Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Robin Smit, Adjunct Professor, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Technology Sydney

Road transport is responsible for a substantial share of global carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions. So reducing these emissions is a high priority.

In the European Union (EU), CO₂ emissions from new passenger cars have been regulated for more than 15 years. The range of policy measures includes mandatory CO₂ emission targets.

But Australia’s mandatory New Vehicle Efficiency Standard will only come in next year, without other supporting policy measures.

In our new research, my colleagues and I compared the two car fleets and examined their emissions in detail. We found Australian cars are typically larger, heavier and less efficient, producing 43% more emissions than their EU counterparts. The results demonstrate the vital role of well-designed, ambitious policies and regulations in driving down emissions.

What we did

Car emissions by country depends on many factors. These include the level of dependence on cars, travel behaviour, consumer preferences, marketing, car types and sizes, fuel efficiency requirements, purchase price, running costs and, importantly, government policies.

Policy levers range from financial incentives, taxes and regulations through to other measures such as information campaigns.

In collaboration with the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, we collected information about the respective car fleets in Europe and Australia.

We obtained region-specific vehicle specifications including vehicle sales, car make and model, weight, size, rated power, battery capacity and certified emissions performance. We extracted this from previous studies, publicly available data sets and information in Europe and Australia.

We then fed this information into detailed simulation models to estimate emissions in a wide range of real-world conditions, for each fleet. This included the effects of different driving conditions and climates.

What we found

Our research revealed Australian cars are larger and heavier than EU cars, which has direct consequences for emissions.

New vehicles in both the EU and Australia must be certified, with their fuel consumption and emissions tested against emission limits, before they can be sold.

But the test procedure differs between the EU and Australia. The EU uses a modern procedure, whereas Australia still uses an outdated and unrealistic test developed in the 1970s – ironically called the New European Drive Cycle test.

In the four years from 2018 to 2021, the difference between certified CO₂ emissions of new cars registered in Australia and the EU increased by 20%. This was mainly due to the more rapid rise of EVs in Europe.

Then there’s the difference between certified emissions and what actually happens on the road, often referred to as the “gap”. We found the gap between certified CO₂ emissions and real-world emissions is larger in Australia. In Europe the average gap for petrol and diesel cars is 15–20%, whereas in Australia it is 30–35%.

Differences in vehicle weight and size, driving style, climate, and the use of air conditioning contribute, but the outdated test protocol is a major factor.

The gap is particularly large for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle emissions are three to four times higher on the road in both Europe and Australia.

Why? Largely because certified emissions performance assumes these vehicles will drive in electric mode 75–90% of the time, while the reality is more like 25%. So in practice, these vehicles mostly drive around as high-emitting petrol or diesel cars.

Overall, we estimated the real-world CO₂ emissions of the registered on road fleets in 2021 were 143 grams per kilometre for the EU and and 204 grams per kilometre for Australia. This means the average Australian car on the road is producing 43% more greenhouse gas emissions than the average EU car.

Mandatory CO₂ emission targets work

Our research shows mandatory CO₂ emission targets are effective in reducing emissions from both (new) passenger cars and, over time, the fleet as a whole. But this only happens if they are well designed.

With its long-standing regulations, the EU has significantly reduced CO₂ emissions, mainly through increased sales of low- or zero-emission vehicles. Conversely, Australia has relied on ineffective voluntary emission standards so far, with relatively slow uptake of electric vehicles and slow or even no progress in reducing emissions as a result.

We found the shift towards electric vehicles is crucial for achieving carbon neutrality goals. Having a higher proportion of zero- and low-emission cars in new EU car sales was the main reason the region’s 2020 emission reduction targets were met.

Without this, 70% of manufacturers would have failed to meet the EU standards. That’s because the emissions performance of conventional diesel and petrol cars have hardly improved.

This is in line with recent research that found only a shift to lightweight battery-electric vehicles, alongside deep decarbonisation of the electricity grid, will get Australia close to net zero by 2050.

Both regions have designed similar paths for future emissions reduction efforts. However, EU targets have been set for a longer term (2015-35). Australia has only set annual targets for the period 2025 to 2029.

Our research suggests sales of battery electric cars will need to increase in each region to meet future CO₂ emissions targets. In the EU, electric vehicle sales will need to hit 50% by 2030 to meet its target. In Australia, electric vehicle sales will need to reach 60% by 2029 to meet its more lenient target.

Shaping future policy

As the EU shows, setting ambitious, effective and legally binding emissions targets can drive innovation and transform markets.

But mandatory targets are not enough on their own. Complementary policies are needed, such as providing incentives to purchase electric cars, and developing charging infrastructure. This holistic approach looks beyond vehicle technology to also consider solutions such as promoting active travel, improving public transport and reducing the need for travel altogether.

Our research also clearly shows Australia needs to update official test procedures. It’s crucial to include on-board fuel consumption monitoring in the new standard, as is done in Europe, to monitor real-world fuel/electricity use and emissions.

Future regulations should consider incorporating the emissions over the life of a vehicle from manufacturing and fuel/energy production to recycling and disposal.

Accurate information for consumers, as well as properly designed government policies, will help Australia finally start reducing greenhouse gas emissions from transport.

Robin Smit is the founding Research Director at the Transport Energy/Emission Research (TER) consultancy.

– ref. Australians’ cars are typically larger, heavier and less efficient than in Europe – here’s why – https://theconversation.com/australians-cars-are-typically-larger-heavier-and-less-efficient-than-in-europe-heres-why-243834

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Chris Ogden, Associate Professor in Global Studies, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

Anyone who has followed New Zealand’s protracted trade negotiations with India will know any new announcement of progress needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters’ hint last week that talks may be resuming is therefore best taken as a sign of optimism rather than anything more tangible. After all, negotiations go back as far as 2010, but had largely stalled by 2015.

A lot has changed since then, not least the advent of a second Trump presidency in the US, and shifting power balances in the Asia-Pacific region exemplified by the AUKUS security pact.

Wellington’s desire for a free trade agreement with New Delhi is clearly already a delicate balancing act. These new dynamics will make it more delicate still. But engaging with India remains vital, given its increasingly prominent global influence.

In many ways, India’s rise is not unlike China’s was – and New Zealand can learn from its trade and diplomatic relationships with Beijing. If India is roughly where China was 15 years ago, we can see clear portents of what the future holds.

India’s rise

In 2023, India’s GDP was US$14.54 trillion, the world’s fourth largest economy, behind the United States, China and the European Union. China hit that level during 2009.

But India’s current annual GDP growth of 7.6% now outstrips all those other countries. If maintained, it will result in India matching China’s 2023 GDP of $34.64 trillion in 14 years. Given India’s population overtook China’s in 2023, that timeframe may be smaller.

India’s expanding financial capacity has been matched by growing military expenditure. In 2023, India spent $83.57 billion on defence, third behind the US and China. Beijing was spending an equivalent amount in 2009.

India was also the world’s largest arms importer from 1950 to 2023. Like the US, China and Russia, it possesses a “nuclear triad” of land-based, submarine and airborne capability.

Like China, India has a large landmass (the world’s seventh largest) and is pivotal to trade routes crossing the Indian Ocean, as well as being close to China, the preeminent trading nation at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region.

Negative realities

India, like China, is also led by a forceful, self-assured and outspoken autocrat. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is one of the world’s two largest political groups – the other is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Both leaders harness often strident domestic nationalism and common colonial histories to inspire popular notions of being or becoming great powers.

But exceptionally high levels and prolonged periods of economic growth – averaging 9.33% per year from 1980 to 2022 in China, and 6.46% per year from 1990 to 2023 in India – also put national development goals at risk.

High energy consumption and levels of pollution have seen natural environments deteriorate in both countries. And both India and China have suffered from endemic corruption since liberalising their economies.

Prevalent political dynasties in India – the equivalent of China’s “princelings” (the offspring or relatives-by-marriage of Communist Party veterans) – concentrate wealth and privilege within elites.

And, like China, India also stands accused of repressing ethnic and religious minorities, particularly against the Muslim portion of Kashmir and against various communities in the northeast, particularly in Assam.

Future fractures

Despite those human rights concerns, both India and China have – at different times – been courted and engaged by the West for strategic reasons.

In the 1970s, the US sought closer relations with China as a countermeasure against the Soviet Union, at the time Washington’s primary rival. Nowadays, the US seeks enhanced ties with India to counter the rise of China.

Both approaches were and are open to accusations of shortsightedness and political cynicism. The US rapprochement with China in the 1970s occurred during the depths of the Cultural Revolution, and Washington was muted in its criticism of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.

Similarly, the perceived need to curb China’s rising power and influence means the West is prepared to work around India’s internal political realities. But this has arguably emboldened Indian foreign policy, with its intelligence services accused of targeting Sikh separatists in Canada, the UK and the US.

As contemporary US-China relations tip towards what has been called a “new Cold War”, one can imagine a future where the US and India face off in the same way. Given India’s trajectory, that might happen as soon as 2040.

Were that to happen – and given China’s slowing economy, ageing population and decoupling from the West – then India may well become China’s successor.

Of course, we can’t predict the future, but all of these considerations will need to be part of New Zealand’s calculations if and when trade negotiations with India truly begin in earnest. And they must remain part of Wellington’s wider strategic calculations in the decades to come.

Chris Ogden is a Senior Research Fellow with The Foreign Policy Centre, London.

– ref. India is the new China – NZ needs to see the bigger picture in trade negotiations – https://theconversation.com/india-is-the-new-china-nz-needs-to-see-the-bigger-picture-in-trade-negotiations-245557

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of Adelaide

At first blush, today’s announcement that Australia and Nauru have signed a security treaty offers something for both countries. Australia increases its influence in a region in which it feels threatened by China. Nauru receives economic assistance and reliable banking services.

But important questions remain unanswered.

For the past decade, Australia has been concerned about China’s ambitions in the Pacific Islands region. It is also conscious that the diplomatic landscape of the region has become more “crowded and complex”, as Australia now cooperates – and competes – with a wider range of partner countries in the region.

Australia has therefore ramped up its development assistance, infrastructure lending, security initiatives, labour mobility and migration opportunities, as well as other policies in the region.

It has also developed an appetite for greater integration with Pacific Island countries. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identified Australia’s aim as being to “integrate Pacific countries into the Australian and New Zealand economies and our security institutions”.

Most famously, during a 2019 speech, Kevin Rudd proposed Australia should offer citizenship to people from Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu in exchange for control of their seas and fisheries. Versions of this proposal had been circulating in Canberra for years, but with limited support. Chinese influence has changed the calculation.

Todays’ announcement of the Nauru–Australia Treaty, a year after the signing of the Falepili Union Treaty between Australia and Tuvalu, seems to vindicate this call for integration by Rudd and others.

Under the Nauru–Australia Treaty, the two countries agree to “deepen and expand security cooperation”, and “consult and consider” in the event of threats. Then there is the big-ticket item: Nauru will “mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on matters relating to Nauru’s security”. This echoes the language used in the Falepili Union with Tuvalu.

Australia has effectively acquired a veto over Nauru and Tuvalu entering any security arrangement with China. This has been Australia’s major concern in the region since Solomon Islands and China entered into a security agreement in 2022. With respect to Nauru, this was further heightened after it switched diplomatic recognition to China in January 2024.

So, the Nauru–Australia Treaty seems like a diplomatic “win” for Australia.

In exchange, Australia has agreed to provide A$100 million of budget support over five years to help Nauru’s “economic resilience, fiscal stability and prosperity”.

Australia will also provide A$40 million over five years to support Nauru’s security and policing needs, particularly the work of its recently appointed National Security Advisor.

Crucially, it will support the Commonwealth Bank to step in to provide banking services in Nauru, after Bendigo Bank announced it would withdraw. This helps secure Nauru’s economic future and removes Nauru’s risk of becoming “unbanked”.

So it seems like a similar “win” for Nauru.

But the treaty has several aspects that are still unclear.

First, how does it sit with Australia’s history with Nauru? As Nauru’s coloniser, Australia oversaw – and benefited from – the extraction of much of Nauru’s surface during phosphate mining. Mismanagement of the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust, established at independence to help return some profits to the people of Nauru, has been a major cause of Nauru’s longstanding economic woes since the 1990s.

But Australia also contributed to Nauru’s challenges through its policy of processing and resettling refugees in Nauru.

Second, Nauru’s democracy has not always benefited from Australia’s presence. Conscious of the need to maintain good relations with the Nauru government to keep its refugee processing centre open, and more recently to counter Chinese influence attempts, Australia has at times been reluctant to comment on the erosion of political rights in Nauru.

This was exemplified during the trial of the “Nauru 19”, who were prosecuted for protesting against government corruption. At the time, retired Australian judge Geoffrey Muecke, who sat on the Nauru Supreme Court, described the prosecution as a “shameful affront to the rule of law”. Will the treaty similarly constrain Australia in the future?

Third, the treaty requires Australia to provide extensive support to the Nauru government’s economic policies. Nauru has agreed it will “ensure integrity, transparency and accountability in its fiscal and financial management systems to prevent fraud, corruption, and misconduct”. But given Australia’s strategic interests in maintaining the treaty, what will Australia do if the Nauru government does not meet this undertaking?

Fourth, critics will justifiably ask questions about the impact of the treaty on Nauru’s sovereignty, echoing concerns raised about the Falepili Union, and before that, Rudd’s 2019 proposal.

In this regard, to dilute its apparent power, Australia may have been better off pursuing a trilateral security agreement that also included New Zealand, of the type proposed by Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown.

On one reading, Australia has taken advantage of the vulnerabilities of Nauru (economic and banking) and Tuvalu (climate change) to secure the treaties and advance its strategic interests.

During the 1960s negotiations on Nauru’s decolonisation, Nauruan negotiators rejected Australia’s proposal to create a relationship of “free association” because they had access to the wealth of the Phosphate Royalties Trust.

Today’s treaty, by contrast, goes a long way to solving several of Nauru’s pressing economic challenges. In exchange, the “cost” – constraints on Nauru’s future security partnerships – may not be seen as steep as they were more than half a century ago. Time will tell.

The Australian government must now sell the Nauru–Australia treaty to an Australian people struggling to meet cost-of-living pressures. This may be easier than the Falepili Union, because a migration pathway is not a key feature of the Nauru deal.

But at the same time, the absence of migration reveals the elephant in the room: for decades the Australian taxpayer has been propping up the economy of an island whose main resource – sovereignty – it mined via its “Pacific Solution” to house refugees. Now it will do so in perpetuity for its strategic interests.

Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence. She is a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington DC.

Jack Corbett currently receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the UK’s SIDAR programme.

– ref. At first glance, Australia’s new treaty with Nauru seems to be a win-win. But questions remain – https://theconversation.com/at-first-glance-australias-new-treaty-with-nauru-seems-to-be-a-win-win-but-questions-remain-245562

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Marika Sosnowski, Postdoctoral research fellow, The University of Melbourne

Sometimes nothing happens for years. And then years – decades even – happen in a few days.

Over the past ten days, a range of Syrian rebel forces led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have mounted an offensive against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. They first captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city and economic hub, and then swept rapidly south through Hama, Homs and finally Damascus.

The rebels were met with little to no resistance from the Syrian regime, nor its Russian, Iranian or Hezbollah allies. And so, the 54-year-old regime led by Hafez al-Assad and then his son Bashar has now fallen.

While it may seem like these events came out of nowhere, the rapid fall of the Assad regime has a long history.

A ‘long-breath’ strategy of appeasement

For decades, Hafez al-Assad, Syria’s autocratic ruler from 1970–2000, had adopted a pragmatic strategy that involved building relationships with a sometimes unlikely array of state and non-state allies, proxies and clients. This “long-breath” strategy was helpful in keeping relations with everyone open, even if those relations were in many cases extremely precarious.

For example, the regime gave preferential treatment to minorities (predominantly Alawis and other quasi-Shiite groups) and other benefits to the Sunni and Christian establishment. These policies meant these groups had a vested interest in the continuation of the regime.

Bashar al-Assad continued this tradition when he came to power following his father’s death.

However, he also initiated liberalisation policies in the early years of his rule that emboldened a new genre of loyalist paramilitary forces. These were often headed by many of Syria’s newly minted business elite who, in large part, created armed groups to protect their economic fiefdoms. These pro-state militia groups tended to be less disciplined than the national army, and more corrupt.

In March 2011, the uprisings across the Middle East spilled over into Syria, leading to the first public protests in the country in decades. Determined to avoid Libya’s fate of external intervention, the Syrian regime quickly opened fire on unarmed protesters, killing many.

This was the start of Syria’s devastating 14-year civil war.

The emergence of Russian-led armed factions

The Russians joined the conflict in mid-2015. One of their conditions of entry into Syria: a single, traditionally structured military command for them to work with.

This necessitated various local militia groups, such as the National Defence Force and Kataeb al-Baath, being absorbed into the Syrian army through the establishment of a new Fourth Corps aligned with the Russians.

Due to the unruly behaviour of many of these militias, Russia later set up a Fifth Corps in an attempt to restructure the Syrian army around personnel who were both reliable and loyal to Moscow.

Then, reconciliation agreements between the regime, Russia and various rebel groups from 2016 to 2018 facilitated the integration of armed rebel groups into the Russian-led Fourth and Fifth Corps, as well as an Iranian-led division of the Syrian army. Under the terms of these reconciliation deals, men in rebel-held communities who had deserted or dodged their mandatory Syrian army conscription were expected to join within six months.

As Syrian researcher Abdullah al-Jabassini has explained, these agreements led to a precarious security situation in southern Syria.

The agreements aimed to end fighting and restore state control over rebel-held areas. However, many of the once-rebel factions who were now, on paper at least, linked to the Syrian army, Russia and Iran, continued to operate with relative freedom and impunity. This ran counter to the regime’s presumed strategy of re-consolidating its control over the country.

Many of these local armed groups continued to provide security to their communities, even erecting barriers at the entrances of each city to prevent the entry of the Syrian Army.

A former Syrian governor told me in an interview in 2022:

In Houran [southern Syria], generally, there is no regime control. It remains impossible for the regime to enter Busra al-Sham, Daraa City, Tafas and their surroundings, due to certain considerations or guarantees. But of course, there are no guarantees but their arms.

For the last few years, the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran seemed to have some ability to control these ex-rebel groups and militias that supposedly now operated under their purview.

However, this control was an illusion. In the past ten days, the regime’s forces have completely disintegrated in the face of the opposition’s offensive.

The army’s fractured levels of control and lack of resources, the dire economic sitution in the country (which resulted in soldiers not being paid), and the low morale and corruption at almost every level could not sustain a military – or a security state.

A state-in-waiting

For more than 50 years, Syria was a suffocating kingdom of silence. People had little ability to collaborate or negotiate in meaningful ways. This made forming any common vision for Syria’s political future a daunting undertaking.

Under Assad, Syria experts Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami have written that “the most cunning and sycophantic” prospered.

[…]there was no culture in the deep sense of the word, only a framework empty of meaning populated by hired intellectuals, with the exception of a very few real thinkers, who were marginalised.

But since the relative freezing of active combat in 2020, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (linked to the Syrian Interim Government and Turkey) and the Kurdish-led forces in northeastern Syria have had time to learn and consolidate.

They have spent the past few years training and preparing their armed forces. They have also developed complex systems of governance, capable of meeting the needs of millions of people.

Across northern Syria, these opposition groups and their political wings have set up a state-in-waiting, with ministries of economy, trade, education and humanitarian affairs. The groups also established their own civil and land registration systems, something normally considered the sole purview of recognised states.

It’s right to be wary and sceptical, particularly of HTS’s supposed transformation from al-Qaeda affiliate to national liberation movement that will represent all Syrians. However, the early signs are promising. The immediate release of prisoners from the Assad regime’s infamous prison system, for example, was a deeply symbolic move aimed at endearing rebel forces to the Syrian population.

When it liberated Aleppo, HTS fighters also secured banks to avoid looting. To build trust and boost morale among the local population, it diverted the electricity being funnelled to large factories to civilian residences.

The group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, now going by his legal name Ahmed al-Sharaa, has said he is willing to dissolve HTS in favour of creating a new structure that is more representative and capable of serving the current needs of all Syrians.

A new chapter is beginning for Syria, its people and the world. The Syrian regime, a cult of personality built on the Assads, has fallen, offering hope to other people in the Middle East and beyond who continue to live under authoritarian dictatorships that change is indeed possible.

May Syrians’ 2011 cry of “Dignity! Freedom! Bread!” continue to prevail.

Marika Sosnowski received funding from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and the Swedish Research Council to research Syria’s supposedly post-war landscape from 2020-2023.

– ref. Why Bashar al-Assad’s security state collapsed so dramatically in Syria – https://theconversation.com/why-bashar-al-assads-security-state-collapsed-so-dramatically-in-syria-245555

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

Anthony Albanese has announced an Australian Federal Police Special Operation Taskforce to combat antisemitism, after criticism from within and outside the Jewish community that the government has not done enough to deal with the escalating issue.

Following a meeting of cabinet’s national security committee, the prime minister faced the media on Monday afternoon flanked by Australian Federal Police Commissioner Reece Kershaw, the head of ASIO, Mike Burgess, the Attorney- General, Mark Dreyfus, and the Immigration Minister, Tony Burke.

Earlier in the day, Friday’s attack on Melbourne’s Adass Israel synagogue was formally declared a “likely terrorist incident”. This upgrades the investigation to come under the Joint Counter-terrorism Team, which includes the Australian Federal Police, Victoria Police and ASIO.

Victoria Police Chief Commissioner Shane Patton told a Melbourne news conference that while there had not been sufficient evidence on Friday to label the firebombing a terrorist incident, the investigation since had made “significant progress” and had reached the threshold.

The declaration of a terrorist attack was advised by a joint management committee meeting of federal and state police, and ASIO, on Monday morning. The upgrade means the tougher anti-terrorism laws apply, rather than the law covering arson. The anti-terrorism law includes the power of preventative detention.

Albanese, who will visit the Melbourne synagogue this week, said Special Operation Avalite was in response to the Friday attack, that followed the attack on Jewish Labor MP Josh Burns’ office in Melbourne and an incident in Sydney in which a car was set set on fire and other cars were vandalised with anti-Israeli graffiti.

Kershaw said: “Special Operation Avalite will be an agile and experienced squad of counter-terrorism investigators who will focus on threats, violence, and hatred towards the Australian Jewish community and parliamentarians.

“In essence, they will be a flying squad to deploy nationally to incidents.

“The Commonwealth offences Special Operation Avalite will investigate will include emerging violence, urging violence against members or groups, advocating terrorism, advocating genocide, using a carriage service to make a threat, and using a carriage service to menace or harass.”

While Patton refused to give details of the synagogue investigation, so as not to compromise it, he indicated the police were looking at three suspects.

Albanese and other politicians had already labelled the incident a terrorist attack, but to be officially declared one, it had to meet certain criteria.

AFP Deputy Commissioner for National Security Krissy Barrett told the Melbourne joint news conference the transition of the attack to come under the Victorian Joint Counter-terrorism team was a “crucial turning point in the investigation”.

“Joint counter-terrorism teams include the best terrorism investigators in the country, and a JCTT investigation unlocks more power, more capability, and more intelligence,” she said.

She said since the attack, the AFP, ASIO, and Victoria Police had been in regular contact, and this meant “that now it has been allocated to the Joint Counter-terrorism Team, we are already well-prepared, well-briefed, and well-progressed”.

Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan told the news conference her government would immediately seek advice on strengthening the state’s laws to protect people going to their place of worship.

Albanese seemed to brush off a question about whether there should be a national cabinet meeting on antisemitism. “What we want to do is to act. If people want to have a phone hook up, I’m very welcome for that to occur.”

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Albanese announces antisemitism taskforce, as synagogue firebombing investigation upgraded – https://theconversation.com/albanese-announces-antisemitism-taskforce-as-synagogue-firebombing-investigation-upgraded-245564

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Siân Halcrow, Professor of Biological Anthropology, University of Otago

Content warning: this story deals with infant loss and human remains acquired historically for use within museum contexts.

A collection of fetal and baby skeletal remains at the University of Otago’s W.D. Trotter Anatomy Museum shows how those on the margins of 19th and early 20th century New Zealand society contributed to medical knowledge – with or without the consent of their loved ones.

The museum is a repository for more than 2,000 anatomical models and “specimens”. It is largely unknown how many of these remains came to be part of the museum’s collection.

But our new analysis of the skeletal remains and associated historical records of babies in the collection from pre-birth to up to one year old show they were largely born to unmarried mothers or lower-class families.

The museum’s collection mirrors a global historical phenomenon where the bodies of society’s most vulnerable — such as infants, the poor, and the marginalised — were used for medical education.

The origins of anatomical collections

New Zealand’s 1875 Anatomy Act mirrored British laws that allowed the use of unclaimed bodies from public institutions, like hospitals and asylums, for anatomical study.

These laws disproportionately affected impoverished families. Hospitals were able to retain custody of the deceased when families lacked financial means for burial or an individual’s body lay “unclaimed”.

Our archival analysis focused on the University of Otago Register of Anatomical Material of body acquisitions from 1876-1941 and associated birth and death certificates.

We were looking for the remains of babies less than one year of age (the medical meaning of infant). We found skeletal remains ranging from five months in-utero up to three months of age.

The skeletal analyses found there were at least 32 infants, and a range of bones from individuals of different ages.

Seven of the 18 infants with records available were born to unmarried mothers, and many were from working class families.

Many of these babies were stigmatised as “illegitimate” and their mothers were often forced to birth in homes for the unmarried.

There is evidence for two dying from birth trauma, one including the possible use of forceps during birth. There is evidence for dissection on some individuals.

There are also four individuals with developmental anomalies whose remains may have been kept for dissection and education as examples of anatomical “oddities.”

Although the archival analysis of age and cause of death are similar to our skeletal analysis, we cannot determine which remains belong to specific individuals.

The structures keeping babies from families

It can be argued that structural violence – the harm inflicted by societal structures and institutions — played a central role in the lives of these mothers and infants. It is part of the reason they were included in the collection.

For example, this was a period when single mothers found themselves in charity-run homes where their children were more likely to be relinquished to medical institutions.

This coincided with a push for the development of anatomical collections by physicians who held significant power within the medical systems at the time.

The uneven power-balance between the mothers and those around them may have made it harder for the families to retain their babies’ remains.

Prioritising respect and consent

Today, the existence of such collections raises challenging ethical questions, and we acknowledge the sensitive nature of studying these remains.

How do we reconcile the scientific value of these remains with the history behind their acquisition? Can the study of these collections offer insights without perpetuating historical injustices?

At present the remains are carefully curated within the museum. These skeletal remains are invaluable for teaching in anatomy.

By doing this new research, we can better inform ourselves of the ethical challenges of teaching with these remains and inform students of when and how they were acquired.

The stark contrast between historical and modern ethical standards is evident in New Zealand’s Human Tissue Act 2008, which mandates explicit consent for the use of human remains.

As we navigate the legacy of these collections, it is important to contextualise them within their historical framework.

This requires acknowledging the social inequities that led to their creation and ensuring contemporary practices prioritise respect and consent.

This work is dedicated to the babies who died and were subsequently kept in the W.D. Trotter Museum.

Sian Halcrow receives funding from the Royal Society Te Apārangi.

Megan Southorn received funding from a University of Otago Doctoral Scholarship and the Maurice and Phyllis Paykel Trust.

Stephie Rose Lončar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Forgotten histories: what fetal and baby remains in medical collections tell us about inequality – https://theconversation.com/forgotten-histories-what-fetal-and-baby-remains-in-medical-collections-tell-us-about-inequality-244931

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ian Musgrave, Senior lecturer in Pharmacology, University of Adelaide

Concern has been rising over the use of a feed supplement, Bovaer 10, to reduce methane production in cows.

Bovaer 10 consists of silicon dioxide (basically sand), propylene glycol (a food stabiliser approved by Food Safety Australia New Zealand) and the active compound 3-nitrooxypropanol (3-NOP).

There has been an enormous amount of misinformation about the safety of 3-NOP, with some labelling milk from herds fed the additive as “Frankenmilk”. Others have been concerned it could make its way to humans via beef.

The bottom line is that 3-NOP is safe. Let’s unpack some of the major misunderstandings.

Why do we need to reduce methane production?

In our attempts to reduce global warming, most of the focus has been on CO₂ as a a major human-produced greenhouse gas. But methane is also a greenhouse gas, and although we produce less of it, it is a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO₂.

Agriculture is the largest human-produced source of methane. As cattle herds expand to fuel our increasing desire for meat and milk, reducing methane production by cows is an important way to reduce greenhouse emissions.

There are several ways to do this. Stopping the bacteria in cows’ stomachs that generate methane from making methane is one approach.

The methane cows and sheep produce is not from the animals themselves, but from microbes that live in their digestive systems. 3-NOP stop the enzymes that do the final step of methane synthesis in these microbes.

3-NOP is not the only compound trialled as a feed additive. A seaweed-based Australian product, Rumin8, for example, is also under development. Saponins, soap-like chemical compounds found in plants, and essential oils have also been investigated.

However, 3-NOP is currently one of the most effective treatments.

But isn’t it a poison?

There is concern on social media about Bovaer “poisoning our food”.

But, as we say in toxicology, it’s the dose that makes the poison. Arsenic, for example, is lethal at 2–20 milligram per kilogram of body weight.

In contrast, 3-NOP was not lethal at the doses used in safety studies, up to 600 mg 3-NOP per kg of body weight. At 100 mg per kg of body weight in rats, it had no adverse effects.

What about reproductive issues?

The effect of 3-NOP on reproductive organs has caused a lot of comment.

Research in rats and cows found that doses of 300–500 mg per kg of body weight resulted in ovarian and testicular shrinkage.

To put that in perspective, to achieve the same exposure in humans, a 70 kg human would need to consume 21–35 grams (around 2 tablespoons) of pure 3-NOP a day every day for weeks on end to see this effect.

No human will be exposed to this amount as 3-NOP does not enter milk – it’s fully metabolised in the cow’s gut.

No cow will be exposed to these levels either.

What about cancer?

3-NOP is not genotoxic or mutagenic, meaning it can’t damage DNA. So 3-NOP’s effects are dose-limited, meaning small doses aren’t harmful while very high doses are (unlike radiation, where there is no safe dose).

At a dose of 300 mg per kg of body weight, researchers found benign tumours in the small intestines of female rats, but not male rats, after 2 years of daily consumption. At a 100 mg of 3-NOP per kg of body weight, no tumours were seen.

Cows are consuming less than 2 grams Bovaer 10 a day (of which only 10% or 0.2 grams, is 3-NOP). This is around 1,000 times less than the acceptable daily intake of 1 mg 3-NOP per kg of body weight a day for a 450 kg cow.

This level of intake will not result in tumours, or any of the other adverse effects.

So how much will humans be exposed to?

Consumers of milk and meat will be exposed to zero 3-NOP. 3-NOP does not get into milk or meat: it is completely metabolised in the cow’s gut.

Farmers might be exposed to a small amount handling the feed additive and industrial workers producing 3-NOP will be potentially exposed to more. Farmers and industrial workers already wear personal protective equipment to reduce exposure to other agricultural chemicals – and are recommended to do so with Bovear 10 as well.

How extensively has it been tested?

3-NOP has been developed over 15 years, subject to multiple reviews by the European Food Safety Authority, the United Kingdom’s Food Safety Authority and others.

It has been extensively tested over months of exposure to cattle with no adverse effects. Some studies actually say it improves milk and meat quality.

Bovaer has been approved for use in dairy cattle by the European Union since 2022 and in Japan in 2024. It is also used in many other countries, including in beef products in Australia.

Very little 3-NOP enters the environment (less than 0.2% of the ingested dose), it does not accumulate and is readily broken down so is not an environmental risk.

Since humans are not exposed to 3-NOP though milk and meat, long-term human exposure is not an issue.

What does Bill Gates have to do with it?

Bill Gates has invested in a different feed treatment for methane, the Australian seaweed based Rumin8. But he has nothing to do with Bovaer 10.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has given research grants to the company that makes 3-NOP for malaria control research, not for 3-NOP.

The bottom line is that adding 3-NOP to animal feed poses no risk to consumers, animals or the environment.

Ian Musgrave has received funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council to study adverse reactions to herbal medicines and has previously been funded by the Australian Research Council to study potential natural product treatments for Alzheimer’s disease.

– ref. Bovaer is added to cow feed to reduce methane emissions. Does it get into milk and meat? And is it harmful for humans? – https://theconversation.com/bovaer-is-added-to-cow-feed-to-reduce-methane-emissions-does-it-get-into-milk-and-meat-and-is-it-harmful-for-humans-245364

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

Friday’s attack on Melbourne’s Adass Israel synagogue has been formally declared a “likely terrorist incident”. This upgrades the investigation to come under the Joint Counter-terrorism Team, which includes the Australian Federal Police, Victoria Police and ASIO.

Victoria Police Chief Commissioner Shane Patton told a news conference that while there had not been sufficient evidence on Friday to label the firebombing a terrorist incident, the investigation since had made “significant progress” and had reached the threshold.

The declaration of a terrorist attack was advised by a joint management committee meeting of federal and state police, and ASIO, on Monday morning. The upgrade means the tougher, anti-terrorism laws apply, rather than the law covering arson. This anti-terrorism laws include the power of preventative detention.

While Patton refused to give details of the investigation so far, so as not to compromise it, he indicated the police were looking at three suspects.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and other politicians had already labelled the incident a terrorist attack, but to be officially declared one, it had to meet certain criteria.

AFP Deputy Commissioner for National Security Krissy Barrett told the joint news conference the transition of the attack to come under the Victorian Joint Counter-terrorism team was a “crucial turning point in the investigation”.

“Joint counter-terrorism teams include the best terrorism investigators in the country, and a JCTT investigation unlocks more power, more capability, and more intelligence,” she said.

She said since the attack, the AFP, ASIO, and Victoria Police had been in regular contact, and this meant “that now it has been allocated to the Joint Counter-terrorism Team, we are already well-prepared, well-briefed, and well-progressed”.

Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan told the news conference her government would immediately seek advice on strengthening the state’s laws to protect people going to their place of worship.

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Synagogue firebombing formally declared ‘terrorist’ incident and investigation upgraded – https://theconversation.com/synagogue-firebombing-formally-declared-terrorist-incident-and-investigation-upgraded-245564

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Siân Halcrow, Professor of Biological Anthropology, University of Otago

Content warning: this story deals with infant loss and human remains acquired historically for use within museum contexts.

A collection of fetal and baby skeletal remains at the University of Otago’s W.D. Trotter Anatomy Museum shows how those on the margins of 19th and early 20th century New Zealand society contributed to medical knowledge – with or without the consent of their loved ones.

The museum is a repository for more than 2,000 anatomical models and “specimens”. It is largely unknown how many of these remains came to be part of the museum’s collection.

But our new analysis of the skeletal remains and associated historical records of babies in the collection from pre-birth to up to one year old show they were largely born to unmarried mothers or lower-class families.

The museum’s collection mirrors a global historical phenomenon where the bodies of society’s most vulnerable — such as infants, the poor, and the marginalised — were used for medical education.

The origins of anatomical collections

New Zealand’s 1875 Anatomy Act mirrored British laws that allowed the use of unclaimed bodies from public institutions, like hospitals and asylums, for anatomical study.

These laws disproportionately affected impoverished families. Hospitals were able to retain custody of the deceased when families lacked financial means for burial or an individual’s body lay “unclaimed”.

Our archival analysis focused on the University of Otago Register of Anatomical Material of body acquisitions from 1876-1941 and associated birth and death certificates.

We were looking for the remains of babies less than one year of age (the medical meaning of infant). We found skeletal remains ranging from five months in-utero up to three months of age.

The skeletal analyses found there were at least 32 infants, and a range of bones from individuals of different ages.

Seven of the 18 infants with records available were born to unmarried mothers, and many were from working class families.

Many of these babies were stigmatised as “illegitimate” and their mothers were often forced to birth in homes for the unmarried.

There is evidence for two dying from birth trauma, one including the possible use of forceps during birth. There is evidence for dissection on some individuals.

There are also four individuals with developmental anomalies whose remains may have been kept for dissection and education as examples of anatomical “oddities.”

Although the archival analysis of age and cause of death are similar to our skeletal analysis, we cannot determine which remains belong to specific individuals.

The structures keeping babies from families

It can be argued that structural violence – the harm inflicted by societal structures and institutions — played a central role in the lives of these mothers and infants. It is part of the reason they were included in the collection.

For example, this was a period when single mothers found themselves in charity-run homes where their children were more likely to be relinquished to medical institutions.

This coincided with a push for the development of anatomical collections by physicians who held significant power within the medical systems at the time.

The uneven power-balance between the mothers and those around them may have made it harder for the families to retain their babies’ remains.

Prioritising respect and consent

Today, the existence of such collections raises challenging ethical questions, and we acknowledge the sensitive nature of studying these remains.

How do we reconcile the scientific value of these remains with the history behind their acquisition? Can the study of these collections offer insights without perpetuating historical injustices?

At present the remains are carefully curated within the museum. These skeletal remains are invaluable for teaching in anatomy.

By doing this new research, we can better inform ourselves of the ethical challenges of teaching with these remains and inform students of when and how they were acquired.

The stark contrast between historical and modern ethical standards is evident in New Zealand’s Human Tissue Act 2008, which mandates explicit consent for the use of human remains.

As we navigate the legacy of these collections, it is important to contextualise them within their historical framework.

This requires acknowledging the social inequities that led to their creation and ensuring contemporary practices prioritise respect and consent.

This work is dedicated to the babies who died and were subsequently kept in the W.D. Trotter Museum.

Sian Halcrow receives funding from the Royal Society Te Apārangi.

Megan Southorn received funding from a University of Otago Doctoral Scholarship and the Maurice and Phyllis Paykel Trust.

Stephie Rose Lončar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Forgotten histories: what fetal and baby remains tell us about inequality in medical collections – https://theconversation.com/forgotten-histories-what-fetal-and-baby-remains-tell-us-about-inequality-in-medical-collections-244931

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt University

Who could have predicted that after nearly 14 years of civil war and five years of stalemate, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria would collapse in just a week? With Assad’s departure, the pressing question now is what lies ahead for Syria’s immediate future.

When opposition fighters led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the major city of Aleppo in late November with minimal resistance, commentators widely believed it marked the beginning of the Assad regime’s downfall. Many anticipated a bitter fight to the end.

Assad was caught off guard, and his forces were clearly unprepared. He withdrew his remaining troops from Aleppo to regroup and gain time for reinforcements to arrive from Russia and Iran, and hope the opposition fighters would stop there.

It wasn’t to be. Emboldened by their swift success in Aleppo, HTS fighters wasted no time and advanced on Hama, capturing it with ease. They quickly followed up by seizing Homs, the next major city to the south.

Russia provided limited air support to Assad. But Iran, having depleted its forces in Hezbollah’s defence against Israel in Lebanon, was unable to offer significant assistance and withdrew its remaining personnel from Syria. Meanwhile, Assad’s frantic calls for support from Iraq did not go anywhere.

Seeing the writing on the wall, the morale of Assad’s forces and leadership plummeted. Fearing retribution in the event of the regime’s collapse, defections began en masse, further accelerating Assad’s downfall.

And on the last day, Assad fled the country, and his prime minister officially handed over power to HTS and its leadership. It marked the end of 54 years of Assad family rule in Syria.

The Assad legacy

The Assad family, including Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, will likely be remembered by the majority of Syrians as brutal dictators.

The modern state of Syria was established in 1920 following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the aftermath of the first world war. Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control, only gaining independence in 1944. Following a tumultuous period, including a failed unification with Egypt, the Ba’ath Party seized control in 1963 through a coup that involved Hafez al-Assad.

In 1966, Hafez al-Assad led another coup alongside other officers from the Alawite minority. This ultimately resulted in a civilian regime, with Hafez al-Assad becoming president in 1970.

Hafez al-Assad established himself as an authoritarian dictator, concentrating power, the military and the economy in the hands of his relatives and the Alawite community. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority was largely marginalised and excluded from positions of power and influence.

Hafez al-Assad is most infamously remembered for his brutal suppression of the opposition in 1982. The uprising, led by the Islamic Front, saw the opposition capture the city of Hama. In response, the Syrian army razed the city, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians dead or disappeared and decisively crushing the rebellion.

Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, and, the least likely candidate, his younger son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed the presidency. Having been educated in the West to become a doctor, Bashar al-Assad projected a moderate and modern image, raising hopes he might usher in a new era of progress and democracy in Syria.

However, Bashar al-Assad soon found himself navigating a turbulent regional landscape following the September 11 2001 terror attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. In 2004, after the United States imposed sanctions on Syria, Assad sought closer ties with Turkey. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became friends, removing visa requirements between their countries and making plans to establish economic zones to boost trade.

Erdoğan and Assad then had a falling out during a series of events in 2011, a year that marked a turning point for Syria. The Arab Spring revolts swept into the country, presenting Assad with a critical choice: to pursue a democratic path or crush the opposition as his father had done in 1982.

He chose the latter, missing a historic opportunity to peacefully transform Syria.

The consequences were catastrophic. A devastating civil war broke out, resulting in more than 300,000 deaths (some estimates are higher), 5.4 million refugees, and 6.9 million people internally displaced. This will be Assad’s legacy.

Syria’s immediate challenges

Syria now has a new force in power: HTS and its leadership, spearheaded by the militant leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. They will face immediate challenges and four key priorities:

1) Consolidating power. The new leadership will now try to ensure there are no armed groups capable of contesting their rule, particularly remnants of the old Assad regime and smaller factions that were not part of the opposition forces.

Critically, they will also need to discuss how power will be shared among the coalition of opposition groups. Al-Jolani is likely to become the founding president of the new Syria, but how the rest of the power will be distributed remains uncertain.

It seems the opposition was not prepared to take over the country so quickly, and they may not have a power-sharing agreement. This will need to be negotiated and worked out quickly.

The new government will likely recognise the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the territories it controls as an autonomous region within Syria. An independent Kurdish state, however, will be strongly opposed by Turkey, the main external backer of the opposition.

Yet, history seems to be moving in favour of the Kurds. There is now the eventual possibility of an independent Kurdish state, potentially combining northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into a single entity.

2) International recognition. Syria is a very complex and diverse place. As such, the new government can only be sustained if it gains international recognition.

The key players in this process are Turkey, the European Union, the United States and Israel (through the US). It is likely all of these entities will recognise the new government on the condition it forms a moderate administration, refrains from fighting the Kurdish YPG, and does not support Hezbollah or Hamas.

Given their unexpected success in toppling Assad so quickly, the opposition is likely to accept these conditions in exchange for aid and recognition.

3) Forming a new government. The question on everyone’s mind is what kind of political order the opposition forces will now establish. HTS and many of the groups in its coalition are Sunni Muslims, with HTS having origins linked to al-Qaeda. However, HTS broke away from the terror organisation in 2016 and shifted its focus exclusively to Syria as an opposition movement.

Nevertheless, we should not expect a democratic secular rule. The new government is also unlikely to resemble the ultra-conservative theocratic rule of the Taliban.

In his recent interview with CNN, al-Jolani made two key points. He indicated he and other leaders in the group have evolved in their outlook and Islamic understanding with age, suggesting the extreme views from their youth have moderated over time. He also emphasised the opposition would be tolerant of the freedoms and rights of religious and ethnic minority groups.

The specifics of how this will manifest remain unclear. The expectation is HTS will form a conservative government in which Islam plays a dominant role in shaping social policies and lawmaking.

On the economic and foreign policy fronts, the country’s new leaders are likely to be pragmatic, open to alliances with the regional and global powers that have supported them.

4) Rebuilding the country and maintaining unity. This is needed to prevent another civil war from erupting — this time among the winners.

A recent statement from HTS’s Political Affairs Department said the new Syria will focus on construction, progress and reconciliation. The new government aims to create positive conditions for displaced Syrians to return to their country, establish constructive relations with neighbouring countries and prioritise rebuilding the economy.

Syria and the broader Middle East have entered a new phase in their modern history. Time will tell how things will unfold, but one thing is certain: it will never be the same.

Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy.

– ref. After 5 decades of brutal rule under the Assads, Syria is at a crossroads. Here are 4 priorities to avoid yet another war – https://theconversation.com/after-5-decades-of-brutal-rule-under-the-assads-syria-is-at-a-crossroads-here-are-4-priorities-to-avoid-yet-another-war-245538

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt University

Who could have predicted that after nearly 14 years of civil war and five years of stalemate, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria would collapse in just a week? With Assad’s departure, the pressing question now is what lies ahead for Syria’s immediate future.

When opposition fighters led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the major city of Aleppo in late November with minimal resistance, commentators widely believed it marked the beginning of the Assad regime’s downfall. Many anticipated a bitter fight to the end.

Assad was caught off guard, and his forces were clearly unprepared. He withdrew his remaining troops from Aleppo to regroup and gain time for reinforcements to arrive from Russia and Iran, and hope the opposition fighters would stop there.

It wasn’t to be. Emboldened by their swift success in Aleppo, HTS fighters wasted no time and advanced on Hama, capturing it with ease. They quickly followed up by seizing Homs, the next major city to the south.

Russia provided limited air support to Assad. But Iran, having depleted its forces in Hezbollah’s defence against Israel in Lebanon, was unable to offer significant assistance and withdrew its remaining personnel from Syria. Meanwhile, Assad’s frantic calls for support from Iraq did not go anywhere.

Seeing the writing on the wall, the morale of Assad’s forces and leadership plummeted. Fearing retribution in the event of the regime’s collapse, defections began en masse, further accelerating Assad’s downfall.

And on the last day, Assad fled the country, and his prime minister officially handed over power to HTS and its leadership. It marked the end of 55 years of Assad family rule in Syria.

The Assad legacy

The Assad family, including Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, will likely be remembered by the majority of Syrians as brutal dictators.

The modern state of Syria was established in 1920 following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the aftermath of the first world war. Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control, only gaining independence in 1944. Following a tumultuous period, including a failed unification with Egypt, the Ba’ath Party seized control in 1963 through a coup that involved Hafez al-Assad.

In 1966, Hafez al-Assad led another coup alongside other officers from the Alawite minority. This ultimately resulted in a civilian regime, with Hafez al-Assad becoming president in 1970.

Hafez al-Assad established himself as an authoritarian dictator, concentrating power, the military and the economy in the hands of his relatives and the Alawite community. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority was largely marginalised and excluded from positions of power and influence.

Hafez al-Assad is most infamously remembered for his brutal suppression of the opposition in 1982. The uprising, led by the Islamic Front, saw the opposition capture the city of Hama. In response, the Syrian army razed the city, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians dead or disappeared and decisively crushing the rebellion.

Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, and, the least likely candidate, his younger son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed the presidency. Having been educated in the West to become a doctor, Bashar al-Assad projected a moderate and modern image, raising hopes he might usher in a new era of progress and democracy in Syria.

However, Bashar al-Assad soon found himself navigating a turbulent regional landscape following the September 11 2001 terror attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. In 2004, after the United States imposed sanctions on Syria, Assad sought closer ties with Turkey. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became friends, removing visa requirements between their countries and making plans to establish economic zones to boost trade.

Erdoğan and Assad then had a falling out during a series of events in 2011, a year that marked a turning point for Syria. The Arab Spring revolts swept into the country, presenting Assad with a critical choice: to pursue a democratic path or crush the opposition as his father had done in 1982.

He chose the latter, missing a historic opportunity to peacefully transform Syria.

The consequences were catastrophic. A devastating civil war broke out, resulting in more than 300,000 deaths (some estimates are higher), 5.4 million refugees, and 6.9 million people internally displaced. This will be Assad’s legacy.

Syria’s immediate challenges

Syria now has a new force in power: HTS and its leadership, spearheaded by the militant leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. They will face immediate challenges and four key priorities:

1) Consolidating power. The new leadership will now try to ensure there are no armed groups capable of contesting their rule, particularly remnants of the old Assad regime and smaller factions that were not part of the opposition forces.

Critically, they will also need to discuss how power will be shared among the coalition of opposition groups. Al-Jolani is likely to become the founding president of the new Syria, but how the rest of the power will be distributed remains uncertain.

It seems the opposition was not prepared to take over the country so quickly, and they may not have a power-sharing agreement. This will need to be negotiated and worked out quickly.

The new government will likely recognise the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the territories it controls as an autonomous region within Syria. An independent Kurdish state, however, will be strongly opposed by Turkey, the main external backer of the opposition.

Yet, history seems to be moving in favour of the Kurds. There is now the eventual possibility of an independent Kurdish state, potentially combining northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into a single entity.

2) International recognition. Syria is a very complex and diverse place. As such, the new government can only be sustained if it gains international recognition.

The key players in this process are Turkey, the European Union, the United States and Israel (through the US). It is likely all of these entities will recognise the new government on the condition it forms a moderate administration, refrains from fighting the Kurdish YPG, and does not support Hezbollah or Hamas.

Given their unexpected success in toppling Assad so quickly, the opposition is likely to accept these conditions in exchange for aid and recognition.

3) Forming a new government. The question on everyone’s mind is what kind of political order the opposition forces will now establish. HTS and many of the groups in its coalition are Sunni Muslims, with HTS having origins linked to al-Qaeda. However, HTS broke away from the terror organisation in 2016 and shifted its focus exclusively to Syria as an opposition movement.

Nevertheless, we should not expect a democratic secular rule. The new government is also unlikely to resemble the ultra-conservative theocratic rule of the Taliban.

In his recent interview with CNN, al-Jolani made two key points. He indicated he and other leaders in the group have evolved in their outlook and Islamic understanding with age, suggesting the extreme views from their youth have moderated over time. He also emphasised the opposition would be tolerant of the freedoms and rights of religious and ethnic minority groups.

The specifics of how this will manifest remain unclear. The expectation is HTS will form a conservative government in which Islam plays a dominant role in shaping social policies and lawmaking.

On the economic and foreign policy fronts, the country’s new leaders are likely to be pragmatic, open to alliances with the regional and global powers that have supported them.

4) Rebuilding the country and maintaining unity. This is needed to prevent another civil war from erupting — this time among the winners.

A recent statement from HTS’s Political Affairs Department said the new Syria will focus on construction, progress and reconciliation. The new government aims to create positive conditions for displaced Syrians to return to their country, establish constructive relations with neighbouring countries and prioritise rebuilding the economy.

Syria and the broader Middle East have entered a new phase in their modern history. Time will tell how things will unfold, but one thing is certain: it will never be the same.

Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy.

– ref. After 55 years of brutal rule under the Assads, Syria is at a crossroads. Here are 4 priorities to avoid yet another war – https://theconversation.com/after-55-years-of-brutal-rule-under-the-assads-syria-is-at-a-crossroads-here-are-4-priorities-to-avoid-yet-another-war-245538

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hal Pawson, Professor of Housing Research and Policy, and Associate Director, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW Sydney

Rising homelessness across Australia is overwhelming the capacity of services to offer emergency help. New evidence in the Australian Homelessness Monitor 2024, released today, confirms homelessness has soared well above pre-pandemic levels in most parts of the country.

Complementing the report’s findings from a survey of local governments, a majority of homelessness services agencies also report “significantly increased” numbers of people seeking assistance over the past 12 months alone.

Much of this escalation likely reflects the sheer lack of rental homes available and the extraordinary rent inflation experienced across Australia since 2020. National median advertised rents have jumped 51% since March 2020. Even when adjusted for inflation, the increase is 29%.

A welcome increase in government investment in social housing offers the prospect of some limited relief in the next few years. However, as none of the recent spending commitments extends far into the future, and because they generally lack any evidence-based logic, there is a high risk this recovery will prove short-lived.

Agencies are feeling the strain

Recent market conditions have created a perfect storm for homelessness services agencies. In parallel with the rising need for crisis assistance, there is less scope to help clients into secure housing. Some 76% of services were finding it “much harder” to find suitable housing for clients in mid-2024 than a year earlier.

Agency monthly caseloads are up 12% since 2019–20. There’s also a big increase in the average time clients receive support: up by 44% in the five years to 2022–23. This has forced agencies to reduce intakes of new clients seeking help.

The sector has a backlog, causing agencies to struggle to meet demand. They have been triaging applications for help. This means giving priority to people who are already homeless rather than at risk of homelessness.

While justifiable in the circumstances, this damages agencies’ ability to prevent – as opposed to relieve – homelessness.

The rental market pressures fuelling this crisis have continued to intensify, well over two years after Australia’s post-COVID reopening.

These problems would have been even worse without “extraordinary” boosts to Commonwealth Rent Assistance sanctioned by Treasurer Jim Chalmers in 2023 and 2024. In combination with routine indexation, these have raised maximum payments by 45% since early 2022.

Rising homelessness has longer-term causes too

The housing market impacts of COVID-19 disruption have aggravated homelessness in the early 2020s. But it’s only the latest phase in a much longer-term trend. This is because the housing market drivers of the problem are not (only) cyclical but structural; that is, built into how the system operates.

Housing demand and market supply have been out of sync for decades. As a result, house prices have continued to increase faster than incomes. This puts home ownership increasingly out of reach for moderate income earners.

With the path from private renting to first home ownership increasingly obstructed, even for moderate to high income earners, overall demand for tenancies has grown. This inflates sector-wide rent prices, further reducing availability of rentals affordable for people on lower incomes.

These housing market dynamics have been an underlying driver of rising rental housing stress and homelessness since the 1990s.

All the while, these tendencies have been underpinned by key tax and other policy settings that inflate housing demand and restrict supply. The federal government’s promised National Housing and Homelessness Plan must acknowledge, analyse and reconsider these policy settings.

Governments have begun to respond

As the 2022 and 2020 editions of the Homelessness Monitor identified, signs of stepped-up engagement with homelessness as a policy priority began to emerge among governments as early as 2016 in states such as New South Wales and Victoria.

Then, in 2020, several states launched large-scale, widely welcomed pandemic emergency accommodation programs for people sleeping rough and others who were homeless.

More recently, in a notable policy reversal highlighted by our new research, both federal and state governments have pledged appreciable investment in long-term social housing.

Initially led by Victoria and Queensland, followed by the Commonwealth and NSW, this new investment should deliver around 60,000 new social homes by 2030, by far the sector’s largest influx of new stock this century.

At least for a few years in the late 2020s, the promised programs might halt – at least temporarily – the trend of social housing dwindling from over 6% of all homes in the 1990s to barely 4% today. Yet any gains will remain modest relative to the scale of unmet need. Referencing this, housing and homelessness advocates have called for social rental homes to form 10% of all housing.

Even so, we should see, at least for a few years, a marked uptick in scope to help people who are homeless into secure and affordable homes. This will be the result of a surge of newly-built social units supplementing existing homes being re-let. And for more of those helped in this way, these will be homes designed and built to modern standards.

Australia can still do much better

Problematically, though, these developments have come about through incremental and disconnected policymaking. Other than in Queensland, there has been a lack of any stated rationale, strategic framing or evidence-based scaling of social housing programs.

In most cases, there has been no explicit recognition or acknowledgement of the need to keep investing much more in social housing than in the recent past. This investment must be enough, at the very least, to prevent a resumption of sector decline. Ideally, it should cover an expansion of social housing in line with known long-term needs.

It would surely be logical to include a statement of aspiration along these lines in the government’s promised National Housing and Homelessness Plan.

We cannot measurably reduce and then prevent homelessness without reducing poverty and expanding access to secure and affordable homes. Just as the current situation has come about thanks to mistaken policy choices of the past, these are challenges that could be squarely addressed by course corrections today.

Hal Pawson receives research funding from the Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation (City of Melbourne), the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, the Australian Research Council and Crisis UK. He is a part-time unpaid advisor to Senator David Pocock and a non-exec director of Community Housing Canberra.

– ref. Homelessness much worse than before COVID leaves agencies battling a perfect storm – https://theconversation.com/homelessness-much-worse-than-before-covid-leaves-agencies-battling-a-perfect-storm-243148

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Nichola Tyler, Senior Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Swinburne University of Technology

A recent bushfire in Kadnook, western Victoria, which destroyed at least one property and burned more than 1,000 hectares of land, is being investigated due to suspicion it was deliberately lit.

This is not an isolated example. About 28% of bushfires in south-east Australia are deliberately lit. The figure rises to 40% if we’re only talking about fires with a known cause.

These figures are consistent with international trends and tell us preventing arson and unsafe fire behaviour alone could significantly reduce the number of bushfires.

Despite this, prevention of deliberately lit bushfires is mostly absent from emergency, public health and climate action plans.

These fires are devastating

Deliberately lit bushfires can spread rapidly and have devastating consequences. They often occur on the edge of urban areas close to populated places, where there are both dense vegetation and flammable structures.

We see a peak in bushfires during summer when hot temperatures, low rainfall, and dry conditions make fire a more potent threat.

Climate change, land management practices, and increased interaction between people and rural areas increase our vulnerability to fire and the risks associated with deliberate fires.

The royal commission into Victoria’s devastating Black Saturday fires in 2009 reported 173 people died and an additional 414 were injured. The commission concluded at least three of the 15 fires that caused (or had the potential to cause) the greatest harm were deliberately lit.

The commission concluded we need to better understand arson. It recommended research to improve how best to prevent arson and how to detect who’s at risk of offending.

Nearly 15 years on from Black Saturday, these recommendations have not been implemented. There is also very limited evidence globally about how to prevent both bushfire arson and deliberately lit fires more broadly (for instance, fires set to structures or vehicles).

Who lights these fires?

We know little about the characteristics and psychology of people who light bushfires or how to intervene to prevent these fires.

The little research we have suggests there is no one “profile” or “mindset” associated with deliberately lighting bushfires.

But there are some risk factors or vulnerabilities we see more commonly in people who light them. These include:

• an interest or fascination with fire or fire paraphernalia. This could include an interest in watching fire, or a fascination with matches or the fire service

• experiences of social isolation, including a lack of friends or intimate relationships

• increased impulsivity

• general antisocial behaviour, such as contact with the police, truanting or property damage

• difficulties managing and expressing emotions

• problems with being assertive.

However, most people with these vulnerabilities will never light a fire.

Research shows rates of mental illness are higher in people who set fires (including schizophrenia, mood and anxiety disorders, personality dysfunction, and substance use disorders). However, mental health symptoms are rarely a direct cause of firesetting. Instead, they appear to worsen existing vulnerabilities.

Why do people light these fires?

There are many, complex reasons why people light fires. Commonly reported drivers include: relieving boredom or creating excitement, gaining positive recognition for putting out a fire (they want to be seen as a hero), as a cry for help, or because they’re angry.

However, not everyone who lights a fire intends to cause serious damage or harm. In some cases, people may not be aware of the possible consequences of lighting a fire or that the fire may spread into a bushfire.

Knowing these kinds of facts about people who light bushfires is important. However, they don’t help us prevent people from lighting fires in the first place. This is because authorities don’t always know who sets the fires.

So how can we prevent this?

First, we can learn more about why people set fires more generally, particularly those who do not attract attention from authorities.

Research in the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand has started to investigate those who set fires but don’t attract police attention. The aim is to identify ways to prevent people lighting fires in the first place, and support them so they don’t light more.

There is almost no research in Australia or internationally into the effects of community awareness, and prevention campaigns or targeted strategies to prevent firesetting, including bushfire arson, in higher risk groups.

We know slightly more about interventions to reduce repeat firesetting. Fire safety education programs delivered by fire and rescue services show some promise as an early intervention for children and adolescents who have already set a fire, particularly those motivated by curiosity, experimentation, or who are not aware of the consequences.

There is also some evidence suggesting specialist psychological interventions can be effective in reducing vulnerabilities associated with adult firesetting. Forensic or clinical psychologists typically deliver a combination of cognitive behavioural therapy (a type of talking therapy), skills building (such as building coping skills, emotion and impulse control, and reducing their interest in fire), and fire safety education.

However, availability of firesetting interventions is patchy both in Australia and internationally. Interventions that are available are also not always tailored to people with complex needs, such as those with significant emotional or behavioural problems or mental health needs. We also don’t know if these interventions lead to a long-term change in behaviour.

Climate change is making this urgent

The continued and escalating effects of climate change makes it more urgent than ever to address the problem of deliberate firesetting, including bushfire arson.

Failing to address deliberate firesetting will have significant long-term consequences for public health, human life and the environment.

But until funding is available for Australian arson research, identifying and helping people who are more likely to set fires will continue to be based on guesswork rather than evidence.

As we enter another summer of high fire danger, our failure to fund arson research should be at the forefront of everyone’s minds.

Nichola Tyler has received funding from the University of Kent, The Royal Society of New Zealand, and Fire and Emergency New Zealand for research on understanding and preventing deliberate firesetting.

Troy McEwan has previously received funding from the RACV to conduct research into understanding and preventing deliberate firesetting.

– ref. Up to 40% of bushfires in parts of Australia are deliberately lit. But we’re not doing enough to prevent them – https://theconversation.com/up-to-40-of-bushfires-in-parts-of-australia-are-deliberately-lit-but-were-not-doing-enough-to-prevent-them-243584

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Elise Waghorn, Lecturer, School of Education, RMIT University

It’s almost the end of the school year. And that means it’s “awards season” for school students.

Before the holidays, students, teachers and families will gather for speech days where awards will be handed out for academic performance, citizenship, leadership and extracurricular achievements in sport, art and music.

Schools bill these awards as a way to recognise and celebrate students’ achievements. But are they a good idea?

Why give awards?

The philosophy behind giving students awards is to reward them for success.

This stems from the behaviourism approach to education.

This highlights how external rewards can influence behaviour. But while these rewards might motivate kids in the short term, once the desire for that reward fades, the behaviour often doesn’t stick.

Read more:
Should you reward kids for success? Or is there a better way to talk about achievement?

Different kinds of motivation

Research has also shown giving awards or rewards to children can be more harmful than helpful.

When kids are offered awards, they can shift their focus from enjoying the activity to trying to earn the award. This means they might participate only for the sake of the award, rather than for the joy of learning or personal growth. This means they are motivated by extrinsic (outside) factors rather than intrinsic (internal) ones.

A 2014 US study of children in years 3 to 5 showed students who were intrinsically motivated performed better academically than their peers who were extrinsically motivated. The study used a scale to assess children’s motivation. An example of intrinsic motivation was, “I ask questions in class because I want to learn new”, while extrinsic motivation included, “I like school subjects where it’s pretty easy to just learn the answers”.

Awards can also lead children to depend on external validation. When kids get used to seeking approval through awards, they may struggle to find self-worth and motivation in their own efforts.

What about the kids who miss out?

For the kids who don’t receive awards, this can lead to feelings of inadequacy or discouragement, especially if the same few children are always being celebrated.

This situation can also create a “fixed mindset”, where kids think their abilities can’t change or improve (“I never get an award, I’m not good at school”).

This is opposed to a “growth mindset”, in which students believe their abilities can improve through hard work, good strategies and help from others.

Read more:
Parents say ‘good girl’ and ‘good boy’ all the time. Here’s why you should try to say something else

What can we do instead?

This is not to say schools should never give students awards. But it’s important to think carefully about why we are doing this and what the impact might be.

For parents – whether your child receives an award or not – there are other ways to talk about their achievement at the end of the school year.

It can help to focus no the process, rather than the product.

You can encourage your child by praising their effort and progress. This means focusing on the hard work and improvements they made, rather than just the final results.

For example, you could say something like, “I noticed how hard you worked on your reading this year”. Or, “I could see how much you cared about your final history project”. This helps kids feel valued for their efforts. This is something within their control and does not invite comparison with others.

Another effective strategy is to encourage self-reflection. Asking questions such as, “I know you found long division tricky this year. How did you overcome that challenge?”

This helps kids think about and recognise how they can grow and improve, even when things don’t go to plan.

This in turn, helps develop resilience, which is so important for their learning at school and life beyond it.

Elise Waghorn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Should we give students awards at school? – https://theconversation.com/should-we-give-students-awards-at-school-245358

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Danks, Associate professor in Cinema and Media Studies, RMIT University

Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore, released on December 9 1974, is a fascinating composite of both 1970s New Hollywood and the legacy of the women-centred melodrama of the 1930s and ‘40s.

It is now mostly remembered as an early film directed by Martin Scorsese. But it was actually a project initiated by its lead actor, Ellen Burstyn, fresh off a series of acclaimed films including The Last Picture Show (1971), The King of Marvin Gardens (1972) and The Exorcist (1973).

The film would go on to be a significant commercial success, earn Burstyn the Academy Award for Best Actress, and inspire a much less gritty and profane sitcom that would last for nine seasons and featured only one (male) member of the original cast.

A step toward Hollywood

The subsequent critical reputation of Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore is somewhat skewed by its status as an atypical Scorsese film.

The director had only made three features: Who’s That Knocking at My Door (1967), Boxcar Bertha (1972) and Mean Streets (1973). Largely working outside the mainstream, he already had a significant critical reputation as a chronicler of flawed urban ethnic masculinity.

It is also fascinating to hear, this early in his career, Scorsese reminisce about how conscious he was of his growing reputation and of not wanting to be pigeonholed into a particular mode of cinema. He actively embraced the opportunity to make his first true Hollywood film.

He also felt the need to reorientate his focus away from men – though they still appear prominently – and embrace a female-centred narrative. There was also an insistence on working with women in key creative roles, and Scorsese followed Burstyn’s lead in terms of adjusting the script, encouraging improvisation and the nuance of performance.

Although women do feature prominently in subsequent Scorsese films such as New York, New York (1977), The Age of Innocence (1993) and Killers of the Flower Moon (2023), it can be argued Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore is Scorsese’s only narrative feature that centres on female experience.

It has been criticised for its overly mild feminism. But Burstyn was keen to make a movie that focused on the everyday pressures and desires of its carefully grounded female characters.

In the relatively inhospitable masculine terrain of New Hollywood, Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore is an outlier.

Scorsese is most commonly talked about as an iconoclast. But a key element of his career has also seen him operate within the system and maintain a capacity to work on large budgets and projects.

His desire to work with technologies such as 3D, large streaming companies, and actors like Leonardo DiCaprio (one of the few truly bankable actors in 21st-century cinema) have their roots in Scorsese’s employment by Warner Bros on this project.

He even expressed excitement about using the old Columbia Pictures sound stages. Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore would allow him to fuse contemporary – arguably feminist – sensibilities with the kind of star “package” designed in earlier times for actors such as Bette Davis and Joan Crawford.

Scorsese constantly toggles between cinema’s present and past, seeing them as inextricably entwined.

The path not taken

The film follows Alice (Burstyn) and her son Tommy as they travel from New Mexico to Arizona in pursuit of her dream of becoming a singer. It is one of many road movies made during this era and provides a fascinating time-capsule portrait of the desert and often ugly urban landscapes it travels through.

Although her pursuit of a career bubbles beneath the surface, the story is more concerned with the men Alice encounters and the camaraderie she forges with her fellow waitresses in a restaurant (the inevitable focus of the subsequent sitcom).

There is nothing particularly new or groundbreaking about this, but the film is most memorable for the small, often idiosyncratic scenes between Alice and her son. For the surprising moments of kindness, hard-won connection and violence Alice encounters. For the genuinely offbeat performance by Jodie Foster as Tommy’s worldly young friend. The needle drop of particular songs on the soundtrack.

Kris Kristofferson also provides an uncommonly soulful, weathered and comparatively gentle representation of masculinity.

Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore represents an important watershed in Scorsese’s career, and also a path not taken.

Although he has continued to work within and to the side of the mainstream, he has rarely produced a subsequent film with such warmth and sympathy for its central characters.

As a portrait of flawed humanity, it is miles away from his next feature, Taxi Driver (1976). After that, there was perhaps no turning back. Both for better and for worse.

Adrian Danks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore at 50: the film that marks a path not taken in Scorsese’s career – https://theconversation.com/alice-doesnt-live-here-anymore-at-50-the-film-that-marks-a-path-not-taken-in-scorseses-career-243460

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

The swift and unexpected fall of the Syrian capital, Damascus, to Sunni opposition forces marks a pivotal moment in the modern history of the Middle East.

Bashar al-Assad’s regime had withstood more than a decade of uprisings, civil war and international sanctions since the onset of widespread protests in 2011. Yet, it collapsed in a remarkably short period of time.

This sudden turn of events, with the opposition advancing without significant battles or resistance, has left regional powers scrambling to assess the fallout and its broader implications.

This dramatic development signals a reshuffling of power dynamics in the region. It also raises questions about Syria’s future and the role of its neighbours and global stakeholders in managing the post-Assad landscape.

What does the future hold for Syria?

With the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria now finds itself fragmented and divided among three dominant factions, each with external backers and distinct goals:

1. Syrian opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: These groups, supported by Turkey, now control central Syria, extending from the northern border with Turkey to the southern border with Jordan.

Although they share a common religious identity, the Sunni factions have a history of internal conflicts, which could hinder their ability to form a cohesive government or maintain long-term stability.

The opposition forces range from former jihadists coming from Islamic State and al-Qaeda to secular groups such as the Syrian National Army, which split from Assad’s army after the 2011 uprising.

2. Kurdish forces: The Kurdish groups control territory in northeastern Syria, bordering Turkey in the north and Iraq in the east. They continue to receive support from the United States, which has established military bases in the area. This support risks escalating tensions with Turkey, which views Kurdish empowerment as a threat to its territorial integrity.

3. Alawite forces: Pro-Assad Alawite factions, primarily situated in the coastal regions of western Syria, maintain strong ties with Iran, Iraq and Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group. These areas could serve as a stronghold for remnants of Assad-aligned groups after the opposition’s takeover, perpetuating sectarian divides.

The stark divisions among these groups, combined with the absence of a mutually acceptable mediator, suggest that Syria may now face prolonged instability and conflict.

How will this impact the region?

The swift fall of the Assad regime has profound implications for the major players in the Middle East.

The Sunni rebel forces, with strong Turkish backing, capitalised on a moment of vulnerability in Syria. The Assad regime’s allies were preoccupied — Russia with its ongoing war in Ukraine, and Iran and its proxies with their ongoing conflict with Israel. This provided a strategic opportunity for the rebels to advance swiftly across Syria to the capital, Damascus.

Turkey already effectively controls a strip of territory in northern Syria, where its military has been fighting Syrian Kurdish forces. Now, with the victory of its Syrian opposition allies, Turkey is expected to expand its political and military influence in Syria, causing more challenges for the Kurdish minority fighting for its autonomy.

Israel is also in a strategically better position. The fall of Assad disrupts the so-called “axis of resistance”, comprised of Iran, Syria and Tehran’s proxy groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Iran’s critical military supply lines to Hezbollah will likely be severed, isolating the militant group and likely weakening it even further.

Additionally, the fragmentation of Syria into ethnic and religious factions could diminish the regional focus on Israel, providing space for it to pursue its broader strategic goals. After Israel agreed to a ceasefire with Hezbollah last month, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasised a shift in focus to countering the “Iranian threat”.

Iran, meanwhile, has the most to lose. Assad was a crucial ally in Iran’s regional proxy network. And the collapse of his government follows the significant damage that Israel has already inflicted on its other partners, Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran’s regional influence has now been severely diminished, leaving it more vulnerable to direct conflict with Israel.

The fragmentation of Syria also poses significant security risks to its neighbouring countries – Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Refugee flows, cross-border violence and sectarian tensions are likely to escalate. Turkey is already hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees – many of whom it hopes will return home now that Assad’s government is gone.

For Iraq and Lebanon, this instability could exacerbate their fragile political and economic situations. The Balkanisation of Syria along ethnic and religious lines could encourage other groups in the region to rebel against governments in the pursuit of their own autonomy. This risks entrenching divisions and prolonging conflict across the region.

While many Syrians have celebrated Assad’s fall, it remains to be seen whether their lives will improve much. With the absence of a unified and internationally recognised government in Syria, sanctions are unlikely to be lifted. This will further strain an already devastated Syrian economy, deepening the humanitarian crisis and potentially fuelling extremism.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen in Syria. How will this impact an already fractured region? – https://theconversation.com/bashar-al-assads-regime-has-fallen-in-syria-how-will-this-impact-an-already-fractured-region-245539

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

In the reactions to incidents of antisemitism, many people observe a contrast between New South Wales Premier Chris Minns and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

Over the past year, Minns has seemed quicker off the mark and more on point than Albanese, even when the PM is saying the right words and doing the right things.

Each projects a different vibe. It may seem a small thing in troubled times, but local Jews pick up on it. One (non-Jewish) observer captures it this way: “Minns gives a sense of himself in his condemnation. With Albanese it’s clearly the prime minister talking, not Anthony Albanese.”

The Middle East conflict – one in which Australia has no role or influence – has now finally fractured Israel-Australian relations. It has also led to increasing criticism of the federal government from the local Jewish community.

Last week brought the perfect storm. Australia voted at the United Nations for a motion calling for Israel to end its “unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible”. This sparked a sharp reaction from the office of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu.

Then in the early hours of Friday, the firebomb attack on the Adass Israel synagogue in Melbourne left many Jews terrified and angry. It came after months of ugly antisemitism to which some Jewish leaders argue the federal government has not responded adequately.

The Melbourne attack has not just reverberated domestically but has driven a further wedge into Israeli-Australian relations.

Netanyahu quickly took to social media to claim, “Unfortunately, it is impossible to separate this reprehensible act from the extreme anti-Israeli position of the Labor government in Australia”.

This included “the scandalous decision” on the UN vote and stopping a former Israeli minister visiting Australia. The latter was a reference to Immigration Minister Tony Burke blocking Ayelet Shaked, who was due to speak at a conference. Burke pointed to her inflammatory anti-Palestinian statements and said she could undermine social cohesion.

Immediately after the Hamas atrocities of October 7 last year, Australia had a more-or-less bipartisan position on Israel, although the opposition criticised Labor Foreign Minister Penny Wong urging restraint as Israel moved to defend itself.

Ever since, however, the two sides of Australian politics have increasingly diverged. Albanese did not visit Israel, Wong did not visit the massacre sites; Peter Dutton did. Labor has been more even-handed in its attitude to the conflict, showing greater concern about the huge number of casualties in Gaza. As Labor has moved away from Israel, the Coalition has dug in ever more strongly behind Israel.

Partly this has been driven by differences of view. Labor itself has long been internally divided over Israel-Palestine issues. Many years ago, Albanese co-chaired the parliamentary friends of Palestine.

Partly the widening partisan gulf has been driven by immediate political concerns and interests. Labor has a very pro-Palestine constituency in some of its western Sydney seats.

Albanese has now called the Melbourne attack a terrorism incident, while pointing out that label is one assigned by the experts.

“If you want my personal view, quite clearly terrorism is something that is aimed at creating fear in the community, and the atrocities that occurred in the synagogue in Melbourne clearly were designed to create fear in the community, and therefore, from my personal perspective, certainly fulfil that definition or terrorism,” he said on Sunday.

Victorian and federal police will discuss the catagorisation on Monday (although they’ve been somewhat pre-empted).

Albanese announced $32.5 million for the Executive Council of Australian Jewry to further strengthen security at Jewish Community sites including synogogues and schools.

At his news conference in Perth he also defended the government against those who say it hasn’t done enough, listing measures it has taken against antisemitism, including banning the Nazi salute and symbols, criminalising doxing, and appointing an antisemitism envoy.

Former treasurer Josh Frydenberg has called for a national security taskforce of federal and state police on antisemitism. But Albanese said the police should be left to go about their work and noted there was a joint counter-terrorism taskforce already.

At a state level, Minns, in the wake of a protest outside Sydney’s Great Synogogue last week that had people effectively trapped inside, is examining action to protect people from harassment at places of worship.

Jewish Labor MP Josh Burns, who holds the Victorian seat of Macnamara, with a substantial Jewish population, says that as well as measures to improve safety, antisemitism needs to be better combatted at universities, some of which have seen Jewish students experience vilification, intimidation and racism. Burns is chair of a inquiry into antisemitism on campuses, conducted by the parliamentary joint committee on human rights, which will report in February.

Pressed on Netanyahu’s attack on Australia over the UN vote, Albanese again pointed out 157 countries had supported the resolution including New Zealand, Canada and New Zealand, which are Five Eyes partners.

The split between Australia and Israel won’t be repaired in the foreseeable future without a change of government in one or both countries.

Bipartisanship over foreign policy on the Middle East is gone. But, despite the temptations posed by an approaching election, the parties need to unite behind combatting local antisemitism, before social cohesion is further undermined.

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. View from The Hill: Albanese announces more funding for Jewish security, labels synagogue firebomb ‘terrorism’ – https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-albanese-announces-more-funding-for-jewish-security-labels-synagogue-firebomb-terrorism-245537

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olli Hellmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waikato

The controversial Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill is being presented by its architect, ACT Party leader David Seymour, primarily as a matter of lawmaking – a clarification through legislation.

The bill seeks to redefine the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi – established by decades of case law and jurisprudence – and instead enshrine new principles in law.

But the bill goes deeper than that, and touches on delicate but fundamental questions of what it means to be a New Zealander.

In the heated debate since the bill’s introduction, two ideas of national identity come head to head. And the implications for social cohesion and the quality of democratic debate are serious.

Equal and democratic vs bicultural nation

For the first few decades of colonial settlement, New Zealand’s identity was contained within an imperial one. The colony aspired to be a “Britain of the South”. It was only from the 1950s that European New Zealanders began to develop a distinct identity.

Pākehā national identity was constructed around ideas of political and economic egalitarianism. These emphasised hard work and social mobility, and portrayed New Zealand as a “land of opportunity” or a “classless society”.

But these notions of the “equal and democratic” nation excluded Māori and perpetuated a monocultural vision of New Zealand. In fact, for Māori, the process of colonisation was anything but an egalitarian experience.

Not only did the loss of ancestral land – through forceful confiscations and the introduction of private property laws – fuel poverty and economic inequality, but Māori were also denied the political rights promised to them in the Māori text of te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Grievances over cultural assimilation, historical injustices and political self-determination galvanised a growing Māori protest movement. In the 1970s and 1980s, governments responded by creating the Waitangi Tribunal and by fostering a bicultural understanding of New Zealand national identity.

Since then, this shift towards greater biculturalism has happened on several levels: weaving Māori culture and language into the fabric of the nation, educating the public about the Waitangi Tribunal’s role in addressing historical wrongs, and promoting the Treaty as the main symbol of Aotearoa-New Zealandness.

Recently published survey data show the bicultural understanding of national identity has taken root among younger generations: 85.4% of those aged 18 to 34 agree that “Māori culture helps to define New Zealand in positive ways”, compared to 63.1% of people aged 65 and over.

Similarly, the younger generation is more likely (59.4%) to accept that “we as a nation have a responsibility to see that due settlement is offered to Māori in compensation for past injustices” than the older generation (37.8%).

The threat of culture wars

The Treaty Principles Bill magnifies the differences between these two different ideas of New Zealand national identity.

Seymour says “the Treaty must be consistent with a liberal democracy and give equal rights to each person that has to live in this country”. As such, the bill aligns with the “equal and democratic” image of New Zealandness.

What is more, by implicitly framing the Treaty as a governance agreement, rather than a partnership between Māori and the Crown, the bill challenges the very interpretation of the Treaty underpinning the bicultural vision of the nation.

New Zealand has previously experienced the kind of divisions so-called culture wars thrive on, for example in public debates about the use of te reo Māori in public life or officially renaming the country Aotearoa.

But the Treaty Principles Bill threatens to inflame a battle over national identity, deepening those divisions and reinforcing them through overlapping generational differences.

As the sociologist James Davison has argued, American-style culture wars, which have spread to other countries, have the potential to “break democracy”.

Not only do they exacerbate a sense of “us versus them,” but they also narrow political discourse. The focus shifts towards emotionally laden, symbolic disagreements, away from real social and economic issues.

Bicultural egalitarianism

At one level, avoiding a culture war escalation requires holding accountable those politicians who engage in divisive rhetoric. But it might also involve reducing tensions by emphasising shared values across the two interpretations of New Zealand identity.

One possible way to do this is to stretch the idea of egalitarianism – which is central to the image of the “equal and democratic” nation – beyond its usual meaning of equality of opportunity.

If we expand its definition to include equality of outcome, the bicultural commitment to provide financial reparations as a means to improve the economic situation of Māori – which continues to be marked by colonial legacies – fits the “equal and democratic” vision.

We could also broaden egalitarianism to mean “epistemic” equality, which stresses the importance of extending equal value to diverse ways of seeing and knowing about the world.

This could help develop a more inclusive narrative of national identity that combines notions of egalitarianism with biculturalism – manifested, for example, in bicultural governance arrangements informed by mātauranga Māori, a Māori worldview.

Olli Hellmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Land of opportunity or bicultural nation? Twin visions of national identity face off over the Treaty principles – https://theconversation.com/land-of-opportunity-or-bicultural-nation-twin-visions-of-national-identity-face-off-over-the-treaty-principles-245033

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Milad Haghani, Senior Lecturer of Urban Risk & Resilience, UNSW Sydney

Soccer’s global allure is unmatched, yet its history is shadowed by tragedies.

At a recent soccer match in Nzérékoré, Guinea, a controversial refereeing decision led to unrest, resulting in crowd violence that claimed more than 50 lives.

In 2022, violence at Indonesia’s Kanjuruhan stadium during a match led to the deaths of 135 people, as security forces responded to pitch invasions with tear gas, triggering chaos and ultimately a crowd crush.

These incidents are stark reminders of the risks tied to violence in sports crowds. They stem from structural failures, poor crowd management, and often complex group dynamics that lead to violent behaviour.

Soccer crowds are especially prone to violence, which raises a pressing question: what is it about soccer and its fan culture that makes such incidents more likely to occur?

Read more:
Dedicated Roman gladiator superfans were the football hooligans of their day

Soccer fan violence: a recurring pattern

Catastrophic incidents rooted in fan violence have been intertwined with the history of this sport.

Perhaps the most extreme case is the Soccer War (more commonly known as the Football War) of 1969, when World Cup qualifiers between El Salvador and Honduras inflamed existing political tensions. Clashes between fans added to the animosity, and within days, the two nations were at war. More than 2,000 people died in the brief conflict.

There are other cases throughout the history of the game:

Estadio Nacional Disaster (1964, Peru) – Riots broke out after a disallowed goal during a Peru-Argentina match in Lima. Police used tear gas, causing chaos as fans tried to escape through locked exits. More than 300 people died.

The Heysel Stadium Disaster (1985, Belgium) – Clashes between Liverpool and Juventus fans before the European Cup final caused a wall to collapse. Thirty-nine people were killed and more than 600 were injured.

Port Said Stadium Riot (2012, Egypt) – After a match between Al-Masry and Al-Ahly, fans attacked each other with weapons while exits were blocked. Seventy-four people died and hundreds were injured.

The most notable case in Australia was the chaotic Melbourne Derby in 2022, when fans stormed the pitch at AAMI Park after a flare was thrown back into the stands. Melbourne City’s goalkeeper, Tom Glover, was struck with a metal bucket, leaving him concussed and bleeding.

Further back, in 1985, a National Soccer League match between Sydney Olympic and Sydney Hakoah erupted into chaos following a controversial referee decision. The chaos remains one of the most notorious examples of soccer crowd violence in Australia’s history.

Soccer fan violence can take many forms

Soccer’s immense popularity means larger, more diverse fanbases with deeply ingrained rivalries.

Fans often see their team as a core part of their identity, with this strong group affiliation sometimes heightening “in-group versus out-group” dynamics. At times, this can lead to hostility.

And it’s not just fan-on-fan violence: soccer fan violence takes many forms. Violent and antisocial acts range from verbal abuse and offensive chants to property damage, vandalism, pitch invasion and physical assaults.

In some countries, soccer fan violence has worsened since the pandemic.

In the United Kingdom, recent police statistics reveal a 59% increase in arrests compared to pre-pandemic levels, with incidents of disorder reaching an eight-year high. Notably, 70% of offences were committed by people aged 18–30.

Players can be affected, too. A 2023 workplace safety report from the International Federation of Professional Footballers highlighted the escalating issue of violence against professional players, emphasising its detrimental impact on their physical and mental wellbeing.

The report reveals a significant number of players have experienced abuse, including threats and physical assaults, both on and off the field. Data shows fan violence against players is most common in Europe (particularly the UK, Italy and Germany) followed by Africa.

What’s behind the trend?

1. Social identity

Soccer fan violence is often deeply tied to social identity dynamics.

Studies from Germany and Brazil emphasise the role of identity fusion, where fans experience an intense bond with their teams and fellow supporters.

This fusion creates a “warrior psychology”, making threats to the group feel personal, to the point that it can drive fans to defend their identity aggressively.

High-stakes rivalry games exacerbate this: violence surges up to 70% during derby matches in Germany. These studies show that match-day violence is driven more by rivalry and group dynamics than game outcomes.

In Brazil, the same identity fusion has been shown to drive hostility, especially toward rival fan groups, as fans perceive out-group threats as existential.

2. Sociodemographic characteristics

Studies have highlighted how “fanatic” supporters – often young, unemployed, and with lower levels of education – are more likely to engage in violence, which is shaped by group norms and accepted aggression levels.

Studies in the UK have revealed historical shifts. While hooliganism once thrived in working-class and hyper-masculine cultures, better crowd management and gentrification have reduced in-stadium violence, though confrontations still occur away from arenas.

3. Drug and alcohol use

Substance use can magnify aggression.

In the UK, cocaine use among fans is higher than the national average.

The combination of the growing fan drug culture in soccer with identity fusion can develop into aggressive behaviour, particularly during intergroup conflicts.

Alcohol, while not universally causal, can also fuel confrontations by lowering inhibitions and amplifying territoriality.

What can be done?

Despite these patterns, some regions have seen significant improvements.

In the UK, decades of reforms, such as CCTV, all-seater stadiums, and higher ticket prices have fostered a more “sanitised and gentrified” fan culture, with fans themselves often regulating violent behaviour.

However, such measures can also displace violence to less-visible spaces, where rival groups arrange confrontations to avoid police detection.

Reducing soccer-related violence requires a multifaceted approach addressing both structural and psychological drivers. Evidence suggests creating positive group dynamics, rather than simply suppressing fan identity, is key.

Further strategies could also include:

• initiatives to reframe rivalries as positive and reciprocal
• better policing tactics using dialogue and de-escalation rather than force
• improvements in managing crowd flows and reducing friction points, such as minimising counterflows of rival fans during departures
• substance use interventions, particularly targeting drug use.

The challenge, however, lies in implementing these solutions while preserving the unique passion and energy that make soccer the world’s most beloved sport.

Milad Haghani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why is soccer fandom so linked to violence? – https://theconversation.com/why-is-soccer-fandom-so-linked-to-violence-245143

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Andrew Lenton, Director CarbonLock, Environment, CSIRO

Global carbon emissions from fossil fuels continue to rise and 2024 is likely to be the world’s hottest year on record.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that limiting global warming to 1.5°C will require much more than existing efforts to reduce emissions and decarbonise industry. We also need to remove enormous amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, 7-9 billion tonnes a year.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says carbon dioxide removal technology will be required to achieve global and national net zero targets. In other words, there is no net zero without CO₂-removal, because emissions of greenhouse gases are not declining anywhere near fast enough.

There will be trade-offs, as CO₂-removal can be costly and often uses up energy, water and land. But Earth is hurtling towards a climate catastrophe, with more than 3°C of warming under current global policies. We must do everything we can to avert disaster, which means slashing emissions as much as we possibly can, and removing what’s left.

Within the international scientific community the debate about carbon dioxide removal has moved on from “could we, should we?” to “we must” – recognising the urgency of the situation. So it’s worth coming up to speed on the basics of carbon dioxide removal technology, both old and new, and the role we can expect it to play in Australia’s net-zero future.

Why do we need carbon dioxide removal?

Carbon dioxide removal accelerates natural processes such as storing carbon in trees, rocks, soil and the ocean. It differs from carbon capture and storage, which seeks to remove carbon before it enters the atmosphere.

As Australia’s Climate Change Authority states, reaching the national goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 does not mean all emissions are eliminated across the economy. Some emissions are likely to remain – about 25% of Australia’s 2005 emissions under the current plan – and they need to be dealt with.

So how much carbon dioxide are we talking about? Some 133 million tonnes a year by mid-century, according to the authority. This equates to billions of tonnes of additional carbon dioxide removal over the next 25 years.

Ways to remove and store carbon dioxide from the atmosphere are among the federal government’s national science and research priorities. So let’s take a look at the technologies we are using now and what we might need.

What technologies do we need?

The international scientific community divides carbon dioxide removal technologies into “conventional” (nature-based) and “novel” (new) approaches.

The conventional technologies rely on biological processes, such as planting trees, boosting soil carbon levels and increasing carbon stores in coastal ecosystems such as mangroves. The carbon is typically stored over shorter timescales, from a decade to a century.

Unfortunately, many of these natural carbon stores or “sinks” are already becoming saturated. They will also become increasingly vulnerable in a changing climate. For example, forest fires are releasing billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere annually.

To reach net zero emissions, the world will need to find more durable ways to remove CO₂ at scale from the atmosphere. This is where the new technologies come in.

Examples include adding crushed carbonate or silicate rock to the ocean or farmland. Research suggests waste rock from mining could be used for this purpose.

Concerningly, novel approaches currently comprise less than 0.1% of total global carbon dioxide removal.

Avoiding potential pitfalls

Like all technologies, carbon dioxide removal comes with potential risks and tradeoffs.

In a market worth as much as US$1.1 trillion dollars (A$1.7 trillion) by 2050, there’s always a risk of overstating the benefits.

To counter this, the IPCC is developing evidence-based methods to ensure the amounts of carbon removed can be verified and included in national accounts. This should promote transparency and reduce the risk of greenwashing or making misleading claims.

Carbon dioxide removal can also affect the environment. For instance, some approaches such as tree planting may compete with agriculture or biodiversity conservation for water and land. This challenge is compounded by climate change.

Other approaches, such as direct air capture and storage, currently face technical challenges in extracting CO₂ from air without consuming high amounts of energy.

The interests and rights of Australia’s First Nations communities must also be considered. A global survey of Indigenous people in 30 countries around the world, including Australia, found positive attitudes to climate intervention technologies. However, this is only a starting point. Greater engagement is needed nationally concerning specific carbon dioxide removal approaches.

More work is needed to understand these challenges, including how to manage them and their impacts on Australian communities.

A new industry for Australia?

Australia’s large land mass and vast oceans mean we have far greater physical capacity than other nations to store carbon.

Australia also has access to renewable energy used to power the technologies, and a skilled workforce to develop and run them.

Much like solar and wind energy, tackling carbon dioxide removal in Australia at the scale required will require a new industry with its own infrastructure, institutions and processes.

CSIRO and other organisations are advancing the technology, but more is needed. Australia requires a national dialogue and clear vision around how to deliver carbon dioxide removal responsibly and sustainably.

Of course, prevention is better than cure. It’s always better to cut emissions and stop carbon dioxide entering the atmosphere in the first place, than trying to remove it afterwards. But time is running out, carbon dioxide levels are already too high and we need to reach net zero by 2050.

Carbon dioxide removal is now essential, along with deep and urgent emissions reduction. We must get moving on permanent carbon dioxide removal if we are to preserve the planet for future generations.

Andrew Lenton receives funding from the federal Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water to represent Australia in ‘Mission Innovation – Carbon Dioxide Removal’. This involves working together to accelerate innovation in carbon dioxide removal technologies to achieve a net reduction of 100 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per year globally by 2030.
His work has also been funded by the Climate Change Authority to explore Australia’s carbon sequestration potential in a series of reports.

Kerryn Brent receives funding from the Australian Research Council and Green Adelaide.
She is an adjunct lecturer in the Law School at the University of Tasmania, and affiliated with the Australian Forum for Climate Intervention Governance based in the law school.
She is also an adjunct senior lecturer at the University of Adelaide Law School.

– ref. Plans to stabilise Earth’s climate rely on emerging carbon removal technology – we need to get moving – https://theconversation.com/plans-to-stabilise-earths-climate-rely-on-emerging-carbon-removal-technology-we-need-to-get-moving-237318