The Defence Force is sending a plane to the Middle East to assist any New Zealanders stranded in Iran or Israel.

The C-130J Hercules, along with government personnel, will leave Auckland on Monday.

Airspace is still closed in the region, but Defence Minister Judith Collins said the deployment was part of New Zealand’s contingency plans.

“Airspace in Israel and Iran remains heavily restricted, which means getting people out by aircraft is not yet possible, but by positioning an aircraft, and defence and foreign affairs personnel in the region, we may be able to do more when airspace reopens,” she said.

The government was also in discussions with commercial airlines to see what they could do to assist, although it was uncertain when airspace would reopen.

Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters said New Zealanders should do everything they could to leave now, if they could find a safe route.

“We know it will not be safe for everyone to leave Iran or Israel, and many people may not have access to transport or fuel supplies,” he said.

‘Stay in touch’
“If you are in this situation, you should shelter in place, follow appropriate advice from local authorities and stay in touch with family and friends where possible.”

Peters reiterated New Zealand’s call for diplomacy and dialogue.

“Ongoing military action in the Middle East is extremely worrying and it is critical further escalation is avoided,” he said. “New Zealand strongly supports efforts towards diplomacy.

“We urge all parties to return to talks. Diplomacy will deliver a more enduring resolution than further military action.”

It will take a few days for the Hercules to reach the region.

New Zealanders in Iran and Israel needing urgent consular assistance should call the Ministry’s Emergency Consular Call Centre on +64 99 20 20 20.

New Zealand hoped the aircraft and personnel would not be needed, and diplomatic efforts would prevail, Collins re-iterated.

The ministers would not say where exactly the plane and personnel would be based, for security reasons.

Registered number in Iran jumps
Peters told reporters the number of New Zealanders registered in Iran had jumped since the escalation of the crisis.

“We thought, at a certain time, we had them all counted out at 46,” he said. “It’s far more closer to 80 now, because they’re coming out of the woodwork, despite the fact that, for months, we said, ‘Look, this is a danger zone’, and for a number of days we’ve said, ‘Get out if you possibly can’.”

There were 101 New Zealanders registered in Israel. Again, Peters said the figure had risen recently.

He indicated people from other nations could be assisted, similar to when the NZDF assisted in repatriations from New Caledonia last year.

Labour defence spokesperson Peeni Henare supported the move.

“I acknowledge the news that the New Zealand Defence Force will soon begin a repatriation mission to the Middle East, and thank the crew and officials on this mission for their ongoing work to bring New Zealanders home safely,” he said.

While he agreed with the government that the attacks were a dangerous escalation of the conflict and supported the government’s calls for dialogue, he said the US bombing of Iran was a breach of international law and the government should be saying it.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

This weekend’s visit to Australia by New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins speaks volumes about major changes underway in New Zealand foreign policy.

Hipkins is flying to Brisbane – Australia’s third-biggest city and home to around 100,000 New Zealand citizens – to meet with his counterpart, Anthony Albanese.

The trip’s significance comes in part from its timing. Hipkins is visiting just before Anzac Day on 25 April. On this day each year, Australia and New Zealand both remember the role played and losses suffered by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (or Anzac for short) in World War I, and by their forces in other conflicts.

In advance of the New Zealand PM’s travel, a new partnership called ‘Plan Anzac’ has been unveiled which promises ‘sustained cooperation’ between the Australian and New Zealand militaries. The arrangement covers a wide range of areas that include ‘strategic engagement, capability, training, readiness and common personnel issues’.

Hipkins’ visit is also expected to serve as an occasion for Australia to unveil a more generous pathway to citizenship for the near million-strong population of New Zealanders living in Australia – an attempt at putting to bed disquiet from New Zealanders who feel Australia has not upheld traditional Anzac ‘mateship’.

There is no better time of year for Canberra and Wellington to send signals of unity.

And the bonhomie comes as New Zealand increasingly follows in Australia’s foreign policy footsteps.

The most recent example of the alignment came in the acceptance by both Albanese and Hipkins of an invitation to the NATO leaders’ summit in Lithuania this July.

The joint RSVP was almost certainly coordinated between Canberra and Wellington.

After NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg publicly invited the pair to attend the meeting a fortnight ago, Hipkins initially remained non-committal, telling reporters he hadn’t decided on whether he would attend and pointedly noting his busy schedule during New Zealand’s election year.

Media reports surfaced soon afterwards that claimed Albanese would be a no-show in Vilnius.

The reporting was not initially denied.

Albanese already has a packed international calendar this year. The Australian PM perhaps thought that his guest attendance at the G7 in Hiroshima and hosting of a Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) leaders’ summit in Sydney next month would be more than enough to satisfy US and European leaders.

If Albanese himself was planning on skipping NATO, this also explained why Hipkins showed a marked lack of enthusiasm.

But criticism by political rivals and commentators – and perhaps some pressure behind the scenes – appeared to change Albanese’s mind and by Monday this week, the Australian leader was saying he ‘would be very pleased to accept’ the NATO invitation.

Yesterday, Hipkins announced that he would also be heading to Vilnius.

In other words, Australia led – and New Zealand followed.

The countries are also becoming closer in other ways.

Most notably, New Zealand defence minister Andrew Little signalled last month that Wellington was interested in joining a second ‘pillar’ of the AUKUS arrangements that focuses on cybertechnology.

A week later, Little held talks in Wellington with his Australian counterpart, Richard Marles.

Little was typically circumspect about the substance of the talks and played down the AUKUS element.

However, Marles noted ‘alignment’ between Australia and New Zealand, adding ‘it’s really important that we are working as closely together as possible’.

The pair’s meeting came not long after a visit to New Zealand by Kurt Campbell, the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator – illustrating how pressures and interests from further afield are also at play, a factor reinforced by the NATO invitation.

Then there is the small matter of TikTok.

Both Australia and New Zealand have issued bans over the past month – and surprisingly, this time New Zealand appeared to be the leader, not the follower.

In March, New Zealand’s Parliamentary Service effectively banned use of the smartphone app, owned by Chinese company ByteDance, by MPs and staffers who accessed Parliament’s network.

The move followed a directive (issued in November 2022, although only publicly revealed months later) by New Zealand’s Defence Force ordering its personnel to delete TikTok from their devices.

For its part, Australia waited until earlier this month to make its decision– but it then issued a far more sweeping ban that prohibited the use of TikTok on devices used by employees at all Australian federal government departments and agencies.

It was also reported that more than half of Australia’s federal government agencies had already banned TikTok.

This suggested Australia was the leader after all.

If alignment is a keyword in the 2023 version of the Australia-New Zealand relationship, another is ‘interoperability’.

Little spoke of the need for a ‘seamless sort of interoperability’ with Australia after taking on the defence portfolio earlier this year – and the word is also used repeatedly to justify the new ‘Plan Anzac’ military partnership.

Expect to hear more about the need for New Zealand to harmonise its capabilities with those of Australia – especially when the results of New Zealand’s Defence Policy Review are soon announced.

The outcome of the Defence Policy Review is also likely to serve as a justification for New Zealand to announce greater military spending.

It remains to be seen how China will react to New Zealand’s increasing willingness to fall in line with Australia – and with NATO.

Trade repercussions seem unlikely, although cannot be ruled out if New Zealand becomes deeply intertwined with Aukus.

China and Australia are currently in a healing phase over trade, after Beijing effectively offered to settle a dispute with Canberra over the tariffs China imposed in 2020 on Australia’s barley exports.

In the short term, any displeasure from China at New Zealand’s decision to take a more Australia-friendly path is more likely to come in the form of ‘playing hard to get’.

A notable omission from Hipkins’ travel announcements this week was any confirmation of a trip to China.

In her final months in office, Jacinda Ardern indicated she was seeking to visit China early in 2023 – a plan that Hipkins initially reaffirmed, but later walked back.

In the announcement of Chris Hipkins’ travel plans this week, the Prime Minister’s office did add that the Government was ‘continuing to pursue a trade focused trip to China later in the year’.

But for Hipkins to visit China, he will need an invitation.

And that invitation may have just become that much harder to obtain.

After all, Chris Hipkins is choosing Brisbane over Beijing.

At least for now.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has New Zealand firmly in its sights.

Last week, New Zealand’s foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta attended the annual NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels – alongside her counterparts from Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Mahuta’s participation came after New Zealand’s then Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern joined last June’s NATO leaders’ summit in Madrid. Mahuta was also a guest at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in April 2022, albeit only in virtual form.

At a more granular level, a NATO military delegation visited New Zealand last month for meetings with officials in Wellington. The head of the delegation said NATO was ‘determined’ to ‘deepen and strengthen our cooperation with our Indo-Pacific partners’.

And this week, top NATO official Benedetta Berti is visiting Wellington. As part of her visit, Berti – who heads NATO’s Policy Planning Unit in the Secretary General’s office – will speak to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) on the impact of the war in Ukraine on the Indo-Pacific. Berti will also explain why NATO is seeking to expand its ties with countries in the region such as New Zealand, according to advance NZIIA publicity material for the event.

The grouping of four Indo-Pacific countries is sometimes referred to as the AP4, or ‘Asia Pacific Four’, particularly by the more hawkish Australia and Japan.

So far, New Zealand has tended to avoid using the AP4 acronym, perhaps to play down the implication that Wellington has joined yet another new bloc.

The website of New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) contains only a single mention of the AP4 – after Mahuta’s attendance at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting last year. There is no mention of AP4 at all on the Ministry of Defence or Beehive ministerial websites, according to a Google search.

NATO itself has also generally shied away from using the AP4 acronym, perhaps in deference to New Zealand’s sensibilities. But this might be starting to change. Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary General, talked openly about the potential of the AP4 at a speech at Tokyo’s Keio University in February.

In that address, Stoltenberg told his audience that NATO had ‘in many ways…already institutionalised’ the AP4 and described the four countries’ participation at the NATO leaders’ summit in Spain in 2022 as a ‘historic moment’.

We can expect to hear much more about the AP4 in the future.

Stoltenberg has publicly invited all four AP4 leaders to attend this year’s leaders’ summit in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius.

In diplomatic terms, this probably means New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins and the other three AP4 leaders have already decided to go.

This is significant.

For one thing, it means Jacinda Ardern’s presence at last year’s NATO summit in Madrid was not just a one-off move to show solidarity with NATO countries in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Second, it shows how New Zealand is continuing to forge a more hardline foreign policy stance under Hipkins’ leadership.

After all, the involvement of the AP4 in NATO is being driven chiefly by the alliance’s interest in China.

At the Madrid summit last year, NATO launched its new long-term Strategic Concept that openly called out China for its ‘stated ambitions and coercive policies’ and pinpointed Beijing as a source of ‘systemic challenges’ for the alliance.

And much of the press conference after last week’s NATO foreign ministers’ meeting that New Zealand’s Nanaia Mahuta also attended was focused squarely on China.

Stoltenberg told media that China was ‘coming closer to us’ and cited a range of familiar Western criticisms of Beijing – ranging from its ‘assertive behaviour’ in the South China Sea, to actions over Hong Kong, Taiwan and its ties with Moscow – that made it necessary for NATO to ‘update and develop’ its stance towards China.

Indeed, the NATO Secretary General openly linked the alliance’s recent deepening of partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries such as New Zealand with NATO’s China strategy – which he called a ‘huge effort’.

Of course, unlike Finland – which became NATO’s 31st member last week – New Zealand cannot formally join NATO, given the alliance’s geographic focus.

But if New Zealand continues to align itself with NATO as part of the AP4 – which could be seen as ‘NATO plus’ – the implications could be as significant as the extraordinary signals from defence minister Andrew Little that Wellington could soon join non-nuclear components of the AUKUS pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and United States.

For one, it means that New Zealand will almost certainly strive to meet NATO’s military spending target of 2 per cent of GDP – a figure which Stoltenberg described last week as a ‘floor not a ceiling’.

To that end, New Zealand’s defence minister Andrew Little is continuing a softening-up campaign in the media to pave the way for greater military spending, ahead of the imminent reporting-back of a defence policy review committee and the Government’s Budget in May.

Any response from Beijing to the latest developments on New Zealand’s involvement with NATO and AUKUS has yet to be fully felt.

But China – New Zealand’s biggest trading partner – made no secret of its displeasure after Jacinda Ardern attended the NATO summit in Spain last year. At the time, the Chinese Embassy in Wellington issued a statement noting Beijing’s opposition to ‘all kinds of military alliances, bloc politics, or exclusive small groups’, while a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said NATO should not seek to ‘replicate the kind of bloc confrontation seen in Europe here in the Asia-Pacific’.

After the NATO meeting in Madrid in June 2022, Jacinda Ardern gradually reined in New Zealand’s more hawkish positioning with more soothing tones towards Beijing – culminating in her meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Thailand in November and her pledge to travel to China early in 2023.

Upon taking over the Prime Ministerial role from Ardern in January, Hipkins said a trip to China would be high on his priority list – but the signals have been rather mixed since then. Last month, Hipkins appeared to play down expectations of a visit to Beijing, citing ‘moving parts’ and domestic pressures during New Zealand’s election year.

Delaying an invitation to New Zealand’s Prime Minister to visit China would certainly be one way for Beijing to signal frustration.

Chris Hipkins may well be heading to the NATO summit in Vilnius.

But it could mean he has to wait longer to visit Beijing.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning analyse how New Zealand and other nations are providing intelligence expertise in the defence of Ukraine.

But are the SIGINT and TECHINT operations a part of the NATO partnership, or, a part of the Five Eyes intelligence network’s operations – where the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand share resources to acquire and coordinate global and targeted intelligence.

Does confirmation from New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern that New Zealand has deployed seven Defence intelligence officers to the United Kingdom and Belgium underscore a direct involvement against Russia and in defence of Ukraine by other independent nations like New Zealand?

• What will the intelligence, including geo-spacial analysis, most likely be used for and how would it be derived and delivered?
• How has western intelligence assisted Ukraine in this war and also in the targeting of Russian generals who were identified and killed during hostilities in Ukraine (ref. Washington Post)?
• How significant has Open Source Intelligence been in the Russia Ukraine war (to date) including the use of citizen acquired video and data and its dissemination to offensive and defensive operations in the conflict?
• And why is SIGINT and TECHINT proving to be more important than ever in this specific conflict?

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The Tongan government has confirmed that all houses on the island of Mango were wiped out in the tsunami that followed Saturday’s volcanic eruption.

It confirmed that three people are now known to have died: a 65-year-old woman in Mango and a 49-year-old man in Nomuka, both in the outlying Ha’apai island group; as well as British national Angela Glover in Tongatapu.

The Tongan navy had deployed with health teams and water, food and tents to the Ha’apai islands.

One aerial image taken by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) showed Mango and described the damage there as “catastrophic”.

No houses, but just a few temporary tarpaulin shelters could be seen.

The Tongan government said Mango, Atata, and Fonoifua islands were being evacuated, and that water supplies in Tonga were seriously affected. It said all houses were destroyed on Mango Island, only two houses remained on Fonoifua and extensive damage occurred on Nomuka Island.

The government also said there were multiple injuries.

First official Tongan statement
It is the first official statement the kingdom has made about the disaster to international media.

The government said parts of the western side of Tongatapu, including Kanokupolu, were being evacuated after dozens of houses were damaged, and that in the central district many houses were damaged in Kolomotu’a and on the island of ‘Eua.

A diplomat, Tonga’s deputy head of mission in Australia, Curtis Tu’ihalangingie, earlier described the images taken by the NZDF reconnaissance flight as “alarming”, saying they showed numerous buildings missing on Atata island as well.

“People panic, people run and get injuries,” Tu’ihalangingie told Reuters. “Possibly there will be more deaths and we just pray that is not the case.”

With communications in the South Pacific island nation cut, the true extent of casualties is still not clear.

Glover, 50, was the first known death in the tsunami, swept away as she tried to rescue the dogs she cared for at a shelter.

Australia’s Minister for the Pacific Zed Seselja said conditions on other outer islands were “very tough, we understand, with many houses being destroyed in the tsunami”.

UN report of distress signal
The United Nations had earlier reported a distress signal was detected in Ha’apai, where Mango is located.

The Tongan navy reported the area was hit by waves estimated to be 5m-10m high, said the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Atata and Mango are between 50km and 70km from the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai volcano, which sent tsunami waves across the Pacific Ocean and was heard some 2300km away in New Zealand when it erupted on Saturday.

Atata has a population of about 100 people and Mango about 50 people.

“It is very alarming to see the wave possibly went through Atata from one end to the other,” Tu’ihalangingie said.

Workers on airport runway
The NZDF images were posted unofficially on a Facebook site and confirmed by Tu’ihalangingie.

Taken from a P-3K2 Orion plane, they also showed workers on the runway clearing volcanic ash at Fua’amotu International Airport, the country’s main airfield.

One caption described the runway as “unserviceable” because of the layer of ash on it, meaning aircraft cannot land there.

It said the clearance operation was being done with shovels and wheelbarrows, and that “no heavy excavation machinery was observed”.

The Tongan government said wharves were also damaged in the eruption.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A View from Afar: Selwyn Manning and Paul Buchanan present this week’s podcast, where they analyse the Australia-China-New Zealand relationship. Has this reached a tipping-point? Also, Israel. How stable will this cobbled together coalition of anti-Netanyahu parties be?

But first, Australia, China, and New Zealand:

• What are the main take-away points from the New Zealand-Australia leaders bilateral meeting this week?
• AU PM Scott Morrison referenced ANZUS while NZ PM Jacinda Ardern spoke of NZ’s defence requirements as an independent consideration.
• So who is correct here? Does Australia and New Zealand’s re-stated commitment to being a Trans-Tasman family drag NZ into supporting any future Australian conflict?

And then there’s China’s foreign ministry response, that states: “The leaders of Australia and New Zealand, with irresponsible remarks on China’s internal affairs relating to Hong Kong and Xinjiang as well as the South China Sea issue, have made groundless accusations against China…”

• Does AU and NZ governments’ renewed sense of self-identity indicate a rebalancing of a regional and global order? And has the PRC’s dominating influence in AU and NZ politics reached its zenith?
• And does the PRC’s increased authoritarianism at home and abroad reflect leadership weaknesses rather than strength?

*** Israel.

In the last quarter of this episode, Buchanan and Manning will discuss the latest from the Middle East.

• Will a cobbled-together coalition of anti-Netanyahu politicians succeed in creating a new Israel Government? How stable will it be, and, what does this mean for Palestinians in the West Bank of Gaza?

WE INVITE YOU TO PARTICIPATE WHILE WE ARE LIVE WITH COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS IN THE RECORDING OF THIS PODCAST:

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

It seems that New Zealand First is driving the Government’s current orientation to the Middle East crisis, with Defence Minister Ron Mark and Foreign Minister Winston Peters the only two Government politicians making any comment to date. The Prime Minister has kept silent.

Should NZ condemn the US assassination of Soleimani?

New Zealand has refused to condemn the US’ assassination of Iran’s general Qasem Soleimani, whose extrajudicial execution precipitated the current escalating crisis. It was an act of state terrorism regarded by experts as counterproductive and illegal.

According to journalist Matthew Theunissen, “Like most of the world’s government’s, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s administration has neither condemned nor endorsed the US drone strike which killed Soleimani, only calling for a de-escalation of hostilities” – see: Iran’s embassy calls on NZ to promote peace and security.

Many commentators say this isn’t good enough. Theunissen reports Middle East expert Jon Stephenson saying New Zealand’s response has been inadequate: “I am concerned that there has been a lack not just of political leadership but of moral leadership by Western politicians. They need to step up now and make it clear to the Trump administration that they’re very concerned”. He suggests that this is the time for Trump’s allies to speak out: “It’s fine for [Justin] Trudeau, [Angela] Merkel, Boris Johnson and Jacinda Ardern to snigger behind Trump’s back at international meetings, but this is where it really counts.”

Former Green MP Keith Locke goes further and complains that Winston Peters’ statements on the assassination “could also be read as a justification for the drone killing” – because Peters’ words included an acknowledgement of the “strong US concerns about Iran” and that “the US took action on the basis of information they had” – see: New Zealand’s response to the Soleimani assassination is shamefully timid.

According to Locke, “Apparently it is now OK to assassinate any top government official you label as a ‘bad person’, whatever the consequences for peaceful relations between nations.” He says “New Zealand must speak out against Donald Trump’s terrorist assassination of Qassem Soleimani. Not doing so will set a dangerous precedent in world politics, and help make us all less safe.”

For Locke, the Government’s response has been “a craven display of fealty to Donald Trump”. And he says the whole episode raises questions about whether New Zealand still has independent foreign policy.

Similarly, leftwing political commentator Gordon Campbell says “Peters’ silence has hardly been a proud moment in the history of our ‘independent’ foreign policy – see: On the Iran aftermath. He also suggests it’s somewhat inconsistent of Peters to hold back on criticising the US’ actions, given that the NZ First leader “likes to flatter himself as a defender of protocol and a promoter of respect for the legal niceties”.

Some similar messages come from international relations specialist Robert Patman of the University of Otago: “Mr Trump’s actions are inconsistent with New Zealand’s world view, a rules-based international order. This was a unilateral targeted killing… We need to be quite clear that we disapprove of an action which boosts both the Iranian regime and Isis” – see Emma Perry’s New Zealand’s reaction to targeted killing too timid, academic believes.

According to this article, Patman thinks New Zealand can only keep its troops in Iraq if the Government approves of Trump’s leadership of the situation: “Whether they leave or not will depend on two things — clearly the situation on the ground and also whether or not New Zealand have confidence Mr Trump is leading the anti-Isis coalition in the correct fashion… That confidence has begun to wane”.

The Green Party has now come out publicly wanting the Government to take a harder line against US actions, with defence spokesperson Golriz Ghahraman saying: “We do have to, in the days to come, reassess whether or not we are really going to stand up to what has become a belligerent US president… I think that is a good place for New Zealand to be, that we stand as a principled voice on the international stage and we do call out our allies” – see Charlie Dreaver’s New Zealand should be a ‘principled voice’ as US-Iran tensions rise, Golriz Ghahraman says.

Not everyone is calling for the Government to condemn Trump’s actions. Negar Partow, who lectures in defence and security studies at Massey University, and who was born in Iran, wants Jacinda Ardern to get more involved in the crisis, but not necessarily to criticise the US’ actions: “There’s quite a lot of discussions about ‘why don’t we condemn this part of the conflict or that part’, my position is… we need to go above this condemnation of this and that and actually tell both of them off and bring them to the negotiation table” – see RNZ’s US-Iran tensions: NZ should ‘tell both of them off’ – academic.

Similarly, in the article, National’s defence spokesperson Mark Mitchell says “I don’t think we should be picking sides”. He is reported saying “New Zealand should encourage a peaceful solution to the conflict and not take advice from Iran or the US.”

Should NZ’s troops be immediately recalled from Iraq?

New Zealand currently has about 50 troops in Iraq – 5 in Baghdad, and another 45 stationed at Camp Taji on the outskirts of the city. In November the New Zealand Government announced the troops would stay there until June of this year.

The recent escalation of conflict has raised the question of whether they should be recalled immediately. A number of voices are now calling for this. This even includes the New Zealand Herald, which says in an editorial that “New Zealand soldiers should be withdrawn without delay” – see: Pullout of NZ troops in Iraq imperative. The newspaper says: “US policy in the Middle East has become muddled, provocative and dangerous.”

Iranian-New Zealander Donna Miles-Mojab says the troops must get out right now, and she warns against New Zealand being dragged into another “endless war” in the Middle East – see: NZ should withdraw troops from Iraq immediately.

Miles-Mojab says: “Whatever the cost of Soleimani’s killing turns out to be, it should not be paid by New Zealand troops stationed in Iraq. It’s time for the troops to come home. The Iraqi Parliament has voted for all foreign troops to leave. New Zealand should respect their decision. This is not our war.”

Will the Labour-led Government listen? Former general secretary of the Labour Party, Mike Smith, has blogged, to say Get out now. He says: “remaining troops should bring forward their scheduled departure and leave immediately. This is the least that New Zealand can do to distance us from the appalling cretinism shown by the US and its NATO allies. This is not because they are threatened but because the actions of the US violate all the norms of common justice and international law and are to be condemned.”

Former National Party Defence Minister Wayne Mapp also says such a withdrawal is now inevitable – see Boris Jancic’s NZ withdrawal from Iraq now ‘inevitable’: former Defence Minister.

Mapp says the original reason for sending the troops – to help defeat Isis – is now complete. From this point, he says “It’s going to start to feel altogether too risky relative to the gains”.

However, according to Defence Minister Ron Mark, a withdrawal is not even being considered by the Government – see RNZ’s Defence Minister Ron Mark not considering withdrawing troops. This is despite, according to this article, other Western countries – Germany, Slovakia, Croatia, and Canada – shifting their troops from Iraq to Kuwait.

What happens now?

If the Government chooses to keep its troops in Iraq, then the National opposition will support this – see Lana Andelane’s Iran missile attacks: National wants to keep New Zealand troops in Iraq. According to this article, “The National Party says New Zealand troops stationed in Iraq should not ‘cut and run’, advising the Government to keep troops on the ground.” National says New Zealand “should emulate our friends Britain and Australia”.

National might be tempted to push a populist and nationalist line on the Middle East issue according to defence analyst Paul Buchanan, who argues the deployment question is “going to become a political football” – see John Weekes’ Middle East: ‘Mission creep’ warning for NZ as election year dawns.

This article reports: “Buchanan said the National Party might run a populist foreign policy election platform, equating any withdrawal of Kiwi troops from Iraq with abandonment of New Zealand’s regional allies and friends.” And “New Zealand First might argue for an extended deployment.” And this possibility is backed up by Winston Peters saying that the Western allies have largely defeated Isis, and “It is important that these gains are preserved and consolidated, not undermined.”

Of course, New Zealand might have little choice in the matter. The Iraqi Parliament has now passed a resolution to expel all foreign troops from their country. And the Iraqi Prime Minister has followed this up with a call for a timetable on the withdrawal of such countries.

Hence, blogger No Right Turn says: We are no longer welcome in Iraq. With the Iraqi elected representatives making this decision, he says New Zealand and the allies “are now invaders and occupiers.”

Interestingly, Ron Mark rejects the notion that New Zealand and its allies are no longer welcome in Iraq, saying “The Iraqi government has not asked us to withdraw” and “We have a mandate for a mission” – see John Weekes’ Defence minister ‘concerned’ about Iraq situation amid claims of more missiles. According to this, “Mark said he had faith in the ability of New Zealand’s coalition partners to assess the situation on the ground and it was not for him to interfere in operational matters.”

National is arguing that New Zealand’s allies will be unhappy with our troops being pulled out early. Mark Mitchell says: “We do not want to cut and run unduly, leaving others to shoulder our responsibilities”.

This position is backed up by law professor Al Gillespie of Waikato University, who says if the Government pulls the troops out of Iraq, then “it’s not going to look good for our relationship with America… In an ideal world you don’t cut and run because you’ve got the integrity of your country, you’ve made a deal with a Iraq and America” – see Sam Hurley and Boris Jancic’s ‘If you want a war, we’ll give you a war’ – NZ faces tough decisions as Iran calls Trump’s bluff, expert says.

In contrast, Paul Buchanan says it wouldn’t be cutting and running to withdraw, especially since Germany is doing just that. He doesn’t think a withdrawal would harm New Zealand’s relations with the US: “It’s not as if [New Zealand is] cutting and running. A bigger country, a middle power has already said ‘this is not worth it’… If they’ve suspended the training what’s the point of being there?… Quite frankly, I don’t think it’s going to impact our relationship with the United States one iota whether they stay or pull out” – see Boris Jancic’s NZ base not hit in Iraq attack, no withdrawal announcement.

Finally, on 25 January there will be a march down Queen St in Auckland to call for New Zealand to immediately take its troops out of the Middle East. For details of this, see Global Peace and Justice Auckland’s Protest against war with Iran January 25! NZ troops out of Iraq Now! 

The announcement came in the form of the New Zealand Defence Capability Plan 2019, which projects details on new military expenditure for the next 11 years. This is best reported in Jason Walls’ article, The Defence Force $20b spending plan includes a commitment to ‘space-based activities’.

Here’s the key part: “Big ticket items include more than $3.5b for new and replacement naval vessels and maritime helicopters, and up to $2.5b for upgrades to New Zealand’s Air Force. The Government also plans to bolster New Zealand’s army personnel to 6000 by 2035 – up from the current number of 4700 troops. As well as the traditional land, sea and air funding, the plan includes money for ‘space-based systems’ as well.”

At the top of the spending list is a decision to purchase “a fleet of so-called Super Hercules planes… costing more than $1 billion” – see RNZ’s NZ Defence Force spends $1 billion on newer aircraft fleet. And, both heavy and light “tanks” (or “armoured vehicles”) are also high up the military’s wish list that is being steadily ticked off by Defence Minister Ron Mark.

Such a massive military spend-up doesn’t really fit with the Government’s stated new “Wellbeing” approach, especially when so much of the reaction to the Budget was about the perceived inadequate spending on health, education and housing. As National leader Simon Bridges was self-righteously able to point out, the Government seems to be prioritising “tanks over teachers”.

Indeed, according to Zane Small, “National’s defence spokesperson has labelled the Government’s $20 billion defence spending plan ‘disingenuous’ and questioned how it fits into its ‘wellbeing’ mantra” – see: National questions how $20 billion defence spend is ‘wellbeing’. However, spokesperson Mark Mitchell also claims the Labour-led Government is simply continuing what National had been planning, saying the spending announcement “is reconfirming that we were on the right track with our 2016 Defence Capability Plan – they’ve confirmed that”.

Will Labour and Greens supporters be troubled by the Government falling into line with National’s pro-military plans? A backlash is unlikely. As with this government’s last big military spending announcement – see my column from last year, Where are the protests over the Government’s new ‘submarine-killers’? – opposition will be muted. Peace Movement Aotearoa and other progressive and protest groups are likely to be soft on this expenditure because it’s coming from a government “from their side”.

It’s more than tribal loyalty that might prevent a backlash though. The spin and framing of the military spend-up means that the essence of the escalating militarism is well camouflaged.

This can be seen in the almost Orwellian attempts to recast the military as some sort of “peace”, humanitarian, or environmental force. This is brilliantly conveyed in Stacey Kirk’s opinion piece in which she channels the military’s thinking on why they need more money, with a justification for liberal concerns – see: Why does NZ need a military? For more reasons than you might think.

Summing up why the military spending can be sold as being part of a “wellbeing” approach, Kirk says: “Guns, ships, planes and drones don’t bring ‘wellbeing’. Peace and security do though. Sustainable food sources do, ongoing climate science hopefully will, disaster and humanitarian relief does in a very direct and measurable way”.

Kirk concludes that the Government is therefore doing the right thing: “A $20b spend on defence equipment is a lot of money. Personal politics is likely to dictate whether that’s seen as wasteful or necessary. But New Zealand relies on the defence force for its protection in more ways than may be obvious. A defence force is necessary. Having one ill-equipped to do what it needs to would arguably be a more definitive waste.”

In another article on the spend-up, Kirk points to the more traditional – and perhaps, accurate – reasons that the Government is giving for building up a stronger military: “rising tensions between competing super powers, resource competition and plays for military dominance in the region and further abroad. New Zealand’s military had to be able to meet international obligations with coalition partners, and the Government expected the defence force to operate in the South Pacific on the same level it does in New Zealand territory. It would be a key plank of supporting the Government’s Pacific Reset” – see: NZ military $20b shopping list: Planes, boats, soldiers, satellites and drones.

Clearly the supposed threat of China looms large in the spending decisions, as Gordon Campbell explains: “this latest round of Defence purchases is our membership fee for defence alliances that were conceived way back during the Cold War era of the 1950s, some 70 years ago. The force configurations and related projections of military power belong to a bygone era, and the steeply mounting cost of the hardware can no longer be justified by any realistic threat scenarios in the Pacific, or the South China Sea. The only conceivable ‘enemy’ to justify these expenditures is China. Are we really planning for war with our main trading partner?”  – see: On the military withdrawal from Iraq.

Campbell suggests the decision, together with the announcement on Iraq and Afghanistan, shows “the Greens have been fobbed off, once again”. The Greens, have indeed, largely come on board with the escalating military expenditure, which is explained today by Richard Harman in his column, How Ron Mark persuaded the Greens to support our defence forces. Interviewing the party’s defence spokesperson, he says “Golriz Ghahraman was full of praise for Mark, for his approach to policy and for the way he has undertaken the review of the Plan.”

Clearly the Greens have been been won over on the basis of the justification of climate change and a military that takes on more humanitarian work. Ghahraman explains that the military’s “core work is going to be much more focused on things that are not to do with violence and war which is what we’ve been advocating for really strongly over the years”.

But have the Greens fallen for the green-washing of the military? According to Harman, the Greens’ traditional opposition “is tempered with a recognition of the role that Defence can play in civilian situations, particularly in the Pacific”.

Ghahraman also seems to have found a connection with the Defence Minister, which has enabled them find common ground. She says: “I think we do have incredibly high levels of mutual respect and we’ve come to this from a position of wanting to collaborate”.

Ghahraman explains: “I think, for him, has been dealing with someone who has also seen war in the Middle East… So we’ve we connected with each other because we both know what the work of Defence is really like.” She adds, “We’ve been able to kind of have a conversation at a really detailed level and also a really human level…. And I really do respect him.”

Nonetheless, despite defending the general plan, the Greens have still argued for lower spending and some different military priorities. Ghahraman has gone on RNZ today to say: “That is a lot of money and defence equipment costs a lot – but again we could have invested in smaller planes and done without the war-making capability that we’re renewing” – see Jonathan Mitchell’s Defence Force’s $1b spend unnecessary – Greens.

Ghahraman also told Richard Harman, “that the Plan needed to be read alongside the decision announced yesterday to end the New Zealand army deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.” And surely that is precisely why the Government made sure the troop departure was announced prior to the spend-up report. The “good news” departure announcement will have helped inoculate the Greens and Labour against criticism for then being so gung-ho on militarism.

For the announcement on New Zealand’s departure from its military deployments in the Middle East see Jason Walls’ ‘Time to go’: NZ to pull troops out of Iraq by June 2020, says Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. Here’s the key detail: “There are 95 non-combat Defence Force personnel in the Taji Military Complex – their job is primarily to train Iraqi Security Forces. Following cabinet’s decision, that number will be reduced to 75 next month, then to 45 in January next year. The remainder would withdraw by June 2020.”

The Greens have claimed victory with the decision, despite the decision to extend the deployment for the time being. This caused some strong push back from the Deputy Prime Minister, who said: “It’s a bit hard to argue you’ve won when the troops are still there until June of next year – let’s be logical about it… How can it be a win if they’re still there?” – see Jason Walls’ Winston Peters: ‘A bit hard to argue’ decision to bring Kiwi troops home was a ‘Green win’. Furthermore, on the idea that the Greens had influenced the decision, Peters said “first time I had ever heard that”.

Finally, former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp has written a thoughtful response to the (delayed) decision to withdraw troops from the Middle East, suggesting that, in the end, this shows that Labour – despite its protests to the contrary – actually has a similar approach to National on foreign affairs and war – see: This belated withdrawal suggests the 2015 Iraq controversy wasn’t all it seemed. Mapp says that this episode illustrates that “Labour is not nearly as radical as their rhetoric would sometimes indicate. There is much more continuity with this government than some of their members would like to pretend.”

New Zealand’s military conduct in its longest running war ever – in Afghanistan – is finally getting an official government inquiry. This has the real potential to open up a can of worms. So far, the announcement of the Government’s inquiry into Operation Burnham has been met with a great diversity of reactions. Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson, and their supporters, have been “over the moon”, as Hager put it. But this doesn’t mean they don’t have concerns about the inquiry.

Validity of inquiry disputed Not everyone is happy to see the New Zealand defence forces being made accountable for the SAS raid in Afghanistan. Newstalk ZB’s Tim Dower represents one strand of opinion in his argument that the military should never be criticised or investigated – see his column condemning the new inquiry: When it comes to military operations, I’m taking the word of our guys. Dower makes the case that New Zealand soldiers were in Afghanistan to help the locals, and the chaotic nature of the conflict there meant “our guys were at a disadvantage from the get-go.” He goes so far as to say that, even if New Zealand troops killed Afghans in a botched raid, “I’d rather it was one of them – even a civilian – than one of ours.” Newstalk ZB’s political editor Barry Soper says that “in reality this was a firefight and unfortunately some innocents lost their lives, which tragically happens in war zones” – see: Little doubt in what SAS inquiry will come up with. He expects the defence forces to be exonerated, on the simple basis that: “the allied forces were under fire and responded”. Soper regards the inquiry as a “waste of money”, saying “surely the money would have been better spent on the mould and leaks at Middlemore Hospital.” This is a similar line to that being run by the National Party. It’s defence spokesperson, Mark Mitchell, has come out strongly against the inquiry, reiterating that when National was in office it carefully considered the evidence and was in no doubt an inquiry wasn’t needed. You can see his very good ten-minute interview with Breakfast TV’s Jack Tame here: Inquiry into deadly NZ-led Afghanistan raid labelled a waste of taxypers’ money by National. The New Zealand Defence Forces bosses remain confident they will be cleared by the inquiry. The head of the defence force, Lieutenant General Tim Keating, has emailed his staff to say that the “conduct of the NZSAS ground forces was exemplary” and the evidence he has will clear “the soldiers of any wrongdoing”. This email was leaked to Stuff journalists – see Laura Walters’ Over three hours of aerial footage of Afghanistan raid exists, NZDF says. This reports that “Keating also said there was ‘compelling material’, which could not be publicly released, including intelligence reports and video footage, which supported what NZDF had publicly said about the raid.” How well has the inquiry been set up? How any government inquiry is set up obviously has a significant impact on what is revealed, and whether justice is served. That’s why so much attention was paid to the terms of reference provided to the inquiry. Supporters of Hager and Stephenson had worried that these terms of reference would be too narrow, or that not enough resources or independence would be supplied by the Government. Such fears appear to have been unfounded. Both Hager and Stephenson have expressed their support for how the inquiry has been established. Stephenson has said, “It appears that the terms of reference are sufficiently broad to enable Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Sir Terence Arnold to ask the questions that I believe need to be asked”, and “I’m pleased that the issue of NZ involvement in transferring detainees to the Afghan secret police who are well known to torture detainees is going to be examined” – see Jo Moir and Henry Cooke’s Author Jon Stephenson pleased with inquiry, but queries Govt ‘muddying waters’. This article also reports Stephenson’s belief that witnesses would be dealt with appropriately: “He said the fact that the inquiry could take evidence under oath in secret and protect the identity of witnesses would mean his sources would be comfortable – particularly the ones who were serving at the time.” According to that article, the main issues that the terms of reference include are the following: “The allegations of civilian deaths. The allegation that NZDF knowingly transferred a man to a prison where he would be tortured. The allegation that soldiers returned to the valley to destroy homes on purpose.” There is one further, less publicised, focus of the inquiry, that has the potential to be even more explosive than the Hit and Run allegations: an examination of whether New Zealand soldiers were involved in assassination missions on behalf of other countries. Here are the terms of reference relating to this: “7.9 Separate from the Operation, whether the rules of engagement, or any version of them authorised the pre-determined and offensive use of lethal force against specified individuals (other than in the course of direct battle) and if so, whether this was or should have been a[aren’t to (a) NZDF who approved the relevant version(s) and (b) responsible Ministers.” Blogger No Right Turn has picked up on this, saying this “is a new and unpleasant issue, and highlights the dangers of letting foreigners decide when and in what circumstances NZ soldiers are allowed to kill” – see: Finally. He adds: “we know that many of NZDF’s allies (including the USA, UK and Australia) are not moral countries and their moral values around military action and assassination are deeply at odds with those of the New Zealand public (and with international law). It’s not clear whether there’s any allegation that NZDF soldiers have been involved in assassinations, but if they have, then they may have committed crimes under New Zealand and international law, for which they will need to be prosecuted.” Investigative journalists Eugene Bingham and Paula Penfold have worked on important stories about the 2012 Battle of Baghak, in which two New Zealand soldiers were killed in action. This controversy has been specifically excluded by the Government, which claims it has already been dealt with in an Army Court of Inquiry. Bingham and Penfold dispute this, and argue the inquiry needs to be considerably wider in scoop – see: Missing the target: The Government inquiry into Afghanistan raid. The journalists give kudos to the Government for establishing the new inquiry, but say “the specific concern over civilian casualties in Operation Burnham represents only a fraction of the problems with culture and lack of accountability at the top of Defence, particularly regarding the decade-long deployment to Afghanistan. Those problems run very, very deep. A bold Government would have taken on these issues. Instead, it has wilfully turned a blind eye.” They argue an inquiry needs to look broadly at the NZDF’s “lack of transparency and accountability. Of a culture of cover-up and obfuscation. And at the heart of it all are questions raised by families of fallen New Zealand soldiers in The Valley: why were we even in Afghanistan in the first place? What were we trying to achieve?” Muddying the waters In announcing the inquiry, the Attorney-General David Parker commented that he had been shown a US military video of the raid, and this “does not seem to me to corroborate some key aspects of the book Hit & Run”. Parker stated: “The footage suggests that there was a group of armed individuals in the village” and that this contradicted how Hager and Stephenson had portrayed the village as “non-threatening”. This is all best covered by Herald reporters Isaac Davidson, Lucy Bennett, Claire Trevett and David Fisher – see: Inquiry already prejudiced, say Hit & Run authors. The first problem with Parker’s actions is that he has refused to give further details, and has not secured the footage for the inquiry. Jon Stephenson believes Parker has pre-empted the actual inquiry: “In my view he’s prejudiced the inquiry and he’s provided that information without any context at all and refused to answer questions about it. He’s just muddied the waters… He’s essentially making statements that are prejudicial… Surely the professional and appropriate thing to do was to allow the inquiry to determine the facts, having heard all the evidence and render a verdict, not pre-empt that.” The must-read view on this is from Gordon Campbell, who sums up the situation like this: “at the outset of an independent government inquiry, the Attorney-General not only felt free to make unverifiable assertions about Hit & Run – but no guarantee can be given that even this august inquiry will be able to see the footage in question and draw definitive conclusions from it, either way. It seems amazing that NZDF is able to screen this footage for lobbying purposes with politicians whenever it suits NZDF to do so, while claiming that national security concerns prevent it from sharing the same information with either the public, the media, or – potentially – even with the $2 million inquiry set up to clarify the matters in dispute. As I suggested to Parker yesterday, we seem to be getting off on the wrong foot here” – see: On the Hit&Run inquiry. It opens the government up to criticism that Parker was deliberately throwing a bone to the defence forces with his reference to the video footage. After all, the Government has reportedly been under strong pressure not to hold the inquiry. Campbell’s column is also essential reading for anyone with concerns about what could go wrong with the inquiry. He points to a myriad of issues and dynamics that might allow authorities to effectively keep the lid on this particular can of worms. Finally, for satire from the past year on these issues, see my blog post, Cartoons about Hit & Run, and NZ in Afghanistan.

There’s an overlooked aspect of the New Zealand Defence Force’s account of Operation Burnham that when scrutinised suggests a possible breach of international humanitarian law and laws relating to war and armed conflict occurred on August 22, 2010 in the Tirgiran Valley, Baghlan province, Afghanistan.

According to New Zealand Defence Force’s official statements Operation Burnham ‘aimed to detain Taliban insurgent leaders who were threatening the security and stability of Bamyan Province and to disrupt their operational network’. (ref. NZDF rebuttal) We are to understand Operation Burnham’s objective was to identify, capture, or kill (should this be justified under NZDF rules of engagement), those insurgents who were named on a Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) that NZDF intelligence suggested were responsible for the death of NZDF soldier Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell.

When delivering NZDF’s official account of Operation Burnham before media, Lieutenant General Tim Keating said:

“After the attack on the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZPRT), which killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell, the NZPRT operating in Bamyan Province did everything it could to reduce the target profile of our people operating up the Shakera Valley and into the north-east of Bamyan Province. “We adjusted our routine, reduced movements to an absolute minimum, maximised night driving, and minimised time on site in threat areas. “The one thing the PRT [NZPRT] couldn’t do was to have an effect on the individuals that attacked Lieutenant O’Donnell’s patrol. For the first time, the insurgents had a major success — and they were well positioned to do so again.”

For the purpose of a counter-strike, intelligence was sought and Lt. General Keating said: “We knew in a matter of days from local and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intelligence who had attacked our patrol [where and when Lt. O’Donnell was killed].” The intelligence specified the villages where the alleged insurgents were suspected of coming from and Lt. General Keating said: “This group had previously attacked Afghan Security Forces and elements of the German and Hungarian PRTs.” The New Zealand Government authorised permission for the Kabul-based NZSAS troops to be used in Operation Burnham. “What followed was 14 days of reliable and corroborated intelligence collection that provided confirmation and justification for subsequent actions. Based on the intelligence, deliberate and detailed planning was conducted,” Lt. General Keating said. Revenge, Keating said, was never a motivation. Rather, according to him, the concern was for the security of New Zealand’s reconstruction and security efforts in Bamyan province. As stated above, Operation Burnham’s primary objective was to identify, capture or kill Taliban insurgent leaders named in the intelligence data. We know, from the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, Operation Burnham failed to achieve that goal.

Analysis of the NZDF Official Account The official account of events that occurred in the early hours of August 22, 2010, describe how Taliban insurgents, realising coalition forces were preparing to raid the area (marked as ‘Operation Burnham Area of Operation’ in a map (slide 3) declasified and released to media on March 27, 2017), formed a tactical maneuver using civilians (women, children and elderly) as a human shield.

Despite the official account placing this group within a building, within a small hamlet, within the area of operation, within Tirgiran Valley, there is no clear definitive official account yet given of what happened to either the civilians or the insurgents.

This appears to be an obvious void in the official record, but one that has failed so far to be scrutinised.

To follow the logic of Lt. General Tim Keating’s account (detailed below), is to discover our defence personnel, who were in charge of the ground and air operation during Operation Burnham, failed to identify what had become of those civilians (women, children, and the elderly), and also importantly the suspected insurgents who Lt. General Keating said during his briefing used the villagers as a human shield.

We know from the Chief of Defence Force’s notes as provided on March 27, 2017, that as Operation Burnham began, NZDF was in command of United States manned aircraft (including helicopters and possibly a AC-130). The aircraft were swarming above the Tirgiran Valley.

From the NZDF account an NZDF joint terminal air controller was in charge of the air attack against those NZDF had defined as insurgents. Lt. General Keating stated the alleged insurgents were armed and a NZDF commander authorised the US manned aircraft to commence firing.

Weapons-fire then began to rain down on the valley from above. Meanwhile NZSAS ground force soldiers prepared to secure their positions and to defend themselves against any potential enemy counter-attack.

Lt. General Keating stated the insurgents responded: “The insurgents, the guerrilla force, the tactic is mixed in with the civilian population, if you like, the term used is a human shield. So they use civilians as a shield.”

He added: “What occurred, is a helicopter was engaging a group of insurgents outside the village, on the outskirts of the village. During that engagement, it was noted by the ground forces there – the SAS ground forces – that some of the rounds [from the US manned aircraft] were falling short, and went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents.”

To be clear, from this account, Lt. General Keating stated a group of insurgents were being tracked, targeted, and fired upon by the US manned aircraft and under the command of a New Zealand Defence Force terminal air controller. Meanwhile, according to the NZDF record, one of the airborne helicopter’s weapon’s sights were not calibrated correctly, and, according to Lt. General Keating, 30mm projectiles went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents – remember these 30mm projectiles are capable of penetrating the side of a tank.

For accuracy, Lt. General Keating restated his account: “It is noted, the building, there were armed insurgents in there, but it is believed that there may have been civilians in the building.”

He then added: “There’s no confirmation that any casualties occurred, but there may have been.” He restated again: “There were civilians in that building.” Now, this is where the Chief of Defence Force’s account fails to further explain what occurred after that point. To summarise, the official position of the New Zealand Defence Force is:

• There were civilians in a building within the village that was fired upon by an armor piercing aircraft weapon
• That it was believed insurgents were also in that building
• That civilian casualties or deaths “may have been” or occurred inside the building.

At this juncture, we must consider whether the New Zealand Defence Force ground commanders had a responsibility to determine whether there were Taliban insurgents in the building?

And if so, whether they were the individuals listed on the JPEL list, those deemed responsible for the death of Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell?

And what of the ground commanders’ legal requirements, the duty of care with respect to civilians, were NZDF commanders on the ground or back in Kabul compelled by law to confirm the status of the civilians, whether they were injured or killed?

When asked by a journalist at the March 27, 2017 press conference: ‘If there may have been civilian casualties, why not have an inquiry to find out?’ Lt. General Keating replied: “Even if there was, as far as the New Zealand Defence Force has heard, the coalition investigation has, um, said that uh, if there were casualties, the fault of those casualties was a mechanical failure of a piece of equipment.” This reply does not appear to consider the legal requirements under:

• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 7: the obligation to provide medical assistance to all wounded, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 8: the obligation to search for and collect the wounded and to ensure their adequate care
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 13: the obligation to protect the civilian population against dangers arising from military operations
• Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, section 102. This section provides that the commanding officer of a person alleged to have committed an offence under that Act must initiate proceedings in the form of a charge or refer the allegation to civil authorities, unless the commanding officer considers the allegation is not well-founded. While little legal guidance is provided, it cannot be accepted that preliminary inquiries to determine whether an allegation is well-founded can be considered adequate where they fail to obtain evidence from the injured parties, determine their identities or even verify that they exist
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 28
• The NZDF Manual of Armed Forces Law provides that there are three types of inquiry in the NZDF: a preliminary inquiry, a court of inquiry and a command investigation. (It appears however the ISAF investigation cited by the Chief of Defence Force was not any of the above forms of inquiry).

Specifically, if you analyse Lt. General Keating’s account, the New Zealand Defence Force commanders failed to identify whether any insurgents were inside the building and whether there were dead or wounded civilians. Why was this the case? It seems reasonable to suggest, this is an abandonment of logic. It does not make sense.

We know from official NZDF documents the soldiers arrived at the scene of Operation Burnham at 0030 hours on August 22, 2010 and left at 0345 hours, that’s the official record. To clarify, the NZSAS commandos were in the area of operation for 3 hours 15 minutes.

Lt. General Keating stated, near the conclusion of the raid: “The ground force commander chose at that time that there was no longer a threat and they were leaving.”

How could that rationally be the case unless the suspected insurgents inside that building had been checked?

Was it not suspected that there were insurgents in that building? Surely the ground force commanders would be compelled to seek and identify the inhabitants of that building to see if they matched the names/descriptions on the JPEL list?

After all, the manhunt for Taliban leadership was the purpose of the raid that night. Also, logic would suggest, the people inside the building were in part civilians including women and probably children – by Lt. Keating’s account the group likely included wounded civilians and probably a dead child.

Also, it is reasonable to suggest, considering the events over those 3 hours 15 minutes, the survivors would have been crying, weeping, even howling, and the wounded would likely have been in agony.

It defies belief that the ground force commanders, and their counterparts back in Kabul, were not aware of this building, that the NZDF account states was housing suspected Taliban, and included a group of civilian victims that had been used as a human shield.

The entire area of operation specific to Operation Burnham is a skewed rectangle approximately 500 metres wide by 1 kilometre long, with an intensified operation plan focusing on two small hamlets, each approximately 50×200 metres in area [based on the scale measures of the NZDF map] – named Objective 1 and Objective 2 in the NZDF released material.

To state it simply, the official silence surrounding the above-mentioned building, and the fate of the people inside, speaks volumes. It leaves one to consider at worst whether a crime was committed by New Zealand Defence Force commanders that night – whether by failing in their duty to care for the injured they were in breach of Articles 8, 9 and 13 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

ADDITIONAL NOTE:
• The Statute of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as, inter alia, “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character”. (Ref. IHL Definition of war crimes, page 1 (pdf) – ICC Statute, Article 8 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 3))
• ‘The Statute defines as within the scope of the law, the “launching an attack without attempting to aim properly at a military target or in such a manner as to hit civilians without any thought or care as to the likely extent of death or injury amounts to an indiscriminate attack”.
• War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. Examples of the latter include failure to provide a fair trial and failure to provide food or necessary medical care to persons in the power of the adversary.’

At best, if NZDF’s official account is to be relied upon, we are to believe the NZSAS ground commanders failed to ensure the Taliban insurgents they sought were not holed up in a building that had sustained damage from coalition force aircraft. If this assumption is incorrect, at what point had the suspected insurgents left the building?

And what had become of the civilians that had been allegedly used as a human shield? Again, the vacuum of information specific to this aspect of the official account needs to be explained, including an explanation as to why NZDF’s account remains vague after six years since Operation Burnham was conducted.

It appears reasonable to assert that this single issue, notwithstanding the irregularities of official NZDF stated ‘facts’, warrants further official and independent investigation. As it is, at this juncture, we are left to consider a series of unanswered questions that to date the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force has failed to satisfy. Here are some of them. Key Unanswered Questions:

• What were the specific definitions of an insurgent that were used by NZDF for the purposes of evaluation during Operation Burnham and for the purpose of post-operation official analysis? For example; was it deemed that anyone who was male and of a fighting age was defined to be an insurgent?
• Were NZDF soldiers fired upon by individuals (villagers or insurgents) located within the confines of the villages or surrounding area during Operation Burnham?
• Was the individual who was killed by a NZSAS soldier or NZDF personnel carrying a weapon at the time of this shooting? If so, had he fired or attempted to fire his weapon in an attempt to kill or wound NZDF personnel?
• How long in minutes were the coalition forces’ helicopters, and any other airborne craft, firing their weapons on the villages and surrounding region during Operation Burnham?
• How long in minutes were NZSAS soldiers involved in securing the operational area from real or potential insurgent attack?
• Did NZDF personnel at anytime seek to identify individuals (and their status, injured, killed, or otherwise) who were located inside or near the building that Lt. General Keating said had suffered damage from an alleged mis-aimed firing from an airborne coalition aircraft?
• Were those who were injured or killed within sight of NZDF personnel before, during, and/or after the alleged mis-aimed firing?
• How many individuals did the NZDF personnel suspect were inside the building?
• How many of these people did the NZDF personnel suspect were civilians?
• How many were suspected of being women?
• How many were suspected of being children?
• Lt. General Keating suggested that one of the individuals that may have been killed during Operation Burnham was a six year-old child. What was the gender of this child?
• Was their any attempt to identify this six year-old victim?
• Was this child Fatima, the three year-old child identified in the Hit & Run [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] book? If not, then who was this child?
• What actions did NZDF personnel do to exercise their duty of care obligations to the injured and to civilians?
• What reports, cautions, evaluations were written and/or submitted regarding Operation Burnham to NZDF by the NZDF legal officer who was on the ground during Operation Burnham?

The Twisting Turning Official Account – Is This Smoke and Mirrors? As a consequence of the Hit & Run book [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] being published, New Zealand Defence Force’s top ranking soldier, Lt. General Tim Keating admitted civilians “may have been” killed during the operation.

Up until March 27, 2017, for the past six years, New Zealand Defence Force has insisted that no civilians were killed during Operation Burnham on August 22, 2010.

But on Monday, under questioning from the media, at the March 27 press conference, Lt. General Keating stated that the NZDF’s new “official line” regarding civilian deaths was “there may have been”. He then attempted to suggest that NZDF’s previously stated position – that claims of civilian deaths were “unfounded” – was basically the same thing. “I’m not going to get cute here and say it’s a twist on words, it’s the same thing, ‘unfounded’, ‘there may have been’. The official line is that there may have been casualties,” Lt. General Keating said.

A journalist then challenged him further suggesting: “They’re different things, one means they didn’t happen and one mean might’ve done.”

Lt. General Keating then replied: “You’re right…the, the, the official line is that civilian casualties may have occurred, but not corroborated.”

When asked how many insurgents were killed, Lt. General Keating replied: “A significant number of insurgents, identified insurgents, were killed during Operation Burnham.”

When asked again how many were killed, Lt. General Keating stated: “Nine.” When asked if NZDF had the names of the insurgents that were killed, he replied: “No, we do not have names of insurgents.”

This trajectory, inching toward a truth, occurred under tight questioning by a journalist, over just a few minutes.

What further truths will become relevant to understanding what occurred that night in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages should a commission of inquiry be established?

The Inconsistencies – A Summary

In evaluation, it is reasonable to assert the official Government inconsistencies observed along a six-year timeline offer the appearance of a military hierarchy that has being dragged, by degrees, (mainly by the work of Jon Stephenson, an investigative journalist specialising in war and conflict reportage) into an arena where the floodlight of public interest ought to shed light on secrets long since filed into a dark place.

However, considering the above, rather than responding openly to the challenge of meeting its responsibilities to the New Zealand Minister of Defence and public, the New Zealand Defence Force appears resistant to its obligations toward open and accurate disclosure of non-classified fact.

In conclusion, if this is true, this conduct exhibited by the officials of New Zealand Defence Force and its Chief Lt. General Tim Keating is hardly a defining benchmark of ‘exemplary’ standards.

Actually, the admissions of relevant information, that is forthcoming only when lanced from the New Zealand Defence Force under questioning, offers the impression of a smoke and mirrors operation – it may appear churlish to suggest, but perhaps the post-Operation Burnham aftermath ought to be referred to as Operation Desert Road (bleak, cold, inhospitable, proceed with caution).

The public deserves to know the whole truth, not spin or part-truths – both the public interest and the national interest depends on it.

By the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, it appears reasonable to suggest that the commanders overseeing Operation Burnham had legal obligations to civilians; that they were potentially negligent when considered against their stated rules of engagement, rules of conduct, obligations to international human rights law and international humanitarian law – negligent of their obligations to laws covering war and armed conflict, notwithstanding their obligations as representatives of the people and Government of New Zealand to observe the Bill of Rights Act.

It is also reasonable to suggest; there are significant established facts as mentioned above, as put by the New Zealand Defence Force, that require an official investigative response from the New Zealand Government.

It is also reasonable to insist that the matter of an absence of consistent fact emitting from the New Zealand Defence Force upon which a reliable opinion can be draw, adds weight to the burden on the Government to establish an inquiry into this matter.

If the New Zealand Prime Minister Bill English elects not to act then it will likely become a matter of political leadership or lack thereof.

If Bill English does not care to act on his office’s public interest obligations, then, it is reasonable to suggest he consider the empirical facts underlying this matter and the impact the matter has on New Zealand’s national interest. Should he fail to do so, this matter potentially could be argued before the International Criminal Court.

“It seems to me,” Lt. General Tim Keating stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.” – Lieutenant General Tim Keating, March 27, 2017.

On Monday, March 27, 2017 both the Prime Minister Bill English and the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force Lieutenant General Tim Keating countered details revealed in the book Hit & Run and argued facts stated in the work could not be relied upon because the authors ‘incorrectly’ alleged Operation Burnham took place in Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village deep in the mountainous Baghlan province of Afghanistan – two locations the Defence Force chief insisted his soldiers had never been to. Lt. General Keating asserted that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to the two villages (Khak Khuday Dad and Naik) and insisted Operation Burnham took place 2.2 kilometres to the south of where the authors Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson had marked the location of the villages (specifically on a map published in the book Hit & Run).

Lt. General Keating said: “As you will note from the book, the authors have been precise in locating these villages with geo reference points — so I have no doubt they are very accurate in the villages they are taking their allegations from.

“The villages lie in the Tirgiran Valley some 2 kilometres north from Tirgiran Village. In straight distance this is like comparing the distance from Te Papa to Wellington Hospital. However, if you overlay the elevated terrain, you will see we are talking about two very separated, distinct settlements,” Lt. General Keating said.

Beyond the obvious, it was a staggering claim, especially for those aware the New Zealand Defence Force had insisted one week prior, that its official position remained the same as stated in a media release dated April 20, 2011 that: “On 22 August 2010 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements, operating as part of a Coalition Force in Bamyan province, Afghanistan conducted an operation against an insurgent group.”

NZDF’s earlier position asserted New Zealand soldiers had not been in Baghlan province on or near August 22, 2010 the night of Operation Burnham. Now, the chief of New Zealand’s armed forces was admitting that they had.

At the press conference on Monday March 27, 2017 the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force prepared to stake his claim that the book could not be relied on as a factual reference.Before around 30 journalists, Lt. General Tim Keating pointed to four relevant bullet-points underlying key claims of fact in the book:

• Helicopter landing sites
• Location of houses that were destroyed
• Locations of where civilians were allegedly killed
• Presumed location of an SAS Sniper with evidence presented of SAS ammunition and water bottles which were found at the site.

A relationship was drawn between the Sniper location and the alleged killing of the individual Islamuddin, the School teacher. He acknowledged that the book contained a detailed list of those alleged to have been killed or wounded during a military operation in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages and a detailed list of the houses destroyed at the two locations.

Lt. General Keating then drove his point home that: “The underlying premise of the book is that New Zealand’s SAS soldiers conducted an operation on Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village…” “It seems to me,” he stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.”

Lt. General Keating pivoted. “Let me now talk about the ISAF Operation Burnham in Tirgiran Village.” The premise of the Chief of Defence Force’s position was; the book Hit & Run described events that may or may not have occurred in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages, but that these alleged events had nothing to do with New Zealand Defence Force soldiers as they had never been to the two locations as marked in the book.

Likewise, the Prime Minister, Bill English, said the book got it wrong, that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to either Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village.

The Prime Minister added: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

For some, it appeared the raid that night as described by the authors could have been committed by another force. For others, it seemed the authors had got a major fact wrong so therefore the remaining claims in the book were moot.

By mid-Wednesday morning, the Government and the public found out there was more to it, that the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force was also wrong with regard to his geography.

Unpicking the official line began in earnest late on Tuesday night (March 28, 2017) when the lawyers representing the alleged victims of Operation Burnham contacted their clients back in Afghanistan. The purpose of the contact was to identify the exact location of Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village; to confirm or otherwise disprove the existence of ‘Tirgiran Village’ (the NZDF stated official location of Operation Burnham), and to identify and confirm what village or villages are located at the exact co-ordinates as provided by Lt. General Tim Keating in his briefing to New Zealand media.

The lawyers’ clients, represented by a doctor from the region, stated categorically that ‘Tirgiran Village’ (as stated by Lt. General Keating) does not exist. That the region is known as Tirgiran Valley.

The lawyers evaluated from the new information, that to refer to the location of Operation Burnham as Tirgiran Village is like insisting an operation had occurred in Otago City (obviously Otago is a region and a city of that name does not exist, and as such would fail to offer an exact point of reference on a map).

Importantly, the lawyers confirmed, New Zealand Defence Force’ co-ordinates of where Operation Burnham took place were correct – but that the location was not as the NZDF had stated as ‘Tirgiran Village’ (an incorrect reference to a village that does not exist) but rather marks the geo-locations of where Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village are located.

Specifically, the villagers confirmed the red-rectangle as marked on the NZDF map provided by the Lt. General on Monday March 27, and referred to as the area specific to Operation Burnham, frames the exact positions of where Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages are located. So simply, the book contained a map that placed Khak Khuday Dad and Naik 2.2 kilometres north of there specific real locations.

And, the NZDF got it wrong by stating that those two villages were located where the book suggested, and that the village at the centre of Operation Burnham was a different village called Tirgiran Village (again, a place-name that does not exist).

So it turns out, according to those that live in the Tirgiran Valley, the Chief of Defence Force’s statement is incorrect or false; that when NZDF stated as a categorical fact that the New Zealand SAS commandos had never been to Khak Khuday Dad Village nor Naik Village, that that information was false.

At this point politically, it’s inescapable that the Prime Minister’s stated position ought to have taken a hit.

Remember back to the Prime Minister’s statement to media on Monday March 27, 2017 where he pitched his rationale: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

Surely, the same measure that was applied to the authors of Hit & Run now ought to be applied in equal measure to the New Zealand Defence Force chief and his officials.

After all, they also got their geography wrong. Since then, there has been stated unease about the whole issue by Internal Affairs Minister Peter Dunne (the minister who would have to sign off and authorise the costs of an inquiry should the Prime Minister order an inquiry be established).

By Thursday March 30, 2017 Dunne, through media, called for an inquiry into the whole affair. (ref. Stuff.co.nz ) Also on Thursday, the Minister of Defence at the time of the raid, Dr Wayne Mapp, wrote of his unease about Operation Burnham in a piece published on the Pundit website. (ref. Pundit ) Dr Mapp argued that the Government’s position, and that of the New Zealand Defence Force, cannot be the end of it. “Part of protecting their [the SAS’] reputation is also finding out what happened, particularly if there is an allegation that civilian casualties may have been accidentally caused. In that way we both honour the soldiers, and also demonstrate to the Afghans that we hold ourselves to the highest ideals of respect of life, even in circumstances of military conflict,” wrote Dr Mapp.

Common Statements Of Fact

The descriptions of Operation Burnham, in both the book, and, as stated by the New Zealand Defence Force, do mirror each account with precision on numerous vital points, including:

• The time of night Operation Burnham took place
• That New Zealand Defence Force was commanding and leading the operation (both on the ground and in the air)
• That the helicopters were manned by United States military personnel under New Zealand’s command
• That the purpose of the operation was to kill or capture those named as having been part of a Taliban insurgent raid that killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell
• That buildings were destroyed during the operation
• That people were killed at the villages.

However, anyone who has reasonably assessed the issue can see there is much more information to be revealed.

Conclusion: In concluding this analysis, it is an imperative that due to the highest levels of public and national interest concerning the alleged conduct, the seriousness of allegations, and the variables relating to the official account, that the matter be subjected to an independent commission of inquiry.