Truth in world affairs is not a single expert-narrated story.

National Politics

In our ‘official’ ‘United Nations’ world – the world referenced by the expression the international rules-based order – there are about 200 sovereign nation states (ie ‘countries’) which are equal members of the global community of nations. We mean equal in a juridical sense, not an economic or demographic sense; as recognised by ‘one nation, one vote’ in the United Nations General Assembly. Further, in this sanctioned and sanctified view – using the verb ‘sanction’ in its original old-fashioned sense – neither history nor geographical proximity matter; Mexico is as independent of the United States as it is of India.

Before moving on to geopolitics, there are four exceptions allowed within this official view. First is that there are numerous pieces of territory which are understood as too small – in population and/or land area – to be viable independent sovereign nation states. Second, some sovereign nation states – usually neighbours – may form a voluntary Union, whereby certain aspects of their sovereignty are ceded to centralised institutions. Third is that many citizens do not reside in the territories associated with their nationalities. And three exceptions not allowed for, but acknowledged to varying extents: countries that don’t exist but do exist; territories subject to internationally tolerated military occupation; and territories within recognised nation-states pushing for secession, though falling well short of either self-government or union with similarly-placed neighbouring territories.

An example of the first type of exception is Greenland, accounted for as a ‘realm’ territory of Denmark. (Other familiar realm territories are: Cook Islands [in the realm of New Zealand], American Samoa, and New Zealand’s closest foreign neighbour [Norfolk Island, in the realm of Australia].) The second exception is the European Union (noting that, in some circumstances – consider FIFA – the United Kingdom is also a Union of [four] nations). Might Canada join the European Union this century?

The third exception – the diaspora exception – applies to a degree to all nation states; and it applies particularly to New Zealand. New Zealand possibly has more citizens resident outside of New Zealand relative to citizens resident inside New Zealand; at least if we only consider countries with resident populations in excess of one million. Is New Zealand its citizenry or its territory? Given the realities of dual-citizenship, it is probably better defined as its territory along with its residentcitizens and denizens.

The fourth generally accepted exception is territories that are formally non-sovereign. Our example here is Antarctica. We may add the Moon.

Re the unsanctioned exceptions, Taiwan is the obvious example of the first type (other examples include Abkhazia and Somaliland) and Palestine is the obvious example of the second type. For the third (secessionist) type, I would cite Eastern Congo in which substantial domestic forces are in reality more aligned to nearby Kigali than faraway Kinshasa; I would also mention Myanmar’s Rakhine state, home to the Rohingya people.

Geopolitics

While the above ‘national politics’ narrative is real and contains a legal structure satisfying to its liberal architects, it is overlaid by an equally real (and quite different) geopolitical layer. Conflicts of big ego and big ideology can neither be understood nor resolved without substantial reference to geopolitics. Geopolitics is tied to both contested histories and geographical proximity. More than anything geopolitics is about empire (formal and informal), the unequal coalitions and powerplays among and between identities of people beyond and within territorial boundaries.

Geopolitics is about the centres of political power – the ‘great powers’ to use an expression from World War One – and their rival claims over the planet and its people. Geopolitical texts commonly refer to cities that are power centres, such as Washington and Berlin, rather than the countries in which those cities are located. Most conflict in the world can only be understood with recourse to geopolitics, which is largely the sociopathic politics of power masquerading as a set of struggles of ‘Good versus Evil’.

At least the president of the United States, DJT, is in a sense more honest than most ‘democratic’ leaders of powerful countries, in that he frames his acquisitive sentiments in the name of America rather than in the name of Good or in the name of God. Coveted Greenland looms larger in geopolitics than in national politics; in national politics it successfully hides in plain sight, as a large appendage of a semi-sovereign nation with a population barely larger than New Zealand.

Greenland: History

Greenland presently – at least formally – lies within the realm of Denmark, noting that ‘realm’ is itself a sanctioned rules-based exception. Denmark, as a member of the European Union, has delegated aspects of its sovereignty; from Copenhagen to Brussels and Paris and Berlin.

The first question to ask about Greenland is: why is it in the possession of the Kingdom of Denmark? Greenland was never conquered or colonised by Danes or by Denmark. Over 1,000 years ago, Greenland was colonised by Norse (ie Norwegian) Vikings. Greenland’s first people were Inuit, and the present population is substantially an Inuit/Norse mix. Around 500 years ago, Norway and Denmark formed a political union – a kingdom in which Denmark was the dominant partner – which lasted around 300 years. In that age of imperialism, Greenland became formally subject to that kingdom. This was a marriage between Denmark and Norway during the constrained period of the Little Ice Age. Greenland was ‘matrimonial property’ in this Union.

In 1814, Norway was passed on to Sweden through the Treaty of Kiel, in an era in which the wife was regarded as the property of the husband. Thus, Denmark formally gained Greenland as part of the divorce settlement. That remains the historical basis for Denmark’s claim over Greenland today. Though we remind ourselves that today’s reality is that Denmark is a somewhat junior partner in the polyamorous European Union. (Would Denmark get to keep Greenland if Denmark was to do a ‘Dexit’? Or would Greenland be passed on to the other husbands and wives?)

Greenland: Geography

Functionally, at least in geo-environmental terms, Greenland is the northern land-analogue of Antarctica. Arctica. While it doesn’t literally cover the North Pole (except that a large sheet of sea-ice extends from northern Greenland), it is near enough; and its land ice-sheet is certainly the northern analogue of the West Antarctica ice sheet. Based on this analogy, Greenland could become subject to a similar extranationalism to that which governs Antarctica. The difference of course is that Antarctica has no formally resident population; almost nobody was born there. The model could be adapted, with authentic Greenlanders becoming limited-power-landlords over an essentially international territory.

When I was a child, it was very common for families to have a globe in their living rooms, somewhere between the mantlepiece and the piano. About 15 years ago, I was lucky enough to have acquired a 3D jigsaw puzzle of the world; indeed, a small self-assembly globe. To see Greenland in perspective, it’s necessary to look at a globe. Short of that, see this satellite picture of North America from the Turtle Island page on Wikipedia.

(I was privileged to learn about Turtle Island when I visited Winnipeg in May 2019. When I walked through the Peace Park at The Forks, I learned for the first time about Turtle Island. See on YouTube: Winnipeg – the heart of Turtle Island. [And note this 16 December 2025 BBC story FBI foils New Year’s Eve terror plot across southern California, officials say relating to the Turtle Island Liberation Front.] I have a personal story about Greenland. While never having set foot there, I remember having a window seat flying from London to Los Angeles one October day. I saw the sun set somewhere northwest of Scotland; then a couple of hours later I saw it rise again, from the west, over Greenland. This was only possible because at such polar latitudes, an east-west flight is fast enough to be able to reverse the sunset.)

The map, in correct perspective, very much shows Greenland as a not-very-green part of North America. Its closest neighbour is of course Canada; indeed since 2022 Greenland has shared a land border with Greenland, on Hans Island in the Kennedy Channel, following the resolution of the Whisky War between Canada and Denmark. (It is unknown whether the Kennedy Channel was named after a Canadian fur-trader and politician, or the guy who was United States Secretary of the Navy in 1852 and 1853. If the latter, this might give false credence to DJT’s claim on Greenland for the United States.)

Greenland certainly looks to be geographically American – just as Norfolk Island geographically connects to New Zealand (on the Zealandia continent). But a geographical argument must also based on the connectivity between population centres. The flight distances from Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, to other capital cities are: Reykjavik, Iceland (1,430 km); Ottawa, Canada (2,560km); Dublin, Ireland (2,800km); Oslo, Norway (3,150km); London, UK (3,250km); Washington DC, US (3,260km); Brussels, EU (3,520km); Copenhagen, Denmark (3,530); Berlin, Germany (3,820); Moscow, Russia (4,630km); Beijing, China (8,400km).

Washington is closer to Nuuk than is Copenhagen. Dublin is the closest EU capital city to Nuuk, and is a more economically connected city to the North Atlantic than is Copenhagen. Brussels, formal capital of the EU is the same distance from Nuuk as is Copenhagen. Berlin, the geopolitical capital of the EU, is nearly 4,000 km from Nuuk (whereas New York, the power capital of the US is less than 3,000km from Nuuk). Moscow and Beijing are both much further from Greenland, have had no geopolitical influence there, and constitute no plausible geopolitical threat; future security issues in Greenland are more likely to emanate from piracy than from power centres in Asia.

While there is no argument in favour of the United States annexing or otherwise acquiring Greenland, the case for European Union control of Greenland is even weaker than that of the United States. The only European countries with credible claims to form a Union with Greenland are Norway and Iceland, on the basis of shared history and shared maritime geography.

Greenland: Demography

Greenland’s population of just under 60,000 is only slightly higher than the populations of the American realm territories of American Samoa and the Northern Marianas Islands. Guam has three times more people than Greenland. The American Virgin Islands, with 100,000 people, is more populated than Greenland. The largest American realm territory, Puerto Rico, has 300 times as many people as Greenland. Of these ‘countries’, only Puerto Rico is a serious candidate to become the 51st state of the United States. The Virgin Islanders don’t even drive on the same side of the road as the rest of the United States.

I suspect that the DJT vision for Greenland is for it to become something like the former Panama Canal Zone; a former American territory that existed when I sailed through the Panama Canal in 1974. Of course we are aware that DJT would like to re-acquire that Panamanian territory for the United States.

Greenland is different though, in the same way that Antarctica is. It has many potentially valuable mining resources; and it lies on economically significant sea channels which are becoming more navigable thanks to climate change. And it has global environmental values. A collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet would drown all of Manhattan and most of the rest of New York; as well as much of other cities mentioned above such as Dublin, London and Copenhagen.

Greenland as Arctica

Greenland’s people can become landlords – but not landlords with monopoly power – able to procure citizens’ royalties (public property rights) from both extractive industries and the use of its sea-lanes. Greenland requires a Treaty of Nuuk, with a limited concession of sovereignty in return for those benefits; but a concession that leaves property rights in Greenland essentially the same as property rights in Antarctica.

Antarctica today represents geopolitics done quite well.

The Greenland question needs to be addressed. It is not sufficient for it to become a de facto territory of Europe – which eventually means Berlin. And it is too large a landmass to be independent in the way that Iceland is.

Warning

By understanding Greenland essentially as an inhabited Anti-Antarctica – as Arctica – we have to realise that the present United States regime may seek to undermine (literally and metaphorically) current arrangements for Antarctica. And when DJT turns his gaze southwards, he may look upon independent sovereign countries in the South Pacific as parts of his growing fiefdom. The South Pacific is America’s gateway to McMurdo Sound, in Antarctica. A number of ‘independent’ and proud countries in the South Pacific – Tonga, for example – already dutifully vote largely according to the United States’ say-so in the United Nations.

If Antarctica becomes a template for Greenland, that’s a definite improvement on the present accidental and unsustainable arrangement; but only if Antarctica’s present governance arrangements are preserved.

Watch what happens if Nasa’s Artemis Program successfully re-lands American men on the Moon. The Washington regime may lay claim to privileged property rights over the Moon – much as Wentworth acquired New Zealand’s South Island in 1839, requiring a treaty (Treaty of Waitangi) to repudiate that claim. If the United States believes it owns the Moon, it may stake a similar claim on Antarctica; and also seek to extend its Pacific realm. Citing America’s security! And breaking the Seventh and Tenth Commandments.

While current American-led geopolitics poses a deeply problematic story for resource-rich and low-populated territories, the expert-led official story of international politics is problematic too. The status-quo is not necessarily the best solution.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

A former head of the United Nations Development Programme is concerned that US President Donald Trump may set a precedent for other countries.

The President has signed a memorandum ordering the withdrawal of the United States from 66 international organisations.

These include the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Democracy Fund, and nearly 30 other United Nations agencies.

Helen Clark, who was also New Zealand prime minister from 1999 to 2008, said it was a “very troubling” move.

“It is an assault on the international system of cooperation, which has been painstakingly built up over many, many decades,” she said.

Clark was concerned that other countries, which were like-minded with the current US administration, would also withdraw.

New Zealand unlikely
However, Clark did not expect New Zealand to be one of them, as the country had always stood for multilateralism.

“I do think New Zealand, and other like-minded countries, do need to be thinking about their positioning, because to say nothing when there is a comprehensive assault on the international system is not a good position to be in.”

Clark said the Framework Convention on Climate Change was ratified by the United States Senate back in 1992.

“It’s not clear that President Trump can simply withdraw from it, and this will no doubt be litigated within the United States.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Pacific civil society groups say 2025 has been a big year for the ocean.

Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) representative Maureen Penjueli said the Pacific Ocean was being hyper-militarised and there was a desire for seabed minerals to be used to build-up military capacity.

“Critical minerals, whether from land or from the deep ocean itself, have a military end use, and that’s been made very clear in 2025,” Penjueli said during the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG) 2025 State of the Ocean webinar.

“They’re deemed extremely vital for defence industrial base, enabling the production of military platforms such as fighter aircraft, tanks, missiles, submarines.

“2025 is the year where we see the link between critical minerals on the sea floor and use [in the] military.”

PANG’s Joey Tau said one of the developments had been the increase in countries calling for a moratorium or pause on deep sea mining, which was now up to 40.

“Eight of which are from the Pacific and a sub-regional grouping the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group) still holds that political space or that movement around a moratorium.”

Deep-sea mining rules
Tau said it came as the UN-sanctioned International Seabed Authority tried to come to an agreement on deep-sea mining rules at the same time as the United States is considering its own legal pathway.

“It is a bad precedent setting by the US, we hope that the ISA both assembly and the council would hold ground and warn the US.”

He said unlike US, China spoke about the importance of multilateralism and it for global partners to maintain unity within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreement which has not been ratified by the United States.

Also in February was the deep sea minerals talanoa, where Pacific leaders met to discuss deep sea mining.

“Some of our countries sit on different sides of the table on this issue. You have countries who are sponsoring and who are progressing the agenda of deep-sea mining, not only within their national jurisdiction, but also in the international arena,” Tau said.

In May, UN human rights experts expressed concern about the release of treated nuclear wastewater.

Japan’s government has consistently maintained the release meets international safety standards, and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency shows there is no measurable impact beyond Japan’s coastal waters.

Legal and moral problem
However, Ocean Vision Legal’s Naima Taafaki-Fifita said as well as being an environmental issue, it was also a legal and moral problem.

“By discharging these radioactive contaminants into the Pacific, Japan risks breaching its obligations under international law,” she said.

“[The UN special rapporteurs] caution that this may pose grave risks to human rights, particularly the rights to life, health, food and culture, not only in Japan, but across the Pacific.”

Taafaki-Fifita said it was a “deeply personal” issue for Pacific people who lived with the nuclear legacy of testing.

In September, what is known as the “High Seas Treaty” received its 60th ratification which means it will now be legally effective in January 2026.

The agreement allows international waters — which make up nearly two-thirds of the ocean — to be placed into marine protected areas.

Taafaki-Fitita said it was important that Pacific priorities were visible and heard as the treaty became implemented.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

International trade expert Steven Okun has warned that the “era of uncertainty” in global trade set in motion by US President Donald Trump’s tariff policies is likely to be prolonged as there is no certainty now of a US return to pre-Trump trade policy era

He has advised small economies like Fiji and Pacific countries to band together and try to negotiate a collective trade agreement with the US.

“We’re in a transitional phase and this transitional phase is going to take years,” Okun said in an interview with The Fiji Times during his visit to Fiji earlier this month.

“This isn’t months, this is going to be years and after Donald Trump is no longer president, the question is going to be who replaces him. And we just have no idea.

“If the replacement for Donald Trump is a Democrat, is that Democrat going to be more like Joe Biden — work with partners and allies — or is he going to be more progressive like Bernie Sanders, and he or she is going to have a different approach to trade.

“We don’t know which way the Democrats are going to go.

“We don’t know which way the Republicans are going to go. Either the successor is going to be somebody more of a traditional Republican, somebody like the Governor of Georgia or the Governor of New Hampshire who are both more establishment-type Republicans, or is the next president going to be Donald Trump Jr or JD Vance.

‘Upended’ system
“If it’s going to be one of those two, it’s going to be very similar presumably to what we have right now, which means we’re not going to get certainty any time soon.”

Okun, founder and chief executive officer of Singapore-based business advisory firm APAC Advisors and a former Clinton Administration official, said the United States under President Trump had upended the global multilateral trading system that the world had been operating on for the last 80 years.

The shifting dynamics in response to that had seen countries gravitating towards regional trading blocs, something that Pacific countries, including Fiji, should seriously consider, he said.

“We see from the US perspective the desire to have bilateral trade and we see other countries creating plurilateral systems or regional trading blocs . . . ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) would be one, CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) is such an agreement, RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is another plurilateral system.

“That’s something that I think a country like Fiji should be looking at, same as a country in Southeast Asia — are there blocs that we can be part of and can the Pacific nations come together and collectively get a better agreement with the United States?”

The Fiji Cabinet revealed last week that negotiations were ongoing with the US for a potential US-Fiji Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART).

Okun, who came to Fiji at the invitation of the Fiji-USA Business Council, was also sceptical about the August 1 deadline set by President Trump in April for the activation of reciprocal tariffs against about 90 countries, which would mean Fijian exporters of goods into the US would pay 32 percent duty at the border.

Republished from The Fiji Times with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A prominent academic has criticised the New Zealand coalition government for compromising the country’s traditional commitment to upholding an international rules-based order due to a “desire not to offend” the Trump administration.

Professor Robert Patman, an inaugural sesquicentennial distinguished chair and a specialist in international relations at the University of Otago, has argued in a contributed article to The Spinoff that while distant in geographic terms, “brutal violence in Gaza, the West Bank and Iran marks the latest stage in the unravelling of an international rules-based order on which New Zealand depends for its prosperity and security”.

Dr Patman wrote that New Zealand’s founding document, the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, emphasised partnership and cooperation at home, and, after 1945, helped inspire a New Zealand worldview enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism.

“In the wake of Hamas’ terrorist attacks in Israel on October 7, 2023, the National-led coalition government has in principle emphasised its support for a lasting ceasefire in Gaza and the need for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the occupied territories of East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank,” he wrote.

However, Dr Patman said, in practice this New Zealand stance had not translated into firm diplomatic opposition to the Netanyahu government’s quest to control Gaza and annex the West Bank.

“Nor has it been a condemnation of the Trump administration for prioritising its support for Israel’s security goals over international law,” he said.

Foreign minister Winston Peters had described the situation in Gaza as “simply intolerable” but the National-led coalition had little specific to say as the Netanyahu government “resumed its cruel blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza in March and restarted military operations there”.

Silence on Trump’s ‘Gaza ownership’
“Even more striking was the government’s silence on President Trump’s proposal to own Gaza with a view to evicting two million Palestinian residents from the territory and the US-Israeli venture to start the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) in late May in a move which sidelined the UN in aid distribution and has led to the killing of more than 600 Palestinians while seeking food aid,” Dr Patman said.

While New Zealand, along with the UK, Australia, Canada and Norway, had imposed sanctions on two far-right Israeli government ministers, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar ben Gvir, in June for “inciting extremist violence” against Palestinians — a move that was criticised by the Trump administration — it was arguably a case of very little very late.

“The Hamas terror attacks on October 7 killed around 1200 Israelis, but the Netanyahu government’s retaliation by the Israel Defence Force (IDF) against Hamas has resulted in the deaths of more than 56,000 Palestinians — nearly 70 percent of whom were women or children — in Gaza.

Over the same period, more than 1000 Palestinians had been killed in the West Bank as Israel accelerated its programme of illegal settlements there.

‘Strangely ambivalent’
In addition, the responses of the New Zealand government to “pre-emptive attacks” by Israel (13-25 June) and Trump’s United States (June 22) against Iran to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities were strangely ambivalent.

Despite indications from US intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had not produced nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Peters had said New Zealand was not prepared to take a position on that issue.

Confronted with Trump’s “might is right” approach, the National-led coalition faced stark choices, Dr Patman said.

The New Zealand government could continue to fudge fundamental moral and legal issues in the Middle East and risk complicity in the further weakening of an international rules-based order it purportedly supports, “or it can get off the fence, stand up for the country’s values, and insist that respect for international law must be observed in the region and elsewhere without exception”.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A View from Afar – In this episode of A View From Afar political scientist Paul Buchanan and host Selwyn Manning analyse how the state of Israel has gone rogue, attacking United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. At this juncture it is clear this is an intentional attack.

Over the past week Israel Defense Force troops have repeatedly attacked UN peacekeepers who were authorised and deployed to the region by the United Nations Security Council.

Also last week; the Government of Israel issued a statement notifying the United Nations Secretary General that he was now banned from Israel and was persona non grata. Within a day of that statement, IDF troops had fired on UN peacekeeping positions in Southern Lebanon.

Since then, the IDF has continued operations that threaten the UN’s presence. And Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has now issued a directive to the UN peacekeeping force to withdraw from the area north of its borders in Southern Lebanon.

Also, despite the United States Biden Administration cautioning Israel on its attacks on UN personnel, overnight New Zealand time, the United States has deployed 100 US troops on the ground in Israel to operate missile defence systems.

Paul and Selwyn consider:

• Why Israel has begun to attack United Nations peacekeepers in the region?
• Why has the United States deepened its involvement in Israel’s so-called defence?
• What of Hezbollah, Hamas; are their attacks on Israel a defence or an attacking offensive?
• What of Iran, what is its position and will it engage in a full-scale war with Israel and what are the consequences should it do so?

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this episode of A View from Afar political scientist and former Pentagon Analyst, Paul G. Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning will discuss: The Murky World of Israel’s Booby-Trapped Pagers and Walkie-Talkies.

Today, Paul and Selwyn will reveal Israel’s long-form planning that led to it sabotaging hand-held communication devices that Hezbollah used to communicate with.

This episode’s questions will include:

• Who was behind the manufacturing of the booby-trapped devices?
• How long has Israel been planning last week’s attack – an attack that saw thousands injured and many killed in Lebanon after Israel remotely pulled the virtual-pin and exploded the devices indiscriminantly?
• And why now? Presumably the devices were also programmed to be tracked. So why did Israel decide to abandon tracking Hezbollah and to attack?
• Was it to cause chaos among its enemies in a preemptive move immediately prior to its widespread bombing and targeting of communities in Lebanon?
• And what of international law? Has Israel gone so far beyond the Rubicon with Gaza that it senses international law no longer applies to Israel?
• And, finally, has the United Nations abandoned its right to protect principles, its peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities in favour of aid, development and an overly bureaucratic institution?

Live Audience: Remember, if you are joining us live via the social media platforms, feel free to comment as we can include your comments and questions in this programme.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this episode of A View from Afar political scientist and former Pentagon Analyst, Paul G. Buchanan and journalist Selwyn Manning will discuss, debate, and assess whether deterrence is still a valid concept in international relations.

Paul and Selwyn will assess whether deterrence has failed in Syria, Ukraine, the Middle East, and failed to stop an intensification of threat in the South China Sea.

And they will consider the questions:

• Is nuclear deterrence dead in the water?
• Or, does a new-generation arms race, based on advanced nuclear weaponry, made more fearsome due to a rapid advance of artificial intelligence-assisted decision-making and target-selection, mixed with hybrid warfare, cause aggressive nations to rethink the consequences should they preemptively initiate conflict?
• And what about the majority of the world, what about small states, small powers, that seek stability and security via multilateralism or a constellation of like-minded nations – how does deterrence impact on their decision-making?
• Do alliances, led by global powers, that rely on deterring adversaries through development of superior weaponry and technology, offer small states more risks than benefits?
• Specifically, is it preferable for many small states to focus on de-escalation and cooperative security rather than bind themselves to collective security agreements that are focused on deterring adversaries?
• And, the big question: How do we as member states in a world where bipolarity and conflict is intensifying, ensure de-escalation occurs without reaching a tipping-point that we cannot return from?
• Is cooperative security, and mutually agreed to weapons and technological controls, the way toward restoring an uneasy peace in the world?

Live Audience: Remember, if you are joining us live via the social media platforms, feel free to comment as we can include your comments and questions in this programme.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Getty Images/Hagen Hopkins

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s acceptance of an invitation to speak at this week’s NATO leaders’ summit in Madrid has fuelled a narrative that New Zealand’s independent foreign policy is falling victim to a new Cold War.

According to this view, Ardern’s participation is a reward for recently aligning New Zealand’s foreign policy more closely with the US and its allies against Russia and, to a lesser extent, China.

This narrative claims this shift has been exemplified by sanctions against Putin’s Russia, humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine and public questioning of China’s growing involvement in the Pacific.

These developments purportedly show American power has forced New Zealand to abandon its preferred strategy of hedging between the two superpowers and instead follow Washington at the expense of its own national interests and the country’s crucial relationship with China.

But this reading of the current international situation and its impact on New Zealand foreign policy is wide of the mark.

There is no new Cold War

The post-Cold War era is fundamentally different from the period between 1947 and 1989 and its rival global economic systems and competing but comparable alliance systems. Those features simply do not exist in the globalising world of the 21st century.

China’s rise to superpower status has been based on full-blooded participation in the global capitalist economy and its dependence on key markets like America, the European Union and Japan.

At the same time, the Ardern government has distinctive reasons, beyond simply following America’s lead, for opposing Putin’s Ukraine invasion and expressing public reservations about the China-Solomon Islands security deal.

Since the second world war, New Zealand has been a firm supporter of a strengthened international rules-based order, enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and embodied in norms such as multilateralism.

Read more:
Ukraine war: Nato summit to meet in a world reordered by Russian aggression and Chinese ambition

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was a flagrant violation of the UN Charter. It confirmed what has been clear for much of the post-Cold War era – the UN Security Council is no longer fit for purpose.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pledged to campaign for a reformed Security Council that can more effectively hold aggression in check. The Ardern government believes it has a big stake in helping Kiev defeat Putin’s expansionism.

By framing concerns about China’s “militarisation” of the Pacific region as a possible breach of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, the Ardern government is seeking to foster local resilience against China’s assertiveness in a region considered as New Zealand’s neighbourhood.

Read more:
Ukraine might be far away, but a security crisis in Europe can still threaten Aotearoa New Zealand

New Zealand’s worldview remains distinctive. It shares many of the concerns of close allies about the threat of authoritarian states to an international rules-based order. But it also rejects the view any great power should enjoy exceptional rights and privileges in the 21st century.

Here New Zealand’s foreign policy parts company with that of its traditional allies. New Zealand not only seeks to defend the international rules-based order, it wants to strengthen it.

New Zealand’s strategic positioning

There are other important strategic and economic reasons for Ardern to make this five-day visit to Europe.

She will have the chance to emphasise to so-called realists within NATO that ceding Ukrainian territory to Putin to bring peace is delusional, only likely to invite more territorial demands from the Kremlin.

China will also loom large in the discussions. Xi Jinping’s regime has diplomatically backed the Kremlin and recently declared Putin’s Ukraine invasion was “legitimate”.

Ardern has said China should not be “pigeonholed” with Moscow. But she will also be mindful a failure to strongly counter Putin’s assault on the rules-based order in Ukraine could increase China’s pressure to incorporate Taiwan, a state with vibrant trade and cultural ties with New Zealand.

Ardern should tell leaders in Madrid the best China strategy at this time is to make sure Putin’s invasion is rebuffed. If Putin’s army is defeated and ejected from Ukraine, it will be a serious blow to Xi’s leadership and could complicate any plans he might have for annexing Taiwan.

Chance to advance bilateral trade talks

The NATO meeting will also facilitate bilateral meetings with European leaders on some crucial trade questions.

In Brussels, Ardern and Trade Minister Damien O’Connor will seek to progress already advanced talks for a New Zealand-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The EU single market remains the world’s largest and most prosperous. It offers New Zealand the prospect of enhanced trade links with an important like-minded partner.

In London, Ardern and O’Connor will meet UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson to build on a “gold-standard” New Zealand-UK FTA negotiated earlier this year.

Read more:
What New Zealand should win from its trade agreement with post-Brexit Britain

The UK government has applied to join the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP). Ardern may warn Johnson that breaching the EU withdrawal agreement in relation to the Northern Ireland protocols could jeopardise this goal.

Ardern’s participation in the NATO summit and bilateral discussions in Europe at a time of geopolitical uncertainty mirror New Zealand’s key national goals of promoting an international rules-based order and diversifying trade links.

Robert G. Patman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Some see NZ’s invite to the NATO summit as a reward for a shift in foreign policy, but that’s far from accurate – https://theconversation.com/some-see-nzs-invite-to-the-nato-summit-as-a-reward-for-a-shift-in-foreign-policy-but-thats-far-from-accurate-185591

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning raise the question: If escalation of the Russian war against Ukraine will occur should NATO or European Union nations intervene to protect Ukraine, who or what can assist in bringing this war to a close?

For many of us around the world, Russia’s war against Ukraine raises a philosophical dilemma. Is defence of the vulnerable the correct pathway toward reestablishing peace?

And specifically, Defence… what should it look like?

Do we, as members of an international community, stand by and allow innocent people to be murdered in the name of a geopolitical doctrine or ambition? Or, do we truly have a responsibility to protect the vulnerable?

In last week’s episode we explored how Russia had advanced ahead of NATO and Europe in matters of deterrence. We also canvassed the Responsibility to Protect principles.

Today, we deep dive into how concerned nations may be able to come to Ukraine’s aid, and under what circumstances could this be possible, and how will such resolutions be defined.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning raise the question: 

If escalation of the Russian war against Ukraine will occur should NATO or European Union nations intervene to protect Ukraine, who or what can assist in bringing this war to a close?

For many of us around the world, Russia’s war against Ukraine raises a philosophical dilemma. Is defence of the vulnerable the correct pathway toward reestablishing peace?

And specifically, Defence… what should it look like?

Do we, as members of an international community, stand by and allow innocent people to be murdered in the name of a geopolitical doctrine or ambition? Or, do we truly have a responsibility to protect the vulnerable?

In last week’s episode we explored how Russia had advanced ahead of NATO and Europe in matters of deterrence.

We also canvassed the Responsibility to Protect principles.

Today, we deep dive into how concerned nations may be able to come to Ukraine’s aid, and under what circumstances could this be possible, and how will such resolutions be defined.

• Join Paul and Selwyn for this LIVE recording of this podcast while they consider these big issues, and remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deep dive into the big picture that hangs over the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

That big picture has many aspects to it, and as such any resolution to the atrocities being committed in Ukraine will likely be weighed against what is a challenge to the International law and rules-based order.

In a previous episode in this series, Paul Buchanan and I examined how the world was transitioning into a democracies versus authoritarian bipolarity. (ref. EveningReport.nz)

This episode continues in that theme, but digs down into how descendent powers, or nations, tend to create or become entrenched in wars, and how Russia, in 2022, fits this pattern. And, there are comparisons to global western powers too, which we will draw on.

But in this episode we go further. We examine how transitional international moments, conflict as a systems regulator, can move to counter Russia.

In 2022, the United Nations security council, due to the P5 nations having veto powers, appears no longer fit for purpose. A UN-led multilateral response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is unlikely.

The UN general assembly appears frustrated by Russia’s refusal to acknowledge the combined insistence of the UNGA that it cease its war against Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, NATO, at this juncture, cannot directly defend Ukrainians as Ukraine was not able to become a NATO member state before Russia invaded its territory.

Sometimes rules and law provide security and stability in the world. And sometimes, as we have seen in 2022, it permits conflict to burn on.

As we will discuss, the global rules-based order is fast changing in 2022. And as such, this underscores a need to re-set the international system.

But what can be done to stop people from being killed in this unprovoked war – a war that in many ways illustrates a wider war between democracies and authoritarians, as the world transitions toward a new bipolarity.

And, if a global order reset is needed, what would that reset look like?

These are huge challenges that require sensible analysis.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar: In this week’s podcast Selwyn Manning and Paul Buchanan debate: How recently New Zealand Government confirmed its intention to be defined as an independent Pacific Island state, where its foreign policy should be considered against the collective values that its peoples share, and its diplomacy (if you consider human rights issues) will now be expressed multilaterally with likeminded countries.

But how does this work in practice?

Many see multilateral bodies like the United Nations being controlled by large global powers such as China and the United States of America. That this reality renders the UN’s security council as toothless, cumbersome, and slow to act in times of crisis.

Basically, this form of multilateralism seems designed to create a stalemate between great powers that assert their respective competing agendas. The affect; small countries lose their voice and influence.

• So how do small powers like New Zealand express themselves on the world stage?
• How do small countries shape reform of global bodies, so that they can work as forces of good in a world where geopolitics is divided between polarised blocs?
• Is microlateralism (a global collective of likeminded states) the answer?
• Is New Zealand about to stride out on the world-stage to assert this new form of multilateral collective bargaining?

WE INVITE YOU TO PARTICIPATE WHILE WE ARE LIVE WITH COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS IN THE RECORDING OF THIS PODCAST:

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

A View from Afar (@ midday, Thursdays NZST): In this week’s podcast Selwyn Manning and Paul Buchanan debate:

Recently New Zealand Government confirmed its intention to be defined as an independent Pacific Island state, where its foreign policy should be considered against the collective values that its peoples share, and its diplomacy (if you consider human rights issues) will now be expressed multilaterally with likeminded countries.

But how does this work in practice?

Many see multilateral bodies like the United Nations being controlled by large global powers such as China and the United States of America. That this reality renders the UN’s security council as toothless, cumbersome, and slow to act in times of crisis.

Basically, this form of multilateralism seems designed to create a stalemate between great powers that assert their respective competing agendas. The affect; small countries lose their voice and influence.

• So how do small powers like New Zealand express themselves on the world stage?
• How do small countries shape reform of global bodies, so that they can work as forces of good in a world where geopolitics is divided between polarised blocs?
• Is microlateralism (a global collective of likeminded states) the answer?
• Is New Zealand about to stride out on the world-stage to assert this new form of multilateral collective bargaining?

WE INVITE YOU TO PARTICIPATE WHILE WE ARE LIVE WITH COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS IN THE RECORDING OF THIS PODCAST:

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning present A View from Afar and in this episode they discuss:

• The US Electoral College Vote confirms Joe Biden as president-elect
• What does this mean for the South-Pacific?
• China + US are global powers operating in the SOPAC. But how does France fit into this mix?