Source: The Conversation – UK
Russia’s drone and missile attacks on Ukraine’s population and infrastructure continue to dominate coverage of the conflict. But on the ground, Ukraine has been making significant, if still limited, gains.
In mid-September, Ukraine formally announced the existence of Operation Vivaldi, which has retaken territory near Lyman and disrupted a Russian advance toward the fortified cities that form a key part of Ukraine’s eastern defences.
What’s important isn’t just that Ukraine has been conducting a successful counteroffensive. It is how it has created the conditions for success and what that might say about future battlefield dynamics in the Russo-Ukraine war.
Lyman is a road and rail junction on the northern approaches to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Russia has spent months trying to advance around it as part of a wider effort to encircle Ukraine’s eastern defensive line. Vivaldi has substantially reduced the Russian push into Ukrainian territory north of Lyman, disrupting the northern arm of the plan. Ukraine’s Third Army Corps has claimed that by the end of last month the operation had retaken 176 sq km of territory.
Institute for the Study of War
Vivaldi is significant because it has been much more than a brief attack against Russian forces. The scale of the preparations, the use of lessons from previous operations and the coordination of several brigades make this an exercise in planning and carrying out a large-scale military campaign.
Vivaldi began in May this year, but Ukraine kept it quiet until September. The corps described its first phase – which appears to have taken place over several months – as creating favourable conditions for later activity. This involved attacking Russian air defence, electronic warfare capabilities, artillery and logistics, disrupting Russian drone operations and concealing Ukrainian intentions.
Ultimately, Ukrainian forces were able to disrupt Russian defences well beyond the frontline and into the depth of the Russian rear areas, and drive back Russian drone units, including elements of the elite Rubicon drone formation. This allowed Ukraine’s Third Corps to achieve the necessary measure of local drone superiority.
Subsequent phases exploited this advantage with the coordinated application of different military capabilities. Drones and robots have been important. Drone crews and other units worked together to strike enemy systems before the infantry advanced. And ground robots carried supplies, conducted mine clearance or provided fire support, and some, for the first time, were dropped by drones behind Russian defences.
But other capabilities have been critical. Even armour, in the form of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, has retained a role – although it is used more cautiously because of the threat posed by enemy drones. After other forces have suppressed enemy drone and artillery units, armoured vehicles have helped exploit gaps in the enemy defences, allowing troops to advance much faster.
Coordinated offensive
But the important development is the manner in which these elements have been coordinated. What has made Vivaldi stand out is much more about how established and newer capabilities have been brought together through innovative tactics and techniques than it is about the impact of a single system.
These lessons may be already being put into practice beyond Lyman. Ukraine has also been making gains east of the fortress-belt cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. This has included advances across the Siverskyi Donets river – which was an important target for Russia back in January 2026. These counterattacks are also likely to have been supported by extensive preparation.
This suggests that Ukrainian forces are applying some of the same methods elsewhere. What this means for the war, though, is still a matter of debate. One of the central difficulties faced by both sides in the conflict is how to escape from a static war of attrition and restore manoeuvre to the battlefield. Operation Vivaldi provides evidence of the methods that might work to restore the power of offensive operations on a high-visibility, high-precision battlefield.
Important caveats
But there are some caveats that must be considered. First, 176 sq km is still a limited advance in the overall scheme of the war. And Russia is continuing to advance elsewhere, albeit very slowly.
Second, while Russian milbloggers – the ecosystem of journalists, commentators and analysts who support the war, but can be critical of the way it is being waged – have confirmed the problems caused by Operation Vivaldi, we are still reliant for most of our information on Ukrainian sources. The formation conducting the assault, Third Corps, is adept at information operations, which promotes its successes relative to the performance of other units.
Third, to have a broader impact, the successful techniques will have to be transferred across other Ukrainian units. This has not always proved easy.
Fourth, Russia is likely to adapt, given that the capacity to adapt to new equipment and tactics is one of the significant features of the war. Russia’s military planners are likely to study the operation and try to copy or counter what has worked. It may strengthen its defences, seek to blunt Ukrainian drone and electronic-warfare advantages, and apply some of the techniques to its own offensive operations.
How far and how fast it can adapt will therefore be a defining factor in the impact of Operation Vivaldi. At the moment, Russia is moving troops from other sections of the front. Its response, however, has been heavily criticised in the Russian milblogger community, especially because of the culture of “beautiful reports”: the propensity across the Russian military to avoid reporting failure upwards and to exaggerate the effectiveness of Russian operations.
Meanwhile, Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure have intensified ahead of winter. And Kyiv has claimed that Putin will seek to increase its mobilisation to raise another 300,000 troops for the battlefield.
It seems unlikely, given its limited scale, that Vivaldi has prompted these developments. But the operation is still unfolding. Whether Ukraine can repeat the methods, and whether Russia can adapt to stop it, will determine whether this operation remains a local success or whether it points to a larger change in the direction of the war.
Chris Tuck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.