Leaders of the three Pacific nations with diplomatic ties to Taiwan are united in a message to the Pacific Islands Forum that the premier regional body must not allow non-member countries to dictate Forum policies — a reference to the China-Taiwan geopolitical debate.

Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine, in remarks to the opening of Parliament in Majuro yesterday, joined leaders from Tuvalu and Palau in strongly worded comments putting the region on notice that the future unity and stability of the Forum hangs in the balance of decisions that are made for next month’s Forum leaders’ meeting in the Solomon Islands.

This is just three years since the organisation pulled back from the brink of splintering.

Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu are among the 12 countries globally that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

At issue is next month’s annual meeting of leaders being hosted by Solomon Islands, which is closely allied to China, and the concern that the Solomon Islands will choose to limit or prevent Taiwan’s engagement in the Forum, despite it being a major donor partner to the three island nations as well as a donor to the Forum Secretariat.

China worked to marginalise Taiwan and its international relationships including getting the Forum to eliminate a reference to Taiwan in last year’s Forum leaders’ communique after leaders had agreed on the text.

“I believe firmly that the Forum belongs to its members, not countries that are non-members,” said President Heine yesterday in Parliament’s opening ceremony. “And non-members should not be allowed to dictate how our premier regional organisation conducts its business.”

Heine continued: “We witnessed at the Forum in Tonga how China, a world superpower, interfered to change the language of the Forum Communique, the communiqué of our Pacific Leaders . . . If the practice of interference in the affairs of the Forum becomes the norm, then I question our nation’s membership in the organisation.”

She cited the position of the three Taiwan allies in the Pacific in support of Taiwan participation at next month’s Forum.

“There should not be any debate on the issue since Taiwan has been a Forum development partner since 1993,” Heine said.

Heine also mentioned that there was an “ongoing review of the regional architecture of the Forum” and its many agencies “to ensure that their deliverables are on target, and inter-agency conflicts are minimised.”

The President said during this review of the Forum and its agencies, “it is critical that the question of Taiwan’s participation in Forum meetings is settled once and for all to safeguard equity and sovereignty of member governments.”

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Northern Marianas Governor Arnold Palacios and Senator Celina Babauta have travelled to Guam to attend a luncheon with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te.

Taiwan is officially known as the Republic of China (Taiwan). China claims Taiwan as its own territory, with no right to state-to-state ties, a position Taiwan strongly disputes.

Palacios welcomed the opportunity to meet Lai and said this could pave the way for improved relations with the East Asian country.

“This meeting is an opportunity for the CNMI to foster relations with allies in the region.”

When asked if meeting the President would upset the People’s Republic of China, which considers Taiwan a rogue state and part of its territory, Palacios said: “As far as being in the crosshairs of China, we already are in many ways.”

Worldwide, a dozen countries maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taipei.

In January, Nauru cut ties with Taiwan and shifted its diplomatic allegiance to Beijing.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The Nauru government said that “in the best interests” of the country and its people, it was seeking full resumption of diplomatic relations with China.

China claims Taiwan as its own territory with no right to state-to-state ties, a position Taiwan strongly disputes.

Dr Anna Powles, an associate professor at the Massey University Centre for Defence and Security Studies, told RNZ this was not Nauru’s “first rodeo” — this was the third time they had “jumped ship”.

“China, certainly, has been on the offensive to effectively dismantle Taiwan’s diplomatic allies across the Pacific,” Dr Powles said.

“There has been increased Chinese pressure — that was certainly one of the reasons why Australia pursued their Falepili union agreement with Tuvalu last year with great speed,” she said.

Taiwan now has three Pacific allies left — Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.

Significant drop
Dr Powles said that was a significant drop from 2019 when Solomon Islands and Kiribati had switched allegiance.

But she said the switch should not come as a major surprise. Most countries, including New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, recognised China and adhere to the one-China policy.

“Nauru is like most other Pacific Island countries, recognising China over Taiwan,” Dr Powles said.

“The challenge here though for Taiwan is for a very long period of time, the Pacific was the bulkhead of its allies, and as I mentioned, China has effectively and very successfully managed to whittle that down and dismantle that network.

“For many of those countries in the Pacific which have switched back and forth between the two, this actually hasn’t contributed in positive ways to sustainable, consistent growth and development.”

Unanswered questions
Dr Powles said there were still questions to be answered.

Nauru set up its intergenerational fund in 2015 with Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan as contributors.

“So the question here is, will China now be a contributor to the trust fund?”

Lai Ching-te from Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, won the presidential election on Saturday as expected and will take office on May 20.

“With deep regret we announce the termination of diplomatic relations with Nauru,” Taiwan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry said on social media platform X, formerly Twitter.

“This timing is not only China’s retaliation against our democratic elections but also a direct challenge to the international order. Taiwan stands unbowed and will continue as a force for good,” it added.

China ‘ready to work’
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said that Beijing “China appreciates and welcomes the decision of the government of the Nauru”.

“There is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”

She said this was affirmed in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 “and is the prevailing consensus among the international community”.

“China has established diplomatic relations with 182 countries on the basis of the one-China principle.

“The Nauru government’s decision of re-establishing diplomatic ties with China once again shows that the One-China principle is where global opinion trends and where the arc of history bends.

“China stands ready to work with Nauru to open new chapters of our bilateral relations on the basis of the one-China principle.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Cheaper loans will be a key agenda for Papua New Guinea officials when Prime Minister James Marape leads a delegation of government and business leaders to China for bilateral talks next week.

Treasurer Ian Ling-Stuckey, who is going to be part of the delegation, made the announcement earlier this week when giving an update on preparations for the visit.

The announcement is likely to worry China’s geopolitical rivals Australia and the US, whose interests on loans, according to Ling-Stuckey, are higher than that of China.

“My key goals during this visit [to China] are to work as part of the government team to strengthen our cooperative relations with such a key partner and friend, the government of China,” Ling-Stuckey said.

“The focus of my work is to secure additional, cheaper funding for PNG. Chinese interest rates are currently below those in the US and Australia, and even from many of our multilateral partners.

“I look forward to meetings with China’s Export Credit Bank along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”

Two weeks ago, Marape led another delegation to Washington, along with other leaders of the Pacific, to meet with US President Joe Biden.

US aid for Pacific
In that summit, Biden announced that he is planned to work with Congress to request the release of nearly US$200 million (K718 million) for the Pacific island states, including PNG.

Ling-Stuckey said government officials were in hectic consultations with Chinese embassy officials in Port Moresby to ensure the visit to China went smoothly, compared to their recent visit to Washington.

Officials said the delegation would hold bilateral talks with senior Chinese officials, including President Xi Xinping, before engaging in the third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum in Beijing.

It is expected that a big part of whatever financial assistance PNG secures from China will be centered around the BRI projects in PNG, which have been gaining momentum since Port Moresby signed up in 2018.

Chinese ambassador Zeng Fanhua a week earlier said China’s development experience and enhanced relations with PNG had laid the foundation for more cooperation and growth, and his government was looking forward to Marape and the PNG delegation’s visit to China.

“This year, we see new development in our bilateral relations. High-level exchanges have resurged,” Zeng said.

“More than a dozen PNG ministers, governors and Members of Parliament have visited China.

New wave of growth
Business and trade cooperation has seen a new wave of growth.

In the first half of this year, PNG’s exports to China was nearly US$1.9 billion, up 6 percent year-on-year.”

“China highly appreciates PNG government’s firm commitment to the One-China principle and the decision to close its trade office in Taipei.

“This has laid a more solid political foundation for advancing China-PNG relations and cooperation in all areas.”

Lawrence Fong is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

What does the Geopolitical balancing that is taking place in the West and South-West Pacific mean for the region and the globe?

Analysis: Paul and Selwyn consider the question from several angles, and provide a context to the headlines that suggest both global powers, the USA and the Peoples Republic of China, are on a collision-course toward conflict.

Paul takes us through the US-PNG and Japan-NZ bilateral security/military agreements as a balancing response to the PRC-Solomons security agreement.

In addition, Paul considers the question: Does the PRC have legitimate interests in the Pacific and, as a great power, should those interests be understood and respected?

Selwyn considers whether China’s ascendancy as a global power threatens the United States’ position as the perceived ‘preeminent defender’ of the Global Order?

And Selwyn raises for debate, highlighting what the two global powers’ messaging was at the Shangri-La security dialogue that took place over last weekend.

Paul then analyses what this all means for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Recommended Links:

•  KiwiPolitico.com Ref. https://www.kiwipolitico.com/2023/06/…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; General Li Shangfu, State Councilor; Minister of National Defense, China Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; Lloyd J Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE: Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

They recommended the audience does so via EveningReport’s YouTube channel, as Facebook has undergone significant changes. Here’s the link: Youtube (remember to subscribe to the channel).

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here, also YouTube podcasts and the Podcast hosts below.

RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

The ABC has soundly condemned the Solomon Islands Office of the Prime Minister for a series of “factual errors” in a statement released which criticised the Four Corners investigative report Pacific Capture: How Chinese money is buying the Solomons.

In a rare statement defending its independent journalism, it said today the ABC “stood by the accuracy and integrity” of the reporting in this programme.

It said about the programme broadcast on August 4:

The ABC wishes to correct the following factual errors in the press release issued by the Solomon Islands Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet regarding the Four Corners report Pacific Capture, which examined the impact of China’s growing presence across Solomon Islands.

At no point did the program rely on “misinformation and distribution of pre-conceived prejudicial information”.

It was not our intention to “cause division between the governments of Australia and Solomon Islands”, rather to highlight issues of concern to all Solomon Islanders.

We completely reject the offensive notion of “racial profiling that is bordering racism and race stereotyping”. In fact, we were determined to tell the story from the perspective of Solomon Islanders and the program reflected their concerns. Its main interviews were with two eminent Solomon Islanders, rather than relying on “foreign experts” as is often the case. The ABC rejects the idea that we were “putting words into the mouths of the interviewees” and sees this as insulting to the Solomon Islanders who appeared in the program.

On the issue of Kolombangara, the ABC did not say that the “shareholders have made a decision to sell off the company to a Chinese firm”. Rather, the program accurately reported that the issue had been discussed at board level and that the Australian directors were so concerned about a potential sale to a Chinese state-owned company that they twice wrote to the Federal Government expressing concerns that the purchase could be used by Beijing to establish a base under the cover of a commercial enterprise. Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s office confirmed it was aware of the issue. Her office has also not ruled out intervening. The ABC also notes that the plantation on Kolombangara is owned 85 per cent by the Nien Family of Taiwan and 15 percent by the government of the Solomon Islands, not the 60/40 split claimed in the press release.

It is incorrect to claim that the program did not acknowledge that Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare “repeatedly reaffirmed to Solomon Islanders and the Pacific region that there will be no military or naval base in Solomon Islands”.

The program said: “At a meeting in Fiji, Sogavare assured the new Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese that Beijing won’t be allowed to establish a military base in the Solomons.” It went on to say that one of the main concerns was that a commercial enterprise controlled by Beijing could one day be used to house military assets.

The ABC stands by the accuracy and integrity of the reporting in this program.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will analyse hostilities and the pathway ahead for Taiwan, China, Asia Pacific nations and the United States of America.

Buchanan and Manning will examine why hostilities have intensified, what defence and pre-emptive security moves have been actioned, and what we all should expect next including the ramifications impacting on Asia Pacific nations’ foreign policies and what the short, medium and long term consequences will be.

The Questions:

What to expect from a deterioration of China / Taiwan relations?

What’s next in the PRC Taiwan stand-off?

What impact will PRC Taiwan hostilities have on the foreign policy positions of Asia Pacific nations?

And is the USA’s Indo-Pacific security/defence realignment a help or a hindrance in the region?

Join Paul and Selwyn for this LIVE recording of this podcast while they consider these big issues, and remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Yet more proposed Chinese “security agreements” in the Pacific Islands have been leaked.

The drafts have been described by critics as revealing “the ambitious scope of Beijing’s strategic intent in the Pacific” and its “coherent desire […] to seek to shape the regional order”. There are concerns they will “dramatically expand [China’s] security influence in the Pacific”.

But does this overstate their importance?

A pause for breath
Australia and New Zealand should be concerned about China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific Islands. A coercive Chinese presence could substantially constrain Australia’s freedom of movement, with both economic and defence implications.

And Pacific states and people have reason to be concerned. The restrictions on journalists during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Solomon Islands demonstrate the potential consequences for transparency of dealing closely with China.

And there are questions about the implications of the Solomon Islands-China security agreement for democracy and accountability.

But before we work ourselves into a frenzy, it is worth pausing for breath.

The leaked drafts are just that: drafts.

They have not yet been signed by any Pacific state.

At least one Pacific leader, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo, has publicly rejected them. Panuelo’s concerns are likely shared by several other Pacific leaders, suggesting they’re also unlikely to sign.

Fiji is joining U.S. President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the White House said, making it the first Pacific Island country in the plan that is part of a U.S. effort to push back on China’s growing regional influence https://t.co/XByydU09IP pic.twitter.com/7xphYtRdv0

— Reuters (@Reuters) May 27, 2022

China wields powerful tools of statecraft — particularly economic — but Pacific states are sovereign. They will ultimately decide the extent of China’s role in the region.

And these drafts do not mention Chinese military bases — nor did the China-Solomon Islands agreement.

Rumours in 2018 China was in talks to build a military base in Vanuatu never eventuated.

What if some Pacific states sign these documents?
First, these documents contain proposals rather than binding obligations.

If they are signed, it’s not clear they will differ in impact from the many others agreed over the last decade. For example, China announced a “strategic partnership” with eight Pacific states in 2014, which had no substantive consequences for Australia.

So common — and often so ineffectual — are “strategic partnerships” and “memoranda of understanding” that there is a satirical podcast series devoted to them.

Second, the drafts contain proposals that may benefit Pacific states.

For example, a China-Pacific Islands free trade area could open valuable opportunities, especially as China is a significant export destination.

Third, the drafts cover several activities in which China is already engaged. For example, China signed a security agreement with Fiji in 2011, and the two states have had a police cooperation relationship since.

It’s worth remembering Australia and New Zealand provide the bulk of policing assistance. The executive director of the Pacific Island Chiefs of Police is even a Kiwi.

The drafts do contain concerning provisions. Cooperation on data networks and “smart” customs systems may raise cybersecurity issues. This is why Australia funded the Coral Sea Cable connecting Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea to Australia.

Provisions relating to satellite maritime surveillance may cause friction with existing activities supported by Australia and its partners.

Greater Chinese maritime domain awareness of the region – meaning understanding of anything associated with its oceans and waterways – would also raise strategic challenges for Australia, New Zealand, and the US.

But there is a risk of over-egging the implications based on our own anxieties.

The omission of #PNG from the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework set up by the US to contest China in the region is a huge mistake & a missed opportunity, especially with China on the prowl in the Pacific Islandshttps://t.co/tRse7G3dvi

— Keith Jackson AM FRSA FAIM (@PNGAttitude) May 27, 2022

China’s interests
Much of China’s diplomacy has been opportunistic and not dissimilar to what Australia and other partners are doing.

Although the region is strategically important to Australia, the southern Pacific islands are marginal to China. And apart from Kiribati and Nauru, the northern Pacific islands are closely linked to the US.

China’s interest may primarily be about demonstrating strategic reach, rather than for specific military purposes.

So, amplifying narratives about China’s threatening presence may unintentionally help China achieve its broader aim of influencing Australia.

And framing China’s presence almost exclusively as threatening may limit Australia’s manoeuvrability.

Given the accelerating frequency of natural disasters in the region due to climate change, it is only a matter of time before the Australian and Chinese militaries find themselves delivering humanitarian relief side-by-side. Being on sufficiently cordial terms to engage in even minimal coordination will be important.

Indeed, Australia should try to draw China into cooperative arrangements in the Pacific.

Reviving, updating, and seeking China’s signature of, the Pacific Islands Forum’s Cairns Compact on Development Coordination, would be a good start.

If China really has benign intentions, it should welcome this opportunity. The compact, a mechanism created by Pacific states, could help ensure China’s activities are well-coordinated and targeted alongside those of other partners.

Amplifying threat narratives also feeds into Australia’s perceived need to “compete” by playing whack-a-mole with China, rather than by formulating a coherent, overarching regional policy that responds to the priorities of Pacific states.

For example, Australia has funded Telstra’s purchase of Digicel, following interest from Chinese telco Huawei, despite questions over the benefits.

What will Australia offer next?
There is a risk some Pacific states may overestimate their ability to manage China. But for the time being it is understandable why at least some would entertain Chinese overtures.

New Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has rushed to Fiji days into the job with sought-after offers of action on climate change and expanded migration opportunities. Pacific leaders might be wondering what Australia will offer next.

Dr Joanne Wallis is professor of international security, University of Adelaide and Dr Maima Koro is a Pacific research fellow, University of Adelaide. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The President of the Federated States of Micronesia says he has serious concerns about the details of two leaked Chinese government documents to be tabled at a meeting next week.

President David Panuelo warns the sovereignty of the Pacific Island countries is at stake, and that the outcome of one of the documents could result in a cold war or even a world war.

Panuelo has written to 18 Pacific leaders — including New Zealand, Australia, and the Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum — specifically about the China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision.

The other document is a five-year plan to implement the outcomes into action.

In his letter he said the Common Development Vision and Monday’s meeting was a “smokescreen” for a larger agenda, and further warned that China was looking to exert more control over Pacific nations’ sovereignty and that this document threatened to bring at the very least a new Cold War era but in the worst-case scenario, a world war.

He has urged leaders in the region to look at it carefully before making any decisions.

In particular, Panuelo noted that the Vision sought to “fundamentally alter what used to be bilateral relations with China into multilateral issues”.

Ensuring ‘Chinese control’
The Vision he added sought to “… ensure Chinese control of ‘traditional and non-traditional security” of our islands, including through law enforcement training, supplying, and joint enforcement efforts, which can be used for the protection of Chinese assets and citizens.

It suggests “cooperation on network and governance” and “cybersecurity” and “equal emphasis on development and security”, and that there shall be “economic development and protection of national security and public interests”.

“The Common Development Vision seeks to ensure Chinese influence in government through ‘collaborative’ policy planning and political exchanges, including diplomatic training, in addition to an increase in Chinese media relationships in the Pacific …,” he said.

“The Common Development Vision seeks Chinese control and ownership of our communications infrastructure, as well as customs and quarantine infrastructure …. for the purpose of biodata collection and mass surveillance of those residing in, entering, and leaving our islands, ostensibly to occur in part through cybersecurity partnership.”

The Vision he said “… seeks Chinese control of our collective fisheries and extractive resource sectors, including free trade agreements, marine spatial planning, deep-sea mining, and extensive public and private sector loan-taking through the Belt and Road Initiative via the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”

Panuelo said the proposed China-Pacific leaders meeting on Monday in Fiji was intended to “shift those of us with diplomatic relations with China very closely into Beijing’s orbit, intrinsically tying the whole of our countries and societies to them.

“The practical impacts, however, of Chinese control over our communications infrastructure, our ocean territory and the resources within them, and our security space, aside from impacts on our sovereignty is that it increases the chances of China getting into conflict with Australia, Japan, the United States, and New Zealand, on the day when Beijing decides to invade Taiwan.

China’s goal – ‘take Taiwan’
“To be clear, that’s China’s goal: to take Taiwan. Peacefully, if possible; through war, if necessary.”

Panuelo said the FSM would attend Monday’s meeting and would reject both documents “on the premise that we believe the proposed agreement needlessly heightens geopolitical tensions, and that the agreement threatens regional stability and security, including both my country’s Great Friendship with China and my country’s Enduring Partnership with the United States.”

He said the Vision and meeting were a “smokescreen for a larger agenda”.

“Despite our ceaseless and accurate howls that Climate Change represents the single-most existential security threat to our islands, the Common Development Vision threatens to bring a new Cold war era at best, and a World War at worst.”

He said the only way to maintain the relationship with Beijing was to focus exclusively on economic and technical cooperation.

Panuelo hoped that by alerting his Pacific colleagues of developments that “… we can collectively take the steps necessary to prevent any intensified conflict, and possible breakout of war, from ever happening in the first place”.

“I believe that Australia needs to take climate change more seriously and urgently. I believe that the United States should have a diplomatic presence in all sovereign Pacific Islands Countries, and step-up its assistance to all islands, to include its own states and territories in the Pacific.”

Not a justification
Panuelo summed up: “However, it is my view that the shortcomings of our allies are not a justification for condemning the leaders who succeed us in having to accept a war that we failed to recognise was coming and failed to prevent from occurring.

“We can only reassert the rightful focus on climate change as our region’s most existential threat by taking every single possible action to promote peace and harmony across our Blue Pacific Continent.”

Panuelo said his cabinet has suggested the FSM resist the objectives of the documents and the nation maintain its own bilateral agenda for development and engagement with China.

He also said the documents would open up Pacific countries to having phone calls and emails intercepted and overheard.

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi is currently visiting several Pacific countries.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A spectre is haunting the Pacific. It is focused on Solomon Islands today, but has eyes everywhere and might pounce anywhere next.

No, I’m not talking about China. I am talking about us.

More specifically, I’m talking about a particular type of Western security pundit, who hypes danger and itches for confrontation. And I am talking about the way our politicians behave when they strive to win votes by stoking fear of the world outside our borders.

The saga of China’s “military base” in Solomon Islands demonstrates how unhelpful such behaviour is, both to our own interests, and to the people of the Pacific.

If you had the good fortune of missing the last few weeks, here’s what happened.

In late March, journalists revealed that China and Solomon Islands had signed a policing agreement. Someone from within the Solomon Islands government also leaked a broader draft security agreement with China.

In April, this agreement was finalised and signed. (Its text hasn’t been released but appears likely to be very similar to the draft.) You can see the draft here. It’s short and clear.

Ship visits and stopover
Solomons can ask China to provide police and military assistance. If, and only if, the Solomon Islands government of the day consents, China can “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands, and relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.”

Permanent bases are not mentioned.

This, however, didn’t stop antipodean pundits from racing to hype the threat of a Chinese base. To be fair, few went as far as David Llewellyn-Smith, who demanded that Australia preemptively invade Solomons.

He was an outlier (although it didn’t stop him from being uncritically quoted in the Courier-Mail). But all spoke of a base as a near certainty.

Then politicians piled on. Penny Wong, who normally displays an impressive understanding of aid and the Pacific, decried the agreement as the “worst failure of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific since the end of World War II”.

Peter Dutton warned that Australia could now expect “the Chinese to do all they can”. (Although he added optimistically they were unlikely to do so before the election.)

Barnaby Joyce fretted about Solomons becoming a, “little Cuba off our coast”. (Solomons is more than 1500km from Australia; Cuba is about 200km from the US.)

Australian agreement similar
Amidst the racket, much was lost. Australia has its own security agreement with Solomon Islands. It’s more carefully worded, but it affords Australia similar powers to China.

And China already has a security agreement with Fiji. Indeed, there was real talk of a base when that agreement was signed, but no base materialised, and the agreement has had no effect on regional security.

And as Scott Morrison pointed out, Manasseh Sogavare, the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, has explicitly ruled out a Chinese base.

True, Sogavare is a political maneuverer who can’t be taken at his word. But a Chinese base in Solomons serves neither his interest, nor that of the Chinese.

It doesn’t serve Sogavare’s interests because it won’t give him what he wants — a stronger hold on power. Seen as the embodiment of a corrupt elite, he’s unpopular in Honiara. His election brought riots.

As did his standoff with Malaitan Premier Daniel Suidani. So he wants Chinese police training and maybe military assistance in times of instability. But a base won’t help.

Solomons is a Sinophobic country and the obvious presence of a base will increase Sogavare’s unpopularity. It would also jeopardise the security support he gets from Australia, as well as Australian aid. (By my best estimate, based on Chinese promises, which are likely to be overstatements, Australia gave more than 2.5 times as much aid to Solomons in 2019, the most recent year with data.)

Base isn’t in China’s interest
I’m not defending Sogavare. I’d rather Chinese police weren’t helping him. But a base isn’t in his interest. And he’s no fool.

A base isn’t in China’s interests either. I don’t like China’s repressive political leaders. But their military ambitions are limited to places they view as part of China. What they’ve done, or want to do, in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan is odious.

But Australia isn’t next on their list. Outside of their immediate sphere of influence they want trade. They need trade, and the wealth it brings, to sustain the political settlement that keeps them prosperous and in power. Any war that saw China menace Australia from Solomon Islands would bring ruinous sanctions in its wake. (US bases in Guam and Okinawa would be a headache too, I’d imagine.)

The broader security agreement is helpful to China: it gives them the ability to protect Chinese nationals and Chinese business interests if riots break out.

But they don’t need a base for that. A base would be costly, hard to establish in a country with little available land, and quite possibly useless next time the Solomons government changes.

I’m not a supporter of the security agreement. But it’s not a base. And it’s not a catastrophe.

Our behaving like it’s a catastrophe is harmful though.

Harmful to Australia and NZ
It’s harmful to countries like Australia and New Zealand, because the main advantage we have over China in the Pacific is soft power. Thanks to anti-Chinese racism and a healthy wariness of China’s authoritarian government, most people in Pacific countries, including political elites, are more hesitant in dealing with China than with us.

Sure, money talks, and China can procure influence, but we are a little better liked. And that helps. Yet we lose this advantage every time we talk of invading Pacific countries, or call the region our “backyard”, or roughly twist the arms of Pacific politicians.

The Pacific is not some rogue part of Tasmania. It’s an ocean of independent countries. That means diplomacy is needed, and temper tantrums are unhelpful.

Worse still, our propensity to view the Pacific as a geostrategic chessboard has consequences for the region’s people. Geopolitical aid is too-often transactional and poorly focused on what people need. It is less likely to promote development.

There’s an alternative: to choose realism over hype in our collective commentary. And to earn soft power by being a respectful and reliable partner. It’s not always easy. But it’s not impossible. Yet it has completely escaped us in the shambles of the last few weeks.

Dr Terence Wood is a research fellow at the Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. His research focuses on political governance in Western Melanesia, and Australian and New Zealand aid. Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

If the coming election goes to Australia’s Labor party, Penny Wong is very likely to become Foreign Minister. So when she speaks, people across the region prick up their ears.

Without the least disrespect to her recent forebears, she could be one of the most acute, incisive and insightful FMs in recent history.

Whether she’ll be any more effective than them is another matter.

Australia has a long tradition of placing prominent front-benchers into the role, and then pointedly ignoring their efforts, their advice and their warnings. It’s as if government leaders find their greatest rival and send them trotting off around the globe, more to keep them from making mischief at home than to achieve anything noteworthy while they’re gone.

In Australia, it seems, foreign policy is domestic policy done outdoors.

If she achieves nothing more, Wong would be well served to look closely at the people supporting her, and to spend considerable effort re-organising and in fact re-inventing DFAT.

Its disconnection from other departments, especially Defence and PMO, has created an internal culture that spends more time feeding on itself than actually helping produce a persuasive or coherent foreign policy.

Ensuring foreign policy’s primacy at the cabinet table is a big ask, but it will be for naught if the department can’t deliver. There are significant structural matters to be dealt with.

‘Worst failure of foreign policy in the Pacific’: Labor launches scathing attack on government over Solomon Islands-China pact https://t.co/efbU2tM6Iu

— ABC News (@abcnews) April 19, 2022

Rolling development and aid into the department was a significant regression that hampered both sides. Volumes can be written about the need to distinguish development assistance from foreign policy, and many of them could be focused on the Pacific islands region.

The two are mostly complementary (mostly), but they must also be discrete from one another.

It’s far more complicated than this, but suffice it to say that development aid prioritises the recipient’s needs, while foreign relations generally prioritise national concerns. The moment you invert either side of that equation, you lose.

Exempli gratia: Solomon Islands.

It’s well known that Australia spent billions shoring up Solomon Islands’ security and administrative capacity. Surely after all that aid, they can expect the government to stay onside in geopolitical matters?

Applying the admittedly simplistic filter from the para above, the answer is an obvious no.

Aid is not a substitute for actual foreign relations, and foreign relations is definitely not just aid.

So is Penny Wong correct when she calls the CN/SI defence agreement a massive strategic setback? Sure.

Is she right to call Pacific Affairs Minister Zed Seselja “a junior woodchuck”, sent in a last minute attempt to dissuade Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare from signing the agreement?

The idea of a minister responsible for the complex, wildly diverse patchwork of nations spanning such a vast space has value. But in terms of resources and policy heft, Seselja rides at the back of the posse on a mule.

There are good reasons to devote an entire office to Pacific affairs. There are also blindingly good reasons to keep the Foreign Minister as the primary point of contact on matters of foreign policy.

That means the role—and yes, the existence—of the Pacific Affairs ministry needs a ground-up reconsideration. Notionally, it fulfills a critical role. But how?

It’s fair to say that Wong is more insightful than those who describe Solomon Islands as a fly-speck in the Pacific, or a Little Cuba (whatever the F that means). But in the past, Labor’s shown little insight into the actual value and purpose of foreign policy.

For the better part of four decades, neither Australian party was fussed at all about the fact that there had been few if any official visits between leaders. Prime Ministers regularly blew off Pacific Islands Forum meetings.

In Vanuatu’s case, the first ever prime ministerial visit to Canberra was in 2018. Why aren’t such meetings annual events?

Australia is rightly proud of its pre-eminence in development assistance in the Pacific islands. But that never was, and never will be, a substitute for diplomatic engagement. And you can’t have that without a functioning diplomatic corps whose presence is felt equally in Canberra and in foreign capitals.

But even that’s not enough. Penny Wong has yet to show in concrete terms how she plans to address what could accurately be called the greatest strategic foreign policy failure since WWII: Leaving Australia alone to guard the shop.

In 2003, George W. Bush was rightly vilified for characterising Australia’s role in the region as America’s Sheriff.

But the Americans weren’t the only ones who walked away, leaving Australia alone to engage with the region. The UK and the EU (minus France in their patch) rolled back their diplomatic presence substantially.

Even New Zealand agreed to restrict its engagement in large areas in deference to its neighbour. The most enduring presence was provided by organisations without any meaningful foreign policy role: UN development agencies and multilateral financial institutions.

Since the beginning of the War on Terror, there has been a consistent and often deliberate draw-down on the capital provided by democratic institutions, multilateral foreign policy, and indeed any collective course-setting among nations.

Post Cold-War democratic momentum has been squandered on an increasingly transactional approach to engagement that’s begun to look alarmingly like the spheres of influence that appeal so much to Putin and Xi.

This hasn’t happened in the Pacific islands alone. The UN has become an appendix in the global body politic, one cut away from complete irrelevance. ASEAN and APEC are struggling just as hard to find relevance, let alone purpose, as the Pacific Islands Forum or the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

Australia has “led” in the Pacific islands region by being the largest aid donor, blithely assuming that all the other kids in the region want to be like it. But that “leadership” masks a massive gap in actual influence in shaping the agenda in a region that’s larger and more diverse than any other in the world.

Want to know more? I have a whole chapter in my last book about it: https://t.co/RjggiClW5Z

— Joanne Wallis (@JoanneEWallis) March 30, 2022

The data’s there if people want it. This isn’t a particularly contentious… er, contention, if you’re among the far-too-small group of people who actually live in and care about the future of the region.

In a regional dynamic defined and dominated by transactional bilateralism, China holds all the aces. The only hope anyone has of slowing its growth in the region is through meaningful multilateralism that treats Pacific island countries as actual nations with national pride and individual priorities. Instead of silencing them, their voices should be amplified and defended, not by Australia alone, but by every other democratic nation with the means and the will to do so.

If we can’t respect the equal standing of nations, we can’t protect their integrity.

Scott Morrison may indeed be one of the worst exemplars of this blithe disregard for actual foreign policy engagement. He’s certainly won few friends with his world-class foot-dragging on climate change. America’s suddenly renewed interest in the region is an indication that they’ve woken up to the Bush administration’s mistakes.

It’s also clear they don’t trust Australia to play Sheriff any more. Kurt Campbell’s upcoming visit to the region is just the latest in a series of increasingly high profile tours of the region.

So yes, Penny Wong is justified in saying that China’s advances in the Pacific derive at least in part from Australia’s lack of a coherent and effective foreign policy.

But foreign policy is not made at home. It’s not Australia’s interests alone that matter. And subjugating Pacific nations in compacts of free association isn’t a substitute for actual policy making.

Pacific island nations will not defend Australia’s national interests unless they share those interests. The only way that Australia—and the world—can be assured they do is by actively listening, and by incorporating Pacific voices into the fabric of a renewed and revitalised global family.

Dan McGarry was previously media director at Vanuatu Daily Post/Buzz FM96. The Village Explainer is his semi-regular newsletter containing analysis and insight focusing on under-reported aspects of Pacific societies, politics and economics. His articles are republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The Solomon Islands prime minister is adamant a security co-operation agreement his government has signed with China will not undermine regional security.

In Parliament yesterday, Manasseh Sogavare confirmed the controversial security agreement with China had been signed despite strong opposition to the deal from the other side of the house.

The pact, a draft of which was first leaked online last month, raised domestic and regional anxieties about Beijing’s increasing influence in the South Pacific.

It is feared that it could open the door to China’s military presence in Honiara — a claim rejected both by China and Solomon Islands.

Sogavare has defended the intention behind the move, saying its aim is for the nation to diversify its security ties “to improve the quality of lives” of its people and to “address soft and hard security threats facing the country”.

“I ask all our neighbours, friends and partners to respect the sovereign interests of Solomon Islands on the assurance that the decision will not adversely impact or undermine the peace and harmony of our region,” Sogavare said.

In response, opposition leader Matthew Wale called on Sogavare to make the signed document public “to allay any regional fears of any hidden parts of it”.

‘Disclosure of the agreement’
“And now that the agreement has been signed whether the Prime Minister will allow a disclosure of the agreement so that members may have a perusal of it,” Wale said.

Wale’s sentiments were echoed by another opposition MP, the chairman of the foreign relations committee, Peter Kenilorea Jr.

Kenilorea Jr said Sogavare’s decision to strike a military cooperation deal with China lacked transparency and he believed whatever efforts partners were putting in from the region were not going to make a difference.

But he also expressed concern, now that the two countries have made the agreement official, that it could become the source for domestic tensions.

“It will just further inflame emotions and tensions and again underscores the mistrust that people have on the government,” Peter Kenilorea Jr said.

“It is cause for concern for many Solomon Islanders, but definitely a certain segment of the society will now feel even more concerned and might want to start to take certain action which is not in the best interest of Solomon Islands in our own unity as a country.”

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern had raised “serious concerns” about the security pact when the news initially broke two weeks ago.

‘No need’, says Ardern
And following the announcement on Wednesday that the deal was done, Ardern reiterated her concerns.

“We see no need for this agreement,” Ardern said.

“We’re concerned about the militarisation of the Pacific and we continue to call on the Solomons to work with the Pacific with any concerns around their security they may have.”

The Solomon Islands prime minister is adamant a security cooperation agreement his government has signed with China will not undermine regional security. https://t.co/SxP21e1lKu

— RNZ Pacific (@RNZPacific) April 20, 2022

RNZ Pacific’s Honiara-based correspondent Georgina Kekea said the issue had divided public opinion in the country.

Kekea said people were already anticipating the signing of the pact.

“From what we’ve seen there are some who are with the signing, there some who are not. Some who are a bit sceptical about what the future will be like in the Solomon Islands with such an agreement being signed with China,” she said.

“So, there’s mixed feelings I would say on the ground, especially with the signing.”

US officials confer with Honiara
Meanwhile, senior US officials are meeting with Solomon Islands government this week with the security deal expected to be a major point of discussions.

Writing on his Village Explainer website in an article entitled “Pacific stuff up?”, Vanuatu columnist Dan McGarry writes that “if the coming election goes to Australia’s Labor party, Penny Wong is very likely to become Foreign Minister. So when she speaks, people across the region prick up their ears.

“Without the least disrespect to her recent forebears, she could be one of the most acute, incisive and insightful FMs in recent history.

“Whether she’ll be any more effective than them is another matter.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A senior Solomon Islands MP has warned that the controversial security agreement with China could result in action among local opponents of the deal.

The government in Honiara signed a controversial security agreement with China despite concern from local political figures, as well as Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

There are regional concerns the deal could open the door for Beijing to base its military in Honiara, but Prime Minister Manasseh Sovagare denies that that is the purpose of the security pact.

Solomon Islands parliamentarian and chair of the Foreign Relations Committee Peter Kenilorea Jr said Sogavare’s decision to seal the deal — despite significant opposition — could lead to domestic ramifications.

He said certain sections of the nation’s population have been strongly against China since the diplomatic switch from Taiwan in 2019.

Kenilorea said some people would not take this lightly and it was going to cause further tensions that were already at play locally.

“It will just further inflame emotions and tensions. And again underscores the mistrust that people have in the government,” he said.

‘A cause for concern’
“And it is cause for concern for many Solomon Islanders, but definitely a certain segment of the society will now feel even more concerned and might want to start to take certain action which is not in the best interest of Solomon Islands in our own unity as a country.”

Kenilorea said the government needed to make the security document signed with China available to the public.

“It is that important that it should be made public. We have a security treaty with Australia, and that can be accessed online.

“So why couldn’t this be and I will be calling for that signed copy to be made available so that all Solomon Islanders as well as a region can see what is in there,” he said.

Opposition Leader Matthew Wale made that a formal request in Parliament “to allay any regional fears” and received a non-commital response from Sogavare.

Australia’s disappointment with Honiara
The Australian federal government has declared it is “deeply disappointed” that Solomon Islands has pressed ahead and signed the security pact with China.

The announcement came just days after Australia’s Minister for the Pacific Zed Seselja travelled to Honiara and met Sogavare in a last-ditch effort to dissuade him from going ahead with the deal.

Senator Seselja and Foreign Minister Marise Payne said the government was “disappointed” by the agreement and that it was not reached in a transparent way.

“Ultimately, this is a sovereign decision of the government of Solomon Islands and we absolutely recognise that, but … declarations and these engagements on security issues have been dealt with in a Pacific-wide manner,” Payne said.

“That is the traditional approach for these issues and it’s why some Pacific partners have also raised concerns.”

Senator Payne said the government’s position was still that Pacific neighbours were the best to delivery security in the region and said it was an “unfair characterisation” to say the region had become less secure while Prime Minister Scott Morrison has been in power.

The ministers said while Solomon Islands had the right to make sovereign decisions about national security, Australia still believed the “Pacific family” was best placed to provide security guarantees.

In Washington, the White House, which is sending a high-level US delegation to Honiara this week, said it was concerned about “the lack of transparency and unspecified nature” of the pact.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A View from Afar – In this podcast, political scientist Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning discuss how numerous countries have committed aid, intelligence expertise, military hardware and weapons to a multilateral effort in support of Ukraine.

What does this 2022-style of military diplomacy mean for the independent foreign policies of countries like New Zealand – with its style of incremental contributions in aid of the defence of Ukraine?

For example, the New Zealand Government this week confirmed the deployment of a C-130 Hercules with 50 personnel to Europe; a further eight logistics specialists based in Germany; $13 million in further support to procure equipment for the Ukraine military.

On announcing the move, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said: “Our support is to assist the Ukraine Army to repel a brutal Russian invasion because peace in the region of Europe is essential for global stability.”

Ardern added: “The global response has seen an unprecedented amount of military support pledged for Ukraine, and more help to transport and distribute it is urgently needed, and so we will do our bit to help.” (ref. ForeignAffairs.co.nz, https://foreignaffairs.co.nz/2022/04/11/mil-osi-new-zealand-new-zealand-sends-c130-hercules-and-50-strong-team-to-europe-to-support-ukraine/ )

So today, we examine how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with its method of total annihilation, has drawn once relatively independent nations into the fold of western security alliances. And we will consider whether such moves will become a permanent configuration?

Also in this episode, we will discuss the South-West Pacific strategic balance. Specifically, why has the People’s Republic of China, and the Solomon Islands bilateral security agreement, upset Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America?

You can comment on this debate by clicking on one of these social media channels and interacting in the social media’s comment area. Here are the links:

• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Youtube
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

It has been an interesting couple of weeks for Solomon Islands, with stories of policing, weapons, replica weapons and a security agreement with China dominating the local and regional media.

Let’s start with the issue of arming the police. After the tensions, for a long time Solomon police did not carry arms but this is an exception in our history.

Indeed, the precursor of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) created during the early colonial era was known as the “BSIP Armed Constabulary”.

For as long as I can remember, our police have had access to some form of arms stored in the armoury. Their use traditionally was ceremonial, mostly during parades.

In fact, many of us who used to watch their parades loved to hear the sound made when the police and marine units lifted the guns as they responded to the orders of the parade commander.

The only time the weapons were used in my lifetime was during the Bougainville crisis and during the ethnic tensions.

The Bougainville crisis necessitated the importation by the Solomon Islands government of high-powered guns because of incursions by armed Papua New Guinean soldiers across the border and their use against Solomon Islands citizens at the PNG-Solomon Islands border.

Weapons bought via US broker
I recall that importation as at that time I was a legal adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The weapons were purchased from the US via a broker in Singapore.

Some questions were asked but, given the circumstances, their importation was justifiable.

A diplomatic request was made for their temporary storage in Australia before they were shipped to Honiara. These were government-procured arms and the procurement procedures for their acquisition duly complied with government procurement processes.

I have been advocating for some time the rearmament of the RSIPF and I am also supportive of the RSIPF to be trained by whoever can provide it. Many police officers have been trained in the US, Taiwan, Australia, UK, Singapore, New Zealand and Fiji.

Thus, I have no particular issues with them being trained by Chinese advisers as was the case recently.

However, I do have issues if the RSIPF is going to equip itself with high-powered guns, whether real ones (as supplied by Australia) or fake ones (as supplied by China). These concerns are exacerbated by the current level of secrecy and confusion around the security arrangements.

Firstly, it is questionable whether it is necessary for the RSIPF to be armed with high-powered weapons. Perhaps there are still a number of guns that were taken from the armoury that are still in the hands of former MEF (Malaitan Eagle Force) militants.

Moreover, this information might be known by a key member of the current political coalition who is a former MEF commander. Perhaps the police just want to be prepared.

Memories of the ethnic tensions
However, we also should not forget what happened 22 years ago during the ethnic tensions, when the armoury was compromised by police giving weapons to militants and militants raiding the armoury for weapons — weapons which were then used by Solomon Islanders to intimidate and kill their fellow citizens.

Members of the public are also genuinely concerned about the manner in which the Chinese fake guns were imported into the country — via a logging vessel which is, to say the least, an unusual means of transporting official government goods.

The shifting narratives from the Police Commissioner about this incident have raised more questions than they have answered.

There are also broader questions. Is security created through arming the police? Or should we instead focus on an approach to security whereby the community is recognised as a partner in building and maintaining peace, and build on the long history Solomon Islanders have of brokering conflict among themselves?

While, as I said, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with arming the police, the focus needs to be on using community policing, chiefs, and youth leaders to broker conflicts. It is unfortunate when the ordinary citizens of the country are viewed not as partners in development, but as threat to the hegemony and hold on power by some people.

Last year’s riots and covid-19 have revealed many underlying governance weaknesses. As I have argued earlier, they are symptomatic of a society that has become increasingly less pluralistic, and of political and economic institutions that have become less inclusive.

Then there is the leaked security agreement with China, which has exacerbated existing unease among the public about China. The increasing engagement with China is explained by the Prime Minister as an attempt by the government to diversify its engagement on security.

Chinese naval base unlikely
It is unlikely that China will build a naval base in Solomon Islands. The agreement does not specify that it will and, although it could be construed that way, the reality is that it is not going to happen.

Australia is already building a patrol base in Lofung, in the Shortland Islands which borders Papua New Guinea, and has announced that they will build another one in the eastern Solomon Islands. I would venture to suggest that the capacity of these investments should cater for a naval base if the need ever arises in the future.

What is unprecedented about this security arrangement is that it allows China, with the consent of the Solomon Islands government, to send armed personnel to protect its citizens and assets.

It also prohibits any publicity around these arrangements. It is ironic that a prime minister who invariably extols the virtues of national sovereignty should agree to cede a fundamental sovereign function — the protection of lives and property — to a foreign force.

It is not clear if this is inadvertent, but it would seem that its ramifications have not been thought through.

The security arrangement has also raised concerns in the region. The President of the Federated States of Micronesia has written to Prime Minister Sogavare requesting that he reconsider it.

There is perhaps nothing intrinsically wrong with Solomon Islands signing a security agreement with China. There should, however, be coherence with similar arrangements with other countries, which focus on the capacity of the Solomon Islands Police Force to deal with internal security uprisings, and preferably all assistance should be within a regional framework supported by the Pacific Islands Forum.

Cannot choose neighbours
While a country may choose its friends, it cannot choose its neighbours.

In Solomon Islands today, there is no opportunity for policy debate by the public except on Facebook. The public and constituents do not have the same ease of access to our ministers and prime minister as embassy officials, and mining and logging CEOs.

Such is the current degree of polarisation that any criticism or comment is viewed by the current political coalition as “anti-government”. There does not seem to be any scope for dissenting views, or even constructive ideas from outside the inner circle, to be accommodated.

Unless a more pluralistic society is promoted where people’s views are welcomed, and there are more inclusive political and economic institutions, the government will be forced to depend on regional troops to support it.

At some stage, regional partners must hold Solomon Islands politicians to account for the economic and political situation they have created and the resulting violence such as the rioting last year.

The current focus on arms, without attention to rights and responsibilities, cannot and should not be sustained.

Dr Transform Aqorau is CEO of iTuna Intel and founding director, Pacific Catalyst, and a legal adviser to the Marshall Islands. He is the former CEO of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement Office. This article was first published by Devpolicy Blog from the Development Policy Centre at The Australian National University and is republished under a Creative Commons licence.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz