Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed federal parliament on Thursday his well-crafted speech had one gaping hole. It did not mention the huge issue dominating world attention – the United States-Israeli strikes on Iran and the subsequent ever-widening conflict that has engulfed the region.

Both Carney and Anthony Albanese were quick to back the action at the weekend. But their endorsements would have been given reluctantly. Despite Australia and Canada being close American allies and members, with the US, of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement, neither leader was accorded any prior notice of the attack.

Elaborating after his initial reaction, Carney said: “we took a position because we view the nuclear threat and the export of terrorism of Iran over decades as one of the gravest threats to international peace and security. In that limited sense we supported that aspect. That is not a blank cheque. That is not us participating.”

Albanese has been equally anxious to keep a distance while providing backing. He has refused, for example, to be drawn into the debate about the strikes seeming to flout international law.

Rewind to 2003 and the Iraq war. Labor was in opposition and came out strongly against the action. Albanese said at the time: “we do need regime change in some places of the world – it would certainly be good thing in Iraq – but it should be brought about peacefully”.

We might ask: if Labor were in opposition now, would it be against the American-Israeli action? Quite possibly.

In power, however, Albanese would have judged his government had no viable choice but to back Donald Trump’s action.

Critics argue that, given the nature of the Trump administration, Australia should unwind its alliance with the US. The Albanese government rejects that view as not in Australia’s long term interests – even if it were practical, given the now-advanced integration of our defence forces, to say nothing of AUKUS.

When Albanese finally secured a meeting with the US President last year, he established what seemed a reasonable rapport.

(Of course this can disappear in an instant, as British Prime Minister Keir Starmer found this week. When Starmer didn’t cooperate with Trump’s wishes in the Middle East conflict Trump turned nasty, saying, “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with”.)

In deciding his government’s stand on the US-Israeli action, Albanese would have been mindful of not harming the relationship he has established. An angry Trump could lash out – as he did against Spain. Trump declared “we’re going to cut off all trade with Spain” after that country said it would not allow the US to use jointly-run air bases in Spain for the Iran operation.

Albanese knew quiescent caucus members would suck up any doubts they had about backing the war. Politically, the main issue the government has had to cope with is some criticism of whether it has been doing enough to help stranded Australians get home.

As petrol prices started to rise – a hot button for the average person – Treasurer Jim Chalmers, who received some good news this week with a small uptick in Australia’s growth, quickly turned his attention to the economic implications of the conflict, amid work on the May 12 budget.

“The full consequences of this conflict are uncertain, but they’re likely to be substantial,” Chalmers said. “We already had challenges in our economy with inflation and global economic uncertainty, and what we’re seeing in the Middle East will make those challenges harder rather than easier, and this will be a key focus of the budget.”

Independent economist Chris Richardson’s judgement is that the conflict will be “a small economic negative and a smaller budget positive”.

“Conflict in the Middle East leads to spikes in both uncertainty and energy prices,” Richardson said in a social media post.

“Both of those will lower world growth, though perhaps not much.

“They’ll also drag on the Australian economy, though we do get a couple of offsets. The weaker world will weigh on industrial commodity prices, such as iron ore. But there are boosts underway to both energy commodities such as gas (where we are big producers) and fear commodities such as gold (ditto).

”[In net terms] that leaves the Australian economy feeling some pain (growth and jobs both a tad weaker), while still adding to overall national income (income from gas and gold both higher). The Australian economy is running faster than it can sustain right now, so a mild growth negative isn’t much of a problem.“

The new war has predictably worsened the fraying of social cohesion we’ve seen since 2023.

There was celebration among the local Iranian community, who welcomed the US-Israel strikes and fervently hope the conflict will lead to regime change.

But some mosques held or planned memorials for Iran’s slain Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. New South Wales premier Chris Minns strongly condemned them. That invited an extraordinary blast from the Liberal mayor of Liverpool Ned Mannoun who accused Minns of having a “fetish with attacking the Islamic community”.

There were calls for funding to be halted to Muslim bodies involved in the memorials. A $670,000 grant to a Melbourne organisation was cancelled.

Weeks before, Minns had cancelled the premier’s Iftar dinner. The state government said this was after consultation with Muslim community leaders. The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils this week said the decision “reflects the growing breakdown in the relationship between the Minns Government and the Muslim community” in the state.

“The reality is that the event would likely have faced a significant boycott from community leaders and organisations, which speaks volumes about the depth of frustration within the community,” the federation said.

Minns, questioned about police last month moving on praying Muslims, this week admitted to a “strained” relationship with the Muslim community.

“We want to rebuild the relationship, not just with me personally or the government or the Labor party, but with the civic institutions […] I don’t want to be in a situation where I’m antagonising the Muslim community, particularly during Ramadan.”

The sentiment is right, but overseas and local events have become wrecking balls for social harmony, and there are no obvious answers for repairing the damage.

– ref. Grattan on Friday: would Labor be supporting this war if it were in opposition? – https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-would-labor-be-supporting-this-war-if-it-were-in-opposition-277242

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

The byelection for the regional New South Wales seat of Farrer, vacated by former opposition leader Sussan Ley, will be held on May 9.

the date was announced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives on Thursday.

The main contenders for the seat with be the Liberal Party, the Nationals, One Nation and at least one high-profile independent, Michelle Milthorpe. The Labor party is not running.

The byelection, just days before the May 12 budget, is being regarded as a major test for new opposition leader Angus Taylor.

Importantly, it will also indicate whether the surge for One Nation in the opinion polls translates to votes. One Nation will select it’s candidate this weekend, from a shortlist of three.

The Liberal and National parties are yet to select candidates but Milthorpe who polled 20% at the last election, is already campaigning.

The Liberals will hold a rank-and-file pre-selection in about a week. The Nationals’ candidate will be chosen on Sunday.

The key dates are:

• Issue of writ Wednesday April 1
• close of rolls Wednesday April 8
• close of nominations Monday April 13
• declaration of nominations Tuesday April 14
• date of polling Saturday May 9
• return of writ on or before Friday July 10

– ref. Farrer byelection will be on May 9 – https://theconversation.com/farrer-byelection-will-be-on-may-9-277621

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By James Dwyer, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania

A US submarine sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena off the southern coast of Sri Lanka on Wednesday, killing 87 people.

The submarine struck the ship with a torpedo, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said, resulting in “quiet death”.

The event marks the first time a US submarine has launched a torpedo in combat or engaged and destroyed a ship since the second world war.

Why is this old weapon reappearing now? And for that matter, what are torpedoes? Can ships defend against them, or even see them coming?

What are torpedoes, and how do they work?

Torpedoes have changed little over the years in terms of their concept and their operation. Simply put, a torpedo is effectively a small, unmanned submersible – a kind of hybrid of a mini-submarine and a missile, designed to attack both submarines and surface ships.

However, they have been modernised to an extent. Torpedoes today are generally “dual purpose”, designed to attack and destroy both ships and submarines. Single-purpose torpedoes are less commonly seen, but given their specialised nature are often more lethal.

Torpedoes are initially connected to the launching submarine by a wire or fibre-optic cable transmitting targeting data. These wires are designed to be “cut” as the torpedo gets close to its target, with the torpedo then switching on its own active sonar to steer the rest of the way.

Exactly how far torpedoes can be fired is highly classified information, but it may be tens of kilometres. It depends partly on how the torpedo is propelled – either with an electric motor (more common) or a fuel-powered one.

Electric motors are generally preferable, given their ability to accelerate instantly and achieve higher speeds. However, the range is generally considered to be lower than fuel-propelled torpedoes.

Why torpedoes are still in use today

Torpedoes are quite old and in many ways quite simple compared with more modern weaponry. However, they remain the primary armament of attack submarines.

As the name suggests, attack subs are designed to hunt and destroy other submarines, surface combatants (warships) and, if necessary, commercial vessels.

Other types of submarines such as ballistic missile submarines (designed for retaliatory nuclear strikes) and guided missile submarines (designed to fire guided missiles) also generally carry torpedoes for self-defence.

Submarines are by their nature stealthy. They are designed to sneak in close to their target undetected, and launch surprise attacks while remaining submerged.

To fire an air missile, a submarine needs to surface and risk detection. So torpedoes, which can be fired underwater, remain the perfect offensive weapon for submarines.

Torpedoes can also be delivered by aircraft, usually to strike at submarines where airborne missiles can’t reach. Aircraft typically use missiles to strike surface ships, as an aircraft would need to make a risky close approach to get within torpedo range.

How do warships detect and protect themselves from torpedo attack?

Beneath the sea, visibility is low and the radio waves used for radar don’t travel far. The primary tool for detecting submerged objects is sonar.

Sonar systems use sound, which travels faster and further through water than air.

There are two kinds of sonar: passive and active. Passive sonar listens quietly for engine noise, or transient sounds such as a torpedo tube being opened.

Active sonar generates a loud “ping” or series of pings and then listens for echoes. The initial pulses of noise reflects off objects to effectively paint an image, in a process known as echolocation.

The use of active sonar is generally avoided unless absolutely necessary, as it gives away the sonar user’s location. It can also be detected further away than it can itself detect objects such as submarines.

Submarine warfare plays out as a game of cat and mouse. The submarine attempts to sneakily move in close to its target undetected using passive sonar, and attack up close where the target has less chance of evading.

In turn, warships are constantly attempting to listen with passive sonar to avoid sneak attacks. If suspicious of close submarine contact, they will turn to active sonar to more accurately locate and attack first.

Active defences

If they know a torpedo is coming their way, surface ships and submarines have a few options up their sleeves for defence.

The first option is often to immediately accelerate and undertake radical changes of direction. The idea here is to make the torpedo manoeuvre in such a way as to break its guidance wires, or throw off its sonar.

If the guidance wires are cut prematurely, the torpedo’s active sonar may not be able to accurately detect the target (and could even possibly target the submarine that launched it if it were to manoeuvre in such a way as to accidentally cross the torpedo’s path).

Failing this, both warships and submarines are equipped with decoy noise makers, either towed or standalone. These generate bubbles and noise to try and get the torpedo to attack them instead of the target vessel.

As a last resort, warships are generally “compartmentalised” so damaged sections can be sealed off, meaning the vessel can still float even if a large amount of damage occurs.

An old weapon but hard to beat

Given the stealthy nature of submarines, in reality it is unlikely that they will be detected. It is also unlikely a torpedo will be detected until the final stage when it switches to active sonar to reach its target.

As a result, ships and submarines are likely to be first aware they are under attack when the torpedo detonates.

While torpedoes are still an old technology, there is still little in the way of active defences against them. This is quite different to the situation in the air, for example, where missile interceptors can often detonate an incoming missile in flight.

For the foreseeable future, torpedoes will still be the main weapon for submarine and anti-submarine warfare.

– ref. The US just torpedoed an Iranian ship. Here’s why this old tech is hard to defend against – https://theconversation.com/the-us-just-torpedoed-an-iranian-ship-heres-why-this-old-tech-is-hard-to-defend-against-277615

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hussein Dia, Professor of Transport Technology and Sustainability, Swinburne University of Technology

Petrol prices began rising even before the conflict in Iran drove oil prices higher. Australia imports around 80% of its fuel, which means prices can spike when geopolitical shocks ripple through supply chains.

As motorists face long queues in Australian cities, some will wonder whether it’s time to join the increasing numbers going electric to prevent hip-pocket pain.

Avoiding the weekly petrol fill-up is appealing. But the sticking point for many motorists has long been the higher upfront cost of an EV. As competition has increased, EV prices have fallen. Even so, most EVs still cost several thousand dollars more than a comparable conventional car.

Over time, cheaper running costs and less maintenance mean EV owners should recoup some of this money. But how long does it take? To answer this, I helped develop a public EV payback calculator, comparing five popular EVs with closely matched hybrid cars in the Australian market. Here, you can estimate how long it will take to pay back the price difference between EV and a conventional car.

It turns out the biggest factor is how you charge your EV. For drivers who rely on pricier public fast chargers, payback will take much longer. But drivers who charge mostly at home can see payback in a few years.

What makes EVs cheaper to run?

Battery electric vehicles are generally cheaper to run for three main reasons.

1. Electricity is typically cheaper than petrol or diesel per kilometre driven – especially when charging at home using off-peak grid power or rooftop solar. EVs convert energy to motion far more efficiently than internal combustion engines, so less energy is wasted as heat.

2. Maintenance costs are usually lower. EVs have far fewer moving parts, no oil changes, and less wear on brake pads, given regenerative braking does more work to slow the car – and recharges the battery. Over time, this translates into lower servicing bills. Early fears about battery degradation are vanishing, as batteries generally last longer than the lifespan of the car and last longer in the real world than during testing.

3. Running costs are more predictable. Petrol prices change daily, while electricity prices usually change more slowly. EV drivers able to charge at home usually choose to charge cheaply at off-peak times or off home solar.

These advantages are real. But they don’t mean EVs are cheaper for everyone in every situation.

How does the calculator work?

At present, the MG4 Excite electric hatch retails at roughly A$42,000 drive-away, while a Toyota Corolla hybrid costs about $40,000.

The question is how fast the EV’s lower running costs recover this gap (in this case, $1,900).

My EV payback calculator models three annual distances: 10,000km (light use), 15,000km (average) and 20,000km (heavy). It also tests three patterns of charging: mostly home charging, a mix of home and public charging, and mostly public fast charging.

The calculator models five vehicle pairs, reflecting the choice many Australians are weighing up: battery EV or hybrid combustion engine vehicle in the same size class and price bracket. This is a conservative choice, because hybrids tend to have lower running costs than traditional cars.

For each pair, the calculator takes the price difference and annual running costs, and then calculates how long it would take for the lower energy and servicing costs of the battery EV to recover the higher purchase price.

These are not predictions or financial advice. They are indicative comparisons using conservative, transparent assumptions.

What does this look like?

The payback time shows how long it takes an EV to recover its higher upfront price under different driving and charging patterns.

Shorter payback times mean savings accumulate quickly, while longer periods indicate the extra upfront cost lasts a long time or is never recovered.

Payback time is useful, but it helps to see what it means in annual savings. Here, the big takeaway is charging behaviour matters as much as the car itself. Charging mostly at home delivers consistent savings, while relying heavily on public fast charging shrinks or even erases the advantage.

Home charging at off-peak times might cost 20 cents a kilowatt-hour, while the same charge at an ultrafast public charger might cost 60c/kWH. For a car with a 60kWH battery, that means a charge could cost A$12 at home or $36 at the public charger.

This means EV affordability is partly a question of charging access and electricity prices, not just sticker price. The economics are shaped less by the badge on the bonnet than by the charging pattern.

Payback time isn’t the only consideration. Many buyers also consider safety features, performance, convenience and likely resale value. But this shows whether an EV is cheaper to run and whether it repays its premium quickly are not the same question.

Home charging makes the biggest difference

When charged mostly at home, all five EVs save money on running costs when driven the typical 15,000km a year. In some cases, savings are large enough that payback arrives well within the typical ownership period of around ten years.

The clearest EV examples are the MG4 Excite and BYD Atto 3. These two battery EVs have moderate upfront premiums, and energy costs are meaningfully lower than hybrid equivalents. Under baseline assumptions, the MG4 can pay back in 3–5 years and the Atto 3 in 5–8 years. Payback is faster for higher-mileage drivers. This shows a lower upfront premium matters as much as efficiency.

Reliance on fast chargers can wipe out savings

Once charging shifts towards more expensive public fast chargers, the running-cost advantage narrows and payback takes longer. This is particularly visible when EVs are compared against efficient hybrids, which already have lower fuel costs.

That does not mean EVs are “bad”. It means more expensive public charging can eat up much of the running-cost advantage, especially when petrol prices are low. For prospective EV drivers without access to home charging, it’s worth checking the cost of nearby public chargers.

What does this mean for you?

My calculator shows EVs save most money and recoup their premium fastest when charging happens mostly at home, especially for people who drive more. But when motorists rely heavily on public fast charging, payback is less certain.

As Australian drivers consider going electric to save money – and end reliance on imported fuels – the key is not to focus only on the sticker price. It’s more useful to think through where you will charge your EV most of the time and estimate the costs and savings from doing so.

– ref. Petrol prices too high? Here’s how quickly an EV could save you money – https://theconversation.com/petrol-prices-too-high-heres-how-quickly-an-ev-could-save-you-money-272165

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rebecca Strating, Director, La Trobe Centre for Global Security, and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made an impassioned pitch in the Australian parliament for middle powers like Canada and Australia to build new coalitions in the “ruptured” global order that are less reliant on the United States.

In a post-rupture world, the nations that are trusted and can work together will be quicker to the punch, more effective in their responses, more proactive in shaping outcomes, and ultimately more secure and prosperous.

The question for middle powers like us is whether we preserve existing rules, write new rules to determine our security and prosperity, or let the great powers increasingly dictate outcomes.

Carney made a compelling case. So, how exactly would new coalitions of middle powers work, and which countries could Australia work with more closely?

The world order has “ruptured”, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has warned – so it’s time for countries like Australia and New Zealand to forge a new, less US-reliant future. In this six-part series, we’ve asked top experts to explain what that future could look like – and the challenges that lie ahead.

Why middle powers need to work together

This enthusiasm for middle power coalitions poses some uncomfortable questions for Australia, given it requires a re-examination of our most important ally, the United States.

In defence terms, Australia remains reliant on Washington’s presence and military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of our own military hardware simply cannot function without the US.

Stepping away from the US alliance completely is not an option. This is why Canberra has expressed support for recent US and Israeli strikes in Tehran, while not participating in them.

Yet, Canberra can – and should – build up other relationships to hedge against dependence on an increasingly unreliable US. We can do this in areas such as trade, conflict prevention and international law.

And with great powers increasingly willing to breach international law, middle powers have a great responsibility. By working together to safeguard international institutions, they can keep the global order functioning and try to restrain the behaviours of great powers when need be.

What would middle power alliances look like?

We need to be careful not to romanticise “middle powers”. The term often refers to countries that are not great powers, but can still exert influence and agency on the global stage through diplomacy or economic and military strength. This can include countries whose values or interests don’t align with Australia’s, such as Iran.

With that in mind, Australia should engage with other middle and smaller powers with a clear understanding of shared priorities:

• avoiding coercion by great powers

• shaping the architecture of international cooperation

• holding great powers to account as “responsible stakeholders” of the international order.

So, how would these arrangements work, practically speaking?

In his speech in Canberra, Carney advocated for a “dense web of connections” with other middle powers. He called it “variable geometry”, or creating different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests.

Variable geometry is not a retreat from multilateralism. It is its evolution.

Bilateral ties

Let’s start by looking at Australia’s ties with individual countries.

Of course, Australia has a strong alliance with New Zealand.

Beyond this, Canberra has signed a number of “comprehensive strategic partnerships” in recent years with countries in the region, including the ASEAN bloc of Southeast Asian countries, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, South Korea, and most recently, Vietnam.

These agreements can deepen cooperation in a range of areas of mutual concern, including security.

Australia also signed a new defence agreement with Japan in 2023 that allows for each country’s forces to operate in the other. This is a big deal – it was Japan’s first defence treaty with an international partner since 1960.

More recently, Australia has agreed to bilateral defence agreements with Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Timor-Leste. These pacts appear focused on “strategic denial” – preventing potential adversaries from achieving a foothold in our immediate region.

These bilateral agreements are regionally focused. A key question for Australia is whether it can also cooperate with countries like Canada, the UK, Germany and France in the Indo-Pacific region. This relies in part on their appetite to engage more here.

As Carney mentioned in Canberra, one potential area of cooperation is the Critical Minerals Production Alliance – an initiative launched by Canada to expand critical minerals production and processing capacity and diversify supply chains.

‘Lattice-work’ arrangements

Australia also has small coalitions in the region that allow for more flexible models of security cooperation.

Coalitions, rather than alliances with firm defence commitments, are more likely to flourish in a region as geo-strategically, economically and politically complex as the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s key “minilateral” partnerships include:

• the Quad (Australia, US, Japan, India) and emerging “Squad” (Australia, Japan, Philippines, US)

• AUKUS (Australia, UK, US)

• the Trilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, Japan, US)

• Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US).

These all centre on US participation for a reason. Strategic minilateralism has long been Canberra’s way of anchoring Washington to the Indo-Pacific to provide a counterweight to China’s regional influence.

It is important to note that many middle powers hedging their bets by not aligning with either the US or China – such as Indonesia – still have strategies that rely on the US not withdrawing from the region.

The challenge now is how to cultivate new small-group arrangements for an uncertain future. Two new groupings that make a lot of sense are:

• Japan, South Korea and Australia These three US allies have been growing closer in recent years. Now, it makes even more sense for them to collaborate in ways that may not involve the US, including in economic security, maritime security and supporting international rules.

• Australia, Japan and the Philippines Like Japan, Australia is increasing its defence cooperation with the Philippines, another US ally. The Philippines is at the coalface of a number of security challenges involving China.

Larger alliances

Australia can also deepen relationships with larger groupings in areas other than security.

In fact, there’s already a successful group of middle and small powers in the region that doesn’t include either the US or China: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (or CPTPP).

This is a free-trade agreement originally for Pacific Rim countries, comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. (Trump pulled the US out in 2017.)

The United Kingdom became the first non-Pacific nation to join in 2024; others like Uruguay, Costa Rica, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and the Philippines are interested in joining next.

The CPTPP has been successful in eliminating most tariffs among member countries, while also providing a platform for economic cooperation more broadly.

This agreement could expand even further to include the European Union, South Korea, Norway and Switzerland. Carney wants to “broker a bridge” between the EU and the CPTPP to “create a trading bloc of 1.5 billion people, grounded in common standards and shared values”.

The premature death of the global order

We need to avoid simplistic narratives about the state of the international order. Multilateralism isn’t dead. Global institutions still matter.

And people risk misunderstanding Carney’s call if they use it to suggest we need to funnel all of our efforts and resources into military deterrence alone. Middle and small powers play important roles in preserving international norms and creating new ones. This is more pressing in the current security environment.

And though the US is less interested in multilateralism at the moment, there is still a place – and a need – to encourage the great powers to cooperate on a wide range of issues, from trade to climate change to AI governance.

– ref. In a ‘ruptured’ world order, here’s how Australia can forge new middle-power partnerships – https://theconversation.com/in-a-ruptured-world-order-heres-how-australia-can-forge-new-middle-power-partnerships-276367

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Heather Bray, Senior Lecturer in Science Communication, The University of Western Australia

Last month, the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court determined that plant-based drink maker Oatly could not trademark the phrase “Post Milk Generation” – effectively banning the use of the word “milk” on their cartons.

The decision marked the end of a long-running legal battle between the Swedish drink maker and Britain’s dairy industry. Dairy UK, representing the country’s dairy farmers, objected to Oatly trademarking the “post milk” phrase on the basis that the use of the term “milk” was deceptive.

The UK Supreme Court upheld Dairy UK’s case, citing UK regulations that limit “milk” to only being used to describe food derived from “mammalian secretions”. In the UK and European Union, only cow’s milk can be called “milk”.

But what are the rules for plant-based drinks in Australia and New Zealand? And are consumers here confused by the word “milk” on everything from soy to almond and oat drink cartons?

What are other countries’ rules on ‘milk’ labelling?

The UK regulations referred to in the Oatly case were actually based on European Union rules, adopted by the UK before Brexit.

The EU regulations have been in place for more than a decade. The words “milk”, as well as other dairy words such as “cheese”, “butter”, and “cream”, are all banned from being used to describe plant-based products sold in the EU.

Under the EU rules, only cow’s milk can be called just “milk”. Any other species of mammal milk has to be identified – such as “sheep’s milk” or “goat’s milk”.

In contrast, in the United States some plant-based drinks are allowed to be labelled as “soy milk” or “almond milk” as those names have been established by common usage.

But there is a long-running bipartisan campaign to ban the word “milk” being used for anything other than dairy there, too.

Critics argue the US Food and Drug Administration has failed to enforce its own detailed standards, defining milk as “the lacteal secretion […] obtained by the complete milking of one or more healthy cows”.

US Democrat Senator Tammy Baldwin, who’s led a nearly decade-long campaign, says:

calling non-dairy imitation products “milk” or “yogurt” that do not contain dairy and are instead from a plant, nut, or grain, hurts dairy farmers […] and causes consumer confusion about the nutritional value of dairy versus imitation products.

What’s allowed in Australia and NZ?

Demand for plant-based drinks has been growing in both Australia and New Zealand.

Australia and New Zealand have a shared food regulator, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). In 2016, the regulator updated the trans-Tasman Food Code to allow plant-based foods and drinks to use terms like milk.

Using soy milk as an example, the regulations say:

The context within which foods such as soy milk or soy ice cream are sold is indicated by use of the name soy; indicating that the product is not a dairy product to which a dairy standard applies.

That’s why you’ll see “almond milk” in Australia and New Zealand sold in supermarkets. Those same products have to be sold as almond “drink” in the EU and UK.

However, that decision has been under review again in recent years.

Consumer research on plant milks

One of the main concerns raised by the dairy industry is that using “milk” for plant-based drinks can mislead consumers. As Australian Dairy Farmers’ President Ben Bennett said last week:

Words matter. When consumers pick up a product labelled ‘milk’, it should come from a cow – not a marketing department.

Responding to those longstanding concerns, the food regulator undertook several studies, including a 2025 consumer research report, involving nearly 3,000 Australians aged 18 to 90 years.

That report found those consumers were generally able to quickly and confidently identify plant-based drinks from their dairy counterparts. It also showed Australians were largely aware of the nutritional value difference between dairy milk and plant-based products.

So ‘oat milk’ is here to stay

On January 30 this year – less than a fortnight before the UK court ruling – Australia’s agriculture minister Julie Collins announced the government would work with the Alternative Proteins Council to “strengthen existing voluntary labelling guidelines” into a new industry code of practice.

Those existing guidelines give examples of how plant-based drinks can be labelled in Australia and New Zealand, such as “oat milk” or “almond milk ice cream”.

So if you’re ever out shopping the UK or Europe, look out for oat “drinks” on the supermarket shelves. But in Australia and New Zealand, expect to see those cartons continuing to say oat milk.

– ref. How Australia and NZ rules on plant milks differ from overseas, where cows make the only ‘milk’ – https://theconversation.com/how-australia-and-nz-rules-on-plant-milks-differ-from-overseas-where-cows-make-the-only-milk-275923

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By T.J. Thomson, Associate Professor of Visual Communication & Digital Media, RMIT University

Why do you see the results you do when you search for information online? It’s a complex mix of what the source is, its relationships to other sources online, and your own past browsing history and device settings.

But this formula is changing. Rather than being passively served content that search engines decide is most relevant (or businesses have paid to have promoted), some big tech platforms have started providing users more control over what they see online.

Earlier this year, Google launched the Preferred Sources feature in Australia and New Zealand. Through it, users can select organisations that are “preferred” and whose content they’d like to see more of in relevant search results.

In response, a raft of organisations, from news outlets to big banks, have started inviting their audiences and customers to choose them, with instructions on how to use this feature. News outlets such as the ABC, News.com.au, RNZ and The Conversation have all done so, among many others.

If you decide to use this new feature, there are potential benefits – but there can be unintended outcomes as well.

Where do you get your news?

In Australia, more adults say they get news from social media (26%) than from online news websites (23%). This means that a feature like “preferred sources” might influence readers who get their news from search engines. But it won’t affect users who primarily get their news from social media apps.

Trading phones with someone and looking at their browsing history or recommended YouTube videos reveals just how much personalisation influences what we see online.

Big tech companies are known to harvest large amounts of data, making money in an attention economy from audience engagement. They also make money from knowing more about their users so they can sell this information to advertisers.

Much of the internet is governed by invisible algorithms – hidden rules dictating who sees what, for which reasons. Algorithms often prioritise content that is engaging and sensational, which is one reason why misinformation can flourish online.

As helpful as it can be to get recommendations of products to buy or Netflix shows to watch, based on your history, when it comes to voting and politics, recommendations become much more fraught.

Our own research has shown people’s online news and information environments are fragmented, complex, opaque, chaotic and polluted, and that users desire more control over what they see. But what are the potential impacts of this?

More control is good

At face value, more control over what we see online is a positive and empowering thing.

This rebalances the equation from the loudest, most popular, or wealthiest voices – or ones that manipulate algorithms the most – to the ones users are actually interested in hearing from.

It potentially also helps with cognitive overload. Rather than having to spend the time and mental energy to decide on a case-by-case basis whether each source you encounter is trustworthy, making this decision once for particular news brands or organisations can make engaging with search results more relevant and efficient.

But a lack of balance is risky

However, the voices people want to hear from aren’t necessarily the ones that are best for them. As with any choice, you need a level of maturity and critical thinking to act responsibly.

As data companies, search engines benefit from knowing ever more information about user behaviour and preferences. Knowing which media outlet you prefer may in some cases indicate your political party preferences. Knowing that you prefer sports news over celebrity news can help companies target you with advertising more effectively.

In addition, more choice could potentially affect the diversity of people’s media diets. Just like with food diets, if people rely too much on low-quality media, over time that may affect their opinions, attitudes and behaviours. This has important implications for democracies that rely on well-informed and engaged citizens to cast votes.

There’s also a risk in conflating news sources with other types of sources. Journalists at news organisations are often held accountable to professional codes of conduct that, for example, aim to prevent reporters from personally benefiting from their reporting.

In theory, this allows audiences to receive independent analysis on important topics with confidence that the source has fact-checked claims and doesn’t have a vested interest in the reporting.

But if you select a business – such as the blog of a hardware store or a bank – as a source, you don’t have those same guarantees around editorial codes of conduct and professional ethics.

Should you use this feature?

Overall, allowing users more control over what they see is a good thing. But appropriate governance and regulation – possibly championed by Australia’s Digital Platform Regulators Forum – is needed to ensure people’s privacy and that their source preferences aren’t unfairly monetised.

Being more involved in your media diet is a positive step, as is thinking about its balance and diversity.

Ensuring a mix of sources across types (think local, regional, national, and international) and varieties (political, social, sports, entertainment news, and so on) can lead to a better balance.

Also think about whether the sources you are relying on are based on opinions or on facts. Doing this and actively creating a high-quality media diet is better for you and for others in your community.

– ref. Are Google’s ‘preferred sources’ a good thing for online news? – https://theconversation.com/are-googles-preferred-sources-a-good-thing-for-online-news-277372

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

If Israel and the US hoped their attack on Iran would force the country to capitulate quickly, they were wrong. Despite the death of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many other senior figures, Iran has managed to continue firing drones and missiles at targets across the Middle East.

This poses a challenge for the US and its allies, including Israel and the Gulf states. The challenge is that they might run out of air defences before Iran runs out of airborne projectiles.

The US and its allies use a number of weapons platforms to knock down incoming missiles and drones. The most important are Thaad interceptors, Patriot systems and SM-family naval missiles, while Israel also uses longer-range Arrow interceptors. However, the supply of these interceptors has been under severe strain in recent years.

Many have been provided to Ukraine, which faces relentless Russian aerial assault. Others have been used in the Red Sea to protect shipping against attacks by the Iran-aligned Houthis. And more still have been stationed in the Indo-Pacific to defend South Korea and Taiwan from possible North Korean and Chinese attacks.

Despite their importance to modern warfare, US stockpiles of these munitions are dangerously low. There are simply too many competing priorities, and production has only recently been increased. The 12-day war the US and Israel fought with Iran in June 2025 is thought to have consumed around a quarter of the entire US inventory of Thaads.

When stocks of these munitions diminish during a war, choices have to be made about which targets to protect – and which not to protect. This usually means focusing on the defence of strategic military installations, allowing some civilian areas to be hit. Israel is widely believed to have made this choice during the 12-day war.

That moment may be approaching again. However, this time it is not just Israel that is at risk, but half a dozen other Middle East countries. The main problem is in the Gulf states, which are in range both of the sort of long-range missile that Iran fires at Israel and its shorter-range projectiles.

These Arab countries can also be hit more easily by Iran’s Shahed exploding drones. The drones are much easier to launch than missiles, require less risk to do so and can reach some targets in the Gulf within minutes. Iran is estimated to have 80,000 of them.

Ukraine has faced this type of attack mix for years and it has developed complex, multi-layered air defences to counter it. This means using expensive interceptors (each Patriot missile costs US$4 million) to take down ballistic missiles and using a combination of other things – even a machine gun will do – to take down drones.

It’s an effective system that has kept Ukraine in the fight and ensures it does not use too many interceptors. The Gulf states have not done this. Instead, they appear to be using Patriot missiles and other extremely expensive and scarce missiles to take down everything from ballistic missiles to US$20,000 (£15,000) drones.

Missile defence systems are designed to launch several interceptors at each incoming projectile, meaning their stocks can run down quickly. Probably within a few days, the Gulf states are going to have to shift their tactics.

Stocks running low

Even if the Gulf states are the most exposed, the situation is not rosy for Israel or US military forces across the region either. Some US forces are in range of Iran’s Shahed drones and short-range missiles. Others are in range of Iran’s long-range missiles.

The exact size of missile defence stocks is classified. But a look at budgetary and procurement data suggests that US forces will become stretched within a matter of days or several weeks at the very most. At that point, the US will have to begin drawing down missile defence stocks from the rest of the world.

According to South Korean media, discussions are already underway about removing Thaads and Patriot systems from South Korea and sending them to the Middle East. Ukraine will get fewer. And US military readiness will be severely degraded around the world, inviting aggression and the possible opening of a second front.

The other side of the equation is Iran’s capabilities, which are something of an unknown. Long-range missiles are the type of munition it has the least of, and they are also the riskiest to launch. The US and its allies can be fairly confident that over time they will significantly degrade Iran’s ability to launch these missiles. Whether it will be fast enough to happen before a critical interceptor shortage is less certain.

But Iran’s short-range missiles and drones are another matter. The drones, especially, can be launched without large, visible weapons platforms, which make an easy target for US and allied air strikes. Particularly if Gulf air defences become very degraded, there are a host of highly damaging targets for them to hit – ranging from US bases to oil and gas infrastructure to shipping.

Ultimately, the answer to how prepared the US and its allies are for a protracted conflict seems to be “not very”. Even if it runs out of long-range missiles, Iran can probably continue its drone attacks for a very long time, causing chaos throughout the region and spiking energy prices by disrupting production and shipping. Stopping them will not be easy.

– ref. How prepared are the US and its allies for a protracted conflict in Iran? – https://theconversation.com/how-prepared-are-the-us-and-its-allies-for-a-protracted-conflict-in-iran-277454

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gokcay Balci, Lecturer in Sustainable Freight Transport and Logistics, University of Leeds

The Iranian regime has announced the closure of the strait of Hormuz and threatened to target ships attempting to transit the narrow waterway. Some have already been damaged. While this could seriously harm global energy supply and raise costs, the consequences actually extend far beyond these markets.

The strait of Hormuz, which sits to the south of Iran and connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea, is one of the most critical chokepoints for international trade. More than 30,000 ships, carrying around 11% of global seaborne trade by volume, transit the strait each year. And around 34% of seaborne oil exports and 19% of seaborne natural gas shipments also pass through it.

However, oil and gas are not the only commodities moving through the strait. The Gulf region serves as a major hub for the transfer of containers carrying consumer goods, particularly between Asia and Europe.

Alongside Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates – the world’s ninth-largest container port – the region handles more than 26 million containers annually, around 80% of which are transhipment (cargo containers being transferred between vessels). It is estimated that more than 150 ships, with a combined capacity of about 450,000 containers, are stranded in the region.

Food and agriculture supply is at risk

The strait of Hormuz is central to the global fertiliser trade. More than 30% of urea – the most widely used nitrogen fertiliser produced from natural gas – is exported from Gulf countries by sea.

Urea prices rose by about 14% on March 2 compared with the previous day. Fertilisers account for a significant share of production costs in many agricultural products, just over a third each for both corn and wheat, for example. When increasing fertiliser prices combine with rising energy costs, producing important crops becomes more expensive.

So the availability of agricultural output and food products could also be affected by the crisis. In addition to potential fertiliser shortages, disruptions to shipping may hit supplies. Perishable goods transported in refrigerated containers are already at risk of spoilage as container ships remain stranded near the strait.

Gulf countries face particularly high risks because many depend heavily on imported food. In Qatar, for example, more than 90% of food is imported, with the vast majority arriving by sea. With flights not fully operating across the region, food availability could become a growing concern. Food by road freight from Turkey may provide an emergency alternative, but capacity would be limited and costs significantly higher than maritime transport.

Beyond the region, consumer prices may also rise. Higher energy costs are likely to be a major driver, although the overall impact will depend on how long the crisis lasts and what happens to those energy prices in the meantime. Brent crude oil prices increased from about US$72 (£54) before the strikes began to around US$79 as of March 4 – compared with roughly US$66 one month earlier.

A 2023 analysis by the European Central Bank suggested that inflation in Europe could rise by 0.8 points if a third of oil and gas supplies passing through the strait of Hormuz were disrupted. In the current situation, almost all shipping traffic through the strait has been halted.

The price of consumer goods could also be affected by the disruptions. Shipping costs have already increased for containerised shipments to the region, with major container lines imposing war risk surcharges ranging from US$1,500 to US$4,000 per container. For context, the typical cost of moving a container from Shanghai to Europe is around US$2,700-US$3,600 including freight and port cargo handling charges.

Similar surcharges are also applied to shipments between other regions not using strait of Hormuz, as leading container lines bypass the Suez canal, which links the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Instead, they reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope off the southern tip of Africa.

Read more: How Red Sea attacks on cargo ships could disrupt deliveries and push up prices – a logistics expert explains

This strategy was also adopted during the Red Sea crisis in late 2023, when Houthis in Yemen (backed by Iran) began seizing and attacking passing ships. Freight costs increased by 250% in the first few months of the crisis.

Overall freight rates – the price companies pay to transport goods – may once again increase globally as shipping capacity shrinks. Increases could be limited this time though, because the container sector was actually facing an overcapacity issue.

But perhaps surprisingly, higher shipping costs do not necessarily translate into large increases in consumer prices. For many products, maritime transport accounts for as little as 0.35% of the final retail price. But delayed shipments and unreliable transit times may instead create logistical challenges, including higher inventory costs and temporary shortages of essential goods, which can affect consumers more.

A prolonged crisis, combined with vessels rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, could intensify pressures on consumer prices, logistics and production costs, and the availability of food and other consumer goods. It’s a reminder that regional tensions happening in strategic locations like the strait of Hormuz have global consequences for consumers.

– ref. Strait of Hormuz: Gulf states’ food security is at immediate risk but wider shortages could push up consumer prices globally – https://theconversation.com/strait-of-hormuz-gulf-states-food-security-is-at-immediate-risk-but-wider-shortages-could-push-up-consumer-prices-globally-277214

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Richard Toye, Professor of Modern History, University of Exeter

When Donald Trump criticised Keir Starmer for failing to sufficiently support American and Israeli operations against Iran, he did so with a historical flourish. “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with,” he complained.

The implication was clear: Churchill would have stood shoulder to shoulder with Washington in a confrontation with Tehran. The remark invites an obvious question: what would Churchill have made of war with Iran?

The answer is not as straightforward as Trump’s comparison suggests. Churchill’s record shows a mixture of hawkish rhetoric, strategic caution and a constant concern with maintaining Anglo-American unity. Far from embodying a simple instinct for confrontation, he tended to see war and diplomacy as inextricably linked.

Churchill’s famous 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri, is a case in point. During this address, he warned that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe. But the speech – formally titled The Sinews of Peace – was not simply a call to arms against Soviet expansion. Churchill simultaneously emphasised the need for understanding between adversaries and the importance of strengthening the United Nations. His core message was that peace could best be preserved if the western powers demonstrated sufficient unity and strength to deter aggression.

Iran already featured in the geopolitical crisis surrounding that speech. At the time, Soviet troops had failed to withdraw from northern Iran despite wartime agreements. The episode formed part of the early tensions that would harden into the cold war. Churchill therefore already viewed Iran through the lens of great-power rivalry.

That perspective had deep roots. During the second world war, Churchill had travelled to Tehran in 1943 to meet Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin at the first conference of the allied “big three”. The gathering took place in the capital of Iran because the country had become a crucial logistical corridor through which allied supplies flowed to the Soviet Union.

For Churchill, the conference was a sobering experience. Roosevelt increasingly cultivated Stalin’s goodwill, sometimes at Britain’s expense. Afterwards Churchill reflected ruefully that he had sat “between the great Russian bear … and the great American buffalo,” while Britain resembled “the poor little British donkey”. The remark captured his growing awareness that Britain was no longer one of the world’s dominant powers.

That realisation reinforced a central element of Churchill’s postwar strategy: the cultivation of an enduring Anglo-American partnership. His call at Fulton for a “special relationship” between the British Commonwealth and the United States was not a mere rhetorical gesture. It was an attempt to anchor Britain’s future security within the emerging American-led order.

The irony of a Churchill reference

But Churchill’s thinking about Iran did not stop with cold war diplomacy. In 1953, during his second premiership, Britain and the US supported a covert operation that overthrew Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and restored the authority of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The coup was organised largely by the CIA, under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt Jr., but Churchill enthusiastically backed the plan. When Roosevelt later described the operation to him at Downing Street, the ageing prime minister reportedly declared that he would gladly have served under his command in such a venture.

That episode suggests that Churchill could certainly favour forceful action when he believed western interests were threatened. Yet it also highlights a historical irony. The overthrow of Mosaddegh became one of the central grievances invoked by Iran’s revolutionary leaders after the Iranian revolution. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly invoked foreign intervention – particularly the Anglo-American coup – to legitimise its rule and to portray itself as the defender of Iranian sovereignty against external domination.

In other words, the legacy of western interference in Iran has become one of the regime’s most powerful political weapons.

Churchill was well aware that wars and interventions could produce unintended consequences. Reflecting on his experiences as a young officer during the Boer war, he later wrote that once the signal for conflict was given, statesmen lost control of events. War became subject to “malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations”. This was not the sentiment of a pacifist. But it was the observation of someone who had seen how quickly political decisions could unleash forces that no government could fully control.

What would Winston do?

How might these instincts translate to the present crisis? Churchill would almost certainly have regarded Iran’s regime with deep suspicion. His cold war mindset inclined him to see international politics in terms of ideological confrontation and strategic balance. He might well have argued that weakness in the face of aggressive regimes invited further challenges.

At the same time, Churchill rarely believed that military action alone could resolve geopolitical disputes. His preferred approach was to combine firmness with diplomacy – to negotiate from strength while maintaining channels of communication with adversaries. Even at the height of the cold war he hoped that a position of western strength might eventually persuade the Soviet leadership to strike a bargain.

Above all, Churchill believed that Britain’s influence depended on maintaining close alignment with the US. But that alignment, in his mind, was meant to shape American power rather than simply echo it. The “special relationship” was supposed to be a partnership, not a blank cheque.

Trump’s invocation of Churchill therefore rests on a simplified image of the wartime leader as an instinctive advocate of military action. The historical record reveals a more complicated figure: a strategist who believed in strength, certainly, but also in diplomacy, alliances and the careful management of great-power rivalries.

If Churchill were alive today, he might indeed be urging western governments to demonstrate resolve. But he would probably also recognise that Iran’s political system has been forged in the memory of past foreign interventions – and that any new conflict would risk reinforcing the very forces it seeks to weaken.

Churchill once observed that war, once unleashed, rarely follows the tidy paths imagined by those who start it. That warning may be as relevant as any of his more famous phrases.

– ref. What would Winston Churchill make of war with Iran? – https://theconversation.com/what-would-winston-churchill-make-of-war-with-iran-277525

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hilary A Smith, Honorary Research Fellow (Linguistics), Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa – Massey University

Debates over language are back in the news in New Zealand, this time with proposed legislation that critics have dismissed as a political distraction.

In practical terms, the English Language Bill now before parliament – which has faced ridicule from the opposition for proposing to make English an official language in Aotearoa – would do little to change how it is used in daily life.

Nevertheless, the bill carries symbolic weight, arriving amid politicised debates over bilingual government department names and other changes to public language.

Moreover, it reminds us that language policy continues to be made reactively and piecemeal in New Zealand.

At a time when more languages than ever are being spoken in Aotearoa, the country remains without a clear and coherent national framework – something that increasingly carries implications for its workforce and migration.

A test too far? The bus driver case

A case in point came in January, when more than 500 bus drivers presented a petition to parliament warning that current immigration language settings risk creating a new driver shortage.

The petition argued the level of English required for residency is set unusually high, particularly when compared with Australia’s rules. According to the petitioners, this could force experienced drivers and their families to leave the country if they fail to meet the threshold.

At the centre of the dispute is the English-speaking world’s most used language test, the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), which tests listening, reading, writing and speaking.

Bus drivers applying for residence in New Zealand must achieve an IELTS score that is comparable to, and in some cases higher than, the level required of students beginning university study.

IELTS is also moving to an online-only format, meaning test-takers will need not only strong English skills but also the ability to type extended written answers under exam conditions.

One of the main arguments for maintaining high language standards is workplace safety.

But international research suggests this issue is more complex than a single test score implies. Studies show high-quality workplace training produces the best outcomes when it is tailored to different language groups.

For example, one 2021 study found that while environmental health and safety training delivered in English produced better results than animated cartoons for Portuguese speakers in Rio de Janeiro, the opposite was true for Chinese speakers in Guangzhou.

In other words, people learn best when they can understand what is being explained.

Reflecting this, US Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards introduced in 2010 require that “an employer must instruct its employees using both a language and vocabulary that the employees can understand”.

When content is well understood, it can also be more easily transferred into another language, including English.

Designed for settlement, not for work

The New Zealand government, for its part, has signalled little appetite to reform language requirements that have remained largely unchanged for more than two decades.

In its formal response to the petition, the government said the higher English standard applies only at the point of residence, not on temporary visas, and is aimed at long-term settlement rather than specific jobs.

In the government’s view, the requirement is about participation in social, economic and civic life, not occupational competence.

But even on its own terms, that distinction is open to challenge. English thresholds vary widely across visa categories: an Accredited Employer Work Visa requires IELTS 4, while from 2025 the Active Investor Plus Visa has no English requirement at all.

By separating “settlement English” from “workplace English”, policy is being asked to do several different jobs at once.

The result is a system that struggles to balance labour market needs, workplace safety and long-term integration, leaving key questions about language, training and productivity to be resolved as each issue arises.

A proper national language policy would align the scattered settings across immigration, education, government, law, public services, media and economic life – replacing ad hoc decisions with a coherent, evidence-based framework.

This is not to say the problem has been ignored.

Some notable pieces of work have included the Ministry of Education’s 1992 report Aoteareo: Speaking for Ourselves, the Human Rights Commission’s 2008 document Te waka reo and Royal Society Te Apārangi’s 2013 paper Languages in Aotearoa New Zealand.

More recently, the Ngā Reo o Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland Languages Strategy set out a long-term vision with goals and actions. It also provided a blueprint for the Languages Alliance’s call for a national, evidence-based policy framework.

All of these documents stressed the benefits of bilingualism and multilingualism – for individuals as well as for society as a whole. The benefits are not only educational and social, but economic.

Meanwhile, Aotearoa’s population is becoming ever more diverse, with more people speaking more languages each year. Data from the 2023 Census shows languages spoken by migrant communities are growing fast, with Panjabi up 45%, Tagalog up 38% and Afrikaans up 33% since 2018.

Without a clearly articulated framework with a strong evidence base, New Zealand is missing out on the potential opportunities offered by its growing linguistic diversity.

– ref. The debate NZ should really be having about language policy – https://theconversation.com/the-debate-nz-should-really-be-having-about-language-policy-277074

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Shalini Arunogiri, Addiction Psychiatrist, Associate Professor, Monash University

A class of medications best known for treating diabetes and obesity may also reduce the risk of addiction – and help people who already have one, a new study shows.

Semaglutide (also known as Ozempic), liraglutide and tirzepatide (Wegovy) belong to a class of drugs called GLP-1 (glucagon-like peptide-1) receptor agonists. These mimic a hormone involved in regulating blood sugar and appetite.

Interest in GLP-1s for addiction has grown in the past decade, as some people prescribed them for diabetes or weight loss noticed they were drinking less alcohol or smoking less.

Animal studies suggested these drugs might reduce cravings and lower the risk of relapse. Large studies using health records or administrative data hinted at similar patterns.

This new study, published today in the BMJ, found starting a GLP-1 drug was linked with a 14% overall reduced risk of developing new substance use disorders, including alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, nicotine and opioids. Among people with an existing substance use disorder, taking a GLP-1 was associated with a 26% reduction in substance-related hospital admissions.

What did the researchers do?

Researchers examined electronic health records from more than 600,000 veterans with diabetes who were treated through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs.

Researchers compared those newly prescribed a GLP-1 with those started on a different class of diabetes medication called SGLT2 inhibitors (including empagliflozin and dapagliflozin) – a well-established treatment used as a comparison point.

The study followed participants for up to three years, asking two questions:

• among people with no prior addiction diagnosis, were those on GLP-1 drugs less likely to develop one?

• among people who already had a substance use disorder, were those on GLP-1 drugs less likely to experience serious harms, such as hospitalisation, overdose, emergency department visits, or death?

The researchers used a method called “target trial emulation,” which structures an observational study to resemble a randomised controlled trial as closely as possible.

In a randomised controlled trial, participants are randomly assigned to receive either the drug being tested or a comparison treatment. The two groups should be similar in every way except for the treatment they receive. If one group does better, we can be confident the drug caused it.

Observational studies work differently. No matter how carefully researchers try to account for differences such as weight, age and other health conditions, there is always the possibility that some unmeasured factor explains the results.

The target trial emulation design used here is among the best available approaches for observational data, but it cannot eliminate this problem. It can tell us that something is associated with better outcomes; it cannot prove that the drug caused those outcomes.

What did they find?

With that caveat in mind, the results were notable. Among people without a prior substance use disorder, those on GLP-1 drugs were less likely to develop one across every substance category examined:

• alcohol, an 18% lower risk
• cannabis, 14% lower
• cocaine, 20% lower
• nicotine, 20% lower
• opioids, 25% lower.

This amounted to roughly 1–6 fewer cases per 1,000 people over three years.

For those who already had a substance use disorder, those prescribed GLP-1 drugs had better outcomes across every measure:

• 31% fewer emergency department visits related to their substance use disorder
• 26% fewer hospital admissions
• a 39% reduction in overdoses
• a 25% reduction in suicidal thoughts or attempts
• 50% fewer deaths.

This amounted to around 1–10 fewer events per 1,000 people over three years.

That these patterns held across multiple substances and multiple outcomes makes them harder to dismiss.

But they remain associations, not proof. The ongoing randomised trials will be essential for determining whether GLP-1 drugs genuinely cause these benefits, or whether something else is at work.

But these results might not apply to everyone

The cohort was 90% male with an average age of 65, so findings may not extend to women, younger people, or those without type 2 diabetes.

The group also had significant health complexity. More than half (57%) were current or former smokers, over 40% had high cholesterol, and many had additional conditions including high blood pressure, heart disease and heart failure.

Mental health conditions were also common – more than 18% had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), over 10% had depression and over 10% had anxiety.

We also don’t know whether participants were receiving any treatment for their substance use disorder, which could itself influence outcomes.

The bigger picture

Perhaps the most important takeaway isn’t about GLP-1 drugs at all. Substance use disorders are highly treatable.

Effective, evidence-based medications already exist – naltrexone and acamprosate for alcohol, methadone and buprenorphine for opioids – alongside a wide range of psychological therapies.

These treatments are safe and effective, yet only a small fraction of people who could benefit from them ever receive them. An estimated 3% of people with alcohol use disorder are ever prescribed effective medication.

The biggest barrier isn’t availability: it’s stigma, shame, fear of judgment and discrimination. Society still views addiction as a moral failing rather than a health condition.

For people living with a substance use disorder, this research on GLP-1s is encouraging but the more immediate message is that effective treatments are already available.

– ref. GLP-1 drugs like Ozempic may lower the risk of addiction: new study – https://theconversation.com/glp-1-drugs-like-ozempic-may-lower-the-risk-of-addiction-new-study-277367