Germany’s important election last week struggled to make the news cycle, even on Germany’s own Deutsche Welle(DW), Germany’s equivalent of Britain’s BBC. Especially (but not only) in the international media, most of the focus was on a single party (AFD, Alliance for Germany) that was never going to have the most votes and was (almost) never going to become part of the resulting government.

Germany is the world’s third largest national economy, and traditionally dominates the politics of the European Union; an important example of this dominance was the Eurozone financial crisis of the first-half of the 2010s; a crisis that was (unsatisfactorily) resolved, thanks to a problematic and controversial program of fiscal austerity.

At present, Germany, like New Zealand, is experiencing an economic recession. (Provisional annual economic growthwas -0.2% in 2024 and -0.3% in 2023.) The cause is similar, too, in both countries: the same ‘balance the Budget’ mentality that gave the world the Great Depression in the 1930s.

Election Result

The ‘winner’ of the German election was the CDU/CSU Alliance (see Wikipedia for a better presentation of the results), which works a bit like the Liberal/National Coalition in Australia. (The Christian Social Union functions in Bavaria much like Australia’s National Party functions in rural Queensland.) CDU/CSU (like National in New Zealand) comfortably prevailed with 28.5 percent of the vote, entitling that alliance to 33 percent of the seats in the Bundestag (Parliament).

The new Chancellor (equivalent to Prime Minister) will be Friedrich Merz; a 69-year-old version of our own Christopher Luxon, as far as I can tell. He is strongly anti-Putin and pro-Israel. He has come to power well and truly under the international media radar; and will be in a strong position to exert near-absolute power, given that he will always be able to turn to the AFD (who got more votes than the Social Democrats; 20.8%) for support in the Bundestag for any measure that is not palatable to Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats. In the new Parliament, the Greens and the Left merely make up the numbers.

Merz’s Christian Democrats will form a coalition government with the losing SPD (Social Democratic Party, like Labour in New Zealand) who came third with 16.4 percent of the vote; 19 percent of the seats. Together these two parties of the establishment centre hold 52% of the new parliament, despite having less than 45% of the vote. (The outgoing minority government was a centrist coalition of the SPD and the Greens; the election was held early because the ACT-like Liberal Party – the FPD, Free Democrats – withdrew from the coalition. The FPD vote shrunk from 11.4 percent in 2021 to just 4.3 percent of the vote this time.)

The result in Germany proved to be very much like that of the United Kingdom in 2024: a slide in support for the two major parties (‘the establishment centre’), a consolidation of power to the self-same establishment centre, and a shift of that establishment centre to the right. (See my chart in Germany’s stale (and still pale) political mainstream, Evening Report 27 February 2025, for a timeline of decline.) While both countries technically underwent a change of government, in both countries the establishment has entrenched its power, and in both countries the political assumptions of the power centre have shifted to the right.

Clearly this is problematic for democracy, because historically disastrous popular support for the ‘broad church’ parties of the establishment centre has coincided with increased power to those parties, as well as policy convergence between them. Further, based on legislative electoral requirements, neither Germany nor the United Kingdom (nor the United States for that matter) will have a new government until 2029. At a time when a week is a long time in international politics, 208 weeks is an eternity. World War Three, a distinct possibility, may be in its second or third year by then.

Voting System

Germany represents the prototype upon which New Zealand’s MMP voting system is based. There are some differences though, and some recent changes.

Germany calls its all-important ‘party vote’ the ‘second vote’, disguising its importance. It is possible that many German voters do not fully appreciate its significance. The electorate vote is called ‘first vote’, and winners (by a plurality, not necessarily a majority) are elected ‘directly’. The second (party) vote is understood as a top-up vote to ensure proportionality.

Party lists are regional in Germany. And ‘ethnic parties’ may get special privileges.

In one respect the German version is more proportional than the New Zealand version of MMP, in that it no longer allows overhang MPs. (However, the most recent result is not proportional in the important sense that two parties together with less than 45% of the vote have 52% of the seats.) In MMP, one can easily imagine an overhang situation being frequent if the ‘major’ parties, which win most electorates, only get between 16% and 29% of the party vote.

In 2013, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court decided that overhang seats were too big a threat to proportionality. So, they introduced ‘levelling seats’. In effect, it meant that if one party gets an overhang, then all parties get an overhang. The result was, in 2013, that a parliament that should have had 598 members (Deputies) ended up with 631, an effective overhang of 33. In 2017 that effective overhang grew to 111, and to 137 in 2021.

For 2025, they decided to abandon overhang representation altogether, by not guaranteeing direct election through the first vote. And they fixed the size of the Bundestag to 630 Deputies, up from a base-size of 598.

If the new German system was in place in New Zealand in 2023, then two of the Te Pati Māori electorate seats from 2023 would have been forfeit, going instead to second placed candidates; proportionality in 2023 entitled Te Pati Māori to four seats, not the six which they have. However, we should note that, if New Zealand was using the present German version of MMP, there would be no special Māori electorates, but the Māori Party would be exempt the five percent party threshold. Ethnic-privileged parties in Germany are incentivised to focus on the party vote, not the electorate vote. In Germany there is a Danish ethnic party (South Schleswig Voters’ Association) which is exempt the threshold. Its leader, Stefan Seidler, did not win his electorate. But his party got 0.15% of the nationwide vote, meaning it qualified for 0.15% of the 630 places in the Bundestag; one seat, for him.

New Zealand voters seem to have more tactical and strategic political nous than do German voters. Thus, it has been very rare for a party in New Zealand to miss out qualifying for Parliament because of getting between 4% and 5% of the party votes (noting that both countries operate a 5% disqualification threshold). In Germany, party-vote percentages just below 5% are not uncommon. In New Zealand, voters, conscious that they want to play a role in coalition-building, actively help parties near the threshold to get over the line. (Indeed, I voted New Zealand First in 2023, because I was 99.9% sure that the only post-election coalition options would be National/ACT or National/ACT/NZF; I favoured the three-party alternative, so I used my vote strategically to help block a National/ACT government.)

Indeed the latest German result was a bit like the latest New Zealand result, but with a party resembling New Zealand First (BSW) getting 4.972% of the vote, so getting no seats at all. BSW getting just a few more votes would have meant a substantial erosion of the two-party power result which eventuated. It is extremely difficult for new non-ethnic parties to get elected in Germany.

In 2025, two parties scored just under five percent of the vote. As well as the BSW, the (ACT-like) Free Democrats who had been part of the previous government, and who had indeed precipitated the early election, scored 4.3%. Indeed, fifteen percent of the votes were ‘wasted’ – that is, cast for ultimately unsuccessful parties. In New Zealand the wasted vote is typically around four percent. Indeed, this high wasted vote turns out to be a more serious challenge to proportionality in German than uncompensated overhang seats.

Both Germany and New Zealand have the contentious (in New Zealand) ‘electorate MP’ rule; the rule that’s misleadingly dubbed in New Zealand as the ‘coat-tail’ rule. (Misleading, because most MPs come in on the coat-tails of their party leadership, and always have.) In Germany the rule is stricter than in New Zealand. In order to avoid disqualification by getting less than 5% of the party vote, New Zealand requires that the party get one electorate MP. In Germany the rule (initially the same as New Zealand), since 1957 has been a requirement for three electorate MPs. In Germany in 2021, the Left Party got 4.87% of the vote and three electorate MPs; they just squeezed in, on both criteria!

Overall, United States’ Vice-President JD Vance’s pre-election comments about democracy in Germany were valid. German politics continues to exclude the non-establishment parties of both the right and the left, despite support for these parties having been increasing for a while, and now representing the majority of German voters.

Media Framing

German television electoral coverage, if DW is anything to go by, is superficial; indeed, is quite insensitive to the national and local dramas taking place. I watched the coverage live. In the hour before the Exit Poll results were announced, the discussion barely mentioned the potential dramas taking place, despite both the BSW and FDP parties pre-polling only just under the five percent threshold. The state of the economy was mentioned in a perfunctory way; clearly it was not a big issue for the political class on display.

At 6 o’clock exactly, the exit-poll results were read out, as if they were the election result. As indeed they turned out to be, more-or-less; the same as the pre-election polls. The subsequent uninterested attitude towards the actual counting of the votes was disappointing. There had been a bit of this in the 2024 UK election as well; as if the exit poll was the election result. In the UK case, Labour’s actual result (for the popular vote) was well under the exit poll result, while the Conservatives did significantly better than their exit poll tally; those facts, though, were for the nerds and psephologists.

In my observation, early votes and exit polls favour the parties supported by the political class; election day votes much less so. So, in New Zealand in 2023 it was initially looking like there would be a two-party coalition of the right. But, to the attentive, as the night wore on, the National Party percentage fell from 41% to 38%, meaning that NZF would have to be included in any resulting coalition.

I suspected something quite similar would happen in Germany, and I was only partially wrong. The exit poll results, and the subsequent counts, were presented to just one decimal place; indeed, the presentation of the numbers was very poor throughout. So, it was hard to see to what extent BSW was improving as the votes were counted.

In the exit poll, two parties – FPD and BSW – were shown as being on 4.7%, and the AFD was on 19.5%. So, the two 4.7% parties were largely written out of the subsequent discussion. We did see an early concession by the FPD, who – representing a segment of the political class – understood the polling dynamics rather well. And we did see the AFD’s Alice Weidel being asked if she was disappointed to get under 20%. Ms Weidel put on a brave face, but she did seem disappointed. When the votes were actually counted, her party got 20.8% exactly on Weidel’s prior expectations.

BSW was completely ignored. There was simply no interest in the possibility that they might reach the 5% threshold, even when the vote count had them upto 4.9%. In the end BSW reached 4.972%; so close! Out of sight, out of mind! In the official results the BSW were lumped with ‘Other Parties’. The DW election panel were too unaware to make any comments about the party itself, its philosophies, or how its possible success might influence the process of forming a coalition government. (Of particular importance was that, with just a few more votes, BSW might have given Eastern Germany a voice in a three-way coalition government.)

For DW, their perennial concern is the place of Germany within Europe and the World; they had little time to give the outside world a glimpse into the domestic lives and politics of ordinary Germans. And we heard nothing about the ‘ethnic vote’, the privileged Denmark Party notwithstanding. I suspect that many if not most of the recent immigrants who do much of the work in Germany either could not vote or did not vote. The election was about them, not for them; denizens, not citizens.

However, DW did invite on a gentleman who mildly focussed the attention of the discussants by suggesting that one of the priorities of the new Chancellor – Friedrich Merz – would be to acquire nuclear weapons! I don’t think the rest of the world had any prior insights into that; ordinary Germans were probably equally in the dark.

Who is Friedrich Merz? Who knows? It turns out that he dropped out of politics for a while, to play a leading role in BlackRock, the international acquisitions company which until recently owned New Zealand’s SolarZero (refer Update on SolarZero Liquidation by BlackRock, Scoop, 29 January 2025). Our media told us that the election was all about the “far-right” AFD Party; that is, the far non-establishment-right. We in New Zealand heard nothing about the far establishment-right; the shadowy man (or his party). Some now fear Merz will be an out-and-out warmonger. Even Al Jazeera, which can be relied upon to cover many stories about places New Zealand’s media barely touches (and in a bit more depth), had the portraits of Olaf Scholz and Alice Weidel on the screen, on 22 February, the day before the election, despite the certainty that Merz world become the new Chancellor.

In that vein, I heard a German woman interviewed in Christchurch, on RNZ on 25 February. She, disappointed with the election result, spent her whole edited four minutes railing about the AFD, as if the AFD had won. There was no useful commentary, by her or RNZ, of the actual result of Germany’s election.

Are we so shallow that we don’t care; that some of us with the loudest voices only want to rail against a non-establishment party, and to see the democratic support for alternative parties as being somehow anti-democratic?

East Germany

People of a certain age in New Zealand will remember the former East Germany; the DDR, German ‘Democratic’ Republic. Most people in Germany itself will have had knowledge of it, including the Berlin-based political staff of DW who were mostly in their thirties, forties and fifties. But the ongoing issues of Eastern Germany were barely in their mindframes.

In Eastern Germany – the former DDR – (especially outside of Berlin), support for the AFD was close to 40%, for BSW over 10%, and the Left much higher than in Western Germany. In the former East Berlin (which I visited in 1974), the Left seems to have been the most popular party. Support in the East for the establishment parties combined was between 25% and 30%, and with a lower turnout.

BSW, it turns out, is Left on economic policy and Right on social policy. And, in the German discourse, is categorised by the political class as ‘pro-Putin’. If BSW had got 5% of the vote, Merz could have tried to bring them into his government; or Merz might have turned to the Green Party instead of a ‘pro-Putin’ party. But I cannot see even the German Greens being able to govern as a junior partner to a belligerent establishment-right CDU-led government. BSW’s failure to get 5% of the vote may turn out to be one of the great ‘might-have-beens’ of Germany’s future history.

As JD Vance stated, this Eastern German situation poses a danger for democracy in Germany and in Europe. Eastern Germany is where the German state is at its most vulnerable. The majority of voters there have voted for ‘pro-Putin’ parties; and, significantly, parties prioritising the problems of economic failure over the big-politics of extranational power-plays.

The new German government, it would seem, is set to aggravate (or, at best, ignore) the problems of Germany’s ‘near-East’, while setting out to inflame the problems of Europe’s ‘far-East’.

The Debt Brake

This is Germany’s equivalent of Ruth Richardson’s 1994 ‘Fiscal Responsibility Act’ (now entrenched in New Zealand law and lore). This is the major single reason why New Zealand has had so many infrastructure problems this century, and why so many young men and families emigrated to Australia in the 1990s, with some of these emigrants coming back to New Zealand in recent years as ‘501s’.

The Merkel debt-brake is the self-inflicted single major reason why many European economies are in such a mess today; and Germany in particular. Germany is congenitally deeply committed to all kinds of financial austerity, with government financial austerity being the most ingrained. Rather than circulating as it should, money is concentrating. The debt-brake is “a German constitutional rule introduced [in 2009] during the Global Financial crisis to enforce budget discipline and reduce [public] debt loads in the country” (see Berlin Briefing, below).

Germany still has a parliamentary session under the old Parliament, before the new parliament convenes. Michaela Küfner (see Berlin Briefing, below) suggests the possibility that the old “lame duck” Parliament could remove the debt-brake from the German constitution, because she sees the make-up of the new more right-wing parliament as being less amenable to address this ‘elephant in the room’. Seems democratically dodgy to me, even talking about pushing dramatic constitutional legislation through a ‘lame duck’ parliament; like Robert Muldoon, pushing through a two-year parliamentary term for New Zealand in the week after the 1984 election!

(Two-year parliamentary terms are not unknown, by the way; the United States has a two-year term for its Congress. This is almost never mentioned when we discuss the parliamentary term in New Zealand. In the United States at present, there will be many people for whom the 2026 election cannot come fast enough; an opportunity to reign-in Donald Trump.)

Future German relations with the United States

On 27 February (28 Feb, New Zealand time) – before the fiasco in the White House on 28 February – I watched Berlin Briefing on DW. This programme is a regular panel discussion of the political editorship of Deutsche Welle.

The context here is that Friedrich Merz made an important speech the evening after the election; a speech that had the Berlin beltway – “people behind the scenes here in Berlin” – all agog. Merz said: “For me the absolute priority will be strengthening Germany so much so that we can achieve [defence] independence from the United States.”

The discussion proceeded as follows:

“How important is this anchoring in Nato of the idea of the United States as ‘The Great Protector’?” Nina Haase, DW political correspondent: “I don’t think there’s a word, ‘massive’ is not enough; people behind the scenes here in Berlin … they talk about are we going to part with the United States amicably or are we going to become enemies [my emphasis] … Europe has relied on the US so much since the Second World War is completely new thinking; just to prepare for a scenario with, if you will, would-be enemies on two sides; in the East with Russia launching a hybrid attack     and then [an enemy] in the West as well.” They go on to talk about the possible need for conscription in Germany.

The political correspondents were talking like bourgeois brat adult children who had expected that they should be able to enjoy a power-lifestyle underwritten by ‘big daddy’ always there as a financial and security backstop; and just realising that the rug of entitlement might be being pulled from under them. Michaela Küfner (Chief Political Editor of DW) goes on to talk about an “existential threat from the United States”, meaning the withdrawal (and potential enmity) of the great protector. “Like your Rich Uncle from across the ocean turning against you”, she said.

Nina Haase: “Pacifism, the very word, needs to be redefined in Germany … Germans are only now able to understand that you have to have weapons in order not to use them.” She was referring to earlier generations of pacifists (like me) who saw weapons as the problem, not the solution.

Ulrike Franke: “Everything needs to change for everything to stay the same”, basically saying Germany itself may have to pursue domestic Rich Uncle policies to maintain the lifestyles of the (entitled) ten percenters.

Michaela Küfner, towards the end of the discussion: “The AFD is framing [the supporters of] the parties which will make up the coming coalition as the political class who we will challenge”. And she noted, but only at the very end of the long discussion, that the effectively disenfranchised people in Eastern Germany are “a lot more Russia-friendly”.

Maybe Merz has a plan to build employment-rich munitions factories in Eastern Germany, to address both his security concerns and the obvious political discontent arising from unemployment and fast-eroding living standards? But Merz will have to abandon his innate fiscal conservatism before he can even contemplate that; can he do a Hoover to Hitler transition? Rearmament was Hitler’s game; his means to full employment after the Depression.

Implications for Democracy

I sense that Friedrich Merz will become the face of coming German politics, just as Angela Merkel once was, and as Trump and Starmer are very much the faces of government in their countries; becoming – albeit through democratic means – similar to the autocrats that, in Eastern and Middle-Eastern countries, they [maybe not Trump] rail against.

We might note that if we look carefully at World War One and World War Two, the core conflict was Germany versus Russia. Will World War Three be the same? And which side will ‘we’ (or ‘US’) be on? In WW1 and WW2, we were on Russia’s side. (Hopefully, in the future, we can be neutral with respect to other countries’ conflicts.)

Democracy is under strain worldwide. The diminishing establishment-centre – the political and economic elites and the people with secure employment and housing who still vote for familiar major parties – is clinging on to power, and for the time-being remains more powerful than ever in Europe.

In the Europe of the early 1930s, it was the Great Depression as a period of abject political failure that resulted in the suspension of democracy. All the signs are that the same failures of democratic leadership – worldwide from the 1920s – will bring about similar consequences.

For democracies to save themselves, they should bring non-establishment voices to the table. In 2025. Germany will be another important test case, already sowing the seeds of political failure. We should be wary of demonising the far non-establishment-right while lionising the far establishment-right.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Ref.

One of the major political developments in the United States that has got little attention in the wake of the Democrats’ astounding loss in the November 5 elections is the success of Arab American political organising.

A new generation of political activists has emerged that has earned representation in unprecedented numbers and impact for the 3.5-million-strong Arab-American community in elected and appointed political offices.

It also put Arab Americans on the electoral map for the first time by launching the Uncommitted movement during the Democratic primaries and making a foreign policy issue — Israel’s genocide in Gaza — a national moral issue.

The Democratic Party underestimated the power of this new generation and the intensity of citizen anger, which cost it dearly in the election.

What happened in the Arab American community is a vintage all-American tale. They, like other communities, started their pursuit of political impact as a low-profile immigrant group who became dynamic citizens after political developments threatened their wellbeing and motivated them to take action.

Arab American mobilisation traces its beginnings to small-scale participation in Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns for the Democratic Party. Jackson was the first serious presidential candidate to include Arab Americans as Democratic Party convention delegates, part of his Rainbow Coalition of:

“the white, the Hispanic, the Black, the Arab, the Jew, the woman, the Native American, the small farmer, the businessperson, the environmentalist, the peace activist, the young, the old, the lesbian, the gay, and the disabled [who] make up the American quilt”.

His campaign gave momentum to voter registration drives within the Arab American community, which continued in the following three decades.

Impact on outcomes
By 2020, nearly 90 percent of Arab Americans were registered to vote. By 2024, the Arab American voter block — in its expansive coalition with other groups — had grown large enough to impact on outcomes in critical swing states, especially Michigan and Pennsylvania.

The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent backlash motivated Arab Americans even more to engage in meaningful politics. Many members of the community refused to live in fear, trying to avoid the intimidation and smears that had long kept their parents and grandparents subdued and quiescent politically.

As Omar Kurdi, founder of Arab Americans of Cleveland, told me, “We were no longer silent because we saw the dangers to us of being quiet and politically inactive. We refused to live in fear of politics.

“Since then, we have been proud, confident, and active in public. We no longer accept crumbs, but want our share of the pie, and we understand now how we can work for that.”

As a result, over the past two decades, Arab Americans have entered the public sphere and politics at all levels: from local, city, and county positions to state and federal ones.

Elected officials say they succeeded because their constituents knew and trusted them. Candidates who won state and national congressional seats — like Rashida Tlaib in Michigan — inspired hundreds of younger Arab Americans to enter the political fray.

Successful experiences in city politics educated newcomers on how they could impact decision-making, improve their own lives, and serve the entire community. They mastered locally the basics of politics, one Ohio activist told me, “like lobbying, bringing pressure, protesting, educating the public, achieving consensus, and creating coalitions based on shared values, problems, and goals”.

Coalesced into Uncommitted movement
All of this momentum, built up over the years, coalesced into the Uncommitted movement in 2024. As the Biden administration unconditionally supported Israel to carry out genocidal violence in Palestine and Lebanon, Arab-American activists moved to use their newfound leverage as voters in electoral politics.

They joined like-minded social justice activists from other groups that mainstream political parties had long taken for granted — including Muslim Americans, Blacks, Hispanics, youth, progressive Jews, churches, and unions — and sent a strong message during the primaries that they would not support Biden’s re-election bid unless he changed his position on Gaza.

The campaign hoped that tens of thousands of voters in the primaries would send the Democrats a big message by voting “uncommitted”, but in fact, hundreds of thousands of Democrats did so across half a dozen critical states.

These numbers were enough to send 30 Uncommitted delegates to the Democratic National Convention in August, where they could lobby their colleagues to shape the party’s national platform.

One activist involved in the process told me they convinced 320 of the other 5,000 delegates to support their demand for a party commitment to a Gaza ceasefire and arms embargo on Israel — not enough to change the party position, but enough to prove that working from inside the political system over time could move things in a better direction.

Intergenerational support and motivation were big factors in the success of the Uncommitted movement. Arab American Institute Executive Director Maya Berry, who has been involved in such activities for three decades, told me that Arab Americans were always in political positions, but in small numbers, so they had little impact.

However, they learned how the system works and provided valuable insights when the time came this year to act. She mentioned Abbas Alawiyeh as an example, who co-chairs the Uncommitted National Movement and worked as a congressional staffer for many years.

Defeat hotly debated
The Uncommitted movement’s precise contribution to the Democratic Party’s defeat is hotly debated right now. One activist told me the movement “placed Arab Americans at the centre of Democratic Party politics, led the progressives, helped Harris lose in swing states, and nationally brought attention to Gaza, divestment, and moral issues in ways we had never been able to do previously.”

All this occurs in uncharted territory, with no clarity if Arab Americans can influence both the Democratic and Republican parties who might now compete for their vote.

One Arab-American activist in his 30s added, “We are liberated from the Democrats who took us for granted, and we Arab Americans are now a swing vote officially.”

Other activists I spoke to thought the election experience could set the stage for a larger movement to counter the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, though that would require conquering the next hurdle of establishing Political Action Committees (PACs) and raising substantial funds.

That is a future possibility.

For now, it is important to recognise that a national-level Arab-American political effort has been born from the fires and devastation of the US-Israeli genocide in Palestine and Lebanon. Whether it can improve the wellbeing of Arab Americans and all Americans will be revealed in the years ahead.

Dr Rami G Khouri is a distinguished fellow at the American University of Beirut and a nonresident senior fellow at the Arab Center Washington. He is a journalist and book author with 50 years of experience covering the Middle East. This article was first published by Al Jazeera.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Background Image courtesy of Nick Minto, Copyright 2024 Nick Minto; photographed November 6, 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn discuss:

• Why Democrats Lost: Incumbency, Elitism, Class & Alienation, Identity Politics…
• Why Trump Won: Anti-Establishment, Populism, Avatar for the Alienated…
• What to Expect Next: Trump Appointments, Isolationism, Geopolitical Impact & Response…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage interaction while live, and encourage their audience to lodge comments and questions. Please subscribe to our YouTube channel and click on notification-bell for an alert for future programmes.

Here’s the link: https://www.youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Background image: courtesy of and Copyright Nick Minto 2024. Image taken November 6 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The LIVE Recording of this podcast will begin today, Monday at 12:45pm November 11, 2024 (NZST) which is Sunday evening, 7:45pm (USEST). Image courtesy of Nick Minto, Copyright 2024 Nick Minto; photographed November 6, 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn will discuss:

• Why Democrats Lost: Incumbency, Elitism, Class & Alienation, Identity Politics…
• Why Trump Won: Anti-Establishment, Populism, Avatar for the Alienated…
• What to Expect Next: Trump Appointments, Isolationism, Geopolitical Impact & Response…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage interaction while live, so feel free to lodge comments and questions, but remember if you do so your interaction may be used in this programme. We recommend that you subscribe to our YouTube channel and click on notification-bell.

Here’s the link: https://www.youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Background image: courtesy of and Copyright Nick Minto 2024. Image taken November 6 2024, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Building upon recent episodes of A View from Afar, Political Scientist Paul G Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning discuss The Politics of Desperation. This episode flows on from our discussions about long transitions and the moment of friction.

As the old status quo begins to crumble (under the weight of fraction), political leaders and elites invested in it get increasingly desperate, leading to more dangerous decisions, more acute moments, and, increased chances of mistake, miscalculation and unanticipated backlash.

The Politics of Desperation accentuates an ongoing downward spiral. And, the Politics of Desperation takes form in differing degrees. For some, the risk of losing is merely a dent in the leader’s ego, reputation, and an awakening that voters have moved on from their style of politics.

But for others, a loss will prove to be devastating, for example; should Donald Trump lose his bid to regain the United States presidency, he will face sentencing as a felon and perhaps even face jail time. For Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, a future loss or a collapse of his right-wing coalition would likely see him facing domestic charges and possibly charges laid by the International Criminal Court for his role in the disproportionate use of military might in Israel’s war on Gaza.

So, Paul and Selwyn discuss the examples of the Politics of Desperation from around the world and assess the risks as the world rests on the cusp of an unknown future.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
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RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The above chart shows the votes for the principal ‘leftish’ political parties in England from 1992 to 2024. The important thing to note is that vote tallies should be rising over time in any country which has a rising population. England had had a rising population trend, yet the numbers of votes cast for the established centre-left parties have been on a falling trend.

For Labour the situation is worse than it looks. In 1992 Labour was comfortably defeated by Conservative. Yet Labour got a million more votes in 1992 than it did in 2024.

We may blame ‘apathy’ for this situation. Many more people are not voting at all. But apparent apathy is usually a symptom of something else. Ideally, when we vote we are voting for some ideal or somebody. More people vote when they perceive at least one of the options in a positive light. There is another situation which can lead to a high propensity to vote; namely if the existing government is perceived as being so bad that people will vote for whoever they must vote for in order to dismiss the government. This was the situation in England in 2024; yet even that urgency failed to galvanise voters. The total number of votes cast in England was the lowest since 2005, when Labour ‘won’ with 35% of the vote. (In 2024 Labour got 34% of the vote.)

In 2024, the total votes cast for Labour in England fell by nearly a million, after the 2019 election which was disastrous for Labour. Yet the number of seats Labour gained nearly doubled. Clearly this last distortion is a result of the ‘plurality’ voting system used in elections to the Westminster Parliament. But there’s something more important going on. The centre-left is losing favour.

The vote for the Liberal Democrats also fell in 2024, despite that party gaining a huge increase in the number of seats won. Their decline in votes is the result of what is commonly known as tactical voting; in this case it appears that about a million people who would have voted LibDem in an MMP election chose to lend their votes to Labour. (Probably more LibDem supporters than this lent their votes to Labour, because it is also clear that, where the LibDem candidate was better placed to beat the Conservative candidate, many otherwise Labour voters lent their votes to LibDem candidates.

It was this ‘efficient’ and rational vote-lending behaviour that enabled the centre-left to win so many seats. So, while, for once, ‘progressive’ voters were clever this time, the bigger story is the decline of popular support for the centre-left political agenda.

Another feature of the 2024 election is the Palestine-Gaza factor. In many traditionally Labour seats, there were ‘independent’ pro-Palestine candidates who cannibalised the Labour vote; indeed a few of these candidates won their seats.

The other important feature is the rise of the Green Party as a left-wing party winning pro-Palestine votes; especially votes of non-Muslims who are disturbed by what is currently happening in the Levant. For this see the two tables below. The Green Party may have gained ‘critical mass’, being poised to be the new left presence in British politics.

England General Election Results
Votes
	Total	Labour	Conservative	LibDem	Green	other
1992	28,148,506	9,551,910	12,796,772	5,398,293		401,531
1997	26,058,712	11,372,329	8,780,881	4,677,565	60,013	1,167,924
2001	21,870,762	9,056,824	7,705,870	4,246,853	158,173	703,042
2005	22,713,855	8,043,461	8,116,005	5,201,286	251,051	1,102,052
2010	25,085,097	7,042,398	9,931,029	6,076,189	258,954	1,776,527
2015	25,571,204	8,087,684	10,517,878	2,098,404	1,073,242	3,793,996
2017	27,165,789	11,390,099	12,379,200	2,121,810	506,969	767,711
2019	26,909,668	9,152,034	12,710,845	3,340,835	819,751	886,203
2024	24,288,122	8,365,122	6,279,411	3,199,060	1,780,226	4,664,303

England General Election Results
Seats
	Total	Labour	Conservative	LibDem	Green	other
1992	524	195	319	10
1997	529	329	165	34		1
2001	529	323	165	40		1
2005	529	286	194	47		2
2010	533	191	298	43	1
2015	533	206	319	6	1	1
2017	533	227	297	8	1
2019	533	180	345	7	1
2024	543	348	116	65	4	10

Watching that election on UK Sky TV (live on You Tube), one commentator repeatedly mentioned the “efficiency” of Labour, meaning that Labour won many seats on small margins. This so-called efficiency will make Labour very vulnerable in the next election, which, luckily for them, may not be until 2029.

Unless Labour performs exceptionally well, the votes lent to Labour will return to their LibDem homes.

What about the votes Labour lost to Independents and Greens in safe Labour seats? And the votes, Labour lent to winning (and near-winning) LibDem candidates. They are most likely to stay with the Liberal Democrats who will need these votes to fend off Conservative candidates.

The Tories

What of the ‘Tory’ Conservatives? They clearly got trounced; their vote count fell by more than 50% in the 2024 election. They may or may not get votes from people who voted Reform, the biggest of the ‘other’ parties in 2024. A useful strategy for them could be to cultivate the large conservative Muslim vote. A significantly higher proportion of voters in England are now Muslims; that proportion will only grow as Muslim households continue to have more children than the national average. And, Islam is a very conservative religion.

There is a natural fit here, going forward. Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nadhim Zahawi was born in Iraq and is “thought to be a Muslim”. Likewise, another former Conservative Chancellor, Sajid Javid – born to Pakistani parents – “still identifies as being a Muslim”. If the Tories wish to be relevant in England’s future, they will need to adopt a wider political vision that is attractive to non-radical Muslims as well as to conservative people of other faiths. Otherwise, the future of the Right in England may fall to the new Reform Party; such a change has already happened in France.

So, I am predicting that – in 2029, or before – the LibDems may come through the middle, just as Emmanuel Macron’s party did in France in 2017, leaving both Labour and Conservative to play the role of small ‘legacy parties’. Labour’s ‘landslide’ is likely to accelerate, but in the wrong way; indeed, a landslide is actually a disaster.

Note

In this chart and text, I have looked at England only, which is the core of the United Kingdom, but not its entirety. This is because, especially in Scotland and Northern Ireland, other parties play significant roles. In Scotland in 2024, the big story was the crash of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Labour was a beneficiary of that crash. But it is likely that votes lent to Labour by regular SNP voters will not stay with Labour.

______________

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

In November 1928, New Zealand had its own ‘Biden moment’ when the 72-year-old Sir Joseph Ward appeared to promise that, if his party won that year’s election, the New Zealand Government would borrow £70 million in 1 year, as a fiscal super-stimulus that would get New Zealand out of the economic doldrums. In large part as a result of that promise, Ward’s party – United, hitherto in third place – was able to form the next government.

Ward misread his speech notes. One source says the proposed loan was meant to be for 10 years; another source says he meant to say £7 million. Probably both are right, in light of what actually happened in 1929; Ward probably meant to say £7 million over ten years. (The Government borrowed about £2 million in 1929, from the London money market. In 1930 and 1931, the United Kingdom was in a deep financial crisis.)

Joseph Ward was one of the most enigmatic of New Zealand’s political leaders. And, importantly, he was one of the few who were ‘fiscal liberals’; opposite of ‘fiscal conservatives’ like Chris Hipkins and Christopher Luxon. (New Zealand has had comparatively few fiscally liberal Prime Ministers. The most fiscally liberal was undoubtedly Julius Vogel. Two others, who are also household names, were Robert Muldoon and Michael Joseph Savage. Along with John Balance, they were New Zealand’s most ‘progressive’ prime ministers, at least in the sense that Julius Vogel understood that word. But in 1928, Ward was well past his political prime; his ‘promise’ was not an articulation of a new vision.

Joseph Ward and his times – a very short potted history to 1925

Joseph Ward (MP for Awarua, ie Bluff) became New Zealand’s Minister of Finance in 1893, a few weeks after his 37th birthday. He was ‘Colonial Treasurer’ during the country’s most ‘progressive’ period – in the modern sense of that word – prior to that of Savage; following Ballance’s premature death. (Ballance had been both Prime Minister and Treasurer during 1891 and 1892.)

Ward was forced out of Cabinet in 1896 on account of his personal financial situation, and resigned from Parliament in 1897 when he had to file for bankruptcy. But he contested the 1897 by-election, and was re-elected by a wider margin than in the 1896 general election. Ward was reappointed to Cabinet once he had paid off his creditors.

Ward became Prime Minister – and, in what was becoming a tradition, also Finance Minister – in 1906 following Richard Seddon’s death. His government folded in 1912; see my France’s Two-Ballot Voting System, and its New Zealand Antecedent, 12 July 2024. Ward resumed his duties as Finance Minister in the World War 1 coalition government, from 1915 to 1919. Ward lost his seat in the 1919 election; that year Prime Minister Massey was able to re-establish majority government.

In 1923, Ward tried to get back into Parliament; he unsuccessfully stood in the Tauranga by‑election. The 1922 general election had been the first genuinely three-party election. Massey’s Reform Party got 37 seats, Ward’s Liberal Party (now led by Thomas Wilford) got 22 seats; Labour (under Harry Holland, an immigrant [1912] from Australia with Marxist sympathies) got 17 seats. Massey governed with the help of the Liberals, though died in office before the 1925 election.

In 1925, Massey’s Reform Party, now lead by Gordon Coates, swept to victory. One of the Liberal’s small caucus of 11 MPs was Joseph Ward, now MP for Invercargill. The Liberal Party had become New Zealand’s third party; suffering a parallel downfall in the 1920s to Lloyd-George’s Liberals in the United Kingdom, and for the same reason – the rise of the proletariat and its own Labour Party.

1925 to 1931: Crisis Years in New Zealand

It was all downhill for the Coates’ government in 1926, and especially 1927. New Zealand suffered from a triple-financial-whammy: the return of the British pound to the gold standard at an over-valued exchange rate, the British general strike which paralysed Great Britain’s seaborne trade, and a significant downturn in the terms of trade (ie relative prices) of agricultural and pastoral products vis-à-vis manufactures. Additionally for the labour market, it was a period of technological unemployment; marked in New Zealand in particular by the revolution of machine milking on dairy farms.

1927 was a year of wholesale bankruptcy of farmers, and became the biggest year of emigration since the 1888 ‘exodus’; especially emigration to Australia, and migration of young job-seekers from the farms to the cities. However, Australia suffered the same triple-whammy, though not as intensively as New Zealand.

In 1928, Australians and others were coming to New Zealand. It was a crisis in both countries. In New Zealand in 1928 there was a National Industrial Conference; the main conclusion was that the apparent and significant rise in unemployment was mainly due to migrants and machines. (Has much changed since then?)

This was the backdrop for the 1928 election. The Liberal Party was fighting for its survival. It hired a very capable campaign manager, Albert Davy. It changed its name to United. And it chose Sir Joseph Ward to be its leader. Then, thanks in part to Joe Ward’s ‘Joe Biden moment’, United ‘won’ the election; it gained more seats than any other party, once four ‘independent Liberals’ were included in the count. United formed a Government with Labour support. Ward was Prime Minister and Finance Minister.

Labour under Harry Holland, with more seats than it had ever had, was at the ‘power table’. Holland has been New Zealand’s only ever ‘far-Left’ political leader in a position of power.

The dynamic didn’t work. While 1929 was a good year for New Zealand, in the midst of many bad years, Ward’s health deteriorated. And he had to switch to Coates’ Reform Party to gain the confidence of the House. This moment represents the real beginnings of the National Party.

Ward died early in 1930, with his earnest and conservative Deputy – George Forbes – taking over as both Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. United was lean on talent and experience, remembering that in 1928 they only had 11 MPs.

The performance of the minority United government in 1930 and 1931 matched its surviving talent. They sleep-walked into the global Great Depression, which hit New Zealand in around August 1930, later than in most countries. In 1931 they ‘saved money’ by cancelling the five-yearly census.

In the 1931 election, United and Reform went to the electorate as the ‘Coalition’, and won comfortably against a fiscally conservative far-left Labour Party. In the UK, a similarly conservative Labour Party with ‘Left’ principles but not practice was in the process of collapsing.

Once again (ie after his 1925-1928 failures), Reform’s William Downie Stewart junior, New Zealand’s dogmatic precursor to Ruth Richardson and Roger Douglas – a ‘classical liberal’ – became Finance Minister. Forbes, as sitting Prime Minister, stayed on, becoming New Zealand’s least-inspiring political leader

The Great Depression deepened in New Zealand, until Downie Stewart lost a political arm-wrestle with his Reform Party leader Gordon Coates, in January 1933. The New Zealand economy bottomed out in the summer of 1932/33, after Coates won his battle to devalue the New Zealand pound.

Summary

Joseph Ward’s ‘Biden moment’ bisected the 1925 to 1933 period, enabling 1929 and most of 1930 to be relatively good years for New Zealand in the midst of a disastrous run of circumstance compounded by the unbending economic liberalism of William Downie Stewart, one of New Zealand’s worst-ever Ministers of Finance.

Today, we could learn from the failings of fiscal conservatism in those years, and the brief relief gained during Joseph Ward’s brief ‘Lazarus’ administration.

Additional References:

https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/sir-joseph-ward

https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/2w9/ward-joseph-george

https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/the-1920s/1928

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/books/ALMA1929-9917504153502836-The-remarkable-life-story-of-Sir Joseph Ward

https://www.odt.co.nz/opinion/today-history-nzs-most-shocking-election-result

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

The Trump Assassination Attempt, Security Failures, The Politics and What Happens Next? – Firstly, in this episode of A View from Afar, political scientist and former Pentagon analyst, Dr Paul Buchanan, provides us a preliminary assessment of the assassination attempt on former United States president Donald Trump. And then Paul and Selwyn assess what impact this crime will have on the US Presidential election campaign.

At this juncture, it’s important to be clear, to achieve a robust analysis of the crime that occurred while Trump was speaking at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania, it will require a thorough assessment of eye witness accounts, details of the supposed gunman, his background, associations, potential motivations – and importantly a deep assessment of the role of the security agencies.

To determine a clear and probable account of what happened in Pennsylvania this weekend, we would need all of that information, and then to apply it against any variances and/or avoidances by those involved or associated with investigating the events. But clearly, much of that information is not yet available to us.

However, there is enough information for us to consider a preliminary assessment of how satisfactory, or otherwise, the security arrangements were for Trump at this rally.

So, with that said; today Paul and Selwyn examine:

• How could an assassin get inside a security parameter, and in to a position with direct line of sight to his target Donald Trump?
• And specifically, while the gunman was outside the immediate venue, it would appear the shooter’s location was within the security parameters, a position obvious to him as a prime area, with direct line of sight to his intended target.
• So why wouldn’t that fact be obvious to the US security services who were responsible for ensuring the parameters were safe and clear?
• And, importantly too, what are the political implications of this assassination attempt?
• For example; does this assassination attempt accentuate Trump’s mythology as an invincible born to rule leader? And as such, draw contrast to the incumbent US President Joe Biden’s frailty?

In this regard, Paul and Selwyn assess what is likely to happen next?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The Trump Assassination Attempt, Security Failures, The Politics and What Happens Next? – Firstly, in this episode of A View from Afar, political scientist and former Pentagon analyst, Dr Paul Buchanan, will provide us a preliminary assessment of the assassination attempt on former United States president Donald Trump.

At this juncture, it’s important to be clear…

To achieve a robust analysis of this crime that occurred while Trump was speaking at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania, it will require a thorough assessment of eye witness accounts, details of the supposed gunman, his background, associations, potential motivations – and importantly a deep assessment of the role of the security agencies.

To determine a clear and probable account of what happened in Pennsylvania this weekend, we would need all of that information, and to apply it against any variances and/or avoidances by those involved or associated with investigating the events.

But clearly, much of that information is not yet available to us.

However, there is enough information for us to consider a preliminary assessment of how satisfactory, or otherwise, the security arrangements were for Trump at this rally.

So, with that said; today we will examine:

• How could an assassin get inside a security parameter, and in to a position with direct line of sight to his target… Donald Trump?
• And specifically, while the gunman was outside the immediate venue, it would appear the shooter’s location was within the security parameters, a position obvious to him as a prime area, with direct line of sight to his intended target.
• So why wouldn’t that fact be obvious to the US security services who were responsible for ensuring the parameters were safe and clear?
• And, importantly too, what are the political implications of this assassination attempt?
• For example; does this assassination attempt accentuate Trump’s mythology as an invincible born to rule leader? And as such, draw contrast to the incumbent US President Joe Biden’s frailty?

In this regard, Paul and I will assess what is likely to happen next?

Live Audience: Remember, if you are joining us live via the social media platforms, feel free to comment as we can include your comments and questions in this programme.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Calling all journalists, academics, planners, lawyers, political activists, environmentalists, and other members of the public who believe that the relationships between vested interests and politicians need to be scrutinised. We need to work together to make sure that the new Fast-Track Approvals Bill – currently being pushed through by the government – works in the public interest, and doesn’t encourage corruption and lobbying that produces poor decisions.

A bright light needs to be shone on the whole process, in which three ministers will be able to greenlight projects such as mining or housing development without the usual resort to the Resource Management Act processes. As I wrote about in early March, the whole new Fast-Track process will inevitably encourage closer linkages between vested interests and politicians, risking cronyism in decision-making – see: The Government’s new fast-track invitation to corruption

Because the normal democratic processes will be bypassed for projects chosen by the three ministers, what will be sorely needed is scrutiny from outside. I’m therefore proposing to run a campaign of analysis and awareness about everything to do with the new Fast-Track process, but especially of the projects that are being lined up for inclusion in the Schedules being inserted into the Bill. So far there has been a dangerous lack of transparency about this process – especially about which businesses and organisations are being invited to submit projects. Overall, the ethos of this reform programme seems alarmingly secretive and anti-democratic.

The name that I’m proposing for this campaign is “Fast-Track Watch” (Hashtag: #FastTrackWatch), to be hosted by the Democracy Project, which I run at Victoria University of Wellington. The main vehicle and output for this investigation and scrutiny will be a series of columns I’ll send out on the Substack platform, which I will make available to all media for free publication. Together, I hope that this campaign will be something of a watchdog on the Fast-Track activities.

In order to analyse the various organisations and businesses involved, and particularly their linkages with each other and politicians, I’ll be using the research databases I am developing as part of my broader programme of work on vested interests at the University. I will try to identify potential conflicts of interest and dubious relationships involved.

But I will also need the help of others: I’m hoping to crowdsource information about the potential Fast-Track projects and processes. Therefore, hopefully whistleblowers and well-informed citizens will provide additional information. Please send me your tips, ideas, feedback, or offers of assistance.

Likewise, if you’re a journalist or involved in media, please contact me if you want to collaborate in any way to help get material out to the public that helps keep scrutiny on the Fast-Track processes.

There will, of course, be many bona fide projects and proposals that deserve to be given resource consents or even fast-tracked by the government. This campaign isn’t against development per se, but merely being done to provide additional scrutiny and transparency, so that there is less chance of unscrupulous and damaging projects getting through the Fast-Track process simply because they’ve employed smart lobbyists, or have good connections with politicians and officials.

If you’re interested, please get in touch, in confidence. Contact me: bryce.edwards@vuw.ac.nz or just reply directly to this email. And please forward this “call” to other interested people, to grow #FastTrackWatch

Dr Bryce Edwards

Political Analyst in Residence, Director of the Democracy Project, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington.

Analysis by Dr Bryce Edwards – Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

Elections in the United States are dominated by big money. But what isn’t commonly understood is that most of it is raised and spent, not by the political parties and candidates for office, but by special interest groups who run their own election campaigns to influence the outcome.

Billions of dollars are channelled into campaign groups to run what are normally attack ads against politicians. The reason for this is because the political donations rules are designed to encourage this – with big clampdowns on people funding the politicians, but allowing them to more easily give to advocacy and lobbying groups instead.

This is a trend that is finally starting to occur in New Zealand. As the rules tighten on money going to candidates and political parties, this is pushing the big money towards less regulated and less transparent special interests. Critics call this “dark money” or “soft money” because it’s outside of the party system and therefore more difficult for officials and the public to scrutinise.

As with the US, such groups are incentivised to run negative attack campaigns, because if they run positive campaigns in support of a party or candidate, then that spending has to be allocated against the expenditure limits of the politicians, who also need to sign off their agreement with the campaigns (which they never want to do).

Dark money spent in the 2023 general election

Some of the money spent by campaign lobby groups must be declared. The Electoral Commission has just published the declarations of those organisations that spent more than $100,000 on advertising at the last election. However, there are many ways that “dark money” spending can stay below the threshold, and so most lobby group campaigning isn’t captured by the Electoral Commission.

The amount spent by these so-called “Third-Party promoters” has escalated quickly in recent elections. At the 2020 election, only $147,000 was spent. This increased by 13 times in 2023, with nearly $2m being declared. You can view all the declarations here: Registered promoter expenses for the 2023 General Election

The top spender lobby groups were the following, in order of money spent:

1. Vote for Better Limited: $386,515
2. New Zealand Taxpayers’ Union: $371,565
3. New Zealand Council of Trade Unions – Te Kauae Kaimahi: $299,344
4. Hobson’s Pledge: $283,899
5. Family First New Zealand: $204,771
6. The Better NZ Trust: $266,069.39
7. Groundswell NZ: $283,899

Lobby group spending dominated by the political right

This big spending list is dominated by rightwing campaigners – with only the CTU and Better NZ Trust being aligned with the leftwing parties. The latter carried out a campaign promoting policies to enable greater electric vehicle uptake. It’s unclear who funded the group, but previously they had listed one of their supporters as being Energy Efficiency & Conservation Authority (EECA) – a government agency – which led to allegations that they were a “sock puppet” group. And the CTU ran an attack campaign against Christopher Luxon, with advertisements saying he couldn’t be trusted.

On the right, there was a real mix of socially and fiscally conservative lobby groups. The biggest spender was the mysterious Vote for Better group, run by businessman Tim Barry, whose main interests are in the horse racing industry.

The next biggest spender was the Taxpayers’ Union, run by director Jordan Williams, which ran anti-Government campaigns, mostly focusing on extravagant spending. Some of the TU’s declared advertising expenses were paid to The Campaign Company, which is also owned by director Jordan Williams. The Campaign Company was also contracted to several other lobby groups – such as Groundswell and Hobson’s Pledge. The company was also employed by electorate candidates, such as NZ First’s Casey Costello.

Some of this is covered today by Farah Hancock’s very good RNZ report, $2m surge in election campaign spending by third-party groups. In this she raises whether some groups such as Hobson’s Pledge have been involved in “astro-turfing”, in which elite well-funded campaigns are passed off as grassroots movements. She also draws attention to the increasing amounts being spent by the conservative groups – Hobson’s Pledge increased their spend from $254,115 in 2017 to $283,899 last year, and Family First went from $141,224 in 2020 to $204,771 in 2023.

There were 31 “third party promoters” that were registered with the Electoral Commission because they were planning to spend significant amounts of election advertising, but 26 of these didn’t make a declaration, presumably because they say they didn’t spend above the $100,000 threshold that necessitates one.

RNZ’s Farah Hancock has also investigated some of these groups. One appears to have been politically successful in its objectives: “The Natural Health Alliance encouraged voters to choose NZ First to get the Therapeutic Products Act repealed. It ran several full-page advertisements in the New Zealand Herald. Chairperson Paddy Fahy indicated these cost close to $10,000 each. Repealing the Act formed part of National’s coalition agreements with NZ First and ACT and is included in the government’s 100-day plan.”

While we know some of what these campaign groups have spent money on, it’s difficult to discover where they raised their money from. Although New Zealand’s political donations rules keep tightening up – and some scholars think they should be tightened significantly more – this has merely pushed the big money into these more mysterious groups, who don’t need to disclose their funding. This trend is only likely to worsen. And because such groups are incentivized to run campaigns against political parties (because the rules discourage them from campaigning in favour of parties or candidates), New Zealand is likely to go further down the route of elections dominated by Americanised attack advertising funded by dark money.

Fights between left and right activists about such dark money are likely to escalate. The Labour Party’s Greg Presland, who is also a part owner in corporate lobbying-PR-consulting firm Polis Consulting Group, has been drawing attention to the funding of groups on the right, asking questions about the rightwing Vote for Better Limited, which was the biggest campaigner last year – see: About the promoters electoral returns

Here’s his key point about this campaign run by businessman Tim Barry: “There is nothing to suggest that he is a well healed individual who is deeply upset with the direction of the last Government and the thought struck me what if he was paid by someone to do all of this? What if he was instructed by a Fisheries Company or an Oil Company or a fundamentalist American Christian Church or the Atlas Network for that purpose to do his best to undermine confidence in the left during the election campaign? The problem with the promoter rules is there is no obligation for them to say who they were paid by. And it can be an overseas person or corporation.”

Other political donations scrutinised

Newsroom’s Jonathan Milne has also drawn attention to a big mining company that appears to have successfully influenced an election race on West Coast last year. He has been investigating the spending of $32,600 by Bathurst Resources to bankroll the campaign of an Independent candidate at last year’s election, which is said to have been a decisive factor in leading to Labour’s Damien O’Connor losing to National’s Maureen Pugh – see: Big coal company bought West Coast election campaign

The mining company was opposed to the Government’s mining policies, and so funded the contest of independent candidate Patrick Phelps who was campaigning for more mining on the West Coast. Phelps is the manager of Minerals West Coast Trust, which last year was given $220,000 by various mining companies.

The donation from Bathurst Resources meant Phelps was the biggest spending candidate, and according to various sources was able to pull enough votes off O’Connor to let National win the seat – something that the Bathurst Resources company also boasts about.

The experience has made Labour’s O’Connor even more critical of the role of the wealthy in the political process: “There are many international companies and organisations wanting to influence New Zealand elections for their own purposes – the smoking industry, the investment and real estate industry as we’re starting to see. And there’ll be many more… I think what people have to do is follow the money, ask the question: why such investments would be made? And for the most part, no business makes an investment without some realistic expectation of a return.”

The big fundraising and spending electoral candidates

The Electoral Commission released the donations and expenditure declarations of all electorate candidates last week, which means the public has a better understanding of the money being used by politicians at the local level. Below are some of the top figures from these declarations, detailing whether they were successful in their campaigns.

The top ten donation recipients:

1. Siva Kilari, National, Manurewa – unsuccessful: $110,483
2. Mahesh Muralidhar, National, Auckland Central – unsuccessful: $109,496
3. Shane Jones, National, Northland – unsuccessful: $95,524
4. Chlöe Swarbrick, Greens, Auckland Central – successful: $95,023
5. Chris Bishop, National, Hutt South – successful: $98,549
6. Cameron Brewer, National, Upper Harbour – successful: $86,659
7. Tim Costley, National, Ōtaki – successful: $79,679
8. Hamish Campbell, National, Ilam – successful: $70,677
9. Scott Sheeran, National, Wellington Central – unsuccessful: $64,260
10. Catherine Wedd, National, Tuktuki – successful: $61,920

The top ten election advertising spenders:

1. Scotty Bright, Democracy NZ, Port Waikato – unsuccessful: $41,905
2. Rachel Boyack, Labour, Nelson – successful: $32,560
3. Julie Anne Genter, Greens, Rongotai – successful: $32,554
4. Raf Manji, TOP, Ilam – unsuccessful: $32,502
5. Tim Costley, National, Ōtaki – successful: $32,089
6. Chlöe Swarbrick, Greens, Auckland Central – successful: $31,643
7. Dana Kirkpatrick, National, East Coast – successful: $31,565
8. Cameron Brewer, National, Upper Harbour – successful: $31,243
9. Katie Nimon, National, Napier – successful: $31,191
10. Carlos Cheung, National, Mt Roskill – successful: $31,072

Some of this information is also available today in Glenn McConnell’s very good Stuff article, The politicians who were flush with cash and broke the bank campaigning

Dr Bryce Edwards

Political Analyst in Residence, Director of the Democracy Project, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington

This article can be republished for free under a Creative Commons copyright-free license. Attributions should include a link to the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

When countries’ national elections are closely fought, it means that the median voters critically determine the parliamentary or congressional outcome. But, though depending to a considerable extent on the prevailing political culture, the centre-of-gravity of the resulting government may be far from that median usually ‘centrist’ position of the voters.

The Aotearoan case

Aotearoa achieved something very rare in 1992 and 1993; a complete change of electoral system. Aotearoans were fed up with extremist winner-takes-all politics, where the ‘winner’ almost never got a majority of votes; and where the outcome in non-battleground electoral districts was purely academic, though ‘academic’ in the best sense of that word.

Ironically, the change was initiated by New Zealand’s ‘right-wing’ government of the last half century; the Bolger-Richardson National government which edged out the Lange-Douglas Labour government for this ‘honour’. (In both cases, the Prime Minister was comparatively ‘centrist’, but with extreme economic liberals as Ministers of Finance, although Roger Douglas was a relative latecomer to the cause of neoliberalism. In a sense, Prime Minister Jim Bolger did a ‘David Cameron’; expecting to put the matter of proportional representation to rest, just as Cameron expected his referendum in 2016 to dispel agitation for British exit ‘Brexit’ from the European Union.) We may also note that the Shipley-Birch government in 1998 and 1999 was very right-wing, having – in 1997 and 1998 – ousted both Prime Minister Bolger and Treasurer Winston Peters; in this case it was Prime Minister Shipley who was seen as more right-wing than Finance Minister Birch.

(There is some chatter – eg Chris Trotter, Nothing Left without Labour, 19 Dec 2023 – about as to whether the new government of Aotearoa New Zealand will be its “most right” ever. Time will tell of course, and there are alarming similarities showing between present Finance Minister Nicola Willis and 1990-1994 Finance Minister Ruth Richardson. For the last 100 years, I would rate the early Depression governments from 1930 to January 1933 as the most right-wing. This period from 1930, which commenced with the death in office of Prime Minister Joseph Ward, includes a Depression election at the end of 1931; an election which saw Labour, already in Opposition, trounced. In 1930 and 1932, Prime Minister George Forbes was also Finance Minister. In 1932 the extreme economic liberal, William Downie Stewart, was Finance Minister. In 1933, as in 1994, the government turned towards the political centre after the ousting of Stewart. The catalyst in 1933 was a critical change to monetary policy; the devaluation of the New Zealand pound which set New Zealand onto its eventual recovery path. Today’s byword for the 1932 and 1992 governments was ‘austerity’; we in Aotearoa sense – palpably – that austerity is also how the mid-2020s will be remembered.)

The hope in 1992 was that proportionally-elected governments would be loose coalitions, and that all parties in Parliament would contribute to some extent to the governance of New Zealand. And indeed we have seen that at times, with the ‘left-wing’ Green Party contributing to some policy delivery under a centre-right National-led government, and with the then radically-centrist Māori Party accepting the Prime Minister’s invitation to contribute formally to the governance process in the early 2010s.

The political culture in New Zealand – or at least the elite political culture – remained committed to binary politics; to the adversarial politics of Governments and Oppositions shouting at each other across a political theatre designed precisely for that kind of politics. As Peter Dunne – former leader of the former centrist United Party, a man who held the balance of power in three Parliaments this century – once said, the parties form into (or are formed into) “job lots” of the Left and the Right. In New Zealand’s history since 1996 of proportionally-elected governments, only three successful parties have resisted pre-election binarisation, and each only partially so: United, New Zealand First, and the previous incarnation of Te Pāti Māori (generally known then as the Māori Party).

As 2023 unfolded, it was looking like two distinct job lots would be fighting it out: National and Act as the Right; and Labour, Green and Te Pāti Māori as the Left. National and Labour were understood to be quasi-centrist neoliberal parties with nearly identical macroeconomic policies: fiscal conservatism laced with monetary austerity. But they had different political cultures: whereas National still represented the Old Right Elites (and rural New Zealand in general), Labour’s power base was the expanding New Left Elites, including the New Māori Elite. Elite politics – the politics of optics over substance, the politics of wilful neglect of the disadvantaged, and the politics of health and education mandates – was becoming increasingly adversarial, indeed becoming visceral.

Out of this cocktail of despair, Winston Peters’ nationalist New Zealand First Party – sometimes semi-radical, genuinely centrist – re-emerged, to the chagrin of the entire political class. But it New Zealand First had to be attached to the National-Act job lot. Peters and Labour had ruled each other out in 2022; and in a way that could not easily be undone. So one of the election campaign’s main ‘gotcha’ games was for the mainstream political media to force National leader Christopher Luxon to explicitly admit New Zealand First into his job lot of Parties, and then to blame Luxon’s ‘moment of weakness’ for Peters’ concurrent rise in the political polls.

The political polls had always indicated that the 2023 election would be a close – even ‘knife-edge’ – contest between the two designated job lots. The voters’ quandary was how to choose a moderate rather than an extreme government, given the relatively extreme positions on the left-right spectrum being taken by Te Pāti Māori, Green and Act. The quandary was exacerbated by the voters’ wish for a non-austere government, when both Labour, National and Act were firmly committed to fiscal austerity, and there was no intellectual commitment from Green or Māori towards an alternative to fiscal austerity.

(2023 was looking like an MMP – proportional – rerun of the 1931 and 1990 elections. We might note here that Joseph Ward’s United Party – unconnected to Peter’s Dunne’s more recent United – was a centrist party in the 1920s, the remnants of Richard Seddon’s Liberals. And, or at least it’s commonly believed, that Ward – then 72 years old, and perceived by some as a bit doddery – won the 1928 election because he misread his speech notes, and promised to raise a 70 million pound loan, when it’s believed he meant £7 million. Fiscal non-austerity is popular among the non-elite; and 1927 had been a terrible year for the New Zealand economy, under the public financial management of the fiscal ultra-conservative William Downie Stewart. More farmers walked off their farms in 1927 than in the Great Depression of the early 1930s.)

There is a party of the ‘radical centre’ in New Zealand – TOP, the Opportunities Party – but it never stood a chance of breeching the five-percent party-vote threshold in 2017, 2020, or 2023. And even TOP has deradicalised, presumably to edge closer to the mainstream fiscal narrative. I heard no mention from TOP or anyone else, in 2023, of a Universal Basic Income; a UBI, once TOP’s cornerstone policy, is counter-elite, hated equally by the elite left and the elite right. The message in 2023, to non-elite voters, was to vote for the elite job-lot they detested least, rather than to risk ‘wasting’ one’s vote on a party that couldn’t make the threshold. Since the first proportional election is 1996, no genuinely new party has made it past the five-percent barrier. (The ‘minor parties’ are all offshoots of ‘major parties’: the Green Party and Jim Anderton’s Progressive Party were offshoots of the Alliance, itself formed as New Labour, a Labour Party offshoot; Act was another offshoot of Labour; New Zealand First was an offshoot of National; Te Pāti Māori was an offshoot of Labour; United was an offshoot of both National and Labour.)

New Zealand voters have developed two techniques for moderating the left-right job-lot fait-accompli. They could tactically switch to United (as they did in 2002) or New Zealand First (as in 2005 and 2017) or the Māori Party (as they might have done in 2008 or 2017, but didn’t). The other possible tactic is for supporters of one of the ‘major parties’ – National or Labour – to switch to the other as a way of minimising the input in government of the minor party which they dislike the most. We saw that in 1999, 2008, and 2020. (In 2020, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern called this other-party supporters “lending their vote” to Labour.)

What can happen is that a close ‘job-lot’ outcome – a close binary outcome between Left and Right – can increase the leverage in government of a small but extremist coalition partner. Act played that role of fear-nemesis to the Left, whereas Green is the traditional fear-nemesis of the Right. This is what is really meant by the ‘tail wagging the dog’; when an extremist party – or at least an adjudged extremist party – has excessive leverage, especially in close-election cases when the median voter supports a party like TOP.

Imagine if this present New Zealand government did not have its New Zealand First “hand-brake”, as Winston Peters accurately paints his intermittent role in New Zealand’s post-1993 proportional governance culture. That ‘hand-brake’ culture hasn’t developed to the point where the political class would be able to countenance a ‘grand-coalition’ of National and Labour. Indeed the median voter in New Zealand is not a bland centrist; not an elitist centrist. A bland-grand-coalition would only have the optics of centrist politics; it would not at all be in touch with non-elite voters.

Very few Prime Ministers in New Zealand have found a centrist position that’s in touch with middle New Zealand. Michael Joseph Savage did. Richard Seddon did. Joseph Ward did, briefly and too some extent inadvertently; but Ward wasn’t a fiscal conservative. And, perhaps belatedly, nostalgia is reviving the legacy of Robert Muldoon; he who helped New Zealand get through its second worst global economic crisis. On RNZ’s The Panel a few weeks ago, I heard someone suggest that Muldoon was New Zealand’s last “socialist” Prime Minister. To the great surprise of that show’s host, people texted in, in full agreement with that ‘last socialist’ proposition, and in a distinctly approving way.

Despite proportional representation, New Zealand’s political culture favours unpopular governments, and adversarial processes of rhetoric and repeal. Aotearoa New Zealand, one of the most privately indebted countries in the world can only elect governments which don’t pursue a ‘duty-of-care’ approach towards ordinary Aotearoans; the main parties are averse to spending money on social-wage services or universal public income support. Indeed, since 1994, ‘fiscal responsibility’ – read ‘wilful neglect’ – is embedded in the Public Finance Act; an Act which I would argue has become central to New Zealand’s de facto constitution.

To understand a political culture, comparisons need to be made with other political jurisdictions, with other sovereignties.

United States

The United States’ ‘parliament’ is Congress, elected on a two-year electoral cycle. Sometimes – like now – two years seems too long. The United States’ polity represents the ‘mother of all adversarial cultures’.

In the 2022 election, Congress flipped, giving the Republican Party a narrow win. That Republican Congress is significantly more extreme than just about any previous Congress, in large part because of the narrowness of its majority. This situation mainly arises because American culture has become so adversarial that the large Democrat minority voted with the Republican extremists to oust the Republican moderate – Kevin McCarthy – from his role as Speaker. (Speaker is the nearest to a Prime Minister that exists in the American system.) The result was an impasse of several weeks, and the eventual election of a Speaker – Mike Johnson – who is a conservative hardliner who endorsed the conspiracy theory that Donald Trump really won the 2020 presidential election.

In the United States system, close elections lead to more extreme outcomes, in complete contravention of the voters’ voice.

Israel

Israel has a proportional system, which allows for a much wider range of political parties than does New Zealand’s ‘MMP’ proportional system. The last two elections have been very close, with its multiparty ‘job lots’ only partly determined by the left-right political spectrum. Personality politics plays a big part.

Two elections ago the ‘man who would be king’ of Israel – Bejamin Netanyahu – was disempowered by an assortment of parties across the spectrum, including a small party supported by Palestinian Israelis. The temperature in this Levantine ‘powder-keg’ turned down a notch. But not for long. In the next election, with a sliver of a margin, Netanyahu was able to resume power by turning to the small ultra-Neozionist rump of his Parliament. The result is ‘history-in-the-present’, as we witness the brutal programmes to ethnically clear Gaza, and to squeeze the Palestinians out of any form of meaningful life in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. To maintain power during this electoral cycle, Netanyahu has no choice but to fall in line with his government’s most extreme voices. For perhaps most Israelis, the next election cannot come soon enough.

Again, given the prevailing political culture, close elections can lead to extreme outcomes.

France

In France – a European exception, without proportional representation – there has been a complete turnover of major parties. France’s equivalents of National and Labour both died in the 2010s. Neither seems capable of resurrection. In their place is a centre party – Renaissance – that looks like a mini-grand-coalition, a populist right party, and a new leftwing alliance. There are no multiparty job-lots as such; rather each party itself is a coalition of factions.  A degree of stability is ensured by the two-ballot system; a system that was used in Aotearoa New Zealand in 1908 and 1911, but abolished in 1913 by one of New Zealand’s most right-wing governments (led by William Massey), and one with a paper-thin majority. (Massey’s first government formed mid-term when ‘Independent Liberal’ Gordon Coates was coaxed by Massey to join the conservative Reform Party. Massey’s first action was to abolish the two-ballot system – effectively preferential voting as in Australia – and return to the First Past the Post system whereby many elected representatives receive well under half of all votes cast.)

Under its present configuration of parties, it’s hard to see how Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance Party cannot control France’s parliament. So, it will be the back-room coalitions which determine the extremity or otherwise of future French parliaments.

United Kingdom

The next election in the United Kingdom looks like being fought between a divided – and somewhat conservative Labour Party – and a Conservative Party which has outstayed its welcome. I am guessing that the centrist Liberal Democrats will score well, though the outcome will be determined by the balance of unpopularity between Labour and Conservative. If the balance of unpopularity is a fine one, and the Liberal Democrats go for a programme like that in New Zealand of TOP, then the United Kingdom may eventually achieve an outcome in line with popular appeal. But there are many ‘ifs’ and ‘maybes’.

The United Kingdom has had a deeply frustrating time with its democracy, of late. The point to note here is that those people voting for large small parties – like UKIP in United Kingdom, and the former Social Credit in New Zealand – and people in ‘safe’ constituencies, are rendered invisible to the elite political classes. One result is that David Cameron made a huge political mistake in 2015, promising a referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union. The unexpected outcome was the result of a rare opportunity by those rendered invisible by the First Past the Post system, to render themselves visible.

Germany

Germany uses the MMP proportional system, the prototype of the New Zealand system. Before World War Two it had a different proportional system, with lower thresholds. As is well known, Germany gained a very extreme government in 1932, as the Great Depression peaked; a great depression made especially severe by both the post World War One Treaty of Versailles and the needless fiscal conservatism (ie austerity) of the centre-left coalition government prior to 1932. The Nazi Party came into the Bundestag (Parliament) on an anti-austerity economic programme, revealing its true colours (of national expansionism and ethnic scapegoating) later, once entrenched in power. The path to the Nazi outcome was a leftish government pursuing deflation, extreme fiscal conservatism; a mix of austerity and unimagination.

Elections were held in Germany in May 1928 (2.6% to the Nazis), Sep 1930 (18.3% to the Nazis), July 1932 (37.3% to the Nazis), Nov 1932 (33.1% to the Nazis), March 1933 (43.9% to the Nazis), and Nov 1933 (92.1%! to the Nazis). Before the Great Depression the Nazi party was a ‘lunatic fringe’ party. Adolf Hitler rode to power on the path of political instability and fiscal austerity.

In Germany today, while the parties in the present Bundestag cover a wide spectrum of ideologies, the post-war culture is to form coalitions around the centre, especially in a very close election. The problem is that the centre in Germany – defined by the Social Democrats (like NZ Labour) and the Christian Democrats (like NZ National) – is a centre of bland fiscal conservatism and of export-focussed mercantilism. We should not look to Germany to find solutions to the world’s financial problems.

New Zealand again

In New Zealand, consider these three-election sequences. The statistic quoted will be the percentage of votes for the parties to the left of (and opposed to) the leading conservative party.

In each case, in the middle year, National (or its equivalent, Reform) swept to power, following centre-left governments which had ‘lost their mojo’.

In the first three cases (all first-past-the-post elections) the centre-left subsequently swept back in the popular vote. (Though, thanks to the prevailing voting system, in 1978 and 1993 there was no change of government. Even in 1935, Labour’s route to power may have depended on a split in the right-wing vote; the extreme-right Democrats got 7.8% of the vote, and split the vote in many electorates.) The centre-right governments of 1931, 1975 and 1990, which lost favour massively in the subsequent election, moved away from policies of austerity; real austerity (in 1993) or perceived austerity (in 1978).

In 2011, something different happened. The centre-left failed to get its vote back. Labour was looking very divided and uncool, whereas the National-led government managed its optics well, taking credit for a re-emergence from the Global Financial Crisis. Part of that political management was the creation of the impression that the 2008 to 2011 government was more centrist than right-wing.

What will happen in 2026? Just now I heard Sue Bradford – former Green left-wing MP – comparing this new government with the National government elected in 1990. I think she’s correct. My sense is that the present government is as intent on making itself unpopular as that early 1990s’ government was. (Indeed both Finance Ministers were young; Ruth Richardson was 40, and Nicola Willis is 42.)

The difference is that Labour (with the other centre-left parties in Labour’s job lot) also gives the appearance that it is similarly intent on retaining their 2023 levels of unpopularity; as they were in 2011 after 2008, and also as the British Labour Party did after Margaret Thatcher gained power in the United Kingdom in 1979.

The 1935 to 1938 Labour government also gained a degree of unpopularity, with left and right factions seeking to find ways to renege on its radical centrist promises of universal social security and superannuation. In the end it was Michael Joseph Savage’s political skills in 1938 that enabled Labour to storm to victory in 1938, and to stay in power for 14 years. New Zealand voters are looking forward to a non-austere non-elitist non-ideological government in 2026; a government with pragmatic imagination (no, that’s not an oxymoron). Good luck to Jo and Joe Median.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Government-formation negotiations are ongoing between National, Act and New Zealand First. We do not know how long these will take. Neither it seems, do they.

Importantly, there are fundamentally no hard deadlines on government formation negotiations in New Zealand. It will take as long as it takes. I’ll start by saying that some of the hypotheticals I talk about here are ridiculously unlikely. National, Act and New Zealand First will almost certainly either come to an agreement, or realise they cannot, well before we reach the ones I mention at the end. The point I am making is well-established by them however: there really are no hard deadlines. There is no date by which, if negotiations haven’t resolved anything, there must be a fresh election. Unless they’re still going in 2026, of course, when we’ll need an election anyway.

In New Zealand, a decision to hold an early election is one that is made by the Prime Minister. This power – like all other powers the Prime Minister has – is circumscribed by the caretaker convention. If a Prime Minister has the confidence of more MPs than not, they may exercise the power to advise the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament and hold an election.

If a Prime Minister is operating in caretaker mode, that is, is governing without the clear support of a majority of MPs, the power to advise the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament and hold an election can only be exercised – like all the other powers – if more MPs than not support the exercise of the power.

This means that, no matter how longs things take, there will be no advice from the Prime Minister to the Governor-General to hold a new election unless at least one of the parties involved in negotiations to form a government agrees to the holding of a new election.

There are soft deadlines all the time. There are soft legal deadlines. Saturday 11 November 2023 was one. It was the date negotiations had to be resolved if we wanted to avoid the necessity of having Chris Hipkins reappointed as Prime Minister because the writ wasn’t able be returned within 28 days of the election. But that date passed, and Chris Hipkins was appointed Prime Minister again (to operate within the confines of the caretaker convention).

There are soft political deadlines too. There was a date that things would have needed to be resolved by for Christopher Luxon to be able to attend this year’s APEC leaders meeting by. That didn’t happen.

And there will be others. At some point, if negotiations continue, this becomes the longest-ever negotiation to form a government. But that’s only politically relevant. It wouldn’t mean anything, legally.

And there’s also a date that this would have to be resolved by so that Christopher Luxon can be sworn in as Prime Minister before the first opening of Parliament for the swearing-in of MPs. But this isn’t a hard deadline either. MPs can be sworn in before Ministers. The opening of Parliament and the first sitting of the House after the 1996 general election occurred before the swearing-in of Ministers from the National-New Zealand First coalition (albeit, the negotiations had been resolved).

They don’t have to be though. At some point, it possibly becomes politically difficult for National. And if it keeps going, it possibly becomes politically damaging for National. They may decide that the harm to them being caused by negotiating is worse than the harm that would be done to them by being seen by the public as forcing New Zealanders back to the polls. But that’s just politics. If National, Act and New Zealand First are content to continue discussions, and none of them wants a fresh election, the can go on basically indefinitely.

Legal things will crop up. Like the re-swearing in of the old Government Ministers. Like the first sitting of the House. But they will just happen. The House will sit to swear-in MPs and to elect a speaker whether negotiations have concluded or not. But once those formalities are done, the House can just adjourn until next year and the talking can continue. The expectation is that the Governor-General will attend at the state opening of Parliament and give a speech from the throne. That can probably happen, albeit the content of the speech will be subject to agreement under the caretaker principle. There is no need for the House to adopt a reply to the speech before everyone is ready to. It can just meet every so often, and National, Act, and New Zealand First would have the numbers to adjourn. One really big soft legal deadline is imprest supply. At some point in the middle of next year, the permission that Parliament has given the government to spend money runs out. But Parliament exists, and there will be MPs. If they’re committed to making negotiations work, they’d just make sure it happens.

Politically, do I think this is at all likely? No. They’ll agree something at some point, or realise they cannot. There are even halfway houses. If it’s taking ages to resolve, but National, Act and New Zealand First are still committed to resolving it, they could even agree in the interim, Christopher Luxon could be appointed Prime Minister instead of Chris Hipkins, to operate under the caretaker principle. I don’t think that’s likely either.

But anyone who tells you there’s a legal deadline this all has to be done by is mistaken, unless the deadline they’re talking about is 10 November 2026. At that point, Parliament will have expired.

*******

Graeme Edgeler is a Wellington barrister, with a professional interest in constitutional and electoral law.

In recent decades the New Zealand Parliament has become more representative of some of the historically neglected demographics in our society. As I told TVNZ’s Q+A programme in the weekend, it’s become browner, younger, more female and more gay, and this is good progress – see: New MP intake heavy on farmers, light on unionists.

But at the same time as Parliament has become more diverse in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, and sexuality, it has become significantly narrower in terms of socioeconomics, occupation, or social class. Ordinary working-class people have been squeezed out of politics.

The trend reflects the professionalisation of politics that has occurred since about the 1980s, when all political parties increasingly became staffed and represented by people from the professional managerial class. Gone were the manual workers, the wage-earners, and in came the managers and higher socio-economic professions. Candidates and MPs were much more likely to be lawyers, public servants, accountants, and businesspeople than even teachers or nurses.

In the 2023 intake of 40 new MPs, ten are business owners, nine are former local government politicians, eight are lawyers, four are from media backgrounds, three are accountants, and another three are former parliamentary staffers. There are no union workers, classroom teachers, clerical workers, and certainly no blue-collar workers among them. Such occupations are seemingly unwelcome in today’s professionalised political parties.

At the same time, we have seen the rise of career politicians, with much younger candidates coming into Parliament after rising through the ranks of student associations, working as Parliamentary staffers, or even as local government politicians.

Labour’s professionalisation

A big part of Parliament’s changing demographics is due to the transformation of the Labour Party. Although the party was expressly established as a vehicle to get working class people into Parliament and Government, Labour has long since ceased with this aim and has become similar to National in terms of the backgrounds of the MPs and people at the top of the party.

The original Labour Party was based in the trade union movement, but by the 1980s it was a middle-class party – which is why the Fourth Labour Government was so easily captured by the neoliberal economic reform programme.

According to leftwing political commentator Josie Pagani, the middle-class bias of modern leftwing parties means that more liberal or social issues are prioritised instead of fixing the problems that most materially impact working class citizens. She argued earlier this year that parties of the left still promise a lot to the working class, but once in power “they reflect the priorities of the college-educated middle classes – who now run these parties. Ban plastic bags. Subsidies for EVs. Cycleways, ban hate speech” etc. Pagani argues that although Labour is inclined to sneer at the working class, what the party really now needs to do is “recruit more candidates who are comfortable in the smoko room, not just the university common room.”

Labour currently has a contradiction whereby the party’s caucus is mostly made up of middle class or wealthy individuals, yet they are seeking to win office on the votes of largely working-class people, with whom the party doesn’t have much organic connection. Increasingly Labour is seen as a creature of the Wellington central bureaucracy rather than ordinary people in provincial or working New Zealand. This isn’t helped by the fact that a quarter of the new Labour caucus live in the capital.

Conservatives reorientate back to farmers

The National Party has also been professionalising in recent decades, bringing in more of the professional managerial class as MPs and moving away from some of its original base in areas like farming. Whereas Federated Farmers was once known as “the National Party in gumboots” this connection dwindled after the 1980s, and farmer representation in Parliament declined too.

However, after National’s shock 2020 defeat the party has been rebuilding, which has involved bringing farmers back into the party, including as candidates. Hence the new National caucus has an influx of MPs from a farming background.

What’s more, Act and NZ First have also brought more farmers into Parliament. In the new intake there are, on current votes, going to be seven new farmers in Parliament. In fact, amongst the conservative parties there will now be a total 18 MPs with a farming or horticultural background.

This shift is in line with a global public mood that is against technocrats, insiders, and cosmopolitan elites. National, Act, and NZ First have grasped, to some degree, the populist Zeitgeist away from the professional managerial class, and have been electorally successful because of it.

Parliament’s working-class democratic deficit

Working class voices were largely absent from the recent election campaign. Instead, the contest was mostly just a debate between different elements of the educated classes and the wealthy.

Democracy suffers when politics is so narrow. It means our representatives simply don’t have the lived experience of ordinary people. They don’t have to worry about paying the bills, they don’t have to worry about the housing crisis.

Josie Pagani has recently pointed out that although only about nine per cent of the general public own more than one house, nearly two-thirds of Parliamentarians do. And while only one in four New Zealanders have a tertiary education degree, in Parliament it’s nine out of ten.

This means that our political system excludes most of the population – those who don’t have capital, great wealth, or aren’t highly educated. So, this large part of society is increasingly feeling disenfranchised. Pagani says: “If a group of people don’t see themselves – or their concerns – represented in their parliament, trust in government declines. Our country gets more divided.”

Furthermore, the fact that our Parliament is made up of the wealthy property-owning professional managerial class helps explain why governments do so little for working people. As Pagani points out, under the new professionalised model of politics the “share of the nation’s income going to wage earners, which had sat at around 70% in the 1970s, fell to under 60% by the late 2010s. If it had stayed at 70%, the average wage today would be $12,000 higher.”

The dominance of middle-class professionals also means that politicians do little to fix the many crises that disproportionately impacts those at the bottom – from the housing crisis through to the cost-of-living crisis, poor public transport or public health services.

For example, the current Prime Minister and Labour leader, Chris Hipkins, who was previously the Minister of Health, pays for personal private health insurance which means that unlike most citizens, he’s not so reliant on the underfunded and crisis-plagued public health system. It’s the same for most politicians, regardless of which party they are from – they’ve used their wealth and professional abilities to separate themselves from the travails and difficulties that most voters face.

Can the left bring working people into Parliament?

Perhaps, therefore, it’s time for the New Zealand Parliament to get an injection of working-class politics. National and the other conservative parties will always bring businesspeople into Parliament, and now we are seeing them return to their traditional constituency with more farmers too.

Looking at the left, it’s unlikely that the Green Party can foster any sort of working-class politics, as their voting constituency is very much the professional managerial class. It’s no coincidence that the Greens now win electorates like Auckland Central, Rongotai, and Wellington Central.

Perhaps it’s only the Labour Party that can bring working people into Parliament. And just because Labour has been failing on this doesn’t mean that the party can’t change. Certainly, after the party’s big defeat at the ballot box, and arguably its failed record in government, Labour is going to need to do some soul searching. This should involve questions about why the party exists, and who exactly it represents.

Although it might not be a popular proposal amongst the current Labour caucus, the answer to the party’s current woes could well lie in ditching the middle-class approach. Of course, all of this is more easily said than done. And ultimately, even if Labour decided to put more working people into Parliament, there’s a big question about whether such people would be ready to embrace a party that long ago abandoned the working class.

Dr Bryce Edwards is the Political Analyst in Residence at Victoria University of Wellington. He is the director of the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

I read this article quoting Christopher Luxon as follows: “We’ve been to many places where marginal seats are and we’re getting good movement.” (Luxon talks to media amid election result limbo fears, NZ Herald, 7 Oct 2023).

He has this misplaced narrative around marginal seats. I have also heard talk in mainstream media circles that appears to give emphasis to ‘marginal seats’. And I heard one explainer on RNZ claiming MMP as a system in which sixty percent of seats in Parliament are elected in electorates, with the remaining ‘list seats’ being determined in proportion to the party vote. The system described in the previous sentence is not MMP (‘Mixed Member Proportional‘); it’s SM (‘Supplementary Member‘). SM was one of the rejected voting methods in the 1992 referendum. Christopher Luxon was just 22 years old at the time of that referendum. I hope he voted; though the low turnout suggests he might not have.

MMP: Mixed Member Proportional

General elections do two things: elect parties to the sovereign Parliament, from which governments are formed; and choose people as local representatives in that Parliament.

The principal purpose of a general election is to determine how many MPs will represent each party; the secondary ‘fine-tuning’ purpose is for the people, rather than the party leaders, to have popular local influence over which people will represent each party in Parliament.

Under MMP – and noting the principal purpose, to elect parties to Parliament in proportion to their popular support nationwide – the concept of ‘marginal electorate’ is entirely meaningless. Wasted votes for very small parties aside (and many people want to increase the number of wasted votes by removing one of the present qualification rules underpinning MMP in New Zealand), parties are elected to Parliament on the basis of the nationwide support for each party. End of story.

Electorates are irrelevant to this nationwide component of the election process. Thus (and assuming no wasted votes) if National gets forty percent of the nationwide party vote, they get forty percent of the seats (ie 48 out of 120) in Parliament. It doesn’t matter whether votes come from Whanganui or Whangamomona; each vote for National counts the same. Parties need to focus on marginal voters, not marginal electorates. (I suspect that there are more marginal voters in West Auckland and in West Christchurch than in Whanganui.)

Under MMP, electorates are an administrative reality in terms of the organisation of the election, facilitating the gathering of votes for the nationwide count. The secondary purpose of the election, people deciding who their local representatives will be, does require electorates; hence the secondary vote – the local vote – is called the electorate vote. The primary vote – the party vote – is a national vote in a national election. The ancillary electorate vote is a local vote in a local election; very much like a vote for a Mayor.

(There is one exception to this situation in New Zealand in 2023. Voters in the Waiariki electorate will cast an electorate vote which could affect nationwide party representation. This adjustment would occur if the sitting Te Pāti Māori representative is defeated by the Labour Party representative.)

In MMP, a large proportion of the list MPs are ‘minor party’ representatives, because the point of MMP is to compensate for the disproportionate way FPP voting discriminates against smaller parties.

SM: Supplementary Member

Under SM, often confused with MMP, most list MPs would be from the ‘major parties’ – usually two major parties – and a top position on the party list would be a political sinecure (much as a safe electorate would also be a sinecure).

‘Supplementary Member’ is a non-proportional electorate-based system. Its core is the old misnamed first-past-the-post system (‘FPP’). (Misnamed because, in each electorate, there is no winning post. Rather, candidates who are ahead when ‘the whistle blows’ or ‘the music stops’ are declared winners whether or not they have reached some metaphorical ‘post’.) SM differs from FPP though, in that a separate minority group (eg forty percent) of MPs are added to the electorate MPs; and this smaller separate group is determined by a second party proportional vote. Under SM, smaller parties are guaranteed token but not proportional representation.

Under the SM system, the primary vote is the electorate vote; and the supplementary vote is the party vote.

Informed and Misinformed Voting Strategies

Under MMP (or at least under ‘informed MMP’), voters first decide on their preferred party. Then they reflect on who they prefer to be their local MP, knowing that the local MP decision does not influence the total number of MPs their preferred party will get. They will know that, in for example Mt Roskill, if Carlos Cheung wins the electorate vote, then some other National Party candidate will miss out on becoming a ‘list MP’.

All elections involve strategic voting. (Under the old ‘FPP’ system, people in ‘safe seats’ voted for the candidate of their preferred party, knowing in advance who the electorate winner would be.) In marginal electorates, people would vote against the candidate representing the party they did not want to win the nationwide election. The actual election only took place in these ‘marginal seats’; indeed, there is still a marginal-seat mindset among people, such as Christopher Luxon it would seem, who should know better. So, in most marginal electorates, anti-National voters would vote for their Labour candidates; even voters who really preferred their Green (or Values Party as the Greens were then) candidate.

With MMP, informed voters normally vote for their preferred party. But they are cognisant of the coalition options. So they might vote for a less-preferred party that has a chance of participating in government if their actual preferred party is unlikely to be in government; that is, they may choose the ‘lesser evil’ option, making a likely government they don’t really want ‘less bad’. In 2020, some people who preferred National over Labour nevertheless voted Labour in order to minimise the influence of the Green Party in government. For those voters, the Green Party was the ‘greater evil’ and the Labour Party was the ‘lesser evil’.

Another form of strategic party voting is to ‘take out insurance’; to vote for a moderating ‘centre’ party. In 2002 that insurance took the form of United Future. In 1996, 2005 and 2017 that ‘hand-brake’ insurance took the form of a vote for New Zealand First.

Under an informed MMP-mindset, electorate votes would generally be for the candidates who would best represent local interests in the national Parliament; regardless of political party. Because there is no cost to voters’ preferred parties. We note that cities over the country have had long-running ‘centre-right’ Mayors despite having mainly ‘centre-left’ MPs. And vice versa. This is also how it should be in MMP electorates.

There is another form of strategic voting in electorates. In particular an electorate-candidate with a low party-list ranking (or not even on the list) can, if elected, displace a candidate who would otherwise become a list MP. Voters may vote for electorate-candidates with this intention in mind. An example might be a National party voter in Ohariu choosing to vote for Labour’s Greg O’Connor as a means to displace someone like David Parker, Andrew Little, Willow Jean Prime, or Ayesha Verrall. Or a Labour Party voter in Ohariu voting for National’s Nicola Willis as a means of helping Parker, Little, Prime and Verrall stay in Parliament.

Misinformed voters are likely to vote as if 2023 is going to be an SM election. They will firstly consider their electorate vote as if it was a Party Vote. They will vote for candidates representing their preferred parties; or against the candidates representing their detested parties, by voting for the party candidate most likely to defeat the candidate for the party they want to lose.

Then they will turn their attention to the party vote, which they understand to being a separate poll to choose list MPs. If such voters want a single-party government they will vote ‘two ticks’, for the party as well as the candidate of that party. Or they may want insurance, voting for a minor-party coalition partner. Or they may vote for the minor party which they really prefer, given the FPP belief that voting for the electorate candidate of a minor party is a wasted vote.

The SM/FPP mindset mainly affects the electorate vote, treating it as a party vote rather than a personal vote. In addition, SM might exaggerate minor-party support in the party-vote; some voters might use the supplementary vote to compensate for the disproportionality of an FPP-type electorate vote.

Predictions

The table below gives my stylised – meaning possibly exaggerated, to make a point – predictions for certain electorates for the 14 October election. I focus on the Labour Party, given that it is the present governing party and that it will lose sitting MP candidates. I make predictions based on the presence or absence of MMP awareness; with MMP awareness favouring popular local candidates regardless of party affiliations, especially sitting MPs. MMP thinking minimises changes in electorate MPs, meaning that there can be big swings among major-party list MPs instead.

And I make predictions for SM/FPP thinking. FPP-style voting yields big electorate MP swings, leaving relatively stable major-party list representation. (In practice, some voters will probably make informed MMP electorate choices, and others will make misinformed electorate choices. So the actual election result is likely to be an average of the two scenarios shown.) And I go on to make a prediction of the result if the voting system actually was SM.

In the Table below, I am basing my predictions on what the recent polls are saying about the parties; namely that Labour will get 26 percent of the vote and 33 seats in the new Parliament. (To keep the table as short as possible, I have excluded any electorates for which I think the Labour candidate will not win.)

Under MMP-informed voting I am predicting 27 electorate MPs for Labour and 6 list MPs. Under SM/FPP-informed electorate voting, I am predicting 16 electorate MPs for Labour and 17 list MPs. Some people – eg Kieran McAnulty – would be an electorate MP under the first scenario and a list MP under the second scenario.

Table of Stylised Predictions for ‘Labour electorates’:

From the table above, these six electorate candidates would get through under MMP-informed electorate voting, but not under SM/FPP-informed electorate voting: Utikere, Leavasa, Boyack, Wood, Twyford, Leary.

And these six would get elected under misinformed electorate voting (ie SM/FPP-informed) but not under MMP-informed electorate voting: Little (List 12), Parker (L13), Radhakrishnan (L15), Andersen (L17), Luxton (L19), Salesa (E).

So I am saying that, if voters vote in the electorates as they would have done under FPP, then Little, Parker, Radhakrishnan, Andersen, Luxton and Salesa would be in instead of Utikere, Leavasa, Boyack, Wood, Twyford, Leary. No prizes for working out which of those sixsomes the Labour leadership would prefer.

I would also mention that under SM-informed voting in an MMP election, the party vote for Labour (and National) would probably be a percentage-point or two lower than under MMP-informed party voting. In my table, that would cost Brooking and Russell their seats.

I would also note that if Labour’s support falls to 22% (about that of National in 2002) and New Zealand First mops up the populist vote, then Labour would be down to zero list MPs in an MMP-informed election and 11 list MPs in an election in which the electorate adopts SM/FPP voting strategies. In an MMP-informed election with the Labour vote at 22%, then Robertson, Tinetti, Verrall, Jackson, Prime and Rurawhe would also be gone.

If it really was an SM election

If SM was actually the voting system, and on present polling – I would predict: 28 MPs for Labour (16 electorate, 12 list); 11 MPs for Green (3 electorate, 8 list); 4 list MPs for NZ First, 2 MPs for Te Pāti Māori (1 electorate, 1 list); 5 MPs for Act (all list); 70 MPs for National (52 electorate, 18 list). National would win outright with less than 40% of the party vote. Christopher Luxon would like that. Many MPs – both electorate and list – would consider themselves to be safe; many more than under MMP.

Green Party, Act, TOP and Māori

My prediction this time is for the Green Party to win three electorate seats in an MMP-informed election (Auckland Central, Wellington Central, Panmure-Otahuhu) and two electorates in a misinformed MMP election (Auckland Central, Wellington Central). The incumbent MP, Chloe Swarbrick, should win Auckland Central either way. Further, I believe that circumstances conspire in Wellington Central, where the overseas vote may play a vital role. And Ofiso Collins, standing for the Greens in Panmure-Otahuhu, could win through a personal vote, given his prominence as a popular Auckland mayoral candidate.

Under MMP-savvy voting, TOP should win Ilam. The TOP leader there – Raf Manji – is a popular Christchurch city councillor; though a vote for Manji could reduce the total number of National or Labour MPs, given that TOP party votes would no longer be wasted. And, under MMP-informed voting, ACT should win Tamaki as well as Epsom. In this case, a vote for the Act candidate (Brooke Van Velden) could have no impact on the number of national or Labour MPs.

Under my MMP-informed predictions, which do not include any seats for TOP, Labour retains most of its Māori caucus, and gains new MPs in the Māori electorates. So, given the likely presence in Parliament of 4 or 5 Te Pāti Māori MPs, and Green Māori MPs as well, the Parliament will have probably its largest Māori representation ever. We note that the first three on the New Zealand First list are all Māori, as is the leader of Act. National will be conspicuously the least-Māori party.

Back to Christopher Luxon.

If Mr Luxon is campaigning too much for the electorate vote in ‘marginal electorates’, then he is potentially missing out on party votes in the parts of the country he is barely seen in. That might not bother me, but should bother him. West Auckland comes to mind here.

Postscript: Trifecta Voting

One way to distance ourselves from SM/FPP thinking would be to introduce trifecta voting in all elections; national and local, electorate and party.

Under trifecta voting, in each ballot voters choose up to three candidates or parties, numbering them as first, second and third preference.

Under trifecta party voting, there would be almost no wasted party votes, because almost all voters would include a successful party as one of their three preferences. Unsuccessful first preference votes would be discarded in favour of voters’ second preferences. And, if still not electing a party, the second preference would yield to the third preference. Same thing for candidate voting. Votes for eliminated candidates would transfer until at least one candidate had sufficient of the vote to be elected.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.