Donald Trump is a mercantilist, as noted in Trump’s tariffs: Short-term damage or long-term ruin? ‘The Bottom Line’, Al Jazeera, 11 April 2025 (or here on YouTube). But the United States, in today’s world, is not a mercantilist country. Or at least not a successful mercantilist country, though it is inhabited by many mercantilists.

In that television interview, Georgetown University professor of Public Policy, Michael Strain said: “I don’t think [Trump’s tariffs are] smart politics, but I think the president [thinks they are]. I think that President Trump is a true mercantilist. The president believes that if the United States are running a trade deficit that means we are losing economic value to the rest of the world.”

Mercantilism, in its most literal form, is the belief that international trade is ‘economic warfare’, and that winning is achieved by a country exporting more than it imports. Obviously, the total amount of exports in this world is exactly equal to the total amount of imports. Every internationally traded good is both an export and an import. So, mercantilism is a belief-system which sees the world in zero-sum terms, as winners and losers, as warfare by financial means.

My chart and article yesterday (International Trade over time: gifts with strings, Evening Report, 8 May 2025) shows the accumulated ‘excess benefits’ of unbalanced global trade over the last forty years. The countries on the top-left-side of the chart are deficit/debtor countries; and the countries on the bottom-right-side are surplus/creditor countries. (The countries are selected on the basis of available ‘current account’ data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025, and as representatives of deficit and surplus countries. China, if on the chart, would belong close to Malaysia. The chart is made from my own calculations to adjust for inflation.)

The chart necessarily – because deficits must be financed elsewhere by surpluses – has a seesaw shape. Some countries are up, some countries are down; and some countries occupy the central pivot, neither up nor down. So long as some countries have consumed substantial amounts of stuff (imports) which they have not yet paid for (the deficit countries), some other countries (the surplus countries) have supplied stuff (exports) that they have not yet accepted payment for (and are unlikely to accept payment for in the imaginable future). Imports are paid for by exports.

It’s not a true seesaw, which is typically either grounded or horizontally balanced. We may think of it as a seesaw pivoting above a chasm. What is true is that if the downside goes further down – that is, if the surplus countries’ accumulated surpluses get bigger – then the upside (accumulated deficits) must go further up. The seesaw is a ‘system’, and the only alternative to the seesaw shape is system collapse, analogous to the whole seesaw breaking off its pivot and falling into the chasm.

Imports are paid for by exports. But many contracted payments are deferred, indeed to the point where the payments will never actually take place. Instead of receiving payment in the form of imports, the mercantilist surplus countries have gleefully accepted ‘promises’; effectively ‘IOUs’ (‘I owe you’). (These ‘financial promises’ or ‘financial assets’ are essentially bonds [ie credit], or titles [ie equity]; promises themselves can be bought and sold, and can appreciate or depreciate in market trading [including depreciating to zero]. Promises typically earn, for their owners, additional promises in the form of interest and dividends. Interest and dividends may be realised – that is, spent – on imports, or may be ‘compounded’ – another word for ‘accumulated’ – hence the concept of compound interest.) Technically, inflation exists when the particular promise that we call money depreciates in market value.

In a mercantilist world, all countries want to occupy the low ‘ground’ (ie a point below the seesaw pivot); they want to import less than they export, and to accumulate promises. In a stable world economy, so long as some countries insist on occupying the low ground, then some others must occupy the high ground.

The most obvious deficit countries in the chart – countries with an accumulation of enjoyed (or invested in new structures) but unpaid-for imports – are the United States, Australia, Greece, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. (Another important deficit country is Türkiye, for which the data is not good enough, but would almost certainly have an accumulated ‘current account’ deficit of over $US100,000 per Turkish person.) These are the world’s ‘spendthrifts’.

The most obvious surplus countries in the chart are Taiwan, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Indeed, the European Union – more than anywhere else, including China – is a mercantilist enterprise. (Further, the European Union is starting to look quite shabby, especially the countries just mentioned.) This is what Donald Trump means by the European Union ‘screwing’ the United States. (Refer EU was born to ‘screw’ US, Trump says, France24, 26 Feb 2025.)

Surplus/creditor nations (like Germany) do not want to settle; they want to compound, they want deficit/debtor nations (like Aotearoa New Zealand) to extend their liabilities. The mercantilist countries are content – indeed, more than content – for other countries to enjoy the fruits of their labour and their capital.

Just as the deficit countries are the world’s ‘spendthrifts’, the surplus countries are the world’s ‘misers’. The global economy maintains a successful equilibrium so long as the willing spendthrifts balance out the insistent misers.

Donald Trump threatens to disturb that global equilibrium by saying – in effect – that he wants the United States to join the ‘miser club’; he says he wants his country to stop being screwed by the misers. The thing is, though, he probably doesn’t actually mean it. His natural proclivity is to spend, and to gamble. He’s a hedonist, not a puritan nor a thriftwad; his nature is neither parsimonious nor austere.

(I would rather Donald Trump than Friedrich Merz was United States’ president; and prefer the pragmatism of the United States and Australian Treasurers over the austere Nicola Willis or the United Kingdom’s brutally austere Rachel Reeves. In 2027, I am optimistic that, in office, NZ Labour’s Barbara Edmonds will be able to break away from the austere image of female Finance Ministers with whom we have become familiar – remember Ruthenasia; public austerity is an election-losing strategy, a generator of societal inequality and low morale.)

Nevertheless, Trump may be unintentionally breaking the world economy, on account of his – or his advisers’ (eg Peter Navarro) – weak understanding of it. If the surplus/creditor nations sought to spend their credits (except for spending in very small increments) they would: either bankrupt the debtor countries, creating systemic collapse; or, due to depreciating prices of assets being dumped onto financial markets, have to accept many fewer imports than they felt they were due. Financial promises work according to the use-it or lose-it rule.

The Great Depression

Parsimony, austerity, and mercantilism in the 1920s got us into the Great Depression of 1930 to 1934. (These were the core years of the Depression; the timing varies for different countries.) The Great Depression was a global event that occurred as a ‘race to the bottom’; almost all countries wanted to be below the pivot of the seesaw and none at the top. The United Kingdom – under Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill – in particular was a deficit country that tried to push its side of the seesaw down through a process of internal devaluation (deflation) at a time when France, United States (under the curmudgeonly Coolidge), and Germany had anchored their side of the seesaw down. (At that time, Germany had been – thanks to post World War One reparations – forced onto the same downside of the seesaw. Churchill’s most specific action was the returning of the British pound to an unworkable restored Gold Standard at an overvalued exchange rate.)

(In the pre WW1 global environment, one of the most important balancing deficit/debtor countries was Russia. Russia seceded from the global capitalist system in 1917, largely as a result of the war. The loss of Russia’s pre-war presence – as a counterweight – was an aggravating factor in the Great Interwar Crisis.)

Deep Mercantilism

Donald Trump, while an overt mercantilist, is shallow in his convictions. He loves ‘money’, but he also loves what money can buy.

Deep mercantilists love money, and other financial assets (‘virtual gold’) including cryptocurrencies, in miserly ways; they believe in making money, not spending it. (Stereotypical new wave misers are young men, mining and trading in Bitcoin from bedrooms in the parents’ homes.) Through hoarding, they act to impede the global circulation of money, not to enable it.

Finance, as an academic discipline, is quintessentially mercantilist. It equates the accumulation and appreciation of financial assets – promises – with the creation of wealth; and that the wealthiest country in the world is the one with the fullest Treasury. And so many people – especially journalists – buy into that vision of wealth as a pile of treasure, as an accumulation of credits.

Modern mercantilists only regard mined gold as wealth, not gold still in the ground; and only promises that are tradeable, or at least potentially tradeable. Financial institutions regard your mortgage as their wealth; and they understand public debt to be private wealth; they buy and sell mortgages, along with other assets such as government debt.

And they believe in the magic of compound interest. They believe that unspent money – unsettled promises – grow exponentially and indefinitely. The seesaw chart, showing unpaid-for imports accumulated over 40 years, belies this. If the surplus nations all tried to spend their gold and their paper (and other virtual) riches – by becoming deficit countries, by shifting the seesaw into the alternate position – then they would find both that their ability to import from the present deficit/debtor countries would amount to less than the unpaid-for amounts shown in the chart – and they would find that many of their claims (ie promises) would be unrealisable.

As already noted, trade credits – promises – are accumulated on a ‘use-it or lose-it’ basis; this amounts to a negative form of compound interest. The surplus countries have not sufficiently used their credits; without realising it, their hoarded credits have already lost much of their initial purchasing capacity. While individual countries – especially small ones like Finland – may successfully shift from one side of the seesaw to the other, it is too late for the seesaw to swing without the surplus group of countries incurring heavy losses. The present deficit countries are simply not tooled up to produce masses of goods and services for export.

Private pension funds represent the epitome of deep mercantilism.

Deep mercantilism is not just about countries and international trade. A major feature of the next Great Depression will be the collapse of these funds, as far too many ‘first world’ people in their fifties and sixties seek to withdraw and spend their retirement savings. Thus, the next Great Depression will be one of stagflation – not 1930s’-style deflation – as there will be a rush of ‘Generation Jones’ people (born in the later 1950s and early 1960s) to spend their savings and finding that the global cupboard of goods and services is becoming bare.

Non-Mercantilism

Human wealth is actually the ‘factors of production’: people (simplistically construed as ‘labour’) and nature (simplistically construed as ‘land’) and structures [and inventories; and including intangible structures such as ‘knowledge’] (construed by economists true to their discipline as ‘capital’) and the enjoyable goods and services which flow to humans from these ‘factors’.

The next global Great Depression can be forestalled if the deficit countries (like United States and Aotearoa New Zealand) – the less-mercantilist countries, or at least the ‘unsuccessful’ would-be mercantilist countries – continue as net spenders, given that the substantial likelihood is that the prevalent mercantilist countries (like Germany and Sweden and Netherlands and China) are likely to at least try to persevere as accumulators of financial assets through the process of selling more goods than they buy.

Or the next Great Depression can be forestalled by most countries slowly moving, in concert, into a position of balance. Imagine each end of the seesaw neither up nor down, a horizontal seesaw on its pivot. Here countries like France, Italy, Indonesia and Philippines serve as examples.

Collapse and its prevention

Under prevailing mercantilist ideology, the best place for a country to be is on the downside of the seesaw. The biggest danger – the danger of system breakage – is that of the deficit countries trying to get their side of the seesaw down while the surplus countries are also trying to keep their side down. Any option of voluntary balance – of some countries trying to do what the majority are trying not to do – may forestall a global economic collapse; including a voluntary continuation of the present situation, with one group of countries happy to stay up while another group of countries want to stay down.

The irony is that the real winners are the alleged losers. For good reason, the seesaw chart shows these real-winner countries at the top rather than at the bottom. The real winners like to import, to enjoy their stuff; they do not pursue the mercantilist illusions of treasure hoards and compound interest.

Children understand that when one side of the seesaw is down, the other should be up. And that being up is fun. Will the adults learn what children already know?

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

There is a reported apparent rift within cabinet between Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta and Defence Minister Andrew Little over Aotearoa New Zealand’s position in the widening conflict between the United States and China.

While at its core it is over relative economic power, the conflict is manifested by China’s increased presence in the Pacific Ocean, including military, and over Taiwan. Both countries have long Pacific coastlines.

However, the United States has a far greater and longstanding economic and military presence (including nuclear weapons in South Korea) in the Pacific.

Despite this disparity, the focus is on China as being the threat. Minister Mahuta supports continuing the longstanding more independent position of successive Labour and National-led governments.

This goes back to the adoption of the nuclear-free policy and consequential ending of New Zealand’s military alliance with the United States in the mid-1980s.

On the other hand, Minister Little’s public utterances veer towards a gradual shift away from this independent position and towards a stronger military alignment with the United States.

This is not a conflict between socialist and capitalist countries. For various reasons I struggle with the suggestion that China is a socialist nation in spite of the fact that it (and others) say it is and that it is governed by a party calling itself communist. But that is a debate for another occasion.

Core and peripheral countries
This conflict is often seen as between the two strongest global economic powers. However, it is not as simple as that.

Whereas the United States is an imperialist country, China is not. I have discussed this previously in Political Bytes (31 January 2022): Behind the ‘war’ against China.

In coming to this conclusion I drew upon work by Minqi Li, professor of economics at the University of Utah, who focussed on whether China is an imperialist country or not.

He is not soft on China, acknowledging that it  ” . . . has developed an exploitative relationship with South Asia, Africa, and other raw material exporters”.

But his concern is to make an objective assessment of China’s global economic power. He does this by distinguishing between core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries:

“The ‘core countries’ specialise in quasi-monopolistic, high-profit production processes. This leaves ‘peripheral countries’ to specialise in highly competitive, low-profit production processes.”

This results in an “…unequal exchange and concentration of world wealth in the core.”

Minqi Li describes  China’s economy as:

“. . . the world’s largest when measured by purchasing power parity. Its rapid expansion is reshapes the global geopolitical map leading western mainstream media to begin defining China as a new imperialist power.”

Consequently he concludes that China is placed as a semi-peripheral county which predominately takes “. . . surplus value from developed economies and giving it to developing economies.”

In my January 2022 blog, I concluded that:

“Where does this leave the ‘core countries’, predominately in North America and Europe? They don’t want to wind back capitalism in China. They want to constrain it to ensure that while it continues to be an attractive market for them, China does not destablise them by progressing to a ‘core country’.”

Why the widening conflict now?
Nevertheless, while neither socialist nor imperialist, China does see the state playing a much greater role in the country’s economy, including increasing its international influence. This may well explain at least some of its success.

So why the widening conflict now? Why did it not occur between the late 1970s, when China opened up to market forces, and in the 1990s and 2000s as its world economic power increased? Marxist economist and blogger Michael Roberts has provided an interesting insight: The ‘New Washington Consensus’.

Roberts describes what became known as the “Washington Consensus” in the 1990s. It was a set of economic policy prescriptions considered to constitute the “standard” reform package promoted for economically struggling developing countries.

The name is because these prescriptions were developed by Washington DC-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the United States Treasury.

The prescriptions were based on so-called free market policies such as trade and finance liberalisation and privatisation of state assets. They also entailed fiscal and monetary policies intended to minimise fiscal deficits and public spending.

But now, with the rise of China as a rival economic global power globally and the failure of the neoliberal economic model to deliver economic growth and reduce inequality among nations and within nations, the world has changed.

What World Bank data reveals
Roberts draws upon World Bank data to highlight the striking nature of this global change. He uses a “Shares in World Economy” table based on percentages of gross domestic production from 1980 to 2020.

Whereas the United States was largely unchanged (25.2 percent to 24.7 percent), over the same 40 years, China leapt from 1.7 percent to 17.3 percent. China’s growth is extraordinary. But the data also provides further insights.

Economic blocs are also compared. The G7 countries declined from 62.5 percent to 47.2 percent while the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also fell — from 78 percent to 61.7 percent.

Interestingly while experiencing a minor decline, the United States increased its share within these two blocs — from 40.3 percent to 52.3 percent in G7 and from 32.3 percent to 40 percent in OECD. This suggests that while both the G7 and OECD have seen their economic power decline, the power of the United States has increased within the blocs.

Roberts use of this data also makes another pertinent observation. Rather than a bloc there is a grouping of “developing nations” which includes China. Over the 40 year period its percentage increased from 21.5 percent to 36.4 percent.

But when China is excluded from the data there is a small decline from 19.9 percent to 19.1 percent. In other words, the sizeable percentage of growth of developing countries is solely due to China, the other developing countries have had a small fall.

In this context Roberts describes a “New Washington Consensus” aimed at sustaining the “. . . hegemony of US capital and its junior allies with a new approach”.

In his words:

“But what is this new consensus? Free trade and capital flows and no government intervention is to be replaced with an ‘industrial strategy’ where governments intervene to subsidise and tax capitalist companies so that national objectives are met.

“There will be more trade and capital controls, more public investment and more taxation of the rich. Underneath these themes is that, in 2020s and beyond, it will be every nation for itself — no global pacts, but regional and bilateral agreements; no free movement, but nationally controlled capital and labour.

“And around that, new military alliances to impose this new consensus.”

Understanding BRICS
This is the context that makes the widening hostility of the United States towards China highly relevant. There is now an emerging potential counterweight of “developing countries” to the United States’ overlapping hegemons of G7 and the OECD.

This is BRICS. Each letter is from the first in the names of its current (and founding) members — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Around 40 countries have expressed interest in joining this new trade bloc.

These countries broadly correspond with the semi-periphery countries of Minqi Li and the developing countries of Roberts. Predominantly they are from Africa, Asia, Middle East, and Central and South America.

Geoffrey Miller of the Democracy Project has recently published (August 21) an interesting column discussing whether New Zealand should develop a relationship with BRICS: Should New Zealand build bridges with BRICS?

Journalist Julian Borger, writing for The Guardian (August 22), highlights the significant commonalities and differences of the BRICS nations at its recent trade summit: Critical BRICS trade summit in South Africa.

Al Jazeera (August 24)has updated the trade summit with the decision to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join BRICS next January: The significance of BRICS adding six new members .

Which way New Zealand?
This is the context in which the apparent rift between Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta and Defence Minister Andrew Little should be seen.

It is to be hoped that that whatever government comes into office after October’s election, it does not allow the widening conflict between the United States and China to water down Aotearoa’s independent position.

The dynamics of the G7/OECD and BRICS relationship are ongoing and uncertainty characterises how they might play out. It may mean a gradual changing of domination or equalisation of economic power.

After all, the longstanding British Empire was replaced by a different kind of United States empire. It is also possible that the existing United States hegemony continues albeit weakened.

Regardless, it is important politically and economically for New Zealand to have trading relations with both G7 and developing countries (including the expanding BRICS).

Ian Powell is a progressive health, labour market and political “no-frills” forensic commentator in New Zealand. A former senior doctors union leader for more than 30 years, he blogs at Second Opinion and Political Bytes, where this article was first published. Republished with the author’s permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

]]> https://eveningreport.nz/2022/06/10/we-can-learn-from-chinese-diplomacy-says-maori-pati-critic-of-nz-stance/ Thu, 09 Jun 2022 13:18:25 +0000 https://eveningreport.nz/2022/06/10/we-can-learn-from-chinese-diplomacy-says-maori-pati-critic-of-nz-stance/ Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

Newly elected Māori Pati president and columnist John Tamihere has launched a blistering criticism of New Zealand’s negative media attitude to Chinese trade and security overtures to the South Pacific, saying “it’s none of our business”.

Writing in The New Zealand Herald today, former Labour cabinet minister Tamihere argued that China had every right to “korero with our Pacific brothers and sisters” without being sneered at.

He said China had handed out a “master class in diplomacy” to Australia, NZ and the US.

An Asia Pacific Report last week noted China had no “colonial baggage in the Pacific” and was a developing country itself, having “made impressive leaps in development and poverty reduction”.

Tamihere, also chief executive of Whānau Ora and West Auckland Urban Māori organisation Te Whānau o Waipareira, said: “I just don’t like the stilted narrative that China is always the bad guy and I don’t buy it because I don’t see the evidence in it.”

He said he would “lower myself for a moment to acknowledge the media reports that China is allegedly buying voting support from the Pacific with military and security intentions in their backyard”.

However, “none of that matters because any sovereign nation has a right to determine its own foreign policy and its own destiny.

‘Pacific taken for granted’
“Meanwhile, [Pacific nations] have been taken for granted and mistreated by the rest of us.

“When was the last time the Americans, Australians and Kiwis entered into trade agreements with our Pacific neighbours?” he asked.

“When you treat people as second-class citizens in your so-called area of interest, why is it so bizarre that they enter into their own trade relationships like we did [with China] in 2008?

In a world first for any developed country, New Zealand entered into a free trade agreement with China that year and opened a competitive advantage.

“Why is it that those eight Pacific nations are currently being ‘manipulated’ [by China] yet we weren’t?

“So it’s okay for the US, Australian and Aotearoa to engage in free trade agreements with China but it’s not okay for the Pacific and Melanesian nations?”

Tamihere said “Aotearoa cannot be drafted without our sovereign consent into any play by Australia or the US”.

He added: “The Australians buying nuclear-powered American submarines demonstrates that they may as well be the 51st state of the USA. Gone is the Anzac brotherhood, it is a myth.

“It is about time we shaped our own foreign policy rather than being dragged along by others.”

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

]]> https://eveningreport.nz/2020/02/05/bryce-edwards-political-roundup-the-extraordinary-yet-tragic-political-life-of-mike-moore/ Tue, 04 Feb 2020 20:45:53 +0000 https://eveningreport.nz/?p=31035

“We may never see his like again” wrote Richard Prebble following the death of Mike Moore in the weekend. Moore was certainly an extraordinary politician. He made some remarkable achievements, had an inimitable style, and was a mass of contradictions. 

Mike Moore’s place in New Zealand political history is complicated. He has been described by many as “tribal Labour”, and yet the Labour political establishment largely shunned him in later years. His working class background and populism was out of place in a Labour Party increasingly characterised by social liberalism (although ironically much celebrated in tributes since his passing). And his role as a central player in the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 90s meant he was an uncomfortable reminder of a period Labour would rather not dwell on.

He was more in line with Chris Trotter’s fabled “Waitakere Man” – socially conservative and concerned with the economic advancement of ordinary people. And yet many saw Moore’s politics as a betrayal of the very people he sought to represent.

There have been some very good obituaries that nicely sum up the remarkable life, colour and contradictions of Moore. One of the best is by RNZ’s Tim Watkin, who says Moore “deserves his prominent place in New Zealand’s political history”, and details his “voracious, eclectic, indefatigable” political nature – see: Mike Moore – Working Class Hero 1949-2020.

Watkin describes Moore’s career as “littered with frustrations”, but he also “reached the very top of global political structures” becoming the WTO boss, and therefore “arguably New Zealand’s most powerful political figure internationally.”

Watkin addresses Moore’s central role in implementing the neoliberal reforms: “He was damned as a Rogernome and deserves some the mix of flak and praise due everyone in that fourth Labour government. But that label was always too simplistic for Moore.”

For anyone who doubts Moore’s role as a disciple of Roger Douglas and David Lange, it’s worth reading John Roughan’s obituary for Moore, which points out that he was “the third-ranked minister in the most radical New Zealand government of our lifetime. Arguably he did more to create that government than either of its leading figures, prime minister David Lange or finance minister Roger Douglas” – see: Mike Moore obituary: New Zealand’s shortest-term prime minister (paywalled).

Moore’s role in Rogernomics is also discussed in a very interesting obituary by Richard Harman: “He was forever proposing ‘ideas’ such as his lamburger, but more particularly he was an ardent advocate of the free market principles that were driving Roger Douglas, David Caygill and Richard Prebble to reform the New Zealand economy radically. Maybe because he was overseas a lot or perhaps because he was not so comfortable with the long drawn out policy development process, he was not a central player in the reforms. A cheerleader, yes; but a policy wonk, no. And sometimes it seemed he was not really a true believer. He didn’t join Act, and he was the only Rogernome to stay on to play an active role in the party for the rest of his life” – see: Labour’s last working class hero.

Journalist Pattrick Smellie, who was a press secretary for Roger Douglas in the early years of the Fourth Labour Government, paints a picture of Moore as a political centrist, pointing out that some in the government and party regarded him as having a “moderating influence on the Douglas reforms”. Smellie says Moore “railed at times – both publicly and privately – against the crash-through radicalism of Roger Douglas’s economic reforms” – see his obituary: Mike Moore, NZ’s ‘most promising Prime Minister. Smellie suggests that Moore was neither on the left nor right of the party, and described himself as an “extreme moderate”.

He also records one-time Moore press secretary Paul Jackman arguing that Moore was “a hero” because his strong performance as Opposition leader, especially in the very close 1993 election, moderated the National Party in the 1990s, preventing them from introducing a more rightwing programme.

Misfit within the modern Labour Party

There’s now a consensus that Moore performed very well as Labour leader, preventing the party being more heavily defeated in 1990 and then coming very close to winning in 1993. Yet he was immediately replaced by Helen Clark and, despite staying on as an MP for another six years, his relationship with the party soured.

According to friend Richard Prebble, “Mike himself admitted he was by the 1990s out of step with the modern, university educated Parliamentary Labour Party”, and “Helen Clark famously complained he was incurably macho” – see: Michael Moore was lucid, funny and kind – former MP Richard Prebble remembers his lifelong friend. His social conservativism reportedly “put him offside with the new Labour MPs whose agenda was social engineering.”

Tim Watkin also discusses the differences between Moore and his increasingly middle class party: “Most politicians on the left today are defined by what is often called identity politics. That was not for Moore; he saw the world through the lens of class. That was the devil that needed to be exorcised.”

According to Pattrick Smellie, it was at this stage that Labour split “rancorously along cultural as well as economic policy lines”. Moore was therefore “abandoned by much of the Labour hierarchy”, which meant when he gave his valedictory parliamentary speech in 1999 it was “sometimes bitter”.

And Richard Harman reports that as an opposition MP he would “lecture journalists on the cabal of feminists and left-wingers who had taken over the party and ended his career.” Harman concludes: “in a way Moore’s analysis was right. Whereas another Northland working class politician, Winston Peters, had recognised that the urban middle class now captured the mainstream parties, Moore resisted the urge to leave Labour.”

Moore did spend some time contemplating and planning a breakaway centrist party, which was rumoured at the time to involve Winston Peters or a merger with NZ First. But he could never take the plunge, being too tribally loyal to his party, even if the party itself no longer returned the sentiment.

According to Stuff political editor Luke Malpass, Moore would have been a better fit in Australian politics – see: Mike Moore: Former PM better understood in Australia? And he argues that the schism between Moore and Labour typifies the contemporary problem that leftwing parties have with working class politics.

Here’s Malpass’ main point: “Moore’s background is also a challenge to modern Labour. Fairly or not, around the world working class voters are slowly but surely turning towards conservative parties as social democrats are seen as parties of the elites. This has happened in the US, Australia, UK and France – among other countries. Labour needs to try to fight this trend in New Zealand. It could do worse than asking itself if there would be a room for a Mike Moore in today’s party. And if not, why not?”

The rightwing embrace of Moore

Although the Labour Party’s relationship with Moore and his legacy is fraught, for the political right the former Labour leader is more easily celebrated. David Farrar points out that Moore “understandably remained bitter about his treatment by Labour for decades. In fact National treated him far better by supporting him to become WTO Director-General and later Ambassador to the US” – see: More on Mike Moore.

Farrar also points to the class problems symbolised by the former PM: “Moore was the last working class leader of the Labour Party. He may be the last one ever, considering more working class voters support National than Labour now.”

Business leaders and rightwing figures are praising Moore whole-heartedly – see, for example, Chris Keall’s Mike Moore remembered as a passionate defender of trade. In this, Taxpayers’ Union chairperson Barrie Saunders is quoted saying, “Mike Moore was a great self-educated New Zealander, who was able to re-think traditional Labour Party mantras.”

Newstalk ZB’s Mike Hosking declares Mike Moore was my favourite politician. He expresses sadness that Moore is likely to be the last blue-collar PM, and adds that he was “a brilliantly nice, entertaining, and erudite man.”

The leftwing evaluations of Moore

The tributes celebrating Moore’s working class background – and somehow by extension, politics – are galling for some on the left, who regard Moore’s career as dominated by the pursuit of an anti-working class agenda. In Chris Trotter’s Looking back at the political career of Mike Moore, New Zealand’s 34th Prime Minister, he paints a picture of Moore as anti-idealistic, extremely pragmatic, as well as being ruthless and cynical.

According to Trotter, “For pretty much the whole of his political life” Moore was concerned with “the grim task of dismantling many of the New Zealand working-class’s most important achievements”, especially those of previous Labour governments. And he suggests that Moore’s working class background was cynically used by both the politician and his party to further the Rogernomics revolution: “How useful it was to have someone who could defend radical free-market capitalism in the absolutely authentic accents of a working-class Kiwi bloke?”

Similarly, although he salutes Moore’s achievements, leftwing blogger Martyn Bradbury briefly tells a story of a working class leftwinger who became a neoliberal leader and an apostle for the globalisation project – see: Mike Moore 1949-2020: Working class battler to neoliberal architect. Bradbury says Moore’s career was tragic because he was caught between his working class origins and his refusal to admit the damage he caused to working class communities in his time in government.

Finally, for one of the best and most insightful accounts of Moore’s political career, it’s well worth watching Moore’s one-hour interview from 2017 with Guyon Espiner for RNZ’s The 9th  Floor series – see: The Trader – Mike Moore.

by Dr Bryce Edwards

This week might come to be seen as a turning point in New Zealand’s complex trading and political relations with China. Suddenly there is a very strong awareness of the deteriorating relations between the capitals of Wellington and Beijing. And although there is plenty of confusion and contention about the details, it’s clear that the Chinese Government has initiated a type of political blowback against New Zealand. This is based on what the Beijing government see as a betrayal by its formerly-close trading partner.

Three factors have been discussed this week as signalling that China has initiated a campaign of retaliation against New Zealand: 1) the sudden announcement that China is postponing the long-planned launch of tourism initiative in Wellington next week, 2) the mysterious turning back of an Air New Zealand flight to Shanghai in the weekend, and 3) the long-running inability of Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to arrange a diplomatic visit to China.

The story about the postponement of the tourism launch was broken by Barry Soper on the frontpage of the Herald on Tuesday, explaining that: “The 2019 China-New Zealand Year of Tourism was meant to be launched with great fanfare at Wellington’s Te Papa museum next week, but that has been postponed by China” – see: China, New Zealand links sink to new low: PM Jacinda Ardern’s visit on hold, tourism project postponed.

In a second piece on Tuesday, Soper points out that the diplomatic explanations for the postponement aren’t credible: “the lame excuse from Wellington officials that there was a change of schedule. Given the Year was announced two years ago by the Key Government when the Chinese Premier visited here, Beijing’s had plenty of time to schedule it in” – see: NZ feeling the heat of the Chinese dragon.

This article also delves into the long-running difficulties that Ardern is having in getting an official visit agreed to by Beijing. Soper says: “The invitation for Jacinda Ardern to visit Beijing early this year’s been put on ice and all her talk at the end of last year about neither side being able to coordinate their diaries was baloney.”

In addition, Soper points to the third issue – the “turning back of the new Air New Zealand plane over the weekend, which was half way to Shanghai, because it wasn’t registered”. These three incidents illustrate, according to Soper that “New Zealand is feeling the heat of the Chinese dragon’s breath and if we’re not careful it could incinerate us.” He reports that “word from the Chinese capital is that retaliation is being worked on.”

And Soper points out that it’s easy to understand why the Chinese have become upset with New Zealand, after the Government here essentially decided late last year to ban the Chinese company Huawei from being involved in the new 5G telecommunications network.

I covered this at the time in my column, Huawei decision is the price of being in Five Eyes, pointing out that the decision was widely seen as fulfilling a US Government request to help it its geopolitical battle against China and Huawei. I predicted, “There is certainly going to be a cost for the ban… this country’s economic and diplomatic ties with the superpower of China will now be strained as a result.”

Of course, it wasn’t just the Huawei decision that soured relations with China – Wellington has been edging away from a close friendship with Beijing for a few years. This is all explained in a must-read column today by Victoria University of Wellington’s strategic studies specialist, Robert Ayson, who goes through the deterioration of the Wellington-Beijing relationship, saying that even under John Key “New Zealand was raising concerns about China’s behaviour in the South China Sea” and in return received some messages “suggesting that Wellington should stay quiet if it wanted an FTA upgrade” – see: New Zealand and China: time for clarity in a hall of mirrors.

According to Ayson, New Zealand’s criticisms of China have been increasing, especially with Ron Mark as Minister of Defence, and with the Government “calling out” China “for nefarious cyber activities”.

The Labour-led Government is still denying, or at least downplaying, the serious pushback that is now coming from Beijing. For the most recent examples of this, see Jo Moir’s news report, Winston Peters dismisses claims govt visits to China stalling.

The best quote in this story is from Shane Jones who declares: “I don’t think I’m one of these losery politicians that’s apparently not allowed to go to China, in fact I’m very popular with the Chinese – I think they see a kindred industrial spirit.” And David Parker is also reported as having visited China and seen no signs of trouble in the relationship.

But there’s clearly now a consensus amongst political commentators and journalists that the political blowback from China is real, many of who are complaining that the Prime Minister and Government are either failing to be upfront or else simply being delusional about the relationship.

Veteran political journalist Richard Harman reports that “the foreign affairs community” is certainly asking questions about China’s retaliation against New Zealand, and says diplomats and officials even see the incident with the Air New Zealand flight as evidence that the relationship has soured – see his column, Why was the AirNZ plane turned back?.

The suggestion is made that China is now cracking down “on technical infringements of its laws” when it comes to New Zealand exporters or the national carrier. In this regard he reports that Victoria University’s David Capie “suggested that what the incident showed was that New Zealand no longer had a special relationship with China. In other words, all things being equal previously, China would have found a way to let the plane land.”

China is prone to using this type of ambiguous retaliation, according to Newsroom’s Sam Sachdeva: “China has a history of operating with plausible deniability when it comes to meting out punishments” – see: NZ-China ‘scheduling issues‘ cause for concern.

Sachdeva reports, “One observer noted that blowback often begins with tourism numbers, moving onto international education before spreading to the wider trade and economic relationship – a script into which the postponement of the Year of Tourism launch sits uneasily.”

The problem, according to the New Zealand Herald, is that New Zealand appears to have chosen sides in the growing US-China rivalry – see the editorial: Has our govt antagonised China?. It points out that “it is not hard to see why China would have the impression this country is not the friend it used to be. The new Government’s ‘reset’ of policy towards the Pacific Islands is strongly tinged with support for the US and suspicion of China’s interests in the region.”

New Zealand observers in Beijing are also commenting on what’s going on. The most interesting is businessman David Mahon, who is interviewed by Liam Dann, saying that the decision to ban Huawei was “seen as a Five Eyes stitch up” and “a breach of trust” – see: NZ/China relationship: ‘We have a big problem’.

Mahon suggests that New Zealand had been building a much closer relationship with China for the last four decades, with the Chinese having huge respect for this country, but “In the last 12 months or so that has almost reversed. So there is now a very different view, almost an opposite view of New Zealand.”

There are real dangers of the China-NZ relationship getting much worse. Geopolitical and security analyst Paul Buchanan says that he’s now warning his clients against going to China due to risks to their safety as a result of what’s going on at the governmental level. On Newstalk ZB, Buchanan said “if you are a New Zealand resident in China, you need to be cognisant of the fact that there could be a knock on your door and you could be taken away on corruption charges or turpitude charges” – see: Kiwis warned over ‘hostage diplomacy’ from China.

Slowly but surely, the current government has engineered a major reorientation of foreign policy according to Audrey Young, who labels the Relationship with China a diplomatic mess. She complains that this “was never foreshadowed before the last election”.

The shift appears to lie with New Zealand First and Winston Peters: “Peters has been an irritant. A year ago Peters framed his Pacific Reset in terms of a response to counter China’s growing influence in the region, and he challenged China’s most important foreign policy strategy, the Belt and Road initiative. He ended the year with a speech in Washington, almost a love-letter to America, practically begging them to get more involved in the Pacific to counter China’s influence. A National Party Foreign Minister could not have made such a speech without being accused of wanting to rejoin Anzus.”

According to Young, the onus is now on the Government, and the Prime Minister, to fix the deterioration. They need to “to take a lot more care in preserving the relationship New Zealand had and to be less cavalier.”

Similarly, the Prime Minister needs to sort out her long-promised trip to Beijing, according to economics journalist Hamish Rutherford – see: Until Jacinda Ardern visits China, questions about the relationship will only deepen.

Rutherford discusses the on-again-off-again trip: “Ardern is left trotting out the line that this is a scheduling issue, and the only thing keeping her from an official visit is scheduling clashes. This has been the case for some time; journalists were asked to prepare for a trip in December, however this was abruptly cancelled. The longer the situation goes on, the more it appears that the excuse that the problems are caused by scheduling issues are simply a subtle diplomatic slap. For weeks there have been rumours that officials at the Chinese Embassy have warned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that the trip is not happening until other issues are resolved, something Mfat denies.”

Herald business editor Fran O’Sullivan is also calling for the Government to quickly fix the problems – see: Chinese relations must get back on track. Her suggestion, however, is that the “postponed” tourism event needs to be sorted out by the Minister of Tourism Kelvin Davis getting “on the first plane up to China to sort out the debacle”.

But perhaps it’s the Minister of Foreign Affairs that needs to be sorted out. Richard Harman suggests that this might already be happening: “The Prime Minister appeared yesterday to deliver a subtle message to Foreign Minister Winston Peters telling him, she, not him, ran foreign policy. This contrasts with her admission last year that she had not read a speech he gave in Washington directly criticising China and calling for more American involvement in the Pacific” – see: Ardern takes the lead on China.

Could Peters even be shifted on from his portfolio, in order to satisfy the Chinese? It seems unlikely, but that’s the hint that security specialist Robert Ayson is making when he says that fixing the NZ-China relations “may also mean a change in the pecking order within the politburo in Wellington.”

Ayson’s column, cited above, also has plenty of other suggestions for how the mess might be fixed – and these include providing the Chinese government with greater clarity about the Huawei decision, showing that New Zealand is not simply “a willing member of a new Cold War”, stop cosying up to the US, and pull back from Winston Peters’ anti-China Pacific Reset strategy.

Finally, last month Matthew Hooton wrote an important and prescient column about New Zealand’s changing relationship with China and US, and this is well worth reading as background for what is happening now – see: Is Jacinda Ardern on board with the Winston Peters Reset?.

A global human rights watchdog claims that Vietnam’s human rights record could jeopardise a free trade deal with the European Union.

A warning letter by Human Rights Watch, dated September 17, sent by 32 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) was addressed to the EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström.

It called for a “push for robust progress in Vietnam’s human rights record ahead of the possible ratification of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA)”.

“. . . loose provisions on national security have been widely used to suppress peaceful dissent and jail scores of human rights defenders. . .,” the letter said.

READ MORE: Vietnam censorship extends to popular, official news website

The letter claimed that there was a need for a series of targets that the country should meet before the agreement was handed over to the European Parliament for its approval.

The ratification of the EVFTA agreement is slated to happen at the end of this year and would rid the country of at least 99 percent of customs duties paid on exports into Europe.

Censorship has lately become a growing concern.

Censoring reality
The words Bachelor: Vietnam contestant Minh Thu uttered to Bachelor Quoc Trung on the episode which aired on September 21 said: “I went into this competition to find love, and I’ve found that love for myself, but it isn’t with you. It’s with someone else”.

While participating in the competition over time, Thu had fallen in love with another woman, fellow contestant Truc Nhu, and they left the programme together.

“In Vietnamese pop culture, there’s a lot of people that are rumoured to be LGBT or people that hint at it. . . So to see a moment that’s unequivocal, where someone is saying that they love someone else . . . I think it’s going to be very powerful to young people,” says the shows story producer Anh-Thu Nguyen.

At this point in the history of Vietnam, few are willing to come out of the proverbial closet – in more ways than one.

Despite this, censors allowed the confession to air almost completely, a move surprising many viewers and commentators.

Vietnam, a Communist country since 1976, has seen much censorship over the years and its culture, it appears, has been no different.

Bachelor: Vietnam, currently in its first season, has faced issues of potential censorship since its inception. According to the show’s executive producer, Anh Tran, it was difficult to sell to networks.

Many of the traditional parts of the United States’ version of the show had to be edited or cut out entirely to avoid censure from censors.

The rose ceremony, for example, has to be carefully edited to avoid showing a line-up of women vying for a man – the main plot point for the show.

Censorship of culture
Vietnam is ruled by the Communist Party, and censorship is seemingly common in the cultural realm as singer Mai Khoi could attest.

In March, the woman who has been dubbed as the country’s own Lady Gaga or Pussy Riot, was detained at the airport, and “interrogated for eight hours”.

Copies of her latest album, Dissent, were confiscated, she claimed in a Facebook post.
She has written songs about the women’s movement and LGBT rights. She also ran – unsuccessfully – for public office in the country. She now performs in secret in her own country.

The country has been a Communist nation since the 1960s, and censorship has long been a part of that.

Last month, Reuters reported that a court had jailed an activist for 12 years in prison and a further five years’ house arrest.

Nguyen Trung Truc, 44, was – according to a statement given by police – among a group called “Brotherhood for Democracy” in 2013. The group, police said, conducted “anti-government activities” with the aim of creating a system of “multi-party democracy” in Vietnam.

‘Hurt the prestige’
A second man, Bui Manh Dong, 40, was convicted over his comments on September 28.
Police said that Dong had “hurt the prestige and leading role of the [Communist] party and the state”.

Dong, and one other man, Doan Knanh Vinh Quang, were accused of encouraging people to protest against government policies or write posts that were critical of the government.

Vietnam has a high level of social media use among its citizens yet the country’s Communist government has introduced a new law which, according to Amnesty International, would force tech companies like Apple, Google, and Facebook to hand over data from their users.

“This decision has potentially devastating consequences for freedom of expression in Viet Nam,” said Clare Algar, international director of global operations for Amnesty International, in June.

“With the sweeping powers it grants the government to monitor online activity, this. . . means there is now no safe place left. . . for people to speak freely”.

Last year, it was reported that the country had built up a force of “cyber-troops” to tackle what they call “wrongful views”.

Jessica Marshall is a student journalist on the Postgraduate Diploma in Communication Studies course at AUT. She is filing articles in the Asia-Pacific Journalism Studies paper.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz