Foreign Minister Winston Peters has confirmed New Zealand’s aid for Kiribati is being reviewed after its President and Foreign Minister cancelled a meeting with him last week.

Terms of Reference for the review are still being finalised, and it remains unclear whether or not funding will be cut or projects already under way would be affected, with Peters’ office saying no decisions would be made until the review was complete.

His office said Kiribati remained part of the RSE scheme and its eligibility for the Pacific Access Category was unaffected — for now.

Peters had been due to meet with President Taneti Maamau last Tuesday and Wednesday, in what was to be the first trip by a New Zealand foreign minister to Kiribati in five years, and part of his effort to visit every Pacific country early in the government’s term.

Kiribati has been receiving increased aid from China in recent years.

In a statement, a spokesperson for Peters said he was informed about a week before the trip President Maamau would no longer be available.

“Around a week prior to our arrival in Tarawa, we were advised that the President and Foreign Minister of Kiribati, Taneti Maamau, was no longer available to receive Mr Peters and his delegation,” the statement said.

‘Especially disappointing’
“This was especially disappointing because the visit was to be the first in over five years by a New Zealand Minister to Kiribati — and was the result of a months-long effort to travel there.”

The spokesperson said the development programme was being reviewed as a result.

“New Zealand has been a long-standing partner to Kiribati. The lack of political-level contact makes it very difficult for us to agree joint priorities for our development programme, and to ensure that it is well targeted and delivers good value for money.

“That’s important for both the people of Kiribati and for the New Zealand taxpayer. For this reason, we are reviewing our development programme in Kiribati. The outcomes of that review will be announced in due course.

“Other aspects of the bilateral relationship may also be impacted.”

New Zealand spent $102 million on the development cooperation programme with Kiribati between 2021 and 2024, including on health, education, fisheries, economic development, and climate resilience.

Peters’ office said New Zealand deeply valued the contribution Recognised Seasonal Employer workers made to the country, and was committed to working alongside Pacific partners to ensure the scheme led to positive outcomes for all parties.

Committed to positive outcomes
“However, without open dialogue it is difficult to meet this commitment.”

They also said New Zealand was committed to working alongside our Pacific partners to ensure that the Pacific Access Category leads to positive outcomes for all parties, but again this would be difficult without open dialogue.

The spokesperson said the Kiribati people’s wellbeing was of paramount importance and the terms of reference would reflect this.

New Zealand stood ready “as we always have, to engage with Kiribati at a high level”.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon says he wants New Zealand to be a partner of choice in the Pacific, as other countries make moves in the region.

Luxon is in Niue ahead of bilateral talks with Premier Dalton Tagalagi, and to celebrate 50 years of free association between the two countries.

Niue is self-governing, but part of New Zealand’s realm. Its citizens are NZ citizens, and New Zealand provides it with aid when asked.

Luxon said it was special to make Niue the first Pacific Island nation he has visited since taking office.

“I think the relationship’s in good heart. I think there’s a lot more for us to do together,” Luxon said.

Upon landing at Hanan International Airport, Luxon was greeted with an embrace from the Premier and a rousing takalo reception.

Later at the High Commission, Luxon and Tagalagi celebrated the King’s Birthday — Niue is 23 hours behind New Zealand, on the other side of the International Dateline — and toasted the relationship.

‘Rely heavily on support’
“I know that we rely heavily on your support. But we’re doing our very best to help ourselves also,” Tagalagi said.

The Speaker of Niue’s Assembly Hima Douglas said the relationship had given Niue peace, security and tranquility.

“When we look back, Prime Minister, we could not have asked for a better country to look after Niue. We could not have asked for a better development partner,” he said.

But as Niue celebrated the past, it was also looking to the future.

MP Emani Fakaotimanava-Lui told RNZ Pacific he wanted to see Niue generating its own finances.

“It would be best for Niue to look at how we can grow with New Zealand towards the next 50 years, possibly to be self-sustaining. Not to be dependent on New Zealand,” he said.

“Every time we need cash, we’re coming to the New Zealand government to ask can we get this money, can we get that money.”

Always a trusted partner
Luxon said he wanted Niue to understand New Zealand would always be a trusted partner.

“I think it’s about us betting really clear about the core infrastructure that sets Niue up for success. And doing what we can as New Zealand to support Niue, one of our realm countries, to make sure it is set up for success with a platform it needs to go forward.”

Bilateral talks between Luxon and Tagalagi will take place later today.

Luxon said the two would discuss the future of the relationship and how it sits in an increasingly contested region, as other nations start to woo the Pacific.

China has become Niue’s second largest trading partner, and has supported Niue with more investment.

“There’s… more strategic competition, whether it’s China, whether it’s the US, whether it’s other powers as well,” Luxon said.

“But this is the Pacific family and we prioritise the centrality of the Pacific Island Forum, we want that to be the regional architecture that deals with challenges within the region. But this is a fantastic region, and it has huge opportunity, and we want to be a trusted partner and a partner of choice.”

This afternoon Luxon heads to Fiji for the next stop on his Pacific mission, with geostrategic choppy water set to rear its head again.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

In this the sixth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning present a two-part episode to analyse what to make of New Zealand Prime Minister, Chris Hipkins’ bilateral meetings with People’s Republic of China’s President Xi JinPing and other leaders of the PRC.

In part one, Paul and Selwyn also consider how the PRC-NZ trade relationship is seen in the eyes of New Zealand’s security partners.

Then, in the second half of today’s podcast, Paul and Selwyn analyse the most recent events in Russia – events that have taken shape since Wagner Commander Yevgeny Prigozhin’s pronounced intent to mobilise his mercenaries against the Russian Federation’s top two military heads, and, while doing so, pronounced that the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine was based on falsehoods.

What should we expect next? What is the real state of Putinism? What do the political and power elites in Russia make of President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the matter?

Weeks prior to this event happening inside Russia, Paul and Selwyn analysed the question: How stable is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power? It’s a question that all those who watch Russian affairs have now been confronted with.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn unpack the complexity, look at what has changed as opposed to what has been said.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recordings of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
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• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

In this the sixth episode of A View from Afar for 2023 political scientist Dr Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will present a two-part episode to analyse what to make of New Zealand Prime Minister, Chris Hipkins’ bilateral meetings with People’s Republic of China’s President Xi JinPing and other leaders of the PRC.

In part one, we will also consider how the PRC-NZ trade relationship will be seen in the eyes of New Zealand’s security partners.

Then, in the second half of today’s podcast, Paul and Selwyn will analyse the most recent events in Russia – events that have taken shape since Wagner Commander Yevgeny Prigozhin’s pronounced intent to mobilise his mercenaries against the Russian Federation’s top two military heads, and, while doing so, pronounced that the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine was based on falsehoods.

What should we expect next? What is the real state of Putinism? What do the political and power elites in Russia make of President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the matter?

Weeks prior to this event happening inside Russia, Paul and Selwyn analysed the question: How stable is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power? It’s a question that all those who watch Russian affairs have now been confronted with.

In this episode Paul and Selwyn will unpack the complexity, look at what has changed as opposed to what has been said, and consider the effect Russian instability has on NATO and BRICS aligned states.

INTERACTION WHILE LIVE:

Paul and Selwyn encourage their live audience to interact while they are live with questions and comments.

To interact during the live recording of this podcast, go to Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/

Remember to subscribe to the channel.

For the on-demand audience, you can also keep the conversation going on this debate by clicking on one of the social media channels below:

• Youtube.com/c/EveningReport/
• Facebook.com/selwyn.manning
• Twitter.com/Selwyn_Manning

RECOGNITION: The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication. Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category.

You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

Warm and constructive.

That’s how Chris Hipkins wanted his meeting with Xi Jinping on Tuesday to be remembered.

The New Zealand Prime Minister deployed the ‘warm and constructive’ phrase at least eight times in a subsequent press conference with New Zealand media.

Hipkins was also keen to note that ‘the meeting was at no point adversarial’. This served to reinforce the impression of warmth.

It also matched with opening public comments by Xi, who said Hipkins’ visit was of ‘great significance’. Xi pointed to the ‘tangible benefits to the two peoples’ that had emerged since China entered into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with New Zealand in 2014.

Xi added ‘we will continue to see each other as partners instead of rivals’, according to a Reuters report that cited Chinese state media.

By emphasising the friendliness of the meeting, Hipkins was also drawing a contrast with claims that his foreign minister, Nanaia Mahuta, had received an ‘epic haranguing’ when she met her Chinese counterpart in Beijing in March.

The timing of the leaked description to ‘The Australian’ newspaper was strategic and threatened to derail Hipkins’ much sought-after appointment with Xi.

The reporting has not been denied, with Mahuta since confirming her meeting with Qin Gang was ‘very robust’.

Against this, Hipkins’ refusal to sign up to Joe Biden’s description of Xi as a ‘dictator’ would have been well received by Beijing.

Hipkins refused to say whether the ‘dictator’ issue had been brought up by Xi – but said he did not raise it himself.

China has yet to release its own account of the Xi-Hipkins meeting, leaving New Zealand’s version of the private section of the encounter largely to stand as the initial record.

But some intriguing insights into the thinking of the Chinese leadership in relation to New Zealand can be found in the semi-official Global Times newspaper.

In an article published late on Tuesday that focused on a range of diplomatic visits to China this week, New Zealand took centre-stage – even overshadowing analysis of Mongolia and Vietnam, China’s neighbours.

The newspaper depicted New Zealand as something of a role model for other Western countries, noting Wellington’s reputation for ‘independent policymaking’ and bipartisan consensus on ‘how to get along with China’. According to the paper, New Zealand showed how ‘Western countries can withstand the pressures of unilateralism, Cold War mentality and hegemony’.

The praise from the Global Times referenced approvingly Hipkins’ stance on the recent ‘dictator’ spat. The paper said the incident was an example of New Zealand’s ‘non-interference when dealing with China’ and contrasted sharply with the ‘arrogant and offensive attitude of Washington’.

After his meeting with Xi, Hipkins appeared somewhat nervous and at times uncharacteristically tongue-tied when answering questions from the New Zealand media – a sign that he was aware of the diplomatic stakes of the bilateral meeting.

Hipkins carefully declined to be drawn on what views Xi expressed during the private meeting, saying that ‘wouldn’t be diplomatic or appropriate’.

But the New Zealand PM did reveal that AUKUS ‘wasn’t specifically discussed’ during the meeting.

When asked, Hipkins also disclosed that New Zealand’s growing ties with NATO were not canvassed.

However, the meeting with Xi was a big picture one and it would not be unusual for these issues of detail to be addressed in a more indirect fashion.

Hipkins said the main focus of the meeting was on New Zealand’s economic ties with China.

But he added that issues such as the US-China relationship, the Pacific, the war in Ukraine and human rights were also covered in a ‘free-flowing dialogue’.

The official statement issued by the New Zealand PM’s office used softer language than the press conference.

For example, there is no direct mention of ‘human rights’ in the readout. Instead, it was noted that the pair ‘engaged on areas where our cultures and political systems differ’.

There was only one, relatively minor faux pas from Hipkins.

During the initial portion of the meeting that was open to media, Xi called New Zealand a ‘friend and partner’.

But when asked by media whether he would reciprocate this assessment, Hipkins initially dodged, responding ‘I would describe the relationship between New Zealand and China as an incredibly important one’.

Hipkins appeared to realise the ramifications of his answer as the questioning on the ‘friend and partner’ issue continued. He later added ‘it depends on the context, but yes, by and large’.

In length, Hipkins’ 40-minute meeting with Xi ran for ten minutes longer than scheduled.

Jacinda Ardern, Hipkins’ predecessor, received 50 minutes for her own meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Bangkok last November.

We should not read too much into this discrepancy.

After all, it is a busy week for China, which is also hosting its first summer meetings of the World Economic Forum since 2019.

On Tuesday, Xi also met with the prime ministers of Barbados, Mongolia and Vietnam.

Moreover, Hipkins’ counterparts from the other ‘Five Eyes’ countries – Australia, Canada, the UK and US – are not currently being hosted in Beijing at all.

Chris Hipkins has passed his first major diplomatic test.

His first meeting with Xi Jinping was a success.

It genuinely was warm and constructive.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

The West and China continue to exert influence over the Pacific region. But discussions of Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are increasingly patronising, framing them as vulnerable, and omitting their agency.

In the battle for geopolitical influence and supremacy in the Pacific, the two most visible antagonists, the Anglo-West and China, are often the only two sides which matter to the mainstream media and political discourse.

The third side, the Pacific Big Ocean States (BOSs), are often forgotten, or relegated to the margin. In a subconscious way, this hierarchy of significance has roots in the colonial discourse which continued to undermine Pacific agency in various ways to this day.

As an example, the recent whirlwind visit to the region by China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, caused media outcry and desperate diplomatic visitations — the political ripples spread far and wide provoking narratives of indignation, anxiety, and outright anger among the Anglo-Western states.

China responded by using tactical diplomatic language to tone down and conceal its own global expansionist agenda under the Belt and Road initiative. Both sides tried their best to project their humane and empathetic imagery towards the Pacific people while concealing their respective geopolitical, ideological, and strategic interests.

This is exactly what diplomacy is all about: putting on different masks when the circumstances require.

As it turned out, the BOSs “won” the diplomatic battle. They rejected China’s hegemonic and all-consuming plan to form a multilateral regional bloc in the form of the “China-Pacific Countries Common Development Vision,” as well as pushed back on the Anglo-Western insistence on keeping away from Chinese offerings.

Bilateral agreements
In the end, Pacific leaders signed bilateral agreements with China, based on specific developmental, economic, and wellbeing needs of individual states.

Bilateral agreements are common in international relations. The United States, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand all have bilateral economic agreements with China as part of their economic lifeline as modern states. Likewise, BOSs are also seeking economic agreements for their survival and why should they be discouraged from engaging with China or any other country in this regard?

There is a subtle ring of patronisation and paternalism here. The Anglo-Western states see the Pacific as their “natural” habitat which should not be shared with anyone else because that’s where they sent explorers, missionaries, and settlers, had colonies, fought against the Japanese invaders,  tested their nuclear bombs, built military bases, and exerted significant cultural influence.

During the Cold War, the Pacific was often described as the “American Lake” because it was literally littered with US military and naval bases.

Despite decolonisation in the region, this feeling of false imperial grandeur still persists in various subconscious forms. For instance, being lectured on the evils of China by the Anglo-West is almost like saying that the BOSs are not smart, strong, and sophisticated enough to stand up to China’s manipulative intents.

Aid, which is used to counter Chinese influence, often ends up benefiting the donor countries such as Australia and New Zealand because the contractors are largely from those countries.

On the other hand, China’s low quality infrastructure and debt-creating loans seem to suggest the rather patronising “beggars cannot be choosers” attitude. Chinese influence is far more cunningly subtle through its “soft power” long term approach compared to the rather abrupt short term approach of the Anglo-Saxon powers.

Common colonial experiences
China has strategically invoked the South-South discourse to engage with BOSs hoping that they will see each other as “developing” countries who share common colonial experiences of Western colonialism.

Whether the BOSs buy this ideological bait is another question. By and large, BOSs still see China as a highly industrialised state with lots of goodies to dangle and benefit from, and not so much as a fellow “poor” Global South brethren.

One of the ironies of history is that colonialism, apart from creating a culture of subservience, has also deeply embedded a strong pro-Anglo-Western cultural orientation amongst the BOSs, despite moments of political and ideological resistance. Most Pacific people speak English, go through Anglo-Western education, are readily exposed to Anglo-Western cultural influences such as music, Hollywood movies, and other forms of ideological hegemony, and have close connections with their neighbours such as Australia, New Zealand, and the USA, where they migrate for various reasons.

These factors have created a deep sense of connection with the Anglo-Western world, a reality which China will never be able to replicate, or even challenge, in the next 20 years, despite its extensive “soft power” machinations.

The BOSs’ engagement with China is more economic and diplomatic and less cultural, although this has been on the increase through scholarship offerings and the establishment of Confucius institutions, among other strategies. BOSs frame their engagement with China on the basis of need rather than ideological alignment as is often assumed and misrepresented by their Anglo-Western neighbours. They are able to play the diplomatic and geopolitical game in subtle and smart ways that keep the big powers guessing and sometimes worried.

The reality is that while individual BOSs may sign bilateral agreements with China, none of them will allow itself to become China’s patron state, the same way that the US has been creating buffer and client states around the world. This is because, as they probably know, the cost of assimilation into China’s sphere of influence will be massive and they have a lot to lose.

Some BOSs have adopted a “Look North Policy” and in recent years Pacific students have travelled  to China for studies, Pacific businesses have sold their products to the Chinese market, and states have engaged in bilateral or multilateral deals with the Asian power. This should be seen as part of the diplomatic diversification process rather than a colonising project.

Just another partner
The reality is that China will always become just another partner and not the alternative to the Anglo-Western connection. Most Pacific people will opt to migrate to New Zealand, US, or Australia, rather than China.

This is where the anxiety and fear of the Anglo-Western countries about a Chinese “takeover” is not just misplaced, but utterly irrational. It does not consider the agency of the BOSs to wisely, strategically, and imaginatively navigate their way through the treacherous geopolitical waters. The overreaction by the Anglo-Western bloc about potential Chinese influence sends out a rather unsavoury message about “bullying” and “colonial attitude.”

This is reinforced by insults such as that by former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison that the Pacific is Australia’s “backyard” or the racist insinuation by Heather du Plessis-Allan (a right-wing New Zealand journalist) that Pacific people are “leeches,” or the unkind and patronising labelling by some Australian academics and policy thinkers of the Pacific as an “Arc of Instability.”

Residues of neo-colonial perception are consciously and subconsciously entrenched in the Anglo-Western perception of the BOSs. This has a long history. The Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901, an offshoot of the White Australian policy, was designed to remove Pacific people from Australia.

In New Zealand, the Dawn Raid era of the mid-1970s and early 1980s saw the arrest, harassment, and removal of Pacific peoples who were unwanted in New Zealand. The then  Australian Immigration Minister Jim Forbes said in May 1971 that “Pacific Islanders are unsophisticated and unsuited to settlement in Australia.”

Pacific people have always been treated as dispensable entities who need to be kept out, only invited in to support their economy as cheap dispensable labour. This philosophy and practice, which started during the Australian labour trade in the 1800s and in New Zealand in the 1950s and 60s, continues today in both countries under the seasonal labour scheme.

Times have changed and it’s important for our bigger members of the Vuvale (family)  to engage with their Pacific neighbours as equal partners, not subordinate and unsophisticated backyard children. The BOS’s agency needs full recognition as capable of making their own mind and plotting their trajectory towards the future they desire.

The old order where colonial paternalism, imperial patronage, racialised narratives, and belittling perceptions shaped relationships no longer have any place. The Anglo-Western countries in the region are good at ticking the UN Sustainable Development boxes such as equity, diversity, and inclusion (SDG10), but they hardly  practice these in meaningful ways.

No matter how well these subtle manoeuvres are diplomatically concealed, these still cannot escape the gaze of Pacific BOSs because they live with it all the time.  Time for a dramatic attitudinal transformation.

Steven Ratuva is a professor and interdisciplinary scholar and director of the Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies at the University of Canterbury, Aotearoa New Zealand. This article was first published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs under a Creative Commons Licence and is republished with the author’s permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz