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By Danny Shaw
From NY

The human rights group Indepaz reports that 800 activists have been killed in the past three and a half years in Colombia, since November 24, 2016, the date the government signed “the Peace Accord” with the FARC.^[1] Taking advantage of society’s fear and distraction, and the demobilization caused by the novel coronavirus, state and paramilitary actors have intensified their violence against organizers and their communities. Human rights activists refer to themselves as “sitting ducks,” explaining that they are pinned down by the pandemic and cannot as easily flee and hide from the forces of repression.^[2]

While state and non-state military actors are notorious for violence in Colombia, the police are also guilty of human rights crimes. On May 19, Anderson Arboleda, a 21-year-old Afro-Colombian was beaten to death by the police for supposedly “violating the quarantine” in the Pacific department of Cauca.^[3] The police killing of Arboleda — which many compare to the Minneapolis Police Department murder of George Floyd — was not an isolated act. Journalists have found that black and indigenous Colombians have suffered the highest rates of institutional discrimination and police violence.^[4]

Human Rights Watch conducted an investigation into Colombian police violations of the rights of peaceful protesters the past year as hundreds of thousands of Colombians took to the streets against budget cuts and political assassinations. They found 72 cases of extreme police brutality. No officer was ever held responsible.^[5] One of these cases was that of 17-year old Dilan Cruz. On November 23, Cruz was at a protest when he was killed by the Escuadrón Móvil Antidisturbios (the ESMAD or Mobile Riot Squad) which fired live ammunition at him from a close distance.

COVID-19: double down crisis on poor Colombians

Colombia now has more than 71,000 cases of COVID-19 and has experienced 2,300 deaths.^[6] In Latin America, Colombia trails only Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico in terms of the total number of cases and deaths from COVID-19.^[7] At El Cumbe Internacional Antiimperialista, Afrodescendiente y Africano (The International Gathering Ground of Antiimperialists, Afro-descendents and Africans) on June 14th, former Colombian senator and lawyer Piedad Córdoba stated: “COVID-19 lays bare the moral, medical and political infrastructure of our country, especially in the poorer Afro-Colombian regions of the Pacific and the Caribbean. Our people have been the most beaten down by the pandemic.”^[8] Senator Córdoba went on to speak about the “hurtful image of a young Black man from Quibdó in the Pacific department of Choco who died on a stretcher in front of a hospital without receiving care for the coronavirus.”^[9]

Despite this unprecedented public health crisis, president Iván Duque and his government seem to be more concerned with suppressing the freedom of speech of activists, criminalizing  resistance and encircling its neighbor Venezuela than seriously confronting the pandemic.

War as state strategy

The negotiations in Havana, Cuba from 2012 to 2016 resulted in a historic peace deal meant to end a 50-year war that cost over 220,000 lives and left 7 million displaced.^[10] The centrist presidency of Juan Manuel Santos received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2016 for his role in the negotiations, though none of the peasant organizations on the other side of the war who endured decades of displacement, torture and death were ever mentioned as a candidate for the  prize or in the ceremony. The government promised a Truth and Reconciliation Committee, land reform, reintegration of former guerrilla fighters, demilitarization of the conflict zones and political openings for the left. The June 2018 electoral victory of Iván Duque, a protégé of far right wing Alvaro Uribe, spelt immediate doom for the Havana peace accords. The government reneged on all of its promises and the areas where the FARC once commanded saw the highest rise in politically-motivated assassinations.^[11] According to the United Nations, more than 170 former fighters have been murdered since the peace deal was signed.^[12]

In response to these charges, Duque and the Colombian media dismissed the FARC dissidents as “narco terrorists,” despite their legitimate status as demobilized non-belligerents.^[13]

Analyst, surgeon and the founder of Pueblos en Camino (The People in Motion), Manuel Rozental explains that the rich in Colombia do not want the military conflict to end because war has always been their cover for appropriating land and resources.^[14] Colombian elites and transnationals, such as British Petroleum, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Exxon Mobil, Coca Cola, Drummond and hundreds of others, use the war as a pretext to clamp down on social movements across Colombia.^[15] War is their strategy to displace and dispossess. Any peasant or social organizations who stand in their way can easily be dismissed as coercive or criminal elements. Joel Villamizar is one example. Villamizar was a leader of La Asociación de Autoridades Tradicionales y Cabildos U’wa – ASOU’WA. When he was ambushed and murdered earlier this year the media and authorities simply dismissed him as a guerilla terrorist.^[16]

“A War on Drugs?” or a “War on Sovereignty”?

According to all reputable data, Colombia is the main supplier of cocaine in the world and the U.S. is the main consumer.^[17] The U.S. allegations that Nicolás Maduro oversees a narco government are politically motivated and not backed up by facts on the ground. Approximately 70 percent of cocaine that arrives in the U.S. comes from Colombia via different supply routes, many through the Pacific ocean.^[18] The U.S. Navy is surrounding and blockading Venezuela, not to stop the flow of cocaine into the streets of the U.S., but rather to stop the progress of the Bolivarian process.

It is also worth pointing out that the drug epidemic in the U.S. is not caused principally by cocaine but rather by opioids, many of which are legally prescribed by doctors. According to the Center for Disease Control, over 70 percent of the 67,000 overdoses in 2018 were from opioids.^[19]

On March 26th, Attorney General William Barr formerly accused the Venezuelan government of “narco terrorism” without even clarifying which drugs are killing Americans and where they come from.^[20] This spoke to the political motivations behind the claims which were really trumped up charges designed to provide the legalese to ratchet up the war on Venezuela. Meanwhile, Washington takes no action against the government of Honduras, accused by even U.S. courts of being involved in drug related crimes, including Juan Orlando Hernández’s family and the president himself.^[21]

The US Navy sent ships to further blockade Venezuela’s Caribbean coast on April 1^[22] and the Southern Command deployed 800 more special force soldiers to Colombia on June 1.^[23] This ignited a national debate in Colombia about the question of sovereignty. The Colombian Congress never agreed to allow foreign soldiers into their homeland.^[24] Aida Avella, senator of the Patriotic Union party, stated: “The U.S. military cannot enter Colombian territory above Congress to advise the fight against drug trafficking. We reject the use of the country for wars and invasions of other countries.”^[25] Lenín Moreno ceded “a new airstrip” in the Galápagos Islands of Ecuador for use by the U.S. military.^[26] The U.S. military currently has nine bases in Colombia, twelve in Panama and 76 total in Latin America.^[27] The US has deployed between 500 and 1,500 troops to Soto Cano air base in Honduras under the guise of humanitarian and drug-fighting operations.^[28] There is also some evidence that the Colombian military may have supported the mercenaries who trained in Colombia before launching incursions into Venezuela in early May in a botched attempt to capture the Venezuelan president.^[29]

Resistance is everywhere

Distrustful of the government’s commitments, thousands of government opponents have returned to the mountains or sprawling slums of Colombia’s cities.^[30] Calling for a second Marquetalia Republic, in reference to the autonomous zones armed peasants held after La Violencia in 1948, rebel commanders like Iván Marquez and Jesús Santrech and their soldiers have taken back to the mountains.

Not all social actors embrace this strategy however. Warning that war is a trap, social movements drafted a letter to the FARC discouraging them from playing into the hands of the state. Around 70 percent of all casualties in the 50-year and running civil war have been civilians.^[31]

In an interview on June 16 with Colombia’s Caracol Radio, representative of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) ^[32] and the head of the Dialogue Delegation of the guerilla army, Pablo Beltrán, explained their perspective. Beltrán said the ELN desires a cease fire but not as long as Duque brings in more U.S. soldiers, making a clash with those troops inevitable in Norte de Santander and Arauca on the border with Venezuela. The ELN has expressed that the priority should be alleviating poverty and keeping people safe from the coronavirus.

As the coronavirus impacts the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of Colombian society, there is little trust that Trump’s faithful partner, the notorious anti-Bolivarian Iván Duque, will respond in a comprehensive way to the health and economic needs of the population. Three national strikes convulsed Colombia between November and December last year because of the neoliberal cuts implemented by Duque. Unable to resolve the needs of their own population, the Colombian elites participate in the destabilization of one of its neighbors. The external and internal contradictions of Colombian society continue to sharpen, promising the playing out of a 50-year national liberation struggle Washington has always feared and sought to contain.

[Main photo: Colombian and US military personnel, in a joint program in Riohacha, Colombia. Credit: US Navy, open license]

End notes

^[1] “Colombia: How armed gangs are using lockdown to target activists,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52661457

^[2] “Colombia: How armed gangs are using lockdown to target activists,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52661457

^[3] “Indignación en Colombia por un caso similar al de George Floyd: un joven negro murió tras una golpiza policial”, https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2020/06/04/indignacion-en-colombia-por-un-caso-similar-al-de-george-floyd-un-joven-negro-murio-tras-una-golpiza-policial/ Translated into English by Danny Shaw

^[4] “Muerte de George Floyd: cuál es la situación de la población negra en América Latina (y el parecido a la de EE.UU.)”, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52969557

^[5] “Colombia: Abusos policiales en el contexto de manifestaciones multitudinarias”, https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2020/03/10/colombia-abusos-policiales-en-el-contexto-de-manifestaciones-multitudinarias

^[6] Worldometers.info, by June 22nd 2020, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/colombia/

^[7] “Where Is the Coronavirus in Latin America?,” https://www.as-coa.org/articles/where-coronavirus-latin-america

^[8] “Afro-Respuestas Frente al Racismo y El COVID-19,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oq02CUZj2tc&t=7090s (2:30:30)

^[9] “Video: hombre sospechoso de covid-19 murió en plena calle de Quibdó,” https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/video-del-hombre-que-murio-de-coronavirus-en-plena-calle-de-quibdo-choco-506612

^[10] “Colombia’s President ‘Wants War,’ FARC Dissidents Comply,” https://therealnews.com/stories/colombias-president-wants-war-farc-dissidents-comply

^[11] “The Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Movement,” https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/colombia-peace-farc/604078/

^[12] “FARC killings a challenge to peace, but some criticism political: Colombian official,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/farc-killings-a-challenge-to-peace-but-some-criticism-political-colombian-official-idUSKBN1ZX2QD

^[13] “Colombia Farc rebels: President vows to hunt down new group,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49516660

^[14] “Colombia’s President “Wants War,” FARC Dissidents Comply,” https://therealnews.com/stories/colombias-president-wants-war-farc-dissidents-comply

^[15] “Global Reach: US Corporate Interests in Colombia,” https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/colombia/corporate.html

^[16] “Asesinan a dirigente indígena colombiano en Norte de Santander”, https://www.telesurtv.net/news/asesinan-dirigente-indigena-colombiano-norte-santander-20200601-0021.html

^[17] “Colombia coca crop: Trump tells Duque to resume spraying,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51722456

^[18] “What Lockdown? World’s Cocaine Traffickers Sniff at Movement Restrictions,” https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/world-cocaine-traffickers-lockdown/#

^[19] “Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Opioid Overdose,” https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/index.html

^[20] “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Criminal Charges against Venezuelan Officials,” https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing-criminal

^[21] “US prosecutors tie Honduras president to drug trafficker,” https://apnews.com/e85a0f7b43264a5eb6b879701356e1f3

^[22] “Trump: US to Deploy Anti-Drug Navy Ships Near Venezuela,” https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2020-04-01/ap-sources-us-to-deploy-anti-drug-ships-near-venezuela

^[23] “US soldiers arrive in Colombia under widespread criticism,”

https://www.plenglish.com/index.php?o=rn&id=56269&SEO=us-soldiers-arrive-in-colombia-under-widespread-criticism

^[24] “Colombian Political Figures, Activists Reject US Troops’ Arrival,” https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Colombian-Political-Figures-Activists-Reject-US-Troops-Arrival-20200531-0007.html

^[25] “Colombian Political Figures, Activists Reject US Troops’ Arrival,” https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Colombian-Political-Figures-Activists-Reject-US-Troops-Arrival-20200531-0007.html

^[26] “Galapagos Islands will not host US military base, Ecuador president says,” https://www.thedefensepost.com/2019/06/19/galapagos-islands-us-military-base-ecuador/

^[27] “U.S. military presence in Latin America & the Caribbean,” http://en.granma.cu/mundo/2018-08-15/us-military-presence-in-latin-america-the-caribbean and “Bases militares de EE.UU. en América Latina y el Caribe. El Plan Suramérica”,

http://www.granma.cu/mundo/2018-08-09/bases-militares-de-eeuu-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe-el-plan-suramerica-09-08-2018-17-08-04

^[28] “Deep in the mountains of Honduras, few know what this US military task force does,” https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/08/12/deep-in-the-mountains-of-honduras-few-know-what-this-us-military-task-force-does/

^[29] “Venezuela seizes empty Colombian combat boats days after failed invasion plot,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/10/venezuela-seizes-empty-colombian-combat-boats-days-after-failed-invasion-plot and “Venezuela: captured US mercenary claims he planned to abduct Maduro,”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/06/venezuela-maduro-abduction-plot-luke-denman-americans-captured

^[30] “Many Of Colombia’s Ex-Rebel Fighters Rearm And Turn To Illegal Drug Trade,” https://www.npr.org/2020/05/19/855567659/many-of-colombias-ex-rebel-fighters-rearm-and-turn-to-illegal-drug-trade

^[31] “Colombia Farc rebels: President vows to hunt down new group,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49516660

^[32] “Colombia. Pablo Beltrán (ELN): ‘Es muy probable que haya enfrentamientos armados con las tropas de EE.UU.’”, https://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2020/06/17/colombia-pablo-beltran-eln-es-muy-probable-que-haya-confrontamientos-armados-con-las-tropas-de-ee-uu/

Book Review
By John Perry
From Nicaragua

Who Killed Berta Cáceres?: Dams, Death Squads, and an Indigenous Defender’s Battle for the Planet, by Nina Lakhani.  Verso, 2020. 336 pp.

“They build dams and kill people.” These words, spoken by a witness when the murderers of environmental defender Berta Cáceres were brought to trial in Honduras, describe Desarrollos Energéticos SA (DESA), the company whose dam project Berta opposed. DESA was created in May 2009 solely to build the Agua Zarca hydroelectric scheme, using the waters of the Gualcarque River, regarded as sacred by the Lenca communities who live on its banks. As Nina Lakhani makes clear in her book Who Killed Berta Cáceres?,^[1] DESA was one of many companies to benefit from the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras, when the left-leaning President Manuel Zelaya was deposed and replaced by a sequence of corrupt administrations. The president of DESA and its head of security were both US-trained former Honduran military officers, schooled in counterinsurgency. By 2010, despite having no track record of building dams, DESA had already obtained the permits it needed to produce and sell electricity, and by 2011, with no local consultation, it had received its environmental licence.

Much of Honduras’s corruption derives from the drug trade, leading last year to  being labelled a narco-state^[2] in which (according to the prosecution in a US court case against the current president’s brother) drug traffickers “infiltrated the Honduran government and they controlled it.”^[3] But equally devastating for many rural communities has been the government’s embrace of extractivism – an economic model that sees the future of countries like Honduras (and the future wealth of their elites) in the plundering and export of its natural resources.^[4] Mega-projects that produce energy, mine gold and other minerals, or convert forests to palm-oil plantations, are being opposed by activists who, like Cáceres, have been killed or are under threat. Lakhani quotes a high-ranking judge she spoke to, sacked for denouncing the 2009 coup, as saying that Zelaya was deposed precisely because he stood in the way of this economic model and the roll-out of extractive industries that it required.

The coup “unleashed a tsunami of environmentally destructive ‘development’ projects as the new regime set about seizing resource-rich territories.”^[5] After the post-coup elections, the then president Porfirio Lobo declared Honduras open for business, aiming to “relaunch Honduras as the most attractive investment destination in Latin America.” ^[6] Over eight years, almost 200 mining projects were approved. Cáceres received a leaked list of rivers, including the Gualcarque, that were to be secretly “sold off” to produce hydroelectricity. The Honduran congress went on to approve dozens of such projects without any consultation with affected communities. Berta’s campaign to defend the rivers began on July 26, 2011 when she led the Lenca-based COPINH (“Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras”) in a march on the presidential palace. As a result, Lobo met Cáceres and promised there would be consultations before projects began – a promise he never kept.

Lakhani’s book gives us an insight into the personal history that brought Berta Cáceres to this point. She came from a family of political activists. As a teenager she read books on Marxism and the Cuban revolution. But Honduras is unlike its three neighbouring countries where there were strong revolutionary movements in the 1970s and 1980s. The US had already been granted free rein in Honduras in exchange for “dollars, training in torture-based interrogation methods, and silence.”^[7] It was a country the US could count on, having used it in the 1980s as the base for its “Contra” war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Its elite governing class, dominated by rich families from Eastern Europe and the Middle East,  was also unusual. One, the Atala Zablah family, became the financial backers of the dam; others, such as Miguel Facussé Barjum, with his palm oil plantations in the Bajo Aguán, backed other exploitative projects.

At the age of only 18, looking for political inspiration and action, Berta left Honduras and went with her future husband Salvador Zúñiga to neighbouring El Salvador. She joined the FMLN guerrilla movement and spent months fighting against the US-supported right-wing government. Zúñiga describes her as having been “strong and fearless” even when the unit they were in came under attack. But in an important sense, her strong political convictions were tempered by the fighting: she resolved that “whatever we did in Honduras, it would be without guns.”^[8]

Inspired also by the Zapatista struggle in Mexico and by Guatemala’s feminist leader Rigoberta Menchú, Berta and Salvador created COPINH in 1993 to demand indigenous rights for the Lenca people, organising their first march on the capital Tegucigalpa in 1994. From this point Berta began to learn of the experiences of Honduras’s other indigenous groups, especially the Garífuna on its northern coast, and saw how they fitted within a pattern repeated across Latin America. As Lakhani says, “she always understood local struggles in political and geopolitical terms.”^[9] By 2001 she was speaking at international conferences challenging the neo-liberal economic model, basing her arguments on the exploitation experienced by the Honduran communities she now knew well. She warned of an impending “death sentence” for the Lenca people, tragically foreseeing the fate of herself and other Lenca leaders. Mexican activist Gustavo Castro, later to be targeted alongside her, said “Berta helped make Honduras visible. Until then, its social movement, political struggles and resistance were largely unknown to the rest of the region.”^[10]

In Río Blanco, where the Lenca community voted 401 to 7 against the dam, COPINH’s struggle continued. By 2013, the community seemed close to winning, at the cost of activists being killed or injured by soldiers guarding the construction. They had blocked the access road to the site for a whole year and the Chinese engineering firm had given up its contract. The World Bank allegedly pulled its funding, although Lakhani shows that its money later went back into the project via a bank owned by the Atala Faraj family. In April 2015 Berta was awarded the Goldman Prize^[11] for her “grassroots campaign that successfully pressured the world’s largest dam builder to pull out of the Agua Zarca Dam.”^[12]

Then in July 2015, DESA decided to go ahead by itself. Peaceful protests were met by violent repression and bulldozers demolished settlements. Threats against the leaders, and Berta in particular, increased. Protective measures granted to her by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights were never properly implemented. On February 20 2016, a peaceful march was stopped and 100 protesters were detained by DESA guards. On February 25, 50 families had to watch the demolition of their houses in the community of La Jarcia.

The horrific events on the night of Wednesday March 2 are retold by Nina Lakhani. Armed men burst through the back door of Berta’s house and shot her. They also injured Gustavo Castro, who was visiting Berta; he waited until the men had left, found her, and she died in his arms. Early the following morning, police and army officers arrived, dealing aggressively with the family and community members who were waiting to speak to them. Attempted robbery, a jilted lover and rivalry within COPINH were all considered as motives for the crime. Eventually, investigators turned their attention to those who had threatened to kill her in the preceding months. By the first anniversary of Berta’s death the stuttering investigation had led to eight arrests, but the people who ordered the murder were still enjoying impunity. Some of the accused were connected to the military, which was not surprising since Lakhani later revealed in a report for The Guardian that she had uncovered a military hit list with Berta’s name on it.^[13] In the book she reports that the ex-soldier who told her about it is still in hiding: he had seen not only the list but also one of the secret torture centers maintained by the military.

Nina Lakhani is a brave reporter. She had to be. Since the coup in Honduras, 83 journalists have been killed; 21 were thrown in prison during the period when Lakhani was writing her book.^[14] She poses the question “would we ever know who killed Berta Cáceres?” and sets out to answer it. Despite her diligent and often risky investigation, she can only give a partial answer. Those arrested and since convicted almost certainly include the hitmen who carried out the murder, but it is far from the clear that the intellectual authors of the crime have been caught. In 2017 Lakhani interviewed or attempted to interview all eight of those imprisoned and awaiting trial, casting a sometimes-sympathetic light on their likely involvement and why they took part.

It took almost two years before one of the crime’s likely instigators, David Castillo, the president of DESA, was arrested. Lakhani heads back to prison to interview him, too, and finds that Castillo disquietingly thinks she is the reason he’s in prison. “There is no way I am ever sitting down to talk to her,” he says to the guard.^[15] Nevertheless they talk, with Castillo both denying his involvement in the murder and accusing Lakhani of implicating him. Afterwards she takes “a big breath” and writes down what he’s said.

In September 2018, the murder case finally went to trial, and Lakhani is at court to hear it, but the hearing is suspended. On the same day she starts to receive threats, reported in London’s Press Gazette^[16] and duly receiving international attention. Not surprisingly she sees this as an attempt to intimidate her into not covering the trial. Nevertheless, when it reopens on October 25, she is there.

The trial reveals a weird mix of diligent police work and careful forensic evidence, together with the investigation’s obvious gaps. Not the least of these was the absence of Gustavo Castro, the only witness, whose return to Honduras was obstructed by the attorney general’s office. Castillo, though by then charged with masterminding the murder, was not part of the trial. Most of the evidence was not made public or even revealed to the accused. The Cáceres family’s lawyers were denied a part in the trial.

“The who did what, why and how was missing,” says Lakhani, “until we got the phone evidence which was the game changer.”^[17] The phone evidence benefitted from an expert witness who explained in detail how it implicated the accused. She revealed that an earlier plan to carry out the murder in February was postponed. She showed the positions of the accused on the night in the following month when Berta was killed. She also made clear that members of the Atala family were involved.

When the verdict was delivered on November 29 2018, seven of the eight accused were found guilty, but it wasn’t until December 2019 that they were given long sentences. That’s where Nina Lakhani’s story ends. By then Honduras had endured a fraudulent election, its president’s brother had been found guilty of drug running in the US, and tens of thousands of Hondurans were heading north in migrant caravans. David Castillo hasn’t yet been brought to trial, and last year was accused by the School of Americas Watch of involvement in a wider range of crimes.^[18] Lakhani revealed in The Guardian that he owns a luxury home in Texas.^[19] He’s in preventative detention, but according to COPINH enjoys “VIP” conditions and may well be released because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Two of those already imprisoned may also be released. Daniel Atala Midence, accused by COPINH of being a key intellectual author of the crime as DESA’s chief financial officer, has never been indicted.^[20]

The Agua Zarca dam project has not been officially cancelled although DESA’s phone number and email address are no longer in service.^[21] Other environmentally disastrous projects continue to face opposition by COPINH and its sister organisations representing different Honduran communities. And a full answer to the question “Who Killed Berta Cáceres?” is still awaited.

End notes

^[1] Lakhani, N. (2020) Who Killed Berta Cáceres? Dams, Death Squads, and an Indigenous Defender’s Battle for the Planet. London: Verso.

^[2] “The Hernández Brothers,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2019/october/the-hernandez-brothers

^[3] “Honduran President’s Brother Is Found Guilty of Drug Trafficking,” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/americas/honduras-president-brother-drug-trafficking.html

^[4] “Murder in Honduras,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2017/march/murder-in-honduras

^[5] Lakhani, op.cit., p.89.

^[6] “Honduras, open for business,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2011/may/honduras-open-for-business

^[7] Lakhani, op.cit., p.24.

^[8] Quoted by Lakhani, op.cit., p.35.

^[9] Lakhani, op.cit., p.44.

^[10] Lakhani, op.cit., p.56.

^[11] The Goldman Prize is sometimes described as the “Nobel Prize” for environmental and human rights defenders. See http://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/berta-caceres/

^[12] “Introducing the 2015 Goldman Prize Winners,” https://www.goldmanprize.org/blog/introducing-the-2015-goldman-environmental-prize-winners/

^[13] “Berta Cáceres’s name was on Honduran military hitlist, says former soldier,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/berta-caceres-name-honduran-military-hitlist-former-soldier

^[14] “Entre balas y cárcel: 35 periodistas exiliados en tres años,” https://www.reporterosdeinvestigacion.com/2020/05/23/entre-balas-y-carcel-la-prensa-hondurena/

^[15] Lakhani, op.cit., p.219.

^[16] “Guardian stringer covering notorious Honduras murder trial shares safety fears amid online smear campaign,” https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/guardian-stringer-covering-notorious-honduras-murder-trial-shares-safety-fears-amid-online-smear-campaign/

^[17] Lakhani, op.cit., p.252.

^[18] “Violence, Corruption & Impunity in the Honduran Energy Industry: A profile of Roberto David Castillo Mejía,” http://www.soaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Violence-Corruption-Impunity-A-Profile-of-Roberto-David-Castillo.pdf

^[19] “Family of slain Honduran activist appeal to US court for help in her murder trial,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/31/berta-caceres-murder-trial-subpoena-david-castillo

^[20] See COPINH’s web page on the aftermath of the Berta Cáceres trial, https://copinh.org/2020/05/actualizacion-causa-berta-caceres-2/; see also “Indígenas piden acusación penal contra Daniel Atala como supuesto «asesino intelectual» de Berta Cáceres,” https://www.reporterosdeinvestigacion.com/2020/05/15/indigenas-piden-acusacion-penal-contra-daniel-atala-como-supuesto-asesino-intelectual-de-berta-caceres/

^[21] “Inside the Plot to Murder Honduran Activist Berta Cáceres,” https://theintercept.com/2019/12/21/berta-caceres-murder-plot-honduras/

By Patricio Zamorano
From Washington DC

Now that we have had a few days to study the failed, illegal paramilitary incursion by a group of American and Venezuelan mercenaries into Venezuela, some key details have emerged in this incredible story. They reveal the internal dynamics of the country’s fractured, demoralized, and financially corrupt opposition. Much of the information was provided by the former U.S. soldier Jordan Goudreau, hired for “Operation Gideon” by Juan Guidó himself along with advisors Sergio Vergara, Juan José Rendón, and with the advice of attorney Manuel Retureta, all of them who signed the service plan to launch the paramilitary operation (called “General Services Agreement”).

A dozen paramilitaries were captured from Sunday May 3 to Monday May 4 in the coastal area of La Guaira and Chuao^[1] with the help of fishermen. They include deserters from Venezuela’s armed forces and police, along with former U.S. soldiers. Eight of the mercenaries were killed by the country’s security forces.^[2]

The trove of evidence makes it impossible for Guaidó and his advisors to deny their involvement in the contract for services. Not only are copies of the 8-pages General Services Agreement circulating on the internet,^[3] there is also a recording of their phone conversation while they were signing it.^[4]

A multi-million dollar contract

U.S. mercenary Jordan Goudreau, owner of Florida Silvercorp USA Inc, which has been around for two years, is revealing all the inside information for the simple reason that Guaidó never paid the agreed upon fee, including a retainer of $US1.5 million. He claims that he only received US$50,000^[5] through Rendón.

A native Canadian, Goudreau is a U.S. Army combat veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan. According to his simple website that centers around his personal image, Jordan Goudreau “has also planned and led international security teams for the President of the United States as well as the Secretary of Defense.”^[6] According to a profile AP wrote about him,^[7] that claim seems to be an exaggeration of his friendly relationship with Keith Schiller, who served as chief of security and bodyguard to Trump. Several interviews conducted by AP of people close to the mercenary suggest that Goudreau is politically naive, impulsive, and harbors delusions of grandeur.

Airing it all out in public

From all the extensive videotaped interviews of Goudreau, it is apparent that on the heels of a failed operation fraught with incompetence and which resulted in the deaths of several mercenaries, the soldier of fortune is rushing to reveal all to the world press in order to redirect blame towards Juan Guaidó. It is also clear that his public statements are motivated by the fact that his fees were not paid and he has no obligation to maintain confidentiality, because “At this point the contract has been completely fractured and nothing has been upheld on the side of the opposition (…) I have done everything that the contract outlines.”^[8]

The actual contract has over 70 pages according to Goudreau. The shorter General Services Agreement promises Silvercorp payment of over US$200 million^[9] for overthrowing the government of Nicolás Maduro. According to the contractor, the money comes from the ample funds the U.S. has illegally confiscated from the Citgo oil company, owned by the Venezuelan State, and which has been transferred to Guaidó’s account.^[10] Goudreau also cited the Rio Treaty (The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, TIAR) as justification for the operation, which is the agreement the Venezuelan opposition has fruitlessly been trying to invoke in the Organization of American States (OAS) to spur military action against Venezuela.^[11]

Goudreau criticizes Guaidó on moral grounds

The mercenary also questioned Guaidó’s character:

“They hurt us more than they helped us. At the beginning they said they were going to help us. You have these guys with access to millions of dollars. They were given 90 million dollars, 9 million of which were allocated towards defense. Look, they are going to deny all this. They knew there were guys in the frontier. You have 60 Venezuelans who were hungry, training, thinking about liberation, and they went and did it. Meanwhile your opposition government is making tons of money. I think there is a problem.” When asked why he thinks Guaidó withdrew support for the attack, Goudreau added, “I think there is a lot of money involved right now. When people are making money, they are comfortable. I don’t think there is a real incentive to free” the country.^[12]

The opposition’s growing disenchantment with Guaidó

Despite all the evidence against him, particularly the contractor’s complaints of non-payment and his apparent signature on the contract for services, the self-proclaimed president of Venezuela was quick to deny any involvement with the paramilitary operation.^[13]

All of these revelations have two implications. First, they confirm the continuous charges made by the Maduro administration in recent years of the existence of a real paramilitary threat coming from Colombian soil.^[14] Second, it drives a wedge of criticism among many in the opposition, particularly in the U.S., who have been coming down hard on Guaidó for abandoning the former Venezuelan military officers.^[15] Even the journalist who interviewed Goudreau on video, Patricia Poleo, who is against the Chavista Maduro government, is being harshly criticized by the most extremist elements of the opposition.^[16]

Criticism and scandal are familiar themes. This case is reminiscent of the abandonment of dozens of Venezuelan military deserters in Colombia, some with their families, after the frustrated fake “humanitarian aid” operation that was staged in February 2019 along the Colombian-Venezuelan border. On that occasion it came to light, and was confirmed by the Colombian intelligence services, that Guaidó’s team stole thousands of dollars that had been raised for that campaign. The Venezuelan deserters who were inspired by the opposition were abandoned in unpaid hotel rooms.^[17]

The opposition is clearly willing to use paramilitary violence

This case proves several fundamental points: That Guaidó is handling large sums of money; his constant attacks on the Venezuelan government are to limited effect; and he has not managed to break the unity of the Venezuelan military. It is also clear that he is financing semi-clandestine private activities, with nothing to show for it so far. And he is willing to hire mercenary forces to launch adventurous military attacks that risk the lives of the participants and of civilians in Colombia and Venezuela.

While the moderate opposition forces continue to engage in talks with the government of Nicolás Maduro, an increasingly isolated hard-line faction continues in its efforts to uphold the U.S. sanctions, to validate foreign military intervention, and to launch paramilitary attacks.

It is also clear that incompetence and low morale are having a significant impact on the extremist opposition in Venezuela, which for some unknown reason, abandoned the group of mercenaries at the start of their attack on this Caribbean nation. The case is like so many such operations in the history of U.S. intervention in Latin America, when groups of mercenaries are abandoned at the last minute for reasons of political pragmatism, realistic military calculations predicting failure, money grabbing scandals, or simple military incompetence.

Leaving obvious clues: operational naiveté and the end of Guaidó

All of the recent scandals surrounding Guaidó have led to a significant withering of his support. There has been clear disappointment in his lack of results, while all the hundreds of millions of dollars the U.S. government has placed at the shadow government’s disposal have not paid off. It also shows that Guaidó is politically immature and inept, leaving such clear traces as a mercenary services contract signed in his handwriting at a law firm that cannot refute the legal evidence.

There is no doubt that this marks the beginning of the end of Guaidó’s influence with the hard liner sector of the  Venezuelan opposition and could perhaps bolster the position of the moderates who prefer a political solution over sanctions, violence, and outside intervention. This unfunded, ill-prepared military attack fraught with errors cost human lives—about eight soldiers perished, many of them young former soldiers and police officers shown on the videos of the ex-military fighters before the attack began.^[18] All those who plotted to support or abandon this military action bear the blame.

The words of Jordan Goudreau leave no doubt about what much of the opposition is feeling now, after the failure of this pseudo-military adventure: “I have been a freedom fighter my whole life. I fought in Iraq, in Afghanistan, I am a decorated soldier. I have been shot at. But I have never ever in my life seen the back stabbing and the level of complete disregard for men in the field.”

This article was translated from the original in Spanish by Jill Clark-Gollub, COHA Assistant Editor/Translator.

End Notes

^[1] “Hijo de Raúl Baduel se encuentra entre los detenidos en la embarcación de Chuao”,

https://www.elnacional.com/venezuela/hijo-de-raul-baduel-se-encuentra-entre-los-detenidos-en-la-embarcacion-de-chuao/

^[2] “Ocho paramilitares fallecidos en incursión frustrada por La Guaira desde Colombia”, http://www.avn.info.ve/node/481798

^[3] Ver varias fuentes: https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14861, https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EXImw1yWkAA1a2B?format=jpg&name=medium, https://dialogosdelsur.operamundi.uol.com.br/america-latina/64517/venezuela-revelan-el-contrato-firmado-por-guaido-para-ejecutar-golpe-de-estado

^[4] “Jordan Goudreau’s telephone conversation with Juan Guaidó, prior signed contract”, https://anoncandanga.com/jordan-goudreaus-telephone-conversation-with-juan-guaido-prior-signed-contract/

^[5] “Ex-Green Beret Says Attempt to Oust Maduro Ongoing After Setback”, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ex-green-beret-says-plan-to-oust-venezuela-e2-80-99s-maduro-is-ongoing/ar-BB13AKhH

^[6] https://www.silvercorpusa.com/about-jordan-goudreau

^[7] “Ex-Green Beret led failed attempt to oust Venezuela’s Maduro,” https://apnews.com/79346b4e428676424c0e5669c80fc310

^[8] “PRUEBA DE QUE GUAIDÓ FIRMÓ EL CONTRATO”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-L2VQPnZMI

^[9]“Venezuela: revelan el contrato firmado por Guaidó para ejecutar golpe de Estado”, https://dialogosdelsur.operamundi.uol.com.br/america-latina/64517/venezuela-revelan-el-contrato-firmado-por-guaido-para-ejecutar-golpe-de-estado

^[10] “Venezuela.- El ex boina verde acusado de la incursión naval en Venezuela dice que el plan contra Maduro sigue en marcha”, https://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-venezuela-ex-boina-verde-acusado-incursion-naval-venezuela-dice-plan-contra-maduro-sigue-marcha-20200505120944.html

^[11] “PRUEBA DE QUE GUAIDÓ FIRMÓ EL CONTRATO”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-L2VQPnZMI

^[12] “CÓMO IMPIDIÓ GUAIDÓ LA SALIDA DE MADURO | EXCLUSIVA OPERACIÓN GEDEON”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGsao-iBZGk

^[13] “Guaidó niega vínculos con intento de invasión en Venezuela”, https://www.chicagotribune.com/espanol/sns-es-coronavirus-guaido-niega-vinculo-intento-invasion-venezuela-20200505-uiditc4i6nbdda3nyx24n26zee-story.html

^[14] “Acusación de “campamento paramilitar” de Venezuela a Colombia”, https://www.trt.net.tr/espanol/espana-y-america-latina/2019/09/01/acusacion-de-campamento-paramilitar-de-venezuela-a-colombia-1261825

^[15] “VIDEOS EXCLUSIVOS | Preparativos Operación GEDEÓN”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJGudB6zJv4

^[16] “Patricia Poleo RESPONDE | Entrevista de Alejandro Marcano”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJ_p6ZyS7Pg&t=1s

^[17] “Guaidó’s Star Fades as his Envoys to Colombia Allegedly Commit Fraud with Humanitarian Funds for Venezuela”,  http://www.coha.org/guaidos-star-fades-as-his-envoys-to-colombia-allegedly-commit-fraud-with-humanitarian-funds-for-venezuela/

^[18] “VIDEOS EXCLUSIVOS | Preparativos Operación GEDEÓN”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJGudB6zJv4&t=549s

By John Perry
From Masaya, Nicaragua

“He’s not a doctor, I don’t think.” Trump had just finished a phone call with Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH), the de facto president of Honduras who runs a  narco-state^[1]. On April 30, JOH was indirectly implicated in drug and murder charges by the US Justice Department^[2] in a case against a former chief police officer. This is merely the latest of several cases in which he is alleged to be involved, that include drug trafficking and money laundering^[3],  as well as  protection of drug dealers^[4]. The criminal charges have also affected his close family, among them his brother^[5], including connections of both siblings with famous narco-dealer El Chapo^[6]. His sister, Hilda Hernández, was also under investigation^[7] in Honduras for embezzlement of public funds^[8], at the time she died in a helicopter accident.

But as he is also the latest person to support Trump’s controversial views on the use of the antimalarial drug, hydroxychloroquine to fight the coronavirus, he appears to hold a special place among Washington’s closest allies in the region. JOH, it appears, had called to thank him, Trump said, perhaps for medical supplies which the US had sent to Honduras.^[9]

While the US props up the regime, public order in Honduras is nearing collapse. It faces the epidemic with a health and social security system that has been drained of resources, both through rampant corruption^[10] and because the government prioritises spending on the security forces. When 2,600 of the demoralised medical staff were chosen to tackle the virus, a quarter of them resigned.^[11] Hernández has been using la mano dura^[12] (the firm hand) to enforce a lockdown and nightly curfews, provoking hunger and repressing the inevitable protests.^[13] On April 24, three brothers selling bread were stopped by police^[14]: one was shot dead and two injured. Food parcels handed out to some families only contain two days’ worth of supplies. The state is buying medical equipment at excessive prices^[15] largely via companies owned by the president’s cronies.^[16]

Neighbouring El Salvador’s economy is also seriously stressed by the pandemic. President Nayib Bukele, who ran under the banner of the right wing GANA party, was widely viewed as a reformist^[17]  when he took office last June, garnering votes from across the political spectrum. But since the election  he has turned autocratic: on February 9 he threatened the country’s parliament, reluctant to approve even more spending on security forces, by marching troops into the chamber.^[18] In early March, when El Salvador still had no confirmed virus cases, he imposed a complete ban on foreign travellers and sent locals returning from abroad into 30-day quarantine in make-shift hostels. A complete lockdown followed on March 22. To compensate those who now couldn’t work, Bukele promised a $300 handout to each family, which backfired when thousands of Salvadorans without bank accounts formed queues outside government offices. When the government could not accommodate the crowds and closed the offices, protests broke out and the security forces were deployed to restore order.

In addition to strengthening the security forces, Bukele seemed to have inadvertently given more power to El Salvador’s notorious gangs, who were enforcing his lockdown with baseball bats.^[19] But in the wake of a new peak^[20] in El Salvador’s notoriously high murder rate (22 in one day on April 24), he ordered an intensified crackdown on gang members in the country’s prisons.

The “northern triangle” countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala share common problems. Repressive governments are supported both by the US and by rich elites who disregard the poor majority’s need to work each day to put food on the table. Some 28,000 people^[21] have been detained for breaching lockdowns. The traditional safety valve of these countries, migration to the US, has almost closed because of the tough measures introduced at Trump’s insistence, combined with fear of the virus. Hundreds of migrants are being sent back from the US and Mexico every week, exacerbating their countries’ economic crises and bringing large numbers of new virus cases.^[22]

Nicaragua, though poorer than its neighbours, has some advantages in fighting the virus: limited emigration to the US, fewer tourists than before – after the violent protests in 2018^[23] – and a community-based health system that is accustomed to dealing with epidemics such as dengue. Its approach has been completely different, involving medical checks at the borders, travellers being quarantined and regularly checked for symptoms, testing, and contact tracing. Checkpoints were kept open to minimise informal crossing of the porous land borders, especially from Costa Rica where many Nicaraguans work.^[24] Some 250,000 volunteer ‘brigadistas’ were trained to take part in health brigades to dispense advice and identify possible virus cases. Practically every household has been visited, often three or four times. Sanctions bar Nicaragua from receiving US aid or support from the World Bank but it is getting technical help from Cuba, Taiwan and South Korea, all of which had early experience in tackling the pandemic.

As I write, the live map of coronavirus cases in Central America^[25] shows 8,880 cases and 286 deaths. By far the majority (6,378 cases) are in Panama, in part because it is the region’s transport hub but also because, as the richest country, it’s better equipped for testing and for producing reliable figures. The second highest, with 771 cases, is Honduras. At the other extreme are Belize with 18 cases and Nicaragua with 14. Belize has closed schools and some businesses but has held back from a full lockdown. Yet only Nicaragua and the other nearby country with a left-wing president^[26], Mexico, have been criticised^[27] for their voluntary approaches to social distancing. A Mexican market trader’s sign^[28] summarises the dilemma facing all the regional governments, whatever their stance so far: “It’s hunger that’s going to kill me, not the coronavirus”.

Photo Credit: Carlos Cortez, www.El19digital.com. A government worker cleans a market in Managua to combat the coronavirus

End notes

^[1] “Hondurans React to Bribe Offered by El Chapo to President: ‘We Live in a Narcostate’,” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez.html

^[2] “Former Chief Of Honduran National Police Charged With Drug Trafficking And Weapons Offenses,” https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-chief-honduran-national-police-charged-drug-trafficking-and-weapons-offenses

^[3] “President of Honduras implicated in $1.5 million drug money conspiracy by New York prosecutor,” https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/president-of-honduras-implicated-in-1-5-million-drug-money-conspiracy-by-new-york-prosecutor

^[4] “US prosecutors tie Honduras president to drug trafficker,” https://apnews.com/e85a0f7b43264a5eb6b879701356e1f3

^[5] “Honduran president’s brother guilty of drug smuggling,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50081304

^[6] “Honduran president’s brother promised ‘El Chapo’ protection, witness says,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-honduras-drugs/honduran-presidents-brother-promised-el-chapo-protection-witness-says-idUSKBN1WO02J

^[7] “Exclusive: A Pandora’s box of corruption in Honduras,”https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/exclusive-a-pandoras-box-of-corruption-in-honduras

^[8] “How hitmen and high living lifted lid on looting of Honduran healthcare system,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/hit-men-high-living-honduran-corruption-scandal-president

^[9] “Estados Unidos apoya con insumos contra la pandemia del covid-19,” http://elpulso.hn/estados-unidos-apoya-con-insumos-contra-la-pandemia-del-covid-19/

^[10] “COVID-19 and Central America: a Learning Moment?,” https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/28/covid19-and-central-america-a-learning-moment/

^[11] “Renuncia el 25 por ciento del personal médico contratado para atender emergencia por el coronavirus,” https://confidencialhn.com/renuncia-el-25-por-ciento-del-personal-medico-contratado-para-atender-emergencia-por-el-coronavirus/

^[12] “Against ‘la mano dura’,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/november/against-la-mano-dura

^[13] “Pobladores protestan por falta de alimentos en la colonia Las Torres de la capital,” https://hch.tv/2020/04/23/pobladores-protestan-por-falta-de-alimentos-en-la-colonia-las-torres-de-la-capital/

^[14] “Agentes de la PMOP asesina a joven en El Paraíso, Omoa,” http://defensoresenlinea.com/agentes-de-la-pmop-asesina-a-joven-en-el-paraiso-omoa/

^[15] “Habrá denuncia ‘con nombre y apellido’ por compras sobrevaloradas durante emergencia,” https://hondudiario.com/2020/04/20/habra-denuncia-con-nombre-y-apellido-por-compras-sobrevaloras-durante-emergencia/

^[16] “Responsables de compras Covid-19 entre parientes e intereses,” https://www.reporterosdeinvestigacion.com/2020/04/23/responsables-de-compras-directas-covid-19-en-honduras/

^[17] “El Salvador President Nayib Bukele Is Flirting With Fascism,” https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/02/el-salvador-president-nayib-bukele-is-flirting-with-fascisms

^[18] “El Salvador: President Bukele Abuses Executive Power and Uses Security Forces to Threaten Congress,” http://www.coha.org/el-salvador-president-bukele-abuses-executive-power-and-uses-security-forces-to-threaten-congress/

^[19] “Army and Gangs Enforce Virus Curfew in El Salvador,” https://www.courthousenews.com/army-and-gangs-enforce-virus-curfew-in-el-salvador/

^[20] “El Salvador imposes prisons lockdown after 22 murders in a day,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/el-salvador-imposes-prisons-lockdown-after-22-murders-in-a-day

^[21] “Central America: Unrest, repression grow amid coronavirus crisis,” https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/central-america-unrest-repression-grow-coronavirus-crisis-200422202713659.html

^[22] “Guatemala official: 44 deportees tested positive for virus,” https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/guatemala-official-44-deportees-tested-positive-virus-70194236

^[23] “After Ortega?,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/may/after-ortega

^[24] “Nicaraguans in Costa Rica: A Manufactured ‘Refugee’ Crisis,” http://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/

^[25] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRZPaRRNDFg&feature=emb_logo

^[26] “Mexico’s Fourth Transformation: AMLO and the Global Left,” https://prruk.org/mexicos-fourth-transformation-amlo-and-the-global-left/

^[27] “Coronavirus: por qué México y Nicaragua son los países de América Latina con menos medidas restrictivas frente al covid-19,”https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566

^[28] “Coronavirus: por qué México y Nicaragua son los países de América Latina con menos medidas restrictivas frente al covid-19,” https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566

Marc Pilisuk, Jennifer Rountree and Rebecca Ferencik
From Berkeley, CA and Portland, OR

In its attempt to stem a spike in the number of Latin American men, women, and children traveling to the U.S., an unprecedented number of them seeking asylum, the Trump administration has pushed Guatemala and other countries in the region to sign “safe third country” agreements. The U.S. is bound by law to permit those seeking asylum and this new agreement is an attempt by the administration to avoid this obligation by declaring Guatemala as a safe third country, requiring asylum seekers from Honduras and El Salvador to remain in Guatemala.

Signing an agreement declaring Guatemala a “safe” country does not make it so. Increasing drug and gang-related violence and poverty—an estimated 59% of Guatemalans live in poverty, most of whom are indigenous—are not the ingredients of a safe and secure environment. This environment is largely a result of the legacy of more than half a century of U.S. policy, intervention, and corporate interest and its deleterious effect on Guatemala’s people. 

The Civil War

In the early 1950s, after decades of colonial rule, Guatemala elected Jacobo Arbenz, a nationalist and socialist who sought to transform oligarchic Guatemalan society through land reform and the development of government-owned enterprises. These government enterprises would be in competition with the American corporations, which at the time, dominated the railroad, electric, and fruit-trade industries. Of these American corporations, the United Fruit Company was the most influential. For decades, the company was the largest landowner, employer, and exporter in Guatemala. With nearly half of its land expropriated by Arbenz’ land reform act, United Fruit Company executives and board members (one of whom was then CIA Director Allen Dulles) appealed to the American government. In 1954, the U.S. government installed a puppet leader, overthrowing Arbenz in a coup, undoing his nationalist policies and setting up a strong-arm government that favored the United Fruit Company and other U.S. corporate interests.

Under U.S. guidance, Guatemala’s powerful military force and network of counterinsurgency surveillance—a program purported to stem the tide of communism in the region—continued for more than three decades. From 1960 through 1996, Guatemala was embroiled in a brutal civil war. The succession of military dictatorships were notorious for their scorched earth methods of destroying entire villages—most of them indigenous Mayan communities—in an effort to root out underground guerilla fighters. Their methods included beheading victims and burning them alive, smashing the heads of children on rocks, and raping women. In the fourteen months of Efraín Ríos Montt’s rule in the early 1980s, 10,000 documented killings or disappearances were reported. Conservative figures estimate that 200,000 people were killed or “disappeared” over the course of the war; 93% of the killings are attributed to the Guatemalan military. The United Nation’s Commission for Historical Clarification declared these deaths as genocide because the vast majority of the war’s victims were indigenous Maya. The 1999 report entitled, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence,” also identifies the U.S. involvement in the country as a key factor which contributed to human rights violations, including the training of Guatemalan officers in counterinsurgency techniques and support for the national intelligence system.

Addressing Organized Crime: Corporate Induced Limitations  

The end of Guatemala’s 36-year civil war did not bring peace. Paramilitary bands, many of whom are employed by U.S. and Canadian corporations, continue to roam the Guatemalan countryside targeting indigenous and worker’s rights groups. Similar to United Fruit Company six decades prior, these corporations determine agricultural productivity and the use of natural resources in Guatemala. Companies such as Tahoe Resources Inc., Goldcorp, and Solway group have come to play a dominant role, removing major areas of agriculture and replacing them with silver, gold, and nickel mines, and with no input from local communities. Severe environmental and health consequences occur in surrounding regions, including water shortages and contamination, air pollution, failing crops, skin rashes, infections, and coughs.

The Guatemalan government aids the corporate interests by suppressing peaceful protestors through intimidation tactics, including utilizing false charges, arrests, and the military. The government has declared states of siege, sending in thousands of heavily-armed soldiers to areas where local farmers and activists have opposed the expansion of mining. Indigenous leaders have played a significant role in speaking out against the loss of communal land for subsistence farming and against the deleterious effects of mining on the soil and water. Many of these leaders have been forced into hiding, and in some cases have been falsely accused of being members of drug cartels or other organized crime groups. Others have been killed for speaking out. In 2018 Guatemala recorded the sharpest rise in the murder of environmental defenders, jumping more than fivefold, making it the deadliest country per capita in the world.

Simultaneously, for many years in the Western Highlands of Guatemala, drug cartels had persuaded poor indigenous farmers to replace their traditional crops with poppies. Then under pressure from the U.S., the Guatemalan government eradicated the poppy fields, inflicting violence in the process. This left farmers with no other similarly-valued replacement crop and no replacement income, nor any form of assistance. For a time, poppy farming brought a level of self-sufficiency to farmers and their families. This loss of revenue added to pressures, increasing the wave of Guatemalans migrating to the U.S. In addition, military crackdowns against illegal drugs led to a level of organized crime, making life more dangerous for those who remained.

Attempts to Restore Justice: Presidents Involved in Corruption

In 2007, The UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was created. It came about largely as a result of efforts by students and Mayan leaders, exasperated that attempts to bring perpetrators of the country’s civil war to trial gained no traction in the justice system. The commission supported corruption probes that resulted in the indictment of Guatemala’s former president Otto Perez Molina and vice president Roxana Baldetti and the prosecution of prominent government officials, including members of Congress and the Supreme Court, two former presidents Álvaro Colom and Alfonso Portillo, dozens of corrupt judges, and thousands of corrupt police officers. It also supported the detention of powerful drug traffickers in the country. This year, CICIG’s mandate expired, lacking both the continued support of the United States and the support of Guatemala’s President Jimmy Morales, himself under investigation for corruption. In the absence of the CICIG, already powerful organized crime groups are expanding their influence across the country and deepening their partnerships with government officials, the military, and transnational crime networks. Experts observe that, given the current levels of poverty and inequality, this environment of unfettered corruption will only continue to make the country an inhospitable and unsafe place, where families have more reasons to leave than to stay.

Climate Change: Drought Increases Food Insecurity

Land not taken over by foreign mining operations has been impacted by climate change. In recent years, the “Dry Corridor,” the tropical dry forest region on the Pacific Coast of Central America which extends from southern Mexico to Panama, has experienced high temperatures, below-average rainfall and periods of drought, resulting in the significant loss of crops—up to 50-75% for large agricultural operations. For families, the loss of crops have translated to a loss of jobs, income, and subsistence, and has pushed more and more families across the region into food insecurity. Guatemala has the fourth-highest rate of chronic malnutrition in the world, with rates as high as 70% among indigenous communities. U.S. Agency for International Development-funded programs, such as Buena Milpa (meaning “good cornfield”), have helped farmers create seed reserves and learn new methods of soil and water conservation. Many of these programs came to a halt earlier this year when the Trump Administration announced it would freeze $450 Million in funding to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras for failure to stop citizens from migrating to the United States. As Latin American experts have pointed out, halting aid may actually increase migration to the U.S., as food insecurity has been one of the primary drivers of migration from Guatemala. 

Conclusion

Guatemala is a case of both global dispossession of people and of advocacy for resistance. The U.S. intervention model has failed in Guatemala. It has used a nation rich in natural resources and in cultural tradition as a tool for extractive resources and for cheap labor. It has relied upon coercion to repress dissent over the failure to provide either decent livelihood or safety for most of its people. Organized community resistance led to CICIG, a UN assisted program, which successfully prosecuted some of the most violent and corrupt violators, but the agency has been undermined by withdrawal of U.S. support over the past two years. Despite dehumanizing efforts to turn away immigrants, Guatemalan families have no choice but to face the hazards of migration to find hope within the wealthy country that has devastated their own. Details differ, but the general problem is repeated in Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Somalia, and in much of central Africa. People will continue to flee until there is reparation for the lives that have been traumatized, until their contaminated lands are replenished, and until the devastating economies and military strongmen who run them, with U.S. assistance, are replaced. The meta problem reflects a global question about sustainable values. A system that allows exploitation of people and of habitats so that a few may prosper, comes to feel the pressure of dissenters. When such dissenters are met with brutality, many choose to flee to find refuge. But the exodus will continue as an inevitable part of a system that is not sustainable and is morally unsatisfactory. It is a system that would have much to learn from traditional Maya wisdom in which tribes of people and their environmental habitats are considered sacred and worthy of preservation.

Advocacy groups have developed both to assist in the plight of refugees and to provide people with viable means to restore their country of origin as a place to live in dignity. Groups such as Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA) https://nisgua.org offer a way to support this effort.   

Marc Pilisuk, Ph.D., is a Professor Emeritus at The University of California Davis and Faculty at Saybrook University, Berkeley, California

Jennifer Rountree, Ph.D., is Project Manager at The Center for Outcomes Research and Education, Portland, Oregon

Rebecca Ferencik, is an Independent Research Analyst, Berkeley, California

Photo credit, central picture: United Nations Women