Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies, Dickinson College

The fragile peace in Lebanon was already showing serious strains in the first months of 2026 – and then came the U.S.-Israeli strikes in Iran.

After the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah – a Shiite paramilitary group and Iranian proxy operating from Lebanon – retaliated by launching rockets into the north of Israel. Israel responded with fresh strikes on Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, Beirut and the Bekaa Valley in the east.

Hezbollah is not the force in Lebanon it once was. Yet as an expert in Hezbollah affairs, I believe the group still maintains the potential to drag Lebanon into conflict and chaos.

Hezbollah is in no position to play an effective role as an ally to Iran in its war with the U.S. and Israel. But the threat of its actions destabilizing Lebanon is real – as is the fear of Israel and Syria using the pretext of Hezbollah’s response now to launch ground invasions and occupy parts of Lebanon.

A failed ceasefire

Hezbollah’s decision to support Iran is in line with the core tenets of the group.

Inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah came into existence in 1985 with the publication of a manifesto that detailed its aims for the region. It pledged allegiance to the supreme leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, and vowed to fight the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

Having dominated internal politics and dictated foreign policy for the best part of 40 years, it has been seriously degraded since October 2023, with Israeli strikes taking out much of its leadership. Many in Lebanon hoped that the grip Hezbollah held would soon be a thing of the past.

On Nov. 27, 2024, Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire following almost a year of Hezbollah attacks, in solidarity with Hamas, and heavy Israeli shelling in response.

As part of the plan, Hezbollah would withdraw north of the Litani River and Israeli troops would withdraw from southern Lebanon within a 60-day period.

Brokered by the U.S., the agreement was never fully implemented. In fact, Israel kept bombing Lebanon almost on a daily basis while claiming that the Lebanese army is not working fast enough to disarm Hezbollah.

The laying down of Hezbollah’s arms was another term in the ceasefire plan but has been difficult to implement. The Lebanese army recently announced entering an “advanced stage” of the disarmament plan and is currently focused on expanding its presence in the south of Lebanon. But Israel expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of disarmament and claimed that Hezbollah is rearming faster than it was being disarmed.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s secretary general, Naim Qassem, has repeatedly said that the group will not agree to a full disarmament and withdrawal north of the Litani River while Israel continues striking Lebanon.

In fact, since November 2024, Israel Defense Forces targeted Lebanon with 855 strikes. February 2026 alone was marked by 44 strikes – and this was before the current war began.

Earlier this year, speaking in a televised address, Qassem declared that the group would not remain neutral if Israel goes to war against Iran. True to his word, Hezbollah started shelling Israel right after the killing of Khamenei.

But that move has been heavily criticized by other voices in Lebanon who accuse the group of putting Iran’s interests ahead of Lebanon’s and, in effect, killing off a peace process that was already under massive strain.

Dragging a nation into conflict

This is not the first time that Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into an armed conflict, nor the first time it has rejected the state’s call to disarm.

In July 2006, demanding the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel, Hezbollah fighters entered Israeli territory, kidnapping two Israeli soldiers and killing three. This led to a 34-day war, the loss of 1,000 civilian lives, the weakening of Lebanon’s economy and significant damages to its infrastructure.

Then, after the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas – and despite the Lebanese state’s numerous calls to remain neutral – Hezbollah vowed solidarity with the Palestinian militants and joined its fight against Israel. What followed was months of tit-for-tat attacks with Israel that escalated into a full-blown war in September 2024.

The Lebanese government has been keen to distance itself from Hezbollah’s actions in the current conflict.

In response to Hezbollah’s shelling of northern Israel, the Lebanese cabinet on March 2 outlawed Hezbollah’s military activities.

This is a first for Lebanon. Almost half a century ago, Lebanon implicitly legalized Hezbollah and agreed to share security responsibilities – which is almost always exclusively within the hands of the state – with Hezbollah, a nominally nonstate entity.

What impact the ban will have, if any, remains to be seen. It certainly did not seem to make an immediate difference, as Hezbollah continued with its military activities in support of Iran.

Sectarian violence

While intended as a step toward isolating Hezbollah and building a stronger state of Lebanon, the recent ban on Hezbollah’s military activities risks exacerbating Lebanon’s sectarian divide.

It comes at a time when Lebanon and the wider region is going through serious challenges that have left Shiite communities outside Iran feeling vulnerable.

The rise of sectarian violence against Alawites – an offshoot of Shiite Islam – in neighboring Syria is a source of concern to many.

And in Lebanon, the Shiites, who make up a third of Lebanon’s population, suffered the most from both Israel’s 40-year occupation of the south and the 2024 war.

As ayatollah, Khamenei was seen as one of the leading spiritual leaders of all Shiites, not just in Iran. His killing and the fact that most Shiites in Lebanon live in the areas that have been heavily targeted by Israel in recent days – south Lebanon, southern Beirut and the Bekaa Valley – will further lead into the narrative that they are a community under threat.

My concern is that tasked with disarming the group, the Lebanese army could be drawn into confrontation with Hezbollah fighters.

Lebanon has a history of such clashes. A serious sectarian confrontation occurred in May 2008 when the Lebanese government attempted to dismantle Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network and remove key security officials from Beirut airport.

Hezbollah responded with a swift and violent takeover of West Beirut, which is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Fighters clashed and killed about 110 civilians.

Lebanon was then on the brink, but the Lebanese army’s decision not to get involved in street battles prevented a turn toward civil war.

Ground invasions

But sectarian violence has long dogged Lebanon – and anything that risks the country’s fracturing is to the detriment of all Lebanese people, not just the Shiites. The country is already suffering from a severe economic crisis and only recently came out of a prolonged period of political paralysis, during which Hezbollah blocked successive attempts to install a president.

Having made steps toward putting in place a functioning government after the 2024 ceasefire, the other fear, alongside civil strife, is invasion from the north and the south.

The Syrian military has significantly reinforced its presence along the northern border with Lebanon. Thousands of Syrian troops were deployed to supposedly secure the border and prevent the infiltration of Hezbollah militants in Syria. However, many Lebanese fear that Syria may want to invade and occupy parts of Lebanon, like it did during the Lebanese civil war.

As for Israel, it is already bombing Lebanon. And Israeli military spokesman Brig. Gen. Effie Defrin said in a public address that it is keeping “all options on the table,” including a potential ground invasion of Lebanon.

It follows growing interest in Israel of an expansionist policy toward lands around the current state. In February, Israeli extremists illegally entered south Lebanon and called for its occupation. This also occurred back in December 2024. And in a recent interview, Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, seemed to express support for Israel’s expansionist agenda, suggesting that “it would be fine” for Israel to take chunks of Middle East “land.”

Hezbollah’s violent death throes?

The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran have again shone a light on how much of Lebanon’s future is premised on regional shifts and developments that exacerbate internal divides.

Hezbollah has for the past 40 years been a focus of this dynamic. For months, observers have – for good reason – suggested the Iran-backed group was on its last leg. Instead, it looks like the group might again bring Lebanon to its knees.

– ref. Hezbollah − degraded, weakened but not yet disarmed − destabilizes Lebanon once again – https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-degraded-weakened-but-not-yet-disarmed-destabilizes-lebanon-once-again-277327

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By José-Miguel Bello y Villarino, Senior Research Fellow, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney

Last week, one of Australia’s leading artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, Toby Walsh, warned Australia’s lack of guardrails for AI is putting young people at risk of being “sacrificed for the profits of big tech”.

Walsh’s remarks came after the government scrapped its own proposal to establish an advisory body of AI experts. Instead, the government offered its National AI Plan, which, among others, stresses investment in data centres, telecommunications infrastructure, and workforce training.

The plan also envisages an “AI Safety Institute” (currently recruiting staff), and also some internal AI transparency measures for the public sector. Transparency results so far have not been great.

What does it all add up to for AI regulation in Australia?

What are other countries doing?

The European Union has attracted attention for its AI Act, which already prohibits such things as using AI systems to exploit vulnerable groups or individuals. However, Europe is struggling to implement rules on high-risk AI uses that are not prohibited.

Several governments in Australia’s region are also passing AI laws, mainly to give themselves the powers to respond when they deem it necessary.

South Korea, Japan and Taiwan – none of them minor AI players – all have newly minted laws, which are meeting the expected pushback from industry.

Not everyone has comprehensive rules

There are countries without any kind of comprehensive AI regulation, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the US, president Donald Trump has even prohibited most state-based regulation in relation to private AI uses. Despite the anti-safeguards language, the government has quietly retained strong safeguards for federal use of AI.

The UK has followed an even more erratic path, to end up in a similar place to Australia. Incapable of deciding what to do, it has tried to provide technical (non-legal) safeguards. This has been done through the creation of the first AI Safety (now Security) Agency, hailed by some, derided by others.

The dilemma of control

The differences in approach between countries are not surprising. Governments face the dilemma of control described by English technology scholar David Collingridge almost 50 years ago:

when [regulatory] change is easy, the need for it cannot be foreseen; when the need for change is apparent, change has become expensive, difficult and time consuming.

What’s more, Australia has limited regulatory clout regarding AI. It is not a significant global AI player in the way it is, for example, in mining, so its influence is limited.

Facing these uncertainties, what should Australia be doing?

Australia’s plan for AI safety

One certainty is that erratic behaviour is not a great option. We have good evidence that regulatory predictability matters for innovation.

In a recent speech, Australia’s Assistant Minister for Science, Technology and the Digital Economy, Andrew Charlton acknowledged this:

one of the important insurance policies we have is regulatory certainty, underpinned by clear principles with broad buy-in.

So, what is the government’s plan?

The official plan to keep Australians safe is a section (action 7) in the National AI Plan. It argues existing Australian frameworks “can apply to AI and other emerging technologies”.

In other words, AI systems and tools can be covered by the rules we already have, such as consumer protections against all misleading and deceptive practices. The government suggested this option back in 2024. (We have previously argued this view, favoured by the Productivity Commission, is not well supported and was not our preferred option.)

Problems with the plan

However, the challenges for applying existing laws, which the government identified years ago, have not gone away.

As we identified in 2023, the existing regulatory frameworks have limitations when it comes to AI.

AI systems are complex, they can act semi-autonomously, and it can be difficult to understand why they do what they do. This makes it very hard to effectively attribute liability or responsibility for AI risks or harms using existing laws and processes.

Regrettably, those limitations have not been addressed systematically – if at all.

Fragmented rules and limited resources

As things stand, the regulatory landscape is highly fragmented and uncertain.

For instance, there are at least 21 mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) state and federal policies about the use of AI in government. Courts have so far had little opportunity to clear things up, with almost no test cases in crucial areas of existing law, including negligence, administrative law, discrimination law, and consumer law.

The new plan is accompanied by a clear commitment to monitor the development and deployment of AI “and respond to challenges as they arise, and as our understanding of the strengths and limitations of AI evolves”.

The issue is: how will that monitoring happen? Will the government really “empower every existing agency across government to take responsibility for AI”?

Dealing with issues such as privacy, consumer protection, anti-discrimination will take money and commitment and a degree of coordination between agencies we have not witnessed to date.

An uncertain future

For predictability, signals matter. A lot.

If there is a change in government in the US in 2028, will that change how Australia regulates AI – in the same way the beginning of the Trump presidency coincided with the abandonment of Australia’s mandatory AI guardrails proposals?

Is a laissez-faire regulatory approach creating predictability, when we have so many stalled and part-completed regulatory processes?

The government seems to expect courts, government agencies, businesses and individuals to work out on their own how to retrofit old laws and institutions to a new technological landscape.

There is some hope for regulation of automated decision-making in the public sector (promised after the Robodebt Royal Commission). For the rest, it’s a “wait and see” approach to AI regulation. We’ll have to wait and see if it works.

– ref. Australia’s official plan for AI safety isn’t much more than a single dot point. Will it be enough? – https://theconversation.com/australias-official-plan-for-ai-safety-isnt-much-more-than-a-single-dot-point-will-it-be-enough-276962

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dan van den Hoek, Senior Lecturer, Clinical Exercise Physiology, University of the Sunshine Coast

The Australian Grand Prix launches the 2026 Formula 1 (F1) season at Melbourne’s Albert Park on Sunday.

While the US strikes on Iran forced many teams to change their travel plans, organisers are confident the event will go ahead without a hitch.

There is plenty to look out for as the F1 world turns its attention towards Melbourne: the season-opening race is the first of a new era, with changes to technical regulations, while Australian Oscar Piastri is ready to challenge for the drivers’ championship as the crowd watches to see if he can break a lengthy drought on home soil.

Key changes to technical regulations

While the cars will look similar to last season’s, they will be vastly different.

The core aim of the new regulations is to make racing more competitive and increase passing.

Compared with 2025, this year’s cars are smaller, more agile and use more electric power.

The Drag Reduction System (DRS) – an adjustable rear wing device to promote overtaking – has been phased out after being introduced in 2011.

Active aero is now part of the regulations – not just a grey area that teams have tried to exploit.

Active aero allows drivers to change the position of the front and rear wing to produce high drag for cornering (increasing downforce, grip and braking performance), or low drag to deliver more speed on straights.

The biggest regulation changes apply to the power units. The cars will keep their 1.6 litre, turbocharged V6 engines, but the hybrid system will be rebalanced, resulting in a roughly equal split between combustion and electric power.

With almost three times greater electrical power (an increase from 120 kilowatts to 350kW) available, drivers will need to manage the battery charge and deployment.

The cars are smaller and lighter than last season, with the wheelbase reduced by 200 millimetres (to a maximum of 3,400mm), total width reduced by 100mm (1,900mm max), and minimum vehicle weight by 30 kilograms, down to 768kg.

These changes are designed to increase agility and encourage more overtaking opportunities.

Why F1 made these changes

Technical resets are part of the competitive lifecycle in F1.

F1 teams build and unveil a new car every season because technical regulations are updated, and because the pace of development means last year’s design is unlikely to be fast enough to be competitive.

Major technical regulation resets happen every few years and 2026 is one of those bigger shifts.

Changes to technical regulations can improve racing, increase opportunities for previously struggling teams, and ensure innovation stays at the forefront.

Each revision challenges engineers to interpret the regulations with limited data, enabling early innovators to gain a competitive advantage.

This unpredictability can reinvigorate fans’ appeal as new contenders emerge.

The 2026 changes are also aimed at supporting sustainability ambitions.

F1 has committed to net zero carbon emissions by 2030, and the use of sustainable fuels reflects this. These commitments could help inform the development of new technologies that find their way into road cars, too.

What will the racing look like?

The lighter, smaller cars may produce more dynamic racing, particularly on narrower street circuits where the smaller cars are more manoeuvrable.

The introduction of active aero should also add a tactical layer, as drivers adjust their wing settings to balance cornering grip and straight line speed.

The increased electrical output of the power units though have raised concerns from some, including four-time world champion Max Verstappen, that F1 racing might resemble Formula E.

Formula E cars run exclusively on battery electrical systems, making energy management central to race strategy: drivers must balance speed with battery conservation, often lifting off the throttle early to regenerate energy through braking.

With battery management, electrical regeneration and deployment all becoming more strategic than before, we will have to wait and see.

Piastri’s weight of expectation

After coming agonisingly close to winning the World Drivers’ Championship last season, the hopes of a nation hang with Piastri.

Australia has produced F1 world champions (Jack Brabham and Alan Jones) but has never produced a winner of the Australian Grand Prix.

Since its move from Adelaide (1985–95) to Albert Park in 1996, the Australian race has opened the F1 season on 23 occasions, meaning it has been the debut race for many drivers.

While many drivers have been successful in their home races – including German Michael Schumacher (four victories at Hockenheim), UK driver Lewis Hamilton (eight wins at Silverstone) and Verstappen from the Netherlands (three victories at Zandvoort) – none of these have coincided with the first race of a season and the implementation of new technical regulations.

Piastri will have to manage the weight of expectation combined with the demands of driving a new car under new regulations, adding a substantial psychological load in his pursuit of a home race win.

His calm and analytical approach to racing should position him well to find early performance in the new car.

Read more: What happens to F1 drivers’ bodies, and what sort of training do they do?

But it’s not just about the driver – team performance and competitors’ adaptation will all play a role in whether Piastri is crowned champion at the end of the season.

The stage is set

So, the stage is set in Melbourne for the next chapter of F1, with Piastri Australia’s best title chance in recent times.

Changes to technical regulations rarely produce a predictable outcome. Drivers and teams go through periods of learning and experimenting to find performance.

The Australian Grand Prix is more than the start of a new season. It is the beginning of a new competitive landscape, where local fans will wait with bated breath to see whether Piastri can finally break the Australian GP hoodoo.

– ref. New rules and high expectations: can Oscar Piastri break Australia’s F1 drought? – https://theconversation.com/new-rules-and-high-expectations-can-oscar-piastri-break-australias-f1-drought-276624

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Henrietta Byrne, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Sydney Centre for Healthy Societies, University of Sydney

You would hope for your dying days to be full of calm and care. But our research with people who are dying shows this is far from the reality for many people.

Instead, financial stress plays a huge and increasing role in who can afford a “good death”.

What we did

In our recent study, we interviewed 18 people nearing the end of life in a palliative care unit, as well as six family members and carers, and 20 palliative care professionals.

We asked what it was like to be dying, to care for someone at the end of life, and to work in palliative care.

Palliative care is for people of any age who have a life-limiting illness. This means they have little or no prospect of a cure. So the goal is to prioritise comfort and living well as they approach the end of their life.

In Australia, palliative care is meant to be mainly free, with most costs covered by state and federal governments, as well as private health insurance.

But our research shows the patchwork of public and private funding means many people are confused and overwhelmed about how to pay for this essential care.

But first, how does palliative care work?

Palliative care can be provided at home or in hospital, a hospice or residential aged care.

Who pays for palliative care depends on where it’s being provided (for example, in the private or public hospital system) and whether the patient has private health insurance.

Australia’s health system is a complex hybrid of public funding, private insurance, charity and out-of-pocket payments.

For dying people and their families, navigating this system can be bewildering.

Previous research has explored how palliative care is funded in Australia. But until now we haven’t heard much directly from patients, carers and workers about how this affects them.

‘It’s expensive being ill’

Our research took place at a specialist palliative care unit in a major city hospital.

People working in the unit told us the activity-based funding model – where hospitals are paid for the number and mix of patients they treat – puts the focus on efficiency, rather than quality of care.

Patients spoke about not wanting to leave behind debt, while carers described confusing and stressful costs.

Patients and families told us they often enter palliative care confused by the patchwork of short-term subsidies, waiting lists for government support packages and gaps they must fill themselves.

For example, some people we interviewed said they had been paying out-of-pocket for medications and essential equipment such as oxygen, which they expected government supports to cover.

But securing government funding, such as the Support At Home program, End-of-Life Pathway or Carer Payment, can sometimes take months to organise.

And once secured, this funding is only available for fixed periods of time. This means patients who live longer than expected can be left without financial security.

Diane*, a community team nurse, told us:

We’ve had people who’ve been referred to us [for end-of-life care] and they were told six weeks [until death], and two years down the track they’ve done their superannuation, they’ve spent it all, […] they’ve got no money left and they’ve still got to pay electricity and things like that. […] And they go, ‘Well, what do I do now?’

Emily* told us her first worry when she got to the palliative care unit was not about dying, but whether the cost would impact her kids:

I didn’t want the children to be loaded with any more debt [because of] me. I would rather [die] on the bench in the park […] the last thing you want to leave them is debt.

Another participant, Kevin*, put it bluntly:

It’s expensive being ill.

Participants who were dying also described feeling pressure not to “outstay their welcome” in a palliative care unit because “the beds are needed” or “the insurance won’t keep paying”.

Alana*, who described herself as a “long-hauler” in the unit, said:

Let’s face it, it’s a business. And I know that. They’re not getting as much money from me as they would for patients coming in and out.

Patients were acutely aware that in the current health system, time is money.

The cost of visiting

For family and friends, their concerns were less about medical bills and more about the price of simply being present.

Jane*, whose elderly mother was dying in the unit, noted the prohibitive cost of parking on site:

They make you pay $20 a day. Your loved one’s dying. Really? […] I’m petrified when I stay overnight […] ‘when does [the parking] run out? I’d better go down and repay’.

Financial stress also impacted whether families could make funeral arrangements. A senior nurse, Patricia*, recounted:

They would say, ‘I don’t have a funeral director. I don’t think we are able to pay for the cost for the funeral. Can you arrange something?’

Death is an economic – not just medical – issue

Our research reveals how money, and worrying about it, can affect people’s experiences when nearing the end of life.

To ensure everyone can access a death free from financial stress, we first need to talk more openly about how money factors into dying.

More accessible government funding for palliative care patients and carers could help ensure everyone has an equal chance of a good end of life. This should be available for as long as people need, rather than on fixed terms.

*Names have been changed for privacy.

– ref. A ‘good death’ has a price – and a new study shows not everyone in palliative care can afford it – https://theconversation.com/a-good-death-has-a-price-and-a-new-study-shows-not-everyone-in-palliative-care-can-afford-it-274202

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alan Brent, Professor and Chair in Sustainable Energy Systems, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington

The government’s plan to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) has raised questions about whether this is the best approach to strengthening New Zealand’s energy security, not least because the conflict in Iran highlights price volatility.

Our analysis suggests it is not. And it casts doubt on the logic of imposing a levy on electricity to fund an LNG terminal, which the government expects to be operational in 2028.

That’s because New Zealand also has a goal to achieve 100% renewable electricity generation by 2030, which means it would be unlikely to need gas in the long term.

We examined whether a fully renewable grid could meet growing electricity demand as the economy decarbonises, and whether the system would be sufficiently resilient during dry years – the conditions that led to an energy security crisis in 2024.

We found existing commitments to invest in renewable electricity generation and storage systems to buffer fluctuations in supply could meet, and even exceed, future demand.

As a first step, we modelled the expected annual electricity generation and investment information provided by the Electricity Authority about renewable projects expected to be ready in 2030.

We assumed new solar, wind and geothermal projects would provide generation profiles similar to the assets already on the grid in 2024. We then asked what would be expected from hydropower to stabilise the intermittent generation of the other renewable sources.

We found that without offshore wind, the added renewable capacities would not be enough to meet a high-end scenario of a 34% increase in electricity demand projected by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.

Demand would exceed the maximum hydropower available (around 5.3 gigawatts) for 474 hours (5%) of the year in 2030. On 28 days (8% of the year), hydro lake reservoirs would reach their minimum levels.

Our model also shows hydro lake reservoirs would deplete at a faster rate during winter in 2030 than they did in 2024, when they reached low levels towards the end of winter. They would also recover faster, however.

But if offshore wind projects are added to the model, it shows New Zealand would need significantly less hydro electricity generation in 2030 compared to 2024.

There would still be instances during winter when demand would exceed maximum hydro power capacity. However, for up to 65% of the year, hydro electricity generation would not be required because other renewables would meet or exceed total demand.

Hydro levels would be kept full for almost the entire year, unlike in 2024.

Storage is crucial

We also modelled the required storage capacity and associated power output for both short-term and long-term needs to stabilise a 100% renewable grid.

Short-term refers to minutes and hours during any energy deficit and is usually covered by battery storage systems.

However, a renewable grid would also require long-term buffers to secure electricity generation for days or weeks, for example during dry years when lake reservoirs are depleted.

This could be achieved through pumped hydro systems, which use excess grid power to pump water to an upper reservoir so it can be released through turbines to generate electricity during high demand.

Since current investment plans for electricity generation don’t include any new hydro projects, our model assumes capacity from hydro generation in 2030 to be similar to 2024.

We found that even without offshore wind, there would be excess energy generated that could be stored and discharged when continuous supply is insufficient.

For the high-end scenario of a 34% increase in electricity demand, we found the maximum short-term power requirements would be 1.45 gigawatts over an hour. That is equivalent to about 15 of the newest commissioned utility-scale battery system at the Ruakākā Energy Park, which have a maximum power output of 100 megawatts.

However, the required long-term storage for normal years (2.58 gigawatts over around 600 hours, or 1.58 terawatt hours) is about a third of the potential requirement during a dry year of 4.5 terawatt hours. This suggests New Zealand would need significant additional long-term storage.

How to keep the power on

New Zealand could avoid power shortages during dry years by combining battery systems with pumped hydro schemes.

For batteries, New Zealand already has a regulatory roadmap in place. For long-term storage, a private consortium has applied for a fast-track consent to revive the scrapped pumped-hydro project at Lake Onslow. This project alone could cover the entire long-term storage needs, or several smaller projects could provide the necessary capacity.

As of February this year, the grid operator Transpower had more than 24 gigawatts of renewable generation and battery energy storage systems in various stages of development. At the end of 2025, nearly 500 megawatts of utility-scale battery projects were underway or scheduled in the next two years.

Our findings echo comments by industry leaders that New Zealand may well be overbuilding capacity. Enough battery capacity will be added to stabilise intermittent generation, and the existing hydro power capacity will cater for long-term storage in a normal year.

For growth in electricity demand beyond 2030, a variety of long-term energy storage technologies such as compressed air energy and advanced flow batteries are expected to become competitive and enter the market.

The government plans to fund the construction of a new LNG terminal through a levy on electricity. Our findings raise the question of why the country would put a levy on power to pay for infrastructure that in all likelihood the electricity sector won’t actually need.

– ref. New modelling shows renewable electricity can meet NZ’s future demand – without importing gas – https://theconversation.com/new-modelling-shows-renewable-electricity-can-meet-nzs-future-demand-without-importing-gas-277215

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Andrew Weeks, Associate Senior Research Scientist, The University of Melbourne

If you follow media coverage of koalas, you could be forgiven for feeling confused.

Recent stories describe a “koala paradox”: endangered in the north of Australia, abundant in the south; genetically diverse in some regions, genetically depleted in others.

Koalas populations are often described simultaneously as being in crisis, or overabundant. These accounts attempt to capture the complexity of this species across different histories and geographic locations. But they also reveal a deeper problem with how we assess genetic risk in wildlife (the likelihood a population will go extinct because it has lost too much genetic diversity).

Our new [research] shows relying too heavily on genetic indicators – how genetic diversity and inbreeding are measured – can be misleading. And we found the koala to be a powerful case study for a much broader lesson in conservation.

The assumption we rarely question

Conservation often rests on a simple logic: a population crash – a rapid and steep decline in population size – reduces genetic diversity and increases inbreeding. Genetically diverse populations, meanwhile, are believed to be more resilient and less susceptible to decline.

This logic is not wrong, but it is incomplete.

It treats genetic health as static, rather than a dynamic outcome shaped by how populations grow or shrink over time. Koalas provide a useful test. Different populations have experienced very different histories; from extreme collapse followed by rapid recovery, to slower but ongoing decline.

What we found and what their DNA reveals

We analysed DNA from 418 koalas sampled across 27 populations in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. This allowed us to reconstruct their population history and size over time. We also examined how different genetic variants respond to population decline and recovery. What emerged was surprising.

Koala populations with higher genetic diversity, particularly those in northern Australia, tended to carry more harmful variants. They also showed declining population sizes. In contrast, populations that had passed through severe historical crashes but were now expanding, showed signs of genetic recovery.

This does not mean population crashes are harmless. They are dangerous and can be irreversible. But it does mean they are not always evolutionary dead ends.

Why recovery can start before diversity rebounds

The key lies in how DNA responds when populations grow rapidly. Generally speaking, when populations expand, recombination (the reshuffling of genetic material each generation) spreads new genetic combinations through the population. This breaks up inherited blocks of DNA and generates new genetic variation. In turn, this can increase a population’s ability to adapt, allowing numbers to grow faster than traditional genetic indicators might suggest.

In koalas, this process is clearly visible. As populations expand, genes are mixed and matched in new ways, creating new genetic variation. Many traditional genetic indicators fail to detect these changes. However, our analyses can reveal them.

This suggests genetic indicators of diversity can lag behind the true health of a population, and sometimes mislead conservation assessments. A population may appear genetically depleted if we rely only on these indicators, even while its diversity is quietly being rebuilt. Conversely, a population can look genetically healthy while its population size is actually becoming unstable, putting that diversity at risk over time.

Correcting a common misconception

Victorian koala populations are often portrayed as genetically compromised because they experienced an extreme population crash in the past. Our results show a more nuanced picture.

Victorian populations still carry the genetic signature of this extreme crash, when fewer than 1,000 koalas remained in the wild. However, many are now on a path to genetic recovery. At the DNA level, their genes are being reshuffled and new genetic variation is appearing. This represents the early stages of genetic recovery, not genetic collapse.

The greater long-term concern is for populations that are rapidly declining but still appear genetically healthy. If population size collapses, genetic diversity can be lost very quickly.

Why this matters beyond koalas

Our results suggest the picture for koalas is more nuanced than previously thought. Southern “inbred” populations are growing again and gaining genetic diversity, whereas northern populations are shrinking, regardless of how genetically diverse they appear today.

This matters far beyond koalas. Many threatened species have experienced population crashes, translocations or reintroductions (such as on French Island and Kangaroo Island) and rapid environmental change. If we judge their future using static genetic indicators, we risk getting the picture wrong, both about their risk of genetic decline and their chance of recovery.

What matters just as much is the direction a population is heading. Is population size rising or falling? Are new genetic variants appearing or disappearing? Is recombination boosting their evolutionary potential, or being choked by small population size?

Rethinking genetic risk

One of the most important messages from our study is this: low genetic diversity does not automatically imply high extinction risk. And high genetic diversity does not guarantee safety. Genetic indicators only make sense when we consider the population’s history, and whether its numbers are rising or falling. Without that context, even well-intentioned conservation decisions can miss the mark.

Koalas, so often used as symbols of the conservation crisis, offer something rare: direct evidence that genetic recovery is possible, and insight into how to detect it early.

If conservation genomics is to guide policy effectively, it must move beyond static genetic indicators. We need to start tracking where populations came from and where they are headed, not just where they are now.

– ref. We thought inbred koalas were at risk of extinction. But what we discovered upends genetic conventions – https://theconversation.com/we-thought-inbred-koalas-were-at-risk-of-extinction-but-what-we-discovered-upends-genetic-conventions-276981

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Erik Meijaard, Honorary Professor of Conservation, University of Kent

Mammals are not especially diverse. Roughly 6,800 mammal species are known to exist, compared with about 8,800 species of amphibian, 11,000 species of bird and 12,500 of reptile. Yet when most people picture biodiversity, they often think of charismatic mammals first: pandas, orangutans, elephants or tigers.

That visibility comes with scrutiny. Mammals are among the best-studied organisms on Earth – and among the most threatened. On the international inventory of the conservation status of species, more than one in four mammal species is classified as vulnerable, endangered or critically endangered.

Because they are so intensively researched, it’s genuinely rare for scientists to find and formally describe a new mammal species. The discovery of the olinguito (Bassaricyon neblina) made global headlines as the first new carnivorous mammal identified in the Americas in 35 years.

In 2017, DNA evidence revealed the world had not six species of great ape, but seven, when the Tapanuli Orangutan (Pongo tapanuliensis) was found to be distinct. It was the first new great ape species described in nearly a century.

Describing a new species is exciting enough. But identifying an entirely new genus is something else altogether. A genus is a taxonomic group covering more than one species, sitting one level above a species in the Linnaean taxonomic classification system, established by Carl Linnaeus. For example, in the scientific name Homo sapiens, Homo is the genus (or genera in plural).

There are only about 1,300 genera of living mammals worldwide. Discovering a totally new genus of mammal happens only a few times a year, if that; some stunning examples include Nagasorex, a distinctive shrew from Nagaland, India in 2025; Paucidentomys, a Sulawesi rodent in 2012; and Laonastes, a rock rat from Laos in 2005.

So, creating a new genus is a rare event and a real privilege. But that is exactly what we just have done – describing a new genus of a small gliding possum in Indonesian Papua.

Finding a Lazarus species

Our story begins with a single photograph.

In 2015, a plantation worker in Indonesian Papua (the western half of the island of New Guinea) caught an unfamiliar tree-dwelling marsupial and took several pictures. We cannot name him, as the location has to be kept secret.

He was part of a citizen science-based biodiversity monitoring project which asked plantation workers to photograph or record the sounds of wildlife they encountered during their work.

The large-eyed, brownish, furry creature, with unfurred ears, superficially resembled an Australian greater glider. But there were clear differences. The photos showed an obvious patagium, or gliding membrane, and a prehensile tail, furred to the top, except for a naked area on the lower side.

The animal did not match any known species from the island of New Guinea. When we examined the images, we realised it closely resembled a possum known only from a handful of fossil bones. These fossils, initially named Petauroides ayamaruensis, had been discovered decades earlier in archaeological sites in West Papua and more recently in Papua New Guinea.

The bones were from a small member of a group of Australian gliding possums called hemibelidines, or ringtail possums. Until recently, this lineage was thought to exist only in eastern Australia. But on the huge, biologically diverse island of New Guinea, there was no sign of its existence. Scientists presumed it had gone extinct around 6,000 years ago.

The photo was evidence this was not the case. What we were looking at appeared to be a “Lazarus species”: one that had vanished from the fossil record, only to reappear alive.

Other famous “Lazarus” examples include the Coelacanth, a large species of fish thought to be extinct for 66 million years until it was rediscovered off the South African coast in 1938.

Meet the new genus, Tous

To confirm our suspicions, we analysed the photographs and made careful comparison with the fossil teeth from Papua and new partially fossilised material from a different location in PNG. The size and shape of mammal teeth and their cusps are very important in distinguishing species. Our analysis of fossil and photographs strongly suggested these all referred to the same animal.

To confirm it, we drew on knowledge shared by local Indigenous landowners who have always known about this animal – it is sacred to some tribal groups in the region.

This confirmed the animal was not only a surviving individual of the fossilised possum, but distinct enough to require an entirely new genus, which we have named Tous.

“Tous” is a local vernacular term applied to this forest species, which is locally recognised as distinct from smaller gliders. During interviews with traditional landowners, elders identified the animal in photographs as “Tous wansai”, distinguishing it from other similar arboreal marsupials.

That makes this discovery exceptionally rare. Establishing a new genus means identifying a lineage that has been evolutionarily separate for millions of years.

In this case, the evidence suggests Tous is from an ancient branch of the possum family tree, one that once extended from Australia to New Guinea, and today survives in a small, vulnerable corner of the Papuan forests. Traditional knowledge indicates Tous roots in tree hollows in the tallest rainforest trees. Like Australia’s greater glider, it is vulnerable to logging.

Protecting the new species

It is this vulnerability that concerns us most. When we formally described Tous, we did not disclose the precise location the original photograph came from. We are unfortunately not able to identify the local Indigenous landowners for similar reasons. With its large forward-facing eyes, soft fur and prehensile tail, Tous is undeniably appealing to wildlife traffickers.

In an era of social media–driven wildlife trade, that appeal can be dangerous. Newly discovered species have sometimes been pushed toward exploitation almost as soon as they are announced. There were, for example, only 22 years between the rediscovery of the Javan rhinoceros in Vietnam in 1988 and its confirmed extinction because of poaching in 2010.

Protecting Tous will not be straightforward. We still don’t know its full range, but all evidence suggests it is restricted to a small region of New Guinea where lowland forests are under pressure from logging and agricultural expansion. Even in the photos, you can see logging debris and planted oil palm in the background. Local people told us it forms a pair and is monogamous, producing a single baby in a year. This likely low reproduction rate means it is especially vulnerable to hunting and habitat loss.

The knowledge that led us to this discovery came not only from fossils and photographs, but from local communities who have known this animal for generations.

If conservation builds on that knowledge, and if communities benefit from keeping wildlife alive rather than harvesting it, then Tous may have both a past and a future.

– ref. Meet ‘Tous’ — an entirely new genus of mammal we identified. Here’s why it’s so exciting – https://theconversation.com/meet-tous-an-entirely-new-genus-of-mammal-we-identified-heres-why-its-so-exciting-277235

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By David Ubilava, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Sydney

Conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran has now led to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key shipping route through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes.

But oil is not the only important commodity that has been disrupted. The Middle East is a key supplier of fertiliser, exporting some 45% of global supply.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the price of urea, a key source of nitrogen used in agriculture, has surged by about 25%, similarly dramatic to the spike in crude oil prices.

This is unwelcome news for Australia, which is a large importer of urea. With effectively no domestic urea production, Australia is fully exposed to global supply shocks.

For farmers, the crisis is not just of affordability, but potentially availability as well. And the timing is far from perfect, with winter crop planting starting soon.

Consumers almost always feel a major oil shock shortly afterwards at the fuel pump.

But if there’s a major shock for fertiliser to grow wheat, do consumers soon see rising prices of bread, flour and beer?

Usually not – and here’s why.

A key ingredient for crops

Urea is a key fertiliser used for agricultural production globally. It’s a concentrated source of nitrogen, widely used by farmers to boost crop and pasture growth.

Australia used to produce some of its own urea. But after fertiliser giant Incitec Pivot shut down its Gibson Island manufacturing facility (near Brisbane) in 2022, the country was left with virtually no domestic production.

A major new fertiliser plant, Perdaman’s Project Ceres (in Western Australia), isn’t expected to come online until 2027.

Right now, more than half of Australia’s urea imports come from United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These countries are all impacted by the conflict and shipping disruption.

How will farmers respond?

Economic theory makes a straightforward prediction: when the price of an input (such as fertiliser) rises, holding everything else constant, it becomes optimal to produce less.

In the present scenario, without close substitutes, one might expect a sustained fertiliser shock would reduce agricultural production and lead to higher prices for consumers.

This is unlikely to happen, however, and there are several reasons for it.

We have been here before

To begin, we have been here before. In this century alone, urea prices have surged substantially on two occasions: first in the late 2000s, then again in the early 2020s.

Focusing on wheat – one of Australia’s key exports, which relies on fertiliser for its production – in both instances, the price spikes were followed by an increase in production.

This may sound perplexing. But this price relationship isn’t like that of crude oil and petrol, where the former input is the main ingredient of the latter final output. While crucial, urea and other fertilisers are just some of many inputs used to grow food.

Indeed, the key input in agricultural production is weather. Much of the variability we see in agricultural yields is driven by climatic shocks rather than costs of fertilisers or other inputs.

Other cogs in the machinery

A recent study found in high-income countries such as Australia, commercial agricultural producers are both able and willing to absorb increased input costs.

It also found, perhaps surprisingly, neither fertiliser demand nor farm profitability were substantially affected by the 2021–2022 fertiliser price surge. An important part of the reason why was high agricultural commodity prices, especially cereal crops (such as wheat).

This neatly aligns with the theory we referred to earlier. Even though fertiliser prices spiked, other factors (such as grain prices) did not remain constant. This somewhat balanced out the effect rising fertiliser costs may have had on production.

Your grocery bills

So, what does all of this mean for the price of bread, meat, rice and other staples in your shopping trolley?

The Reserve Bank of Australia says it’s “too early to say” what the conflict could mean for inflation.

Certainly, if the disruption persists for a long time, the burden of the fertiliser shortage will fall on many Australian farmers.

But even if that happens, in high-income countries such as Australia the price of food is largely determined by the cost of processing, packaging and marketing – not the prices paid to farmers.

A surge in urea prices, in and of itself, may not drive food prices higher. But it won’t help ease other inflationary pressures, either.

– ref. Fertiliser costs are soaring amid war in the Middle East. Will your grocery bill follow? – https://theconversation.com/fertiliser-costs-are-soaring-amid-war-in-the-middle-east-will-your-grocery-bill-follow-277511

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Emily Brayshaw, Honorary Research Fellow, School of Design, University of Technology Sydney

Amanda Seyfried wears a “prosthetic butthole” in her new movie, The Testament of Ann Lee.

She told BBC Radio 2:

This movie needed to be graphic, so I wore a prosthetic butthole. […] It was cool. It was exciting. I was pregnant and naked, but I wasn’t naked at all. And at the end of the movie I was standing in front of a burning building with just a merkin. I felt so free.

On the surface, Seyfried’s comments might seem like a case of TMI. Audiences generally only see costume as a tool that helps to create and support a narrative. But costume also performs the important, invisible technical function of a quasi-body the actor inhabits to transform into their character.

Actors have intimate interactions with their costume that audiences don’t notice, including personal physical experiences of warmth, cold, comfort, coverage, restriction or movement.

But some roles can require the actor to portray intense emotional vulnerability, or distressing events, which can leave them feeling anything from mildly embarrassed to deeply traumatised.

By creating a costume that can be taken off, even when the character appears to be naked, costume designers help create an important separation between the role and the actor.

Taking care of the actor

Historically, actors have often been expected to do whatever appalling things the director demanded of them, regardless of the consequences to their physical or mental health.

Actors have also been expected to manage their own emotions in these roles. While many have different processes to help them exit the role, they still rely on theatre and film professionals like stage managers, dressers and directors to help manage their sources of emotion and distraction.

An important part of leaving the character behind involves taking off the costume at the end of a play or scene. But if your own naked body is the character’s costume in a scene, then how can you take it off?

Every actor has a different approach. Some don’t mind appearing nude for laughs, while others might use body doubles for sex and nude scenes, which provides them with a surrogate body.

The newer job of intimacy coordinators has developed in the past 15 years to help protect actors on stage and set. These are professional advocates who establish the ground rules, look out for the actors’ physical and emotional wellbeing, and assist with the choreography during scenes that require intimate touching, nudity or sex.

Actors and intimacy coordinators collaborate closely with the costume department to ensure the actor will be protected during nude and sex scenes with the right type of coverage.

Costume designing for ‘nudity’

Costume departments have a host of garments, accessories, prosthetics and hacks to protect an actor’s dignity in nude and sex scenes. These include modesty patches, fake nipples, stick on bras, strapless thongs and pouches that cover the genitals. These can be attached to the body with fashion tape or kinesiology tape.

The devices are made to match the actor’s skin tone and can be padded with a thick material (think yoga mat fabric) or made from a hard plastic to mitigate the impact of being touched or grabbed. Other costume hacks, such as merkins, have been around for hundreds of years.

The use of these devices means you won’t see the actor’s actual private parts or pubic hair; you’ll see the character’s.

This crucial distinction gives the actor a body they can take off.

Read more: Skims has put merkins back on the fashion map. A brief (and hairy) history of the pubic wig

Creating Ann Lee’s naked body

The Testament of Ann Lee covers the life of the founder of the Shaker faith over three decades and shows how she used her religious faith to process the pain and grief of physical tribulations, sexual abuse and the loss of her children, and to inspire others.

Seyfried has described the role of Ann Lee as “fucking daunting” and “really scary”, and has said the part needed to be graphic to show the strength of Lee’s faith in the face of extreme adversity.

Towards the end of the film, local thugs who do not want the Shakers to establish a church near their village attack Lee and her fellow worshippers at night and burn down their church. The thugs strip Lee and beat and humiliate her, accusing her of being a man and of being a witch. Ann Lee’s naked body is on display in front of the burning church during the brutal scene.

This is the scene where Seyfried wore a merkin and the “prosthetic butthole” – likely a modesty sticker, or a strapless, skin-toned thong with the merkin on the front that covered the vulva, perineum and anus.

The pubic wig is seen but the fake anus is not. But wearing them meant Seyfried could focus on the intensity of her acting and fully embody Lee in the scene, without worrying about her own dignity.

The modesty garments also gave Seyfried a body she could take off, leaving any potential for personal trauma, embarrassment or pain from playing Ann Lee behind her.

– ref. Amanda Seyfried’s ‘prosthetic butthole’ isn’t a joke – costuming nudity is important for actors – https://theconversation.com/amanda-seyfrieds-prosthetic-butthole-isnt-a-joke-costuming-nudity-is-important-for-actors-277233

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mehmet Ozalp, Professor of Islamic Studies, Head of School, The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation, Charles Sturt University

The death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, during the holy month of Ramadan marks one of the most consequential turning points in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

His successor, widely expected to be his son Mojtaba Khamenei, represents both continuity and contradiction in the revolutionary system established after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

At stake is not only who leads Iran, but what the Islamic Republic has become, nearly half a century after the revolution that promised an end to dynastic rule.

Who is Mojtaba Khamenei?

Mojtaba Khamenei is a cleric who has spent most of his career outside public office but close to power, working within the Office of the Supreme Leader. He was often seen as a gatekeeper and powerbroker rather than a public political figure with a formal portfolio.

At 17, he briefly served in the Iran–Iraq war. He only began attracting public attention in the late 1990s, by which time his father’s authority as supreme leader was firmly established.

Over time, his reputation has centred on two key features. The first is a close relationship with Iran’s security establishment, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and its hardline networks.

The second is a strong opposition to reformist politics and Western engagement.

Critics have linked him to the suppression of protests following the disputed 2009 presidential election. He is also believed to have wielded influence over Iran’s state broadcasting organisation, giving him indirect control over parts of the country’s information landscape and state narrative.

In 2019, the first Trump administration sanctioned Mojtaba, accusing him of acting in an official capacity on behalf of the supreme leader despite holding no formal government position.

Mojtaba’s legitimacy as leader

Iran’s constitution dictates that the Assembly of Experts (an 88-member clerical body) selects the supreme leader.

The assembly lists the religious, political and leadership qualifications of possible candidates. But in practice, it is not a neutral electoral body. Candidates for the assembly itself are vetted through institutions ultimately shaped by the supreme leader’s orbit, and its deliberations are opaque.

This creates a familiar Iranian scenario – the constitution supplies the choreography, while the security-clerical establishment supplies the music.

That matters when assessing why Mojtaba is seen as a viable supreme leader amid critiques he lacks the senior religious standing traditionally associated with the office.

A mid-ranking cleric, he was only given the title ayatollah in 2022. The title is necessary to become supreme leader, so the promotion signalled he was being groomed to take over from his ageing and ill father.

The revolution’s founding myth was clearly anti-dynastic. After toppling the shah, the revolution’s leaders rejected hereditary rule.

To many Iranians, a son following his father as supreme leader looks like an ideological backslide. The regime appears more like a theocratic monarchy, less the famous “guardianship of the jurist”.

Yet, it is also important to be precise. Mojtaba cannot inherit the position by bloodline alone. The assembly must select him.

Still, political systems can become dynastic without rewriting constitutions. Dynastic outcomes emerge when informal power networks, such as family ties, political patronage, security ties, and control over the media, can make one candidate appear more natural, safe or inevitable.

That has essentially been the Mojtaba story in Iran for years: a man who built influence not by winning elections, but by managing the gate to the most powerful office in the country.

The circumstances of Ali Khamenei’s death add another layer of significance and, ironically, legitimacy to Mojtaba’s ascension.

For many Shi’a Muslims, being killed during Ramadan carries deep symbolic resonance. The first imam of Shi’ism, Ali ibn Abi Talib, was assassinated during the dawn prayer in Ramadan in 661 CE, an event still commemorated each year by Shi’ite Muslims.

Shi’ite historical memory places strong emphasis on martyrdom. In particular, the death of Husayn ibn Ali, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, at Karbala in 680 CE, symbolises the struggle between justice and oppression.

Because of this tradition, violent deaths of leaders in the past and today are framed within a broader narrative of sacrifice and resistance.

Iran’s revolutionary ideology has long drawn on these themes. If the state presents Khamenei’s death in this light, it could strengthen a narrative of martyrdom and defiance.

This, in turn, gives his son Mojtaba an aura of religious legitimacy that is very strong in the Shi’ite Muslim psyche.

How different would he be from his father?

This is the most consequential question for Iran. The answer is likely less different than many might expect.

Ali Khamenei was a figure of the revolutionary generation. His authority rested on ideological legitimacy, decades spent amassing and consolidating power, and his ability to arbitrate between competing factions. Over time, he became the system’s final referee.

Mojtaba Khamenei, by contrast, is often portrayed as a product of the security establishment, rather than a public theologian or statesman. He is known less for speeches or religious authority than for his influence and the networks he has built behind-the-scenes coordination.

If that assessment is correct, the shift would be from a leader who balanced institutions to one who may lean more heavily on the might of the IRGC. This would deepen an existing trend toward the securitisation of Iranian politics.

In a period of war and instability, regimes typically prioritise continuity and control. Mojtaba’s appeal to the establishment, therefore, appears to rest on several factors:

• his close ties to the IRGC and intelligence networks
• his long experience inside the supreme leader’s office
• his ideological alignment with hardline positions sceptical of reform and Western engagement.

A figure trusted by the most powerful security institutions also reduces the chance of power struggles or fragmentation at the top.

What might this mean for the war?

A new supreme leader rarely produces an abrupt ideological shift, especially during a military conflict. Continuity is the more likely outcome.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s profile suggests a more security-centred style of leadership with three possible ways forward.

First, domestic control may harden. Given Mojtaba’s reported ties to the security establishment, unrest is more likely to be met with swift repression rather than political accommodation.

Second, the IRGC could expand its influence in regional affairs, given how closely aligned Mojtaba is with the guards.

Third, any negotiations with the West would likely be tactical rather than transformative. They would be framed as a strategic necessity rather than an ideological shift.

And given the fact his father was killed in US-Israeli airstrikes, this will only reinforce a more hardline posture toward both countries.

In short, Iran under Mojtaba Khamenei would likely remain confrontational in rhetoric, but pragmatic when regime survival is at stake.

– ref. Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s presumed next supreme leader? And would he bring change – or more brutal suppression? – https://theconversation.com/who-is-mojtaba-khamenei-irans-presumed-next-supreme-leader-and-would-he-bring-change-or-more-brutal-suppression-277483

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

South Australians are heading to the ballot box on March 21. If polls are correct, Peter Malinauskas’s Labor government will win in a landslide.

Polling also indicates One Nation has pulled ahead of the Liberal Party in the state, making it the first test of whether One Nation’s recent surge in national polls can translate into votes – and seats.

To talk about how the campaign is going so far and to explain some distinct features of the South Australian system, we speak to four locals:

• Flinders University’s Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy, Rob Manwaring
• former federal minister and incoming national Labor president, Kate Ellis
• Opposition Leader Ashton Hurn
• former Liberal Senator turned One Nation’s lead upper house candidate, Cory Bernardi.

A ‘once-in-a-generation premier’: Manwaring

Flinders University’s Rob Manwaring says Labor is not taking the election win for granted and was still “trying to pinch strategic moments”, like poaching the MotoGP from Victoria. Manwaring says the premier’s personal popularity has been a key to Labor’s success.

I just wouldn’t underestimate just the charisma and the political leadership of Peter Malinauskas. He has been described by others as a sort of once-in-a-generation style politician.

[…] Largely he’s been sort of quite untouchable [… although] the debacle over, for example, Adelaide Writers Week and the disinvitation to a particular writer and the fallout from that, that actually proved perhaps there was some overreach by the premier […] But politically, there’s no damage.

As for One Nation, Manwaring predicts the party could win one or two seats in the lower house and “at least two spots” in the upper house, based on current polling. But he says seats alone are not the only way to measure One Nation’s success at this election.

I think that One Nation nationally will be looking at South Australia as a test bed to say they are riding high nationally […] I think they will be looking at the South Australian campaign to see what’s working and what’s not. And it’s a striking development too, because One Nation has had so little […] history in South Australia.

Voters ‘flirting’ with One Nation should think again: Hurn

Ashton Hurn, who took over as Liberal leader with only around 100 days before the election, says she and her team “are working to ensure that everyone knows what we stand for”.

You just have to be focused on speaking with as many people as you possibly can. Something that I’m always mindful of is Winston Churchill. He said that a politician complaining about the media is like a sailor complaining about the sea, or thereabouts. And so I just try and focus on what I can control and that’s my movements on the ground, getting to businesses, getting to every corner of the state as much as I possibly can.

The opposition leader says that while “the polls are pointing in a certain direction […] it’s not over until it’s over”.

I’m focused on […] getting the important things right, like affordability in SA, the healthcare system, which, of course, was such a dominant issue at the last election that the premier went to the election urging people to vote like their life depends on it and now he barely mentions the ramping word. So just getting back to the basics, I feel that’s what people are wanting.

As for the challenge from the Liberals’ right flank from One Nation, Hurn says:

We’re dealing with One Nation in the same way that we would deal with all minor parties. And I say that not because I’m ignorant to what I see in the polls. But it’s one thing to be sending a message to the major parties. It’s another thing to vote for minor parties come election day.

So we’re really clear about what we stand for. We’re the only party that is interested in defeating the ALP. And I just encourage anyone who’s flirting with the idea of voting One Nation to give the Liberals another look.

Aiming for ‘a couple’ of upper house seats: Bernardi

Cory Bernardi, One Nation’s lead upper house candidate, says he and his team are “running to give a voice to a great many South Australians who think the major parties have left them behind”.

They think the Liberal and Labor parties are basically the same, they care more about themselves than they care about outcomes for the electorate, and we’re giving them a strong voice. But we’ve also got a solid policy backing behind us. We know what we want to do, we know what we want to influence.

Bernardi says One Nation’s priorities include opposing “all race-based legislation”, including repealing South Australia’s Voice to Parliament; abandoning “net zero”; and lowering the cost of living, such as by removing state government stamp duty from general insurance contracts.

Bernardi also defends recent comments One Nation leader Pauline Hanson made about no “good” Muslims. He says “I’m 100% supportive about her comments in respect to the cultural integration and immigration mix in this country”.

Bernardi says while “predictions are fraught with error”, he won’t be surprised if a likely Labor government can get their legislation through the next parliament. But he says “I’d like to think we might be able to get a couple [of seats] in the upper house”.

With so many in the race, expect complicated results: Ellis

Incoming national Labor president Kate Ellis says “a huge split in the right and a number of independents and a fracturing of the vote […] makes this a little more unpredictable than other elections”.

Asked about the SA premier’s pro-immigration stance, Ellis says Malinauskas hasn’t been “kowtowing to One Nation”, despite the party’s surging support in the polls.

He’s actually leading an intelligent conversation about the fact that we need immigration, our economy needs immigration. But also everyday families need immigration across a whole range of employment areas, where otherwise we just wouldn’t find the workers.

[…] The rise of One Nation here is really interesting, in that I’m seeing it in metropolitan areas where I see people that were once locked-in Liberal voters wearing One Nation t-shirts and caps when they’re at the local farmers market. Like it’s quite noticeable and quite new and different.

I think the thing we don’t know is we’ve seen the polls, but we also know that it’s going to be really complex here in terms of results. We have a huge number of candidates, I think it’s a record high, the number of candidates running in seats across the state. But we also have a number of independents and some quite strong independents. So we know that disillusioned voters may be looking elsewhere. But I don’t know where those votes are going to land in the end.

– ref. Politics with Michelle Grattan: South Australian election special – https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-south-australian-election-special-277502

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed federal parliament on Thursday his well-crafted speech had one gaping hole. It did not mention the huge issue dominating world attention – the United States-Israeli strikes on Iran and the subsequent ever-widening conflict that has engulfed the region.

Both Carney and Anthony Albanese were quick to back the action at the weekend. But their endorsements would have been given reluctantly. Despite Australia and Canada being close American allies and members, with the US, of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement, neither leader was accorded any prior notice of the attack.

Elaborating after his initial reaction, Carney said: “we took a position because we view the nuclear threat and the export of terrorism of Iran over decades as one of the gravest threats to international peace and security. In that limited sense we supported that aspect. That is not a blank cheque. That is not us participating.”

Albanese has been equally anxious to keep a distance while providing backing. He has refused, for example, to be drawn into the debate about the strikes seeming to flout international law.

Rewind to 2003 and the Iraq war. Labor was in opposition and came out strongly against the action. Albanese said at the time: “we do need regime change in some places of the world – it would certainly be good thing in Iraq – but it should be brought about peacefully”.

We might ask: if Labor were in opposition now, would it be against the American-Israeli action? Quite possibly.

In power, however, Albanese would have judged his government had no viable choice but to back Donald Trump’s action.

Critics argue that, given the nature of the Trump administration, Australia should unwind its alliance with the US. The Albanese government rejects that view as not in Australia’s long term interests – even if it were practical, given the now-advanced integration of our defence forces, to say nothing of AUKUS.

When Albanese finally secured a meeting with the US President last year, he established what seemed a reasonable rapport.

(Of course this can disappear in an instant, as British Prime Minister Keir Starmer found this week. When Starmer didn’t cooperate with Trump’s wishes in the Middle East conflict Trump turned nasty, saying, “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with”.)

In deciding his government’s stand on the US-Israeli action, Albanese would have been mindful of not harming the relationship he has established. An angry Trump could lash out – as he did against Spain. Trump declared “we’re going to cut off all trade with Spain” after that country said it would not allow the US to use jointly-run air bases in Spain for the Iran operation.

Albanese knew quiescent caucus members would suck up any doubts they had about backing the war. Politically, the main issue the government has had to cope with is some criticism of whether it has been doing enough to help stranded Australians get home.

As petrol prices started to rise – a hot button for the average person – Treasurer Jim Chalmers, who received some good news this week with a small uptick in Australia’s growth, quickly turned his attention to the economic implications of the conflict, amid work on the May 12 budget.

“The full consequences of this conflict are uncertain, but they’re likely to be substantial,” Chalmers said. “We already had challenges in our economy with inflation and global economic uncertainty, and what we’re seeing in the Middle East will make those challenges harder rather than easier, and this will be a key focus of the budget.”

Independent economist Chris Richardson’s judgement is that the conflict will be “a small economic negative and a smaller budget positive”.

“Conflict in the Middle East leads to spikes in both uncertainty and energy prices,” Richardson said in a social media post.

“Both of those will lower world growth, though perhaps not much.

“They’ll also drag on the Australian economy, though we do get a couple of offsets. The weaker world will weigh on industrial commodity prices, such as iron ore. But there are boosts underway to both energy commodities such as gas (where we are big producers) and fear commodities such as gold (ditto).

”[In net terms] that leaves the Australian economy feeling some pain (growth and jobs both a tad weaker), while still adding to overall national income (income from gas and gold both higher). The Australian economy is running faster than it can sustain right now, so a mild growth negative isn’t much of a problem.“

The new war has predictably worsened the fraying of social cohesion we’ve seen since 2023.

There was celebration among the local Iranian community, who welcomed the US-Israel strikes and fervently hope the conflict will lead to regime change.

But some mosques held or planned memorials for Iran’s slain Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. New South Wales premier Chris Minns strongly condemned them. That invited an extraordinary blast from the Liberal mayor of Liverpool Ned Mannoun who accused Minns of having a “fetish with attacking the Islamic community”.

There were calls for funding to be halted to Muslim bodies involved in the memorials. A $670,000 grant to a Melbourne organisation was cancelled.

Weeks before, Minns had cancelled the premier’s Iftar dinner. The state government said this was after consultation with Muslim community leaders. The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils this week said the decision “reflects the growing breakdown in the relationship between the Minns Government and the Muslim community” in the state.

“The reality is that the event would likely have faced a significant boycott from community leaders and organisations, which speaks volumes about the depth of frustration within the community,” the federation said.

Minns, questioned about police last month moving on praying Muslims, this week admitted to a “strained” relationship with the Muslim community.

“We want to rebuild the relationship, not just with me personally or the government or the Labor party, but with the civic institutions […] I don’t want to be in a situation where I’m antagonising the Muslim community, particularly during Ramadan.”

The sentiment is right, but overseas and local events have become wrecking balls for social harmony, and there are no obvious answers for repairing the damage.

– ref. Grattan on Friday: would Labor be supporting this war if it were in opposition? – https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-would-labor-be-supporting-this-war-if-it-were-in-opposition-277242