Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

If Israel and the US hoped their attack on Iran would force the country to capitulate quickly, they were wrong. Despite the death of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many other senior figures, Iran has managed to continue firing drones and missiles at targets across the Middle East.

This poses a challenge for the US and its allies, including Israel and the Gulf states. The challenge is that they might run out of air defences before Iran runs out of airborne projectiles.

The US and its allies use a number of weapons platforms to knock down incoming missiles and drones. The most important are Thaad interceptors, Patriot systems and SM-family naval missiles, while Israel also uses longer-range Arrow interceptors. However, the supply of these interceptors has been under severe strain in recent years.

Many have been provided to Ukraine, which faces relentless Russian aerial assault. Others have been used in the Red Sea to protect shipping against attacks by the Iran-aligned Houthis. And more still have been stationed in the Indo-Pacific to defend South Korea and Taiwan from possible North Korean and Chinese attacks.

Despite their importance to modern warfare, US stockpiles of these munitions are dangerously low. There are simply too many competing priorities, and production has only recently been increased. The 12-day war the US and Israel fought with Iran in June 2025 is thought to have consumed around a quarter of the entire US inventory of Thaads.

When stocks of these munitions diminish during a war, choices have to be made about which targets to protect – and which not to protect. This usually means focusing on the defence of strategic military installations, allowing some civilian areas to be hit. Israel is widely believed to have made this choice during the 12-day war.

That moment may be approaching again. However, this time it is not just Israel that is at risk, but half a dozen other Middle East countries. The main problem is in the Gulf states, which are in range both of the sort of long-range missile that Iran fires at Israel and its shorter-range projectiles.

These Arab countries can also be hit more easily by Iran’s Shahed exploding drones. The drones are much easier to launch than missiles, require less risk to do so and can reach some targets in the Gulf within minutes. Iran is estimated to have 80,000 of them.

Ukraine has faced this type of attack mix for years and it has developed complex, multi-layered air defences to counter it. This means using expensive interceptors (each Patriot missile costs US$4 million) to take down ballistic missiles and using a combination of other things – even a machine gun will do – to take down drones.

It’s an effective system that has kept Ukraine in the fight and ensures it does not use too many interceptors. The Gulf states have not done this. Instead, they appear to be using Patriot missiles and other extremely expensive and scarce missiles to take down everything from ballistic missiles to US$20,000 (£15,000) drones.

Missile defence systems are designed to launch several interceptors at each incoming projectile, meaning their stocks can run down quickly. Probably within a few days, the Gulf states are going to have to shift their tactics.

Stocks running low

Even if the Gulf states are the most exposed, the situation is not rosy for Israel or US military forces across the region either. Some US forces are in range of Iran’s Shahed drones and short-range missiles. Others are in range of Iran’s long-range missiles.

The exact size of missile defence stocks is classified. But a look at budgetary and procurement data suggests that US forces will become stretched within a matter of days or several weeks at the very most. At that point, the US will have to begin drawing down missile defence stocks from the rest of the world.

According to South Korean media, discussions are already underway about removing Thaads and Patriot systems from South Korea and sending them to the Middle East. Ukraine will get fewer. And US military readiness will be severely degraded around the world, inviting aggression and the possible opening of a second front.

The other side of the equation is Iran’s capabilities, which are something of an unknown. Long-range missiles are the type of munition it has the least of, and they are also the riskiest to launch. The US and its allies can be fairly confident that over time they will significantly degrade Iran’s ability to launch these missiles. Whether it will be fast enough to happen before a critical interceptor shortage is less certain.

But Iran’s short-range missiles and drones are another matter. The drones, especially, can be launched without large, visible weapons platforms, which make an easy target for US and allied air strikes. Particularly if Gulf air defences become very degraded, there are a host of highly damaging targets for them to hit – ranging from US bases to oil and gas infrastructure to shipping.

Ultimately, the answer to how prepared the US and its allies are for a protracted conflict seems to be “not very”. Even if it runs out of long-range missiles, Iran can probably continue its drone attacks for a very long time, causing chaos throughout the region and spiking energy prices by disrupting production and shipping. Stopping them will not be easy.

– ref. How prepared are the US and its allies for a protracted conflict in Iran? – https://theconversation.com/how-prepared-are-the-us-and-its-allies-for-a-protracted-conflict-in-iran-277454

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gokcay Balci, Lecturer in Sustainable Freight Transport and Logistics, University of Leeds

The Iranian regime has announced the closure of the strait of Hormuz and threatened to target ships attempting to transit the narrow waterway. Some have already been damaged. While this could seriously harm global energy supply and raise costs, the consequences actually extend far beyond these markets.

The strait of Hormuz, which sits to the south of Iran and connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea, is one of the most critical chokepoints for international trade. More than 30,000 ships, carrying around 11% of global seaborne trade by volume, transit the strait each year. And around 34% of seaborne oil exports and 19% of seaborne natural gas shipments also pass through it.

However, oil and gas are not the only commodities moving through the strait. The Gulf region serves as a major hub for the transfer of containers carrying consumer goods, particularly between Asia and Europe.

Alongside Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates – the world’s ninth-largest container port – the region handles more than 26 million containers annually, around 80% of which are transhipment (cargo containers being transferred between vessels). It is estimated that more than 150 ships, with a combined capacity of about 450,000 containers, are stranded in the region.

Food and agriculture supply is at risk

The strait of Hormuz is central to the global fertiliser trade. More than 30% of urea – the most widely used nitrogen fertiliser produced from natural gas – is exported from Gulf countries by sea.

Urea prices rose by about 14% on March 2 compared with the previous day. Fertilisers account for a significant share of production costs in many agricultural products, just over a third each for both corn and wheat, for example. When increasing fertiliser prices combine with rising energy costs, producing important crops becomes more expensive.

So the availability of agricultural output and food products could also be affected by the crisis. In addition to potential fertiliser shortages, disruptions to shipping may hit supplies. Perishable goods transported in refrigerated containers are already at risk of spoilage as container ships remain stranded near the strait.

Gulf countries face particularly high risks because many depend heavily on imported food. In Qatar, for example, more than 90% of food is imported, with the vast majority arriving by sea. With flights not fully operating across the region, food availability could become a growing concern. Food by road freight from Turkey may provide an emergency alternative, but capacity would be limited and costs significantly higher than maritime transport.

Beyond the region, consumer prices may also rise. Higher energy costs are likely to be a major driver, although the overall impact will depend on how long the crisis lasts and what happens to those energy prices in the meantime. Brent crude oil prices increased from about US$72 (£54) before the strikes began to around US$79 as of March 4 – compared with roughly US$66 one month earlier.

A 2023 analysis by the European Central Bank suggested that inflation in Europe could rise by 0.8 points if a third of oil and gas supplies passing through the strait of Hormuz were disrupted. In the current situation, almost all shipping traffic through the strait has been halted.

The price of consumer goods could also be affected by the disruptions. Shipping costs have already increased for containerised shipments to the region, with major container lines imposing war risk surcharges ranging from US$1,500 to US$4,000 per container. For context, the typical cost of moving a container from Shanghai to Europe is around US$2,700-US$3,600 including freight and port cargo handling charges.

Similar surcharges are also applied to shipments between other regions not using strait of Hormuz, as leading container lines bypass the Suez canal, which links the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Instead, they reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope off the southern tip of Africa.

Read more: How Red Sea attacks on cargo ships could disrupt deliveries and push up prices – a logistics expert explains

This strategy was also adopted during the Red Sea crisis in late 2023, when Houthis in Yemen (backed by Iran) began seizing and attacking passing ships. Freight costs increased by 250% in the first few months of the crisis.

Overall freight rates – the price companies pay to transport goods – may once again increase globally as shipping capacity shrinks. Increases could be limited this time though, because the container sector was actually facing an overcapacity issue.

But perhaps surprisingly, higher shipping costs do not necessarily translate into large increases in consumer prices. For many products, maritime transport accounts for as little as 0.35% of the final retail price. But delayed shipments and unreliable transit times may instead create logistical challenges, including higher inventory costs and temporary shortages of essential goods, which can affect consumers more.

A prolonged crisis, combined with vessels rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, could intensify pressures on consumer prices, logistics and production costs, and the availability of food and other consumer goods. It’s a reminder that regional tensions happening in strategic locations like the strait of Hormuz have global consequences for consumers.

– ref. Strait of Hormuz: Gulf states’ food security is at immediate risk but wider shortages could push up consumer prices globally – https://theconversation.com/strait-of-hormuz-gulf-states-food-security-is-at-immediate-risk-but-wider-shortages-could-push-up-consumer-prices-globally-277214

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Richard Toye, Professor of Modern History, University of Exeter

When Donald Trump criticised Keir Starmer for failing to sufficiently support American and Israeli operations against Iran, he did so with a historical flourish. “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with,” he complained.

The implication was clear: Churchill would have stood shoulder to shoulder with Washington in a confrontation with Tehran. The remark invites an obvious question: what would Churchill have made of war with Iran?

The answer is not as straightforward as Trump’s comparison suggests. Churchill’s record shows a mixture of hawkish rhetoric, strategic caution and a constant concern with maintaining Anglo-American unity. Far from embodying a simple instinct for confrontation, he tended to see war and diplomacy as inextricably linked.

Churchill’s famous 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri, is a case in point. During this address, he warned that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe. But the speech – formally titled The Sinews of Peace – was not simply a call to arms against Soviet expansion. Churchill simultaneously emphasised the need for understanding between adversaries and the importance of strengthening the United Nations. His core message was that peace could best be preserved if the western powers demonstrated sufficient unity and strength to deter aggression.

Iran already featured in the geopolitical crisis surrounding that speech. At the time, Soviet troops had failed to withdraw from northern Iran despite wartime agreements. The episode formed part of the early tensions that would harden into the cold war. Churchill therefore already viewed Iran through the lens of great-power rivalry.

That perspective had deep roots. During the second world war, Churchill had travelled to Tehran in 1943 to meet Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin at the first conference of the allied “big three”. The gathering took place in the capital of Iran because the country had become a crucial logistical corridor through which allied supplies flowed to the Soviet Union.

For Churchill, the conference was a sobering experience. Roosevelt increasingly cultivated Stalin’s goodwill, sometimes at Britain’s expense. Afterwards Churchill reflected ruefully that he had sat “between the great Russian bear … and the great American buffalo,” while Britain resembled “the poor little British donkey”. The remark captured his growing awareness that Britain was no longer one of the world’s dominant powers.

That realisation reinforced a central element of Churchill’s postwar strategy: the cultivation of an enduring Anglo-American partnership. His call at Fulton for a “special relationship” between the British Commonwealth and the United States was not a mere rhetorical gesture. It was an attempt to anchor Britain’s future security within the emerging American-led order.

The irony of a Churchill reference

But Churchill’s thinking about Iran did not stop with cold war diplomacy. In 1953, during his second premiership, Britain and the US supported a covert operation that overthrew Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and restored the authority of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The coup was organised largely by the CIA, under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt Jr., but Churchill enthusiastically backed the plan. When Roosevelt later described the operation to him at Downing Street, the ageing prime minister reportedly declared that he would gladly have served under his command in such a venture.

That episode suggests that Churchill could certainly favour forceful action when he believed western interests were threatened. Yet it also highlights a historical irony. The overthrow of Mosaddegh became one of the central grievances invoked by Iran’s revolutionary leaders after the Iranian revolution. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly invoked foreign intervention – particularly the Anglo-American coup – to legitimise its rule and to portray itself as the defender of Iranian sovereignty against external domination.

In other words, the legacy of western interference in Iran has become one of the regime’s most powerful political weapons.

Churchill was well aware that wars and interventions could produce unintended consequences. Reflecting on his experiences as a young officer during the Boer war, he later wrote that once the signal for conflict was given, statesmen lost control of events. War became subject to “malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations”. This was not the sentiment of a pacifist. But it was the observation of someone who had seen how quickly political decisions could unleash forces that no government could fully control.

What would Winston do?

How might these instincts translate to the present crisis? Churchill would almost certainly have regarded Iran’s regime with deep suspicion. His cold war mindset inclined him to see international politics in terms of ideological confrontation and strategic balance. He might well have argued that weakness in the face of aggressive regimes invited further challenges.

At the same time, Churchill rarely believed that military action alone could resolve geopolitical disputes. His preferred approach was to combine firmness with diplomacy – to negotiate from strength while maintaining channels of communication with adversaries. Even at the height of the cold war he hoped that a position of western strength might eventually persuade the Soviet leadership to strike a bargain.

Above all, Churchill believed that Britain’s influence depended on maintaining close alignment with the US. But that alignment, in his mind, was meant to shape American power rather than simply echo it. The “special relationship” was supposed to be a partnership, not a blank cheque.

Trump’s invocation of Churchill therefore rests on a simplified image of the wartime leader as an instinctive advocate of military action. The historical record reveals a more complicated figure: a strategist who believed in strength, certainly, but also in diplomacy, alliances and the careful management of great-power rivalries.

If Churchill were alive today, he might indeed be urging western governments to demonstrate resolve. But he would probably also recognise that Iran’s political system has been forged in the memory of past foreign interventions – and that any new conflict would risk reinforcing the very forces it seeks to weaken.

Churchill once observed that war, once unleashed, rarely follows the tidy paths imagined by those who start it. That warning may be as relevant as any of his more famous phrases.

– ref. What would Winston Churchill make of war with Iran? – https://theconversation.com/what-would-winston-churchill-make-of-war-with-iran-277525

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hilary A Smith, Honorary Research Fellow (Linguistics), Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa – Massey University

Debates over language are back in the news in New Zealand, this time with proposed legislation that critics have dismissed as a political distraction.

In practical terms, the English Language Bill now before parliament – which has faced ridicule from the opposition for proposing to make English an official language in Aotearoa – would do little to change how it is used in daily life.

Nevertheless, the bill carries symbolic weight, arriving amid politicised debates over bilingual government department names and other changes to public language.

Moreover, it reminds us that language policy continues to be made reactively and piecemeal in New Zealand.

At a time when more languages than ever are being spoken in Aotearoa, the country remains without a clear and coherent national framework – something that increasingly carries implications for its workforce and migration.

A test too far? The bus driver case

A case in point came in January, when more than 500 bus drivers presented a petition to parliament warning that current immigration language settings risk creating a new driver shortage.

The petition argued the level of English required for residency is set unusually high, particularly when compared with Australia’s rules. According to the petitioners, this could force experienced drivers and their families to leave the country if they fail to meet the threshold.

At the centre of the dispute is the English-speaking world’s most used language test, the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), which tests listening, reading, writing and speaking.

Bus drivers applying for residence in New Zealand must achieve an IELTS score that is comparable to, and in some cases higher than, the level required of students beginning university study.

IELTS is also moving to an online-only format, meaning test-takers will need not only strong English skills but also the ability to type extended written answers under exam conditions.

One of the main arguments for maintaining high language standards is workplace safety.

But international research suggests this issue is more complex than a single test score implies. Studies show high-quality workplace training produces the best outcomes when it is tailored to different language groups.

For example, one 2021 study found that while environmental health and safety training delivered in English produced better results than animated cartoons for Portuguese speakers in Rio de Janeiro, the opposite was true for Chinese speakers in Guangzhou.

In other words, people learn best when they can understand what is being explained.

Reflecting this, US Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards introduced in 2010 require that “an employer must instruct its employees using both a language and vocabulary that the employees can understand”.

When content is well understood, it can also be more easily transferred into another language, including English.

Designed for settlement, not for work

The New Zealand government, for its part, has signalled little appetite to reform language requirements that have remained largely unchanged for more than two decades.

In its formal response to the petition, the government said the higher English standard applies only at the point of residence, not on temporary visas, and is aimed at long-term settlement rather than specific jobs.

In the government’s view, the requirement is about participation in social, economic and civic life, not occupational competence.

But even on its own terms, that distinction is open to challenge. English thresholds vary widely across visa categories: an Accredited Employer Work Visa requires IELTS 4, while from 2025 the Active Investor Plus Visa has no English requirement at all.

By separating “settlement English” from “workplace English”, policy is being asked to do several different jobs at once.

The result is a system that struggles to balance labour market needs, workplace safety and long-term integration, leaving key questions about language, training and productivity to be resolved as each issue arises.

A proper national language policy would align the scattered settings across immigration, education, government, law, public services, media and economic life – replacing ad hoc decisions with a coherent, evidence-based framework.

This is not to say the problem has been ignored.

Some notable pieces of work have included the Ministry of Education’s 1992 report Aoteareo: Speaking for Ourselves, the Human Rights Commission’s 2008 document Te waka reo and Royal Society Te Apārangi’s 2013 paper Languages in Aotearoa New Zealand.

More recently, the Ngā Reo o Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland Languages Strategy set out a long-term vision with goals and actions. It also provided a blueprint for the Languages Alliance’s call for a national, evidence-based policy framework.

All of these documents stressed the benefits of bilingualism and multilingualism – for individuals as well as for society as a whole. The benefits are not only educational and social, but economic.

Meanwhile, Aotearoa’s population is becoming ever more diverse, with more people speaking more languages each year. Data from the 2023 Census shows languages spoken by migrant communities are growing fast, with Panjabi up 45%, Tagalog up 38% and Afrikaans up 33% since 2018.

Without a clearly articulated framework with a strong evidence base, New Zealand is missing out on the potential opportunities offered by its growing linguistic diversity.

– ref. The debate NZ should really be having about language policy – https://theconversation.com/the-debate-nz-should-really-be-having-about-language-policy-277074

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Shalini Arunogiri, Addiction Psychiatrist, Associate Professor, Monash University

A class of medications best known for treating diabetes and obesity may also reduce the risk of addiction – and help people who already have one, a new study shows.

Semaglutide (also known as Ozempic), liraglutide and tirzepatide (Wegovy) belong to a class of drugs called GLP-1 (glucagon-like peptide-1) receptor agonists. These mimic a hormone involved in regulating blood sugar and appetite.

Interest in GLP-1s for addiction has grown in the past decade, as some people prescribed them for diabetes or weight loss noticed they were drinking less alcohol or smoking less.

Animal studies suggested these drugs might reduce cravings and lower the risk of relapse. Large studies using health records or administrative data hinted at similar patterns.

This new study, published today in the BMJ, found starting a GLP-1 drug was linked with a 14% overall reduced risk of developing new substance use disorders, including alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, nicotine and opioids. Among people with an existing substance use disorder, taking a GLP-1 was associated with a 26% reduction in substance-related hospital admissions.

What did the researchers do?

Researchers examined electronic health records from more than 600,000 veterans with diabetes who were treated through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs.

Researchers compared those newly prescribed a GLP-1 with those started on a different class of diabetes medication called SGLT2 inhibitors (including empagliflozin and dapagliflozin) – a well-established treatment used as a comparison point.

The study followed participants for up to three years, asking two questions:

• among people with no prior addiction diagnosis, were those on GLP-1 drugs less likely to develop one?

• among people who already had a substance use disorder, were those on GLP-1 drugs less likely to experience serious harms, such as hospitalisation, overdose, emergency department visits, or death?

The researchers used a method called “target trial emulation,” which structures an observational study to resemble a randomised controlled trial as closely as possible.

In a randomised controlled trial, participants are randomly assigned to receive either the drug being tested or a comparison treatment. The two groups should be similar in every way except for the treatment they receive. If one group does better, we can be confident the drug caused it.

Observational studies work differently. No matter how carefully researchers try to account for differences such as weight, age and other health conditions, there is always the possibility that some unmeasured factor explains the results.

The target trial emulation design used here is among the best available approaches for observational data, but it cannot eliminate this problem. It can tell us that something is associated with better outcomes; it cannot prove that the drug caused those outcomes.

What did they find?

With that caveat in mind, the results were notable. Among people without a prior substance use disorder, those on GLP-1 drugs were less likely to develop one across every substance category examined:

• alcohol, an 18% lower risk
• cannabis, 14% lower
• cocaine, 20% lower
• nicotine, 20% lower
• opioids, 25% lower.

This amounted to roughly 1–6 fewer cases per 1,000 people over three years.

For those who already had a substance use disorder, those prescribed GLP-1 drugs had better outcomes across every measure:

• 31% fewer emergency department visits related to their substance use disorder
• 26% fewer hospital admissions
• a 39% reduction in overdoses
• a 25% reduction in suicidal thoughts or attempts
• 50% fewer deaths.

This amounted to around 1–10 fewer events per 1,000 people over three years.

That these patterns held across multiple substances and multiple outcomes makes them harder to dismiss.

But they remain associations, not proof. The ongoing randomised trials will be essential for determining whether GLP-1 drugs genuinely cause these benefits, or whether something else is at work.

But these results might not apply to everyone

The cohort was 90% male with an average age of 65, so findings may not extend to women, younger people, or those without type 2 diabetes.

The group also had significant health complexity. More than half (57%) were current or former smokers, over 40% had high cholesterol, and many had additional conditions including high blood pressure, heart disease and heart failure.

Mental health conditions were also common – more than 18% had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), over 10% had depression and over 10% had anxiety.

We also don’t know whether participants were receiving any treatment for their substance use disorder, which could itself influence outcomes.

The bigger picture

Perhaps the most important takeaway isn’t about GLP-1 drugs at all. Substance use disorders are highly treatable.

Effective, evidence-based medications already exist – naltrexone and acamprosate for alcohol, methadone and buprenorphine for opioids – alongside a wide range of psychological therapies.

These treatments are safe and effective, yet only a small fraction of people who could benefit from them ever receive them. An estimated 3% of people with alcohol use disorder are ever prescribed effective medication.

The biggest barrier isn’t availability: it’s stigma, shame, fear of judgment and discrimination. Society still views addiction as a moral failing rather than a health condition.

For people living with a substance use disorder, this research on GLP-1s is encouraging but the more immediate message is that effective treatments are already available.

– ref. GLP-1 drugs like Ozempic may lower the risk of addiction: new study – https://theconversation.com/glp-1-drugs-like-ozempic-may-lower-the-risk-of-addiction-new-study-277367

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jack Anderson, Professor of Sports Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne

The opening ceremony of the 2026 Milan Cortina Winter Paralympics takes place on Friday but geopolitical tensions have spurred some countries, including the Czech Republic, Finland and Ukraine, to boycott the opening ceremony.

The planned boycotts come after a vexed build-up to the summer Olympics in Italy and continuing political uncertainty.

So, why are some countries boycotting the opening ceremony and how may the event be affected?

A tense lead-up

The build-up to the Paralympics, and the Winter Olympics before them, have been tense.

In February, many Italians protested when the United States confirmed it would send security officers from a unit of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for the recently completed Winter Olympics. These officers were stationed at the US Consulate in Milan to provide support to the broader US security team.

Then just this week, the Middle East has been rocked by US-Israeli attacks on Iran.

And on Wednesday, it was revealed the Ukrainian team had to change its uniform for the Paralympics because they featured a map of the country’s internationally recognised borders.

Items related to national identity are forbidden by the International Paralympic Committee (IPC). An alternative uniform was provided within 24 hours.

This brings us to the opening ceremony.

Why are some countries boycotting the ceremony?

A number of countries – including Germany, Finland, Latvia, Poland, and the Netherlands – have said they will boycott it outright or substantially reduce the number of team members who attend.

Some countries will be represented by proxy – that is, by local volunteers who will hold that nation’s flag and wave, on its behalf, to the dignitaries in the arena and the millions watching worldwide.

Russia is the reason these countries are rallying.

The IPC, as with most sports globally, banned athletes from Russia and Belarus from competing in major international events following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

While the IPC initially imposed a blanket ban, it subsequently allowed a limited number of Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete as neutrals at the 2024 Paris Paralympics.

But at its General Assembly in September 2025, IPC members voted to fully reinstate the membership rights of both Russia and Belarus.

The votes to rescind both the full and partial bans on Russian and Belarusian athletes competing at Paralympics were comprehensive: 2:1 in favour of reinstatement, as premised, in part, on a:

desire to separate politics from sport to a belief that the treatment of Russia had been inconsistent with that afforded Israel.

Despite the IPC vote, a number of international federations, which decide on the qualifying criteria for Paralympics, wanted to retain the partial suspension.

The matter was appealed to sport’s international court of justice, the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which struck down the partial suspension.

This meant a limited number of Russian and Belarusian athletes (six and four respectively) will compete at the Milan Cortina Paralympics, and they will do so under their own flags.

The fallout

All of this sparked outrage from Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelensky condemning it as a “dirty decision” at odds with European values.

Ukraine’s condemnation has been forcefully supported by many of its European allies – including Finland, Latvia, Poland and the Netherlands – the European Commission and Canada.

Not wanting to disadvantage its athletes by fully withdrawing from the games, these countries decided to boycott the opening ceremony.

But the IPC’s political troubles with the Winter Paralympics may not end with its opening.

Further concerns

The biggest legal issue at the Winter Olympics was the decision by the IOC to disqualify a Ukrainian athlete who wished to wear a helmet in remembrance of those lost in the war with Russia.

But what happens if, during an event, a Ukrainian para-athlete (or indeed a Russian or Belarusian competitor) makes a political gesture, either in celebration or defiance?

If such a gesture happens on the podium, will that athlete be stripped of their medal for breaching IPC rules on political neutrality?

The IPC is also keeping an eye on current events in the Middle East, but the attack by the US and Israel on Iran is likely to have greater impact on 2026’s biggest sporting event – soccer’s FIFA World Cup.

Attracting attention for the wrong reasons

The opening ceremony for the games will take place at the Verona Arena.

It is one of the best-preserved Roman amphitheatres in Europe. Built in the first century, it hosted gladiatorial games. Now, it hosts municipal events such as opera festivals.

It is a perfect setting for an opening ceremony, yet the Paralympics’ mission may be somewhat overshadowed, at least initially.

For the IPC, the Paralympics are central to its mission to use para-sport as a means to advance the lives of people with disabilities and create an inclusive world.

An opening ceremony is therefore an important means of introducing the world to these athletes – their struggles, stories and successes.

Current geopolitical uncertainty means, however, this opening ceremony is attracting attention for other reasons.

– ref. Paralympic politics: how Russia, Belarus and Israel sparked opening ceremony boycotts – https://theconversation.com/paralympic-politics-how-russia-belarus-and-israel-sparked-opening-ceremony-boycotts-276751

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Vaughan Cruickshank, Senior Lecturer in Health and Physical Education, University of Tasmania

On the eve of the 2026 AFL season, players and fans are mourning the loss of legendary commentator Dennis Cometti.

Cometti passed away in Perth on Wednesday after battling Alzheimer’s disease and dementia for several years.

Known and loved for his warm character and quick-witted “Cometti-isms”, he was a giant of Australian sports broadcasting.

He was 76.

The player

While Cometti is best remembered for his unique commentary style, he was also a talented footballer in his younger years.

He played 38 games for West Perth (1967–71) in the West Australian Football League and also coached the team for three seasons (1982–84).

His best year was as a 19-year-old in 1968, when he kicked 63 goals under the coaching of the legendary Graham “Polly” Farmer.

He made the senior list at Footscray in 1971, but did not play a senior VFL game due to injuries and media commitments.

He returned to Perth and had success as captain-coach of Maddington in the South Suburban Murray Football League, winning a hat-trick of premierships from 1974–76 and being club best and fairest in 1975 and 1976.

He also coached Kelmscott to the premiership in the same competition in 1979.

But it was commentary where Cometti really thrived.

The commentator

Cometti’s media career began as a disc jockey on Perth radio station 6KY in 1968.

He covered a range of sports, including cricket, Australian rules football and swimming across five decades.

Cometti worked for the ABC from 1972 to 1985, calling more than 100 cricket Test matches and working alongside another legendary commentator, Alan McGilvray.

But he was best known for his work as a VFL/AFL commentator.

He moved to the Seven Network in 1986 to cover football. He was chief caller across Seven and Nine for the next three decades.

He called more than 1,000 matches on television and radio, including nearly 500 with his close friend Bruce McAvaney.

Their partnership from 2007 to 2016 became one of the most respected commentary pairings in Australian sport.

Separate to his AFL achievements, Cometti also played a key role in Seven’s broadcast of three Summer Olympic Games: Barcelona 1992, Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000.

He is best remembered for his commentary of iconic gold medals from swimmers such as Kieren Perkins, Susie O’Neill and Ian Thorpe.

When he retired from television commentary following the 2016 AFL grand final, he was the only network television commentator to have broadcast every AFL season.

He retired from all broadcasting after calling the the 2021 AFL grand final for Triple M radio.

Outside of the commentary box, Cometti was renowned for being warm, generous with his time, and for his extensive preparation for games.

The preparation, often done while flying from Perth to Melbourne for games, allowed him to be one of the game’s most knowledgeable commentators, even though he did not play the game at the highest level.

‘Cometti-isms’

In addition to his smooth voice and deep knowledge, Cometti was famous for his quick wit and timing, which resulted in many famous pieces of sports commentary.

These included many entertaining one–liners, often called “Commetti-isms”.

Well-known examples include:

Another fan favourite was his description of Bulldogs midfielder Tony Liberatore emerging from a pack with a cut above his eye: “Libba went into the pack optimistically, but came out misty, optically.”

The national treasure

Cometti has been described as a “national treasure”, “without peer”, the “voice of football” and the “benchmark” for all other commentators.

He was the AFL Media Association’s caller of the year a record 11 times.

Cometti was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia in 2019 and was inducted into the Sport Australia Hall of Fame in 2019 and the Australian Football Hall of Fame in 2020.

Continuing legacy

Cometti is considered one of Australia’s greatest ever commentators.

His voice was the soundtrack to some of Australia’s greatest triumphs and he will be deeply missed, but not forgotten.

The Media Centre at Optus Stadium in Perth was named in his honour when it opened in 2018.

His quotes have been compiled into several books and a documentary focused on his commentary career will premier later this year.

His iconic description of Heath Shaw coming up “like a librarian” to smother the ball in the 2010 Grand Final replay was featured as a Toyota Legendary Moment in 2025.

Additionally, the “Golden Cometti” award for outstanding commentary is awarded annually on popular AFL focused show “The Front Bar”.

A giant of sport and media

For more than five decades, Cometti shone in the often harshly criticised world of sports commentary with barely a bad word said about him.

His passing sparked an outpouring of grief among countless athletes, teams, leagues, media personalities and the general public.

Brownlow medallist Gerard Healy, a long-time colleague of Cometti’s, summed it up perfectly: “

Cometti was simply one of the best and a joy to work with. He turned good moments into great, and great moments into forever memorable.

He leaves a legacy that is unique and authentic.

– ref. ‘Centimetre perfect’: how commentator Dennis Cometti became footy’s favourite voice – https://theconversation.com/centimetre-perfect-how-commentator-dennis-cometti-became-footys-favourite-voice-277503

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rohan Havelock, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

New Zealand’s Treasury has just launched a review of household insurance affordability – and it could not be timelier.

Amid another summer of weather disasters around the country, it emerged one insurer had temporarily stopped offering new home policies in Westport because of flood risk.

This follows wider concerns about insurers retreating from high-risk areas and more than a decade of rising premiums, with costs increasing three times faster than inflation since 2011.

Consumer NZ recently described the situation as “serious” and called for urgent government action, citing concerns about both affordability and the way the market is functioning.

The affordability and availability of private insurance are important public concerns in their own right. But they also have wider significance.

They reflect shifts in the level and distribution of natural hazard risk – and raise hard questions about whether New Zealand’s longstanding model remains fit for purpose.

The system behind the premiums

New Zealand’s approach to natural hazards protection, dating back to World War II, is built on private property insurance. Homeowners who insure privately automatically receive statutory natural hazards cover.

This link between private and public cover sits at the heart of this model. It assumes most households can obtain and afford private insurance. If that assumption weakens, the scheme’s reach shrinks. Access to insurance is therefore not only a market issue, but a structural one.

Essentially, insurance is a way of pricing and pooling risk. When the expected frequency or severity of loss increases, private insurers tend to raise premiums.

Climate change is contributing to more intense rainfall, flooding and landslides in many parts of the country. Past land-use decisions, allowing development in hazard-prone areas, have also increased exposure.

At the same time, New Zealand relies heavily on offshore reinsurance to manage catastrophic risk. In recent years, global reinsurance markets have tightened after large losses abroad. Higher reinsurance costs are often passed on to domestic premiums, along with higher building costs.

Unlike private insurance, natural hazards cover is not priced according to how risky a property is. Instead, it is funded through a flat levy paid by all insured homeowners – currently 16 cents for every $100 of the building cover cap – regardless of whether they live in a low or high-risk area.

This provides a degree of universal protection and spreads the risk of loss among homeowners nationwide, so those in lower-risk areas subsidise those in higher-risk ones.

An unlimited Crown guarantee means that the costs of extreme losses ultimately sit with the public balance sheet. By international standards, this cover is generous and unusual in extending to certain land damage.

Intervening to address the affordability of private insurance – through price controls or mandated coverage, for instance – could have unintended consequences. If insurers are unable to price risk freely, they may withdraw more broadly from certain areas.

Without private insurance, some homeowners would lose access to natural hazards cover altogether. That, in turn, could create pressure to expand statutory cover or rely more heavily on publicly funded disaster relief, shifting greater costs onto taxpayers.

When the safety net is stretched

The pressures facing private insurance are only part of the picture.

The natural hazards cover itself is also under strain. Treasury projects it will be underfunded by about 34% over its first five years, meaning levy income and investment returns are unlikely to cover expected claims over that period.

In practice, underfunding means either higher levies in future – something already signalled – or greater reliance on the Crown guarantee in major events. As hazards become more frequent or severe, that exposure is likely to grow.

The scheme therefore raises not only affordability concerns, but also questions about long-term fiscal sustainability. The Canterbury earthquake sequence illustrated this clearly, exhausting the statutory fund and requiring recourse to the Crown guarantee.

The Natural Hazards Insurance Act, which came into force in 2024, updated and refined the former Earthquake Commission (EQC) regime. It followed a public inquiry that drew lessons from the Canterbury earthquakes, clarifying definitions, lifting caps and improving claims processes.

Yet it did not revisit the system’s core design or its underlying assumptions about natural hazard risk.

For example, the scheme largely treats earthquake, flood (in respect of land damage) and landslide risks the same for the purposes of levies and cover. But these risks are not alike. Earthquakes are typically low in annual probability but high in severity.

Flood and coastal hazards are often more localised, more frequent and increasingly shaped by climate change. Landslides sit somewhere in between. Providing identical cover for very different risk profiles may no longer make sense.

All this underscores the urgent need for a broader review of New Zealand’s natural hazards insurance model. It should draw together hazard and climate science, economic analysis, land-use planning, fiscal sustainability, social policy and insurance market practice.

Rising premiums may be unsettling, but they are a signal of deeper pressures: growing natural hazard risk and strain on New Zealand’s current system.

The real challenge is to decide whether the model we rely on remains fit for purpose and sustainable in the decades ahead.

– ref. NZ’s rising house insurance premiums warn of a system under strain – https://theconversation.com/nzs-rising-house-insurance-premiums-warn-of-a-system-under-strain-277088

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Paul Strangio, Emeritus Professor of Politics, Monash University

The recent elevation of Angus Taylor to leader of the Liberal Party generated an expected avalanche of commentary. The reactions ranged over most points of the compass. In some, Taylor was depicted as a final leadership throw of the dice to avert the slide of the Liberals towards electoral oblivion. In others, he was a man with the right stuff to put the party “on track” (that is, to propel it further towards conservative populism).

However, one salient point missing in the tens of thousands of words expended on Taylor’s ascension was that it continued the now 36-year exile of Victorians from the Liberal Party’s helm.

The state has not produced a leader of the party since Andrew Peacock was defeated by John Hewson in April 1990. Over that time, the Liberals have changed leader 11 times, yet none has been from Victoria.

By contrast, of the ten individuals who have had charge of the party during that period, one has been from Queensland (Peter Dutton), one from South Australia (Alexander Downer) and eight from New South Wales. In short, the NSW division has enjoyed a virtual mortgage on the leadership, Taylor the latest instance.

Once the heartland of the Liberal project

The relegation of Victorians from the apex of the Liberal Party since the beginning of the 1990s is a radical departure from the story of the last century. The state’s primacy in the party was evident from its inception during the second world war.

In fact, disproportionate Victorian influence was also a reality of the Liberal Party’s original predecessor and namesake. It formed at the end of the first decade of the Commonwealth under the leadership of the quintessential Victorian and three-time prime minister, Alfred Deakin.

The moving spirit of the creation of the modern Liberal Party in 1944 was, of course, Victoria’s Robert Menzies, and the lion’s share of his influential allies in that foundation were also from his home state. Menzies became the party’s first leader and first prime minister. This began a pattern of predominance — during the second half of the 20th century, four out of six Liberal prime ministers and six out of ten of the party’s federal leaders were Victorians.

This Victorian hegemony effectively ended with John Howard’s resurrection as Liberal leader in January 1995. Howard not only remained leader until his defeat as prime minister at the 2007 election, but his abiding influence over the party ever since has worked to consolidate the ascendancy of NSW and the isolation of Victoria.

In other words, from the 1990s, the power centre of the Liberal Party migrated from its traditional base of Melbourne to Sydney. Moreover, in recent years that shift has stretched further northwards as a consequence of the preponderance of Queenslanders in the federal Liberal parliamentary room. Between 2022 and 2025, Queenslanders constituted nearly 40% of the party’s MPs, a dominance amplified by Dutton’s leadership.

The extraordinary weakening of Victoria’s hold on the federal Liberal Party from its heights of last century has mattered in at least two significant ways. Though frequently overlooked, historically the Australian colonies and states exhibited distinctive political cultures. Victoria’s was of an interventionist, progressive hue, whereas in NSW it was of more a conservative laissez faire flavour.

This distinction was evident in the contrasting philosophical tempers of the non-Labor parties from their early incarnations. Broadly speaking, the NSW Liberal division and its predecessors were ideologically positioned to the right of their Victorian counterparts.

This mostly persisted throughout last century. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude the pre-eminence of the NSW Liberals from Howard’s time (abetting his vast individual influence) is implicated in the party’s rightward pivot nationally. The recent numerical ascendancy of Queensland, a state with a tradition of strong strains of authoritarianism, populism and racial chauvinism in its political makeup, has only exacerbated this.

Second is the residualising effect on the Victorian Liberal Party. This century, it has become a pale imitation of its glory days during the postwar era. There is a chicken-and-egg conundrum to the Victorian Liberals’ electoral fall from grace over the past four decades and their shrinking sway in the federal party. Which of these developments catalysed the other?

Leaving that question aside, the electoral decline of the Liberals in the state can be readily summarised: the Coalition has lost the two-party preferred vote in Victoria in 15 out of 17 federal elections from 1980. The Liberals now hold only one out of 23 metropolitan seats in Melbourne: Tim Wilson’s electorate of Goldstein, which he reclaimed in 2025 by a wafer-thin margin of 175 votes.

The collapsed electoral fortunes of the Victorian Liberal division is also stark at state level. The party has enjoyed a solitary term of government at Spring Street this century. Its abject condition is injecting competitiveness into the state election to be held this November that would otherwise be anticipated as an inevitable defeat for Jacinta Allan’s Labor government.

With Labor seeking an unprecedented 16 years in office and mired in scandal, the Liberals ought to have a virtual lock on winning power. Yet November’s election looms as not merely a referendum on Allan’s tainted government, but also on whether the Liberals can be entrusted with office.

Riven by ideological and personal feuds that routinely explode to the surface, low on talent and led by the young and highly inexperienced Jess Wilson, few are willing to punt on a Liberal victory. Indeed, it appears voters are so repelled by both Labor and the Liberals that we are likely to see a chaotic smorgasbord of swings to minor parties and independents.

Read more: The Coalition leads in Victorian DemosAU poll, with One Nation posting 21% support

The waning of a Victorian tradition

It is intriguing to note that twice in the era of NSW dominance (and Queensland’s escalating influence) within the Liberal Party, there has been the prospect of the leadership returning to Victoria. The first opportunity followed Howard’s defeat at the 2007 election, when Peter Costello was the assumed heir apparent: he had been blocked from succeeding the older man by Howard’s manic determination to stay prime minister to the bitter end.

However, aggrieved at Howard’s denial of him and unwilling to endure a potentially lengthy stint in opposition, Costello spurned the leadership before leaving parliament. The second time was when Scott Morrison’s government was defeated in May 2022. Morrison’s treasurer, Josh Frydenberg, had been regarded as a leader-in-waiting. However, he lost his formerly blue ribbon seat of Kooyong at that election, a casualty of the Teal insurgency.

It is impossible to say with confidence whether, if either of these Victorians had acquired the Liberal leadership, they would have been willing or able to chart a more moderate course for their party. Costello had displayed signs of less conservative sensibility to Howard on the issues of climate change and Indigenous reconciliation. Frydenberg, too, had moments when he showed a markedly different mindset to Liberal right-wing warriors, such as with his ultimately futile effort when environment minister in Malcolm Turnbull’s government to devise a policy mechanism for curbing carbon emissions.

As it was, the leadership passed to NSW and Queensland in 2007 and 2022, respectively. On the first occasion, it went briefly to Brendan Nelson and then to Turnbull before settling in Tony Abbott’s hands. On the second occasion it went straight to Dutton. Notably, these two, Abbott and Dutton, more than any other leaders of the Liberal Party post-Howard, through a process of imitation and amplification of Howardism, accelerated the party’s journey to conservative populism and an intolerance of progressivism.

The marginalising of Victorian influence has undoubtedly been one factor in the dire place the Liberal Party has arrived at in Australia. Where once the Victorian division could have been relied on to provide a point of resistance to the party’s rightward trajectory, it has been largely reduced to impotence as an ideological balancing force.

Indeed, this sidelining has been so prolonged there is little sign of the division any longer being custodian of an alternative, more centrist philosophical outlook.

The Victorian division has grown virtually unrecognisable from its distinctive historical identity: as a party whose forebears encompass Deakin, Menzies, Rupert Hamer and Malcolm Fraser. The end result is that, unlike during the second world war when the renaissance of non-Labor was led from Victoria, there appears a greatly diminished prospect of the state being a springboard for the party’s national rejuvenation today.

– ref. The Liberal Party’s current woes are many. Sidelining Victoria is one of them – https://theconversation.com/the-liberal-partys-current-woes-are-many-sidelining-victoria-is-one-of-them-262431