Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By James Dwyer, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania

Late last week, Israel began a wave of attacks on Iran under the banner of Operation Rising Lion, with the stated goal of crippling the Islamic republic’s nuclear program and long-range strike capabilities. At the outset, Israel claimed Iran would soon be able to build nine nuclear weapons, a situation Israel regarded as completely unacceptable.

Following Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, and targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and key members of the Iranian armed forces, Iran retaliated with a large barrage of ballistic missiles and drones against Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The first wave consisted of some 200 ballistic missiles and 200 drones.

The conflict continues to escalate, with population centres increasingly being targeted. Israel’s missile defence systems (including the vaunted Iron Dome) have so far staved off most of Iran’s attacks, but the future is uncertain.

Ballistic missiles and how to stop them

Iran possesses a large arsenal of ballistic missiles and long-range drones, alongside other long-range weapons such as cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles travel on a largely fixed path steered by gravity, while cruise missiles can adjust their course as they fly.

Iran is approximately 1,000km from Israel, so the current strikes mostly involve what are classified as medium-range ballistic missiles, alongside long-range drones. It is not clear exactly what type of missile Iran has used in its latest strikes, but the country has several including the Fattah-1 and Emad.

It is very difficult to defend against ballistic missiles. There is not much time between launch and impact, and they come down at very high speed. The longer the missile’s range, the faster and higher it flies.

An incoming missile presents a small, fast-moving target – and defenders may have little time to react.

Israel’s missile defence and the Iron Dome

Israel possesses arguably one of the most effective, battle-tested air defence systems in service today. The system is often described in the media as the “Iron Dome”, but this is not quite correct.

Israel’s defences have several layers, each designed to address threats coming from different ranges.

Iron Dome is just one of these layers: a short range, anti-artillery defence system, designed to intercept short-range artillery shells and rockets.

In essence, Iron Dome consists of a network of radar emitters, command and control facilities, and the interceptors (special surface-to-air missiles). The radar quickly detects incoming threats, the command and control elements decide which are most pressing, and the interceptors are sent to destroy the incoming shells or rockets.

Ballistic defence systems

The other layers of Israel’s defence system include David’s Sling, and the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors. These are specifically designed to engage longer-range ballistic missiles, both within the atmosphere and at very high altitudes above it (known as exoatmospheric interception).

Spectacular footage has been captured of what are likely exoatmospheric interceptions taking place during this latest conflict, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to engage longer-range missiles.

The US military has comparable missile defence systems. The US Army has the Patriot PAC-3 (comparable to David’s Sling) and THAAD (comparable to Arrow 2), while the US Navy has the Aegis and the SM-3 (comparable to Arrow 3) and the SM-6 (comparable again to Arrow 2).

The US deployed Aegis-equipped warships to support Israel’s defence against missile attacks in 2024, and appears to be preparing to do the same now.

Iran possesses some air defence systems such as the Russian S300 which has some (very limited) ballistic missile defence capabilities, but only against shorter range (and thus slower) ballistic missiles. Further, Israel has been focusing on degrading Iran’s air defences, so it is not clear how many are still operational.

Iran has been focusing on developing technology such as maneuverable warheads, which are harder to defend against. However, it is not clear whether these are yet operational and in Iranian service.

Can missile defences last forever?

Missile defences are finite. The defender is always limited by the number of interceptors it possesses.

The attacker is also limited by the number of missiles it possesses. However, the defender must often assign multiple interceptors to each attacking missile, in case the first misses or otherwise fails.

The attacker will plan for some losses to interceptors (or mechanical failures) and send what it determines to be enough missiles for at least some to penetrate the defences.

When it comes to ballistic missiles, the advantage lies with the attacker. Ballistic missiles can carry large explosive payloads (or even nuclear warheads), so even a handful of missiles “leaking” past defensive systems can still wreak significant damage.

What now?

Israel’s missile defences are unlikely to stop working completely. However, as attacks deplete its stocks of interceptors, the system may become less effective.

As the conflict continues, it may become a race to see who runs out of weapons first. Will it be Iran’s stocks of ballistic missiles and drones, or the interceptors and anti-air munitions of Israel, the US and any other supporters?

It is impossible to say who would prevail in such a race of stockpile attrition. Some reports suggest Iran has fired approximately 1,000 ballistic missiles of an estimated 3,000. However, this still leaves it with an enormous stockpile to use, and it is unclear how fast Iran can make new missiles to replenish its resources.

But we should hope it doesn’t come to that. Beyond the tit-for-tat exchange of missiles, the latest conflict between Israel and Iran risks escalating. If it is not resolved soon, and if the US is drawn into the conflict more directly, we may see broader conflict in the Middle East.

James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How does Israel’s famous air defence work? It’s not just the ‘Iron Dome’ – https://theconversation.com/how-does-israels-famous-air-defence-work-its-not-just-the-iron-dome-259029

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matt Fitzpatrick, Professor in International History, Flinders University

In the late 1960s, the prevailing opinion among Israeli Shin Bet intelligence officers was that the key to defeating the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was to assassinate its then-leader Yasser Arafat.

The elimination of Arafat, the Shin Bet commander Yehuda Arbel wrote in his diary, was “a precondition to finding a solution to the Palestinian problem.”

For other, even more radical Israelis – such as the ultra-nationalist assassin Yigal Amir – the answer lay elsewhere. They sought the assassination of Israeli leaders such as Yitzak Rabin who wanted peace with the Palestinians.

Despite Rabin’s long personal history as a famed and often ruthless military commander in the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, Amir stalked and shot Rabin dead in 1995. He believed Rabin had betrayed Israel by signing the Oslo Accords peace deal with Arafat.

It’s been 20 years since Arafat died as possibly the victim of polonium poisoning, and 30 years after the shooting of Rabin. Peace between Israelis and the Palestinians has never been further away.

What Amnesty International and a United Nations Special Committee have called genocidal attacks on Palestinians in Gaza have spilled over into Israeli attacks on the prominent leaders of its enemies in Lebanon and, most recently, Iran.

Since its attacks on Iran began on Friday, Israel has killed numerous military and intelligence leaders, including Iran’s intelligence chief, Mohammad Kazemi; the chief of the armed forces, Mohammad Bagheri; and the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hossein Salami. At least nine Iranian nuclear scientists have also been killed.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly said:

We got their chief intelligence officer and his deputy in Tehran.

Iran, predictably, has responded with deadly missile attacks on Israel.

Far from having solved the issue of Middle East peace, assassinations continue to pour oil on the flames.

A long history of extra-judicial killings

Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman’s book Rise and Kill First argues assassinations have long sat at the heart of Israeli politics.

In the past 75 years, there have been more than 2,700 assassination operations undertaken by Israel. These have, in Bergman’s words, attempted to “stop history” and bypass “statesmanship and political discourse”.

This normalisation of assassinations has been codified in the Israeli expression of “mowing the grass”. This is, as historian Nadim Rouhana has shown, a metaphor for a politics of constant assassination. Enemy “leadership and military facilities must regularly be hit in order to keep them weak.”

The point is not to solve the underlying political questions at issue. Instead, this approach aims to sow fear, dissent and confusion among enemies.

Thousands of assassination operations have not, however, proved sufficient to resolve the long-running conflict between Israel, its neighbours and the Palestinians. The tactic itself is surely overdue for retirement.

Targeted assassinations elsewhere

Israel has been far from alone in this strategy of assassination and killing.

Former US President Barack Obama oversaw the extra-judicial killing of Osama Bin Laden, for instance.

After what Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch denounced as a flawed trial, former US President George W. Bush welcomed the hanging of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as “an important milestone on Iraq’s course to becoming a democracy”.

Current US President Donald Trump oversaw the assassination of Iran’s leader of clandestine military operations, Qassem Soleimani, in 2020.

More recently, however, Trump appears to have baulked at granting Netanyahu permission to kill Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

And it’s worth noting the US Department of Justice last year brought charges against an Iranian man who said he’d been tasked with killing Trump.

Elsewhere, in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, it’s common for senior political and media opponents to be shot in the streets. Frequently they also “fall” out of high windows, are killed in plane crashes or succumb to mystery “illnesses”.

A poor record

Extra-judicial killings, however, have a poor record as a mechanism for solving political problems.

Cutting off the hydra’s head has generally led to its often immediate replacement by another equally or more ideologically committed person, as has already happened in Iran. Perhaps they too await the next round of “mowing the grass”.

But as the latest Israeli strikes in Iran and elsewhere show, solving the underlying issue is rarely the point.

In situations where finding a lasting negotiated settlement would mean painful concessions or strategic risks, assassinations prove simply too tempting. They circumvent the difficulties and complexities of diplomacy while avoiding the need to concede power or territory.

As many have concluded, however, assassinations have never killed resistance. They have never killed the ideas and experiences that give birth to resistance in the first place.

Nor have they offered lasting security to those who have ordered the lethal strike.

Enduring security requires that, at some point, someone grasp the nettle and look to the underlying issues.

The alternative is the continuation of the brutal pattern of strike and counter-strike for generations to come.

Matt Fitzpatrick receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. Iran war: from the Middle East to America, history shows you cannot assassinate your way to peace – https://theconversation.com/iran-war-from-the-middle-east-to-america-history-shows-you-cannot-assassinate-your-way-to-peace-259038

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jessica Kaufman, Research Fellow, Vaccine Uptake Group, Murdoch Children’s Research Institute

Last week, the Australian government announced a new National Immunisation Strategy for 2025–30. This strategy sets out the government’s priorities for improving vaccine uptake for children, adolescents and adults over the next five years.

It comes at an important moment. Childhood vaccination coverage has been declining consistently since 2020.

So what are the key goals of this new strategy, and will it be able to reverse the drop in vaccination rates among Australian children?

Declining vaccination coverage since the pandemic

While overall vaccination coverage remains high by global standards – at 92% for one-year-olds – this is down from a high of nearly 95% in 2020. The reasons for the drop include access challenges and concerns among some parents about vaccine safety and effectiveness.

Many children are missing out on timely vaccines that prevent diseases such as whooping cough and meningitis. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, who also have lower vaccination coverage rates at one and two years old, bear a disproportionate burden of these diseases.

And it’s not just children missing out. Among adolescents, HPV coverage at age 15 has dropped by 5% in girls (down to 81%) and 7% in boys (down to 78%) since 2020.

Influenza vaccination coverage has declined year on year since 2022 and remains at very low levels. Coverage in 2024 was 62% for people aged 65 and older, and under 30% for the rest of the population.

Across six key priority areas, the new immunisation strategy seeks to reduce vaccine hesitancy and improve access to vaccinations, particularly in priority groups such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. A few key points stood out to us.

1. Emphasis on trust and community engagement

We need to strengthen trust in vaccines and the people and systems that deliver them because low levels of trust are associated with vaccine scepticism and refusal. Even though Australians’ trust in childhood vaccines is generally high, there have been some bumps in recent years.

The pandemic left some people with lingering questions and misperceptions about vaccines, supercharged by misinformation and increasing political polarisation of vaccination.

The strategy rightly emphasises the need to engage with communities and build trust in vaccination and the health system.

However, relationships with communities can’t be stood up at a moment’s notice – they take time and effort to sustain. State and federal governments invested in these relationships with diverse communities during the COVID vaccine rollout, but many of these initiatives have since been dissolved due to lack of sustained funding and commitment.

Recently, there have been positive indications some governments are reinvesting in these efforts. Hopefully this strategy will encourage more to do the same.

2. Addressing equity and access

Too often government leaders and media headlines blame individual laziness or hesitancy for our uptake problems, failing to acknowledge the very real problems with service convenience and access that are also present.

The strategy makes clear that the government and immunisation service providers should make vaccination accessible and equitable. As a part of this commitment, it highlights the importance of ensuring all health-care professionals who are able to deliver vaccines are being utilised to their full potential.

Pharmacists are specifically mentioned, but there is no reference to the largest group of immunisation providers: nurses. They should be better recognised and we need reform to enable nurses to vaccinate more independently.

3. Recognising the importance of data

When vaccination rates are low, it’s essential to know why. This comes from both talking with communities and collecting robust data.

We are part of the National Vaccination Insights project, which carries out yearly monitoring using surveys and interviews with the public to better understand the drivers of vaccine uptake.

The strategy proposes a live dashboard of vaccine uptake data, which would be valuable, but we also encourage the addition of social and behavioural data. The dashboard should also report rates of vaccination in pregnancy. This information is newly available, thanks to the recent addition of a field to record pregnancy status in the Australian Immunisation Register.

4. Commitment to consider vaccine injury compensation

Maintaining trust in vaccination means being able to acknowledge when vaccines can very occasionally cause harm. People tend to be more confident in vaccines when you tell them what to expect, what the common minor side effects are, as well as the rare serious ones.

When those rare serious side effects become a reality for a handful of people, they may have to take time off work, incur medical expenses, and very occasionally, manage long-term complications. So it’s essential these people are financially compensated by government.

We had such a compensation scheme during the pandemic for COVID vaccines, but this ended in September 2024. We welcome the government’s plan to explore whether establishing a compensation scheme is feasible for all vaccines on the national program.

A comprehensive no-fault vaccine injury compensation scheme is overdue and, with thoughtful and consultative planning, would make our already robust vaccination system more trustworthy.

Where to from here?

The new national immunisation strategy is comprehensive and informed by evidence. But its impact will ultimately come down to its funding and implementation, which are not described in this document. Finalising these key plans and putting them into action must happen soon to arrest declining vaccination coverage and keep people well protected from serious diseases.

Jessica Kaufman receives funding from the NHMRC, MRFF, Australian government, Victorian government, and UNICEF. She is a member of the Collaboration on Social Science and Immunisation (COSSI).

Julie Leask receives funding from NHMRC, WHO, US CDC, NSW Ministry of Health. She received funding from Sanofi for travel to an overseas meeting in 2024.

– ref. The Australian government has launched a new strategy to boost vaccination rates. Will it work? – https://theconversation.com/the-australian-government-has-launched-a-new-strategy-to-boost-vaccination-rates-will-it-work-258808

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sarah Lothian, Senior Lecturer in Maritime Law and Academic Barrister, University of Wollongong

The high seas are set to gain a greater level of protection when a long-sought after treaty finally enters into force.

For almost 20 years, nations have debated the need for the High Seas Treaty, intended to protect marine life in the high seas and the international seabed. These marine areas together account for nearly two-thirds of the world’s ocean and harbour a rich array of unique species and ecosystems. The treaty is formally known as the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement.

Many hoped last week’s United Nations Oceans Conference would result in enough nations ratifying the treaty to bring it into force. As of today, 50 states of the 60 required have done so, while another 19 have promised to do so by the year’s end. A greater level of protection for our high seas is well and truly in sight.

By United Nations standards, this is a cracking pace. The treaty-making process itself can take years, particularly as states need to incorporate the treaty into their domestic laws. This speaks to the urgency of the moment. Researchers and authorities have warned that the world’s oceans are now in deep trouble, threatened by climate change effects, overfishing, plastic pollution and other human-caused issues.

Once the treaty enters into force, nations can begin to propose high seas marine protected areas, which could limit fishing and other activities. The question then will be how to police these marine protected areas.

How did we get here?

In June 2023, the High Seas Treaty was adopted by consensus at the UN Headquarters in New York. It was a long time coming.

For decades, nations argued and negotiated over what this treaty might look like. How could the marine genetic resources of this global commons be shared fairly and equitably? How could protected areas be designated and managed? What was eventually thrashed out was a comprehensive international legal framework able to better protect and safeguard the rich and diverse web of life inhabiting the deep sea.

Getting to this point was a real achievement.

But for this treaty to enter into force, 60 countries have to ratify it. This means their governments must consent to be legally bound by the terms of the treaty.

While Australia has pledged to ratify the treaty, it is still working through the ratification and domestic legal process. On a positive note, Environment Minister Murray Watt has indicated this will happen before the end of the year.

What will the treaty actually do?

At present, the high seas are regulated by a patchwork of global, regional and sectoral frameworks, instruments and bodies. However, none of these have a core mandate of protecting the biodiversity of the oceans.

In 1982, the Law of the Sea Convention was adopted, giving every coastal nation rights over the waters extending to 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) from their coastline.

Once you are past this, you’re in the high seas – the swathes of ocean not controlled by any one nation.

If and when it comes into effect, the High Seas Treaty would give the world a way to set up large marine protected areas in the high seas. It would also apply to the international seabed – the seabed, subsoils and ocean floor lying beyond the continental shelf of a coastal state.

Any new protected areas would likely have restrictions on activities such as fishing and shipping. But this will need to be done in consultation with relevant international bodies such as the International Maritime Organisation and regional fisheries management organisations.

The treaty would go a long way to reaching key conservation goals set under the 2022 Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Pact, which calls for protection of at least 30% of the world’s marine and coastal habitats by 2030.

The treaty also sets up a mechanism for the sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources, financial and otherwise. Bacteria living in deep-sea ecosystems have attracted much scientific and commercial attention for potential use in medical research or pharmaceutical, cosmetics and food industries. Genetic resources from sea sponges have given rise to antiviral drugs targeting COVID and HIV as well as anti-cancer drugs.

These resources were a major sticking point during the long negotiations.

Many coastal countries lack the ability to participate in high seas research. As a result, they can miss out on these and other benefits. The High Seas Treaty recognises this and sets up a strong framework for capacity-building, technology transfer and technical assistance for developing nations.

When will the oceans get a reprieve?

Once the 60th nation ratifies the High Seas Treaty, it will enter into force 120 days later. This date could be as soon as May 1 next year, if the threshold is reached on January 1.

Once this happens, this will be the date upon which the treaty gains legal force, meaning nations will have to comply with its obligations.

That doesn’t mean huge new marine parks will come into being. There’s still much work to do to hash out the mechanics of how the treaty would actually work, how it would be overseen and how it would work with the International Seabed Authority which oversees deep-sea mining and the Antarctic Treaty System, among others. Negotiators face more work ahead to solve these outstanding issues before the real work can begin.

That’s not to diminish this achievement. The progress on this treaty has been very hard won. Once it’s in effect, it will make a concrete difference.

Sarah Lothian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The historic High Seas Treaty is almost reality. Here’s what it would mean for ocean conservation – https://theconversation.com/the-historic-high-seas-treaty-is-almost-reality-heres-what-it-would-mean-for-ocean-conservation-258710

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lauren Zeuschner, Lecturer in Social Work, Federation University Australia

Thousands of men who use violence are referred every year to men’s behaviour change programs. Sometimes this attendance is ordered by a court, other times it is voluntary. The hope is this will result in program attendance (although that is not always guaranteed), promote perpetrator accountability and, ultimately, increase the safety of women and children.

Unfortunately, program attendance is low and while researchers have tried again and again to answer the question of whether these programs work, it is still not clear.

Referrals have continued anyway, so my colleagues and I decided to ask a new question. We invited nine Victorian women to talk in-depth about their experience of their partner being referred to a men’s behaviour change program.

We wanted to know: what was that like for these women? What meaning did they make of it?

This new study, published recently in the journal Violence Against Women, found the referral period can ignite for women an emotional firestorm characterised by hope, blame, being judged and, eventually, a sense of indignation.

How did women initially react?

Initially after their partner or ex-partner was referred to a men’s behaviour change program, the women were desperate to know if the type of family life they hoped for was something they would ever experience with their partner.

As Fiona* recalled:

I thought if it can help – this was when he sort of had me bluffed – if it’s going to work, go for it because the explosions were too big. And if he could control himself and think of what he says, pull his head in, if it can work then we can be a family. I was hoping.

The women were initially generally intensely hopeful, even though they hadn’t seen any evidence before to suggest their partners would change.

Janet said:

When we were together and I used to say, “We need to go and get help; we need to go and talk to someone”, he would say, “No.” He would yell in my face and tell me to “eff off” and “mind my own business” and that he didn’t have a problem; I was the problem.

This hopefulness motivated many women to stay in relationships with their partner or to support his access to their children.

The attention men’s behaviour change programs have received over the years seems to have fuelled a belief the programs could bring meaningful change.

As Rose put it:

the men’s behavioural change program is big-noted so much, like it’s oh you know, “It’s a great way for the men to realise what they’ve done and move on.” And it doesn’t do that.

Did their actual experiences match expectations?

The short answer is no.

The women we spoke to described being blamed by family, friends and workers for their partner or ex now having to attend the program. Meera recalled being told:

You are just ruining your marriage because now you have involved the police, so whatever happens to you that is your consequence because you chose to do that.

Many of the men resisted the suggestion they were “perpetrators” who needed to change. Some men contrasted themselves with others in the men’s behaviour change programs.

As Erin put it:

There’s always someone worse, and that’s how they are justifying themselves.

Other men reportedly gained support for their behaviour from men in the program. Paige said:

He would come home and tell me that the group agreed with him that the kids were at fault. That if the kids wouldn’t do what they did, then he wouldn’t lose his temper and he wouldn’t have to hit ’em […] So it was like they were justifying his actions.

Some women also battled with uncertainty around whether what they had experienced actually was family violence.

If their partner was a “perpetrator” did that make them a “victim survivor”? And if so, what did that mean for them and how they saw themselves?

A sense of indignation

For many of the women, the fact their partner or ex ended up being referred to a men’s behaviour change program helped inspire moments of validation.

It helped them believe with confidence that their partners’ behaviour was actually family violence; that it was unacceptable and unwarranted, and it was he who needed to change.

As the women came to terms with the reality of their partners’ behaviour and his resistance to change, the women began responding with indignation. Jane recalled that:

I said: “You’ve hurt a lot of people” and I said: “You’re not taking ownership.”

What’s next?

In the end, encouraging women to simply respond with indignation is not the answer. This would just continue the age-old practice of placing sole responsibility on women for the violence they face.

One action we can all take is supporting victim-survivors to identify that what they’re experiencing may actually constitute family violence, and question whether they believe those behaviours to be acceptable.

This new study also stresses the need for family violence and domestic violence services in the community to consider the implications a men’s behaviour change program referral has for everyone.

We must question who is intended to benefit when a man is referred to these programs, whether or not it actually eventuates into program attendance.

*Names have been changed to protect identities.

Lauren Zeuschner has received funding from an Australian government Research Training Program Fee-Offset Scholarship through Federation University Australia, and a Central Highlands Children and Youth Area partnership industry funded stipend through Child and Family Services Ballarat, which runs men’s behaviour change programs.

– ref. ‘They were justifying his actions’: what women say about men’s behaviour change programs – https://theconversation.com/they-were-justifying-his-actions-what-women-say-about-mens-behaviour-change-programs-259012

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Myra Williamson, Senior Lecturer in Law, Auckland University of Technology

Seabed mining could become one of the defining environmental battles of 2025. Around the world, governments are weighing up whether to allow mining of the ocean floor for metal ores and minerals. New Zealand is among them.

The stakes are high. Deep-sea mining is highly controversial, with evidence showing mining activity can cause lasting damage to fragile marine ecosystems. One area off the east coast of the United States, mined as an experiment 50 years ago, still bears scars and shows little sign of recovery.

With the world facing competing pressures – climate action and conservation versus demand for resources – New Zealand must now decide whether to fast-track mining, regulate it tightly, or pause it entirely.

Who controls international seabed mining?

A major flashpoint is governance in international waters. Under international law, seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

But the US has never ratified UNCLOS. In April this year, President Donald Trump issued an executive order to bypass the ISA and allow companies to begin mining in international waters.

The ISA has pushed back, warning unilateral action breaches international law. However, the declaration from the recently concluded UN Ocean Conference in France does not urge countries to adopt a precautionary approach, nor does it ban deep seabed mining.

The declaration does “reiterate the need to increase scientific knowledge on deep sea ecosystems” and recognises the role of the ISA in setting “robust rules, regulations and procedures for exploitation of resources” in international waters.

So, while the international community supports multilateralism and international law, deep-sea mining in the near future remains a real possibility.

Fast-track approvals

In the Pacific, some countries have already made up their minds about which way they will go. Nauru recently updated its agreement with Canadian-based The Metals Company to begin mining in the nearby Clarion Clipperton Zone. The deal favours the US’s go-it-alone approach over the ISA model.

By contrast, in 2022, New Zealand’s Labour government backed the ISA’s moratorium and committed to a holistic ocean management strategy. Whether that position still holds is unclear, given the current government’s policies.

The list of applications under the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024 – described by Regional Development Minister Shane Jones as “arguably the most permissive regime” in Australasia – includes two controversial seabed mining proposals in Bream Bay and off the Taranaki coast:

• Trans-Tasman Resources’ proposal to extract up to 50 million tonnes of Taranaki seabed material annually to recover heavy mineral sands that contain iron ore as well as rare metal elements titanium and vanadium.

• McCallum Brothers Ltd’s Bream Bay proposal to dredge up to 150,000 cubic metres of sand yearly for three years, and up to 250,000 cubic metres after that.

Legal landscape changing

Māori and environmental groups have opposed the fast-track policy, and the Treaty of Waitangi has so far been a powerful safeguard in seabed mining cases.

Provisions referencing Treaty principles appear in key laws, including the Crown Minerals Act and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act.

In 2021, the Supreme Court cited these obligations when it rejected a 2016 marine discharge application by Trans-Tasman Resources to mine the seabed in the Taranaki Bight. The court ruled Treaty clauses must be interpreted in a “broad and generous” way, recognising tikanga Māori and customary marine rights.

But that legal landscape could soon change. The Regulatory Standards Bill, now before parliament, would give priority to property rights over environmental or Indigenous protections in the formulation of new laws and regulations.

The bill also allows for the review of existing legislation. In theory, if the Regulatory Standards Bill becomes law, it could result in the removal of Treaty principles clauses from legislation.

This in turn could deny courts the tools they’ve previously used to uphold environmental and Treaty-based protections to block seabed mining applications. That would make it easier to approve fast-tracked projects such as the Bream Bay and Taranaki projects.

Setting a precedent

Meanwhile, Hawai’i has gone in a different direction. In 2024, the US state passed a law banning seabed mining in state waters – joining California (2022), Washington (2021) and Oregon (1991).

Under the Hawai’i Seabed Mining Prevention Act, mining is banned except in rare cases such as beach restoration. The law cites the public’s right to a clean and healthy environment.

As global conflict brews over seabed governance, New Zealand’s eventual position could set a precedent.

Choosing to prohibit seabed mining in New Zealand waters, as Hawai’i has done, would send a strong message that environmental stewardship and Indigenous rights matter more than short-term resource extraction interests.

If New Zealand does decide to go ahead with seabed mining, however, it could trigger a cascade of mining efforts across New Zealand and the Pacific. A crucial decision is fast approaching.

Myra Williamson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon – https://theconversation.com/seabed-mining-is-becoming-an-environmental-flashpoint-nz-will-have-to-pick-a-side-soon-258908

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Protesters across the United States have brandished placards declaring “no kings!” in recent days, keen to send a message one-man rule is not acceptable.

The defeat of the forces of King George III in the United States’ revolutionary war of 1775–83 saw the end of royal rule in the US. Touting itself as the world’s leading democracy, kings have not been welcome in America for 250 years. But for many, Donald Trump is increasingly behaving as one and now is the time to stop him.

Having studied ancient Roman politics for years, America’s rejection of kingship reminds me vividly of the strong aversion to it in the Roman republic.

Early Romans too, sought a society with “no kings!” – up until, that is, the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar, when everything changed.

The seven kings of Rome

Seven kings ruled Rome, one after the other, after the city was founded in 753 BCE. The first was Romulus who, according to some legends, gave the city its name.

When the last of the kings of Rome was driven from the city in 509 BCE, his key opponent, Lucius Junius Brutus, vowed:

I will pursue Lucius Tarquinius Superbus and his wicked wife and all his children, with sword, with fire, with whatever violence I may; and I will suffer neither him nor anyone else to be king in Rome!

Tarquinius Superbus (meaning “the proud”) had ruled Rome for 25 years. He began his reign by executing uncooperative Senators.

When Tarquinius’ son raped a noblewoman named Lucretia, the Roman population rebelled against the king’s long-running tyranny. The hubris of the king and his family was finally too much. They were driven from Rome and never allowed to return.

A new system of government was ushered in: the republic.

The rise of the Roman republic

In the new system, power was shared among elected officials – including two consuls, who were elected annually.

The consuls were the most powerful officials in the republic and were given power to wage war.

The Senate, which represented the wealthiest sections of society (initially the patrician class), held power in some key areas, including foreign policy.

Less affluent citizens elected tribunes of the plebs who had various powers, including the right to veto laws.

In the republican system, the term king (rex in Latin) quickly became anathema.

“No kings” would effectively remain the watchword through the Roman republic’s entire history. “Rex” was a word the Romans hated. It was short-hand for “tyranny”.

The rise and fall of Julius Caesar

Over time, powerful figures emerged who threatened the republic’s tight power-sharing rules.

Figures such as the general Pompey (106–48 BCE) broke all the rules and behaved in suspiciously kingly ways. With military success and vast wealth, he was a populist who broke the mould. Pompey even staged a three-day military parade, known as a triumph, to coincide with his birthday in 61 BCE.

But the ultimate populist was Julius Caesar.

Born to a noble family claiming lineage from the goddess Venus, Caesar became fabulously wealthy.

He also scored major military victories, including subduing the Gauls (across modern France and Belgium) from 58–50 BCE.

In the 40s BCE, Caesar began taking offices over extended time frames – much longer periods than the rules technically allowed.

Early in 44 BCE he gave himself the formal title “dictator for life” (Dictator Perpetuo), having been appointed dictator two years earlier. The dictatorship was only meant to be held in times of emergency for a period of six months.

When Caesar was preparing a war against Parthia (in modern day Iran), some tried to hail him as king.

Soon after, an angry group of 23 senators stabbed him to death in a vain attempt to save the republic. They were led by Marcus Junius Brutus, a descendant of the Brutus who killed the last Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus.

However, the Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death. His great nephew Octavian eventually emerged as leader and became known as Augustus (27 BCE – 14 CE). With Augustus, an age of emperors was born.

Emperors were kings in all but name. The strong aversion to kingship in Rome ensured their complete avoidance of the term rex.

‘No kings!’

American protesters waving placards shouting “no kings!” are expressing clear concerns that their beloved democracy is under threat.

Donald Trump has already declared eight national emergencies and issued 161 executive orders in his second term.

When asked if he needs to uphold the Constitution, Trump declares “I don’t know.” He has joked about running for a third term as president, in breach of the longstanding limit of two terms.

Like Caesar, is Donald Trump becoming a king in all but name? Is he setting a precedent for his successors to behave increasingly like emperors?

The American aversion to “king” likely ensures the term will never return. But when protesters and others shout “no kings!”, they know the very meaning of the term “president” is changing before their eyes.

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too – https://theconversation.com/no-kings-like-the-la-protesters-the-early-romans-hated-kings-too-259011

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Middle East Studies, Australian National University

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could last for at least two weeks.

His timing seems precise for a reason. The Israel Defence Forces and the country’s intelligence agencies have clearly devised a methodical, step-by-step campaign.

Israeli forces initially focused on decapitating the Iranian military and scientific leadership and, just as importantly, destroying virtually all of Iran’s air defences.

Israeli aircraft can not only operate freely over Iranian air space now, they can refuel and deposit more special forces at key sites to enable precision bombing of targets and attacks on hidden or well-protected nuclear facilities.

In public statements since the start of the campaign, Netanyahu has highlighted two key aims: to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and to encourage the Iranian people to overthrow the clerical regime.

With those two objectives in mind, how might the conflict end? Several broad scenarios are possible.

A return to negotiations

US President Donald Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, was to have attended a sixth round of talks with his Iranian counterparts on Sunday aimed at a deal to replace the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated under the Obama administration in 2015. Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term in 2018, despite Iran’s apparent compliance to that point.

Netanyahu was opposed to the 2015 agreement and has indicated he does not believe Iran is serious about a replacement.

So, accepting negotiations as an outcome of the Israeli bombing campaign would be a massive climbdown by Netanyahu. He wants to use the defanging of Iran to reestablish his security credentials after the Hamas attacks of October 2023.

Even though Trump continues to press Iran to accept a deal, negotiations are off the table for now. Trump won’t be able to persuade Netanyahu to stop the bombing campaign to restart negotiations.

Complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program

Destruction of Iran’s nuclear program would involve destroying all known sites, including the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, about 100 kilometres south of Tehran.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, the facility is located about half a mile underground, beneath a mountain. It is probably beyond the reach of even the US’ 2,000-pound deep penetration bombs.

The entrances and ventilation shafts of the facility could be closed by causing landslides. But that would be a temporary solution.

Taking out Fordow entirely would require an Israeli special forces attack. This is certainly possible, given Israel’s success in getting operatives into Iran to date. But questions would remain about how extensively the facility could be damaged and then how quickly it could be rebuilt.

And destruction of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges – used to enrich uranium to create a bomb – would be only one step in dismantling its program.

Israel would also have to secure or eliminate Iran’s stock of uranium already enriched to 60% purity. This is sufficient for up to ten nuclear bombs if enriched to the weapons-grade 90% purity.

But does Israeli intelligence know where that stock is?

Collapse of the Iranian regime

Collapse of the Iranian regime is certainly possible, particularly given Israel’s removal of Iran’s most senior military leaders since its attacks began on Friday, including the heads of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian armed forces.

And anti-regime demonstrations over the years, most recently the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests after the death in police custody of a young Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, in 2022, have shown how unpopular the regime is.

That said, the regime has survived many challenges since coming to power in 1979, including war with Iraq in the 1980s and massive sanctions. It has developed remarkably efficient security systems that have enabled it to remain in place.

Another uncertainty at this stage is whether Israeli attacks on civilian targets might engender a “rally round the flag” movement among Iranians.

Netanyahu said in recent days that Israel had indications the remaining senior regime figures were packing their bags in preparation for fleeing the country. But he gave no evidence.

A major party joins the fight

Could the US become involved in the fighting?

This can’t be ruled out. Iran’s UN ambassador directly accused the US of assisting Israel with its strikes.

That is almost certainly true, given the close intelligence sharing between the US and Israel. Moreover, senior Republicans, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, have called on Trump to order US forces to help Israel “finish the job”.

Trump would probably be loath to do this, particularly given his criticism of the “forever wars” of previous US administrations. But if Iran or pro-Iranian forces were to strike a US base or military asset in the region, pressure would mount on Trump to retaliate.

Another factor is that Trump probably wants the war to end as quickly as possible. His administration will be aware the longer a conflict drags on, the more likely unforeseen factors will arise.

Could Russia become involved on Iran’s side? At this stage that’s probably unlikely. Russia did not intervene in Syria late last year to try to protect the collapsing Assad regime. And Russia has plenty on its plate with the war in Ukraine.

Russia criticised the Israeli attack when it started, but appears not to have taken any action to help Iran defend itself.

And could regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates become involved?

Though they have a substantial arsenal of US military equipment, the two countries have no interest in becoming caught up in the conflict. The Gulf Arab monarchies have engaged in a rapprochement with Iran in recent years after decades of outright hostility. Nobody would want to put this at risk.

Uncertainties predominate

We don’t know the extent of Iran’s arsenal of missiles and rockets. In its initial retaliation to Israel’s strikes, Iran has been able to partially overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system, causing civilian casualties.

If it can continue to do this, causing more civilian casualties, Israelis already unhappy with Netanyahu over the Gaza war might start to question his wisdom in starting another conflict.

But we are nowhere near that point. Though it’s too early for reliable opinion polling, most Israelis almost certainly applaud Netanyahu’s action so far to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, Netanyahu has threatened to make Tehran “burn” if Iran deliberately targets Israeli civilians.

We can be confident that Iran does not have any surprises in store. Israel has severely weakened its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. They are clearly in no position to assist Iran through diversionary attacks.

The big question will be what comes after the war. Iran will almost certainly withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and forbid more inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Israel will probably be able to destroy Iran’s existing nuclear facilities, but it’s only a question of when – not if – Iran will reconstitute them.

This means the likelihood of Iran trying to secure a nuclear bomb in order to deter future Israeli attacks will be much higher. And the region will remain in a precarious place.

Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netanyahu has two war aims: destroying Iran’s nuclear program and regime change. Are either achievable? – https://theconversation.com/netanyahu-has-two-war-aims-destroying-irans-nuclear-program-and-regime-change-are-either-achievable-259014

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joaquin Vespignani, Associate Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania

The weekend attacks on Iran’s oil facilities – widely seen as part of escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran – represent a dangerous moment for global energy security.

While the physical damage to Iran’s production facilities is still being assessed, the broader strategic implications are already rippling through global oil markets. There is widespread concern about supply security and the inflationary consequences for both advanced and emerging economies.

The global impact

Iran, which holds about 9% of the world’s proven oil reserves, currently exports between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day, primarily to China, despite long-standing United States sanctions.

While its oil output is not as globally integrated as that of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, any disruption to Iranian production or export routes – especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows – poses a systemic risk.

Markets have already reacted. Brent crude prices rose more than US 6%, while West Texas Intermediate price increased by over US 5% immediately after the attacks.

These price movements reflect not only short-term supply concerns but also the addition of a geopolitical risk premium due to fears of broader regional conflict.

International oil prices may increase further as the conflict continues. Analysts expect that Australian petrol prices will increase in the next few weeks, as domestic fuel costs respond to international benchmarks with a lag.

Escalation and strategic intentions

There is growing concern this conflict could escalate further. In particular, Israel may intensify its targeting of Iranian oil facilities, as part of a broader strategy to weaken Iran’s economic capacity and deter further proxy activities.

Should this occur, it would put even more upward pressure on global oil prices. Unlike isolated sabotage events, a sustained campaign against Iranian energy infrastructure would likely lead to tighter global supply conditions. This would be a near certainty if Iranian retaliatory actions disrupt shipping routes or neighbouring producers.

Countries most affected

Countries reliant on oil imports – especially in Asia – are the most exposed to such shocks in the short term.

India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil and are particularly vulnerable to both supply interruptions and price increases. These economies typically have limited strategic petroleum reserves and face external balance pressures when oil prices rise.

China, despite being Iran’s largest oil customer, has greater insulation due to its diversified suppliers and substantial reserves.

However, sustained instability in the Persian Gulf would raise freight and insurance costs even for Chinese refiners, especially if the Strait of Hormuz becomes a contested zone. The strait, between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, provides the only sea access from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean.

Australia’s exposure

Australia does not import oil directly from Iran. Most of its crude and refined products are sourced from countries including South Korea, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.

However, because Australian fuel prices are pegged to international benchmarks such as Brent and Singapore Mogas, domestic prices will rise in response to the global increase in oil prices, regardless of whether Australian refineries process Iranian oil.

These price increases will have flow-on effects, raising transport and freight costs across the economy. Industries such as agriculture, logistics, aviation and construction will feel the pinch, and higher operating costs are likely to be passed on to consumers.

Broader economic impacts

The conflict could also disrupt global shipping routes, particularly if Iran retaliates through its proxies by targeting vessels in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, or Hormuz Strait.

Any such disruption could drive up shipping insurance, delay delivery times, and compound existing global supply chain vulnerabilities. More broadly, this supply shock could rekindle inflationary pressures in many countries.

For Australia, it could delay monetary easing by the Reserve Bank of Australia and reduce consumer confidence if household fuel costs rise significantly. Globally, central banks may adopt a more cautious approach to rate cuts if oil-driven inflation proves persistent.

The attacks on Iran’s oil fields, and the likelihood of further escalation, present a renewed threat to global energy stability. Even though Australia does not import Iranian oil, it remains exposed through price transmission, supply chain effects and inflationary pressures.

A sustained campaign targeting Iran’s energy infrastructure by Israel could amplify these risks, leading to a broader energy shock that would affect oil-importing economies worldwide.

Strategic reserve management and diplomatic engagement will be essential to contain the fallout.

Joaquin Vespignani is affiliated with the Centre for Australian Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University.

– ref. Israel’s attacks on Iran are already hurting global oil prices, and the impact is set to worsen – https://theconversation.com/israels-attacks-on-iran-are-already-hurting-global-oil-prices-and-the-impact-is-set-to-worsen-259013

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

The scale of Israel’s strikes on multiple, sensitive Iranian military and nuclear sites on Friday was unprecedented. It was the biggest attack on Iran since the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.

As expected, Iran responded swiftly, even as Israeli attacks on its territory continued. The unfolding conflict is reshaping regional dynamics, and Iran now finds itself with no easy path forward.

Strikes come at a delicate time

The timing of the Israeli strikes was highly significant. They came at a critical point in the high-stakes negotiations between Iran and the United States over Tehran’s nuclear program that began earlier this year.

Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report accusing Tehran of stockpiling highly enriched uranium at levels dangerously close to weaponisation.

According to the report, Iran has accumulated around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity. If this uranium is further enriched to 90% purity, it would be enough to build nine to ten bombs.

The day before Israel’s attack, the IAEA board of governors also declared Iran to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in two decades.

The nuclear talks recently hit a stumbling block over a major issue – the US refusal to allow Iran to enrich any uranium at all for a civilian nuclear program.

Iran has previously agreed to cap its enrichment at 3.67% under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a nuclear deal between Iran, the US and other global powers agreed to in 2015 (and abandoned by the first Trump administration in 2018). But it has refused to relinquish its right to enrichment altogether.

US President Donald Trump reportedly urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to attack Iran last week, believing he was close to a deal.

But after the attack, Trump ramped up his threats on Iran again, urging it to agree to a deal “before there is nothing left”. He called the Israeli strikes “excellent” and suggested there was “more to come”.

Given this context, it is understandable why Iran does not view the US as an impartial mediator. In response, Iran suspended its negotiations with the US, announcing it would skip the sixth round of talks scheduled for Sunday.

Rather than compelling Iran to agree to a deal, the excessive pressure could risk pushing Iran towards a more extreme stance instead.

While Iranian officials have denied any intention to develop a military nuclear program, they have warned that continued Israeli attacks and US pressure might force Tehran to reconsider as a deterrence mechanism.

Read more:
As its conflict with Israel escalates, could Iran now acquire a nuclear bomb?

Why surrender could spell the regime’s end

On several occasions, Trump has insisted he is not seeking “regime change” in Iran. He has repeatedly claimed he wants to see Iran be “successful” – the only requirement is for it to accept a US deal.

However, in Iran’s view, the US proposal is not viewed as a peace offer, but as a blueprint for surrender. And the fear is this would ultimately pave the way for regime change under the guise of diplomacy.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to the latest US proposal by insisting that uranium enrichment remains a “red line” for Iran. Abandoning this right from the Iranian perspective would only embolden its adversaries to escalate their pressure on the regime and make further demands – such as dismantling Iran’s missile program.

The fear in Tehran is this could push the country into a defenceless state without a way to deter future Israeli strikes.

Furthermore, capitulating to the US terms could ignite domestic backlash on two fronts: from an already growing opposition movement, and from the regime’s base of loyal supporters, who would see any retreat as a betrayal.

In this context, many in Iran’s leadership believe that giving in to Trump’s terms would not avert regime change – it would hasten it.

What options remain for Iran now?

Caught between escalating pressure and existential threats, Iran finds itself with few viable options other than to project strength. It has already begun to pursue this strategy by launching retaliatory missile strikes at Israeli cities.

This response has been much stronger than the relatively contained tit-for-tat strikes Israel and Iran engaged in last year. Iran’s strikes have caused considerable damage to government and residential areas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Iran sees no alternative but to push forward, having already been drawn into open confrontation. Any sign of weakness would severely undermine the regime’s legitimacy at home and embolden its adversaries abroad.

Moreover, Tehran is betting on Trump’s aversion to foreign wars. Iranian leaders believe the US is neither prepared nor willing to enter another costly conflict in the region – one that could disrupt global trade and jeopardise Trump’s recent economic partnerships with Persian Gulf states.

Therefore, Iran’s leadership likely believes that by standing firm now, the conflict will be limited, so long as the US stays on the sidelines. And then, Iran’s leaders would try to return to the negotiating table, in their view, from a position of strength.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As war breaks out with Israel, Iran has run out of good options – https://theconversation.com/as-war-breaks-out-with-israel-iran-has-run-out-of-good-options-258916

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hassan Vally, Associate Professor, Epidemiology, Deakin University

On Thursday afternoon local time, an Air India passenger plane bound for London crashed shortly after takeoff from the northwestern Indian city of Ahmedabad. There were reportedly 242 people onboard, including two pilots and ten cabin crew.

The most up-to-date reports indicate the death toll has surpassed 260, including people on the ground.

Miraculously, one passenger – British national Vishwashkumar Ramesh – survived the crash.

Thankfully, catastrophic plane crashes such as this are very rare. But seeing news of such a horrific event is traumatic, particularly for people who may have a fear of flying or are due to travel on a plane soon.

If you’re feeling anxious following this distressing news, it’s understandable. But here are some things worth considering when you’re thinking about the risk of plane travel.

Just how dangerous is flying?

One of the ways to make sense of risks, especially really small ones, is to put them into context.

Although there are various ways to do this, we can first look to figures that tell us the risk of dying in a plane crash per passenger who boards a plane. Arnold Barnett, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, calculated that in 2018–22, this figure was one in 13.7 million. By any reckoning, this is an incredibly small risk.

And there’s a clear trend of air travel getting safer every decade. Barnett’s calculations suggest that between 2007 and 2017, the risk was one per 7.9 million.

We can also compare the risks of dying in a plane crash with those of dying in a car accident. Although estimates of motor vehicle fatalities vary depending on how you do the calculations and where you are in the world, flying has been estimated to be more than 100 times safer than driving.

Evolution has skewed our perception of risks

The risk of being involved in a plane crash is extremely small. But for a variety of reasons, we often perceive it to be greater than it is.

First, there are well-known limitations in how we intuitively estimate risk. Our responses to risk (and many other things) are often shaped far more by emotion and instinct than by logic.

As psychologist Daniel Kahneman explains in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, much of our thinking about risk is driven by intuitive, automatic processes rather than careful reasoning.

Notably, our brains evolved to pay attention to threats that are striking or memorable. The risks we faced in primitive times were large, immediate and tangible threats to life. Conversely, the risks we face in the modern world are generally much smaller, less obvious, and play out over the longer term.

The brain that served us well in prehistoric times has essentially remained the same, but the world has completely changed. Therefore, our brains are susceptible to errors in thinking and mental shortcuts called cognitive biases that skew our perception of modern risks.

This can lead us to overestimate very small risks, such as plane crashes, while underestimating far more probable dangers, such as chronic diseases.

Why we overestimate the risks of flying

There are several drivers of our misperception of risks when it comes to flying specifically.

The fact events such as the Air India plane crash are so rare makes them all the more psychologically powerful when they do occur. And in today’s digital media landscape, the proliferation of dramatic footage of the crash itself, along with images of the aftermath, amplifies its emotional and visual impact.

The effect these vivid images have on our thinking around the risks of flying is called the availability heuristic. The more unusual and dramatic an event is, the more it stands out in our minds, and the more it skews our perception of its likelihood.

Another influence on the way we perceive risks relevant to flying is called dread risk, which is a psychological response we have to certain types of threats. We fear certain risks that feel more catastrophic or unfamiliar. It’s the same reason we may disproportionately fear terrorist attacks, when in reality they’re very uncommon.

Plane crashes usually involve a large number of deaths that occur at one time. And the thought of going down in a plane may feel more frightening than dying in other ways. All this taps into the emotions of fear, vulnerability and helplessness, and leads to an overweighting of the risks.

Another factor that contributes to our overestimation of flying risks is our lack of control when flying. When we’re passengers on a plane, we are in many ways completely dependent on others. Even though we know pilots are highly trained and commercial aviation is very safe, the lack of control we have as passengers triggers a deep sense of vulnerability.

This absence of control makes the situation feel riskier than it actually is, and often riskier than activities where the threat is far greater but there is an (often false) sense of control, such as driving a car.

In a nutshell

We have an evolutionary bias toward reacting more strongly to particular threats, especially when these events are dramatic, evoke dread and when we feel an absence of control.

Although events such as Air India crash affect us deeply, air travel is still arguably the safest method of transport. Understandably, this can get lost in the emotional aftermath of tragic plane crashes.

Hassan Vally does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. News of the Air India plane crash is traumatic. Here’s how to make sense of the risk – https://theconversation.com/news-of-the-air-india-plane-crash-is-traumatic-heres-how-to-make-sense-of-the-risk-258907

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Erin Smith, Associate Professor and Discipline Lead (Paramedicine), La Trobe University

Vishwashkumar Ramesh, a British citizen returning from a trip to India, has been confirmed as the only survivor of Thursday’s deadly Air India crash.

“I don’t know how I am alive,” Ramesh told family, according to his brother Nayan, in a video call moments after emerging from the wreckage. Another brother Ajay, seated elswhere on the plane, was killed.

The Boeing 787-7 Dreamliner crashed into a medical college less than a minute after taking off in the city of Ahmedabad, killing the other 229 passengers and 12 crew. At least five people were killed on the ground.

Surviving a mass disaster of this kind may be hailed as a kind of “miracle”. But what is it like to survive – especially as the only one?

Surviving a disaster

Past research has shown disaster survivors may experience an intense range of emotions, from grief and anxiety to feelings of loss and uncertainty.

These are common reactions to an extraordinary situation.

Some people may develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and have difficulty adjusting to a new reality after bearing witness to immense loss. They may also be dealing with physical recovery from injuries sustained in the disaster.

Most people recover after disasters by drawing on their own strengths and the support of others. Recovery rates are high: generally less than one in ten of those affected by disasters develop chronic, long-term problems.

However, being a sole survivor of a mass casualty may have its own complex psychological challenges.

Survivor’s guilt

Survivors can experience guilt they lived when others died.

My friend, Gill Hicks, spoke to me for this article about the ongoing guilt she still feels, years after surviving the 2005 bombings of the London underground.

Lying trapped in a smoke-filled train carriage, she was the last living person to be rescued after the attack. Gill lost both her legs.

Yet she still wonders, “Why me? Why did I get to go home, when so many others didn’t?”

In the case of a sole survivor, this guilt may be particularly acute. However, research addressing the impact of sole survivorship is limited. Most research that looks at the psychological impact of disaster focuses on the impact of disasters more broadly.

Those interviewed for a 2013 documentary about surviving large plane crashes, Sole Survivor, express complex feelings – wanting to share their stories, but fearing being judged by others.

Being the lone survivor can be a heavy burden.

“I didn’t think I was worthy of the gift of being alive,” George Lamson Jr. told the documentary, after surviving a 1985 plane crash in Nevada that killed all others on board.

Looking for meaning

People who survive a disaster may also be under pressure to explain what happened and relive the trauma for the benefit of others.

Vishwashkumar Ramesh was filmed and interviewed by media in the minutes and hours following the Air India crash. But as he told his brother: “I have no idea how I exited the plane”.

It can be common for survivors themselves to be plagued by unanswerable questions. Did they live for a reason? Why did they live, when so many others died?

These kinds of unaswerable questions reflect our natural inclination to look for meaning in experiences, and to have our life stories make sense.

For some people, sharing a traumatic experience with others who’ve been through it or something similar can be a beneficial part of the recovery process, helping to process emotions and regain some agency and control.

However, this may not always be possible for sole survivors, potentially compounding feelings of guilt and isolation.

Coping with survivor guilt

Survivor guilt can be an expression of grief and loss.

Studies indicate guilt is notably widespread among individuals who have experienced traumatic events, and it is associated with heightened psychopathological symptoms (such as severe anxiety, insomnia or flashbacks) and thoughts of suicide.

Taking time to process the traumatic event can help survivors cope, and seeking support from friends, family and community or faith leaders can help an individual work through difficult feelings.

My friend Gill says the anxiety rises as the anniversary of the disaster approaches each year. Trauma reminders such as anniversaries are different to unexpected trauma triggers, but can still cause distress.

Media attention around collectively experienced dates can also amplify trauma-related distress, contributing to a cycle of media consumption and increased worry about future events.

On the 7th of July each year, Gill holds a private remembrance ritual. This allows her to express her grief and sense of loss, and to honour those who did not survive. These types of rituals can be a valuable tool in processing feelings of grief and guilt, offering a sense of control and meaning and facilitating the expression and acceptance of loss.

But lingering guilt and anxiety – especially when it interferes with day-to-day life – should not be ignored. Ongoing survivor guilt is associated with significantly higher levels of post-traumatic symptoms.

Survivors may need support from psychologists or mental health professionals in the short and long term.

Erin Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Just one man survived the Air India crash. What’s it like to survive a mass disaster? – https://theconversation.com/just-one-man-survived-the-air-india-crash-whats-it-like-to-survive-a-mass-disaster-258905