Christopher Luxon is finding his foreign policy feet.

Now eight months into the job, New Zealand’s Prime Minister is in Washington DC this week to attend the NATO summit.

It is the third year in a row that Wellington has been invited to the annual gathering of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the West’s premier political and military alliance. This year’s meeting – already carrying special weight by commemorating the 75^th anniversary of NATO’s founding – looks set to be the most substantive summit yet in terms of New Zealand’s involvement.

New plans are being unveiled for NATO’s cooperation with its ‘Indo-Pacific 4’ (or ‘IP4’) partners: Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Four joint projects from the IP4 and NATO will focus on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation and cybersecurity, according to US officials.

This marks new territory for New Zealand – and something of a turnaround.

While it sent two Prime Ministers to NATO, New Zealand’s previous Labour Government had delayed formalising expanded bilateral links with the alliance.

Australia, Japan and South Korea all finalised ‘Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes’ (or ITPPs) with NATO by last year – but New Zealand’s formal ties remained a work in progress.

This may have been driven by a degree of caution on the part of Jacinda Ardern and Chris Hipkins, who attended NATO as New Zealand Prime Ministers in 2022 and 2023 respectively.

Both Ardern and Hipkins were proponents of New Zealand’s ‘independent foreign policy’. The doctrine, developed after the US downgraded ties with New Zealand in the 1980s, has seen New Zealand build strong relations with China.

A major reason for NATO’s invitation to the IP4 to its Madrid summit in 2022 was to support the launch of the alliance’s new long-term blueprint. The Strategic Concept openly called out China for its ‘stated ambitions and coercive policies’ and pinpointed Beijing as a source of ‘systemic challenges’ for the alliance.

After Ardern attended the 2022 NATO gathering, the Chinese Embassy in Wellington issued a statement noting Beijing’s opposition to ‘all kinds of military alliances, bloc politics, or exclusive small groups’.

Two years on, New Zealand has a new centre-right government. Winston Peters, Luxon’s foreign minister, signalled in April that an ITPP was very much still on its way. Peters himself is known for his pro-US views and more hawkish stance towards China.

China’s reaction to the new NATO-IP4 joint projects remains to be seen. But Beijing is unlikely to be mollified by the fact that the plans avoid any direct mention of China, given the trajectory of closer IP4-NATO cooperation.

Stronger ties with NATO may present particular geopolitical risks for Wellington. NATO is solely a political and military alliance; no companion trade deals are on offer. China has been New Zealand’s biggest trading partner since 2017, while access to most North American and European markets remains heavily restricted for New Zealand exporters.

Aware of the sensitivities of NATO’s interest in China, Christopher Luxon has been keen this week to put the focus on Ukraine – the subject of one of the new NATO-IP4 cooperation projects and tying in with this year’s overall summit theme, ‘Ukraine and transatlantic security’.

To that end, New Zealand’s Prime Minister has announced a modest new $NZ16 million package of aid for Kyiv, of which $NZ4 million appears to be for weaponry. The funds come on top of a $NZ26 million package announced in February, of which $NZ6.5 million was allocated for lethal aid.

The arms contributions are significant because under the previous Labour Government, Wellington had become reluctant to send Ukraine additional lethal aid (or money to purchase it) after making a one-off $NZ7.5 million contribution in April 2022.

After this week’s announcement, Luxon wrote on social media: ‘New Zealand understands that while we are distant from Ukraine, what happens there affects us all, and we are prepared to stand with Ukraine for the long haul’.

It was the Prime Minister’s second Ukraine-related post for the week.

By contrast, there was little publicity this week of New Zealand’s participation in a joint briefing published by a large number of NATO and IP4 security agencies, including New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre. The 28-page publication focused on the ‘tradecraft’ used in relation to Australia by ‘APT40’, defined as a ‘People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber group’.

Given the advisory’s target and its authors, it seems very unlikely to be a coincidence that the document was released just prior to the NATO summit.

Stepping back, it is worth reflecting how this week’s NATO focus has shifted the spotlight away from the debate over whether Wellington will join AUKUS – the high-level defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Much ink has been spilled over the merits and drawbacks of New Zealand becoming a member of the ostensibly technology-focused ‘Pillar II’ strand of AUKUS.

With time running out for New Zealand to join AUKUS before US elections in November, New Zealand’s Prime Minister may be turning the page.

For Christopher Luxon, AUKUS may not be needed at all.

A deeper partnership with NATO could be more than enough.

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

A Pacific regionalism academic has called out New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters for withholding information from the public on AUKUS and says the security deal “raises serious questions for the Pacific region”.

Auckland University of Technology academic Dr Marco de Jong said Pasifika voices must be included in the debate on whether or not Aotearoa should join AUKUS.

New Zealand is considering joining Pillar 2 of the agreement, a non-nuclear option, but critics say this could be seen as Aotearoa rubber-stamping Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.

New Zealand is considering joining Pillar 2 of the agreement, a non-nuclear option, but critics say this could be seen as Aotearoa rubber-stamping Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.

On Monday, Peters said New Zealand was “a long way” from making a decision about participating in Pillar 2 of AUKUS.

He was interrupted by a silent protester holding an anti-AUKUS sign, during a foreign policy speech at an event at Parliament, where Peters spoke about the multi-national military alliance.

Peters spent more time attacking critics than outlining a case to join AUKUS, de Jong said.

Investigating the deal
Peters told RNZ’s Morning Report the deal was something the government was investigating.

“There are new exciting things that can help humanity. Our job is to find out what we are talking about before we rush to judgement and make all these silly panicking statements.”

The Minister answers questions following his speech from media, including on the strategic environment, AUKUS Pillar 2, defence spending, leadership in 🇳🇿’s national security system, and bipartisanship in 🇳🇿 foreign policy. pic.twitter.com/BSSolJLhHQ

— Winston Peters (@NewZealandMFA) May 1, 2024

According to UK’s House of Commons research briefing document explaining AUKUS Pillar 2, Canada, Japan and South Korea are also being considered as “potential partners” alongside New Zealand.

Peters said there had been no official invitation to join yet and claimed he did not know enough information about AUKUS yet.

However, Dr de Jong argues this is not the case.

“According to classified documents New Zealand has been in talks with the United States about this since 2021. If we do not know what it [AUKUS] is right now, I wonder when we will?”

The security pact was first considered under the previous Labour government and those investigations have continued under the new coalition government.

Former Labour leader and prime minister Helen Clark said NZ joining AUKUS would risk its relationship with its largest trading partner China and said Aotearoa must act as a guardian to the South Pacific.

Profiling Pacific perspectives
Cook Islands, Tonga and Samoa weighed in on the issue during NZ’s diplomatic visit of the three nations earlier this year.

At the time, Samoa’s Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa said: “We don’t want the Pacific to be seen as an area that people will take licence of nuclear arrangements.”

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) prohibits signatories — which include Australia and New Zealand — from placing nuclear weapons within the South Pacific.

Fiamē said she did not want the Pacific to become a region affected by more nuclear weapons.

However, other Pacific leaders have not taken as strong a stance as Samoa, instead acknowledging NZ’s “sovereignty” while re-emphasising commitments to the Blue Pacific partnership.

“I do not think that Winston Peters should mistake the quietness of Pacific leaders on AUKUS as necessarily supporting NZ’s position,” de Jong said.

“Most Pacific leaders will instead of calling out NZ, re-emphasis their own commitment to the Blue Pacific ideals and a nuclear-free Pacific.”

Minister Peters, who appears to have a good standing in the Pacific region, has said it is important to treat smaller nations exactly the same as so-called global foreign superpowers, such as the US, India and China.

Pacific ‘felt blindsided’
When the deal was announced, de Jong said “Pacific leaders felt blindsided”.

“Pacific nations will be asking what foreign partners have for the Pacific, how the framing of the region is consistent with theirs and what the defence funding will mean for diplomacy.”

AUKUS is seeking to advance military capabilities and there will be heavy use of AI technology, he said, adding “the types of things being developed are hyper-sonic weapons, cyber technologies, sea-drones.”

“Peters could have spelled out how New Zealand will contribute to the eight different workstreams…there’s plenty of information out there,” de Jong said.

“They are linking surveillance drones to targeting systems and missiles systems. It is creating these human machines, teams of a next generation war-fighitng technology.

The intention behind it is to win the next-generation technology being tested in the war in Ukraine and Gaza, he said.

Dr de Jong said it was crucial New Zealand find out how this was and could impact “instability in the Pacific”.

“Climate Change remains the principle security threat. It is not clear AUKUS does anything to meet climate action or development to the region.

“It could be creating the very instability that it is seeking to address by advancing this military focus,” he added.

Legacies of nuclear testing
Dr de Jong said in the Pacific, nuclear issues were closely tied to aspirations for regional self-determination.

“In a region living with the legacies of nuclear testing in Marshall Islands, Ma’ohi Nui, and Kiribati, there is concern that AUKUS, along with the Fukushima discharge, has ushered in a new nuclearism.”

He said Australia had sought endorsements to offset regional concerns about AUKUS, notably at the 52nd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting and the ANZMIN talks.

“However, it is clear AUKUS has had a chilling effect on Australia’s support for nuclear disarmament, with Anthony Albanese appearing to withdraw Australian support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the universalisation of Rarotonga.

“New Zealand, which is a firm supporter of both these agreements, must consider that while Pillar 2 has been described as ‘non-nuclear’, it is unlikely that Pacific people find this distinction meaningful, especially if it means stepping back from such advocacy.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz