Are wars affordable? The answer of course is ‘yes and no’.

Affording a war is different from financing a war. To make any new thing affordable, either there must be a reallocation of resources or a deployment of resources not otherwise in use. Or a mix of both. Further, resources get destroyed, and not only the resources of the ‘loser’.

Wars may be fully tax-funded – that is, by increased taxation – by one or more belligerents; but most usually they are not. Otherwise, wars are financed. Financing is a mechanism which enables the distribution of spending to differ from the distribution of income. Typically, spending by warring parties exceeds their incomes, so must be financed through government ‘fiscal’ deficits.

Income is the rights to current goods and services; that is, to current output. Present tense. In particular wages, profits, rents, royalties. Finance is the principal mechanism whereby such rights to current output are transferred by some people (including businesses and governments) to other people. By giving up a right to current output, a party either gains a right (ie a ‘claim’) to future output or is fulfilling an obligation – a debt – incurred in the past. Thus, giving up rights to current output is called either ‘saving’ or ‘debt repayment’. Saving, conceding such rights in return for claims on future output, is commonly understood as lending or ‘advancing’ funds.

We note that in many cases, debtors – parties holding obligations incurred in the past – have discretion over when they fulfil their obligations. Likewise, savers (creditors) have some discretion over when they call in (ie realise, spend) their savings; that is, discretion over when they exercise – ie liquidate – their historical claims to current output. As a general matter, is it a good thing if those two matters of debtor and creditor discretion balance out, creating a sense of ‘equilibrium’.

Historically, however, creditors have often failed to liquidate their claims at all; many creditors like to hold onto their claims for indefinite periods, thereby enabling debts to be merely ‘serviced’ rather than repaid. Unrealised claims are called ‘wealth’, and many people like to hold wealth until they die, rather than spend it.

If insufficient current output is purchased by past savers, it becomes a systemic requirement that new debts are contracted and spent.

When sovereign governments contract new debts to fulfil this systemic requirement (possibly as ‘debtors of last resort’), this is ‘fiscal accommodation’. When governments refuse to contract new debts to fulfil this systemic requirement, we may call this either ‘fiscal consolidation’ or ‘public austerity’.

Wars – and preparations for war – may be destructive (or at least non-productive) examples of fiscal accommodation; such accommodating militarisation may achieve that purpose without specific intent to do so. (In the 1930s the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes offered, as an example of contextually beneficial non-productive fiscal accommodation, governments paying workers to dig up holes and fill them in again!)

Wars

Medieval wars were often short-term affairs, because of seasonal patterns of labour demand. Wars have for the most part been labour intensive; and that’s still the case today, even if the casualties of post-modern wars are more likely to be civilians and less likely to be soldiers and sailors.

Medieval sieges often had to be terminated around August because the soldiers in the sieging army had to return to collect the harvest. September was the time of the year when there was virtually zero unemployment. Siege defence was made possible because harvest labour requirements would likely break the stalemate. The corollary is that medieval wars could be afforded because, in late-spring and early-summer, there was seasonally unemployed labour.

In the modern period (approximately 1490 to 1990), especially in Europe, labour became increasingly divorced from agriculture, making it possible to have ever larger standing armies (and navies), making bigger and longer wars possible. Further, the modern period saw the emergence of sovereign nation states; so, increasingly, war finance became intrinsically connected to public finance. Wars of exploitation and territorial expansion became a central feature of the emergent mercantile States.

Public finance and war finance were essentially the same thing in the golden eras of merchant capitalism (roughly 1550 to 1800) and subsequent industrial capitalism. That financial conflation is re-emerging as a new reality of the twentyfirst century, as sovereigns (and their foreign state and non-state proxies) up their military spending while simultaneously diminishing their commitments to the peacetime provision of public goods.

Fast forward to the years from 1989 to 2011

This transition period from modern to post-modern may be seen as a particularly peaceful period – after the Great World War of 1914 to 1945; after the wars of recolonisation and decolonisation which may be seen to have ended in 1979 with the revolution in Iran and Vietnam ending the post-colonial genocide in Cambodia; after the wars in Lebanon, the Falkland Islands, and Iran-Iraq; and after the fall of the empire of the Soviet Union.

The millennial years 1989 to 2011 are sometimes called the ‘unipolar moment’, when the United States could and would call the shots; typically with a foolhardy and exceptionalist perspective of the world as a kind of playpen for Washington and New York largesse. And with a neoliberal outlook through which narratives about the Great Depression and World War Two were recast. In the latter case, World War Two became a grand narration of ‘Hitler versus the Jews’; most of the many other lessons arising from the years 1914 to 1945 were largely forgotten.

I am particularly interested in the affording and financing of the Second Gulf War (essentially 2003 to 2009, an asymmetric war between United States and Iraq); although good starting points are the post-Tiananmen (after 1989) emergence of China and the execution in 1990 by the United States of the First Gulf War.

These charts of financial balances for China and the United States give some important clues about who paid for the Gulf Wars. (For the United States in particular, it is necessary for now, to not be distracted by the dramatic financial accommodations between 2009 and 2021, relating to the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid19 Pandemic.) They show variations over time in private saving and spending, government deficit spending, and these nations’ saver/spender relationships with their outside worlds.

We note that most of the economic and financial cost of war comes after the main event (eg after 1990, and after 2003); as military equipment needs to be replenished, armies need to be expanded, and destruction zones need to be rebuilt. Indeed, the costs of a standing defence force are high whether or not there is a war.

1990, the middle of a period of both economic and financial flux in the world, came at the end of a recovery in the United States following the 1987 sharemarket crash. So, almost unusually, there was no speculative bubble in place, there was increased saving as people looked more to future spending than present spending, and the labour market remained weak.

For the United States, we see in the years from 1991 to 1993, high saving in the private sector – largely household saving – and comparably high spending in the government sector. Thus, domestic private savings directly funded the war. Unemployment in the United States was lower than it otherwise would have been. While savers were not asked whether they were happy that their caution was being translated into government military spending, it’s unlikely that they minded too much; the ‘war against Saddam’ was not an unpopular war in the United States.

In times of recession, when more people than usual are unemployed or underemployed, affording a war is easier but financing a war is harder. Liberal governments must make financial accommodations by departing from the standard fiscal rules they impose upon themselves. (We note that, just this year, 2025, the German Bundestag has made such an accommodation, and abandoned its self-set and dearly-held fiscal rule; giving itself a blank cheque to pursue debt-funded military spending.)

Most modern wars have been afforded through a process of restrained consumption, financed through the mechanism of new government debt and a build-up of household credits; governments owing, and households owning new debt. As a side-effect, and considering the United States, this affording and funding enlarges the combined balance sheet of American banks: more assets (government debts) and more liabilities (private savings).

Affording wars is always a matter of economic resources being deployed into military theatres, whether that is redeployed from civilian production or a reduction of resource underemployment. From a financing point of view, the four options are that wars are funded by taxes (which would not show up on this type of chart), by domestic saving (as happened in the United States from 1991 to 1993), by foreign saving (as happened in the mid-2000s), or by foreign aid from patron to proxy.

War financed by foreign saving may mean direct or indirect foreign funding. Much of the Allies funding in the Great World War was financed by American debt which, in the fullness of time, would be written off; making that war significantly American gift funded, even if at the time the advances were only intended and consented as loans. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom afforded their war only with substantial reductions in normal consumption; this was even more true for most of the other participating nation states.

In the United States chart above, we see (in green) that in every year shown except 1991, the United States has incurred debts to the rest of the world. Though these foreign advances were unusually low in the early 1990s. America’s war in 1990 was domestically funded, and relatively easily afforded.

(We note that that Gulf War involved both an invasion by Iraq and an invasion of Iraq. I make no attempt to discuss the affording or financing of the war from the point of view of either Iraq or Kuwait. Clearly, however, there was a substantial loss and degradation of life in Iraq, and degradation of land and infrastructure.)

The Wars of the 2000s, especially the Second Gulf War from 2003

The United States economy changed dramatically with the birth of the Internet-Age, just after the First Gulf War. Private balances follow a classic ‘bubble’ formation from 1994 to 2000/01; this came to be known as the dotcom bubble, and was characterised by a new ‘information technology’ sector being speculatively debt-financed. Government tax revenues ballooned, leading to unheard-of government budget surpluses. In addition, the United States economy attracted increased foreign credits before the turn of the millennium, though not much then from China.

We can see the collapse of the dotcom bubble in 2001, with a marked reduction in private debt spending, and the ensuing unusually high foreign financing of the United States economy.

The wars of the new-millennium began with the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, followed by the bigger United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. These wars were foreign-funded, the US chart shows, and lasted – in their predominant phase – throughout the Bush presidency. (Refer Iraq War troop surge of 2007.)

We can trace this funding of the Bush-wars by examining the China chart. From 2002, we see a clear rise in Chinese private saving and of ‘foreign investment’. The ‘rest of the world’ percentages represent spending in the rest of the world (from China’s perspective) made possible by non-spending in China.

At its peak, China’s foreign investment ‘current account surplus’ – for our purpose, China’s excess of exports over imports – reached almost 10% of GDP in 2007. This co-dependency of Chinese exports and American imports has been called by some Chimerica; the best known proponent of this concept is the British global historian Niall Ferguson.

As well as considering the percentages, we remind ourselves that Chinese supercharged annual economic growth, which bottomed-out at 8% in 1999-2001, climbed to 14% in 2007. Given earlier growth in the 1980s and 1990s, China was no longer starting from a low base. These were massively increased levels of Chinese economic output in the 2000s; output sent from China rather than spent in China.

The result was that industrial capacity within the United States was freed up to supply military goods rather than civilian goods. While China provided the ‘butter’ (ie consumer goods), Uncle Sam was freed to specialise in the production and deployment of ‘guns’.

While China paid for the Second Gulf War through its massive export surpluses, for the West in general and the United States in particular, the war was fought for free; a ‘free lunch’ so to speak. Of course it wasn’t technically free; China built up a massive amount of financial claims on the United States, though it was never clear how or when China might exercise those claims. China is yet to show any desire to acquire the American imports which would constitute the settlement of China’s claims on the United States.

China will only be reimbursed for its massive lending to the United States in 2003 to 2008 when we see, in its future financial balances’ chart, a whole lot of green on the upper ‘savers’ side. Otherwise, China’s loans to the United States will morph into gifts. An export surplus can only be reimbursed in the form of an export deficit; not China’s style in current or near-future times.

Tax Cuts

Not only did the United States wage two major wars in West Asia, close to America’s Indian Ocean antipodes, it did the unheard-of for a nation at war; it reduced its tax rates. While the most obvious way to fund a war is to raise taxes, the United States did the precise opposite; to not fund the wars ‘because it could’. China was happily paying for those American wars. For many Americans not directly involved, these wars were more than a ‘free lunch’; they were, through tax cuts, a ‘sugar hit’.

Indeed, this detachment of fighting from cost-bearing has become the most dangerous facet of the emergent ‘Warrior epoch’. Western elites have come to believe that they can undertake wars – be they ‘good wars’ or ‘bad wars’ – without themselves facing up to the reality that all wars are costly.

The United States legislated two major rounds of tax cuts, in 2001 and 2003. The first round was undertaken in the light of the Clinton budget surpluses (see the year 2000), and without awareness that war was coming. Those Clinton fiscal surpluses were unsustainable, a consequence of the dotcom bubble mini-boom, though the tax cuts (ill-targeted as they were) helped to fiscally accommodate the recovery from the 2000/01 dotcom bust.

The 2003 federal tax cuts were inexcusable. Initiated just as the pre-Gulf-War hype was peaking, these tax cuts passed through Congress and the Senate during the peak initial phases of the war. The incongruence of simultaneous military aggression at scale and tax decreases was astounding in its brazenness.

After 2011

The principal wars in the 2010s were located in Afghanistan and Syria; there was additional militarisation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, associated with the eastward expansion of Nato.

China played a constructive new role in that decade.

An important feature of global financial imbalances – very clear in the American chart – was the Global Financial Crisis, showing resurgent American private saving (mainly debt repayment) and the spectacular (and necessary) US Government accommodation of that dramatic change in private behaviour. Then we see a return to normality from 2013 to 2019. Higher than usual United States government deficits were a critical part of the global recovery from the financial crisis. (We may mention in passing that the New Zealand government’s fiscal policy – under National and Labour – has been and still is non-accommodating; the pandemic year 2020 being the exception that ‘proves’ the rule.)

For the second critical component of the 2010s’ global economic recovery, we can see a big change in China’s financial balances. In particular, we see the emergence of the Chinese consumer and taxpayer (much less blue and less red). And Chinese net exports substantially diminished as a share of the Chinese economy. Consumer spending and government spending in China and the other BRICsrevived global demand for non-military goods and services.

Although the United States incurred a specific debt to China during the Second Gulf War in the 2000s, subsequently the whole West ‘owes’ China a considerable debt of gratitude for its role in restarting the global economy around 2010. Thankyous to China have been considerably lacking, however, as the West increasingly seeks to point its military hardware at China.

The West – led by the United States – has gamified war, and has become indifferent to non-western lives. There are also too many signs that western elites are becoming indifferent to western working-class lives; starting with indifference to the many immigrants who are already performing so much of the necessary labour to support higher-middle-class living standards.

China, already on the verge of a balance-sheet recession in the view of Richard Koo, may now be following in the financial and economic footsteps of Japan in the 1990s (see my Red Gold; Japan’s lesson for the world). Certainly China’s financial balances’ chart (above) is starting to look very Japanese, with a smallish and stable export surplus, and large government deficits.

2020s’ Wars

After the 2020 Covid19 Financial Crisis, which, as in 2009, required huge fiscal accommodations – especially by the United States federal government – wars have become proxy affairs whereby the means of war have been largely gifted by patrons to their proxies. Such financing leaves only small marks on countries’ financial balances charts. Though the patron nations will have larger-than-otherwise government deficits; see the United States’ government balance (above) for 2023 and 2025 (and the 2025 forecast).

The financing of the two sides of the Sudan ‘Civil War’ appears too convoluted to examine here. It would seem to involve proxies of proxies, and to be an important outlet for internationally traded military goods.

For the West, the affording of the wars in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine would appear to be mainly through a mix of gifts and loans by patron governments, meaning involved governments undersupplying too few peacetime public goods. (Too little ‘butter’, to use that metaphor, and too many guns.)

Russian citizens will be incurring substantial opportunity costs, mainly through higher taxes, a reallocation of government spending, and reduced opportunities for its citizens to live international lives. Ukraine seems to be funding its war through a mix of foreign gifting and government debt; though its people – like Russians – have been paying a high price through reductions in their living standards.

Israel continues to be a net exporter, so its deliveries of military hardware from the United States should definitely be regarded as aid rather than imports. Lucky Israel! To be able to fight its neighbours on such favourable terms is a privilege rarely granted.

In Retrospect

Wars are costly. Very intensive and extensive in the use of resources and the destruction of resources; let alone the loss of quantity and quality of life.

In all wars, all parties incur costs; significant costs. Sometimes, a party to a war can avoid most of those costs through having someone else pay. Of course, the United States paid to some extent for the wars against Iraq in terms of American lives lost and degraded; little cost was borne by those Americans who propagated those wars, though.

The material costs of the wars in the 2000s were paid – indirectly – by Chinese households not consuming large swathes of the goods they produced; Chinese workers and capitalists were, on an increasingly massive scale, exporting the fruits of their labour and their capital to the United States. More sending than spending. Much more. (A Marxian analysis would attribute the seemingly costless affording of the US-Iraq war to the extraction of ‘surplus value’ from the Chinese working class by the American capitalist class.)

Yet these Chinese costpayers didn’t much mind, because – while their abilities to enjoy the increasing fruits of their labours were highly constrained by China’s export policy – they were happily stacking up claims on future production; deferred enjoyment, rather than the pure exploitation which occurred in the early years of Chinese Communism.

China bore the West’s costs in other ways too; in those years Chinese people suffered huge environmental costs, at a time when natural environments were improving in the deindustrialising West.

There was a wider set of ongoing costs, however, arising from the ensuing highly unbalanced global capitalism. United States’ industrial survival is now largely dependent on its specialisation in military hardware and software; meaning that the United States’ economic deformation has made that country into a predatory warrior state. Violences, especially upon non-Americans, are today directly committed by the American state; and through both exported and gifted military goods and services, and through violations committed directly by America’s proxies (and, as in Sudan, by its proxies’ proxies).

Wars, when they happen, are affordable because they happened. They are very costly, both in terms of their opportunity costs (the loss of other uses to which the deployed resources could have been put) and the human misery of death, destruction of habitat and taonga, and injury. They are commonly financed by third parties – eg Chinese households – who may or may not enjoy reimbursement for their credit advanced.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

COMMENTARY: By Caitlin Johnstone

It’s so revealing how Israelis keep begging Trump to end the killing in Gaza, because they understand that the US President has the power to force Israel to stop. It seems like Israelis understand this far better than Americans do.

Six former Israeli hostages and the widow of a slain hostage have released a video pleading with President Trump in English to support a comprehensive deal to make peace in Gaza so that the remaining hostages can be freed.

“You have the power to make history, to be the president of peace, the one who ended the war, ended the suffering, and brought every hostage home, including my little brother,” implores one of the hostages.

“President Trump, please act now before it’s too late for them, too,” pleads the widow.

This is not the first time Israelis have begged Trump to force an end to the slaughter.

Earlier this month more than 600 former senior Israeli security officials from Mossad and Shin Bet sent Trump a letter urging him to compel Netanyahu to make peace in Gaza. They did this because they understand something that many Americans do not: that the US President has always had the power to end the Gaza holocaust.

It’s crazy how many times I’ve encountered Americans telling me that this is “Israel’s war” and there’s nothing the president can do to end it.

It was mostly Democrats doing this back when Biden was president and I was slamming Genocide Joe for continuing this mass atrocity, and now that Trump is in office it’s his supporters who show up in my comments section white knighting for the president.

“It’s not our war and we should stay out of it,” they sometimes claim, mistakenly thinking that critics of the US-backed genocide are asking for some kind of US intervention.

But the call isn’t for the US to intervene, it’s for the US to stop intervening. To end the US interventionism that has been underway for two years. The Gaza holocaust can be ended by the US simply ceasing to add wood to the fire.

Israeli military insiders have been saying again and again that the onslaught in Gaza would not be possible without US support.

A senior Israeli air force official told Ha’aretz last year that “without the Americans’ supply of weapons to the Israel Defence Forces, especially the air force, Israel would have had a hard time sustaining its war for more than a few months.”

In November 2023, retired Israeli Major-General Yitzhak Brick told Jewish News Syndicate that, “All of our missiles, the ammunition, the precision-guided bombs, all the airplanes and bombs, it’s all from the US.

“The minute they turn off the tap, you can’t keep fighting. You have no capability . . .  Everyone understands that we can’t fight this war without the United States. Period.”

Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert wrote the following last year:

“The entire Israel Air Force relies completely on American aircraft: fighter planes, transport planes, refueler planes and helicopters. All of Israel’s air power is based on the American commitment to defend Israel.

“We have no other reliable source for essential supplies of equipment, munitions and advanced weapons that Israel cannot manufacture on its own.

“In recent months, hundreds of American transport planes have landed at IAF bases carrying thousands of tons of advanced, vital military equipment and munitions.”

The Israelis clearly understand that they’ve been entirely dependent on the US for the IDF’s acts of butchery in Gaza this entire time, and they clearly understand that the US President has the ability to turn off the tap whenever he wants.

And now they are begging the president to do so with increasing urgency, because it’s been made clear to them that their own government isn’t going to stop until it is forced to stop. They can’t stop the gunman, so they’re turning to the man who’s feeding him the ammo.

It would be good if Americans understood this as well.

Trump is committing genocide in Gaza, just as surely as Netanyahu is, and he could end it at any time. The fact that he still has not chosen to do so makes him one of the most evil people on earth.

Caitlin Johnstone is an Australian independent journalist and poet. Her articles include The UN Torture Report On Assange Is An Indictment Of Our Entire Society. She publishes a website and Caitlin’s Newsletter. This article is republished with permission.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

For example;

In Syria, opposition-baked forces have taken Aleppo city and other strategic centres in an attempt to remove Syria’s authoritarian leader Assad. Assad’s forces are resisting on the ground while Russian air forces attacked the opposition force’s positions. Israel announced it may strike Syria government munitions sites in a move to ensure opposition forces do not take possession of such weaponry.

Meanwhile, fighting has intensified on the Ukraine-Russia frontlines after:

• North Korea deployed a 10,000-strong assistance force to the Kursk region;
• Outgoing US President Joe Biden authorised Ukraine to fire ATTACM missiles deep into Russia;
• Ukraine indeed fired ATTACMs into the Russian motherland and has increased its drone attacks on military targets in cities once regarded as safe from attack.
• Also, and significantly, Russia fired into Dnipro City in Ukraine a hypersonic “experimental” Medium-Range-Ballistic-Missile – and followed up with the biggest barrage of drone and missile strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since the conflict began.

So-called “red-lines” have been crossed and all sides appear determined to take as much territory as possible before US President-Elect Donald Trump is sworn into office in January.

Paul and Selwyn assess what we can expect to witness in the next two months, how other state actors are being drawn into conflict, and what objectives are driving warring sides at flashpoints around the world.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

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The LIVE Recording of this podcast will begin today, Monday at 12:45pm November 11, 2024 (NZST) which is Sunday evening, 7:45pm (USEST). Image courtesy of Nick Minto, Copyright 2024 Nick Minto; photographed November 6, 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn will discuss:

• Why Democrats Lost: Incumbency, Elitism, Class & Alienation, Identity Politics…
• Why Trump Won: Anti-Establishment, Populism, Avatar for the Alienated…
• What to Expect Next: Trump Appointments, Isolationism, Geopolitical Impact & Response…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage interaction while live, so feel free to lodge comments and questions, but remember if you do so your interaction may be used in this programme. We recommend that you subscribe to our YouTube channel and click on notification-bell.

Here’s the link: https://www.youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Background image: courtesy of and Copyright Nick Minto 2024. Image taken November 6 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar – In this episode of A View From Afar political scientist Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning analyse how the state of Israel has gone rogue, attacking United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. At this juncture it is clear this is an intentional attack.

Over the past week Israel Defense Force troops have repeatedly attacked UN peacekeepers who were authorised and deployed to the region by the United Nations Security Council.

Also last week; the Government of Israel issued a statement notifying the United Nations Secretary General that he was now banned from Israel and was persona non grata. Within a day of that statement, IDF troops had fired on UN peacekeeping positions in Southern Lebanon.

Since then, the IDF has continued operations that threaten the UN’s presence. And Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has now issued a directive to the UN peacekeeping force to withdraw from the area north of its borders in Southern Lebanon.

Also, despite the United States Biden Administration cautioning Israel on its attacks on UN personnel, overnight New Zealand time, the United States has deployed 100 US troops on the ground in Israel to operate missile defence systems.

Paul and Selwyn consider:

• Why Israel has begun to attack United Nations peacekeepers in the region?
• Why has the United States deepened its involvement in Israel’s so-called defence?
• What of Hezbollah, Hamas; are their attacks on Israel a defence or an attacking offensive?
• What of Iran, what is its position and will it engage in a full-scale war with Israel and what are the consequences should it do so?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this episode of A View From Afar political scientist Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning I will analyse how the state of Israel has gone rogue, attacking United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon.

At this juncture it is clear this is an intentional attack. Over the past week Israel Defense Force troops have repeatedly attacked UN peacekeepers who were authorised and deployed to the region by the United Nations Security Council.

Also last week; the Government of Israel issued a statement notifying the United Nations Secretary General that he was now banned from Israel and was persona non grata.

Within a day of that statement, IDF troops had fired on UN peacekeeping positions in Southern Lebanon. Since then, the IDF has continued operations that threaten the UN’s presence.

And Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has now issued a directive to the UN peacekeeping force to withdraw from the area north of its borders in Southern Lebanon.

Also, despite the United States Biden Administration cautioning Israel on its attacks on UN personnel, overnight New Zealand time, the United States has deployed 100 US troops on the ground in Israel to operate missile defence systems.

It would appear the Biden Administration has allowed Israel’s Government to draw it further into a war justified on defence but is factually a conflict that is clearly disproportional to Israel’s threat.

Atrocities against Palestinian civilians in Gaza continue; and, IDF hostilities continue in the occupied West Bank; missile attacks against civilian areas in Lebanon; and missiles have been fired into Syria over the weekend.

Today, Paul and Selwyn will consider:

* Why Israel has begun to attack United Nations peacekeepers in the region?

* Why has the United Nations deepened its involvement in Israel’s so-called defence?

* What of Hezbollah, Hamas; are their attacks on Israel a defence or an attacking offensive?

* What of Iran, what is its position and will it engage in a full-scale war with Israel and what are the consequences should it do so?

Live Audience: Remember, if you are joining us live via the social media platforms, feel free to comment as we can include your comments and questions in this programme.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

COMMENTARY: By David Robie in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s famous Củ Chi tunnel network was on our bucket list for years.

For me, it was for more than half a century, ever since I had been editor of the Melbourne Sunday Observer, which campaigned against Australian (and New Zealand) involvement in the unjust Vietnam War — redubbed the “American War” by the Vietnamese.

For Del, it was a dream to see how the resistance of a small and poor country could defeat the might of colonisers.

“I wanted to see for myself how the tunnels and the sacrifices of the Vietnamese had contributed to winning the war,” she recalls.

“Love for country, a longing for peace and a resistance to foreign domination were strong factors in victory.”

We finally got our wish last month — a half day trip to the tunnel network, which stretched some 250 kilometres at the peak of their use. The museum park is just 45 km northeast of Ho Chi Minh city, known as Saigon during the war years (many locals still call it that).

Building of the tunnels started after the Second World War after the Japanese had withdrawn from Indochina and liberation struggles had begun against the French. But they reached their most dramatic use in the war against the Americans, especially during the spate of surprise attacks during the Tet Offensive in 1968.

The Viet Minh kicked off the network, when it was a sort of southern gateway to the Ho Chi Minh trail in the 1940s as the communist forces edged closer to Saigon.

Eventually the liberation successes of the Viet Minh led to humiliating defeat of the French colonial forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

Cutting off supply lines
The French had rebuilt an ex-Japanese airbase in a remote valley near the Laotian border in a so-called “hedgehog” operation — in a belief that the Viet Minh forces did not have anti-aircraft artillery. They hoped to cut off the Viet Minh’s guerrilla forces’ supply lines and draw them into a decisive conventional battle where superior French firepower would prevail.

However, they were the ones who were cut off.

The Củ Chi tunnels explored.    Video: History channel

The French military command badly miscalculated as General Nguyen Giap’s forces secretly and patiently hauled artillery through the jungle-clad hills over months and established strategic batteries with tunnels for the guns to be hauled back under cover after firing several salvos.

Giap compared Dien Bien Phu to a “rice bowl” with the Viet Minh on the edges and the French at the bottom.

After a 54-day siege between 13 March and 7 May 1954, as the French forces became increasingly surrounded and with casualties mounting (up to 2300 killed), the fortifications were over-run and the surviving soldiers surrendered.

The defeat led to global shock that an anti-colonial guerrilla army had defeated a major European power.

The French government of Prime Minister Joseph Laniel resigned and the 1954 Geneva Accords were signed with France pulling out all its forces in the whole of Indochina, although Vietnam was temporarily divided in half at the 17th Parallel — the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, and the republican State of Vietnam nominally under Emperor Bao Dai (but in reality led by a series of dictators with US support).

Debacle of Dien Bien Phu
The debacle of Dien Bien Phu is told very well in an exhibition that takes up an entire wing of the Vietnam War Remnants Museum (it was originally named the “Museum of American War Crimes”).

But that isn’t all at the impressive museum, the history of the horrendous US misadventure is told in gruesome detail – with some 58,000 American troops killed and the death of an estimated up to 3 million Vietnamese soldiers and civilians. (Not to mention the 521 Australian and 37 New Zealand soldiers, and the many other allied casualties.)

The section of the museum devoted to the Agent Orange defoliant war waged on the Vietnamese and the country’s environment is particularly chilling – casualties and people suffering from the aftermath of the poisoning are now into the fourth generation.

The global anti-Vietnam War peace protests are also honoured at the museum and one section of the compound has a recreation of the prisons holding Viet Cong independence fighters, including the torture “tiger cells”.

A guillotine is on display. The execution method was used by both France and the US-backed South Vietnam regimes against pro-independence fighters.

A placard says: “During the US war against Vietnam, the guillotine was transported to all of the provinces in South Vietnam to decapitate the Vietnam patriots. [On 12 March 1960], the last man who was executed by guillotine was Hoang Le Kha.”

A member of the ant-French liberation “scout movement”, Hoang was sentenced to death by a military court set up by the US-backed President Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime.

In 1981, France outlawed capital punishment and abandoned the use of the guillotine, but the last execution was as recent as 1977.

Museum visit essential
Visiting Ho Ch Min City’s War Remnants Museum is essential for background and contextual understanding of the role and importance of the Củ Chi tunnels.

Also for insights about how the last US troops left Vietnam in March 1973, Nixon resigned the following year under pressure from the Watergate revelations, and a series of reverses led to the collapse of the South Vietnam regime and the humiliating scenes of the final Americans withdrawing by helicopter from the US Embassy rooftop in Saigon in April 1975.

Back in my protest days as chief subeditor and then editor of Melbourne’s Sunday Observer, I had published Ronald Haberle’s My Lai massacre photos the same week as Life Magazine in December 1969 (an estimated 500 women, children and elderly men were killed at the hamlet on 16 March 1968 near Quang Nai city and the atrocity was covered up for almost two years).

Ironically, we were prosecuted for “obscenity’ for publishing photographs of a real life US obscenity and war crime in the Australian state of Victoria. (The case was later dropped).

So our trip to the Củ Chi tunnels was laced with expectation. What would we see? What would we feel?

The tunnels played a critical role in the “American” War, eventually leading to the collapse of South Vietnamese resistance in Saigon. And the guides talk about the experience and the sacrifice of Viet Cong fighters in reverential tones.

The tunnel network at Ben Dinh is in a vast park-like setting with restored sections, including underground kitchen (with smoke outlets directed through simulated ant hills), medical centre, and armaments workshop.

ingenious bamboo and metal spike booby traps, snakes and scorpions were among the obstacles to US forces pursuing resistance fighters. Special units — called “tunnel rats” using smaller soldiers were eventually trained to combat the Củ Chi system but were not very effective.

We were treated to cooked cassava, a staple for the fighters underground.

A disabled US tank demonstrates how typical hit-and-run attacks by the Viet Cong fighters would cripple their treads and then they would be attacked through their manholes.

‘Walk’ through showdown
When it came to the section where we could walk through the tunnels ourselves, our guide said: “It only takes a couple of minutes.”

It was actually closer to 10 minutes, it seemed, and I actually got stuck momentarily when my knees turned to jelly with the crouch posture that I needed to use for my height. I had to crawl on hands and knees the rest of the way.

A warning sign said don’t go if you’re aged over 70 (I am 79), have heart issues (I do, with arteries), or are claustrophobic (I’m not). I went anyway.

People who have done this are mostly very positive about the experience and praise the tourist tunnels set-up. Many travel agencies run guided trips to the tunnels.

“Exploring the Củ Chi tunnels near Saigon was a fascinating and historically significant experience,” wrote one recent visitor on a social media link.

“The intricate network of tunnels, used during the Vietnam War, provided valuable insights into the resilience and ingenuity of the Vietnamese people. Crawling through the tunnels, visiting hidden bunkers, and learning about guerrilla warfare tactics were eye-opening . . .

“It’s a place where history comes to life, and it’s a must-visit for anyone interested in Vietnam’s wartime history and the remarkable engineering of the Củ Chi tunnels.”

“The visit gives a very real sense of what the war was like from the Vietnamese side — their tunnels and how they lived and efforts to fight the Americans,” wrote another visitor. “Very realistic experience, especially if you venture into the tunnels.”

Overall, it was a powerful experience and a reminder that no matter how immensely strong a country might be politically and militarily, if grassroots people are determined enough for freedom and justice they will triumph in the end.

There is hope yet for Palestine.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

Building upon recent episodes of A View from Afar, Political Scientist Paul G Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning discuss The Politics of Desperation. This episode flows on from our discussions about long transitions and the moment of friction.

As the old status quo begins to crumble (under the weight of fraction), political leaders and elites invested in it get increasingly desperate, leading to more dangerous decisions, more acute moments, and, increased chances of mistake, miscalculation and unanticipated backlash.

The Politics of Desperation accentuates an ongoing downward spiral. And, the Politics of Desperation takes form in differing degrees. For some, the risk of losing is merely a dent in the leader’s ego, reputation, and an awakening that voters have moved on from their style of politics.

But for others, a loss will prove to be devastating, for example; should Donald Trump lose his bid to regain the United States presidency, he will face sentencing as a felon and perhaps even face jail time. For Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, a future loss or a collapse of his right-wing coalition would likely see him facing domestic charges and possibly charges laid by the International Criminal Court for his role in the disproportionate use of military might in Israel’s war on Gaza.

So, Paul and Selwyn discuss the examples of the Politics of Desperation from around the world and assess the risks as the world rests on the cusp of an unknown future.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Building upon recent episodes of A View from Afar, Political Scientist Paul G Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning will discuss The Politics of Desperation. This episode flows on from our discussions about long transitions and the moment of friction.

As the old status quo begins to crumble (under the weight of fraction), political leaders and elites invested in it get increasingly desperate, leading to more dangerous decisions, more acute moments, and, increased chances of mistake, miscalculation and unanticipated backlash.

The Politics of Desperation accentuates an ongoing downward spiral. And, the Politics of Desperation takes form in differing degrees. For some, the risk of losing is merely a dent in the leader’s ego, reputation, and an awakening that voters have moved on from their style of politics.

But for others, a loss will prove to be devastating, for example; should Donald Trump lose his bid to regain the United States presidency, he will face sentencing as a felon and perhaps even face jail time. For Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, a future loss or a collapse of his right-wing coalition would likely see him facing domestic charges and possibly charges laid by the International Criminal Court for his role in the disproportionate use of military might in Israel’s war on Gaza.

So today, Paul and Selwyn will discuss the examples of the Politics of Desperation from around the world and assess the risks as the world rests on the cusp of an unknown future.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The Trump Assassination Attempt, Security Failures, The Politics and What Happens Next? – Firstly, in this episode of A View from Afar, political scientist and former Pentagon analyst, Dr Paul Buchanan, provides us a preliminary assessment of the assassination attempt on former United States president Donald Trump. And then Paul and Selwyn assess what impact this crime will have on the US Presidential election campaign.

At this juncture, it’s important to be clear, to achieve a robust analysis of the crime that occurred while Trump was speaking at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania, it will require a thorough assessment of eye witness accounts, details of the supposed gunman, his background, associations, potential motivations – and importantly a deep assessment of the role of the security agencies.

To determine a clear and probable account of what happened in Pennsylvania this weekend, we would need all of that information, and then to apply it against any variances and/or avoidances by those involved or associated with investigating the events. But clearly, much of that information is not yet available to us.

However, there is enough information for us to consider a preliminary assessment of how satisfactory, or otherwise, the security arrangements were for Trump at this rally.

So, with that said; today Paul and Selwyn examine:

• How could an assassin get inside a security parameter, and in to a position with direct line of sight to his target Donald Trump?
• And specifically, while the gunman was outside the immediate venue, it would appear the shooter’s location was within the security parameters, a position obvious to him as a prime area, with direct line of sight to his intended target.
• So why wouldn’t that fact be obvious to the US security services who were responsible for ensuring the parameters were safe and clear?
• And, importantly too, what are the political implications of this assassination attempt?
• For example; does this assassination attempt accentuate Trump’s mythology as an invincible born to rule leader? And as such, draw contrast to the incumbent US President Joe Biden’s frailty?

In this regard, Paul and Selwyn assess what is likely to happen next?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

New Zealand’s international relations are under new management. And Winston Peters, the new foreign minister, is already setting a change agenda.

As expected, this includes a more pro-US positioning when it comes to the Pacific – where Peters will be picking up where he left off. Peters sought to align New Zealand more closely with the United States under his ‘Pacific Reset’ policy that he launched while serving as foreign minister under Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-New Zealand First coalition government from 2017-2020.

Peters is wasting no time in getting back on the foreign affairs horse.

Just three days after being sworn in as a minster, he gave his first speech on foreign policy at the US Business Summit in Auckland last week.

Peters was lavish in his praise for the US in his address, arguing that Washington had been ‘instrumental in the Pacific’s success’. But he noted that ‘there is more to do and not a moment to lose. We will not achieve our shared ambitions if we allow time to drift.’ Adding that ‘speed and intensity’ would be needed, Peters said ‘the good news is that New Zealand stands ready to play its part.’

The early timing of the speech itself is a sign that New Zealand’s new, yet very familiar foreign affairs minister is unlikely to wait around when it comes to taking major decisions.

It was an important, agenda-setting address.

There were strong hints that New Zealand’s new Government wants to move swiftly when it comes to Wellington’s potential involvement in in ‘Pillar II’ of the AUKUS defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Peters’ disclosed in the Q&A to the speech that he had already talked to Judith Collins, the new defence minister, about New Zealand’s AUKUS stance.

The previous Labour government’s position was that AUKUS remained a hypothetical question while no formal offer existed for New Zealand to join ‘Pillar II’ of the high-level defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

But while playing for time in an election year, the then Prime Minister Chris Hipkins signalled in July that New Zealand was at least ‘open to conversations’ about joining the pact in some form. And Labour’s expedited release of three major defence strategy documents in August, just prior to the election campaign, laid the groundwork for at least formal consideration of involvement in AUKUS.

The reports also paved the way for New Zealand to spend vastly more on its military and to take a more security-focused approach to the Pacific – recommendations that Peters will probably be keen to implement.

Wellington and Washington have been becoming closer since at least November 2010, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited New Zealand’s capital to sign the ‘Wellington Declaration’. The relatively short agreement served to clear the air after decades of chequered bilateral relations stemming from the Fourth Labour Government’s introduction of a nuclear-free policy in the 1980s.

Going nuclear-free (which prevented visits from US warships) saw New Zealand cast out as a US ally. Washington formally suspended its obligations to Wellington under the ANZUS defence treaty in 1986. But nearly 40 years on, US-NZ relations are rapidly deepening, a trend that has been accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Western concerns over China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.

Since February 2022, New Zealand has imposed sanctions on Russia, joined US-led groupings such as Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and sent its Prime Ministers to successive NATO summits. And in May 2022, Jacinda Ardern visited Joe Biden at the White House, where a 3000-word joint statement called for ‘new resolve and closer cooperation’.

Meanwhile, a string of senior US officials have visited New Zealand just this year, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink and the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell (who Joe Biden recently nominated to become his new Deputy Secretary of State).

If New Zealand does join AUKUS, it could spell the effective end of the country’s ‘independent foreign policy’. The ANZUS break-up of the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalisation had allowed New Zealand to free itself from blocs. Wellington talked to anyone and everyone, building solid, trade-focused relations with China and others in the Global South – while not neglecting Western partners, including the United States.

Peters may think the current geopolitical environment justifies a new approach.

If he does, he should prepare for significant pushback. Helen Clark, who was Prime Minister during Winston Peters’ first term as foreign minister from 2005-8, posted on Friday that New Zealand was now ‘veering towards signing up’ to AUKUS despite bipartisan support over decades for the independent foreign policy stance.

This added to criticism from Clark earlier in the year, including in August, when she argued the new defence blueprint showed New Zealand was ‘abandoning its capacity to think for itself & instead is cutting & pasting from 5 Eyes’ partners’.

It should also be remembered that Winston Peters, while undoubtedly powerful and highly experienced, is only one Government minister. The views of Judith Collins – the defence minister – remain unknown in any detail, while the foreign policy positions of Christopher Luxon seem more centrist than radical.

Moreover, with the US now firmly focused on the war between Hamas and Israel – and its own presidential election year fast approaching – it is far from guaranteed that the hypothetical AUKUS question will turn into a concrete one for New Zealand anytime soon.

Moreover, Peters’ initial ministerial comments on New Zealand’s own position towards the Middle East suggest there is plenty of room for nuance. Calling the death toll in Gaza ‘horrific’, Peters welcomed a short-lived extension to the ceasefire on Friday, but called for all parties to ‘work urgently towards a long-term ceasefire’.

And in a radio interview earlier last week, Peters said ‘the ceasefire is not good enough, we’re going to have find a way forward through this and a peaceful solution – that’s what New Zealand and the Western world has got to put its focus on’.  Peters added ‘internationally we need to be talking to people across the political divide who are making sense on this matter’.

Talking to all sides and playing a small role in facilitating a sustainable political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would very much be in keeping with New Zealand’s independent foreign policy approach – and Winston Peters is already speaking out strongly about the war.

With Christopher Luxon passing up on the opportunity to attend COP28 in Dubai at the weekend, Winston Peters will have the chance to make the Government’s first ministerial trip to the Middle East to begin this dialogue. The Gulf states would be a natural starting point for these discussions.

Meanwhile, on Ukraine – the war that helped to speed up New Zealand’s alignment with the US in 2022 – Peters was open to the idea of New Zealand upgrading its military support to Ukraine by sending Kyiv light armoured vehicles (LAVs). While noting that the decision was not up to him alone, he added ‘if we can help we should be doing the best we can’.

Labour had denied a request from Ukraine to provide the LAVs in 2022 and of late had preferred to make financial contributions to Kyiv’s war effort – the most recent being a $NZ4.7 million package announced by Chris Hipkins in July at the NATO leaders’ summit in Lithuania.

It all adds up to a complex picture.

Winston Peters has no shortage of global issues to address.

And there could be some major changes ahead for New Zealand foreign policy.

*******

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

A Papua New Guinean academic says the new security deals with the United States will militarise his country and anyone who thinks otherwise is naïve.

In May, PNG’s Defence Minister Win Barki Daki and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement and the Shiprider Agreement.

Last week they were presented to PNG MPs for ratification and made public.

The defence cooperation agreement talks of reaffirming a strong defence relationship based on a shared commitment to peace and stability and common approaches to addressing regional defence and security issues.

Money that Marape ‘wouldn’t turn down’
University of PNG political scientist Michael Kabuni said there was certainly a need for PNG to improve security at the border to stop, for instance, the country being used as a transit point for drugs such as methamphetamine and cocaine.

“Papua New Guinea hasn’t had an ability or capacity to manage its borders. So we really don’t know what goes on on the fringes of PNG’s marine borders.”

But Kabuni, who is completing his doctorate at the Australian National University, said whenever the US signs these sorts of deals with developing countries, the result is inevitably a heavy militarisation.

“I think the politicians, especially PNG politicians, are either too naïve, or the benefits are too much for them to ignore. So the deal between Papua New Guinea and the United States comes with more than US$400 million support. This is money that [Prime Minister] James Marape wouldn’t turn down,” he said.

The remote northern island of Manus, most recently the site of Australia’s controversial refugee detention camp, is set to assume far greater prominence in the region with the US eyeing both the naval base and the airport.

US fighter jets now (21.06.23) at Jacksons International Airport, Port Moresby.

📷 Walen Parange pic.twitter.com/EVrOV7CWZ3

— Bobby Jr (@tambijr_4rmPNG) June 21, 2023

Kabuni said Manus was an important base during World War II and remains key strategic real estate for both China and the United States.

“So there is talk that, apart from the US and Australia building a naval base on Manus, China is building a commercial one. But when China gets involved in building wharves, though it appears to be a wharf for commercial ships to park, it’s built with the equipment to hold military naval ships,” he said.

Six military locations
Papua New Guineans now know the US is set to have military facilities at six locations around the country.

These are Nadzab Airport in Lae, the seaport in Lae, the Lombrum Naval Base and Momote Airport on Manus Island, as well as Port Moresby’s seaport and Jackson’s International Airport.

According to the text of the treaty the American military forces and their contractors will have the ability to largely operate in a cocoon, with little interaction with the rest of PNG, not paying taxes on anything they bring in, including personal items.

Prime Minister James Marape has said the Americans will not be setting up military bases, but this document gives them the option to do this.

Marape said more specific information on the arrangements would come later.

Antony Blinken said the defence pact was drafted by both nations as ‘equal and sovereign partners’ and stressed that the US will be transparent.

Critics of the deal have accused the government of undermining PNG’s sovereignty but Marape told Parliament that “we have allowed our military to be eroded in the last 48 years, [but] sovereignty is defined by the robustness and strength of your military”.

The Shiprider Agreement has been touted as a solution to PNG’s problems of patrolling its huge exclusive economic zone of nearly 3 million sq km.

Another feature of the agreements is that US resources could be directed toward overcoming the violence that has plagued PNG elections for many years, with possibly the worst occurrence in last year’s national poll.

But Michael Kabuni said the solution to these issues will not be through strengthening police or the military but by such things as improving funding and support for organisations like the Electoral Commission to allow for accurate rolls to be completed well ahead of voting.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

In this the first episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning examine the pros and cons of New Zealand, and other APAC nations, joining the AUKUS security defence pact.

Specifically, Paul and Selwyn examine the following questions:

* What is AUKUS’s purpose?

* What are the risks to New Zealand’s national and public interest?

* What does AUKUS ‘success’ look like? What could its failure look like?

Paul presents the reasons why he believes New Zealand will not join AUKUS, and Selwyn delivers his assessment of why New Zealand must not join the Anglophile security pact.

ALSO, Paul and Selwyn will headline:

* The latest on the US Pentagon leaks. What really is happening here?

* The Global Geopolitical Theatre and how stable is Russian Federation’s president, Vladimir Putin’s regime?

INTERACTION: Paul and Selwyn invite and encourage you to interact with your questions and comments.

They recommend you do so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, or via Facebook. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

You can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

You can see this episode as video-on-demand, and engage with earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.