Recorded Live – A View from Afar podcast. Series 06, Episode 03 – In this episode, political scientist and former Pentagon Analyst Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deep-dive into: The End of the Liberal Internationalist Order and the Rise of Illiberalism.

The topics discussed include:

• A Global Transition Process – What is this exactly and Why is this happening?
• Why is conflict used as a global systems regulator and agent of change? And what does this mean for 2026?
• The US has been the core of two pillars of liberal internationalism – its security system and system of trade.
• Why then has the United States decided to break the very system it has benefitted from, and risk advancing its own demise?

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Remember, if you are joining us live , you can comment and lodge questions but remember we may include your comments and questions in our programmes.

Also, we encourage you to join us via YouTube, as on YouTube live interaction is especially efficient. See you there.

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LIVE@ 12:30PM (NZ TIME): A View from Afar podcast. Series 06, Episode 03 – In this episode, political scientist and former Pentagon Analyst… Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will deep-dive into: The End of the Liberal Internationalist Order and the Rise of Illiberalism.

The topics to discuss are:

• A Global Transition Process – What is this exactly and Why is this happening?
• Why is conflict used as a global systems regulator and agent of change? And what does this mean for 2026?
• The US has been the core of two pillars of liberal internationalism – its security system and system of trade.
• Why then has the United States decided to break the very system it has benefitted from, and risk advancing its own demise?

Remember, if you are joining us live via the social media platforms, feel free to comment as we can include your comments and questions in this programme.

And, we encourage you to join us via YouTube, as on YouTube live interaction is especially efficient. See you there.

• Why did Netanyahu and Trump attack Iran and start this war?
• Why did the US decide to attack without a clear reason to do so and without strategic planning nor a legal argument for it?
• What impact will this war in the Middle East have on US Midterm Elections?
• And what of independent operators in this conflict, such as European states, why do they risk being drawn into this US-Israel Middle East War?

You can follow this podcast via the following podcast platforms:
 

For this, the sixth series of A View from Afar, political scientist and former Pentagon analyst Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deep-dive into geopolitical issues and trends to unpick relevancy from a world experiencing rapid and significant change.

And, in this episode, the topic will be: How to Define A Way Forward When the World is in Chaos.

Since the re-election of the US President Donald Trump, Paul has been doing a lot of work… a lot of reading… and a huge amount of thinking.

Today we hear from Paul about:

1. The US Trump Administration’s “Authoritarianism at home, Imperialism abroad” currency.
2. How to deconstruct the entire “spheres of Influence” nonsense.
3. About United States fears of the rise of the Global South in a poly-centric world.
4. And Paul and I will lean-forward and consider; what to expect in the medium and longterm.

If listeners enjoy interaction in a LIVE recording environment, you can comment and question the hosts while they record this podcast. And, when you do so, the hosts can include your comments and questions in future programmes.

With this in mind, Paul and Selwyn especially encourage you to join them via YouTube, as on YouTube live interaction is especially efficient.

You can join the podcast here (and remember to subscribe and get notifications too by clicking the bell):

OK, let us know what you think about this discussion. Let the debate begin!

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SIGNIFICANT QUOTE PAUL G. BUCHANAN: “The sad fact, though, is that the US is the center of our earthly geopolitical universe, serving as the first rock to drop in the global pond whose ripple effects are extensive, negative, and washing up in unexpected and unforeseen ways. That rock, in fact, is a black hole sucking the remnants of the rule based order into oblivion, or if not oblivion, irrelevance in a new age of power politics (might makes right, etc.). It is a dark force from which things as they exist cannot return.”

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‘Rational Expectations’ is a problematic theory in economics. Here I want to focus more away from economics; and more on the meanings of ‘rationality’ in decision-making, than on the problematic ambiguity of the word ‘expect’ (and its derivatives such as ‘expectations’). ‘Expectation’ here means what we believe ‘will’ happen, not ‘should’ happen; a rational expectation is a prediction, an unbiased average of possibilities, formed through a (usually implicit) calculation of possible benefits and costs – utilities and disutilities, to be technical – and their associated probabilities.

A rational decision is one that uses all freely available information in unbiased ways – plus some researched information, bearing in mind the cost of information gathering – to reach an optimal conclusion, or to decide on a course of action that can be ‘expected’ to lead to an optimal outcome to the decision-maker.

All living beings are rational to a point, in that they contain an automatic intelligence (AutoI) which exhibits programmed rationality. For most beings, AutoI is fully pre-programmed, so is not ‘intelligence’ as we would normally understand it; for others, that programming is subject to continuous reprogramming through a process of ‘learning’, true intelligence. In addition, beings of at least one species – humans – have a ‘manual override‘ intelligence (ManualI), which is our consciousness or awareness.

AutoI is an imperfect, though subversive, process of quasi-rational decision-making. Brains make calculations about optimal behaviour all the time; calculations of which we are not aware. (Richard Dawkins – eg in The Selfish Gene – would argue that these calculations serve the interest of the genotype rather than the individual phenotype.) For humans at least, full rationality means the capacity to use ManualI to override the amoral limitations of AutoI.

Rational decision-making, through learning, may be called ‘intelligence’. Though intelligence has another meaning: ‘information’, as in the ‘Central Intelligence Agency’ (CIA). It is perfectly possible to use unintelligent (stupid?) processes to gather and interpret intelligence!

Even when rational processes are used, many good decisions will, with hindsight, have inferior outcomes; or many good forecasts will prove partly or fully incorrect. It’s mostly bad luck, but also partly because intelligence is rarely completely unbiased, and partly because the cost of gaining extra information can be too high.

Expected Value, aka Expected Outcome

There is a simple rationality formula – familiar to students of statistics and of finance – which can yield a number called an ‘expected value’. In this expectations’ formula, a high positive number represents a good decision and a higher positive number represents a better decision. A negative number represents a bad (ie adverse) expected outcome, although sometimes all available expected outcomes are ‘bad’, meaning that the better course of action is the ‘lesser evil’. A positive number indicates an expected benefit, though not a necessary benefit. Negative possible outcomes represent ‘downside risk’, whereas positive possible outcomes represent ‘upside risk’.

(It is important to note that, in many contexts, a negative number does not denote something bad. A negative number may indicate ‘left’, as in the left-side of a Bell Curve; or ‘south’ or ‘west’ as in latitude and longitude. In accounting, a ‘deficit’ by no means indicates something bad, though President Trump and many others are confused on that point [see Could US tariffs cause lasting damage to the global economy? Al Jazeera 7 April 2025, where he says “to me a deficit is a loss”]; and we note that the substitution of the term ‘third world’ for ‘global south’ suggests an inferiority of southern latitudes. In double-entry bookkeeping, items must add to zero; one side of any balance sheet has negative values by necessity. A deficit, in some contexts, represents a ‘shortfall’ which is probably ‘bad’; but also a ‘longfall’ – or ‘surplus’ – is often bad, just think of the games of lawn bowls and pétanque.)

A simple example of rational decision-making is to decide between doing either something or nothing; for example, when contemplating asking someone out on a date. The expected outcome of doing nothing – not asking – has a value of zero. But, if you ask the person for the date, and you evaluate the chance of a ‘yes’ as 0.2, the utility of a ‘yes’ as +10, and the disutility of a ‘no’ as -1, then the expected value calculates to 1.2; so, the rational decision is to ask (the calculation is 10×0.2–1×0.8). This example is interesting, because the more probable outcome is a ‘no’, and a ‘no’ would make you less happy than if you had not asked the question; nevertheless, the rational decision here is to ‘take the risk’. (‘Risk averse’ persons might have rated the consequence of ‘rejection’ as a -4 rather than a -1; they would calculate an expected value of -1.2, so would choose to not ask for the date.)

Political Decision-Making when Catastrophic Outcomes are Possible

A rational calculation allocates values and probabilities to each identified possible outcome. A favourable outcome is represented by a positive number, a neutral outcome has a zero value, and an adverse outcome has a negative value.

A basic favourable outcome may be designated a value of one; an outcome twice-as-good has a value of two. An outcome an ‘order-of-magnitude’ better has a utility or happiness value of ten. The same applies to adverse outcomes; the equivalent disutility scores are minus-one, minus-two, and minus-ten.

An aeroplane crash might incur a score of minus fifty to society and minus ten million to an individual. The probability of dying in such a crash, for an individual, getting on a plane is probably about one in 100 million. If it was less than one-in-a-million, hardly anybody would get on a plane. (The chance of winning NZ Lotto first division is about one-in four-million.)

We should be thinking like this when we think about war. What kind of risk would we be willing to take? A problem is that the people who provoke wars do not themselves expect to be fatal victims.

A catastrophic outcome could range from minus 100 (say a small war) to minus infinity. An outcome which meant the total eradication of all life on Earth would come close to minus infinity. However, because of the mathematics of infinity (∞), any outcome of minus infinity with a non-zero probability yields an expectation of minus infinity. So for the following example, I will use minus one billion (-1b) as the disutility score for such a total catastrophe. A catastrophe that leads ‘only’ to human extinction might have a value of minus ten million (-10m). A holocaust the size of the 1943 RAF firebombing of Hamburg might have a catastrophe-value of minus one thousand (-1,000). A catastrophe the size of the 1932-1945 Bloodlands of Eastern Europe (which included 14,000 murders including the Holocaust, and much additional non-fatal suffering) might have an overall catastrophe-value of minus a hundred thousand (-100,000).

(Could we imagine an outcome of plus infinity: +∞? Maybe not, though certain evangelical Christians – extreme dispensationalists – pray for Armageddon; “dispensationalism views the progression of history in stages that begin in the Garden of Eden and ends in the paradise of the New Heavens and New Earth“. Thus, what might be minus infinity to most of us could be plus infinity for a few. There is an analogy of ‘wrap-around-mathematics’ in geospace; a longitude of +180° is the same as a longitude of -180°. And, in another example, some people believe that there is little difference between extreme-far-right politics and extreme-far-left politics. On this topic of extremes, the mainstream media should avoid the mindless repetition of hyperbole – as in a comment recently heard that President Trump’s tariffs may amount to an “economic nuclear winter“.)

My Example – the Ukraine War

In an example with some relevance to today, we might consider the NATO-backed ‘defence of Ukraine’. I could assign a modestly favourable outcome of +1 with a 50% probability, a very favourable outcome +10 with a 10% probability, and a catastrophic -1,000,000 with a 1% probability. (All other possibilities I will treat here as neutral, although my sense is that they are mostly adverse.) I calculate an expected value of minus 9,998.5; practically, minus 10,000; this is an average of all the identified possibilities, a catastrophic risk rather than a prediction of a major catastrophe.

This decision to persevere with the NATO-backed ‘defence of Ukraine’ is only rational if the only alternative decision – to abandon the NATO- backed ‘defence of Ukraine’ – comes up with an even lower expected value. (These two alternative decisions would be characterised by New Zealand’s former Ambassador to the United Kingdom – Phil Goff – as ‘standing up for Good in the face of Evil’ versus ‘appeasement of Putin’.) It seems to me that catastrophe becomes much less probable, in my example, with the ‘appeasement’ option than with the ‘defence’ option. (In the case that Goff was commenting on, his implication was that the 1938 ‘appeasement’ of Adolf Hitler by Neville Chamberlain led to either an increase in the probability of catastrophic war, or an increase in the size of catastrophe that might ensue.)

Morality Fallacy

One view of morality is the identification of some Other as Evil, and that any subsequent calling out of that (Evil) Other must therefore be Good. Further, in this view of morality, the claim is that, if and when hostilities break out between Good and Evil, then Good must fight to the ‘bitter end’ at ‘any cost’. (When we see Evil fighting to the bitter end – as per the examples of Germany and Japan in World War Two – we tend to think that’s stupid; but Good fighting to the bitter end is seen as righteous.)

Of course, this kind of morality is quite wrong. The idea that one must never surrender to Evil is a moral fallacy, based on the false (binary) idea that one side (generally ‘our side’) of a dispute or conflict has the entire ‘moral-high-ground’ and the other side has the entire ‘moral-low-ground’. Further, a victory to ‘Evil’ is surely less catastrophic than annihilation; a victory to Evil may be a lesser evil. Choosing annihilation can never be a Good choice.

Most conflict is nothing like Good versus Evil, though many participants on both (or all) sides believe that their side is Good. Most extended conflict is Bad versus Bad, Bad versus Stupid, or Stupid versus Stupid; although there are differing degrees of Bad and Stupid. Further, in the rare case when a conflict can objectively be described as Good versus Evil, it can never be good to disregard cost.

Morality in Practice

True morality requires a broadening of the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘self-interest’.

The important issues are benefits and costs to whom (or to what), and the matter of present benefits/costs versus future benefits/costs. In a sense, morality is a matter of ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘when’. Is it beneficial if something favourable happens ‘here’ but not ‘there’? ‘Now’, but not ‘then’? To ‘me’ or ‘us’, but not to ‘you’ or to ‘them’.

Human ManualI is very good at inclusive morality; AutoI is not.

It is natural, and not wrong, to prioritise one’s own group; and to prioritise the present over the future. The issue is the extent that we ‘discount’ benefits to those that are not ‘us’, and future benefits vis-à-vis present benefits. And costs, which we may regard as negative benefits. A very high level of discounting is near complete indifference towards others, or towards to future. An even higher level of discounting is to see harm to others as being beneficial to us; anti-altruism, being cruel to be cruel.

Then there is the ‘straw man’ morality much emphasised by classical liberals. ‘Libertarians’ claim that certain people with a collectivist mindset believe in an extreme form of altruism, where benefits to others take priority over benefits to self; such an ethos may be called a ‘culture of sacrifice’, benefitting by not-benefitting. While this does happen occasionally, what is more common is for people to emphasise public over private benefits; this is the sound moral principle that libertarians really disapprove of.

Thus, an important part of our ‘rational calculus’ is the private versus public balance; the extent to which we might recognise, and account for, ‘public benefits’ in addition to ‘private benefits’.

So, when we complete our matrix of probabilities and beneficial values, what weight do we give to the benefits that will be enjoyed by people other than ourselves, to other people in both their private and public capacities. Should we care if another group experiences genocide? Do we gloat? Should we empathise, or – more accurately – sympathise, and incorporate others into a more broadly-defined ‘community of self’?

If we have a war against a neighbouring country, should we care about how it affects other more distant countries through ‘collateral damage’? Should we care about a possible catastrophe if it can be postponed until the end of the life-expectancy of our generation? Should we care about the prosperity of life forms other than our own? Should we care about the well-being of our environments? Should we care more about our ‘natural resources’ – such as ‘land’ – than we care about other people who might be competing for the use of those same resources? If we have knowledge that will allow us to make improvements to the lives of others so that they catch up to our own living standards, should we make that knowledge public and useful? Should we account for the well-being of people who live under the rule of rulers who we have cast as ‘Evil’ (such as the burghers of Hamburg in 1943)?

One important morality concept is that of ‘reciprocation’. If we accept that others have the right to think of us in ways that compare with how we think of them, then we must value their lives much as we value our own lives. If I live in Auckland, should I value the life of a person who lives in New Delhi nearly as much as I value the life of someone who lives in Wellington? I should if I expect persons in Mumbai to value my life nearly as much as they value the lives of people in New Delhi.

Reciprocal morality can easily fail when someone belongs to a group which has apparent power over another group. We may cease to care whether the other group suffers our wrath, if we perceive that the ‘lesser’ group has no power to inflict their wrath onto our group. We may feel that we have immunity, and impunity. They should care about us, but we need not care about them.

It is through our ManualI – our manual override, our consciousness, our awareness – that we have the opportunity to make rational valuations which incorporate morality. Our AutoI, while rational in its own terms, is also amoral. We can behave in amoral self-interested ways – even immoral ways – without being aware of it. Our automatic benefit-cost analyses drive much of our behaviour, without our awareness; we cannot easily question what drives our Auto-Intelligence.

Our AutoI systems may – in evolutionary terms – select for degrees of ignorance, stupidity, blindness as ways of succeeding, of coping. AutoI protects us from having to face-up to the downsides of our actions and our beliefs; especially downsides experienced more by others than by ourselves. And they tell us that we are Good, and that some others are Bad.

Pavlovian Narratives

We come to believe in other people’s narratives through habit or conditioning. AutoI itself has a cost-cutting capacity that allows speedy decision-making; it adopts reasoning shortcuts, in the context that shortcuts save costs. We build careers – indeed our careers as experts in something – by largely accepting other people’s narratives as truths that should not be questioned and that should be passed on. We enjoy belonging to ‘belief communities’; and we are ‘pain-minimisers’ at least as much as we are ‘pleasure-maximisers’; it may be ‘painful’ to be excluded from a community. We too-easily appease unsound public-policy decisions without even knowing that we are appeasing. We turn-off the bad news rather than confronting it.

Our beliefs are subject to Pavlovian conditioning. And one of the most painful experiences any human being can suffer is to have beliefs cancelled as ‘stupid’. So we unknowingly – through AutoI – program our auto-intelligences to protect our beliefs from adverse exposure; and, if such protection fails, to denounce those who challenge our belief-narratives.

One form of cost-cutting-rationality is ‘follow-the-leader’. It’s a form of ‘conclusion free-riding’. We choose to believe things if we perceive that many others believe those things. An important form of ‘follow-the-leader’ is to simply take our cues from authority figures, saving ourselves the trouble of ‘manual’ self-reasoning.

With AI – Artificial Intelligence – we delegate even more of our decision-making away from our moral centres, our consciousnesses, our manual overrides. We allow automatic and artificial intelligence to perform ever more of our mental labour. It’s more a matter of people becoming robot-like than being replaced by robots.

Pavlovian rationalisation is heavily compromised by unconscious bias. Beliefs that arise from uncritical ‘follow-the-leader’ strategies are unsound. They lead us to make suboptimal decisions.

Why War?

Many people, including people in positions of influence, make decisions that are sub-rational, in the sense that they allow auto-biases to prevail over reflective ‘manual’ decision-making. There are biases in received information, and further biases in the way we interpret/process information.

Unhelpful, biased and simplistic narratives lead us into wars. And, because wars end in the future, we forever discount the problem of finishing wars.

When we go to war, how much do we think about third parties? In the old days when an attacker might lay-siege to a castle, it was very much ‘us’ versus ‘you’. But today is the time of nuclear weapons, other potential weapons of mass destruction, of civilian-targeting, and drone warfare. Proper consideration of third-parties – including non-human parties – becomes paramount. A Keir Starmer might feel cross towards a Vladimir Putin; but should that be allowed to have a significant adverse impact on the people of, say, Sri Lanka; let alone the people of Lancashire or Kazan?

Proper reflective and conscious consideration of the costs and benefits of our actions which impact on others should be undertaken. Smaller losses are better than bigger losses, and the world doesn’t end if the other guy believes he has ‘won’. Such considerations, which minimise bias, do allow for a degree of weighting in favour of the protagonists’ communities. But our group should never be indifferent to the wellbeing of other groups – including but not only the antagonist group(s) – and should forever understand that if we expect our opponents to not commit crimes, then we should not commit crimes either.

War escalates conflicts rather than resolves them. And it exacerbates other public ‘bads’ such as disease, famine, and climate change. War comes about because of lazy unchecked narratives, and unreasoned loyalty to those narratives.

Further Issues about Rational Expectations:

Poor People

It is widely believed by middle-class people that people in the precariat (lower-working-class) and the underclass should not gamble; as in buying lottery tickets and playing the ‘pokies’. But ‘lower-class people’ generally exhibit quite rational behaviour. In this case, rare but big wins make a real difference to people’s lives, whereas regular small losses make little difference to people already in poverty or in poverty-traps.

The expected return on gambling is usually negative, though the actual value of a big-win cannot simply be measured in dollar-terms. $100,000 means a much greater benefit to a poor person than to a rich person. Further, the expected value of non-gambling for someone stuck in a poverty-trap is also negative. It is rational to choose the least-negative option when all options are adverse.

Policy Credibility

Here I have commented about the rationality of decision-making, and how rational decisions are made in a reflective, conscious, moral, and humane way. However, there is also an issue around the meaning of ‘expectations’. While the more technically correct meaning of expectation is a person’s belief in what will happen, the word ‘expectation’ is also used to express a person’s belief in what should happen.

(An expectation can be either what someone will do, or should do. Consider: ‘Russia will keep fighting’ and ‘Russia should stop fighting’. To ‘keep fighting’ and to ‘stop fighting’ are both valid expectations; though only the first is a rational expectation from the viewpoint of, say, Keir Starmer; the second is an ‘exhortation’.)

The phrase ‘rational expectations’ is used most widely in the macroeconomics of interest rates and inflation. The job of Reserve Banks (‘central banks’) in the post-1989 world is to condition people (in a Pavlovian sense) into believing that an engineered increase in interest rates will lead to a fall in the inflation rate. This is called ‘credibility’. The idea is that if enough people believe a proposition to be true, then it will become true, and hence the conditioned belief becomes a rational belief. If people come to believe that the rate of inflation this year will be less than it was last year – however they came to that belief – then it should dowse their price-raising ardour; it becomes a contrived ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’.

War

The same reasoning may be applied to warfare. If, by one side (especially ‘our’ side) talking-tough (and waving an incendiary stick), people on both sides believe that the other side will dowse its asset-razing ardour (due to fear or ‘loss of morale’), then the belief that a war is more-likely-to-end may in itself lead to a cessation of hostilities. While unconvincing, because humans are averse to humiliation, it’s an appeal to ‘our’ AutoI (automatic intelligence) over our less credulous ManualI (manual override, our reflective intelligence). It’s the ‘credible’ ‘tough-man’ (or iron-lady) narrative. In this sense, Winston Churchill was a credible wartime leader.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

This story, Germany to ease government debt limits in major step aimed at boosting economy, defense spending,AP, 6 March 2015, reflects my comments in Germany’s Election 2025. (And note Reforming the debt brake: Now or never! Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, 28 Feb 2025. And Germany’s election victor must ditch its debt rules—immediately, The Economist 24 Feb 2025. These are gung-ho stories.)

The plan in Germany is to use the ‘lame-duck’ Parliament that was voted out on 23 February 2025 to alter that country’s constitution. To do this, a two-thirds majority is required in Parliament, and the Chancellor-elect (Friedrich Merz) believes he will not be able to get such a majority in the new parliament, which convenes at the end of March.

To achieve this change in Germany’s constitution, the provisional coalition (CDU/CSU/SPD) will need the support of either the Green Party (in the new parliament) or the ‘liberal’ (ie like New Zealand’s ACT) Free Democratic Party (who will not feature in the new parliament). Hitherto – before 2025 – the CDU, the FDP, and the SPD, were the main supporters of the debt brake. They understood it – in 2009, when it was added to the Constitution – as a means of hobbling any future government which might oppose fiscal austerity; as a means of baking-in, for all foreseeable time, their particular macroeconomic philosophy.

(New Zealand, though with a less formal constitution, has the 1989 Reserve Bank Act and the 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act effectively baked in. And for similar reasons; to make it extremely difficult for a future government to undertake reforms similar to the very popular macroeconomic policies that were implemented, and successful, in the late 1930s.)

Germany has less than two weeks to break its self-imposed shackle. If they miss that deadline, if they have to use the new parliament, they will have to do something like what Adolf Hitler did in 1933 with the Enabling Act. The irony is that the parties expected to vote against the emergency measure will be the parties – strong in Eastern Germany – who, if in power, would benefit most from a general release of the debt brake.

For the Green Party it will be a case of ‘Which side are you on?’; the Establishment or the Anti-Establishment? This vote may be ‘make or break’ for the German Greens. Historically, the Greens have been opposed to the use of the debt brake to hobble progressive domestic policies. Will they now favour a piece of unprincipled political manoeuvring so that Germany can put itself in a position to make war on Russia or in support of Israel?

A Case for Comparison: New Zealand’s ‘Constitutional Crisis’ of 1984

Robert Muldoon was New Zealand’s caretaker Prime Minister in the week of so after his political defeat in the 14 July 1984 election. The constitutional crisis unfolded the following Monday.

Before and during the election campaign, the Labour Party’s ‘Finance Minister in Waiting’ Roger Douglas had indicated a desire to devalue the New Zealand Dollar by around twenty percent. This set up a ‘one-way-bet’ within the monied community; sell New Zealand dollars for another currency, wait for the election, then buy-back New Zealand dollars. At best there would be windfall capital-gains of 20%; at worst there would be no losses.

So, in the weeks leading up to the election, a financial crisis took place on account of the dramatic rundown of foreign exchange reserves. After the election, Douglas and Prime Minister elect David Lange wanted Robert Muldoon to immediately devalue the New Zealand dollar by twenty percent. Muldoon was reluctant to grant the one-way-speculators their maximum windfall profits; he favoured a much smaller five-percent devaluation.

This reluctance was presented as a constitutional crisis, because the ‘lame duck’ Prime Minister (and Finance Minister) disagreed with the incoming administration. Though eventually Muldoon conceded. Subsequently, the foreign exchange crisis has always been dubbed a constitutional crisis – a crisis of democracy – because the outvoted ‘lame-duck’ government was reluctant to give way to the government-elect. On the matter of the best policy, Muldoon was correct; a 5% devaluation would have been optimal. But nobody seemed to care about that; the barely contested narrative was that in a proper democracy the incoming parliament is always right, even when it’s wrong!

On this basis, what Friedrich Merz is planning to do should be a political scandal. But it probably won’t be. In the end, its all about who’s pushing the narratives, and whose interest it is to buy into which narrative.

Friedrich Merz’s double narrative

In Merz’s first narrative, public debt is bad, so bad that it must be curtailed through a country’s constitution. In his second narrative, Russia is worse; and the United States has become an unreliable ally. Merz still wants to have it both ways. He wants Germany (and the European Union) to continue to be self-hobbled on social spending, including those automatic stabilisers that prevent recessions turning into depressions. He wants to have access to unlimited public debt only for a limited purpose; freedom to wage war, to pursue military spending (despite his country not being under military threat). Mainly as a concession to his putative coalition partner, Merz will agree to use public debt (beyond that presently allowed for) to provide some improvements in public capital infrastructure. He continues to promulgate both an anti-public-debt narrative and an anti-Russia narrative. He wants to perpetuate a forever stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war, and to promote a baseless domino theory narrative about Russia’s global military ambitions. Germany borders neither Russia nor Ukraine.

Certainly, there is an argument for Germany to have a defence force in balance with the totality of the public sphere, especially in a liberal democracy which sets its own foreign policy. In that context, any German government should be able to persuade the entire parliament (not just two-thirds) to proceed by removing the debt brake without privileging military spending. The recently elected German government should be able to do this with the Bundestag-elect. But in the present context, the constitutionally dubious proposal is not about self-defence, but in about the pursuit of a geopolitical narrative which posits an urgent need for Western Europe to escalate the Russia-Ukraine War.

Historical Military Conflicts between Russia and Foreign Powers since Tsar Peter the Great

While Russia expanded eastwards in much the same way as the United States expanded westward, there has never been anything like evidence that Russia would like to become a global hegemon. As such, Russia has never attacked German territory with expansion in mind. Russia did ‘liberate’ Eastern Europe at the end of World War Two, and continued to control most of Eastern Europe (including a portion of Germany). But that was the end of a vicious conflict in which Germany coveted much of Russia’s territory. Russia (or Soviet Union as the Russian Empire was then) never sought to extend its living space into Germany, though it did inadvertently in 1945 (in the former East Prussia, the Kaliningrad enclave today).

World War One started on 1 August 1914, when Germany declared war on Russia. And the Soviet Union’s ‘Great Patriotic War’ began when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.

Other great power military invasions of the Russian Empire included that by Sweden in the 1700s (Sweden was a ‘great power’ then), repelled by Tsar Peter the Great. Then there was Napoleon’s invasion by France in 1812, the subject of Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace. Then there was the conflict in the 1850s in Crimea, involving United Kingdom and France and Florence Nightingale (Crimean War); and an abortive invasion by United Kingdom and United States on the incipient Soviet Union in August 1918 (at Archangel and at Vladivostok). (In addition, Russia fought Japan in Manchuria in 1905; Japan opened hostilities. Both Russia and Japan were emulating the prior European powers’ aggression towards China.)

The Domino Theory as applied to Russia

We should mention the Soviet Invasion of its neighbour, Afghanistan, in 1979. This serves as an analogue for the present Russia-Ukraine war. It this stage we should note several things: that Afghanistan was the neighbour of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had genuine concerns about western-power game-playing in Afghanistan, that Afghanistan was not intended by Soviet Russia as the first domino of a global military campaign, and that the world is still dealing with the unforeseen consequences of post-1976 foreign-power-meddling in Afghanistan. The 1989 outcome, a withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, should not be seen as a credible template for an end to the present war. (‘Game playing’, for the West, is a semi-formal process, representing an application of game theory, a branch of economics.)

Despite the historical record being one of Western European aggression towards Russia – and not vice versa – the present conflict in Ukraine is being increasingly framed (without evidence) as Russia waging a ‘domino war’, meaning that once the Ukrainian domino is knocked over, there will be no halting Russia’s alleged ambitions to control the western world. (Indeed, in the White House rhetorical fracas on 28 February, the comment by Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy that set off Donald Trump was the suggestion that Trump might “think differently” when Russia had secured territory on the Atlantic coast of Europe.)

In three years, Russia has not had sufficient military power to fully appropriate the Oblast of Donetsk, in Ukraine. Under what conceivable scenario might the Putin military machine have the capacity or competence to threaten Germany or indeed any part of the European Union?

This is not the first time of course that the domino theory has been applied to Russia. Many of us will remember how North Vietnam was portrayed as a ‘Communist’ stooge – a Soviet Union proxy – and that if the Communists won in Vietnam they would be all around the Pacific Rim next.

1885 and all that

Going further back into history, there was the Russian Scare, which peaked in New Zealand in 1885. New Zealand’s major cities still have the gun emplacements constructed in 1885, to protect the colony from the Russians! Near the albatross colony at Taiaroa Head, Otago, there is a disappearing gun that’s still in pristine condition. And the similar gun at Auckland’s North Head is also a major tourist attraction.

(New Zealand references include the ‘fake news’ article: War with Russia. A Calamity for Auckland. Hostile Visit of Russian Ironclad. Seizure of Gold and Hostages, Daily Southern Cross, 19 February 1873. And: The Russians are here! New Zealand Geographic 2015; The Russians are coming! NZ History; The Enemy that never was: the New Zealand ‘Russian scare’ of 1870-1885, 1976, by Glynn Barratt.)

It’s worth noting that the 1880s was in New Zealand a period of fiscal austerity – the global Long Depression, and in New Zealand – in which defence spending was being pushed despite what was, for all practical purposes, a public sector debt brake.

What was happening in and around 1885 was conflict in Afghanistan between the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire; conflict in which the United Kingdom was portraying Russia as a domino-style aggressor. (Refer the Panjdeh Incident. This period in British military history was sometimes known as the Great Game, and it includes the Crimean War.)

The Russians never came. (Though 101 years later a Russian ship was sunk through misadventure in New Zealand waters.)

Who’s Threatening Who in the Former Soviet Union?

Russia has always seen Ukraine as being part of Greater Russia. Indeed, Kyiv was Russia’s foundation city. In 2022, Russia’s Plan A was to do to Ukraine exactly what the United States did to Iraq in 2003; use military force to bring about regime change through conquest. Aggression, indeed. That war was apparently within the ‘international rules’; or was an ‘acceptable’ departure from those rules. (And, as of now, civilian casualties in Ukraine have been fewer than those of Iraq in the Iraq War.)

Russia’s Plan B has been to redraw the former provincial boundary between Russia and Ukraine, as Russia did in Georgia in 2008 with the effective incorporation of South Ossetia into Russia. (In 2008, there was no subsequent domino invasion of the wider world, and the West was not as invested in Georgia as it came to be in Ukraine.) These border disputes reflect that the former Soviet Union provincial boundaries might not have been optimised for a world in which former republics have become nation states.

From 1999, the United States has overseen the process in which a new state, Kosovo, has been created through a split that Serbia was forced to accept; it was a commonsense rationalisation arising from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, despite the supposed sanctity of international borders.

None of these issues warranted escalation into a world war. Nor does the present Ukraine dispute. Nor did the Third Balkan War (1914); a war that did (but needn’t have) become World War One.

The irony is that Plan B, the plan Russia is following, is the lesser plan; a partial military conquest is always lesser than a full conquest such as the 2003 Iraq War. And a second irony is that, if hostilities do not end this or next month, then Russia (which seems to have settled for some form of Plan B) may end up achieving its original Plan A goal.

War is a nasty business. There should always be alternatives to war, so that conflicting security concerns can be understood and managed peacefully. It requires international ‘players’ seeking mutual optimisation rather than ‘victory’ for one party over another.

What has been the game of the United States and its European proxies?

Three Well-Informed Realists

John Mearsheimer is an American international relations scholar and practitioner who distinguishes between the ‘liberals’ and the ‘realists’ in places like Washington. He’s firmly in the realist camp. And he’s able to evaluate the debates between the two groups. This short clip on YouTube is an interview with John Anderson, former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia (under John Howard). He traces how, from the time of Bill Clinton’s presidency, the liberal foreign policy hawks have always pushed for the ongoing eastward expansion of Nato after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. And how realists (including former senior European political leaders Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel) opposed this, especially the push to get Nato into Ukraine and Georgia; but were outmanoeuvred by the ‘liberals’. Journalist Peter Hitchens echoes this realist view, also in an interview with Anderson, noting how democracies will get into wars on the basis of overhyped narratives, and on account of those same narratives find it almost impossible to get out of these wars.

Jeffrey Sachs is an esteemed Harvard and Columbia University development economist, who’s been a consultant on global economic development and has been a first-hand witness to much geopolitical policymaking over the last four decades. You can see and hear Sachs in this long clip; in an address/discussion to the European Parliament in late February 2025. He connects the 1990s’ United States expansionist project to the philosophy of Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example outlined here in A Geostrategy for Eurasia, Foreign Affairs 1997; though noting that American unipolar hegemony builds on British Empire principles that go back to Lord Palmerston in the 1850s, and to the early twentieth century theories of Halford Mackinder. Brzezinski was an important figure, United States’ rival foreign policy guru to the pragmatic realist Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. It was under Brzezinski’s period in power as National Security Adviser, in the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, that the Cold War – dampened in the early 1970s under Richard Nixon’s presidency – reheated; and that the United States started meddling in Afghanistan.

Peter Turchin is the Russian-born American cliodynamicist (scholar of long period history with the use of long-period statistics) who wrote in End Times (2023) and a number of other important books in the last quarter-century. He has substantial insights into the political and business dynamics of the United States, and of Russia along with its historical satellites such as Belarus and Ukraine. Turchin sees – for the 1990s – the United States, Russia, and Ukraine as true plutocracies (or ‘oligarchies’), subject to the power and foibles of the very rich. For the United States, that influence has waxed and waned throughout its history, but has always been there. Russia, Turchin observes, ceased to be a plutocracy after what was effectively a coup in the late 1990s on the part of the former military/bureaucratic establishment. Belarus never got started as an oligarchy. But Ukraine continues as a true plutocracy, and the United States liberal establishment invested heavily into ensuring that Ukraine would remain so. He says in End Times “By 2014, American ‘proconsuls’, such as veteran diplomat Victoria Nuland, had acquired a large degree of power over the Ukrainian plutocrats.” On this basis, it would seem to be true that the American Lobby in Ukraine operated much as the Israel Lobby operates in the United States. (And we sort-of know the stories of the Bidens’ interest [Joe and Hunter] in Ukraine.)

Conclusion

Germany is dowsing the embers of a twice-vibrant democracy. A war that might have been a small regional war threatens to become a world war, as big liberal-mercantilist (money-focused ‘economically conservative’ and ‘socially liberal’ political classes who are indifferent to unselected genocides and mass-suffering-events) economic powers such as Germany (and the United Kingdom) become less democratic and more bellicose. If we treasure our democratic principles, we should at least take notice.

The Russia-Ukraine War is a mucky border conflict between two countries with a long and intertwined shared history, and with more than enough ‘stirring of the pot’ from outside to convert a regional security dispute into an existential global security threat. It can be settled with a deal that reflects the military situation, rather than by democratically compromised sabre-rattling from Western Europe. After a fluid war in 1950 followed by an extended bloody stalemate – and a change of government in Washington – the 1953 Korean War cease-fire enabled the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to become an economic superpower. An independent capitalist Republic of Ukraine (or, if necessary, West Ukraine) might do the same.

(In that context, we note that Korea’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Syngman Rhee, “refused to sign the armistice agreement that ended the [hostilities], wishing to have the peninsula reunited by force”. Syngman Rhee’s country was saved, though not by him.)

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Background Image courtesy of Nick Minto, Copyright 2024 Nick Minto; photographed November 6, 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn discuss:

• Why Democrats Lost: Incumbency, Elitism, Class & Alienation, Identity Politics…
• Why Trump Won: Anti-Establishment, Populism, Avatar for the Alienated…
• What to Expect Next: Trump Appointments, Isolationism, Geopolitical Impact & Response…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage interaction while live, and encourage their audience to lodge comments and questions. Please subscribe to our YouTube channel and click on notification-bell for an alert for future programmes.

Here’s the link: https://www.youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Background image: courtesy of and Copyright Nick Minto 2024. Image taken November 6 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The LIVE Recording of this podcast will begin today, Monday at 12:45pm November 11, 2024 (NZST) which is Sunday evening, 7:45pm (USEST). Image courtesy of Nick Minto, Copyright 2024 Nick Minto; photographed November 6, 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn will discuss:

• Why Democrats Lost: Incumbency, Elitism, Class & Alienation, Identity Politics…
• Why Trump Won: Anti-Establishment, Populism, Avatar for the Alienated…
• What to Expect Next: Trump Appointments, Isolationism, Geopolitical Impact & Response…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage interaction while live, so feel free to lodge comments and questions, but remember if you do so your interaction may be used in this programme. We recommend that you subscribe to our YouTube channel and click on notification-bell.

Here’s the link: https://www.youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Background image: courtesy of and Copyright Nick Minto 2024. Image taken November 6 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Building upon recent episodes of A View from Afar, Political Scientist Paul G Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning discuss The Politics of Desperation. This episode flows on from our discussions about long transitions and the moment of friction.

As the old status quo begins to crumble (under the weight of fraction), political leaders and elites invested in it get increasingly desperate, leading to more dangerous decisions, more acute moments, and, increased chances of mistake, miscalculation and unanticipated backlash.

The Politics of Desperation accentuates an ongoing downward spiral. And, the Politics of Desperation takes form in differing degrees. For some, the risk of losing is merely a dent in the leader’s ego, reputation, and an awakening that voters have moved on from their style of politics.

But for others, a loss will prove to be devastating, for example; should Donald Trump lose his bid to regain the United States presidency, he will face sentencing as a felon and perhaps even face jail time. For Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, a future loss or a collapse of his right-wing coalition would likely see him facing domestic charges and possibly charges laid by the International Criminal Court for his role in the disproportionate use of military might in Israel’s war on Gaza.

So, Paul and Selwyn discuss the examples of the Politics of Desperation from around the world and assess the risks as the world rests on the cusp of an unknown future.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The above chart shows the votes for the principal ‘leftish’ political parties in England from 1992 to 2024. The important thing to note is that vote tallies should be rising over time in any country which has a rising population. England had had a rising population trend, yet the numbers of votes cast for the established centre-left parties have been on a falling trend.

For Labour the situation is worse than it looks. In 1992 Labour was comfortably defeated by Conservative. Yet Labour got a million more votes in 1992 than it did in 2024.

We may blame ‘apathy’ for this situation. Many more people are not voting at all. But apparent apathy is usually a symptom of something else. Ideally, when we vote we are voting for some ideal or somebody. More people vote when they perceive at least one of the options in a positive light. There is another situation which can lead to a high propensity to vote; namely if the existing government is perceived as being so bad that people will vote for whoever they must vote for in order to dismiss the government. This was the situation in England in 2024; yet even that urgency failed to galvanise voters. The total number of votes cast in England was the lowest since 2005, when Labour ‘won’ with 35% of the vote. (In 2024 Labour got 34% of the vote.)

In 2024, the total votes cast for Labour in England fell by nearly a million, after the 2019 election which was disastrous for Labour. Yet the number of seats Labour gained nearly doubled. Clearly this last distortion is a result of the ‘plurality’ voting system used in elections to the Westminster Parliament. But there’s something more important going on. The centre-left is losing favour.

The vote for the Liberal Democrats also fell in 2024, despite that party gaining a huge increase in the number of seats won. Their decline in votes is the result of what is commonly known as tactical voting; in this case it appears that about a million people who would have voted LibDem in an MMP election chose to lend their votes to Labour. (Probably more LibDem supporters than this lent their votes to Labour, because it is also clear that, where the LibDem candidate was better placed to beat the Conservative candidate, many otherwise Labour voters lent their votes to LibDem candidates.

It was this ‘efficient’ and rational vote-lending behaviour that enabled the centre-left to win so many seats. So, while, for once, ‘progressive’ voters were clever this time, the bigger story is the decline of popular support for the centre-left political agenda.

Another feature of the 2024 election is the Palestine-Gaza factor. In many traditionally Labour seats, there were ‘independent’ pro-Palestine candidates who cannibalised the Labour vote; indeed a few of these candidates won their seats.

The other important feature is the rise of the Green Party as a left-wing party winning pro-Palestine votes; especially votes of non-Muslims who are disturbed by what is currently happening in the Levant. For this see the two tables below. The Green Party may have gained ‘critical mass’, being poised to be the new left presence in British politics.

England General Election Results
Votes
	Total	Labour	Conservative	LibDem	Green	other
1992	28,148,506	9,551,910	12,796,772	5,398,293		401,531
1997	26,058,712	11,372,329	8,780,881	4,677,565	60,013	1,167,924
2001	21,870,762	9,056,824	7,705,870	4,246,853	158,173	703,042
2005	22,713,855	8,043,461	8,116,005	5,201,286	251,051	1,102,052
2010	25,085,097	7,042,398	9,931,029	6,076,189	258,954	1,776,527
2015	25,571,204	8,087,684	10,517,878	2,098,404	1,073,242	3,793,996
2017	27,165,789	11,390,099	12,379,200	2,121,810	506,969	767,711
2019	26,909,668	9,152,034	12,710,845	3,340,835	819,751	886,203
2024	24,288,122	8,365,122	6,279,411	3,199,060	1,780,226	4,664,303

England General Election Results
Seats
	Total	Labour	Conservative	LibDem	Green	other
1992	524	195	319	10
1997	529	329	165	34		1
2001	529	323	165	40		1
2005	529	286	194	47		2
2010	533	191	298	43	1
2015	533	206	319	6	1	1
2017	533	227	297	8	1
2019	533	180	345	7	1
2024	543	348	116	65	4	10

Watching that election on UK Sky TV (live on You Tube), one commentator repeatedly mentioned the “efficiency” of Labour, meaning that Labour won many seats on small margins. This so-called efficiency will make Labour very vulnerable in the next election, which, luckily for them, may not be until 2029.

Unless Labour performs exceptionally well, the votes lent to Labour will return to their LibDem homes.

What about the votes Labour lost to Independents and Greens in safe Labour seats? And the votes, Labour lent to winning (and near-winning) LibDem candidates. They are most likely to stay with the Liberal Democrats who will need these votes to fend off Conservative candidates.

The Tories

What of the ‘Tory’ Conservatives? They clearly got trounced; their vote count fell by more than 50% in the 2024 election. They may or may not get votes from people who voted Reform, the biggest of the ‘other’ parties in 2024. A useful strategy for them could be to cultivate the large conservative Muslim vote. A significantly higher proportion of voters in England are now Muslims; that proportion will only grow as Muslim households continue to have more children than the national average. And, Islam is a very conservative religion.

There is a natural fit here, going forward. Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nadhim Zahawi was born in Iraq and is “thought to be a Muslim”. Likewise, another former Conservative Chancellor, Sajid Javid – born to Pakistani parents – “still identifies as being a Muslim”. If the Tories wish to be relevant in England’s future, they will need to adopt a wider political vision that is attractive to non-radical Muslims as well as to conservative people of other faiths. Otherwise, the future of the Right in England may fall to the new Reform Party; such a change has already happened in France.

So, I am predicting that – in 2029, or before – the LibDems may come through the middle, just as Emmanuel Macron’s party did in France in 2017, leaving both Labour and Conservative to play the role of small ‘legacy parties’. Labour’s ‘landslide’ is likely to accelerate, but in the wrong way; indeed, a landslide is actually a disaster.

Note

In this chart and text, I have looked at England only, which is the core of the United Kingdom, but not its entirety. This is because, especially in Scotland and Northern Ireland, other parties play significant roles. In Scotland in 2024, the big story was the crash of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Labour was a beneficiary of that crash. But it is likely that votes lent to Labour by regular SNP voters will not stay with Labour.

______________

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Post-pandemic economics and the rise of national populism – Wherever we look today, whether it be through a political, economic, or security lens, we can see the consequences of post-pandemic economic instability.

And politically, the rise of national populism is in evidence, as is an apparent anti-incumbent mood among voters.

In this podcast, Paul G Buchanan and Selwyn Manning assess the global Zeitgeist and what impact post-pandemic economics is having on geopolitics and geo-economics.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

I enjoy Bryce Edwards’ Political Roundup as a succinct and pertinent summary of current New Zealand politics. But, in The Liberal v Conservative anguish over the direction of NZ politics (NZ Herald, 3 January 2024) Edwards corrupts the word ‘liberal’ too much.

The word ‘liberal’ has a definite, important, and nuanced meaning – despite decades of misuse, especially in North America. Steven Joyce, former Minister of Finance and much else, comes close to the mark. In his 2023 book On The Record. Joyce says: “The world is divided broadly into collectivists and individualists, with a whole lot of people in the middle who are collectivist sometimes and individualist at other times”.

The ‘liberal project’ is firmly one of individualism, which makes ACT the nearer to a liberal political party than any of the parties of the left. Joyce himself is a pragmatist, a person in the middle who nevertheless veers firmly towards liberalism. I can accept Steven Joyce as a liberal, given that to be ‘a liberal’ does not always mean being liberal. I cannot accept Jacinda Ardern or Chris Hipkins as liberals.

Act, while subscribing to an authentic set of liberal principles, is not really a liberal party. It has illiberal blindspots, in particular its beliefs about money and public finance. Without wanting to dwell on these here, I might mention political economist James K Galbraith, and his recent article Mainstream Economics’ Medieval Inflation Medicine (Project Syndicate, 29 Dec 2023). (Galbraith likens orthodox macroeconomic policy prescriptions as being like those of pre-scientific humoral medicine. The four humors, prone to excess, of medieval medicine – blood, phlegm, yellow bile, black bile – map to four inflationary biles of conservative macroeconomics: too much money, too much government spending, too many jobs, and unmanaged expectations.)

The recent buzz (and not-so-recent in the USA) is for the political left to call itself ‘liberal’, and to insist that others do so too. Edwards obliges. The Left have grabbed other words too; the most obvious being ‘progressive’. I can live with this last one, which goes back to the Progressive movement in the United States in the 1900s’ decade. ‘Progressive’ means a certain ‘whiggish’ direction of change, of self-congratulatory improvement. New Zealand’s progressives see the new centre-right government as regressive, because they are making (and not just talking about) changes that are ‘turning the clock back’ to the 1990s. Nicola Willis does indeed have an uncanny resemblance to Ruth Richardson.

The progressives of the Victorian era were also the liberals of that era, and they stood to the ‘left’ of the conservative ‘Tories’. They were originally called Whigs in the United Kingdom, and represented the capitalists – the rising bourgeoisie, the proponents of laissez-faire – against the ‘conservative’ men representing entrenched landed wealth. The individualists were then to the left of the collectivists; indeed, many liberals regarded themselves as – and were regarded as – radicals. (The word ‘radical’ now means extremist, not progressive.)

I would be happy for Bryce Edwards to substitute ‘liberal’ for ‘progressive’, given the understanding that progressive politics in the 21st century is principally a collectivist enterprise; and noting that a modern (and most pre-modern) collectivist political systems represent rule by elites for elites. Elites expand and shrink, diminish and replace, and elites are rivalrous by nature; new elites draw their power by identifying with identity populations characterised by large numbers of disadvantaged people, and leveraging off those disadvantaged to confer more privileges to the advantaged minorities in those ‘disadvantaged’ populations.

To be liberal

1. Core tenets of liberalism are as follows, noting a degree of practical inconsistency:

• permissive (aka ‘free to choose’, including ‘free speech’ and ‘freedom of association’)
• individual autonomy and responsibility
• individual choice and free will
• small government
• private property (including inheritance)
• enlightened competitive markets (no races to the bottom; win-win)
• price mechanism
• natural regulation (so, not ‘anarchy’); respect for nature
• rule of law, law of enlightened rules
• social capital (‘enlightenment’); business trust (not ‘trusts’!)
• enlightened respect, tolerance; sympathetic empathy
• critical thinking and awareness
• happiness
• service
• money as a medium of exchange and a measure of relative value
• horizontal equity, universality
• human rights (as in ‘all lives matter’)
• equality of opportunity (practically inconsistent with inheritance of private property)
• market-constrained inequality
• civil society (‘club’ or ‘membership’ model for collective expression)
• dynamic ‘bottom-up’ change
• public goods, including information as a public good
• public domain; free spaces
• rationality: belief-systems derived from axiom, observation, and argument; not authority
• accounting: double-entry balance sheets
• fractional banking
• small sovereign nation states (‘sovereignties’)

2. Other concepts commonly associated with liberalism, but which may (or do) also have significant collectivist expression:

• capitalism
• interest, profit, and rent
• democracy
• equilibrium
• discipline
• governance systems
• defence
• dynamic rivalry
• deal-making
• social mobility
• international economy of nation states
• globalisation
• science
• intellectual property
• internalisation of costs
• sustainability
• neoliberalism
• low public debt
• financial wealth
• mercantilism (money as wealth)
• vertical equity (targeted discrimination)

3. Additional principles of mature liberalism:

• public property rights
• public equity
• systemic limitation of inequality; equity of opportunity
• public debt
• paying-forward debt
• interest rates, positive or negative, understood as the price of inter-temporal trade
• the right of individuals to lead expansive or restrictive lives
• mature capitalism; capitalism with a public dimension
• mature democracy; democracy with a financial dimension
• confederations of sovereignties as fiscal unions

The taxonomy here is that list 2 are principles which many liberals (especially ‘centre-right’ liberals) adhere to, but not necessarily in a way that is consistent with list 1. List 3 represents the natural development of liberalism, though the debates we could be having about these principles are tacitly suppressed by both liberal and non-liberal elites.

What is not liberal?

While collectivism is not liberal, collectivism is not in itself ‘bad’. Practical societies contain a mixture of individual and enforced group dynamics, as Steven Joyce acknowledged. Taxation, an enforced group dynamic, is as inevitable as individual death.

Collectivism does have a greater tendency to be elitist, in part because elitism is itself a collectivist concept. Elites are collectives of relative privilege, each with certain shared goals and behavioural mannerisms.

Returning to Bryce Edwards summary of the outlook for the ‘progressive’ Left (not “liberal”, as he lazily presumes) in Aotearoa New Zealand, we need to note that today’s progressive (and largely ‘western’) project is inherently both collectivist and elitist. The axis of the Left in contemporary New Zealand represents the antithesis of liberalism; the would-be rule of the new elites, by the new elites, for the new elites.

We might note here that the terms ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ were adopted after the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century. This was a very serious – indeed fatal – clash of a new-left elite coming up against an old-right elite (both elites owned slaves in the Americas). The resulting synthesis of these elites underpinned the subsequent industrialisation of Europe; and, in its own ways, the not particularly liberal economic development of the United Kingdom and the United States.

What is practical?

Humanity can never live within a purely liberal order – neither at local, ethnic national, territorial, nor global levels – but is best served by service-institutions (not self-serving institutions) infused with liberal principles. Human rights are universal. And human identities are multidimensional, not exclusive; when trust is present, people naturally mix and mingle on that basis of both similarity and difference. I am not a this or a that; I am (a) human. Humans are in nature, not apart from it. And humans can diagnose and address problems, through liberally-infused collective actions.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Today, In this the twelfth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will note and discuss some of the big world events that have occurred and are occurring in 2023.

And in particular, Paul and I will discuss the rise of the Global South; evaluate the the wars that continue to rage in Ukraine and Gaza; and tensions in the South China Sea.

Plus we will note, with particular reference the trends that will become prominent in 2024, including the decline of Western democracies and witness a rightward turn in many places (including in Argentina and New Zealand in their respective 2023 elections).

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this the tenth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul Buchanan and journalist/analyst Selwyn Manning examine the current Israel-Palestine Atrocities.

As we prepared for this podcast, representatives of Arab states have presented a united front at the United Nations, criticising the UN Security Council of doing nothing to protect civilians from Israeli bombing and missile attacks on Gazan civilians and locations.

Since then, the UN Security Council has considered two resolutions, the latter calling for a pause in hostilities to allow a humanitarian effort to enter Gaza to assist civilians.

The United States vetoed that Security Council resolution.

Al Jazera has detailed that Israel forces have targeted and bombed civilian facilities include Hospitals, schools, residential areas resulting in the deaths of thousands of people, civilians, – around one-third of the deaths are children.

It remains contested by all sides in this conflict as to who, or what, is responsible for the deadly attack on Gaza Hospital, resulting in the deaths of over 471 people.

Additional to this, Israel has sealed the borders of Gaza while it prevents food, water and medical supplies from reaching civilians – in breach of international law requirements and laws of conflict.

Israel ordered Gazan civilians, who wish to get to safety, to get out of North Gaza and move toward the south, to the border with Egypt. But as people fled south toward what appeared to be safety, Israel bombed the southern Gaza region killing more civilians and sealing off that corridor for others who sought refuge.

As a consequence of the bombing, Egypt responded by sealing the Gaza-Egypt border.

Humanitarian aid now sits on trucks, waiting, on the Egypt side of the border, while United Nations officials implore Israel and Egypt to allow medical supplies, food and water to get through to those who are injured and dying.

The Israel Defence Force strikes followed a surprise-attack on Israeli citizens by soldiers operating under the Hamas banner.

Civilians were slaughtered and others taken hostage, only to be used as bargaining chips and leverage against their enemies.

Even Palestinian advocacy groups like the Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa suggested that breaches of international humanitarian Law, crimes against civilians, have been committed by those Hamas-aligned fighters. But they are clear, as others are too, that crimes against humanity, war crimes, have been committed by Israel, without consequence, as we all give witness to its response which is disproportionate, brutal, and disregarding of the thousands of Palestinian lives that have already been taken.

That’s the current situation. It is likely to get much worse.

In this episode, our questions will include:

What are the world’s leaders doing to stop the carnage?

Are the world’s nations being drawn into what will be an ever-expanding war?

Are we witnessing the beginning of a war where on one side authoritarian-led states like Russia, Iran, the wider Arab states, and possibly China stand unified against the United States, Britain, Germany, and other so-called liberal democratic allies representing the old world order?

Is what we are witnessing, what happens when a global rules-based order, multilateralism and institutions like the United Nations no longer have influence to prevent war, or restore peace and stability, or assert principles of international justice and enforce the rights of victims to see recourse to the law?

Why has this slaughter become an opportunity for the US and Russia to square-off against each other at the UN Security Council – a body that was once designed to advocate and achieve peace, but has now become a geopolitically divided entity of stalemate and mediocrity?

Eventually, will humanitarianism prevail? Will the world recognise that all people, the elderly, women, children, people of all ethnicities and religions, that they all bleed and die irrespective of their state of origin, when leaders of all sides, while sitting back in their bunkers, unleash weapons designed to kill as many people as is possible?

In this episode, Paul and Selwyn examine this most grave situation from a geopolitical vantage point. It may appear as dispassionate, and as so even disturbing, but we will take this approach in an attempt to aide an understanding of why this is happening in Gaza and why it is happening now.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this the sixth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning present a two-part episode to analyse what to make of New Zealand Prime Minister, Chris Hipkins’ bilateral meetings with People’s Republic of China’s President Xi JinPing and other leaders of the PRC.

In part one, Paul and Selwyn also consider how the PRC-NZ trade relationship is seen in the eyes of New Zealand’s security partners.

Then, in the second half of today’s podcast, Paul and Selwyn analyse the most recent events in Russia – events that have taken shape since Wagner Commander Yevgeny Prigozhin’s pronounced intent to mobilise his mercenaries against the Russian Federation’s top two military heads, and, while doing so, pronounced that the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine was based on falsehoods.

What should we expect next? What is the real state of Putinism? What do the political and power elites in Russia make of President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the matter?

Weeks prior to this event happening inside Russia, Paul and Selwyn analysed the question: How stable is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power? It’s a question that all those who watch Russian affairs have now been confronted with.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn unpack the complexity, look at what has changed as opposed to what has been said.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recordings of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.