What does the Geopolitical balancing that is taking place in the West and South-West Pacific mean for the region and the globe?

Analysis: Paul and Selwyn consider the question from several angles, and provide a context to the headlines that suggest both global powers, the USA and the Peoples Republic of China, are on a collision-course toward conflict.

Paul takes us through the US-PNG and Japan-NZ bilateral security/military agreements as a balancing response to the PRC-Solomons security agreement.

In addition, Paul considers the question: Does the PRC have legitimate interests in the Pacific and, as a great power, should those interests be understood and respected?

Selwyn considers whether China’s ascendancy as a global power threatens the United States’ position as the perceived ‘preeminent defender’ of the Global Order?

And Selwyn raises for debate, highlighting what the two global powers’ messaging was at the Shangri-La security dialogue that took place over last weekend.

Paul then analyses what this all means for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Recommended Links:

•  KiwiPolitico.com Ref. https://www.kiwipolitico.com/2023/06/…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; General Li Shangfu, State Councilor; Minister of National Defense, China Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; Lloyd J Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…

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Papua New Guinea’s new Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko has revealed to Australian media his country is moving to negotiate a security treaty with Australia — and potentially New Zealand.

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported this seemed to signal Canberra and Port Moresby were willing to build a deeper defence relationship as China entrenched its power in the region.

Tkatchenko told the broadcaster he discussed the idea with Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong during her visit to Port Moresby this week, and both countries were keen to press ahead with negotiations.

“There were discussions of a treaty going forward between our countries to ensure we are all on the same page when it comes to security in the region,” Tkatchenko said.

“And it will also make us connected in all aspects of anything that might arise now or into the future.”

While Australia and Papua New Guinea have strong security links, the two countries have never signed a formal treaty.

Tkatchenko said the treaty “would cover all security aspects in the region”.

It could well take in New Zealand as well — although he did not say whether he had had any discussions with the government in Wellington on the subject.

“I would say New Zealand would be a major part of it as well, in our region. It would be a joint treaty to work on security,” he told the ABC.

“A treaty between our traditional partners in the region will just help give security to all countries.”

Tkatchenko did not say whether the treaty could be binding, or whether it would be a broader informal agreement, stressing that discussions were at a very early stage.

“[This] has yet to be confirmed and finalised, it still has to go through the appropriate procedures and departments like Defence, like the Prime Ministers’ [department] and others to come to a complete understanding of that arrangement,” he said.

“It’s all not in black and white yet. But it was put on the table and it’s something that will be considered and taken forward into the future.”

Both countries would have more detailed discussions about the proposal at the PNG-Australia Ministerial Forum due to be held in Canberra in November, he said.

Wong plays down potential treaty
Tkatchenko’s announcement comes as Australia pours more resources into its military ties with Papua New Guinea.

The federal government is already pressing ahead with a A$175 million upgrade of the Lombrum Naval Base on PNG’s Manus Island, along with the United States.

The ABC asked Wong about the proposed treaty during an interview in Port Moresby.

She played down the prospect of any security treaty being struck soon, saying she had only had “very, very early discussions” with Tkatchenko and did not want to get ahead of talks with the newly re-elected government under Prime Minister James Marape.

“We obviously … discussed some of the items contemplated under [our partnership], which include discussions about security, but we have a long way to go. It’s a new government, and we want a list of what Papua New Guinea’s priorities are,” she told the ABC.

She also would not be drawn on whether New Zealand might also be invited to join, or what shape the treaty might take.

“Those are matters that will be discussed by Australia and Papua New Guinea. But you wouldn’t be surprised at both countries wanting to continue to work together on security cooperation, we have a long standing defence relationship,” she said.

In New Zealand, Massey University defence and security studies senior lecturer D Anna Powles said Tkatchenko’s declaration about the treaty was “a surprising development”, particularly given Papua New Guinea’s new government had only just taken shape.

She told ABC the move might have been triggered by increasing anxiety in Port Moresby about the implications of the security agreement that China struck with Solomon Islands, saying it “likely reflects Prime Minister Marape’s concerns about the Solomon Islands-China security deal on his doorstep”.

“Australia has sought to establish a ‘hubs-and-spokes’ system of bilateral security treaties in the Pacific, and a security treaty of this nature with PNG would be an obvious extension of that,” she said.

Meanwhile, reports said the Solomon Islands had to delay entry of a US Coast Guard ship last week due to the “late submission of information” needed to approve access for the vessel into the country, according to Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare.

The ship, Oliver Henry, was denied entry into Guadalcanal due to a delay in submitting the required documents, which led the ship to depart the island’s waters before approval was granted on August 20, Sogavare said.

The Oliver Henry was forced to change course and head for Papua New Guinea instead.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The Solomon Islands government has threatened to ban or deport foreign journalists “disrespectful” of the country’s relationship with China, according to a statement released by the Prime Minister’s Office this week.

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has condemned this “grave infringement on press freedom” and has called on Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare to ensure all journalists remain free to report on the Solomon Islands.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Even from the grainy black and white footage of American soldiers wading towards shore while under fire, you can see and sense the fear, resignation and determination in that moment.

The Battle of Midway in World War II may have been won, but on August 7, 1942, the Solomon Islands campaign was just beginning.

By the end, nearly 40,000 men lost their lives here, 31,000 Japanese and 7,100 Allies.

In 2013, I travelled with a large group of New Zealand war veterans to New Caledonia, marking the war in the Pacific.

There is a New Zealand cemetery at Bourail where Kiwis who died in the Pacific are buried. It was humbling to be with these men, aged in their 80s and 90s, as they were slowly led down to the graves of their mates.

There were many tears for fallen but also burdens of their own to carry. Many years had passed but some things remain raw.

One of the veterans who came along was a man named John Jones. He was one of three coastwatchers who survived in what was then the Gilbert and Ellis Islands. He and the others survived because they were captured early in the war by the Japanese.

Rounded up, beheaded
Unlike his three best friends (they had all signed up together) who were later among 25 rounded up and beheaded.

Jones would weep as he thought of the terror his mates must have felt as they watched their colleagues being beheaded one by one while waiting for their turn. Unimaginable.

Solomon Islands marks 80th anniversary of Battle of Guadalcanal. Video: 1News

Jones had fought NZ authorities pushing for acknowledgement of the slain coastwatchers.

He succeeded and there is now a beautiful monument in their honour. I had got to know him over the years and was immensely fond of him.

We met up many times and when he died in 2017, myself and a fellow journalist, Mike Field, who had also written about him extensively, went to his funeral.

So here we are in the Solomon Islands and I am reminded of my old friend as there are no veterans here today. Too many years have now passed — any still alive would be in their late 90s or older.

So why does it matter 80 years later that we remember this day?

Undercurrents of tension
There are currently undercurrents of tension in the Pacific we would be foolish to ignore. In the three decades of covering the Pacific, a lot of it based in the region, I feel deep unease about what is happening that I’ve never felt before.

China’s reach and influence are growing. While that’s not a bad thing in some areas, there is a flow-down impact on development, democracy, justice, and freedom of speech.

There is a lot of cash and corruption around. My home country of Kiribati is isolated even from its neighbours and this feels very deliberate.

I fear for what is ahead.

So while we think back to the past today, we need to think about what was won — and at what cost — and how we must go forward.

Barbara Dreaver is 1News Pacific correspondent and a contributor to Asia Pacific Report.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Yet more proposed Chinese “security agreements” in the Pacific Islands have been leaked.

The drafts have been described by critics as revealing “the ambitious scope of Beijing’s strategic intent in the Pacific” and its “coherent desire […] to seek to shape the regional order”. There are concerns they will “dramatically expand [China’s] security influence in the Pacific”.

But does this overstate their importance?

A pause for breath
Australia and New Zealand should be concerned about China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific Islands. A coercive Chinese presence could substantially constrain Australia’s freedom of movement, with both economic and defence implications.

And Pacific states and people have reason to be concerned. The restrictions on journalists during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Solomon Islands demonstrate the potential consequences for transparency of dealing closely with China.

And there are questions about the implications of the Solomon Islands-China security agreement for democracy and accountability.

But before we work ourselves into a frenzy, it is worth pausing for breath.

The leaked drafts are just that: drafts.

They have not yet been signed by any Pacific state.

At least one Pacific leader, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo, has publicly rejected them. Panuelo’s concerns are likely shared by several other Pacific leaders, suggesting they’re also unlikely to sign.

Fiji is joining U.S. President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the White House said, making it the first Pacific Island country in the plan that is part of a U.S. effort to push back on China’s growing regional influence https://t.co/XByydU09IP pic.twitter.com/7xphYtRdv0

— Reuters (@Reuters) May 27, 2022

China wields powerful tools of statecraft — particularly economic — but Pacific states are sovereign. They will ultimately decide the extent of China’s role in the region.

And these drafts do not mention Chinese military bases — nor did the China-Solomon Islands agreement.

Rumours in 2018 China was in talks to build a military base in Vanuatu never eventuated.

What if some Pacific states sign these documents?
First, these documents contain proposals rather than binding obligations.

If they are signed, it’s not clear they will differ in impact from the many others agreed over the last decade. For example, China announced a “strategic partnership” with eight Pacific states in 2014, which had no substantive consequences for Australia.

So common — and often so ineffectual — are “strategic partnerships” and “memoranda of understanding” that there is a satirical podcast series devoted to them.

Second, the drafts contain proposals that may benefit Pacific states.

For example, a China-Pacific Islands free trade area could open valuable opportunities, especially as China is a significant export destination.

Third, the drafts cover several activities in which China is already engaged. For example, China signed a security agreement with Fiji in 2011, and the two states have had a police cooperation relationship since.

It’s worth remembering Australia and New Zealand provide the bulk of policing assistance. The executive director of the Pacific Island Chiefs of Police is even a Kiwi.

The drafts do contain concerning provisions. Cooperation on data networks and “smart” customs systems may raise cybersecurity issues. This is why Australia funded the Coral Sea Cable connecting Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea to Australia.

Provisions relating to satellite maritime surveillance may cause friction with existing activities supported by Australia and its partners.

Greater Chinese maritime domain awareness of the region – meaning understanding of anything associated with its oceans and waterways – would also raise strategic challenges for Australia, New Zealand, and the US.

But there is a risk of over-egging the implications based on our own anxieties.

The omission of #PNG from the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework set up by the US to contest China in the region is a huge mistake & a missed opportunity, especially with China on the prowl in the Pacific Islandshttps://t.co/tRse7G3dvi

— Keith Jackson AM FRSA FAIM (@PNGAttitude) May 27, 2022

China’s interests
Much of China’s diplomacy has been opportunistic and not dissimilar to what Australia and other partners are doing.

Although the region is strategically important to Australia, the southern Pacific islands are marginal to China. And apart from Kiribati and Nauru, the northern Pacific islands are closely linked to the US.

China’s interest may primarily be about demonstrating strategic reach, rather than for specific military purposes.

So, amplifying narratives about China’s threatening presence may unintentionally help China achieve its broader aim of influencing Australia.

And framing China’s presence almost exclusively as threatening may limit Australia’s manoeuvrability.

Given the accelerating frequency of natural disasters in the region due to climate change, it is only a matter of time before the Australian and Chinese militaries find themselves delivering humanitarian relief side-by-side. Being on sufficiently cordial terms to engage in even minimal coordination will be important.

Indeed, Australia should try to draw China into cooperative arrangements in the Pacific.

Reviving, updating, and seeking China’s signature of, the Pacific Islands Forum’s Cairns Compact on Development Coordination, would be a good start.

If China really has benign intentions, it should welcome this opportunity. The compact, a mechanism created by Pacific states, could help ensure China’s activities are well-coordinated and targeted alongside those of other partners.

Amplifying threat narratives also feeds into Australia’s perceived need to “compete” by playing whack-a-mole with China, rather than by formulating a coherent, overarching regional policy that responds to the priorities of Pacific states.

For example, Australia has funded Telstra’s purchase of Digicel, following interest from Chinese telco Huawei, despite questions over the benefits.

What will Australia offer next?
There is a risk some Pacific states may overestimate their ability to manage China. But for the time being it is understandable why at least some would entertain Chinese overtures.

New Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has rushed to Fiji days into the job with sought-after offers of action on climate change and expanded migration opportunities. Pacific leaders might be wondering what Australia will offer next.

Dr Joanne Wallis is professor of international security, University of Adelaide and Dr Maima Koro is a Pacific research fellow, University of Adelaide. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The United States would “respond” if China takes steps to establish a permanent military presence in the Solomon Islands, says a US official, noting the “potential regional security implications” of a newly signed pact between the two countries.

“We outlined clear areas of concern with respect to the purpose and scope of the agreement,” Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said at a press briefing yesterday following his trip to Honiara, where he led a US delegation last week.

US officials met with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and his cabinet following separate announcements by China and the Solomon Islands that the controversial Security Cooperation Agreement has been signed.

“We outlined that of course we have respect for the Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, but we also wanted to let them know that if steps were taken to establish a de facto permanent military presence, power-projection capabilities or a military installation, then we would have significant concerns and we would very naturally respond to those concerns,” Kritenbrink said.

However, the State Department official did not provide a clear answer when asked to explain how exactly the US would respond.

“I’m not going to speculate on what that may or may not involve, but I think our goal was to be very clear in that regard,” Kritenbrink said.

“I’m not in a position to talk about what the United States may or may not do in such a situation.”

US still worried
Despite Sogavare’s repeated assurance that the pact was intended only for domestic implementation, Kritenbrink said the US is worried about the “potential regional security implications of the agreement, not just for ourselves, but for allies and partners across the region.”

Kritenbrink said what troubled the US was “the complete lack of transparency” behind the pact.

“What precisely are the motivations behind the agreement? What exactly are China’s objectives and the like?

“I think they’re completely unclear because this agreement has not been scrutinised or reviewed or subject to any kind of consultation or approval process by anyone else,” Kritenbrink said.

He linked the Solomons-China agreement to Beijing’s relentless bid to expand the People’s Liberation Army’s footprint in the region.

“I think it’s important in this context to keep in mind that we do know that [China] is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure that would allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances,” Kritenbrink said.

He added that the US “would follow developments closely in consultation with regional partners.”

Opening US embassy plans
Kritenbrink was accompanied by Kurt Campbell, Indo-Pacific coordinator for the National Security Council; Lieutenant-General Steve Sklenka,deputy commander of the Indo-Pacific Command; and Craig Hart, USAID’s acting senior deputy assistant administrator for Asia.

During the visit, the US delegation announced Washington’s intention to expedite the process of opening a US embassy in Honiara, strengthen the ties between the US and the Solomon Islands.

“Our purpose in going to the Solomons was to explain to our friends there our approach to the region and the steps we’re taking to step up our engagement across the Pacific Islands, the specific programmes and activities that are ongoing in the Solomons and that we expect to expand and accelerate in the months ahead,” Kritenbrink said.

“We reiterated our commitment to enhancing our partnership with the Solomon Islands, including expediting the opening of the US embassy there, advancing cooperation on addressing unexploded ordnance, and increasing maritime domain awareness, as well as expanding cooperation on climate change, health, people-to-people ties, and other issues as well,” he added.

Mar-Vic Cagurangan is chief editor and publisher of the Pacific Island Times. Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A spectre is haunting the Pacific. It is focused on Solomon Islands today, but has eyes everywhere and might pounce anywhere next.

No, I’m not talking about China. I am talking about us.

More specifically, I’m talking about a particular type of Western security pundit, who hypes danger and itches for confrontation. And I am talking about the way our politicians behave when they strive to win votes by stoking fear of the world outside our borders.

The saga of China’s “military base” in Solomon Islands demonstrates how unhelpful such behaviour is, both to our own interests, and to the people of the Pacific.

If you had the good fortune of missing the last few weeks, here’s what happened.

In late March, journalists revealed that China and Solomon Islands had signed a policing agreement. Someone from within the Solomon Islands government also leaked a broader draft security agreement with China.

In April, this agreement was finalised and signed. (Its text hasn’t been released but appears likely to be very similar to the draft.) You can see the draft here. It’s short and clear.

Ship visits and stopover
Solomons can ask China to provide police and military assistance. If, and only if, the Solomon Islands government of the day consents, China can “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands, and relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.”

Permanent bases are not mentioned.

This, however, didn’t stop antipodean pundits from racing to hype the threat of a Chinese base. To be fair, few went as far as David Llewellyn-Smith, who demanded that Australia preemptively invade Solomons.

He was an outlier (although it didn’t stop him from being uncritically quoted in the Courier-Mail). But all spoke of a base as a near certainty.

Then politicians piled on. Penny Wong, who normally displays an impressive understanding of aid and the Pacific, decried the agreement as the “worst failure of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific since the end of World War II”.

Peter Dutton warned that Australia could now expect “the Chinese to do all they can”. (Although he added optimistically they were unlikely to do so before the election.)

Barnaby Joyce fretted about Solomons becoming a, “little Cuba off our coast”. (Solomons is more than 1500km from Australia; Cuba is about 200km from the US.)

Australian agreement similar
Amidst the racket, much was lost. Australia has its own security agreement with Solomon Islands. It’s more carefully worded, but it affords Australia similar powers to China.

And China already has a security agreement with Fiji. Indeed, there was real talk of a base when that agreement was signed, but no base materialised, and the agreement has had no effect on regional security.

And as Scott Morrison pointed out, Manasseh Sogavare, the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, has explicitly ruled out a Chinese base.

True, Sogavare is a political maneuverer who can’t be taken at his word. But a Chinese base in Solomons serves neither his interest, nor that of the Chinese.

It doesn’t serve Sogavare’s interests because it won’t give him what he wants — a stronger hold on power. Seen as the embodiment of a corrupt elite, he’s unpopular in Honiara. His election brought riots.

As did his standoff with Malaitan Premier Daniel Suidani. So he wants Chinese police training and maybe military assistance in times of instability. But a base won’t help.

Solomons is a Sinophobic country and the obvious presence of a base will increase Sogavare’s unpopularity. It would also jeopardise the security support he gets from Australia, as well as Australian aid. (By my best estimate, based on Chinese promises, which are likely to be overstatements, Australia gave more than 2.5 times as much aid to Solomons in 2019, the most recent year with data.)

Base isn’t in China’s interest
I’m not defending Sogavare. I’d rather Chinese police weren’t helping him. But a base isn’t in his interest. And he’s no fool.

A base isn’t in China’s interests either. I don’t like China’s repressive political leaders. But their military ambitions are limited to places they view as part of China. What they’ve done, or want to do, in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan is odious.

But Australia isn’t next on their list. Outside of their immediate sphere of influence they want trade. They need trade, and the wealth it brings, to sustain the political settlement that keeps them prosperous and in power. Any war that saw China menace Australia from Solomon Islands would bring ruinous sanctions in its wake. (US bases in Guam and Okinawa would be a headache too, I’d imagine.)

The broader security agreement is helpful to China: it gives them the ability to protect Chinese nationals and Chinese business interests if riots break out.

But they don’t need a base for that. A base would be costly, hard to establish in a country with little available land, and quite possibly useless next time the Solomons government changes.

I’m not a supporter of the security agreement. But it’s not a base. And it’s not a catastrophe.

Our behaving like it’s a catastrophe is harmful though.

Harmful to Australia and NZ
It’s harmful to countries like Australia and New Zealand, because the main advantage we have over China in the Pacific is soft power. Thanks to anti-Chinese racism and a healthy wariness of China’s authoritarian government, most people in Pacific countries, including political elites, are more hesitant in dealing with China than with us.

Sure, money talks, and China can procure influence, but we are a little better liked. And that helps. Yet we lose this advantage every time we talk of invading Pacific countries, or call the region our “backyard”, or roughly twist the arms of Pacific politicians.

The Pacific is not some rogue part of Tasmania. It’s an ocean of independent countries. That means diplomacy is needed, and temper tantrums are unhelpful.

Worse still, our propensity to view the Pacific as a geostrategic chessboard has consequences for the region’s people. Geopolitical aid is too-often transactional and poorly focused on what people need. It is less likely to promote development.

There’s an alternative: to choose realism over hype in our collective commentary. And to earn soft power by being a respectful and reliable partner. It’s not always easy. But it’s not impossible. Yet it has completely escaped us in the shambles of the last few weeks.

Dr Terence Wood is a research fellow at the Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. His research focuses on political governance in Western Melanesia, and Australian and New Zealand aid. Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Former Solomon Islands Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo says the country needs an economic solution to its instability problems, not a security solution.

Lilo said he could not understand how current Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare could justify signing a security cooperation agreement with China to quell public discontent in his government’s handling of national affairs.

Earlier this week Honiara and Beijing confirmed the signing of a security treaty despite serious concerns raised locally and internationally about the deal.

Lilo was supporting calls for the document to be made public in the interest of transparency and accountability.

“The best thing to help our people … to understand better on government is for government to take responsibility to manage our economy,” Lilo said.

“Create more employment, create more investment, that to me is a better way of securing a better society for our country, than to militarise this country,” he said.

Lilo served as prime minister of Solomon Islands from 2011 to 2014.

‘Beggars have no choice’
Meanwhile, another former prime minister, Danny Philip, who is now a backbencher in the Sogavare government, said Solomon Islands was “open to all sorts of things” because “beggars do not have a choice”.

He said Solomon Islands was mindful of the interplay between the superpowers in the Pacific, but the country did not want to be drawn into geopolitical battles.

“Yes, the US has always been there. But for the first time ever in 80 years they’ve sent very high officials to the Solomon Islands at the moment,” he said.

“We have with arrangements with Australia, which is very much US-mandated agreement. Australia is referred to by President Bush, I think as the as the ‘deputy sheriff’ of the United States in the Pacific.”

Solomon Islanders treated with ‘disrespect‘
A senior journalist in Honiara said Solomon Islanders were being treated disrespectfully and kept in the dark over the government’s security pact with China.

Speaking at a panel on the contentious treaty, Dorothy Wickham said most of the news coverage on the security arrangement had been focused on Australia and America’s positions.

“The government’s handling of the way it went about handling this treaty shows disrespect … to Solomon Islanders that there was no discussion, no consultation,” she said.

“Even a press release on the eve of the signing would have been a standard procedure and until today we have not had a press briefing or a press statement for a press briefing from the Prime Minister’s Office,” Wickham added.

She said the government had not meaningfully engaged with journalists to ensure that they could inform Solomon Islanders about what the security deal meant for them.

Wickham said local media had been struggling to refocus the narrative so that it was about Solomon Islands.

Pacific Islands Forum best place to discuss contentious security pact
Meanwhile, New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta said discussions on the security agreement signed between China and Solomon Islands needed to be inclusive of other Pacific nations.

Mahuta said the Pacific Islands Forum was the best platform for discussing regional security concerns.

“I have concerns that based on a number of representations to ensure that this is fully discussed because of the regional implications that this has not been given priority, certainly by Solomon Islands, they have given us assurances, we must take them at their word, respecting their sovereignty,” Mahuta said.

“However, regional security issues, regional sovereignty issues are a matter of a broader forum. We see the Pacific Islands Forum as the best place for this.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

If the coming election goes to Australia’s Labor party, Penny Wong is very likely to become Foreign Minister. So when she speaks, people across the region prick up their ears.

Without the least disrespect to her recent forebears, she could be one of the most acute, incisive and insightful FMs in recent history.

Whether she’ll be any more effective than them is another matter.

Australia has a long tradition of placing prominent front-benchers into the role, and then pointedly ignoring their efforts, their advice and their warnings. It’s as if government leaders find their greatest rival and send them trotting off around the globe, more to keep them from making mischief at home than to achieve anything noteworthy while they’re gone.

In Australia, it seems, foreign policy is domestic policy done outdoors.

If she achieves nothing more, Wong would be well served to look closely at the people supporting her, and to spend considerable effort re-organising and in fact re-inventing DFAT.

Its disconnection from other departments, especially Defence and PMO, has created an internal culture that spends more time feeding on itself than actually helping produce a persuasive or coherent foreign policy.

Ensuring foreign policy’s primacy at the cabinet table is a big ask, but it will be for naught if the department can’t deliver. There are significant structural matters to be dealt with.

‘Worst failure of foreign policy in the Pacific’: Labor launches scathing attack on government over Solomon Islands-China pact https://t.co/efbU2tM6Iu

— ABC News (@abcnews) April 19, 2022

Rolling development and aid into the department was a significant regression that hampered both sides. Volumes can be written about the need to distinguish development assistance from foreign policy, and many of them could be focused on the Pacific islands region.

The two are mostly complementary (mostly), but they must also be discrete from one another.

It’s far more complicated than this, but suffice it to say that development aid prioritises the recipient’s needs, while foreign relations generally prioritise national concerns. The moment you invert either side of that equation, you lose.

Exempli gratia: Solomon Islands.

It’s well known that Australia spent billions shoring up Solomon Islands’ security and administrative capacity. Surely after all that aid, they can expect the government to stay onside in geopolitical matters?

Applying the admittedly simplistic filter from the para above, the answer is an obvious no.

Aid is not a substitute for actual foreign relations, and foreign relations is definitely not just aid.

So is Penny Wong correct when she calls the CN/SI defence agreement a massive strategic setback? Sure.

Is she right to call Pacific Affairs Minister Zed Seselja “a junior woodchuck”, sent in a last minute attempt to dissuade Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare from signing the agreement?

The idea of a minister responsible for the complex, wildly diverse patchwork of nations spanning such a vast space has value. But in terms of resources and policy heft, Seselja rides at the back of the posse on a mule.

There are good reasons to devote an entire office to Pacific affairs. There are also blindingly good reasons to keep the Foreign Minister as the primary point of contact on matters of foreign policy.

That means the role—and yes, the existence—of the Pacific Affairs ministry needs a ground-up reconsideration. Notionally, it fulfills a critical role. But how?

It’s fair to say that Wong is more insightful than those who describe Solomon Islands as a fly-speck in the Pacific, or a Little Cuba (whatever the F that means). But in the past, Labor’s shown little insight into the actual value and purpose of foreign policy.

For the better part of four decades, neither Australian party was fussed at all about the fact that there had been few if any official visits between leaders. Prime Ministers regularly blew off Pacific Islands Forum meetings.

In Vanuatu’s case, the first ever prime ministerial visit to Canberra was in 2018. Why aren’t such meetings annual events?

Australia is rightly proud of its pre-eminence in development assistance in the Pacific islands. But that never was, and never will be, a substitute for diplomatic engagement. And you can’t have that without a functioning diplomatic corps whose presence is felt equally in Canberra and in foreign capitals.

But even that’s not enough. Penny Wong has yet to show in concrete terms how she plans to address what could accurately be called the greatest strategic foreign policy failure since WWII: Leaving Australia alone to guard the shop.

In 2003, George W. Bush was rightly vilified for characterising Australia’s role in the region as America’s Sheriff.

But the Americans weren’t the only ones who walked away, leaving Australia alone to engage with the region. The UK and the EU (minus France in their patch) rolled back their diplomatic presence substantially.

Even New Zealand agreed to restrict its engagement in large areas in deference to its neighbour. The most enduring presence was provided by organisations without any meaningful foreign policy role: UN development agencies and multilateral financial institutions.

Since the beginning of the War on Terror, there has been a consistent and often deliberate draw-down on the capital provided by democratic institutions, multilateral foreign policy, and indeed any collective course-setting among nations.

Post Cold-War democratic momentum has been squandered on an increasingly transactional approach to engagement that’s begun to look alarmingly like the spheres of influence that appeal so much to Putin and Xi.

This hasn’t happened in the Pacific islands alone. The UN has become an appendix in the global body politic, one cut away from complete irrelevance. ASEAN and APEC are struggling just as hard to find relevance, let alone purpose, as the Pacific Islands Forum or the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

Australia has “led” in the Pacific islands region by being the largest aid donor, blithely assuming that all the other kids in the region want to be like it. But that “leadership” masks a massive gap in actual influence in shaping the agenda in a region that’s larger and more diverse than any other in the world.

Want to know more? I have a whole chapter in my last book about it: https://t.co/RjggiClW5Z

— Joanne Wallis (@JoanneEWallis) March 30, 2022

The data’s there if people want it. This isn’t a particularly contentious… er, contention, if you’re among the far-too-small group of people who actually live in and care about the future of the region.

In a regional dynamic defined and dominated by transactional bilateralism, China holds all the aces. The only hope anyone has of slowing its growth in the region is through meaningful multilateralism that treats Pacific island countries as actual nations with national pride and individual priorities. Instead of silencing them, their voices should be amplified and defended, not by Australia alone, but by every other democratic nation with the means and the will to do so.

If we can’t respect the equal standing of nations, we can’t protect their integrity.

Scott Morrison may indeed be one of the worst exemplars of this blithe disregard for actual foreign policy engagement. He’s certainly won few friends with his world-class foot-dragging on climate change. America’s suddenly renewed interest in the region is an indication that they’ve woken up to the Bush administration’s mistakes.

It’s also clear they don’t trust Australia to play Sheriff any more. Kurt Campbell’s upcoming visit to the region is just the latest in a series of increasingly high profile tours of the region.

So yes, Penny Wong is justified in saying that China’s advances in the Pacific derive at least in part from Australia’s lack of a coherent and effective foreign policy.

But foreign policy is not made at home. It’s not Australia’s interests alone that matter. And subjugating Pacific nations in compacts of free association isn’t a substitute for actual policy making.

Pacific island nations will not defend Australia’s national interests unless they share those interests. The only way that Australia—and the world—can be assured they do is by actively listening, and by incorporating Pacific voices into the fabric of a renewed and revitalised global family.

Dan McGarry was previously media director at Vanuatu Daily Post/Buzz FM96. The Village Explainer is his semi-regular newsletter containing analysis and insight focusing on under-reported aspects of Pacific societies, politics and economics. His articles are republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The Solomon Islands prime minister is adamant a security co-operation agreement his government has signed with China will not undermine regional security.

In Parliament yesterday, Manasseh Sogavare confirmed the controversial security agreement with China had been signed despite strong opposition to the deal from the other side of the house.

The pact, a draft of which was first leaked online last month, raised domestic and regional anxieties about Beijing’s increasing influence in the South Pacific.

It is feared that it could open the door to China’s military presence in Honiara — a claim rejected both by China and Solomon Islands.

Sogavare has defended the intention behind the move, saying its aim is for the nation to diversify its security ties “to improve the quality of lives” of its people and to “address soft and hard security threats facing the country”.

“I ask all our neighbours, friends and partners to respect the sovereign interests of Solomon Islands on the assurance that the decision will not adversely impact or undermine the peace and harmony of our region,” Sogavare said.

In response, opposition leader Matthew Wale called on Sogavare to make the signed document public “to allay any regional fears of any hidden parts of it”.

‘Disclosure of the agreement’
“And now that the agreement has been signed whether the Prime Minister will allow a disclosure of the agreement so that members may have a perusal of it,” Wale said.

Wale’s sentiments were echoed by another opposition MP, the chairman of the foreign relations committee, Peter Kenilorea Jr.

Kenilorea Jr said Sogavare’s decision to strike a military cooperation deal with China lacked transparency and he believed whatever efforts partners were putting in from the region were not going to make a difference.

But he also expressed concern, now that the two countries have made the agreement official, that it could become the source for domestic tensions.

“It will just further inflame emotions and tensions and again underscores the mistrust that people have on the government,” Peter Kenilorea Jr said.

“It is cause for concern for many Solomon Islanders, but definitely a certain segment of the society will now feel even more concerned and might want to start to take certain action which is not in the best interest of Solomon Islands in our own unity as a country.”

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern had raised “serious concerns” about the security pact when the news initially broke two weeks ago.

‘No need’, says Ardern
And following the announcement on Wednesday that the deal was done, Ardern reiterated her concerns.

“We see no need for this agreement,” Ardern said.

“We’re concerned about the militarisation of the Pacific and we continue to call on the Solomons to work with the Pacific with any concerns around their security they may have.”

The Solomon Islands prime minister is adamant a security cooperation agreement his government has signed with China will not undermine regional security. https://t.co/SxP21e1lKu

— RNZ Pacific (@RNZPacific) April 20, 2022

RNZ Pacific’s Honiara-based correspondent Georgina Kekea said the issue had divided public opinion in the country.

Kekea said people were already anticipating the signing of the pact.

“From what we’ve seen there are some who are with the signing, there some who are not. Some who are a bit sceptical about what the future will be like in the Solomon Islands with such an agreement being signed with China,” she said.

“So, there’s mixed feelings I would say on the ground, especially with the signing.”

US officials confer with Honiara
Meanwhile, senior US officials are meeting with Solomon Islands government this week with the security deal expected to be a major point of discussions.

Writing on his Village Explainer website in an article entitled “Pacific stuff up?”, Vanuatu columnist Dan McGarry writes that “if the coming election goes to Australia’s Labor party, Penny Wong is very likely to become Foreign Minister. So when she speaks, people across the region prick up their ears.

“Without the least disrespect to her recent forebears, she could be one of the most acute, incisive and insightful FMs in recent history.

“Whether she’ll be any more effective than them is another matter.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A senior Solomon Islands MP has warned that the controversial security agreement with China could result in action among local opponents of the deal.

The government in Honiara signed a controversial security agreement with China despite concern from local political figures, as well as Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

There are regional concerns the deal could open the door for Beijing to base its military in Honiara, but Prime Minister Manasseh Sovagare denies that that is the purpose of the security pact.

Solomon Islands parliamentarian and chair of the Foreign Relations Committee Peter Kenilorea Jr said Sogavare’s decision to seal the deal — despite significant opposition — could lead to domestic ramifications.

He said certain sections of the nation’s population have been strongly against China since the diplomatic switch from Taiwan in 2019.

Kenilorea said some people would not take this lightly and it was going to cause further tensions that were already at play locally.

“It will just further inflame emotions and tensions. And again underscores the mistrust that people have in the government,” he said.

‘A cause for concern’
“And it is cause for concern for many Solomon Islanders, but definitely a certain segment of the society will now feel even more concerned and might want to start to take certain action which is not in the best interest of Solomon Islands in our own unity as a country.”

Kenilorea said the government needed to make the security document signed with China available to the public.

“It is that important that it should be made public. We have a security treaty with Australia, and that can be accessed online.

“So why couldn’t this be and I will be calling for that signed copy to be made available so that all Solomon Islanders as well as a region can see what is in there,” he said.

Opposition Leader Matthew Wale made that a formal request in Parliament “to allay any regional fears” and received a non-commital response from Sogavare.

Australia’s disappointment with Honiara
The Australian federal government has declared it is “deeply disappointed” that Solomon Islands has pressed ahead and signed the security pact with China.

The announcement came just days after Australia’s Minister for the Pacific Zed Seselja travelled to Honiara and met Sogavare in a last-ditch effort to dissuade him from going ahead with the deal.

Senator Seselja and Foreign Minister Marise Payne said the government was “disappointed” by the agreement and that it was not reached in a transparent way.

“Ultimately, this is a sovereign decision of the government of Solomon Islands and we absolutely recognise that, but … declarations and these engagements on security issues have been dealt with in a Pacific-wide manner,” Payne said.

“That is the traditional approach for these issues and it’s why some Pacific partners have also raised concerns.”

Senator Payne said the government’s position was still that Pacific neighbours were the best to delivery security in the region and said it was an “unfair characterisation” to say the region had become less secure while Prime Minister Scott Morrison has been in power.

The ministers said while Solomon Islands had the right to make sovereign decisions about national security, Australia still believed the “Pacific family” was best placed to provide security guarantees.

In Washington, the White House, which is sending a high-level US delegation to Honiara this week, said it was concerned about “the lack of transparency and unspecified nature” of the pact.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz