The recent series of high-level agreements between Papua New Guinea and France marks a significant development in PNG’s geopolitical relationships, driven by what appears to be a convergence of national interests.

The “deepening relationship” is less about a single personality and more about a calculated alignment of economic, security, and diplomatic priorities with PNG, taking full advantage of its position as the biggest, most strategically placed island player in the Pacific.

An examination of the key outcomes reveals a partnership of mutual benefit, reflecting both PNG’s strategic diversification and France’s own long-term ambitions as a Pacific power.

A primary driver is the shared economic rationale. From Port Moresby’s perspective, the partnership offers a clear path to economic diversification and resilience.

But many in PNG have been watching with keen interest and asking: how badly does PNG want this?

While Prime Minister James Marape offered France a Special Economic Zone in Port Moresby (SEZ) for French businesses, he also named the lookout at Port Moresby’s Variarata National Park after President Emmanuel Macron drawing the ire of many in the country.

The proposal to establish a SEZ specifically for French industries is a notable attempt to attract capital from beyond PNG’s traditional partners.

Strategically coupled
This is strategically coupled with securing the future of the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project.

Macron’s personal undertaking to work with TotalEnergies to keep the project on schedule provides crucial stability for one of PNG’s most significant economic ventures.

For France, these arrangements secure a major energy investment for its national corporate champion and establish a stronger economic foothold in a strategically vital region between Asia and the Pacific.

In the area of security, the relationship addresses tangible needs for both nations.

PNG is faced with the immense challenge of monitoring a 2.4 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone, making it vulnerable to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The finalisation of a Shiprider Agreement with France provides a practical force-multiplier, leveraging French naval assets to enhance PNG’s maritime surveillance capabilities. This move, along with planned defence talks on air and maritime cooperation, allows PNG to diversify its security architecture.

For France, a resident power with Pacific territories like New Caledonia and French Polynesia, participating in regional security operations reinforces its role and commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Elevating diplomatic influence
The partnership is also a vehicle for elevating diplomatic influence.

Port Moresby has noted the significance of engaging with a partner that holds permanent membership on the UN Security Council and seats at the G7 and G20.

This alignment provides PNG with a powerful channel to global decision-making forums. The reciprocal move to establish a PNG embassy in Paris further cements the relationship on a mature footing.

The diplomatic synergy is perhaps best illustrated by France’s full endorsement of PNG’s bid to host a future UN Ocean Conference. This support provides PNG with a major opportunity to lead on the world stage, while allowing France to demonstrate its credentials as a key partner to the Pacific Islands.

This deepening PNG-France partnership does not exist in a vacuum.

It is unfolding within a broader context of heightened geopolitical competition across the Pacific.

The West’s view of China’s rapid emergence as a dominant economic and military force in the region has reshaped the strategic landscape, prompting traditional powers to re-engage with renewed urgency.

increased diplomatic footprint
The United States has responded by significantly increasing its diplomatic and security footprint, a move marked by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Port Moresby to sign the Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Similarly, Australia, PNG’s traditional security partner, is working to reinforce its long-standing influence through initiatives like the multi-million-dollar deal to establish a PNG team in its National Rugby League (NRL), a soft-power exercise reportedly linked to security outcomes.

This competitive environment has, in turn, created greater agency for Pacific nations, allowing them to diversify their partnerships beyond old allies and providing a fertile ground for European powers like France to assert their own strategic interests.

A strong foundation for the relationship is a shared public stance on environmental stewardship. The agreement on the need for rigorous scientific studies before any deep-sea mining occurs aligns PNG’s national policy with a position of environmental caution.

This common ground extends to broader climate action, where France’s commitment to conservation in the Pacific resonates with PNG’s status as a frontline nation vulnerable to climate change.

This alignment on values provides a durable and politically important basis for cooperation, allowing both nations to jointly advocate for climate justice and ocean protection.

For the Papua New Guinea economy, this deepening partnership with France is critically important as it provides high-level stability for the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project and creates a direct pathway for new investment through a proposed SEZ for French businesses.

Vital economic resource
Furthermore, by moving to finalise a Shiprider Agreement to combat illegal fishing, the government is actively protecting a vital economic resource.

For Marape’s credibility in local politics, these outcomes are tangible successes he can present to the nation as he battles a massive credibility dip in recent years.

Securing a personal undertaking from the leader of a G7 nation, gaining support for PNG to host a future UN Ocean Conference, and enhancing national security demonstrates effective leadership on the world stage.

This allows him to build a narrative of a competent statesman who, through “warm, personal relationships”, can deliver on promises of economic opportunity and national security while strengthening his political standing at home.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A leaked “working paper” on New Caledonia’s future political status is causing concern on the local stage and has prompted a “clarification” from the French government’s Minister for Overseas Manuel Valls.

Details of the document, which was supposed to remain confidential, have been widely circulated online over the past few days.

Valls said earlier the confidentiality of the document was supposed to ensure expected results of ongoing talks would not be jeopardised.

However, following the leak, Valls said in a release on Friday that, for the time being, it was nothing more than a “working paper”.

The document results from earlier rounds of talks when Valls was in Nouméa during his previous trips in February and March 2025.

Valls is due to return to New Caledonia on April 29 for another round of talks and possibly “negotiations” and more political talks are ongoing behind closed doors.

He has denied that it can be regarded as a “unilateral proposal” from Paris.

The latest roundtable session was on Friday, April 11, held remotely via a video conference between Valls in Paris and all political stakeholders (both pro-France and pro-independence parties) in Nouméa.

All tendencies across the political spectrum have reaffirmed their strong and sometimes “non-negotiable” respective stances.

Parties opposed to independence, who regard New Caledonia as being part of France, have consistently maintained that the results of the latest three referendums on self-determination — held in 2018, 2020 and 2021 — should be respected. They reject the notion of independence.

The last referendum in December 2021 was, however, largely boycotted by the pro-independence movement and indigenous Kanak voters.

On the pro-independence side, the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS, dominated by the Union Calédonienne) is announcing a “convention” on April 26 — just three days before Valls’s return — to decide on whether it should now fully engage in negotiations proper.

In a news conference last week, the FLNKS was critical of the French-suggested approach, saying it would only commit if they “see the benefits” and that the document was “patronising”.

Two other pro-independence parties — the PALIKA (Kanak Liberation Party) and the UPM (Union Progressiste en Mélanésie) — have distanced themselves from the FLNKS, which they see as too radical under Union Calédonienne’s influence and dominance) and hold a more moderate view.

PALIKA held a general meeting late last week to reaffirm that, while they too were regarding the path to sovereignty as their paramount goal, they were already committed to participating in future “negotiations” since “all topics have been taken into account” (in the working document).

They are favour an “independence association” pathway.

Carefully chosen words
In his release on Friday, Valls said the main pillars of future negotiations were articulated around the themes of:

• “democracy and the rule of law”, a “decolonisation process”, the right to self-determination, a future “fundamental law” that would seal New Caledonia’s future status (and would then, if locally approved, be ratified by French Parliament and later included in the French Constitution);
• the powers of New Caledonia’s three provinces (including on tax and revenue collection matters); and
• a future New Caledonia citizenship (and its conditions of eligibility) with the associated definition of who meets the requirements to vote at local elections.

Citizenship
On acquiring New Caledonia citizenship, a consensus seems to emerge on the minimum time of residence: it would be “10 to 15” years with other criteria such as an “exam” to ascertain the candidate’s knowledge and respect of cultural “values and specificities”.

Every person born in New Caledonia, children and spouses of qualified citizens, would also automatically qualify for New Caledonia’s citizenship.

Power-sharing
On power-sharing, the draft also touches on the “sovereign” powers (international relations, defence, law and order, justice, currency) which would remain within the French realm, but in a stronger association for New Caledonia.

All other powers, regarded as “non-sovereign”, would remain under direct control of New Caledonia as they have already been transferred, gradually, to New Caledonia, over the past 27 years, under the Nouméa Accord.

New Caledonia would also be consulted on all negotiations related to the Pacific islands region and would get representation at European Union level.

Local diplomats would also be trained under France’s Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Under the Nouméa Accord, the training process was already initiated more than 10 years ago with New Caledonian representatives appointed and hosted at French embassies in the region — Fiji, New Zealand, Australia.

A local “strategic committee” would also be set up on defence matters.

However, despite long-time FLNKS demands, this would not allow for a seat at the United Nations.

In terms of currency, the present French Pacific Francs (CFP, XPF) would be abolished for a new currency that would remain pegged to the Euro, provided France’s other two Pacific territories (French Polynesia, Wallis-and-Futuna — which are also using the CFP) agree.

Reinforced provincial powers
A new proposal, in terms of reinforced provincial powers, would be to grant each of New Caledonia’s three provinces (North, South and Loyalty Islands) the capacity — currently held by New Caledonia’s government — to generate and collect its own taxes.

Each province would then re-distribute their collected tax revenues to the central government and municipalities.

This is also reported to be a sensitive point during the talks, since about 80 percent of New Caledonia’s wealth is located in the Southern Province, which also generates more than 90 percent of all of New Caledonia’s tax revenues.

This is perceived as a concession to pro-France parties, which are calling for an “internal federation” model for New Caledonia, a prospect strongly opposed by pro-independence parties who are denouncing what they liken to some kind of “partition” for the French Pacific dependency.

In the currently discussed project, the representation at the Congress (Parliament) of New Caledonia would be revised among the three provinces to better reflect their respective weight according to demographic changes.

The representation would be re-assessed and possibly modified after each population census.

Under the proposed text, New Caledonia’s government would remain based on the notion of “collegiality”.

Future referendum — no more just ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to independence
The current working paper, on the right to self-determination, suggests that any future referendum on self-determination no longer has a specified deadline, but should take place after a “stabilisation and reconstruction” phase.

It would no longer ask the binary question of “yes” or “no” to independence and full sovereignty, but rather seek the approval of a “comprehensive project”.

To activate a referendum, the approval of at least three fifths of New Caledonia’s 54-seat Congress would be needed.

The Congress’s current makeup, almost equally split in two between pro-France and pro-independence parties, this 3/5th threshold could only be found if there is a consensual vote beyond party lines.

Some of the FLNKS’s earlier demands, like having its president Christian Téin (elected in absentia in August 2024 ) part of the talks, now seem to have been dropped.

Téin was arrested in June 2024 for alleged involvement in the May 2024 insurrectional riots that caused 14 dead (including two French gendarmes), hundreds of injured, thousands of jobless and the destruction of several hundred businesses for a total estimated damage of 2.2 billion euros (NZ$4.3 billion).

Four days after his arrest, Téin was transferred from New Caledonia to mainland France.

Although he is still remanded in custody pending his trial (for alleged involvement in organised criminal-related acts), his case was recently transferred from the jurisdiction of judges in Nouméa to mainland France magistrates.

Union Calédonienne president and pro-independence front man Emmanuel Tjibaou told public broadcaster NC la 1ère yesterday he was in regular contact with Téin from his jail in Mulhouse (northeastern France).

Another recent development that could also be perceived as a concession to the FLNKS is that last week, France announced the replacement of French High commissioner Louis Le Franc, France’s representative and man in charge in Nouméa during last year’s riots.

‘We are facing a decisive moment’, says Valls
Valls said he remained hopeful that despite “all positions remaining at present still far from each other . . . evolutions are still possible”.

“I reaffirm the (French) State’s full commitment to pursue this approach, in the spirit of the Matignon and Nouméa Accords (signed respectively in 1988 and 1998) to build together a united, appeased and prosperous New Caledonia,” Valls concluded.

“We are facing a decisive moment for the future of New Caledonia, which is confronted with a particularly grave economic and social situation. Civil peace remains fragile.”

The much sought-after agreement, which has been at the centre of political talks since they resumed in early 2025 after a three-year hiatus, is supposed to replace the Nouméa Accord from 1998.

The 1998 pact, which outlines the notion of gradual transfer of sovereign powers from France to new Caledonia, but also the notion of “common destiny”, stipulates that after three referendums on self-determination resulting in a majority of “no”, then the political partners are to meet and “discuss the situation thus created”.

Determination, anxiety and hope
On all sides of the political landscape, ahead of any outcome for the crucial talks, the current atmosphere is a mix of determination, anxiety and hope, with a touch of disillusionment.

The pro-independence movement’s Emmanuel Tjibaou has to manage a sometimes radical base.

He told NC la 1ère that the main objective remained “the path to sovereignty”.

Within the pro-France camp, there is also defiance towards Vall’s approach and expected results.

Among their ranks, one lingering angst, founded or not, is to see an agreement being concluded that would not respond to their expectations of New Caledonia remaining part of France.

This worst-case scenario, in their view, would bring back sad memories of Algeria’s pre-independence process decades ago.

On 4 June 1958, in the midst of its war against Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), French President General De Gaulle, while on a visit to Algiers, shouted a resounding “Je vous ai compris!” (“I have understood you”) to a crowd of cheering pro-France and French Algerians who were convinced at the time that their voice had been heard in favour of French Algeria.

On 19 March 1962, after years of a bloody war, the Evian Accords were signed, paving the way for Algeria’s independence on July 3.

“I had to take precautions, I had to proceed progressively and this is how we made it”, De Gaulle explained to the French daily Le Monde in 1966.

In the meantime, in an atmosphere of fear and violence, an estimated 700,000 French citizens from Algeria were “repatriated” by boat to mainland France.

As an alternative posed to French nationals at the time, FLN’s slogan was “la valise ou le cercueil” (“the suitcase or the coffin”).

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

As French Minister for Overseas Manuel Valls lands in New Caledonia tomorrow to pursue talks on its political future, the situation on the ground has again gained tension over the past few days.

The local political spectrum is deeply divided between the two main opposing camps, the pro-independence and those wanting New Caledonia to remain part of France.

The rift has already culminated in May 2024 with rioting resulting in 14 deaths, several hundreds injured, thousands of job losses due to the destruction, burning and looting of businesses, and a material cost of over 2 billion euros (NZ$3.7 billion).

Valls hosted talks in Paris with every party represented in New Caledonia’s Congress on February 4-9.

Those talks, held in “bilateral” mode, led to his decision to travel to Nouméa and attempt to bring everyone to the same negotiating table.

It is all about finding an agreement that would allow an exit from the Nouméa Accord and to draw a fresh roadmap for New Caledonia’s political future.

However, in the face of radically different and opposing views, the challenge is huge.

The two main blocs, even though they acknowledged the Paris talks may have been helpful, still hold very clear-cut and antagonistic positions.

Each camp seems to have their own interpretation of the 1998 Nouméa Accord, which has until now defined a roadmap for further autonomy and a gradual transfer of powers.

The main bloc within the pro-independence side, Union Calédonienne (UC), which since last year de facto controls the wider FLNKS (Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front), has been repeatedly placing as its target a new “Kanaky Agreement” to be signed by 24 September 2025 and, from that date, a five-year “transition period” to attain full independence from France.

Within the pro-independence camp, more moderate parties, such as PALIKA (Kanak Liberation Party) and UPM (Progressist Union in Melanesia), have distanced themselves from a UC-dominated FLNKS, and are favourable to some kind of “independence in association with France”.

On the pro-France side, the two main components, the Les Loyalistes and the Rassemblement-LR, have shown a united front. One of their main arguments is based on the fact that in 2018, 2020 and 2021, three successive referenda on self-determination have resulted in three votes, each of those producing a majority rejecting independence.

However, the third and latest poll in December 2021 was boycotted by most of the pro-independence voters.

The pro-independence parties have since challenged the 2021 poll result, even though it has been ruled by the courts as valid.

Pro-France parties are also advocating for a change in the political system to give each of New Caledonia’s three provinces more powers, a move they described as an “internal federalism” but that critics have decried, saying this amounted to a kind of apartheid.

Talks required since 2022
The bipartisan talks became necessary after the three referendums were held.

The Nouméa Accord stipulated that in the event that three consecutive referendums rejected independence, then all political stakeholders should “meet and examine the situation”.

There have been earlier attempts to bring about those talks, but some components of the pro-independence movement, notably the UC, have consistently declined.

Under a previous government, French Minister for Home Affairs and Overseas territories Gérald Darmanin, after half a dozen inconclusive trips to New Caledonia, tried to push some of the most urgent parts of the political agreement through a constitutional reform process, especially on a change to New Caledonia’s list of eligible registered voters at local elections.

This was supposed to allow citizens who have resided in New Caledonia for at least ten uninterrupted years to finally cast their votes. Until now, the electoral roll has been “frozen” since 2009 — only those residing before 1998 had the right to vote.

Pro-independence parties protested, saying this was a way of “diluting” the indigenous Kanak votes.

The protest — in the name of “Kanak existential identity” — gained momentum and on 13 May 2024 erupted into riots.

Now the sensitive electoral roll issue is back on the agenda, only it will no longer be tackled separately, but will be part of a wider and comprehensive scope of talks regarding New Caledonia’s political future.

Heavy schedule for Valls
On Thursday, Valls unveiled his programme for what is scheduled to be a six-day stay in New Caledonia from 22-26 February 2025.

During this time, he will spend a significant amount of time in the capital Nouméa, holding talks with political parties, economic stakeholders and representatives of the civil society and law and order agencies.

He will also travel to rural parts of New Caledonia.

In the capital, two solid days have been earmarked for “negotiations” at the Congress, with the aim of finding the best way to achieve a political agreement, if all parties agree to meet and talk.

On Tuesday, February 25, Valls also intends to pay homage and lay wreaths on independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou and anti-independence leader Jacques Lafleur’s graves.

They were the leaders of FLNKS and (pro-France) RPCR, who eventually signed the Matignon Accords in 1998 and shook hands after half a decade of quasi civil war, during the previous civil unrest in the second half of the 1980s.

Valls was then a young member of French Prime Minister Michel Rocard (Socialist) who enabled the Matignon agreement.

On several occasions, over the past few days, Valls has stressed the grave situation New Caledonia has been facing since the riots, the “devastated” economy and the need to restore a bipartisan dialogue.

He told public broadcaster NC La Première that since the unrest started had France had provided financial support to sustain New Caledonia’s economy.

‘Fractures and deep wounds within New Caledonia’s society’
“But blood has been shed . . . there have been deaths, injuries, there are fractures and deep wounds within New Caledonia’s society,” Valls said.

“And to get out of this, dialogue is needed, to find a compromise . . . to prevent violence from coming back. I still believe those (opposing) positions are reconcilable, even though they’re quite far apart,” he said.

“I’m very much aware of the difficulties . . . but we have to find an agreement, a compromise.”

One clear indication that during his visit to New Caledonia the French minister will be walking on shaky ground came a few days ago.

When, speaking to French national daily Le Monde, he recalled the Nouméa Accord included a wide range of possible perspectives from “a shared sovereignty” to a “full sovereignty”, there was an immediate outcry from the pro-French parties, who steadfastly brandished the three recent referendums opposing independence and urging the minister to respect those “democratic” results.

“Respecting the Nouméa Accord means respecting the choice of New Caledonians”, said Les Loyalistes-Le Rassemblement-LR in a media release.

“Shared sovereignty is the current situation. It’s all in the Nouméa Accord, which itself is enshrined in the French Constitution”, Valls replied.

Over the past six months, several notions have emerged in terms of a political future for New Caledonia.

It all comes down to wording: from independence-association (Cook Islands style), to outright “independence” or “shared sovereignty” (as suggested by French Senate President Gérard Larcher during his visit in October 2024).

A former justice minister under Socialist President François Hollande, Jean-Jacques Urvoas, well-versed in New Caledonian affairs, suggested an innovative wording which, he believed, could bring about some form of consensus — the term “associated state”, could be slightly modified into “associated country” (“country” being one of the ways to describe New Caledonia, also described as a sui generis entity under French Law).

Urvoas said this would make the notion more palatable.

Pro-France meetings indoors
On Wednesday evening, in an indoor multi-purpose hall in Nouméa, an estimated 2000 sympathisers of pro-France Rassemblement and Loyalists gathered to hear and support their leaders who had come to explain what was discussed in Paris and reiterate the pro-France bloc’s position.

“We told [Valls] the ‘bilaterals’ are over. Now we want plenary discussions or nothing,” pro-France Virginie Ruffenach told the crowd.

“We will tell him: Manuel, your full sovereignty is No Pasaran! (in Spanish ‘Will not pass’, a reference to Valls’s Spanish heritage),” said Nicolas Metzdorf, who is also one of the two New Caledonian MPs in the French National Assembly, speaking to supporters brandishing blue, white and red French flags.

Metzdorf said he hoped that supporters would show up during the minister’s visit with the same flags “to remind him of three “no” votes in the three referenda.

A ban on all open-air public meetings is still in force in Nouméa and its greater area.

The ruling came in an appeal case from the Paris Administrative Court.

It overturned a ruling made in 2023 by the former New Caledonian (pro-independence) territorial government to add the Kanak flag to the local driving licence, next to the French flag.

In its February 14 ruling, the Appeal Court stated that the Kanak flag could not be used on such official documents because “it is not the official flag” of New Caledonia.

The court once again referred to the Nouméa Accord, which said the Kanak flag, even though it was often used alongside the French flag, had not been formally endorsed as New Caledonia’s “identity symbol”.

The tribunal also urged the new government to make the necessary changes and to re-circulate the former one-flag version “without delay”.

Meanwhile, the government is bearing the cost of a fine of 100, 000 French Pacific francs (about US$875) a day, which currently totals over US$43,000 since January 1.

The “identity symbols”, as defined by the Nouméa Accord, also include a motto (the wording ‘Terre de Parole, Terre de Partage’ — Land of Words, Land of Sharing’ was chosen) and even a national anthem.

But despite several attempts since 1998, no agreement has yet been reached on a common flag.

This week, hours after the court ruling, an image is being circulated on social media declaring: “If this flags disturbs you, I’ll help you pack your suitcase” (“Si ce drapeau te dérange, je t’aide à faire tes valises”).

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Pro-independence Kanak leader Christian Téin will remain in a mainland French jail for the time being, a Court of Appeal has ruled in Nouméa.

This followed an earlier ruling on October 22 from the Court of Cassation, which is tasked to rule on possible procedural mistakes in earlier judgments.

The Court of Cassation found some flaws in the procedure that justified the case being heard again by a Court of Appeal.

Téin’s lawyer, Pierre Ortet, confirmed his client’s detention in a mainland prison (Mulhouse jail, north-eastern France) has been maintained as a result of the latest Court of Appeal hearing behind closed doors in Nouméa on Friday.

But he also told local media he now intends to bring the case to the European Court of Human Rights, as well as United Nations’ human rights mechanisms — especially on the circumstances that surrounded Téin’s transfer to France on 23 June 2024 on board a specially-chartered plane four days after his arrest in Nouméa on June 19.

Nouméa Public Prosecutor Yves Dupas told local media in an interview on Friday that in this case the next step should happen “some time in January”, when a criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation is expected to deliver another ruling.

Reacting to recent comments made by pro-independence party Union Calédonienne, which maintains Téin is a political prisoner, Dupas said Téin and others facing similar charges “are still presumed innocent”, but “are not political prisoners, they have not been held in relation to a political motive”.

Alleged crimes
The alleged crimes, he said, were “crimes and delicts related to organised crime”.

The seven charges include complicity as part of murder attempts, theft involving the use of weapons and conspiracy in view of the preparation of acts of organised crimes.

Téin’s defence maintains it was never his client’s intention to commit such crimes.

Christian Téin is the head of a “Field Action Coordinating Cell” (CCAT), a group created late in 2023 by the largest and oldest pro-independence party Union Calédonienne.

From October 2023 onward, the CCAT organised marches and demonstrations that later degenerated — starting May 13 — into insurrectional riots, arson and looting, causing 13 deaths and an estimated 2.2 billion euros (NZ$3.9 billion) in material damage, mainly in the Greater Nouméa area.

“The judicial inquiry aims at establishing every responsibility, especially at the level of ‘order givers’,” Dupas told local Radio Rythme Bleu on Friday.

He confirmed six persons were still being detained in several jails of mainland France, including Téin.

3 released under ‘judicial control’
Three others have been released under judiciary control with an obligation to remain in mainland France.

“You see, the manifestation of truth requires time. Justice requires serenity, it’s very important”, he commented.

Late August, Téin was also chosen as president of the pro-independence umbrella FLNKS at its congress.

The August 2024 Congress was also marked by the non-attendance of two other main pillars of the movement, UPM and PALIKA, which have since confirmed their intention to distance themselves from FLNKS.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Over 30 years the French government tested 193 nuclear weapons in Māohi Nui and today Indigenous peoples still suffer the impacts through intergenerational cancers.

In 1975, France stopped atmospheric tests and moved to underground testing.

Hinamoeura Morgant-Cross was eight years old when the French nuclear tests at Moruroa and Fangataufa stopped in 1996.

“After poisoning us for 30 years, after using us as guinea pigs for 30 years, France condemned us to pay for all the cost of those cancers,” Morgant-Cross said.

She is a mother of two boys and married to another Māohi in Mataiea, Tahiti, and says her biggest worry is what will be left for the next generation.

As a politician in the French Polynesian Assembly she sponsored a unanimously supported resolution in September 2023 supporting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

It called on France to join the treaty, as one of the original five global nuclear powers and one of the nuclear nine possessors of nuclear weapons today.

As a survivor of nuclear testing, Morgant-Cross has worked with hibakusha, which is the term used to describe the survivors of the US atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945.

Together, as living examples of the consequences, they are trying to push governments to demilitarise and end the possession of nuclear arsenals.

Connections from Māohi Nui to Aotearoa
Morgant-Cross spoke to Te Ao Māori News from Whāingaroa where she, along with other manuhiri of Hui Oranga, planted kowhangatara (spinifex) in the sand dunes for coastal restoration to build resilience against storms or tsunamis at a time of increased climate crises.

In the 1970s and 1980s, many of the anti-nuclear protests were in response to the tests in Māohi Nui, French Polynesia.

The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement began in Fiji in 1975 after the first Nuclear Free Pacific Conference, which was organised by Against French Testing in Moruroa (ATOM).

The Pacific Peoples’ Anti-Nuclear Action Committee was founded by Hilda Halkyard-Harawira and Grace Robertson, and in 1982 they hosted the first Hui Oranga which brought the movement for a nuclear-free and independent Pacific home to Aotearoa.

In 1985, Greenpeace was protesting against the French nuclear tests in Moruroa on its flagship Rainbow Warrior when the French government sent spies and members of its military to bomb the ship at its berth in Auckland Harbour. The two explosions led to the death of crew member Fernando Pereira.

Condemned to intergenerational cancer
“We still have diseases from generation to generation,” she says.

Non-profit organisation Nuclear Information and Resources Services data shows radiation is more harmful to women with cancer rates and death 50 percent higher than among men.

In her family, Morgant-Cross’ great-grandmother, grandmother, aunt and sister have been diagnosed with thyroid or breast cancer.

A mother and lawyer at the time, Morgant-Cross was diagnosed with leukaemia at 25 years old.

Valentina Cross, her mother has continuing thyroid problems, needs to take pills for the rest of her life and, similarly, Hinamoeura has to take pills to keep the leukaemia dormant for the rest of her life.

Being told the nuclear tests were “clean”, Morgant-Cross didn’t learn about the legacy of the nuclear bombs until she was 30 years old when former French Polynesian President Oscar Temaru filed a complaint against France for alleged crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the the nuclear tests.

She then saw a list of radiation-induced diseases, which included thyroid cancer, breast cancer, and leukaemia and she realised it wasn’t that her family had “bad genes”.

Known impacts ‘buried’ by the French state
Morgant-Cross says her people were victims of French propaganda as they were told there were no effects from the nuclear tests.

A 2000 research paper published in the Cancer Causes & Control journal said the thyroid rates in French Polynesia were two to three times higher than Maōri in New Zealand and Hawaians in Hawaii.

In 2021, more than two decades later, Princeton University’s Science and Global Security programme, the multimedia newsroom Disclose and research collective INTERPT released an investigation — The Moruroa Files — using declassified French defence documents.

“The state has tried hard to bury the toxic heritage of these tests,” Geoffrey Livolsi, Disclose’s editor-in-chief told The Guardian.

The report concluded about 110,000 people were exposed to ionising radiation. That number was almost the entire Polynesian population at the time.

New nuclear issues and justice
Similarly in Japan, the government and scientists are denying the links between high thyroid cancer rates and the Fukushima disaster.

Morgant-Cross said she was also concerned with the dumping of treated nuclear waste especially after pushback from NGOs, Pacific states, and experts.

The Pacific Islands Forum had an independent expert panel of world-class scientists and global experts on nuclear issues who assessed the data related to Japan’s decision to discharge ALPS-treated nuclear wastewater and found it lacked a sound scientific basis and offered viable alternatives which were ignored.

In Māohi Nui, much of the taxes go towards managing high cancer rates and Morgant-Cross said they were not given compensation to cover the medical assistance they deserved.

In 2010, a compensation law was passed and between then and 2020, RNZ Pacific reported France had compensated French Polynesia with US$30 million. And in 2021, it was reported to have paid US$16.6 million within the year but only 46 percent of the compensation claims were accepted.

“During July 2024 France spent billions of dollars to clean up the river Seine in Paris [for the [Olympic Games] and I was so shocked,” Morgant-Cross said.

“You can’t help us on medical care, you can’t help us on cleaning your nuclear rubbish in the South Pacific, but you can put billions of dollars to clean a river that is still disgusting?”

As a politician and anti-nuclear activist, Morgant-Cross hopes for nuclear justice and a world of peace.

She has started a movement named the Māohi Youth Resiliency in hopes to raise awareness of the nuclear legacy by telling her story and also learning how to help Māohi in this century.

Republished from Te Ao Māori News with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz