Timing is everything. And from China’s perspective, this week’s visit by its foreign minister to New Zealand could be coming at just the right moment. The visit by Wang Yi to Wellington will be his first since 2017.

Anniversaries are important to Beijing. It is more than just a happy coincidence that the visit is taking place during the tenth anniversary year of the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and New Zealand.

That agreement, signed during a visit to Wellington by Xi Jinping in November 2014, marked the start of glory days for bilateral trade. New Zealand’s exports to China have roughly doubled in value since Xi’s visit. They now stand at nearly $NZ21 billion annually. Imports are not far behind, but there is still a trade surplus of some $NZ3 billion in New Zealand’s favour.

Indeed, China has been New Zealand’s biggest two-way trading partner since 2017. A consistent flow of agricultural exports to China – especially milk powder and meat – helped to keep New Zealand afloat during the Covid-19 pandemic while both countries’ borders were closed.

However, New Zealand’s exports to China fell last year for the first time (except for covid-affected 2020) since the 2014 pact was signed. Goods exports took a particular tumble, falling $NZ1.7 billion from 2022 levels in the year to December 2023. Only a post-pandemic recovery in services exports, driven by travel, was able to mask a greater fall. But it was not enough to prevent a $NZ500 million drop overall.

The removal of China’s last remaining tariffs on New Zealand dairy products at the start of 2024 may provide some hope for improvement this year.

But forecasts for China’s economy are mixed and a bumpy post-Covid 19 recovery seems likely. After an expansion of 5.2 per cent in 2023, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts China’s economy will grow by only 4.6 per cent this year and 4.1 per cent in 2025.

Given its food-focused exports, New Zealand is particularly vulnerable to sluggish Chinese economic growth. Tourism is also affected: visitor numbers from China for November 2023 were just 52 per cent of those seen during the same month four years earlier, before the pandemic.

A visit by Wang Yi cannot solve these wider macroeconomic problems. But it will put New Zealand’s crucial relationship with China in the spotlight.

There is every chance the trip could set the stage for an anniversary year visit to Wellington by Xi Jinping later in 2024.

However, whether this occurs will be highly dependent on New Zealand’s next steps in relation to Aukus.

It can be taken as read that Wang will have strong words for Winston Peters, his New Zealand counterpart, about Wellington’s apparent enthusiasm to entertain joining ‘Pillar II’ of the new pact.

The tea leaves are still being read after Labour lost power in the October 2023 election and a new three-way, centre-right coalition led by the National Party’s Christopher Luxon took office the following month.

A joint statement issued by Australia and New Zealand after the countries’ foreign and defence ministers met in Melbourne in early February claimed Aukus was making ‘a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.’

Reaction from the Chinese Embassy in Wellington to the text was typically furious. In an apparent reference to another section of the joint statement which expressed ‘grave concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang’, a spokesperson argued that ‘groundless accusations have been made on China’s internal affairs’.

Meanwhile, on Aukus, the Embassy asserted that the pact ran counter to ‘the common interests of regional countries pursuing peace, stability and common security’. The spokesperson asked ‘relevant countries’ to ‘cherish the hard-won environment for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and be prudent with their words and action to maintain peace, stability and development’.

An indirect, yet ultimately harder-hitting rebuke came from the Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand himself, Wang Xiaolong. Lamenting a lack of options after a last-minute cancellation of a flight to Auckland the day after the joint statement was issued, the Ambassador posted on X: ‘Stuck at Wellington airport clueless as to what to do due to the cancellation of my flight to Auckland and the lack of alternatives. Right now, I am really missing the high-speed trains back in China.’

The displeasure could not be clearer.

Earlier, New Zealand’s new government had sought to move swiftly on Aukus, particularly after Labour itself had laid the groundwork for the new Government by issuing a set of three hawkish defence blueprints just months before the election.

In December, Judith Collins, the defence minister, said that a failure to join Aukus in some form was ‘a real opportunity lost by the previous government’. Christopher Luxon then appeared to back her, telling media: ‘we’re interested in exploring Pillar II, particularly in Aukus, and the new technologies and the opportunities that may mean for New Zealand’. Meanwhile, Winston Peters called for greater NZ-US cooperation in the Pacific, saying ‘we will not achieve our shared ambitions if we allow time to drift’.

However, the Aukus tide may be turning.

Bonnie Jenkins, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, visited New Zealand in early March and told media: ‘we’re still in the process of having discussions about additional partners’, adding ‘that’s not where we’re at right now’.

Speech notes for an address to be given by Jenkins also seemed restrained.

The lack of a concrete Aukus membership offer is not a new argument. In May 2023, New Zealand’s then Labour Prime Minister Chris Hipkins called the idea of joining ‘purely hypothetical’.

However, gradual shifts in language since then – culminating with Luxon’s comments in December – had suggested that a more specific proposal was afoot.

A looming US election was also a logical reason for New Zealand to act on Aukus sooner rather than later.

But perhaps nothing had ever really changed. A new government in Wellington might have been getting ahead of itself.

Alternatively, it could be that a rethink is now going on in Canberra, London and Washington over the merits of asking Wellington – or others – to become involved with Aukus at all.

In New Zealand itself, opposition to the deal also appears to be increasing in intensity. Labour is appearing to back away from its ‘open to conversations’ approach to Aukus that was set by former Prime Minister Chris Hipkins during a visit by Anthony Blinken to New Zealand in July.

In February, Phil Twyford, the party’s associate foreign affairs spokesperson, described Aukus as an ‘offensive warfighting alliance against China’. And David Parker, Labour’s main spokesperson, said ‘we’re not convinced we should be positioning China as a foe’.

The same month, high-profile former Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark co-wrote an opinion piece in the New Zealand Herald newspaper with Don Brash, a former right-wing rival. The strongly-worded article called on Luxon to ‘reassert New Zealand’s independent foreign policy by making it clear that we want no part of Aukus’.

Finally, questions are being asked in Australia about the future of the original purpose of Aukus – to give Canberra nuclear-powered submarines – following a US decision to cut production of ‘Virginia’ class submarines in half from 2025.

Adding to the uncertainty is Donald Trump’s presumptive nominee status in the US presidential election campaign. A survey conducted in August 2023 found 37 per cent of Australians thought Canberra should pull out of the wider Anzus alliance if Trump wins in November. Meanwhile, Trump’s own stance on the Aukus deal remains unknown.

If all is not well with ‘Pillar I’ of Aukus, it is hard to see an expansion to ‘Pillar II’ in the short-term.

For China’s Wang Yi, the potential wavering over Aukus is an opportunity.

The clock is certainly ticking, but no final decisions have been made.

There is still time for Beijing to make its case to Wellington.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

This article can be republished for free under a Creative Commons copyright-free license. Attributions should include a link to the Democracy Project (https://democracyproject.nz)

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will analyse the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Specifically, we will examine how the invading forces of Russia are struggling against a determined and well-equipped Ukraine defence.

What can we expect next from Russia?

How can western nations sustain the sanctions regime, and is there an intensifying risk of sanctions evasion taking place?

How stable is the wider region, and how serious is the fomenting unrest among the Balkan states?

How advanced is the Eurozone in facing the reality that Russia has the advantage of cutting gas supplies as winter advances in the next few months?

How sustainable is Russia’s alliance-making effort with the Stan states, the PRC, and what the west regards as rogue states like Iran, Venezuela, DPRK, Cuba, Nicaragua?

And finally, how can Russian Federation president, Vladimir Putin survive a military stalemate?

Join Paul and Selwyn for this LIVE recording of this podcast while they consider these big issues, and remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern says there is “very little” reason for China to station military forces on Solomon Islands, describing developments as “gravely concerning”.

A draft agreement — leaked online — indicated Solomon Islands would allow Beijing to send military forces there and make regular ship visits.

The New Zealand and Australian governments have both expressed concern at the development.

“We see such acts as the potential militarisation of the region and also see very little reason in terms of the Pacific security for such a need and such a presence,” Ardern said.

Ardern said during the recent unrest experienced in Solomon Islands both Australia and New Zealand had personnel, vessels and a presence there to support the country’s stability.

She said that demonstrated there was no need to reach beyond this region for such support.

“So we do see this as gravely concerning.”

Relationship building
Ardern said the Solomon Islands relationship with China had been building.

She said there were leadership level talks between New Zealand and Solomon Islands at the end of last year and at that time there was talk to China’s presence as the Solomons looked to regain stability after recent disruptions in the country.

“We expressed some concern over the direction of travel that Solomons was taking in terms of their security arrangements with China,” at that time, Ardern said.

But Ardern said it is vital to recognise these were sovereign nations which were entitled to form their own security arrangements.

“But actually, as a region, and I say as a region, the Pacific island nations in particular actually coming together and asking the question, ‘well what gaps are there, what needs are there and how can we support one another to fill those so that we’re not having to look beyond our own Pacific family?’”

Ardern rejected comments from former foreign minister Winston Peters that his successor should have visited Pacific neighbouring countries sooner and more frequently.

Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta is set to travel to Fiji today — her first trip as minister in the region, aside from Australia.

Borders closed
Ardern said New Zealand has not visited the Pacific recently because their borders were closed due to covid-19.

“Now that we have the opportunity to travel into the Pacific safely and be welcomed, we are doing so.”

Ardern said Peters seemed to be implying that the relationship between Solomon Islands and China is new, but that was not the case.

She said Solomon Islands switched its relationship to China from a previous relationship they had had with Taiwan in 2019 when Peters was foreign minister and even then the development had been building for some time.

Ardern said New Zealand would not be able to outspend other countries on military defence, but its relationships in the Pacific were longstanding.

“We have to make sure that we are respecting the sovereignty of our neighbours while working closely alongside them to make sure our region’s needs are met.”

There was no need for new military arrangements to ensure that needs are met, Ardern said.

Needed the support
An international politics expert said the reason why Solomon Islands wanted a security deal with China was because it needed the support.

Victoria University of Wellington professor of Political Science and International Relations Jon Fraenkel said it was still too early to see how things would pan out.

The draft agreement talks about Chinese security assistance in a way that was similar to agreements Australia and New Zealand had reached with Solomon Islands about the deployment of military and policing personnel, Fraenkel said.

He said Australia and New Zealand both built up the local police force between 2003 and 2017, but Solomon Islands still needed a boost.

“The reason why the Solomon Islands is accepting this kind of agreement is because of the extreme riots that were experienced last year in late 2019, not for the first time — Solomon Islands has a lot of experience of urban rioting,” he said.

“Chinese vessels already move around the Pacific and dock at various ports and indeed dock at both New Zealand and Australia ports.

“China’s been wary about putting straight military vessels into the Pacific … and of course the draft agreement, if that’s what gets agreed, says any such deployment would have to be on a mutual agreement of the two countries.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A draft security cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands has been leaked on social media.

The unverified document includes seven articles, which discuss the scope of cooperation between both nations.

Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security senior lecturer Dr Anna Powles has seen the agreement on social media.

She told RNZ Pacific that the document is presented as a draft: “It doesn’t have any dates, nor is it signed.

“There are still questions around its authenticity but if it is authentic, it raises some serious questions and if it’s not authentic then it also provides some interesting insights into the way in which the geopolitical dynamic is playing out domestically in the Solomon Islands,” she said.

Dr Powles said that the draft document includes a request between the Solomon Islands government and China to send armed police personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to the Solomon Islands.

“Now that raises a lot of questions obviously, what is the distinction between police and armed police, and who are the other law enforcement and armed forces that are referred to in the agreement.

‘Maintaining social order’
“It also talks about what kind of tasks that a Chinese contingent would be involved in such as maintaining social order, it’s not clear what that means, it also talks about providing assistance on other tasks and it’s also unclear what those other tasks would be.”

Dr Powles points out that the agreement refers to protecting lives and property, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

In February, a team of Chinese police officers began working in Solomon Islands. This was two months after the Solomons government accepted Beijing’s offer to help restore law and order following anti-government riots in November 2021.

Dr Powles believes that if the draft agreement is authentic, then the deployment was a natural extension of the document.

The document also contains some concerning provisions which allow China to send ships to the Solomon’s “according to its needs”.

“The agreement states that China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands government make ship visits to the Solomons and carry out logistical replenishment and stopover and transition in the Solomons.”

She said that such provisions would need to be clarified as it was unclear what “China’s own needs” refer to.

Concerns over ‘strategic interests’
Are those strategic interests for instance? If so, that would raise a number of concerns. Particularly as to what would happen if China’s interests cut across the interests of the Solomon Islands or of its key regional partners such as Australia or Papua New Guinea.

“And it also suggests that logistical support would be provided for ship visits in the Solomon Islands and suggests that perhaps China could seek to establish a logistical supply base in Solomon Islands to support those ship visits.

The document does not specify what types of ships, but Dr Powles said “we could safely assume that they are referring to the People’s Liberation Army Naval (PLAN) ships.”

“In the Pacific, we have seen PLAN ship visits to the region. China has a strong interest in maritime issues and in the Pacific maritime domain. And so that probably is not surprising and there have been long-standing concerns and very public long-standing concerns about the potential for increased ship visits for China increasing its engagement in the Pacific maritime domain and potential implications that may have for a potential base to support those ship visits.”

Dr Powles also drew attention to one particular provision of the agreement, which raised alarm bells with respect to the control of information around security cooperation.

That provision stated that information between the Solomon Islands and China could only be released on mutual agreement by both parties.

“And that suggests that there would be the intent to control public information, to control media briefings, to control what access media has to information about security arrangements between the two countries.

“We can be legitimately concerned about lack of transparency about a degree around this agreement,” she said.

Solomon Islands switched allegiances from Taiwan to China in 2019.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The Green Party says New Zealand has put its relationship with the NATO security alliance ahead of saving lives in Ukraine.

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern yesterday announced $5 million would go to a NATO fund for the purchase of “non-lethal military assistance” such as fuel, rations and first aid equipment.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO, is a security alliance including the United States, Canada and 28 European nations.

Green Party Foreign Affairs spokesperson Golriz Ghahraman told RNZ the funding appeared to be a “diplomatic nod” and could have been put to better use.

“It looks like we’re trying to be part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ — so to speak — when that’s not actually our best contribution,” Ghahraman said.

“That $5m could have gone to aid where it would immediately be saving lives … versus us ticking-the-box of being in the NATO circle while giving very little by way of actually helping people in this conflict.”

Ghahraman said Ukrainian refugees were desperately in need of food, blankets, medicine and shelter.

‘Contending with covid’
“They are contending with covid at the same time they’re living through a European winter — millions upon millions, displaced in refugee camps or in need of resettlement.”

To date, New Zealand has contributed $6m in humanitarian aid, mostly through the Red Cross. The government has also created a special visa to assist Ukrainians to join their relatives in New Zealand.

Speaking at a media conference on Monday, Ardern said the “extraordinary measures” to help Ukrainian forces were in direct response to requests from Ukraine.

Asked to explain the pivot from humanitarian aid to military assistance, Ardern described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as “a massive disruption to the international rules-based order”.

The Defence Force will also donate surplus stock of 1066 body armour plates, 571 camouflage vests and 473 helmets to Ukrainian forces.

ACT leader David Seymour said New Zealand’s contribution was “pathetic” and should include direct weapon support.

“How long do we want to be the weakest link in the West? We have to answer the call and provide what we have to help these people defend their homes.”

Send missile launchers
Seymour said New Zealand should immediately send Ukraine its supply of Javelin medium-range missile launchers.

“They’re not doing much here — I haven’t seen any Russian tanks in New Zealand lately — but they could do a lot over there,” Seymour said.

Ardern said directly providing weapons would be a “fundamental change” in the country’s approach to the conflict, but the option remained on the table.

She noted New Zealand did not have a large supply of such equipment.

National Party Foreign Affairs spokesperson Gerry Brownlee told RNZ the government’s response, so far, was appropriate.

“The circumstances here are very different than anything we’ve had to deal with before,” Brownlee said. “We should be doing our bit.”

Providing firepower
Brownlee said the option of providing firepower could potentially be considered “further down the track”.

“Our contribution would be so small compared to that from the United States or Great Britain,” Brownlee said.

“Whatever we do, clearly we’re going to have to operate through NATO and their connections into Ukraine to make sure that whatever assistance is given does get to the right place.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz