• What impact will global change have on domestic, regional, and global economies?
• And, how will global powers react to a redefined world economic order?
• If change is coming, and it is, then how can the world re-emerge from this pandemic-period, and ensure progress and security are in sync?

Progress and security, that will be the next challenge of our times.

Remember to join Paul and Selwyn for future LIVE recordings of of this podcast. And remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

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If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Papua New Guinea’s Department of Labour has broken its silence over the government’s stance on covid-19 testing requirements in the “no jab no jobs” controversy, reports the PNG Post-Courier.

It has called on employers and employees to exercise common sense and ensure that businesses are allowed to continue and embrace workplace safety rules.

Labour and Industrial Relations Minister Tomait Kapili said at the weekend that the department, working with workers’ unions and employer representatives, had issued a joint communiqué that would support business continuity and protect employees during the ongoing isolation strategy period and beyond.

He said any new workplace policies developed by employers on covid-19 vaccinations must comply with the provisions of the National Pandemic Act.

Kapili also announced that the department was dealing with the controversial “no-jab-no-job” stance adopted by some businesses on a case-by-case basis.

He said covid-19 was not an outcome of work-related issues, so employees and employers should not be disadvantaged during the isolation period.

“This situation is not brought about by the employers or the workers, so neither party should be disadvantaged during this isolation period,” Kapili said in a statement.

Safe work practices
“All employers and employees are encouraged to embrace safe work practices. Employers are further encouraged to make arrangements to maintain normal services under the New Normal as provided for under the New Normal protocols and in compliance with the national isolation strategy being imposed.

“All employers are encouraged to maintain the salaries, wages and employment contracts of all their employees.”

He said that while vaccination was voluntary, employers were encouraged to implement their basic occupational health and safety (OHS) policies, as first-up measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the workplace.

“Employers should not encourage redundancy exercises during the period. As workers are the front-liners and their exposure to covid-19 will be deemed high, it is important that safety measures, either temporary or permanent, are built into the workplaces to minimise the spread of the virus.

“Discriminative practices requiring testing, isolation, quarantine, and monitoring should be avoided.

“Where an employee is aggrieved by the actions of an employer, the employee can formally lodge a complaint with the Department of Labour and Industrial Relations.”

Awareness of two laws
Kapili said the legal context to deal with covid-19 at the workplace must take into consideration two laws that should govern covid-19 workplace-related activities.

These are the COVID-19 National Pandemic Act 2020 and the Industrial Safety, Health, and Welfare Act (Chapter 175) of 1961 and Regulations 1965, in administering the Occupational Safety, Health and Welfare Act.

The administration of covid-19 vaccination falls within the ambit of the National Pandemic Act 2020 for any interpretation such that we cannot use the duty of care concept as a reason for compulsory vaccination on workers.

“Any workplace policies developed by employers on the covid-19 vaccination, must be consistent with and adhere to the provisions of the National Pandemic Act 2020,” he said.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

There is something decidedly sinister about the way the right-wing media is pursuing the “elimination strategy is madness” argument so doggedly. Yes, it’s always interesting to discover what people are saying about New Zealand overseas, but The New Zealand Herald republishing anti-Jacinda Ardern editorials from the Daily Telegraph — mouthpiece of the British Conservative Party — points to an altogether more disturbing preoccupation.

These misgivings are only reinforced when one considers the near unanimous hostility directed towards the Prime Minister and her government by New Zealand’s talkback hosts.

At the most superficial level, one could argue that the right-wing media’s editorial hostility is generated almost entirely by bottomline anxieties. With most of its advertising revenue generated by realtors, retailers, the hospitality industry and tourist operators, the big media outlets must experience significant financial pain whenever New Zealand and/or its most important economic hub, Auckland, goes into lockdown.

The pressure brought to bear on the media bosses to get the doors open for their advertisers’ paying customers is easily imagined.

More than anything else, commercial enterprises hate surprises. Certainty and predictability are what they need to go on generating profits for their shareholders. The sudden appearance of covid-19 in the community, followed by lockdowns of a severity to make the eyes of overseas commentators water, bring with them consequences that are costly, disruptive and generally bad for business.

Unsurprisingly, a significant fraction of the business community would very much prefer that covid-19 was responded to in a fashion less injurious to their financial health.

Those business leaders less bound by the short-term selfishness of their colleagues take a more responsible position. They understand how very bad it looks for businesspeople to convey the impression that they care a great deal less about people getting very ill, and quite possibly dying, than they do about making money.

Short, sharp, uncompromising lockdowns
They also know that New Zealand’s style of short, sharp, uncompromising lockdowns protect the economic interests of the business community a whole lot more effectively than the loose, dangerously porous, lockdowns on display in the UK, the USA, and across the Tasman in Australia.

Not that anything as mundane as “the facts of the matter” have ever slowed the government’s critics down. Neither New Zealand’s extraordinary success in keeping the number of covid-19 deaths below 30, nor the powerful bounce-back of its economy, cuts any ice with the “elimination strategy is madness” brigade. Indeed, the obvious success of Jacinda Ardern’s elimination strategy only seems to make them madder.

So what is it? What drives Ardern’s critics so crazy?

Sadly, a great many of her right-wing opponents seem to be inspired by nothing more edifying than sexist antipathy towards a young, female prime minister, from a tiny and powerless country at the bottom of the world, who has outperformed (by a wide margin) the male leaders of much larger and more powerful nations.

Something about this picture is just wrong, wrong, wrong. Young women are supposed to defer to the “big dogs” of the international community — not show them up. Ardern has produced a disturbance in the conservative “Force” that makes them shudder: as if an entire political ideology suddenly cried out in indignation and was rudely silenced.

They fear something terrible is going on.

And, in a way, they’re right. From the perspective of those responsible for creating a world in which the interests of business take precedence over even the ordinary person’s right to stay safe and well (some might say especially over the ordinary person’s right to stay safe and well) the sight of a young, female prime minister putting the interests of ordinary people first is a terrible thing.

Ardern’s “kindness” works way beyond neoliberalism’s explanation
Because Jacinda Ardern’s “kindness” doesn’t just work a little bit, it works way beyond neoliberalism’s capacity to supply a credible explanation.

Take Sweden, for example. For a while it was the “who needs lockdowns?” brigade’s poster child. But Sweden, with just twice the population of New Zealand, racked-up a horrifying 14,000+ covid fatalities. Had Ardern followed the Swedish prime minister’s example, her country would have sustained upwards of 7,000 deaths.

By following its leader’s strict elimination strategy, however, New Zealand’s “Team of Five Million” kept their country’s covid death toll to 26.

On the Right, however, this sort of science-guided, humanitarian response to covid-19 just doesn’t compute. Conservatives around the world react by accusing Ardern of political cowardice. She simply doesn’t have the balls to adopt a strategy that will lead directly to hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths.

Look at the Brits; look at the Yanks; they had the courage to condemn tens-of-thousands of their people to early and unnecessary deaths; they know that “you can’t live in a cave forever”; that, in the end, the economy must come first.

This is the upside-down world towards which the right-wing media’s wayward editorial decisions are dragging its readers, viewers and listeners. A world in which saving New Zealanders’ lives is the wrong thing to do. A world where “freedom” means nothing more than being able to go shopping wherever and whenever you want – without a mask.

That the big media companies haven’t quite arrived there yet is because there are still some executives who understand that, ultimately, the news media relies on ordinary people to read its copy and listen to its broadcasters’ opinions.

Ordinary people who, if right-wing editors and producers ever get around to actually swallowing the insanity-inducing Kool-Aid swishing about in their mouths, will be offered-up to deranged conservatives (and the advertisers) as unavoidable human sacrifices to the Moloch god of the free market.

The only elimination strategy the right-wing media will ever wholeheartedly support.

This essay, by Chris Trotter, was originally posted on the Bowalley Road blog of Thursday, 26 August 2021, under the title: “A Disturbing Preoccupation: Why the Right-Wing Media Hates Jacinda’s Covid Elimination Strategy”.  It is republished by Asia Pacific Report with the permission of the author.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz