In an unprecedented result, French Polynesia’s pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira Party candidates have won a clean sweep of all three seats in the French National Assembly.
The three will sit with the left-wing Nupes group which emerged as the second biggest force in the 577-strong National Assembly.
The success of the alliance around Jean-Luc Melenchon was emulated by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally on the right of the political spectrum, resulting in Emmanuel Macron’s centrist bloc losing its absolute majority.
In New Caledonia, Macron’s Ensemble party won both seats and also won the single seat in Wallis and Futuna, but none in French Polynesia.
A surprise novice in the Assembly is Tahiti’s Tematai Le Gayic, who as a 21-year-old has become the youngest person ever to be elected to the National Assembly of the Fifth French Republic.
Le Gayic, who interrupted his university studies for the election campaign, won just under 51 percent of the votes in the Papeete constituency to defeat former Tourism Minister Nicole Bouteau of the ruling Tapura Huiraatira party.
In the first round, Bouteau had the best score of any candidate.
Brotherson returned Another new Tavini candidate, Steve Chailloux, scored 59 percent in his constituency to beat Tepuaraurii Teriitahi.
Moetai Brotherson, who was the only Assembly member left in the run for a second term, won his seat with more than 61 percent of the vote, beating Tuterai Tumahai.
Tavini’s Moetai Brotherson … won 61 percent of the vote in his electorate. Image: Walter Zweifel/RNZ Pacific
The three, who had been campaigning for French Polynesia’s sovereignty, are now bound for Paris to take up their seats.
Le Gayic told local media that he wants France to recognise the Māohi culture.
“Because of in the French constitution, only one people is recognised, the French people, and only one language is recognised, the French language. As soon as the Māohi people are recognised as a people, the Māohi language can be made official in this territory’, he said.
In a first reaction, President Edouard Fritch said the defeated Tapura candidates were aligned with the majority of President Emmanuel Macron, which raised the question of how French Polynesia can push its concerns in Paris and how it can ask for France’s support.
Fritch said the loss was due to “an amalgamation of everything and anything”.
Observers noted that the Tapura may have been sanctioned for the way it managed the pandemic, which saw an extraordinary first spike in late 2020 and was followed by dissent over vaccination mandates.
Two weeks ago, Fritch and the former Vice-President Tearii Alpha were both fined for flouting covid-19 rules they put in place last year.
Alpha, who was vice-president at the time, invited 300 people, including all cabinet members, to his wedding at the height of restrictions.
New Caledonia New Caledonia’s anti-independence candidates have retained the territory’s two Assembly seats, defeating the challengers of the pro-independence FLNKS.
Philippe Dunoyer was re-elected for a second five-year term in the constituency centered on Noumea, standing for a four-party coalition tied to French president Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble.
Dunoyer won 66 percent of the vote, beating Wali Wahetra who was the first pro-independence politician to make the run-off in the Noumea area in 15 years.
In the other constituency, comprising the rest of the main island, the mayor of La Foa, Nicolas Metzdorf, won comfortably against Gerard Reignier.
Metzdorf has been a member of New Caledonia’s Congress since 2014 and in 2020, he became mayor, but to comply with French law on the cumulation of offices, he is expected to relinquish the mayoralty.
The election result reflected the sharp split already seen in the independence referendums of the past four years, with Kanak voters overwhelmingly favouring independence.
Reignier scored more than 90 percent of the votes in several electorates, and even attained more than 96 percent in Belep.
The winning candidates have been campaigning for a new statute anchoring New Caledonia within France after last December’s third rejection of independence.
They want the electoral rolls for referendums and provincial elections to be opened to all French citizens residing in New Caledonia — a proposition fiercely contested by indigenous groups.
Yesterday’s vote was open to all French citizens.
Wallis and Futuna The candidate of the ruling majority in Wallis and Futuna, Mikaele Seo, has narrowly won the territory’s Assembly seat.
Seo beat the opposition-backed Etuato Mulukihaamea by just 16 votes, which is a score so tight that it may get challenged.
Seo, who is the president of the permanent commission of the Assembly of Wallis and Futuna, had already been in the Paris seat since 2019 after the last winner Sylvain Brial fell ill and had to quit his post.
Mulikihaamea is the head of the local Olympic committee and known for his engagement in rugby.
The living component among these pieces was Rodrigo Duterte — an ally who, when elected president, normalised Marcos’ machinery, painting over a picture of murders and plunder to show glory and heroism instead.
“I think that really, if we are to make a metaphor [to] describe the role of Duterte to Marcos’ win, it’s really Duterte being the sponsor or a ninong to Marcos Jr…. I think Duterte ultimately is the godfather of this all,” said Fatima Gaw, assistant professor at the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman.
The alliance Marcos’ disinformation machinery that was years in the making was complemented by his longtime ties to the Duterte family. Before “Uniteam,” there was “AlDub” or Alyansang Duterte-Bongbong.
Marcos courted Rodrigo Duterte in 2015, but Duterte chose Alan Peter Cayetano to be his running mate. Even then, calls for a Duterte-Marcos tandem persisted.
Gaw said Duterte played a part in driving interest for Marcos-related social media content and making it profitable. The first milestone for this interest, according to Gaw, was when Marcos filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-president in 2015.
They saw an influx of search demand for Marcos history on Google.
“There’s interest already back then but it was amplified and magnified by the alliance with Duterte. So every time there’s a pronouncement from Duterte about, for example, the burial of Marcos Sr. in the Libingan ng mga Bayani, that also spiked interest, and that interest is actually cumulative, it’s not like it’s a one-off thing,” Gaw said in a June interview with Rappler.
Using CrowdTangle, Rappler scanned posts in 2016 with the keyword “Marcos,” yielding over 62,000 results from pages with admins based in the Philippines. Spikes can be seen during key events like the EDSA anniversary, the Pilipinas 2016 debate, election day, and instances after Duterte’s moves to bury the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
On February 19, 2016, Duterte said that if elected president, he would allow the burial of the late dictator at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. On August 7, 2016, Duterte said that Marcos deserved to be buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani for being a soldier and a former president.
The burial pushed through on November 18, 2016 and became a major event that allowed the massive whitewashing of the Martial Law period.
Made with flourish Related content would then gain views, prompting platforms to recommend them and make them more visible, Gaw said. In a research she conducted in 2021 with De La Salle University (DLSU) communication professor Cheryll Soriano, they found that when searching “Marcos history” on YouTube, videos made by amateur content creators or people unaffiliated with professional groups were recommended more than news, institutional, and academic sources.
“A big part of Marcos’ success online and spreading his message and propaganda is because he leveraged both his political alliances with [the] Dutertes, as the front-facing tandem and political partnership. And on the backend, whatever ecosystem that the Duterte administration has established, is something that Marcos already can tap,” Gaw said.
In an upcoming study on social media and disinformation narratives authored by Aries Arugay and Justin Baquisal, they identified four thematic disinformation narratives in the last election campaign — authoritarian nostalgia/fantasy, conspiracy theories (Tallano gold, Yamashita treasure), “strongman”, and democratic disillusionment.
Arugay, a political science professor at UP Diliman, said these four narratives were the “raw materials” for further polarisation in the country.
“Para sa mga kabataan, ’yung mga 18-24, fantasy siya. Kasi naririnig natin ‘yun, ah kaya ko binoto si Bongbong Marcos kasi gusto kong maexperience ‘yung Martial Law,” Arugay said in an interview with Rappler in June.
(For the youth, those aged 18-24, it’s a fantasy. We hear that reasoning, that they voted for Bongbong Marcos because they want to experience Martial Law.)
Arugay described this as “unthinkable,” but pervasive false narratives that the Martial Law era was the golden age of Philippine economy, that no Filipino was poor during that time, that the Philippines was the richest country next to Japan, among many other claims, allowed for such a fantasy to thrive.
Institutionalising disinformation While traditional propaganda required money and machinery, usually from a top-down system, Gaw said Duterte co-opted and hijacked the existing systems to manipulate the news cycle and online discourse to make a name for himself.
“I think what Duterte has done…is to institutionalise disinformation at the state level,” she said.
This meant that the amplification of Duterte’s messaging became incorporated in activities of the government, perpetuated by the Presidential Communications Operations Office, the Philippine National Police, and the government’s anti-communist task force or the NTF-ELCAC, among others.
Early on, Duterte’s administration legitimized partisan vloggers by hiring some of them in government. Other vloggers served as crisis managers for the PCOO, monitoring social media, alerting the agency about sentiments that were critical of the administration, and spreading positive news about the government.
Bloggers were organized by Pebbles Duque, niece of Health Secretary Francisco Duque III, who himself was criticised over the government’s pandemic response.
Mocha Uson, one of the most infamous pro-Duterte disinformation peddlers, was appointed PCOO assistant secretary earlier in his term. (She ended up campaigning for Isko Moreno in the last election.)
Now, we’re seeing a similar turn of events — Marcos appointed pro-Duterte vlogger Trixie Cruz-Angeles as his press secretary. Under Duterte’s administration, Angeles had been a social media strategist of the PCOO.
Following the Duterte administration’s lead, they are again eyeing the accreditation of vloggers to let them cover Malacañang briefings or press conferences.
“So in the Duterte campaign, of course there were donors, supporters paying for the disinformation actors and workers. Now it’s actually us, the Filipino people, funding disinformation, because it’s now part of the state. So I think that’s the legacy of the Duterte administration and what Marcos has done, is actually to just leverage on that,” Gaw said.
Targeting critics What pieces of disinformation are Filipinos inadvertently funding? Gaw said that police pages are some of the most popular pages to spread disinformation on Facebook, and that they don’t necessarily talk about police work but instead the various agenda of the state, such as demonising communist groups, activist groups, and other progressive movements.
Emboldened by their chief Duterte, who would launch tirades against his critics during his speeches and insult, curse, and red-tag them, police pages and accounts spread false or misleading content that target activists and critics. They do this by posting them directly or by sharing them from dubious, anonymously-managed pages, a Rappler investigation found.
Facebook later took down a Philippine network that was linked to the military or police, for violating policies on coordinated inauthentic behavior.
The platform has also previously suspended Communications Undersecretary and NTF-ELCAC spokesperson Lorraine Badoy who has long been targeting and brazenly red-tagging individuals and organizations that are critical of the government. She faces several complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman accusing her of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct for public officials.
“PCOO as an office before wasn’t really a big office, they’re not popular, but all of a sudden they become so salient and so visible in media because they’re able to understand that half of the battle of governance is not just doing the operations of it but also the PR side of it,” Gaw said.
Facebook users recirculated a post Badoy made in January 2016, wherein she talked about the murders of Boyet and Primitivo Mijares under Martial Law. In that post, just six years ago, Badoy called Bongbong an “idiot, talentless son of the dead dickhead dictator.”
Badoy has since disowned such views. In a post on May 2022, Badoy said she only “believed all those lies I was taught in UP” and quoted Joseph Meynard Keynes: “When the facts change, I change my mind.”
Angeles also said the same in June 2022 when netizens surfaced her old tweets criticising the Marcos family. She said, “I changed my mind about it, aren’t we entitled to change our minds?”
But the facts haven’t changed. A 2003 Supreme Court decision declared $658 million worth of Marcos Swiss deposits as ill-gotten. Imelda Marcos’ motion for reconsideration was “denied with finality”.
According to Amnesty International, 70,000 were imprisoned, 34,000 were tortured, and 3,240 were killed under Martial Law.
“Red-tagger” Lorraine Badoy … spokesperson of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) pictured in November 2020. Image: Rappler
The rise of alternative news sources Outside government channels, Badoy co-hosts an SMNI programme named “Laban Kasama ng Bayan” with Jeffrey “Ka Eric” Celiz — who is supposedly a former rebel — where they talk about the communist movement. SMNI is the broadcasting arm of embattled preacher Apollo Quiboloy’s Kingdom of Jesus Christ church.
SMNI has been found to be at the core of the network of online assets who red-tag government critics and attack the media. The content that vloggers and influencers produce to defend Duterte’s administration now bleeds into newscasts by organisations with franchises granted by the government.
The first report of the Digital Public Pulse, a project co-led by Gaw, found that on YouTube, leading politician and government channels, including that of Marcos, directly reach their audiences without the mediation of the media.
“This shift to subscribing to influencers and vloggers as sources of news and information, and now subscribing to nontraditional or non-mainstream sources of information that are [still considered institutional] because they have franchises and they have licences to operate, it’s part of the trend of the growing distrust in mainstream media,” Gaw said.
She said that given the patronage relationship that religious organisations have with politicians, alternative news sources like SMNI and NET25 don’t necessarily practice objective, accountable, or responsible journalism because their interest is different from the usual journalistic organisation.
“I think that in general these two are politically tied and economically incentivised to perform the role that the administration and the incoming presidency of Marcos want them to play, and exactly, serving as an alternative source of information,” she said.
A day after he was proclaimed, Marcos held a press conference with only three reporters, who belonged to SMNI, GMA News, and NET25.
Rappler reviewed NET25’s Facebook posts and found that it has a history of attacking the press, Vice-President Leni Robredo, and her supporters. The network had also released inaccurate reports that put Robredo in a bad light.
Gaw said because these alternative news channels owned by religious institutions have a mutually-benefiting relationship with the government, they are given access to government officials and to stories that other journalists might not have access to. There is thus no incentive for them to report critically and perform the role of providing checks and balances.
“They would essentially be an extension of state propaganda,” Gaw said.
For Arugay, the Marcos campaign was able to take advantage of how the state influenced the standards of journalism.
“Part [of their strategy] is least exposure to unfriendlies, particularly media that’s critical. I think at the end they saw the power of critical media. And once they were able to get an opportunity, they wanted to turn things around. And this is where democracy suffers,” Arugay said.
Under Duterte, journalists and news organisations faced a slew of attacks that threatened their livelihood and freedom. Rappler was banned from covering Malacañang, faced trumped-up charges, then witnessed its CEO Maria Ressa being convicted of cyber libel.
Broadcasting giant ABS-CBN was shut down. Journalist Frenchie Mae Cumpio is in her second year in jail.
While the international community lauds the courageous and critical reporting of Philippine journalists, Filipinos are shutting them out.
All bases covered While Duterte mostly used a Facebook strategy to win the election, Marcos went all out in 2022 — and it paid off.
“[The] strategy of the Marcos Jr. campaign became very complicated [compared with] the Duterte campaign because back then they were really, they just invested on Facebook. [That’s not the case here]…. No social media tech or platform was disregarded,” Arugay said.
At one point in 2021, YouTube became the most popular social media platform in the Philippines, beating Facebook. Whereas Facebook at least has a third-party fact-checking programme, YouTube barely has any strong policies against disinformation.
“I think with the Marcos campaign, they knew Facebook was a battleground, they deployed all their efforts there as well, but they knew they had to win YouTube. Because that’s where we can build more sophisticated lies and convoluted narratives than on Facebook,” Gaw said.
YouTube’s unclear policies allow lies to thrive A study by FEU technical consultant Justin Muyot found that Marcos had the highest number of estimated “alternative videos” — those produced by content creators — on YouTube. These videos aimed to shame candidates critical of Marcos and his supporters, endear Marcos to the public, and sow discord between the other presidential candidates.
YouTube is also where hyperpartisan channels thrive by posing as news channels. These were found to be in one major community that includes SMNI and the People’s Television Network.
This legitimises them as a “surrogate to journalistic reporting”.
“That’s why you’re able to sell historical disinformation, you’re able to [have] false narratives about the achievements of the Marcoses, or Bongbong Marcos in particular. You’re able to launch counterattacks to criticisms of Marcos in a very coherent and coordinated way because you’re able to have that space, time, and the immersion required to buy into these narratives,” Gaw said.
Apart from YouTube, Gaw said that Marcos had a “more clear understanding of a cross-platform strategy” across social media.
On Twitter, freshly-made accounts were set up to trend pro-Marcos hashtags. The platform later suspended over 300 accounts from the Marcos supporter base for violating its platform manipulation and spam policy.
Outgoing Vice-President and unsuccessful presidential candidate Leni Robredo – the only woman to contest the president’s office last month. Image: David Robie/APR
Ruining Robredo was a ‘coordinated effort’ Duterte and Marcos had a common target over the years: Robredo. She is another female who was constantly undermined by Duterte, along with Leila de Lima, a victim of character assassination who continues to suffer jail time because of it.
“It has been a coordinated effort of Duterte and Marcos to really undermine her, reap or cultivate hatred against her for whatever reason and to actually attach her to people and parties or groups who have political baggage, for example LP (Liberal Party) even if she’s not running for LP,” Gaw said.
The meta-partisan “news” ecosystem on YouTube, studied by researchers of the Philippine Media Monitoring Laboratory, was found to deliver propaganda using audio-visual and textual cues traditionally associated with broadcast news media.
They revealed patterns of “extreme bias and fabricated information,” repeating falsehoods that, among others, enforce negative views on Robredo’s ties with the Liberal Party and those that make her seem stupid.
Rappler found that the top misogynistic attack words used against Robredo on Facebook posts are “bobo,” “tanga,” “boba,” and “madumb,” all labeling her as stupid.
Fact-checking initiative Tsek.PH also found Robredo to be the top victim of disinformation based on their fact checks done in January 2022.
“By building years and years of lies and basically giving her, manufacturing her political baggage along the way, that made her campaign in [2022] very hard to win, very hard to convert new people because there’s already ambivalence against her,” Gaw said.
Arugay and Gaw both said that the media, academe, and civil society failed to act until it was too late. “The election result and [and where the] political landscape is at now is a product of that neglect,” Gaw said.
There is still a lack of a systemic approach on how to engage with disinformation, said Gaw, since much of it is still untraceable and underground. To add, Arugay said tech companies are to blame for their nature of prioritising profit.
“Just like in 2016, the disinformation network and architecture responsible for the 2022 electoral victory of Marcos Jr. will not die down. They will not fade.
“They will not wither away. They will just transition because the point is no longer to get him elected, the point is for him to govern or make sure that he is protected while in power,” Arugay said.
When the new administration comes in, it will be the public’s responsibility to hold elected officials accountable. But if this strategy — instilled by Duterte’s administration and continued by Marcos — continues, crucifying critics on social media and in real life, blaming past administrations and the opposition for the poor state of the country, and concocting narratives to fool Filipinos, what will reality in the Philippines look like down the line?
Loreben Tuquerois a journalist for Rappler. Republished with permission.
As well as her interviews with politicians and experts, Politics with Michelle Grattan includes “Word from The Hill”, where she discusses the news with members of The Conversation politics team.
Politics editor Amanda Dunn and Michelle discuss Reserve Bank Governor Philip Lowe’s Tuesday statements about the economic outlook. Lowe has again warned of more rate rises, indicating the bank is determined to reduce inflation from a likely 7% at year’s end down to the 2-3% target range. But the Governor says he doesn’t expect Australia to face a recession.
Meanwhile Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil has visited Sri Lanka this week amid concerns the people smugglers are looking to test Australia’s borders now there’s a new government. Australia, which needs Sri Lanka to be as active as possible in stopping boats leaving, has announced $50 million in aid for that country, directed to its food and health needs.
With Wikileaks founder Julian Assange facing extradition from Britain to the United States, Anthony Albanese is under pressure to make strong representations to have the Australian freed. Albanese is sympathetic, but whether he can achieve any progress is another matter.
The calendar for the new parliament has now been released, showing only four sitting weeks between now and the October budget.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Last year experts raised their eyebrows when the Morrison government announced Australia would abandon its contract for French-built Attack class submarines, in favour of eight nuclear-powered submarines delivered under the AUKUS partnership.
Retired Royal Australian Navy Chief Petty Officer Greg Jones was one key individual who questioned whether the choice is appropriate for Australia’s defence needs (at least in the short to medium term).
One particularly controversial point is the time it will take for the nuclear submarines to become operational. Most estimates indicate they won’t enter service until the 2040s.
The Australian Industry Defence Network is now calling for an “interim submarine” class to be purchased to plug the gap. But what would this even look like?
Why are there calls for an interim submarine?
In its contract with France, Australia intended to purchase up to 12 Attack class boats at a cost of up to A$90 billion.
The Morrison government justified its decision to pull out of the deal by arguing the conventional diesel-electric submarines would be obsolete by the time they became operational in the early to mid-2030s. This is despite Defence insisting for years they were appropriate.
The former government said Australia would need more survivable and longer-range nuclear-powered boats to overcome the “narrowing” of the “technological edge enjoyed by Australia and our partners”.
While not overtly mentioned, this was a thinly veiled statement that it intended to counter the potential threat of an increasingly confident and capable China.
In some respects, the cancellation of the Attack class was justified. The development of the project had been rocky for some time. There were allegations of cost blowouts and time-frame issues, leading to questions about whether the submarines would indeed become obsolete not long after entering service.
Given submarines provide a significant contribution to Australia’s military deterrent, a potential capability gap is receiving a lot of attention. But there are several arguments regarding how the gap should be addressed (or whether it can be).
There are persuasive arguments both for, and against, the adoption of an interim capability until the future nuclear-powered boats enter service. Advocates argue Australia’s current Collins class won’t be enough to face more modern technology entering service in the Indo-Pacific region.
Former Royal Australian Navy submariners have written to Defence Minister Richard Marles, arguing Australia faces an important decision: to operate the Collins class for longer than intended (and likely longer than it will remain capable), or purchase an interim capability.
In contrast, senior figures in Defence, including Navy Chief Vice-Admiral Mike Noonan, have rejected the idea an interim capability is required. One argument is that it wouldn’t be viable to operate a third class of submarine, given the small size of the Australian Navy.
Another difficult question is what the interim capability would be. Some argue for a modernised and refurbished Collins class, or a new “son of Collins” class.
According to Lars Tossman, head of business at Swedish company Saab Kockums (the designer of the Collins class), the current A-26 submarine design could be adapted for Australia’s interim needs as a more modern “son of Collins” class submarine.
However, both prospects appear to be at risk due to Australia’s naval ship builder, ASC Corporation. ASC has so far refused to work closely with Saab Kockums for a Collins class refurbishment. The program could potentially extend the operational lifespan of Australia’s existing Collins class by up to a decade.
Even if the current Collins class boats are modernised, Australia’s ability to operate and deploy them is questionable. Some assessments indicate that out of the six boats available, only a handful are available for deployment at any one time.
Difficulty sticking to plans
Another issue is the Defence department’s recent track record in relation to procurement, with several prominent purchases suffering significant issues.
For instance, the Hunter class frigate currently in development has been revealed to be underpowered and arguably too lightly armed for Australia’s needs. The Boxer class combat reconnaissance vehicle has cost almost $2 billion, yet only 25 training vehicles have been delivered. And of course the cancellation of the Attack class submarines cost more than $4 billion (including the cost of the program before cancellation) – with nothing to show for it.
These examples call into question Defence’s decision-making capabilities. These issues are particularly concerning given that the scope of the AUKUS nuclear submarine project vastly exceeds any previous procurement.
Another significant procurement could lead to more delays and cost blowouts, even if only for an interim measure. This could detract focus and funding from other important projects.
Looking to the US for help
Another option, recently hinted at by opposition leader and former defence minister Peter Dutton, is the United States may be willing to sell two Virginia class submarines (the increasingly preferred nuclear-powered submarine option) “off the shelf” at some point in the next eight years – and supply personnel to serve on the vessels and train Australian crews.
In effect, this handful of nuclear-powered boats would accelerate the AUKUS procurement. The plan would go some way towards addressing the capability gap, but is reliant on the US providing the submarines and crew. Yet the US is struggling to meet its own demand for the Virginia class.
The cost of procuring the Virginia class has been estimated to be between A$117 billion and $171 billion. Given the expenses involved in procuring nuclear-powered submarines, it would ultimately be a better option than trying to develop or purchase yet another submarine class in the interim, particularly one that would only be a temporary measure.
But even this option raises questions. Experts argue if the US were willing to provide two nuclear boats off the shelf, Australia lacks the naval support to operate them. Peter Briggs, former head of the Navy’s submarine capability program, said this capability would take 10-15 years to develop.
Unfortunately, there’s no simple solution. And it seems Marles will face a difficult decision no matter which way he turns.
James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In a recent media release, Australian Federal Police said:
We have about 51 Italian organised crime clans in Australia. We have identified 14 confirmed ‘ndrangheta clans across Australia, involving thousands of members.
The ‘ndrangheta, widely considered Italy’s wealthiest and most powerful mafia group, are connected with Calabria, a region in southern Italy. They have important international links with – and are sometimes in a superior position to – local groups, such as bikies.
A flurry of recent reporting and police comment on the ‘ndrangheta may give the impression their activity in Australia is a relatively new phenomenon.
But in truth, the ‘ndrangheta has been successfully planting seeds into Australian society for 100 years. It is integrated into Australian society; it’s not an alien guest or recent virus.
The recent AFP statement was celebrating first anniversary of “the overt action taken under Operation Ironside, the biggest and most significant organised crime operation” in AFP history.
Operation Ironside – otherwise known as operation AN0M or Trojan Horse in the United States – involved a joint action between the FBI and the AFP that took place on June 8 last year.
According to the AFP statement, “globally, excluding Australian statistics, more than 700 alleged offenders have been charged”, thanks to Ironside. In Australia, it said, 383 alleged offenders have been charged with 2,340 offences.
The recent anniversary of this joint action led to a spike in media reports about the ‘ndrangheta in Australia, with AFP Assistant Commissioner Nigel Ryan quoted as saying:
It’s entirely possible that people will be living next door to members of the ‘ndrangheta without knowing.
I thought it was notable the AFP’s press release mentioned 51 Italian crime groups, of which only 14 are recognised ‘ndrangheta clans; this begs the question of who are the remaining groups.
The AFP’s statement didn’t specify, and focused chiefly on the ‘ndrangheta.
As someone who has researched the ‘ndrangheta for a decade – and specifically the Australian ‘ndranghetasince 2014 – I didn’t think there was much urgent or new in the recent “revelations” tied to the anniversary of the Ironside arrests.
The ‘ndrangheta – also known as “the honoured society” – has operated in Australia in a structured way for at least a century.
The ‘ndrangheta in Australia
The criminal organisation even has an Australian “birthday”: December 18, 1922 when the ship King of Italy docked at the Western Australian port of Fremantle, then in Adelaide and then in Melbourne. It left in each of these ports one of the three founders of the ‘ndrangheta.
The ‘ndrangheta has capitalised on Calabrian/Italian migration to Australia to grow and entrench its power in Australia.
Australian institutions were quicker than their Italian counterparts to recognise the specificities of the ‘ndrangheta between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s. At this time, Italian authorities were largely focused on the more famous Cosa Nostra, the Sicilian mafia.
The history of the AFP’s policing of Italian organised crime in this country is marked by widely spruiked success, rarely mentioned failure and extended periods of malaise.
As his report noted, in the past 20 years alone Australian law enforcement has produced maps of ‘ndrangheta families and confidential reports about its members and activities.
Drugs, political infiltration and power
Much media and police focus has been on ‘ndrangheta and the drug trade (Operation Ironside is, so far, no exception).
Yes, the drug trade is fundamental to ‘ndrangheta wealth and power in Australia and has been for many years.
However, as outlined in my recent book, Chasing the Mafia and by investigative reporters, there is a world of political infiltration, too. Legal businesses have been born on the back of proceeds of crime, and powerful men who have a say in the Calabrian/Italian community.
This is less talked out, partly due to fear and intimidation but also due to consensus, friendships, and exploitation of ethnic solidarity.
The ‘ndrangheta is deeply integrated into Australian society; it is a phenomenon with many heads.
When it comes to the ‘ndrangheta in Australia, the combined knowledge of the AFP, the NSW police and the Victorian police is unparalleled. Much of this knowledge is, of course, left out of official statements. These statements have arguably one good effect: they raise the level of attention yet again.
But any attempt to take the ‘ndrangheta seriously requires sustained political will and resources. Swinging between a flurry of attention on the ‘ndrangheta and collective forgetfulness of the issue does not help.
Anna Sergi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Australia’s electricity generators would be paid extra money to be available even if they don’t actually generate any energy, under a new mechanism proposed by the federal government’s Energy Security Board (ESB).
Controversially, the ESB has recommended all generators be eligible for the payment, including ageing coal-fired generators that are increasingly breaking down.
The proposal comes after federal and state ministers last week requested the ESB advance its work on a “capacity mechanism … to bring on renewables and storage”. The ESB says a mix of generators is crucial for the mechanism to be effective, guaranteeing energy supply to the grid.
So will this capacity mechanism lower energy prices for households? Probably not, because it includes unreliable coal-fired power stations, and consumers are likely to pick up the cost when the plants ultimately fail.
The electricity market is in crisis
Wholesale electricity prices have surged due to two main factors: high coal and gas prices (driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and roughly one in four coal power stations being out of action at various times in the past few weeks.
The coal stations are unavailable because of maintenance as well as the sudden exit of 3,000 megawatts of power due to breakdowns, with almost all Australian coal-fired power stations now older than their original design life.
The Australian Energy Market Operator has suspended the market in response to the crisis, and it’s unclear when it will restart.
Under the temporary system now in place, generators provide their availability and the market operator tells generators when to run to ensure secure supply. Market prices are then fixed at the past 28-day average for that hour of the day, between A$150 and $300 per megawatt hour.
If generation costs are higher, power station owners can apply for additional compensation, which will be later recovered from consumers. Unfortunately, this means all electricity customers will effectively subsidise the companies that own the unreliable coal generators that caused this crisis.
AEMO last week suspended the National Electricity Market in response to the rising energy prices. Shutterstock
Would a capacity market have helped avoid this crisis?
The short answer is no. The long answer is actually worse: a capacity market is likely to cause further crises such as the one we’re currently in.
The ESB suggests that selling “capacity certificates” three or four years in advance will mean coal generators will signal when they intend to close. But coal generators are unlikely to face penalties if they don’t turn up when needed – they will just hand back the extra payments they’ve received.
This sort of arrangement is what economists call a “free option” – it costs nothing to participate. If the coal stations fail to deliver, as they have done over the last two months, it will be left to consumers to deal with the consequences.
By including all existing generators (including coal), a traditional capacity market is actually more likely to delay investment in new, fast-start, dispatchable technologies (such as batteries, pumped hydro and hydrogen-ready gas turbines) than accelerate them, as ministers want.
Indeed, ESB’s recommendation is already looking difficult to implement. Federal Energy Minister Chris Bowen says it will be up to the states to choose which generators are eligible, and Victoria has already said fossil fuels will not be.
Any capacity mechanism needs to have a solution to unexpected and sudden shortfalls of capacity.
The ESB has noted the biggest risk to consumers is that coal will exit suddenly with little warning because it is old and prone to breaking down. This has been a significant contributing factor to the current crisis.
It also drove higher prices in 2017 when Hazelwood suddenly closed without sufficient time for investment in new capacity to be brought online.
The market operator didn’t foresee any reliability problems less than two months ago – and neither did anyone in the market. The ESB’s proposed capacity market would have implicitly recommended less capacity in the system.
Hazelwood workers left their hats on the power station’s last day. Shutterstock
A capacity mechanism needs to create a reserve
As older coal power stations are increasingly unreliable, it may be prudent to have new generation in place before coal power stations fail.
Governments should create a capacity reserve market. Effectively, a capacity reserve pays new generators for new capacity until it’s needed, whereas a traditional capacity market (like the ESB is recommending) pays all existing generators that would have been available anyway. This is the key difference between a capacity market and a capacity reserve.
Under a capacity reserve, governments could provide payments only to new, modern, reliable, fast-start, firm capacity such as batteries, hydrogen-ready gas turbines and pumped hydro. This could be brought into a “waiting room” and held until it’s needed.
New generators could be deployed immediately when coal power stations fail, helping prevent the type of crisis we’re going through now.
Importantly, consumers would only be paying for new generation, not coal-fired power stations. This will cost less, and is the only way to provide the insurance the market needs.
Ministers want a smooth transition to renewables. Shutterstock
We already have the tools in place
Several years ago, the ESB introduced the Retail Reliability Obligation, which requires retailers to hold contracts with generators for their share of peak electricity demand. This is intended to encourage retailers to plan ahead.
The Retail Reliability Obligation framework could be modified to address situations such as what we’re in now.
If coal-fired generators fail and the market operator is forced to intervene like it did last week, then any costs the market operator incurred could be recovered from the retailers without enough generation or contracts in place to supply all of their customers.
This would be better than today, where the operator’s costs are recovered from all electricity consumers.
By strengthening price signals and building some reserves, we can help prevent future crises and deliver what ministers have rightly requested: a smooth pathway to more renewables and storage.
It’s also worth remembering coal-fired generators received a windfall of up to $5 billion under the Clean Energy Future package in 2012. How much more money do coal generators need from taxpayers and energy consumers to simply do the right thing and make their plant reliable? Or to shut it down with sufficient notice to allow new capacity to be built?
Tim Nelson is an Associate Professor at Griffith University and the EGM, Energy Markets at Iberdrola Australia, that develops renewable projects and batteries
Joel Gilmore is an Associate Professor at Griffith University and the GM Energy Policy & Planning at Iberdrola Australia, that develops renewable projects and batteries
Summer evenings by the pool, lake or BBQ mean mosquitoes. But what about during winter when we’re mostly indoors? As the weather cools, these bloodsucking pests are rarely seen.
But where do they go?
Warm, wet conditions suit mosquitoes
Mosquitoes have complex life cycles that rely on water brought to wetlands, flood plains, and water-holding containers by seasonal rainfall. Depending on whether we’re experiencing a summer under the influence of El Niño or La Niña, mosquito populations will change in different ways.
During warmer months, their life cycle lasts about a month. Eggs laid around water hatch and the immature mosquitoes go through four developmental stages. Larvae then change to pupae, from which an adult mosquito emerges, sits briefly on the water surface, and then flies off to buzz and bite and continue the cycle.
Water is crucial but temperature is really important too. Unlike warm-blooded animals, mosquitoes can’t control their own body temperatures. The warmer it is, the more active mosquitoes will be. There’s usually more of them about too.
But once cold weather arrives, their activity slows. They fly less, they don’t bite as often, they reproduce less, and their life cycle takes longer to complete.
Temperature also plays a role in determining the ability of mosquitoes to spread viruses.
Ponds and puddles may be frozen but that doesn’t mean all mosquitoes have disappeared. Tom Keldenich/Unsplash, CC BY
Mosquitoes don’t disappear completely
On a sunny afternoon in winter, you may notice the occasional mosquito buzzing about in your backyard. Not as many as in summer but they’re still around.
Some mosquitoes do disappear. For example, the activity of the pest mosquito Culex annulirostris, thought to play an important role in the spread of Japanese encephalitis virus in Australia, dramatically declines when temperatures start dropping below 17.5℃.
Studies in Sydney have shown some mosquitoes, such as Culex annulirostris, disappear. Others, such as Culex quinquefasciatus and Culex molestus, remain active throughout the winter. You just may not notice them (unless they enter your home to buzz about your ears).
Some mosquitoes, such as the common Aedes notoscriptus, may occasionally be seen buzzing about in winter. Cameron Webb/NSW Health Pathology
Mosquitoes can disappear into diapause
We’re familiar with the idea of mammals hibernating through winter but mosquitoes, like many other insects, can enter a phase of inactivity called diapause.
Once cold weather arrives, adult mosquitoes find hiding places such as tree hollows and animal burrows, within the cracks and crevices of bushland environments, or in garages, basements or other structures around our homes, suburbs and cities. These mosquitoes may only live a few weeks during summer but going into diapause allows them to survive many months through winter.
Mosquitoes can also be found in frozen bodies of water, whether it is a bucket of water in your backyard or a near freezing wetland. For example, there is a group of mosquitoes that belong to the genus Coquillettidia whose larvae attach to the submerged parts of aquatic plants and can survive the cold winter temperatures. Their development dramatically slows and they’ll stay in the water until spring arrives.
By going into ‘diapause’ adults can survive in places like tree hollows for the cold months. Unsplash/Pat Whelan, CC BY
Some mosquitoes make it through the winter thanks to their eggs. Mosquito eggs can be incredibly resilient. They survive being dried out in hot and salty coastal wetlands during summer but also frozen in snow-covered creeks in winter.
In coastal regions of Australia, eggs of the saltmarsh mosquito (Aedes vigilax), sit perfectly safely on soil. Once the weather warms and tides bring in water to the wetlands, these eggs will be ready to hatch.
There is also a special mosquito in Australia known as the “snow melt mosquito” (Aedes nivalis) whose eggs survive under snow and hatch once that snow melts and fills ponds, creeks and wetlands throughout alpine regions.
Knowing the seasonal spread of mosquitoes helps health authorities design surveillance and control programs. It may help understand how invasive mosquitoes survive conditions in Australia outside their native ranges by hiding out from the cold, such as in rainwater tanks.
This knowledge may even expose the chilly chink in mosquito’s armour that we can use to better control mosquito populations and reduce the risks of disease outbreaks.
Cameron Webb and the Department of Medical Entomology, NSW Health Pathology, have been engaged by a wide range of insect repellent and insecticide manufacturers to provide testing of products and provide expert advice on mosquito biology. Cameron has also received funding from local, state and federal agencies to undertake research into mosquito-borne disease surveillance and management.
I woke up on Friday morning a pawn in a Kafka-esque story. Except I hadn’t been transformed into a chess piece but was a diplomatic pawn, a small player in a much larger international story. I read the news that I and 119 other “prominent” Australians were banned from travelling to Russia “indefinitely”.
The Russian sanctions were a response to Western sanctions and the “spreading of false information about Russia”. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced 121 people had been sanctioned but, in a beautifully Russian bureaucratic bungle, Air Vice-Marshal Darren Goldie was banned twice, making it just 120 of us on the list.
As usual, I was the second person in my family to know. My wife had woken before me and was listening to the news. “Russia has banned a bunch more Australians,” she told me. “Bet you’re on the list.”
The rest of the list was made up of journalists, business people, army officials, politicians and the odd academic like myself. What unites us is our outspoken criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
No more trips to Russia
This is one club of which I am proud to be a member.
And rather than silence the critics, Russia’s actions only give our concerns more exposure. After all, you wouldn’t be reading this if Russia hadn’t banned me.
I have a number of Russian friends and colleagues that I am saddened now not to be able to visit. I was at a conference in Moscow a few years ago and had a great time. I promised then to return to see the delights of St Petersburg.
And I always imagined one day I’d follow Paul Theroux’s footsteps on the trans-Siberian express. But it seems I will now only ever read about such adventures from the comfort of my armchair.
AI-powered landmines
This brings me to my outspoken criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
At the start of last week, I had the pleasure to speak about artificial intelligence (AI) at DevFest Ukraine, an online charity event put on by the tech community that raised over US$100,000 for those impacted by Russia’s invasion. And, in acknowledging the ownership of the land on which I was speaking, I acknowledged the ownership of all lands illegally occupied including those in Ukraine.
But I am sure it was another act that was the cause of my sanction: casting doubt on Russia’s claims about AI. In April, I was interviewed for a story about Russian weaponry in the Australian – and as the author is the only tech journalist who made the Russian list, I’m confident that article is to blame.
I can just imagine the Russian official in some non-descript office in bowels of the Foreign Ministry reading the Australian and pulling out the file to which my name was added.
When the mine is triggered, an expelling charge projects the warhead roughly one metre above ground level, at which point the warhead detonates. The warhead is packed with toothed rings designed to harm vital organs in a target’s body many metres away.
The mine is triggered by a seismic sensor that detects approaching footsteps.
Russia claims the mine is equipped with AI that can recognise friendly soldiers, thus minimising the risk of collateral damage.
This is an absurd claim. The footsteps of Ukrainian and Russian soldiers will produce the same seismic footprint. No AI can tell them apart.
Not too late to limit AI weapons
Russia’s wild claim illustrates a worrying trend where states will say weapons use “AI” to target combatants rather than civilians. Handing over battlefield decision-making to AI is a hugely dangerous proposition.
And this is just one the many dangers of AI in warfare. Others include the lowering of the barriers to war, and the development of new weapons of mass destruction.
Fortunately, it’s not too late to regulate this space. Indeed, the increasing use of hi-tech drones in the conflict in Ukraine has been a wake-up call to militaries around the world that technologies like this are fundamentally changing how we fight wars.
Discussions are moving slowly at the United Nations to limit the use of lethal autonomous weapons.
Australia has an opportunity to take leadership in this area. Australia has long been at the forefront of international efforts to combat the spread of chemical and biological weapons but has taken a back seat in the diplomatic efforts around autonomous weapons.
It’s time we took up the cause of regulating weapons that use AI to identify, track and target humans. I could then get back to reading about the wonderful history of Russia from my armchair.
Toby Walsh receives funding from the Australian Research Council as an ARC Laureate Fellow.
Recent Victorian and New South Wales government announcements may signal the first steps in a profound change to Australia’s early childhood sector.
And it’s been a long time coming. Over the past 30 years there has been a big increase in the use of early learning. There are more parents in the workforce and more children in formal care than ever before.
Low pay and poor conditions have led to major problems with attracting and retaining the skilled workforce we need to deliver early learning and care services.
The state governments’ promises are significant. They follow the new federal Labor government’s promise to investigate how to introduce universal high-quality childcare.
But a lot of work needs to be done for Australia’s early childhood sector to live up to the promises being made by governments.
These services use a subsidy-based funding model where providers set their price and charge parents a fee.
The federal government supports the cost through a subsidy, based on family income and paid directly to the childcare service.
A major part of the NSW and Victorian government announcements is an expansion of preschool programs.
Whereas childcare can cater for children aged 0 to 5 years, preschool is more focused on the year or two years before school. Preschool involves structured play-based learning in a range of settings. These include schools, standalone centres and, increasingly, alongside childcare services in centre-based day care.
By expanding access to preschools, the state governments are offering to create more places, particularly for children aged 3 to 5.
Like the school sector, they will use a direct funding model. This is where governments pay a pre-determined amount directly to a centre based on enrolments.
The NSW and Victorian government also announced measures focusing on the supply-side of childcare.
The Victorian government is promising to establish 50 government-operated childcare centres, bucking a trend of relying on non-government providers to deliver childcare.
NSW will create a fund to support an increase of 47,000 childcare places at non-government providers.
The current early childhood system has strengths, but many weaknesses too.
The total amount of subsidies provided is large – about A$8.5 billion per year. But so is the cost to parents. Estimates based on federal government data suggest the current average out-of-pocket cost for the first child in centre-based day care is A$5,000 per year.
Access is another big issue. Recent Mitchell Institute research highlights the extent of the problem of “childcare deserts”. These are areas where there are more than three children vying for every available place.
About 35% of Australians live in a childcare desert. And 1.1 million Australians do not have access to a childcare centre at all.
Unlike the school system, governments do not have an obligation to provide access to childcare. Instead, providers choose where to operate. Price plays a central role in the system’s design, and weak or unstable demand means it can be too risky to operate in certain locations.
Providers can be encouraged to go where there is more demand and where they can charge more.
Finding the workforce to enable increased supply will be a further challenge to the proposed expansion. The sector is experiencing record workforce shortages.
A high-quality workforce is a major component of a quality system. Attracting skilled workers and retaining them will be very important.
Behind the flurry of announcements are long-term demographic shifts. The proportion of children in formal childcare has increased by 75% since 1996. About 66% of three-year-olds were in a subsidised service in the July 2021 quarter. Nearly 90% of eligible children were enrolled in a preschool program in the year before they started school.
If home is where we start from, some form of early learning is where most children will end up next.
Making sure that families are supported in a way that meets their needs and matches a child’s stage of development is vitally important.
The early childhood sector is only part of the response. Meeting the needs of families and children also requires reform of parental leave, maternal and child health services, and other wraparound services.
The announcements made by the federal, NSW and Victorian governments set the scene for the next stage of reform in the early childhood sector.
Designing a system that delivers affordable, accessible, high-quality early childhood education and care will require a lot more work, and a lot more resources than what has just been announced.
Peter Hurley works for the Mitchell Institute who receive funding from Minderoo’s Thrive By Five to undertake research into early childhood education and care.
The final buttons to electronically distribute preferences for the Senate were pressed in NSW, Victoria and Western Australia on Monday. I wrote about the distribution of preferences in Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania on Saturday, and the climate activist’s David Pocock’s ACT Senate victory on Tuesday.
All states have 12 senators, with six up for election at half-Senate elections. A quota is one-seventh of the vote, or 14.3%. State senators are elected for six-year terms beginning July 1, barring a double dissolution.
Final primary votes in WA were Labor 2.42 quotas, the Liberals 2.22, the Greens 1.00, One Nation 0.24, Legalise Cannabis 0.24, the Christians 0.15 and UAP 0.15. The outcome was three Labor, two Liberals and one Green, with Labor gaining from the Liberals.
This was a crucial victory for Labor, because it means Labor, the Greens and Pocock will have 39 of the 76 senators, enough to pass legislation opposed by the Coalition.
The preference distribution shows that One Nation was well ahead of the third Liberal when the Liberals were excluded: 0.71 quotas for Labor’s third candidate, Fatima Payman, 0.61 One Nation and 0.46 Liberals.
Had Liberal preferences heavily favoured One Nation, Payman would have lost, but non-exhausting Liberals were about 50-50, with Payman defeating One Nation by 0.85 to 0.75 quotas.
In Victoria, final primary votes were Coalition 2.26 quotas, Labor 2.20, the Greens 0.97, UAP 0.28, Legalise Cannabis 0.21 and One Nation 0.20. Two Coalition, two Labor and one Green were elected, with the UAP’s Ralph Babet defeating the Coalition’s Greg Mirabella for the final seat to gain this seat from the Coalition.
ABC election analyst Antony Green said Babet led One Nation by 0.44 quotas to 0.40 when One Nation was excluded, and gained over 50% of their preferences. Had Mirabella beaten Labor into third, he may have benefited from Labor preferences.
But he trailed Labor by 0.50 quotas to 0.55 with Babet on 0.64. Babet extended his lead on Mirabella’s preferences to win by 0.83 quotas to 0.69 for Labor.
Final primary votes in NSW were 2.57 quotas for the Coalition, 2.13 Labor, 0.80 Greens, 0.29 One Nation and 0.24 UAP. Three Coalition, two Labor and one Green were elected. This was a Greens gain from Labor.
Analyst Kevin Bonham said the third Liberal, Jim Molan, defeated One Nation by 2.4%, down from a 4.0% primary vote gap.
Overall Senate results
The outcome of this half-Senate election is 15 Coalition out of 40 (down three including a gain from a defector), 15 Labor (steady), six Greens (up three), one One Nation (steady), one Jacqui Lambie Network (JLN) (up one), one UAP (up one) and one Pocock (up one). The defector from the Coalition in the NT and two Centre Alliance in SA (one a defector) all lost their seats.
Other than the states listed above, the JLN gained from the Liberals in Tasmania, the Greens gained from the LNP in Queensland, the Liberals and Greens gained from two Centre Alliance in SA, David Pocock gained from the Liberals in the ACT and the NT Country Liberals gained from a defector.
The overall Senate is 32 Coalition out of 76, 26 Labor, 12 Greens, two One Nation, two JLN, one UAP and one Pocock. On legislation opposed by the Coalition, Labor will need the Greens and one of the six Others, most likely Pocock or the JLN.
It’s the highest Senate representation for the Greens, reflecting their wins in all states at the last two half-Senate elections.
The table below shows the results for this election by state and nationally. ONP is One Nation and Others are UAP in Victoria and Pocock in the ACT.
2022 Senate results.
The JLN won one seat on just 0.2% of the national vote. They only contested Tasmania, which is easily the least populous Australian state, but all states have 12 senators.
There are many Other parties, but their voters don’t usually like each other, so they struggle to win seats. Left-wing Others prefer Labor and the Greens ahead of right-wing Others, and right-wing Others prefer the Coalition and One Nation.
Senate primary vote swings were different from House of Representatives swings
Antony Green has a table of the final national Senate vote. The Coalition won 34.2% (down 3.8% since 2019), Labor 30.1% (up 1.3%), the Greens 12.7% (up 2.5%), One Nation 4.3% (down 1.1%), UAP 3.5% (up 1.1%) and Legalise Cannabis 3.3% (up 1.5%).
House of Representatives national votes were 35.7% Coalition (down 5.7%), 32.6% Labor (down 0.8%), 12.2% Greens (up 1.8%), 5.0% One Nation (up 1.9%), 4.1% UAP (up 0.7%) and 5.3% independents (up 1.9%).
The reason for the swing to One Nation in the House, but a swing against in the Senate was that One Nation contested 149 of the 151 house seats, up from 59 in 2019. In the Senate, One Nation contested all states, as they had in 2019. So the Senate swing is a better guide to One Nation’s overall support.
As One Nation is a right-wing party, they took votes away from the Coalition by contesting almost every House seat. Labor’s House vote was down due to the teal independents, who were not factors in the Senate apart from Pocock in the ACT.
Senators up at next half-Senate election
These are the senators who will be up for election if the next election is a normal half-Senate election. That election would need to be held by May 2025.
senators up.
The four ACT and NT senators only have three year terms, while the state senators up are the ones who were elected in 2019. In every state except Tasmania, the Coalition will be defending three seats. Another bad election for the Coalition would be costly in the Senate.
The Greens will be defending their seats in every state, while Pocock will be defending his ACT Senate seat.
LNP easily holds Callide at Queensland state byelection
At Saturday’s Queensland state byelection for Callide, the LNP crushed Labor by 71.4-28.6, a 5.6% swing to the LNP since the 2020 state election. Primary votes were 49.8% LNP (down 7.4%), 19.6% Labor (down 6.1%), 14.4% One Nation (did not contest previously) and 9.8% Katter’s Australian Party (up 1.4%). The Greens did not contest the byelection.
This byelection was caused by the resignation of LNP member Colin Boyce to contest the federal seat of Flynn, which he won.
Macron’s coalition loses majority in French legislative elections
I covered Sunday’s French legislative elections for The Poll Bludger. President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble coalition lost its majority, and will probably depend on the conservative alliance to pass legislation. Both the left and the far-right made big gains.
Also covered: two Conservative-held UK byelections that occur this Thursday, and US President Joe Biden’s ratings are now worse than Donald Trump’s at this point in both their presidencies.
Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joanna Mendelssohn, Principal Fellow (Hon), Victorian College of the Arts, University of Melbourne. Editor in Chief, Design and Art of Australia Online, The University of Melbourne
Zan Wimberley/Ngununggula
Review: Land Abounds, Ngununggula
Ngununggula (pronounced Nun-uhn-goola), in the Southern Highlands of New South Wales, at first appears to be the most contradictory of contemporary art spaces. The reconfigured dairy is a part of Retford Park, the grand estate bequeathed by James Fairfax to the National Trust.
The gallery, designed by Brian Zulaikha, places the new so that it sits gracefully with the old.
The entrance pavilion shows Quandamooka artist Megan Cope who worked with the local Aboriginal community to create an installation to celebrate their language and culture.
Director Megan Monte aims to embed connections between land, place and people into all Ngununggula’s activities. These are not limited to art. People come for Yoga and Tai Chi classes, and stay for coffee and art. Children are welcome both as participants in Saturday art classes and to visit on school excursions.
Local artist Ben Quilty was involved in the considerable networking and fundraising to get a gallery of this scale built. One of his original motivations was realising his children had to travel to Canberra or Sydney to see art exhibitions.
The exhibition program ranges from a survey of the local artist John Olsen, to the intellectual and emotional challenge of the current exhibition, Land Abounds.
A place for new and old art
James Fairfax is rightly remembered as the visionary chair of John Fairfax & Sons, the man who presided over The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The National Times and the Australian Financial Review when they published some of the best journalism this country has seen.
In 2011, Fairfax commissioned a heritage assessment of Retford Park, originally built as the country estate of Samuel Hordern. After he had bought it in 1964, Fairfax had restored the house and landscaped the gardens, but paid no attention to the dairy.
The gallery is housed in an old dairy. Tamara Dean/Ngununggula
For over 30 years local residents had been agitating for a regional gallery, a place to show new art, as well as old.
Local artist Ben Quilty may be best known for his art, but he has another talent – networking. He knows how connections between people work, and with a disarming smile, can convince people of the reasonable nature of his vision.
The National Trust was persuaded the old dairy and veterinary clinic, at risk of deterioration, was the ideal site for a functioning art gallery. The local Wingecarribee Shire Council and the state government were persuaded to join the partnership. The distinguished heritage architects Tonkin Zulaikha Greer undertook a feasibility study to show all was possible.Private donors, including the James Fairfax Foundation, completed the picture.
Two artist brothers: Abdul Abdullah and Abdul-Rahman Abdullah, living on opposite sides of the country, have bounced their work against that of one of their most admired artists, Tracey Moffatt, in particular the movie montages she made in conjunction with Gary Hillberg.
Abdul-Rahman has described the exhibition as “an ongoing conversation between the practices of my brother and I, brought to bear on the enduring legacy of Tracey Moffatt.”
They see their work as being profoundly influenced by the way she elegantly confronts the big questions of race and cultural difference mainstream society prefers to ignore.
Abdul Abdullah has said, “I have felt that my entire practice was influenced by seeing her work Other at the 2011 Singapore Biennale.”
The exhibition sees the work of Abdul Abdullah and Abdul-Rahman Abdullah in conversation with the art of Tracey Moffatt. Zan Wimberley/Ngununggula
The brothers first met Moffatt in 2014, participating in her work Art Calls, and as Abdul Abdullah describes it, they “have been friends ever since”.
Visitors to the exhibition can see video conversations with the brothers, next to a screening of Moffatt’s Doomed (2007), reworking catastrophe.
The sense of unease is accelerated in Abdul-Rahman’s The Dogs, where a pack of black carved animals appear to race toward the viewer, teeth bared, their savagery emphasised by the glittering chandeliers that hang above them, telling the viewer to go away.
Although the Abdullah brothers are the seventh generation of their family to be Australians, their Muslim faith and names continue place them as perpetual outsiders.
There is a sense of unease throughout the works on display. Zan Wimberley/Ngununggula
Abdul-Rahman Abdullah’s carved animals have a frightening reality. His Dead Horse lying on the hard gallery floor, evokes pity for its state. The artist sees its many possibilities:
A horse is many things; a trophy, a companion, a resource.
A dead horse is many things; a tragic failure, a half tonne of pet food, a senseless repetition.
The horse’s isolation is emphasised by being placed in front Abdul Abdullah’s epic work, Legacy assets, a ten metres long painted panorama of the pastoral ideal. This classic landscape of the Southern Highlands, fields and trees with a river running through it, is countered by the stark white printing of the artist’s message:
WHAT WOULD OUR PUBLIC COLLECTIONS LOOK LIKE IF WE DIVESTED THEM OF SEX PESTS AND PAEDOPHILES?
There is no comfort here. Abdullah has long been concerned that “the projection of genius on deeply flawed individuals was used to justify and obfuscate abhorrent behaviour”.
This is a painting to make us ask whether the aesthetic ends ever justify the means. Can the price of beauty be too high? Is the language of art a “language of entitlement”?
On the opposite wall Tracey Moffatt screens Other (2009), wittily mocking the exploitation of people of colour in popular American cinema.
The name Ngununggula, in the language of the local Gundungurra people, translates as “belonging”. It works.
The signing of a security agreement between Solomon Islands and China in April 2022 brought geopolitical competition and militarisation in the Pacific to the fore of public discussion.
Australian policymakers and the public are concerned about the potential for a Chinese military base in the Pacific region. They harbour wider concerns that China’s influence is becoming sharper and more destructive.
At a time of intensifying geostrategic competition, Australia may feel pressure to take a short-term and transactional approach towards the Pacific. Such crisis thinking would be unnecessary and counterproductive.
Australia should frame its relationship with the Pacific in terms of long-term, generational partnership. It should be responsive to the Pacific’s priorities for development with a clear eye on a shared, long-term future.
The Pacific will always be of great strategic significance for Australia. Peace and stability in Pacific island countries goes to the heart of Australia’s security, prosperity and national interest.
This means Australia’s interest in the region, and the attention it pays to it, should remain clear, consistent and coherent, irrespective of whether there are crises or not. Genuine, consistent Australian engagement should address each Pacific island country’s unique needs through both bilateral and regional Pacific-led initiatives.
There is a danger that a focus on China could overtake other priorities. This would undermine trust and lead to Australia’s diplomatic intentions not always being well-received. If Australia privileges its own institutional requirements and solutions above local agency and solutions, it can feed negative perceptions about Australia’s intent.
Foreign Minister Penny Wong has spent much time in the Pacific since Labor won office. AAP/AP/Department of Foreign Affairs
When Pacific leaders look at regional security they have an expanded view, which includes climate change, human security, gender equality, environmental and resource security, transnational crime and cybersecurity. This reflects insecurity in the Pacific at multiple levels:
globally, as a warming planet presents ecological and civilisational threats
regionally, as players and relationships change
nationally, as countries respond to the effects of COVID-19, natural disasters, illegal fishing, transnational crime and other threats, compounded by gender inequality
locally, where community leaders and security agencies struggle to control violence and conflicts in several countries. In some areas, law and order challenges and the proliferation of firearms mean the risks to individual safety and tribal and political violence are extremely real.
These shared challenges and mutual threats require the long-term attention of Australia and Pacific island countries. We need to move beyond paying lip service to each others’ security concerns and develop a common security framework that responds to the full set of peace and security challenges in the Pacific. This requires deepening relationships and making sure shared concerns are not lost along the way.
The good news is there are strong foundations to work on in Australia-Pacific co-operation. Australia has security co-operation arrangements with most Pacific Island states. These include police-to-police co-operation, defence capacity-building and joint military exercises.
There are development programs designed to address drivers of fragility such as inequality and inclusive economic growth. There has been co-operation on climate science, sustainable fisheries and preserving maritime boundaries in the face of sea-level rise. Australia has goodwill in the region to draw on.
There is a risk that Australia’s concerns about geopolitical change lead it to overstate differences with Pacific island countries. There will always be areas where views and interests align, and others where they do not.
Australia needs to envisage Pacific island countries as a network of interaction, trade, exchange, communication and influence reaching across much of the Pacific Ocean. Strong relationships are not made up only of defence and security ties, and do not come into play only in situations of threat. They are the product of long-term, consistent and multifaceted engagement, genuine partnership with and respect for countries that are equally sovereign, and exchange that takes seriously all parties’ priorities, concerns and values.
The opportunity exists for a rhetorical reset framing Australia as a generational partner for Pacific societies. Faced with a challenge to its profile and influence, Australia should pursue a long-term approach. The focus should be on economic integration, reciprocity and sustained commitment to generational progress.
Australians should accept that Pacific island countries will engage with other countries, and work towards bridging the gaps in our defence, development and diplomatic relationships with the region.
Melissa Conley Tyler is Program Lead at the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D). This research is based on a report “What does it look like for Australia to be a Partner in Climate Leadership in Southeast Asia?” funded by the Australian Civil-Military Centre. Thanks to all those involved in consultations to produce this report.
Social housing has become extremely difficult to access; in 2021 around 160,000 households were on the waiting list.
To have any chance of getting a social housing spot in a reasonable time frame, applicants must be on the priority waiting list; people on the general waiting list may never get social housing.
However, to get on the priority list, applicants need to
show they have tried to find private rental accommodation.
In short, they have to prove they are massively disadvantaged.
To find out more, we interviewed 43 people involved in the social housing application process in NSW, Tasmania and Queensland. This included assessment workers, support workers and government staff.
Our study, published in the journal Housing, Theory and Society, found an applicant’s chances of getting on the priority waiting list are much greater if they have help from advocates who know what arguments to make and how.
Success can depend on whether advocates can invest a significant amount of emotional effort to help the applicant and connect them to professionals who can track down supporting documentation.
The application form for social housing is demanding.
In NSW it requires answering 31 questions and – depending on the applicant’s situation – up to 18 supporting documents.
Completing the form optimally requires a fair amount of literacy and “cultural capital” – things such as presenting and speaking “well” or being able to draw on the benefits of a good education.
Claire (all names used are pseudonyms), a NSW community housing provider worker, said even understanding the application form is challenging:
I think sometimes it’s the interpretation of what is actually required. What are they asking in this question? And if you don’t have the context of why that question is being asked, sometimes it can be very difficult to know how much information to put [in]. Do I just skip it or […] what do I do with that [question], or what does that even mean?
Jess, an assessment team manager in Tasmania, said:
… [the] majority would need assistance and do get help from supports, family and advocates, as it is onerous. Also literacy, language interpretation would be an issue, especially for lower socio-economic cohorts.
James, an assessment worker in NSW, said some applicants simply abandon the process:
It’s really an overwhelming process […] Sometimes people will say, “You know […] this is too much. Forget about it.”
Marie, a Queensland homelessness worker, said:
It’s more common that they won’t know how to do the process, and so I’ll go through it with them. I assist them with identifying well-being barriers, complete the application with them, get it, and then when it’s approved, also do community housing applications with them if they wish.
The challenge of gathering ‘evidence’
Producing evidence of clients’ vulnerabilities is potentially challenging.
Karim, a homelessness support worker in Queensland, said:
So, getting onto the wait list, that is a battle in itself, right? [Part of that is] getting people document ready […] So, say someone is on the streets, we know they are very, very unwell, but they don’t have documents to prove that. We have done the housing application, it’s gone to department of housing and they’re waiting for further information, because this person’s checked that they have chronic health issues. So [the department] want medical documents or confidential medical report from the GP. This person does not have a GP. What do we do? We try and link them in with the GP, take them there […]
Lots of people, their stuff’s stolen. They’re more worried about where the next meal is coming from instead of worrying about IDs. So getting ID documents, medical documents to go along with the housing application, to get it approved, is the first battle.
Susan, a women’s refuge worker in Sydney, said:
Every question has […] evidence requirements […] and they have to gather all of that and you know obviously just gathering all of that is a challenge […] But that’s definitely something that we support them with; to get all the support letters and stuff in order.
In Queensland and NSW, an applicant who needs social housing because they are fleeing domestic violence needs to provide substantiation.
Susan told us:
The types of documents people would have to collect for this question are copies of AVOs (apprehended violence orders), police event numbers, doctor reports (GP or psychiatrist), support letters from social services. So, as you can imagine, these are quite onerous as many people don’t report to police or perhaps their doctor doesn’t record the injuries as resulting from violence. On top of that, if they’ve just experienced violence they might not feel like running around.
To get on the priority list, applicants need to be in danger of becoming homeless. Shutterstock
Emotional capital: care, empathy and compassion
Working with vulnerable people requires empathy and compassion.
Avril, an assessment worker in Tasmania, said:
So much of it is about rapport. These people who are often really sick of systems, really sick of them and they don’t want to divulge their entire life to someone that they’ve just met once. They don’t want to sit still in a small room for an hour and a half.
What we’ve found is that by having Pat, she’s our specialist rough sleeper front door worker, [and] is based in services that they know and frequent. She’s known to them and they do tend to [open up] bit by bit.
Jill, an ex-manager in a community housing provider in NSW, explained:
Also refugees or people who are trauma, torture survivors, DFV (domestic and family violence) survivors […] experience additional layers and complexities in applying.
Whilst the system aims to only ask a client to tell their story once and not multiple times, this is not always possible. So it adds further challenges to these applicants and brings up the trauma again, especially if not handled well by untrained staff.
Applying for social housing is fraught, onerous and competitive; applicants have to “prove” their vulnerability is greater than others.
Assistance from skilled advocates clearly helps get you on the priority wait list, which begs the question: what hope do others have?
Alan Morris has received funding from the ARC. This story is part of The Conversation’s Breaking the Cycle series, which is about escaping cycles of disadvantage. It is supported by a philanthropic grant from the Paul Ramsay Foundation.
Andrew Clarke receives funding from the Australian Research Council.
Cameron Parsell receives funding from the ARC
Catherine Robinson receives funding from the ARC and would like to acknowledge the particular contribution of Anglicare Tasmania, a partner organisation supporting this research.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sarah Hellewell, Research Fellow, Faculty of Health Sciences, Curtin University, and The Perron Institute for Neurological and Translational Science, Curtin University
Understanding the facial expressions of others is an important development stage. It helps us learn non-verbal communication and to recognise when someone is angry or scared and primes us to react to threats or show empathy for others’ feelings. A growing body of evidence suggests our neighbourhood environment shapes this response in children’s brains in different ways, depending on the dynamics of the neighbourhood itself.
The amygdala is an important brain structure for recognising and reacting to facial expressions. It is responsible for our “fight or flight” response and is sensitive to emotional facial expressions, especially those related to threats.
While this primitive alert system is useful to keep us safe, the amygdala can’t differentiate between real threats and emotions like stress, aggression, anger or fear. This means we often have the same “fight or flight” response to different situations.
A recent study examined the link between neighbourhood disadvantage and amygdala reactivity to emotional faces in kids. The researchers wanted to understand whether positive or negative social aspects of the neighbourhood could influence amygdala reactivity in childhood.
The right and left amygdala drive responses to emotional stimuli, real or imagined. Shutterstock
The amygdala is particularly responsive to our environment, especially as children when our brains are developing.
Kids exposed to extreme trauma growing up – such as living in a warzone or experiencing physical or emotional abuse – show altered brain pathways for fear and anger processing, with new brain connections allowing faster and more intense emotional responses. This means that kids may be more “on guard” and quick to react to negative emotions.
People who grow up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods may have an enlarged amygdala, which is related to increased fearfulness.
They are more likely to show heightened sensitivity to emotional stimuli. Neighbourhood disadvantage and amygdala reactivity are also linked to antisocial child and youth behaviours.
What is less known is how the environment and social processes of neighbourhoods can shape the developing brain, for better or worse. Positive social processes of neighbourhoods might include shared beliefs about what behaviour is appropriate, community support and trust, and willingness of neighbours to intervene for the common good.
To understand how neighbourhood environments could influence brains, researchers examined 700 children from different neighbourhoods in Michigan, United States. To get accurate information about neighbourhoods, they used census information to rate neighbourhood disadvantage based on employment rates, education, home ownership, and income.
Researchers then used birth records to locate families with twins. Twins are helpful for this kind of research because they live in the same environment so should have the same brain responses. The study included twin families living above and below the poverty line to specifically examine effects of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
Twins underwent task-based Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans. They were shown faces for two seconds and matched faces based on whether they were angry, fearful, happy, or neutral (no expression). The MRI scans detected reactivity of the amygdala in their scans in real-time when viewing the faces.
The study also included adults from the same neighbourhoods as the twins. These adult neighbours provided an independent rating of the neighbourhood. There were about four neighbours to each twin family.
Neighbours filled out questionnaires about social processes such as community support (e.g. how willing people are to help their neighbours); informal social order (e.g. what someone in the neighbourhood might do if a child was left home alone at night); and behavioural norms (e.g. how people in the neighbourhood might intervene if a child was doing something dangerous, even if it was not their child).
Neighbourhood disadvantage, over-active brains
The study found experiences of neighbourhood disadvantage resulted in over-activity of the right amygdala, with kids from these neighbourhoods being more reactive to facial expressions of anger and fear.
Likewise, if neighbours scored the neighbourhood social processes low and thought neighbours did not look out for one another, kids from these neighbourhoods were more likely to have a highly reactive amygdala response to emotional faces.
However, researchers also found positive neighbourhood social processes could mediate, or lessen, the relationship between neighbourhood disadvantage and amygdala reactivity.
When neighbours said the neighbourhood worked together cooperatively and was supportive – there was no effect of neighbourhood adversity on amygdala reactivity. The kids from these neighbourhoods had the same response to expressions of anger and fear as kids from less disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
In communities where neighbours report strong social support and interpersonal connections, researchers found less effect on brain reactivity. Shutterstock
Neighbourhood environments and social connections are critically important for shaping emotional recognition in kid’s brains. This influence can be positive or negative, depending on the social dynamics of the neighbourhood.
This fresh research shows no matter how disadvantaged a neighbourhood is, the actions, attitudes and behaviour of the people who live there are highly important influences on how growing children understand and process threats around them.
Growing up in a positive and connected neighbourhood where people look out for one another and act in the best interests of the community is one of the best things we can do to give our kids a stable start in life.
This story is part of The Conversation’s Breaking the Cycle series, which is about escaping cycles of disadvantage. It is supported by a philanthropic grant from the Paul Ramsay Foundation.
It’s that time of year again, when the humpback highway is about to hit peak blubber to blubber as humpback whales migrate up Australia’s east and west coasts from Antarctic waters.
They’re headed to the whale disco – warm breeding waters where males will sing their whale song to attract female company, and pregnant females will birth their calves.
Already this season we’ve seen dolphins dancing with whales, dwarf minke whales with their calves, killer whales and a re-sighting of Curly, the humpback with an unusual curved tail. That’s only just the beginning.
Curly the humpback whale with the unique tail. Photo: Dr Vanessa Pirotta.
We expect more than 40,000 humpback whales to make this annual journey. I’ll be joining the ABC for their special tonight, Southern Ocean Live, to explore the science around this glorious migration first hand.
But as excitement for the whale season builds, there’s just one whale on the minds of many: the famous white humpback whale named Migaloo.
Who is Migaloo?
Migaloo is by far one of the world’s most recognisable whales, because he is completely white. Thanks to genetic sampling of Migaloo’s skin, scientists have identified that he’s male, and his albino appearance is a result of a variation in the gene responsible for the colour of his skin.
Simply by looking different, Migaloo has become an icon within Australia’s east coast humpback whale population. Indeed, Migaloo has his own Twitter account with over 10,000 followers, and website where fans can lodge sightings and learn more about humpback whales.
Migaloo is an all white humpback whale. Jodie Lowe, Author provided
He was first discovered in 1991 off Byron Bay, Australia, and has since played hide and seek for many years, with many not knowing where or when he’ll show up next. He’s even surprised Kiwi fans by showing up in New Zealand waters.
With the last official sighting two years ago, the time has once again come for us to ask: where is Migaloo?
Already this year there have been false sightings, such as a near all white whale spotted off New South Wales. To make things more confusing, regular-looking humpbacks can trick whale watchers when they flip upside down, due to their white bellies.
Not Migaloo: a northward migrating whale upside down photographed during whale snot drone collection, Sydney, Australia. Macquarie University/Heliguy Scientific, Scientific Licence 101743, Author provided
Migaloo as a flagship whale
The annual search for Migaloo connects people with the ocean during the colder months, and is an opportunity to learn more about the important ecological role whales play in the sea.
Migaloo’s popularity has also help drive modern marine citizen science. For example, the Cape Solander Whale Migration study records sightings of Migaloo as part of their 20 year data set. His presence was always a highlight for citizen scientists in the team.
Migaloo also represents the connection whales play between two extreme environments: the Antarctic and the tropics, both of which are vulnerable to climate change.
Humpback whales are the connection between two extreme environments: Antarctica and the tropics. Dr Vanessa Pirotta, Author provided
Earlier this year humpbacks were removed from Australia’s list of threatened species, as populations bounced back significantly after whaling ceased. But climate change poses a new threat, with a paper this year suggesting rising sea surface temperatures may make humpback whale breeding areas too warm.
Other changes to the ocean – such as ocean currents and the distribution of prey – may change where whales are found are when they migrate.
In Australia, for example, we’re already seeing many whales dine out on their migration south. Humpback whales are known to primarily feed once they’re back in Antarctic waters, so scientists are closely watching any new feeding areas off Australia.
Feeding in Australian waters might even become an annual event, and may mean southern NSW waters become an area of importance for migrating humpback whales. This behaviour encourages us to ask more about what’s going on below the surface, and the potential changes in the broader marine ecosystem we just don’t yet know about.
Humpback whales feed on krill in the Southern Ocean, before they travel northwards to breed. Shutterstock
So where is he now? Could he be dead?
Migaloo’s presence – or lack thereof – highlights the variations in whale migration. Some whales may choose to migrate early or late, or even elsewhere such as in New Zealand. Others might choose not to migrate at all and remain in the Southern Ocean.
Migaloo’s presence may be driven by several factors. This includes social circumstances, such as interactions with other whales (including moving between different pods) or biological needs (the desire to head north the reproduce).
Environmental conditions, such as currents and water temperature, may also impact when and where Migaloo chooses to swim.
Unfortunately, Migaloo and other whales do face a number of human-caused threats in the ocean every day, such as entanglement in fishing gear or collisions with ships. They also face natural threats, such as predation by killer whales.
Fortunately, Migaloo’s sighting history has shown us he can turn up when we least expect it, or not. So, there’s still hope we might see him yet. After all, being in his mid 30s, he’s likely in the prime of his whale life.
How to get involved
The continuing search for Migaloo shows how marine citizen science has become a powerful way to learn about wildlife. Many eyes make science work, as a network of citizen scientists can cover vast areas scientists can’t alone.
A team of 200 citizen science scuba divers, for example, surveyed 2,406 ocean sites in 44 countries over a decade to track how warming oceans impact marine life. They found fish may expand their habitat, pushing out other sea creatures.
But participating in marine citizen science is often as easy as recording wildlife observations on your phone next time you’re at the beach. Opportunities include Happy Whale, RedMap, Wild Sydney Harbour and INaturalist.
It’s peak season for whale watching in Australia. Shutterstock
This year’s annual migration will last until October or November, so here’s hoping we’ll see Migaloo once again. The power of this unique whale to generate discussion, despite not being seen for years, is true testament to just how curious we are about the mysteries of the deep.
Vanessa Pirotta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Australia’s east coast energy market has been on a rocky road for the past few weeks. It begs the question: how could the market change to avoid the next crisis?
To date, discussion has largely focused on the need to generate more energy. But there’s another way to ease strain on the system – by using less energy.
Last week, New South Wales residents were asked to find safe ways to consume less power during the evening peak, such as not running dishwashers until after they went to bed. Such actions, when deployed at scale, can make a big difference to shoring up short-term supplies.
But Australia has only scratched the surface of what’s possible when it comes to managing energy demand. As the transition away from fossil fuels continues, we should scrutinise every bit of electricity consumption to make sure it’s needed. It’s not about going without, but making the best use of what’s available.
Demand management is not about going without energy, but doing more with what we have. Jono Searle/AAP
Getting smart about energy use
Asking people to reduce electricity use is known in energy circles as “demand management”.
Sometimes it involves paying consumers to use less electricity. That’s because offering financial rewards is far cheaper than blackouts or bringing more emergency reserve supply onto the market.
The current system of demand management is currently geared towards major energy consumers, such as industrial plants. AEMO has severalmechanisms through which it pays big energy users to power down when the system is struggling.
But more can be done to encourage households to reduce their electricity demand.
Some energy retailers offer incentives to encourage households to reduce their use at given times. It might mean people turning down the heater, using appliances outside peak times or tapping into rooftop solar power stored in home batteries instead of taking power from the grid.
Householders signed up to the scheme are sent a text message asking them to propose a reduction in energy use ahead of an expected supply shortage. Credits are paid if the household achieves the reduction.
Reducing household electricity demand will become easier as home appliances become increasingly internet-enabled and remotely controlled. This allows people to, for example, turn off a home appliance while they’re at work.
In future, it could even allow people to opt into a scheme where a retailer temporarily turns off appliances in thousands of homes when they’re unoccupied.
Currently, only a small number of households take part in schemes – but retailers see much greater potential. For instance, over the next four years Origin Energy proposes to scale up their scheme to 2,000 megawatts – capacity similar to a large power station such as Loy Yang A in Victoria.
There’s huge potential to better manage household energy demand. Shutterstock
Net-zero and beyond
There are many ways to improve the way we currently manage demand – and many of them can lead to lower bills for consumers.
Time-of-use tariffs, which offer cheaper electricity outside peak times, are a key potential measure. Some homes already use the lower overnight electricity rates to heat their hot water. But big energy users have traditionally made most use of these incentives.
As householders increasingly use smart meters – devices that digitally measure energy use – opting into these tariffs will become easier.
Appliances, lighting and heating connected to the internet can dramatically increase the broader power of demand management. Businesses could offer services to, for instance, monitor the wholesale electricity market and remotely turn on electric hot water heaters when prices are cheapest.
Managing energy demand is crucial for the longer-term transition to net-zero emissions. As sectors such as transport and industry become electrified or move to green hydrogen (produced by renewable energy), new supply challenges will emerge.
For heavy industry, reduced energy use – as part of a broader shift away from fossil fuels – will reduce business costs and increase competitiveness. A new report, which we contributed to, shows a coordinated transition could also lead to wider benefits such as thousands of new jobs and cuts to greenhouse gas emissions.
The challenge for AEMO is to integrate renewable energy generation and storage, and a far greater use of demand management, into its next plan for the national electricity market.
And much can be done at a household level. Millions of Australian homes are costly to heat or cool because they’re poorly insulated and designed. All levels of government could support the proposed revision of the National Construction Code to increase energy performance standards.
Proposed standards for new homes could improve household energy efficiency. Russell Freeman/AAP
Looking ahead
Managing demand makes sense well beyond a crisis. Doing it well will go a long way to creating the clean, affordable and reliable energy system Australians need.
The potential for demand management only grows as renewable energy makes the electricity system more decentralised, and technology enables consumers to participate more actively.
The Energy Security Board is taking the right steps by working on issues such as flexible demand and consumer technology choices. The next test is how well the nation’s energy ministers embrace the power of managing energy demand.
Anna Malos is part of Climateworks Centre which receives funding from philanthropy and project-specific financial support from a range of private and public entities including federal, state and local government and private sector organisations and international and local non-profit organisations. Climateworks Centre works within Monash University’s Sustainable Development Institute.
Emi Minghui Gui is part of Climateworks Centre which receives funding from philanthropy and project-specific financial support from a range of private and public entities including federal, state and local government and private sector organisations and international and local non-profit organisations. Climateworks Centre works within Monash University’s Sustainable Development Institute. Emi previously worked for AEMO from 2010-2012.
Australia’s two most populous states, New South Wales and Victoria, have set the target of delivering an extra year of learning for all children before they start school. Billed as “the greatest transformation of early education in a generation”, last Thursday’s announcement follows close on the heels of the new federal government’s legacy vision for childcare, with an extended childcare subsidy to increase access.
These moves are well justified. There is compelling evidence that such investments could lift productivity by increasing parent employment and children’s development gains and improving life chances for the most disadvantaged.
Realising the promise of these gains, however, depends entirely on the availability of a qualified, supported and thriving workforce. We can’t deliver high-quality learning without them. Developing such a workforce must be an urgent priority given Victoria’s target date for the new program is 2025 and NSW’s is 2030.
Not all early education programs deliver on the promise of promoting children’s development and learning. “Cheaper childcare” may enable parent workforce participation. But it is unlikely to deliver the long-term benefits of promoting children’s learning and closing equity gaps.
Quality matters. The first five years of life are a critical period in human brain development. The quality of experiences in these years lays the foundations for lifetime achievement and well-being.
For this reason, research seeks to identify the essential components that go beyond child-minding to delivering high-quality early childhood education and care.
More than two decades of research has shown the interactions between educators and children are the critical element of optimal child learning. Policy-regulated features, such as physical resources and staff qualifications, help support higher-quality learning. Yet they alone are not enough to deliver on the promise of improving children’s life chances and reducing the stark inequities among children starting school, as documented by the 2021 Australian Early Development Census.
For this reason, researchers in this field focus on identifying the qualities of educator-child interactions that best support children’s learning and well-being. Our Australian research has examined the long-term effects of instructional, organisational and emotional qualities of interactions.
Instructional qualities are focused on teaching content and language interactions. Organisational interactions are focused on setting behavioural expectations and maintaining predictability. Emotional interactions are focused on relationships between child and educator, including regard for the child’s perspective.
Analysing data from E4Kids, Australia’s largest study of early childhood education and care quality, the emotional qualities of interactions emerge as the critical factor. Our study published last week in Child Development, tracked 1,128 children across three years of early education to ask how change in instructional, organisational and emotional qualities of educator-child interactions was associated with each child’s rate of learning.
We found instructional and organisational aspects of interaction did not reliably predict child learning. Changes in the emotional environment did predict language development.
Further, in a study for the Queensland government, we linked the qualities of the early learning environment at age four to the subsequent school achievements (maths, science, English, NAPLAN) of the children participating in E4Kids. Again, the emotional quality of interactions was the key predictor of outcomes. We could still see the effects in secondary school.
It all depends on a stable and supported workforce
Emotionally positive early childhood education and care environments require a stable and supported workforce. Globally, there is a shortage of qualified early childhood educators. Australia is no exception.
Our workforce study included a national survey and detailed study of services in metropolitan, regional and remote locations. We found one in five educators intended to leave the sector in the next year. In tracking a cohort of educators, each year one in three left their service. In remote settings the attrition rate was one in two.
This represents a serious loss of relationships for children and their parents. As educators leave, they take with them their depth of knowledge of each child and family.
Our research, and a 2021 survey by the United Workers Union, found those who stay are often stressed. They feel unable to deliver the optimal emotionally supportive environment.
Early childhood workers are paid well below average weekly earnings. Many struggle financially or depend on spouses or family members for financial support to continue in the job they love. Those studying for a degree are often doing so to move to the school sector where pay, conditions and status are better.
Need to boost workforce is urgent
Without significant investment in the workforce, the new early education strategies will lack solid foundations and may well fall short on the promise they offer.
A workforce strategy for the next decade, Shaping Our Future, was published in September 2021. It acknowledges the need for better pay, conditions and professional recognition to grow and sustain the workforce. The strategy also recognises their well-being as important, though it emphasises individualised supports for well-being, not systemic change.
However, the stated strategy to remedy the crisis is to “investigate options” for improving pay and conditions and well-being supports by 2025. That’s when the extra year of preschool learning is due to begin in Victoria. Our research, and the timing of the announced changes, suggests an urgent need to move from investigation to immediate action to stem the exodus of qualified early childhood educators and enable those who stay to thrive.
This article is part of The Conversation’s Breaking the Cycle series, which is supported by a philanthropic grant from the Paul Ramsay Foundation.
Karen Thorpe receives funding from the Australian Research Council as a chief investigator on the Centre of Excellence for Children and Families across the Life Course ( CE200100025) , the Centre of Excellence for the Digital Child (CE200100022) and a current Discovery Project (DP190102981). She has also been funded by the Queensland Government and Commonwealth Departments of Social Services, Education and Health to undertake studies of early child development. This article is part of The Conversation’s Breaking the Cycle series, which is about escaping cycles of disadvantage. The series is supported by a philanthropic grant from the Paul Ramsay Foundation.
Azhar Potia’s research is supported partially by the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course (Project ID CE200100025). He has also received funding from Government departments such as the Queensland Department of Education and the Department of Health, and NGOs such as the Former Origin Greats, Social Ventures Australia and Beyond the Broncos.
Peter Rankin’s research was supported (partially or fully) by the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course (Project ID CE200100025). He has also been funded by the Queensland Government and Commonwealth Departments of Social Services and Education.
Sally Staton has previously received research funding from the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical Research Council, from the Queensland Government Department of Education, and from NGOs including Social Ventures Australia and Early Childhood Australia.
Dr Sandy Houen’s research is partially supported by the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course (project ID CD 200100025) and the Australian Research
Council Centre of Excellence for the Digital Child (project ID CE200100022). She has previously received funding from the Queensland Government Department of Education and Social Ventures Australia.
If you’re building or renovating a home, and frustrated with huge delays, you’re not alone.
Australia’s builders are struggling to find timber. For items such as laminated veneer lumber – used for frames and beams – they’ve reported waiting up to four months. For trusses – used to build walls and roofs – up to nine months.
Fears these shortages could send builders bust have been exaggerated, but the pain of delays and escalating price is real enough for tradies and clients.
There’s no easy fix to this crisis. It has been caused by the confluence of four factors: government stimulus for the building industry; increasing reliance on imported lumber; the pressure placed on global shipping by the pandemic; and the effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the world market.
Government (over)stimulus
If one had to choose a specific date for when the crisis began, it would be June 3 2020 – the day the Morrison government announced its A$688 million Homebuilder scheme.
This scheme provided up to $25,000 towards building a new home or renovating an existing one. State governments also subsequently offered building grants.
There were reasons to fear the pandemic would devastate home construction. The Master Builders Association in 2019 had forecast new-dwelling starts would decline 3.5% in 2020/21. In April 2020, during the initial phase of the COVID panic spiral, it tipped the decline would be 40%.
The following graph shows what actually happened. Approvals for all new dwellings increased more than 25% in 2020-21. Approvals for new houses rose more than 40%.
Obviously there were multiple factors driving these increases. The Reserve Bank of Australia cut interest rates from 0.75% to 0.25% in March, and again in November to 0.1%. Billions of dollars were being pumped into the economy in other ways.
Higher demand, lower supply
Higher housing starts means higher demand for lumber.
Freestanding houses in particular use larges quantities of lumber – softwoods for roof and lightweight framing, hardwoods for joinery and flooring. Carpentry typically represents about 20% of the cost of the average new home.
However, domestic lumber supply in Australia is going the other way. Logging of native forests is in decline while domestic plantation production has plateaued.
The following graphs shows trends in the volume of wood logged from Australia’s native forests or harvested from plantations.
You can see hardwoods (shown in dark green and dark blue) overwhelmingly come from native forests. These volumes have been falling in line with action to conserve what’s left of native forests. Supply will fall further when Queensland and Western Australia end native logging in 2024, and Victoria in 2030.
Softwoods mostly come from commercial plantations. The volume of softwood harvested has increased by about 40% over the past 20 years, but the amount of land plantations has been stable for about a decade.
Minimal new plantations have been established in recent years. Eastern Australia’s 2019-20 bushfires also affected about 130,000 hectares of commercial plantations.
Waiting for costlier imports
This means Australian builders are more reliant on imported timber – at a time most global supply chains are strained and energy prices are driving up transportation costs.
Wood products are typically shipped in containers, which have been in short supply during the pandemic (due to extra demand). If you can actually find a container, the transport cost may still be more than double than before COVID-19.
Another issue is that Russia is a major wood exporter – second to Canada in all sawn-wood exports, but the top exporter of softwood lumber. While a relatively unimportant source for Australia overall, it dominates in specific products such as laminated veneer lumber.
Australia will impose a 35% tariff on “conflict timber” from Russia (and Belarus) in October.
Should Australia do more to become self-sufficient? This is a hard question to answer.
Even if you think yes, bear in mind even the fastest-growing softwood tree takes at least 20 years to grow.
Bringing forward production is complicated. Forestry businesses must forecast demand and lock in production for decades to come. They cannot be expected to respond to short-term crises in the same way as an oil producer or toilet paper manufacturer can.
The hard truth is that the construction industry will have to weather the storm the best it can – likely until at least 2023. By then the home-building boom should be at an end, with higher interest rates likely to slow the pace of housing construction.
Flavio Macau is affiliated with the Australasian Supply Chain Institute (ASCI)
The Reserve Bank of Australia is about to be put under the microscope in the first major review of its performance in at least 30 years, and perhaps forever.
In research published this month in the Economic Record, Australian Labor member of parliament Andrew Leigh and myself analyse how the bank has set interest rates over the past two decades and grade its performance.
To do this we use the RBA‘s own model (called MARTIN) to evaluate how well it has achieved its two key goals of full employment and price stability.
We examine the bank’s performance across three periods:
The global downturn that began in 2001
The global financial crisis that began in 2008
The four pre-pandemic years from 2016 to 2019, in which inflation was below the bank’s 2-3% target band.
Top marks for the first two crises
We find that in each of the first two crises the bank did a good job. In the face of large economic shocks it cut interest rates to save jobs.
Low interest rates make it easier for businesses and households to borrow and spend. From 2001 the rate cuts lowered unemployment from 7% to less than 6%.
During the global financial crisis the bank again aggressively cut interest rates.
The bank’s model suggests that had it not decreased rates unemployment would have climbed to almost 8%. Instead, it fell to 5%, never even climbing as high as 6%.
The mark we assign to the bank for each of these two periods is a solid “A”.
A pre-COVID failure that cost people work
But we find that between 2016 and 2019 the bank dramatically under-performed.
During this period the economy entered a slump. Economic growth sank, wage growth was anaemic and inflation hovered below the bank’s target band.
The bank did cut its cash rate, but not by much, from 1.75% to 0.75%.
This relative inaction meant unemployment was kept higher than was necessary.
Relative to the optimal path identified by the RBA‘s model, we find this cost the equivalent of 270,000 people being out of work for one year.
The high cost of high interest rates
270,000 jobs is a big deal. By way of comparison, Melbourne’s suburban rail loop is estimated to create only 8,000 jobs when construction starts on the first stage, while the national inland rail project is estimated to create around 20,000 jobs. Closing Australia’s border is estimated to have cost 72,000 jobs.
Each of these is a massive public project or decision, but they are dwarfed by the bank’s decision to run the economy to slow over that four year period.
The stance taken by the bank under Governor Philip Lowe during those four years amounts to a substantial error. Such an error warrants a grade of “C-” at best.
Too much concern about home prices?
One explanation for this error might be that the bank didn’t want to boost house prices.
Governor Lowe told a business audience in 2017 that while he would like the economy to grow a bit more,
if we were to try to achieve that through monetary policy that would encourage people to borrow more and it would probably put upward pressure on housing prices. At the moment I don’t think those two things are in the national interest.
More recently he has backed away from the idea, telling the National Press Club in 2022 he did not think the idea of making the bank responsible for home prices made sense.
Using interest rates to restrain house prices is known as “leaning against the wind”. The Reserve Bank’s own researchers have found the costs of leaning against the wind are three to eight times larger than the benefit of avoiding financial crises.
We have been in a very different situation since. During COVID, the bank cut rates further than it once thought possible and helped push unemployment down to a 48-year low of 3.9%. And now it has begun to push rates back up.
But the best way to avoid repeating mistakes is to acknowledge and diagnose them. Hopefully the review can help illuminate where such errors have occurred so that the bank can do better in the future.
Isaac Gross does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Less than a week ago, American singer and rapper Lizzo set a new bar for celebrity apologies. Lizzo re-released her latest single GRRRLS after receiving criticism online, due to the first verse in the song containing an ableist slur.
Fans and disability advocates shared their disappointment and hurt over the lyric. On Twitter and TikTok the use of the term and its history as offensive was discussed and dissected. Lizzo tweeted an apologetic statement three days later, receiving high praise.
A celebrity apology acts as a turning point, influencing if and how fans will continue to support them. Done well, a celebrity apology allows their fans to see behind the constructed persona, understand their motivations and view them as genuine.
From Ariana Grande licking a donut and claiming she “hated America”, and Will Smith’s infamous Oscars slap, to offensive comments and criminal allegations, we want celebrities to show they are sorry. We demand these statements so frequently that Chris Pratt made a “heartfelt apology for whatever it is he would end up accidentally saying”.
So, why was Lizzo’s apology so effective?
Acknowledge the mistake
An apology is made up of two parts, the first being an acknowledgement. Hugh Grant admitting “[he] did a bad thing and there you have it” is widely considered one of the best, as he owned his arrest and affair.
Lizzo’s reads:
“It’s been brought to my attention there is a harmful word in my new song ‘GRRRLS’. Let me make one thing clear: I never want to promote derogatory language.”
She addresses and admits to her mistake and the hurt caused, in a clear and explicit way. The second sentence of her acknowledgement acts to set the record straight ensuring what we knew of her persona to be true: Lizzo champions acceptance and self-love.
Show you’re sorry
The second part of an apology is showing remorse. It indicates the apology is not performative or a box-ticking exercise and communicates genuine regret. For example, Kristen Stewart was “deeply sorry for the hurt and embarrassment [she] caused” over her affair, and Chris Evans “rightfully angered some fans” over his use of offensive language.
Social and political philosopher, Alice MacLachlan argues there are many emotions which can signify remorse. An apology could express “sorrow, shame, or anger […] guilt, sheepish[ness], heartbreak, despair [or] hope”. The emotion conveyed should be suitable to the scandal.
Lizzo shows remorse as empathetic:
“As a fat Black woman in America, I’ve had many hurtful words used against me so I overstand the power words can have (whether intentionally or in my case, unintentionally)”.
Lizzo outlines her motivations were “unintentional”, indicating she was not aware of the words offensive meaning. The lack in knowledge could have been used as an excuse, justification, or a way to avoid blame and responsibility. However Lizzo demonstrated accountability for the hurt she caused fans.
Justifications and excuses are considered a non-apology. Celebrities who use passive and vague language, generate further criticism on top of the scandal. The common phrase, “to anyone who I’ve offended”, implies no remorse and suggests the celebrity does not understand or care about what they are apologising for.
If action does not follow an apology, it can be considered “cheap talk”. Lizzo showcased immediate amends:
I’m proud to say there’s a new version of GRRRLS with a lyric change. This is the result of me listening and taking action.
By re-releasing the single, Lizzo amended her mistake, decreased negative reactions to the original lyric, and maintained her relationship with her fans.
As an influential artist I’m dedicated to being part of the change I’ve been waiting to see in the world.
The reasoning behind her apology aligns with her public values. It appears her intentions were pure, rather than only seeking forgiveness without any growth, learning or making amends.
Finally, Lizzo responded in a timely manner, delivering her apologetic statement three days after offence was caused. Timing an apology correctly and appropriately is a delicate balance. Too soon and the victims have not had enough time to process their hurt, and too late the apology will lose value and meaning.
A good celebrity apology is rare. We are consistently expecting apologies in the hope one day we might see one and this time, Lizzo delivered.
Sarah Scales does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
When it comes to infrastructure planning, there are plenty of promises, especially in times of crisis.
COVID-19 brought with it severe economic impacts and many governments quickly announced major infrastructure stimulus packages alongside legal reforms to fast track delivery.
The promise was that these emergency infrastructure investments would “build back better”, responding to the immediate economic challenges of COVID-19, as well as spur societal transformation.
The possibilities sparked plenty of hope. There was no shortage of public opinion pieces calling for things like a “green recovery” or a reduction in the geographical inequalities in jobs and well-being the pandemic helped reveal.
Transformational possibilities
Our research investigated the substance and the politics of these much vaunted transformational promises in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
Each country had its own high profile crises, as well as existing social, economic, spatial, ecological and intergenerational challenges.
While an increase in infrastructure spending was promoted as a universal solution, the urgent timescale meant there was little focus on the details.
The urgency also limited any public debate and scrutiny of the proposed projects. Questions about their value, their purposes, and what communities would be affected and how, faced little examination.
Before the pandemic, all three countries had similar debates on infrastructure “deficits” and the need to reduce “red tape” from planning and public consultation.
Recognising infrastructure projects can become toxic and lead to electoral backlashes, politicians had also sought to depoliticise aspects of the decision-making process.
Each country established “independent” infrastructure commissions to develop national strategies and advise on priorities. Inevitably perhaps, these commissions confirmed the need for more infrastructure spending and for faster processes.
With the need for emergency response at the forefront, these preexisting arguments for reforms were quickly revived as the pandemic hit. Most of the decision-making power was given to technical experts and politicians.
In New Zealand, the Infrastructure Industry Reference Group was established to help select projects and bidders. Interested parties were given just two weeks to make submissions.
In the UK, Project Speed was set up and led by the Treasury, again with urgency very much to the fore.
Shovel-ready projects were pushed forward as part of COVID-19 related stimulus packages. Getty Images
The usual strategies in an unusual crisis
In the end, the economic impact of the pandemic was comparable to previous crises in terms of, for example, contractions in gross domestic product. The societal impact, on the other hand, was like no other crisis we have seen.
In hindsight, insufficient time was given to understanding how the pandemic was reshaping the way we live.
Profound changes to how work is done, whether working from home, commuting less, or moving out of the major urban centres, ultimately had little influence on the stimulus plans.
There was some progress in more transformational infrastructure investments, but this was limited by challenges over public acceptance. Initiatives to pursue low traffic neighbourhoods and cycle lanes met with significant local opposition in some areas, for example.
The short timescale limited space for public consultation, high quality designs, or to position these as part of a city-wide strategy.
As research for the UK’s Local Government Association found, more stakeholder engagement was needed for these schemes, not less, to help identify and address community concerns.
In stark contrast to such faltering progress, much more headway was apparent in introducing reforms to speed up decision making on large infrastructure projects, not least by reducing opportunities for public feedback.
As governments announced shovel-ready infrastructure projects, the opportunity to implement real societal change may have been missed. Getty Images
The shift towards centralised and expert-led decision making facilitated a rapid “pipeline” of investment. Yet this pipeline curtailed the space for the necessary politics typically associated with more transformative futures.
So rather than allowing a major rethink of infrastructure priorities, existing reforms, narratives and projects all became entrenched, some of which were fast-tracked.
Promises unrealised
While well intentioned, the promises of building back better did not constitute the radical rupture initially promised. This failure is in part due to the urgent, expert-led processes which were ill-suited to more transformative futures.
A key message is that if we really want to be transformative in future crisis we must hold those making promises accountable.
Accountability can be achieved by resisting the closure of political space that typically accompanies emergency claims and asking the question: “what infrastructure ought to be built, for whom, where and why?”
This invites us to question the normalisation of new infrastructure as a solution – almost regardless of the problem – and instead challenges us to unpick the existing assumptions of promoting high growth and productivity, not least where these negatively affect climate change mitigation.
Towards ‘shovel-worthy’ projects
There seems to be growing acknowledgement, from Australia’s Grattan Institute, the OECD and others, that rapidly building infrastructure is not the answer to the complex crises we face.
Additionally, the infrastructure we do build should be limited in scale and localised – focusing on creating coherent networks of smaller infrastructure projects as much as headline-grabbing mega-projects.
This two-pronged approach would better reflect the more local ways in which life has been conducted in cities since the early years of the pandemic.
We argue that to chart a different pathway, politicians will need to spend more time actively identifying “shovel worthy” alternatives – projects that cultivate more equitable and climate-friendly cities and regions of the future.
“Shovel-worthy” means working with local communities and planning for infrastructure in an integrated way that centres climate justice and moves away from mega-projects.
Engaging with local knowledge and allowing open public scrutiny will greatly assist policy makers in identifying the kinds of infrastructure that can better address current inequalities and facilitate the societal transitions that cities and regions desperately need.
Iain White receives funding from the Aotearoa New Zealand Government National Science Challenge: Resilience to Nature’s Challenges – Kia manawaroa – Ngā Ākina o Te Ao Tūroa. Iain White also receives funding from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment’s Endeavour Fund to research issues connected to flood risk mapping and better decision making.
Crystal Legacy receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Henry Halloran Trust.
Graham Haughton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Albanese government has launched a concerted effort to nip in the bud a threatened resumption of the people smuggling trade, with a visit by Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil to Sri Lanka and a $50 million aid package for that economically-beleaguered country.
Several boats have set out from Sri Lanka in recent weeks. Mostly, the boats are being intercepted by the Sri Lankan authorities. Any making it into Australian waters have the passengers returned.
The Australian government is not currently providing details of boat activity.
The people smugglers started to look to a resumption of their trade just before the election, when a change of government looked likely. The Morrison government had text messages sent out on election day about the interception of a boat, hoping to sway some voters.
O’Neil is meeting Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and Foreign Minister, G. L. Peiris.
Early last week O’Neil and Peiris spoke by phone. The visit has been planned for a few days and coincides with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
A statement from O’Neil said her Sri Lankan discussions would cover “how Australia can deepen cooperation and assist Sri Lanka as the country faces very difficult economic times, as well as strengthening engagement on transnational crime, including people smuggling”.
The Australian aid is directed to food and health needs. Announcing the package, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said the country faced “its worst economic crisis in 70 years, leading to shortages of food, medicine and fuel”.
She said Australia would contribute an immediate $22 million to the World Food Programme for emergency food assistance to help three million people in Sri Lanka meet their daily needs.
The government will also provide $23 million in development assistance to Sri Lanka in 2022-23. “This will support health services, and economic recovery, with a strong emphasis on protecting those at risk, especially women and girls,” Wong said.
The money is in addition to the $5 million Australia recently provided to United Nations agencies for Sri Lanka.
“Australia has a close and long-standing relationship with Sri Lanka. Not only do we want to help the people of Sri Lanka in its time of need, there are also deeper consequences for the region,” Wong said.
Asked what message the government hoped to send to people smugglers and the Sri Lankan government during O’Neil’s visit, Prime Minister Albanese said: “That people who arrive by boat will not be settled here.
“People smugglers seek to trade in misery. They seek to mislead, [they are] often run by criminal syndicates.
“We will be strong when it comes to our borders. […] We will look after our international obligations to do the right thing. But the right thing is not having a free-for-all whereby people who turn up will be settled.
“We understand that there are issues in Sri Lanka and that the wrong messages are being given by people smugglers. Our message will be very clear,” Albanese said.
One of the first acts of the Albanese government was to allow the Sri Lankan “Biloela” family to return to the Queensland town. Albanese was subsequently pictured with the family, a photo some fear could be used by people smugglers as part of their advertising pitch.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The shock suspension last week of Australia’s wholesale electricity market rekindled an age-old debate about whether the energy sector should be nationalised – in other words, owned and controlled by government.
The calls came after electricity prices spiked and supply tightened along Australia’s east coat, triggering a chain of events which eventually forced the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) to suspend the national electricity market.
So should the flow of energy in Australia come under public control? And even if it’s feasible, would it prevent crises like the one we’ve just seen?
I’m an academic in energy economics with a special interest in electricity network privatisation. As my work has revealed, nationalising electricity is not a silver bullet. To operate most effectively, the sector needs to balance the roles of private competition and government regulation.
What’s caused the energy crisis?
A recent cold snap meant more people were turning on their heaters, so using more electricity. Compounding that, prices on the wholesale electricity market – where generators are paid for the power they produce – surged for two reasons.
First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has driven up global coal and gas prices.
Second, about a quarter of coal power stations feeding the national grid were offline due to unplanned outages or maintenance. At times, renewable energy outputs also fell.
All this caused wholesale electricity prices to surge, which prompted AEMO to impose a cap on prices. The capped price was less than it costs some plants to generate power, prompting them to withdraw their capacity from the market. The situation became impossible for AEMO to manage so it stepped in to suspend the market indefinitely to prevent disastrous blackouts.
Generators must now supply the market with electricity and will be compensated for losses.
Public vs private
The national electricity market was created in 1998, and comprises electricity generation, transmission, distribution and retailers. It covers all states and territories except Western Australia and the Northern Territory, and delivers around 80% of the nation’s electricity.
Since the 1990s, state governments have tended to sell off power assets to private operators. The system is now privatised to varying degrees.
In Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, electricity supply is fully owned by state governments. In Queensland, the state government owns most of the electricity supply system and only the retail market has been privatised.
The electricity system is mostly privatised in Victoria and South Australia, and partially privatised in New South Wales. However, governments still regulate electricity prices in Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and regional Queensland.
The energy market suspension isn’t the only energy crisis Australia has faced in recent times. In 2016, the South Australian power market – a mostly privatised system – was suspended for 13 days.
Energy supply and affordability crises in the national electricity market have increasinglycoincided with growing private ownership.
Western Australia, which isn’t part of the national market and has a system featuring significant state intervention in gas supply, has avoided the energy crisis currently gripping the eastern states.
My research found privatisation can lead to improved energy market efficiency, but only if coupled with strong regulation of the sector. This suggests states with fully privatised energy markets should shift to more government involvement. It also suggests public-owned states should privatise some assets.
Nationalising isn’t a silver bullet. That’s because market outcomes are the best outcomes for consumers if the market is functioning well. Having competition is the best way to bring retail and wholesale costs down.
But if electricity prices are so high that some consumers can’t afford it, it’s the responsibility of government to provide electricity to them – through subsidies, for instance.
Experience from energy markets overseas shows that for a complicated industry like electricity to work, markets and government policies should co-exist.
Chile’s power supplies were state-owned until 1982. Then, it became the first country in the world to adopt a competitive power sector by establishing a wholesale electricity market. Today, that market is well-functioning because energy prices tend to reflect the long-term costs of producing electricity.
The success of this privately owned system is due to strong government-initiated reforms. They include effective regulation of transmission and distribution networks, strengthening sector institutions and modifying auction rules in the wholesale market to encourage new bidders.
Chile has also become a renewable energy champion while having a privatised electricity system, because market reforms were supported by policies to promote clean energy.
Other Latin American countries with market-based electricity systems, such as Argentina, also allowed for varying degrees of government involvement to make the market work.
As climate change worsens and countries struggle to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, market-based electricity systems will become more difficult.
Everyone pays the cost of emissions in the form of global warming. But these costs aren’t factored into the costs of generating electricity. So without a carbon price, there’s little incentive for generators in an entirely privatised market to reduce their emissions.
The United Kingdom has recognised this. It has significantly intervened in the electricity market by introducing a mechanism to keep prices stable for consumers, and guaranteeing extra capacity in times of tight supply.
This helps to meet its climate change objectives by preventing supply shortfalls during the transition to renewables.
What lies ahead?
Australia’s National Electricity Market lacks the right balance between state and market.
The strong push towards the market that began in the early 1990s in Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales now needs to be clawed back somewhat. And in Queensland and Tasmania where markets can be established, this should be done – with policies to support energy security and environmental sustainability.
The experience of the UK and Latin America with partly state-owned electricity systems suggests Australia should not be sceptical of such reforms.
Active government involvement in the electricity sector is necessary for Australia to meet its ambitious climate targets, but this doesn’t mean totally abandoning the power of market forces.
Rabindra Nepal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Restrictions have eased, international borders are open and influenza is back in Australia after a two-year absence.
Suddenly, major flu outbreaks are occurring across the country, catching many off guard.
Flu vaccinations aim to protect against four influenza viruses that cause disease in humans (two subtypes from influenza A and two from influenza B).
But vaccine-mediated protection varies each year depending on how well the vaccine matches the disease-causing influenza viruses that are circulating at a given time. Vaccine effectiveness – a real-world measure based on the proportion of vaccinated people who still develop the flu – ranges from 16% to 60%.
However, it’s still important to get your flu shot. If you’ve been vaccinated and still get the flu, you’re less likely to get as sick.
Why it’s difficult to predict which subtypes will dominate
Of the four types of influenza viruses that exist in nature, two cause significant disease in humans: influenza A and influenza B.
The 2022 influenza vaccine is quadrivalent (targets four distinct viruses): two influenza A viruses (subtypes H3N2 and H1N1) and two influenza B viruses from distinct lineages.
Within each flu A subtype further genetic variation can arise, with mutations (known as genetic drift) generating many viral variants that are classified into “clades” and sub-clades.
H3N2 is particularly good at generating lots of diversity in this way. So predicting exactly which H3N2 virus to target in the vaccine is especially difficult.
A key challenge for flu vaccines is the decision for which virus to target has to be made months ahead of time. The the H3N2 virus in the Australian flu vaccine (A/Darwin/9/2021) was chosen in September 2021 to enable the vaccine to be manufactured and distributed in time for the 2022 winter.
There is no guarantee a different H3N2 virus that isn’t so well targeted by the vaccine won’t arrive in the country in the months leading into winter and start causing disease.
The subtypes contained in the seasonal flu vaccine are selected months in advance. Shutterstock
Another factor that has made predicting which H3N2 virus to target in the vaccine uniquely difficult for 2022 is the lack of data on which viruses were dominant in the preceding flu seasons, both in Australia and on the other side of the Equator.
With travel restrictions easing towards the end of 2021, flu cases did start to reappear during the northern hemisphere 2021-22 winter. But the lack of flu cases during the preceding seasons (due to COVID) meant the data used to predict which viruses to target was inadequate.
The US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) analysed data from more than 3,000 children and found a vaccine effectiveness of just 16% protection from mild to moderate disease from H3N2. Protection from more severe disease was just 14%.
We don’t know which subtypes will circulate in Australia
Data about flu vaccine effectiveness in the southern hemisphere 2022 winter isn’t yet available, and it’s unclear how protective the current vaccine is against the currently circulating disease-causing subtypes.
While H3N2 viruses appears to be driving some disease now, other flu viruses may become more prevalent later in the season.
The flu vaccine is a quadrivalent vaccine, so in addition to influenza A H3N2, it will protect against another influenza A subtype (H1N1) and two distinct lineages of influenza B virus. These viruses don’t change as rapidly as H3N2, so it’s more likely the vaccine will give better protection against these other influenza viruses.
Even if vaccine protection against H3N2 is lower than usual this year, the vaccine could make the difference between recovering at home versus ending up in hospital.
The flu vaccine offers the highest level of protection in the first three to four months months after vaccination. The season generally peaks between June and September – although this year we have seen a much earlier than usual start to the flu season. It’s unclear whether this early start will mean a longer flu season or an early finish. So it’s not too late to get vaccinated.
Flu vaccines are recommended for everyone aged six months and over, but are particularly important for people who are more at risk of complications from influenza, including:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people aged six months and over
children aged six months to five years
pregnant women
people aged 65 years or over
people aged six months or over who have medical conditions that mean they have a higher risk of getting serious disease.
What if you still get the flu?
If you develop flu symptoms, isolate and see your GP for an influenza PCR test to determine whether you are indeed infected with influenza, particularly if you’re in the higher-risk groups.
Specific antivirals for influenza can help, if given early. To ensure rapid access to particularly vulnerable aged-care residents, aged-care facilities are being stocked with the flu antiviral drug Tamiflu.
In New South Wales, free drive-through clinics now offer testing for influenza, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) and SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID. Other states and territories may follow.
Nathan Bartlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Milton Speer, Visiting Fellow, School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Technology Sydney
NASA
You wouldn’t know it from the torrential rains that have inundated large parts of New South Wales and Queensland this year, but average late-autumn rainfall over southeast Australia has declined significantly since the 1990s.
Less rain in these areas is an expected consequence of global warming. In both the northern and southern hemispheres, the paths of the weather systems that bring rain in the middle latitudes have been moving away from the equator and towards the poles.
We studied in detail the drop in rainfall during April and May in southeast Australia, and found it is just one consequence of far-reaching changes in the behaviour of high-altitude winds over Australia.
Jet streams
These high-altitude winds are called jet streams: narrow bands of rapidly flowing air that typically occur at altitudes around the cruising height of commercial passenger aircraft. In April and May, the westerly jet stream over southeast Australia normally splits into a northern branch (called the subtropical jet) and a southern branch (called the polar-front jet).
Since the mid 1990s, the location of this split has moved and the speeds of the winds involved have also changed. We found these changes, which are related to global warming, are responsible for a decrease in the number of low-pressure systems bringing rain to southeast Australia.
The maps you might see on weather apps or TV forecasts usually show what’s going on at ground level: high- and low-pressure systems, cold fronts, and so on. However, these ground-level systems are largely driven by the jet streams and related atmospheric processes.
Humidity and rotation
As well as the changes in the jet stream, there are two other important changes reducing rainfall in the early cool season.
First, the air over parts of inland southeast Australia has become significantly drier since the 1990s.
And second, areas of strongly rotating air have moved further east and south, over the Tasman Sea.
Both humidity and air rotation are important contributors to the development of low-pressure areas that bring rain. As a result of these changes, there has been a significant decrease in late autumn rainfall in southeast Australia.
The bigger picture
Much of the variation in rainfall from year to year depends on the phase of El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a large-scale climate phenomenon over the Pacific Ocean. When this is in one phase, called La Niña, eastern Australia experiences lower temperatures and higher rainfall – in the opposite phase, El Niño, it’s the other way around.
In the absence of La Niña years, and particularly groups of repeat La Niña events such as those of 2010–12 and 2020–22, we have seen extreme droughts following dry summers and dry late-autumn periods.
Changes in the atmospheric circulation, especially in the jet stream location and strength, have contributed to the multiple-year droughts we have seen since the 1990s, namely, the periods 1997–2007 and 2017–2019. For example, rain-bearing “east coast lows” are often forming further south, and there are fewer cut-off low pressure systems over inland southeast Australia.
Unfavourable winds
The effects of drought at ground level are easy to see.
The drought periods since 1997 have killed huge numbers of river fish, reduced the viability of broad acre and pastoral farming and other economic industries, and reduced river flows and sustainable access to water in many areas. In a future warming climate, these drought periods are expected to continue.
However, changes to the jet stream also have less obvious effects at higher altitudes. In particular, these changes have implications for air transport.
Changes in speed, location and structure of jet streams will mean planes will use more fuel on many routes, including in Australia. Less favourable winds, and an increase in sudden “clear-air turbulence”, will increase aviation fuel consumption.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In a wealthy country like Australia, a time with no government schools seems unimaginable. But back in the 1840s, when the Sisters of Mercy opened the first seconadary school in Western Australia, there were only a few tiny private schools. Many children, particularly girls, received no formal education.
Women religious, or nuns, made education more accessible. Their way of life also offered one of few leadership opportunities for women.
These women demonstrated entrepreneurial and diplomatic skill while developing education in Australia. Their work required them to navigate hostile male hierarchies, religious discrimination, class struggles and complex relationships with Aboriginal peoples.
Historians have documented part of this story, but there is a way to go. In a country enamoured with egalitarianism, the lives of women religious speak of the broader historical reality of inequality.
Where did these women come from?
Religious orders consist of people living apart from society but as a community in accordance with the spiritual rule of their founder. Catherine McAuley (1778-1841) founded the Sisters of Mercy in Dublin when she opened the first House of Mercy dedicated to serving the poor, sick and uneducated.
Catherine’s approach to assisting Ireland’s burgeoning poor was radical. The community consisted of two classes of sisters. Choir sisters were educated, middle-class women and generally served as teachers. Lay sisters were poor and working class and operated the kitchen or laundry.
Ursula Frayne (1816-1885), who opened the first secondary school in Western Australia as well as schools in Victoria in the mid-19th century, had trained with McAuley. In 1845 Bishop John Brady visited the sisters’ Dublin convent and requested the mother superior send six sisters to Western Australia with Frayne as the leader.
While sailing to Western Australia aboard The Elizabeth, a member of the missionary group travelling with Bishop Brady was a young French monk, Leandre Fonteinne, who ominously noted:
“His Lordship is only concerned […] for the six women religious that he is bringing along with us. They are and for quite a number of years to come will be a burden to the mission.”
What did they do in Australia?
After arriving in Perth, in 1846 the sisters became the first female religious teaching order to establish a school in Australia. Having navigated sectarism in Ireland, they decided to offer a general education to all Christians. The sisters prioritised Aboriginal people, immigrant Irish orphan girls, the poor and the uneducated. The sisters established a fee-paying school, benevolent institution and Western Australia’s first high school.
Coming from a prosperous Dublin family, Frayne was class-conscious but the distinction between choir and lay nuns was unsustainable in colonial Perth. Relying on the bishop was not an option that would allow them to progress their enterprise.
For these women to be self-sufficient, everyone had to do domestic duties. Frayne herself became a baker.
Although Bishop Brady promised financial support, in 1850 Frayne travelled to Colombo, Malta, Rome, Florence, Paris, England and Ireland to raise funds. In March 1851, she returned to Perth with £450. She gave £157 to the bishop, who was broke.
By 1853 the nuns could afford a new £800 school building. As the sisters’ workload increased, they applied to Dublin for “strong” lay sisters.
Two of the longest-serving lay sisters sent from Dublin were Catherine O’Reilly and Catherine Strahan. O’Reilly filled multiple roles, including carpenter. She was eventually promoted to choir sister and helped to establish schools at locations such as Geraldton.
Strahan’s trajectory was different. Strahan was a lay sister at 30 and provided essential services to the convent kitchen and laundry until she died at 67.
Ursula Frayne was a pioneer of education in both Perth and Melbourne.
Undeniably important yet curiously anonymous
Women religious operated significant educational enterprises. Historian Stephanie Burley considers female Irish teaching orders as an empire within the British Empire. Their classes bridged the political, religious and cultural norms of the Irish Catholic Church and the British Empire, acting as a pacifying force between the two spheres.
“Unfortunately, historians have too often seen these women as an undifferentiated mass, undeniably important yet curiously anonymous. Yet [they] were not merely the passive transmitters of male ideas or initiatives.”
As a leader, Frayne has been the subject of biographies. However, Catherine O’Reilly and Catherine Strahan remained cloistered.
The women who laboured in domestic roles in religious communities deserve greater attention. Although historians are increasingly showing interest in the broader role of women religious in Australian society, aspects of their influence remain opaque.
Odhran O’Brien is affiliated with the Catholic Archdiocese of Perth as the archivist.
In the wake of the Green and teal wave that crashed through the federal Parliament, attention has inevitably turned to what the new cross-benchers will say and do about climate policy. So far, attention has focused on Australia’s 2030 emissions reduction target, and whether they will pressure the new Labor Government to increase its relatively unambitious) target, to which it has now formally committed.
There’s a much more important question to ask. That is, how will any new target actually be reached. The history of Australian climate policy — under both Labor and Coalition governments — shows us very clearly that our large and powerful fossil fuel industry and its political clients are adept at devising “innovative” ways to ensure targets are achieved without obstructing the Lemming-like march toward ever more coal and gas production.
Cynical? Hardly. We’ve met previous targets not by shrinking the fossil fuel industry, but through accounting tricks using inscrutable “land sector abatement”. The Morrison Government took this to new levels, allowing its signature “Emissions Reduction Fund” to become a super-generator of dodgy offsets and a figleaf for the expansion of the gas industry. Our previous government even projected it would meet its 2050 net zero emissions target through a combination of business as usual and unspecified “technological breakthroughs”. Australians are now paying the price in not only climatic terms, but also financial terms, for being too dependent on polluting methane gas and on electricity produced from ageing, unreliable and even-more-polluting coal-fired power generators.
Both teal independents and Greens have built their reputations on restoring integrity to politics. This gives them a mandate to scrutinise accounting rules, offset methodologies and assumptions behind whatever target Labor sets. That’s a start. But to foster climate politics based on integrity, they’ll have to go much further to get to the root of the problem.
We need a reckoning
First, we need an honest conversation about the extent to which the fossil fuel industry has captured Australian politics and wider society, and how this has crippled our response to the climate crisis.
To expose the depth of our gas, oil and coal industry’s influence on public perceptions and elite institutions such as political parties, the media, and virtually every aspect of government — from international diplomacy to the school curriculum – would require something like a royal commission.
In recent years, investigations have been launched into the fossil fuel industry’s knowledge and practices around climate change by investigative bodies ranging from the Massachusetts Attorney General to the Philippines Human Rights Commission. In the Massachusetts case, the Attorney-General’s three-year investigation of oil giant Exxon Mobil was followed by a lawsuit against the company, which is ongoing.
Investigating the practices and influence of Australia’s fossil fuel industry would lead naturally into a discussion of what can and must be done to restore integrity to our democracy — from bans on fossil fuel advertising and sponsorship to restrictions on lobbying, donations, and revolving-door and “golden escalator” relationships.
We could look to Victoria’s pioneering approach to tobacco in the 1980s, including banning tobacco advertising and promotion and buying out tobacco sponsorships from sports and arts bodies.
Australians are now paying the price for being dependant on on electricity produced from ageing, unreliable coal-fired power generators. Shutterstock
The emissions burned overseas from the coal and methane gas we export dwarf the emissions produced within our borders. Our political leaders have long hidden behind claims that these exported emissions are the responsibility of the importing country. Never mind that we put the weight of our foreign and trade policy behind cultivating overseas demand for our fossil fuels. You might have also heard the drug dealer’s defence of “if we don’t export the coal and gas, someone else will.” All of these are hypocritical and opportunistic excuses – the opposite of adhering to moral principles.
Taking a principled stand means taking responsibility for problems to which we contribute, or that we have the power to redress, regardless of whether others are acting wrongfully. It’s not beyond us. In other areas, successive Australian governments have performed admirably in taking a stand on issues from nuclear disarmament to the mining of asbestos. We stopped doing dangerous things like mining asbestos because they were wrong, and we used our diplomatic weight to persuade other countries to follow suit.
If Australia was to regain its moral compass on fossil fuels, we wouldn’t be acting alone. A number of governments recently formed the Beyond Oil & Gas Alliance, which commits them to stop issuing new oil and gas exploration and production licences and to phase out existing oil and gas production on a timeframe aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Other governments, including New Zealand and California, have taken significant steps in that direction.
In this spirit, I hope the teal independents join the Greens in championing an end to fossil fuel subsidies and a ban on new coal and gas projects. Not only is a ban the principled thing to do, but it will help protect existing fossil fuel jobs for a transition period while governments plan a managed phase-out of the industry.
Phasing out this industry must happen while putting communities first and while amplifying the voices of those in the community already working to forge a future beyond fossil fuels. Fortuitously, the teal independents know a thing or two about community-building.
Fergus Green receives funding for some of his research from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK). He is a member of the Just Transition Taskforce of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, an intergovernmental body.
New Zealand Parliament Buildings, Wellington, New Zealand.
Political Roundup: Why Jacinda Ardern said no to the Commonwealth, but yes to NATO
By Geoffrey Miller
Jacinda Ardern’s decision to attend the upcoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Spain – but to skip the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Rwanda – symbolises the changes she is making to New Zealand foreign policy.
The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) starts today in Kigali, while the NATO summit will be held in Madrid next week.
However, Jacinda Ardern is only attending the NATO summit. She is sending her foreign minister, Nanaia Mahuta, to attend the Commonwealth meeting in her place.
Ardern is hardly alone with her decision to stay away from CHOGM – so far, only 35 of 54 Commonwealth leaders have sent an RSVP. New Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will be among the absentees – deputy Prime Minister (and defence minister) Richard Marles will go instead.
This is despite the fact that this year’s CHOGM is being held during the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee year and just over a month before the Commonwealth Games – the grouping’s sporting flagship. The summit will also be the first CHOGM since 2018, the first CHOGM in Africa since 2007 and the first to be hosted by a ‘new’ Commonwealth member – Rwanda was never a British colony, but voluntarily joined the Commonwealth in 2009.
Indeed, Rwanda’s hosting of the summit this year is not without controversy. Freedom House, a US-based think tank, calls the country ‘not free’, with a ranking of just 22 points out of 100 – placing it firmly in the bottom third of its global rankings, two places ahead of Russia.
Freedom House says the Rwandan regime – led by authoritarian President Paul Kagame – undertakes ‘pervasive surveillance, intimidation, torture, and renditions or suspected assassinations of exiled dissidents.’
This year’s CHOGM also threatens to be overshadowed by a UK plan to deport asylum-seekers to Rwanda. Prince Charles, who reportedly called the deal ‘appalling’, will be representing the Queen at the summit in Kigali.
Despite these two red flags, prominent human rights organisations are not calling for a boycott of the event. Rather, they want Commonwealth leaders to draw attention to the problems. Human Rights Watch, for instance, has asked leaders to voice their ‘grave concern to the [Rwandan] government on its human rights record’. And, in reference to the UK-Rwanda asylum-seeker deal, Amnesty International wants Commonwealth members to ‘seize the opportunity in Kigali to denounce this inhumane arrangement’.
Jacinda Ardern’s no-show at CHOGM is probably driven partly by domestic political considerations and timing. This Friday’s inaugural ‘Matariki’ public holiday, which marks the Māori New Year, was a key election campaign pledge by Ardern’s Labour Party in 2020 – and the Prime Minister is scheduled to attend a pre-dawn ceremony on the day.
Outside of the Commonwealth Games, the Commonwealth has a low profile – but it has a lot going for it. Few intergovernmental organisations can rival it for size – with the Commonwealth’s collective population reaching 2.6 billion, only the likes of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the United Nations (UN) represent more people.
Moreover, the Commonwealth has a particular strength in representing small states, especially island ones – 25 of the 54 members are classified as Small Island Developing States. This means the Commonwealth can be a particularly useful forum for discussing climate change and environmental issues. The results have included initiatives such as the Commonwealth Litter Programme, which has made real differences to countries such as Vanuatu in fighting plastic pollution.
The Commonwealth is more than just a talking shop, but the disparate nature of its membership is a major challenge. The Commonwealth includes wealthy, democratic countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the UK – but also poor, authoritarian ones such as Cameroon, Rwanda and Uganda. In between, there are also some rich authoritarian members (such as Brunei) and less well-off democracies (such as India)
Of course, there is still great value in an organisation that brings opposing sides together for a robust exchange of views – the new geopolitical faultline between the Global South and North over Ukraine is a case in point. While Western countries – including New Zealand – have provided strong support to Ukraine, most non-Western countries have not followed suit.
It would do Jacinda Ardern good to listen to the rationale that countries such as South Africa and Mozambique might have for not falling in line with the Western position. Countries perhaps learn best when they are not just surrounded by their like-minded friends.
However, in the new Cold War, ideology is back with a vengeance – and many countries are drifting away from pragmatic, inclusive groupings towards more ideologically-driven ones. For Australia, this means countering Chinese influence with the reinvigorated ‘Quad’ arrangement (with India, Japan and the US) and AUKUS (with the United Kingdom and the United States); for New Zealand, the Pacific Islands Forum and bilateral meetings with Australia and the United States have taken on greater significance.
All of this explains why Jacinda Ardern has accepted an invitation to attend NATO’s Madrid Summit next week. Jens Stoltenberg, the alliance’s Secretary General, has recently been at pains to highlight the invitation to the bloc’s ‘Asia-Pacific partners’ – Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The reason is obvious – on Thursday, Stoltenberg specifically mentioned China as one of the priorities for the meeting, which will set out a new ‘Strategic Concept’ – effectively a blueprint for the future of NATO.
And while NATO’s main focus will remain on security in Europe, last year’s summit in Brussels – held well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – was noteworthy for making China its main priority. The summit’s communique made NATO’s position crystal-clear: ‘China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security’.
Jacinda Ardern’s invitation to attend the NATO’s 2022 Madrid Summit will also be something of a reward for aligning New Zealand’s foreign policy more closely with NATO – and the West generally – over the past few months. After all, Ardern has overhauled New Zealand’s foreign policy by introducing sanctions against Russia and sending military equipment and weapons to Ukraine – and by making a symbolic contribution of New Zealand troops to Europe to assist with the war effort.
But as Stoltenberg likes to say, security ‘does not come for free’ – and the meeting will undoubtedly also serve as an opportunity to put pressure on New Zealand to provide even more assistance. The NATO Secretary-General recently pointed out that there have been ‘seven consecutive years of rising defence investment across Europe and Canada’. New Zealand’s military spending shows a remarkably similar trajectory, with spending now at the 1.5% of GDP level– up from 1.1% in 2015, although still well below NATO’s target of 2%.
Like Jacinda Ardern, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will also be a guest of honour at the NATO summit. Anthony Albanese is also travelling to Madrid – and Zelensky has already invited the Australian PM to visit Kyiv.
If he accepts, Albanese would be following in the footsteps of many other NATO country leaders who have travelled to Ukraine in recent weeks, including the UK’s Boris Johnson, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Olaf Scholz.
And given the focus on Western unity and solidarity in recent months, there’s every chance Jacinda Ardern would travel together with Anthony Albanese on any European side-trip to Ukraine – on a joint ANZAC solidarity mission.
Ardern is backing NATO over CHOGM.
She might be choosing Kyiv over Kigali.
Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s international analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian.
Other items of interest and importance from the last week
Australia’s minister for foreign affairs, Penny Wong, discussed Pacific affairs with her New Zealand counterpart, Nanaia Mahuta, in Wellington, June 16.Getty Images
The frequent use of the term “shared values” to describe developments in the Pacific tends to obscure a distinct shift in New Zealand and Australian relations with their Pacific partners over the past two decades.
This shift has seen a move away from ready acceptance by Pacific nations of policy prescriptions reflecting “developed country” priorities, towards a greater insistence on New Zealand and Australian support for policies generated by those Pacific partners themselves.
This shift has now been recognised by New Zealand’s foreign minister, Nanaia Mahuta, and more recently by Australia’s new foreign minister, Penny Wong, during her visit to New Zealand last week, giving credibility to a renewed Australian focus on the “Pacific family”.
Perhaps the most obvious expression of those Pacific priorities and values relates to climate change. This existential challenge to island nations has been given the highest priority by Pacific governments, but has also been by far the most divisive factor in recent Australia and New Zealand relations with the Pacific.
Successive Australian leaders have refused to consider commitments to climate change policies that Pacific countries see as critical to their long-term survival. Australian officials have worked to weaken the outcomes of international climate change conferences.
Frustrated by Australia’s resistance to using the Pacific Islands Forum to demand more meaningful action on climate change, Pacific countries have felt compelled to seek participation in other international groups and forums where their priorities could be unambiguously advanced.
Against this background, Wong’s post-election dash to Fiji was a necessary and timely “save”. Her catch-cry of “we have heard you and we are listening” crucially signalled a coming change in Australia’s climate change stance.
A new regional convergence on climate change policy will remove a major irritant from Pacific relations and create a solid foundation for the partnership’s future. But ongoing commitment by Australia and New Zealand to climate change policies that are fit for purpose will be essential for its durability.
Fiji’s growing influence
Fiji’s evolving position has been an important factor in the widening of Pacific states’ international relations.
Following the 2006 coup, Fiji reacted to tensions with Australia and New Zealand by aggressively pursuing a “Look North” policy. It intensified trade and development partnerships with East Asian and other non-Western states (including China) and pressured other Pacific governments to follow its lead.
While Fiji eventually moved away from its adversarial stance towards Australia and New Zealand, the legacy of that policy remains, in expanded connections with China and other non-Western countries.
In recent years, relations between New Zealand and Fiji have been progressively normalised. This is reflected, for example, in Fiji’s participation along with New Zealand and other partners in the proposed Agreement on Climate Change Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS). It was further cemented by New Zealand’s support for Fiji’s COVID vaccine rollout.
In the meantime, Fiji has engaged energetically in international climate change diplomacy, positioning itself as a global champion of the Pacific’s priorities. This has enhanced its leadership credentials among Pacific Island Forum members, further amplified this year by its status as forum chair.
The visits to Fiji earlier this year by New Zealand cabinet ministers Peeni Henare and Nanaia Mahuta, and the resulting Duavata Declaration, reflected both the realities of the renewed partnership and the modern regional role of both countries.
Understanding China’s misstep
China’s recent failure to secure Pacific nations’ support for its proposed agreement on regional governance and security was greeted with relief by observers in New Zealand.
But it’s important to recognise that failure was also a salutary demonstration of Pacific governments’ insistence that policies affecting the region must be based on decisions by those governments themselves, reflecting their own priorities.
New Zealand has been wise to recognise this and allow space for regional governments to build consensus on relevant issues ahead of the coming meeting of Pacific Island Forum leaders.
Looking to the future, the greatest potential contribution New Zealand can make to Pacific development lies in the expansion and broadening of labour mobility arrangements with Pacific partners. This has the added advantage that China will not realistically be able to match such arrangements.
The impact of Pacific seasonal workers’ absence during the pandemic highlighted their importance to the New Zealand economy.
Consultation should now take place both internally and with Pacific partners to design and implement an expanded range of labour mobility arrangements that both support Pacific development aspirations and deliver an economic benefit to New Zealand.
During the recent Australian election campaign, both major parties indicated their intention to move ahead on this issue. It’s one area – among others – where New Zealand should not be seen to lag behind.
Robert Scollay does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In Tuesday’s budget, NSW will announce a switch from stamp duty to land tax.
It will become the second Australian jurisdiction to do so, with the ACT halfway through a 20-year switchover.
Homebuyers who accept the offer will be taxed annually on the value of their land, instead of hit with an upfront fee (that averaged $50,000 for Sydney in 2018) when they buy.
Once they have accepted, their property will be out of the stamp duty system and subject only to land tax for future owners.
It’s become conventional wisdom to say that such a revenue-neutral switch would boost productivity.
Why? Moving house sets in motion a chain of transactions: residents engage lawyers to transfer titles, real estate agents to manage the property sale, removalists to transport possessions, and so on.
Stamp duties compound these costs, by adding a significant, additional layer of taxation, which in some states makes up 80% of the total cost of moving house.
Land tax, in contrast, is one of the least-damaging taxes. It encourages land owners to put land to its highest-value use.
In a landmark modelling exercise completed this month, my team at the Victoria University Centre of Policy Studies finds that the productivity gains are large by the standards of tax swaps.
After 20 years, replacing stamp duty with a land tax would boost national income by A$0.30 for each dollar of revenue swapped, or up to $720 per household if implemented Australia-wide, about 0.34% of annual gross domestic product.
Of greater interest for homeowners and buyers is what it would do to prices.
Houses versus apartments
Broadly, we find that the switch would put downward pressure on prices, but not for every type of home.
Apartments are different. Shutterstock
Across the market as a whole, we expect downward pressure on the price paid by buyers of about 4.7%, and downward pressure on the price received by sellers of about 0.1%.
But for houses, we expect much stronger downward pressure than the average suggests.
We expect the price paid by house buyers to fall by about 7.6%, and the price received by sellers to fall 3%.
Interestingly, for apartments we expect movements in the other direction, pushing up the price paid by buyers by 2%, and pushing up the price received by sellers by 6.4%.
What’s so different about apartments?
Why would the switch put downward pressure on the price of houses but upward pressure on the price of apartments?
It is because of how two offsetting effects play out.
One is that higher land taxes depress land prices. Buyers who know they will be lumbered with future bills find their purchases less valuable. This effect is much bigger on house prices than apartment prices, because houses occupy more land on average.
The other effect is that removing stamp duty not only removes an impost on the current buyer, but also removes an impost that will have to be paid when the current buyer sells, and when the subsequent buyer sells, and so on, making resale more valuable to the current buyer than it would have been.
For properties that aren’t turned over often this effect isn’t very important, but for properties that are turned over frequently, it becomes significant.
Apartments are turned over twice as frequently as houses, meaning that for apartments the upward effect on prices from removing stamp duty overwhelms the downward effect from imposing land tax.
Much depends on exactly what’s proposed
It would be possible to lessen this upward pressure on apartment prices by imposing higher land taxes on higher density housing, an idea canvassed by the Henry Tax Review in 2010. Planning and zoning rules could also play a role.
Other policy design decisions could have other effects on prices. Our modelling is based on an immediate swap of stamp duty for land tax.
This is not the same as the NSW government’s opt-in proposal, which could have different price consequences to the policy we modelled.
The NSW government is also reported to be considering excluding the most expensive 20% of properties from the switchover, so it can continue to collect stamp duties on high-value transfers.
In future work we plan to extend our modelling beyond a simple swap of stamp duty and land tax.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
What if your insurer was tracking your online data to price your car insurance? Seems far-fetched, right?
Yet there is predictive value in the digital traces we leave online. And insurers may use data collection and analytics tools to find our data and use it to price insurance services.
For instance, somestudieshave found a correlation between whether an individual uses an Apple or Android phone and their likelihood of exhibiting certain personality traits.
In one example, US insurance broker Jerry analysed the driving behaviour of some 20,000 people to conclude Android users are safer drivers than iPhone users. What’s stopping insurers from referring to such reports to price their insurance?
Our latest research shows Australian consumers have no real control over how data about them, and posted by them, might be collected and used by insurers.
Looking at several examples from customer loyalty schemes and social media, we found insurers can access vast amounts of consumer data under Australia’s weak privacy laws.
How would you feel if a detail as menial as the brand of your phone was used to price your car insurance? Shutterstock
Your data is already out there
Insurers are already using big data to price consumer insurance through personalised pricing, according to evidence gathered by industry regulators in the United Kingdom, European Union and United States.
Consumers often “agree” to all kinds of data collection and privacy policies, such as those used in loyalty schemes (who doesn’t like freebies?) and by social media companies. But they have no control over how their data are used once it’s handed over.
There are far-reaching inferences that can be drawn from data collected through loyalty programs and social media platforms – and these may be uncomfortable, or even highly sensitive.
Researchers using data analytics and machine learning have claimed to build models that can guess a person’s sexual orientation from pictures of their face, or their suicidal tendencies from posts on Twitter.
Think about all the details revealed from a grocery shopping history alone: diet, household size, addictions, health conditions and social background, among others. In the case of social media, a user’s posts, pictures, likes, and links to various groups can be used to draw a precise picture of that individual.
What’s more is Australia has a Consumer Data Right which already requires banks to share consumers’ banking data (at the consumer’s request) with another bank or app, such as to access a new service or offer.
The regime is actively being expanded to other parts of the economy including the energy sector, with the idea being competitors could use information on energy usage to make competitive offers.
The Consumer Data Right is advertised as empowering for consumers – enabling access to new services and offers, and providing people with choice, convenience and control over their data.
In practice, however, it means insurance firms accredited under the program can require you to share your banking data in exchange for insurance services.
The previous Coalition government also proposed “open finance”, which would expand the Consumer Data Right to include access to your insurance and superannuation data. This hasn’t happened yet, but it’s likely the new Albanese government will look into it.
There are plenty of reasons to be concerned about insurers collecting and using increasingly detailed data about people for insurance pricing and claims management.
For one, large-scale data collection provides incentives for cyber attacks. Even if data is held in anonymised form, it can be re-identified with the right tools.
Also, insurers may be able to infer (or at least think they can infer) facts about an individual which they want to keep private, such as their sexual orientation, pregnancy status or religious beliefs.
There’s plenty of evidence the outputs of artificial intelligence tools employed in mass data analytics can be inaccurate and discriminatory. Insurers’ decisions may then be based on misleading or untrue data. And these tools are so complex it’s often difficult to work out if, or where, errors or bias are present.
Each day, people post personal information online. And much of it can be easily accessed by others. Shutterstock
Although insurers are meant to pool risk and compensate the unlucky, some might use data to only offer affordable insurance to very low-risk people. Vulnerable consumers may face exclusion.
A more widespread use of data, especially via the Consumer Data Right, will especially disadvantage those who are unable or unwilling to share data with insurers. These people may be low risk, but if they can’t or won’t prove this, they’ll have to pay more than a fair price for their insurance cover.
They may even pay more than what they would have in a pre-Consumer Data Right world. So insurance may move further from a fair price when more personal data are available to insurance firms.
We need immediate action
Our previous research demonstrated that apart from anti-discrimination laws, there are inadequate constraints on how insurers are allowed to use consumers’ data, such as those taken from online sources.
The more insurers base their assessments on data a consumer didn’t directly provide, the harder it will be for that person to understand how their “riskiness” is being assessed. If an insurer requests your transaction history from the last five years, would you know what they are looking for? Such problems will be exacerbated by the expansion of the Consumer Data Right.
Interestingly, insurance firms themselves might not know how collected data translates into risk for a specific consumer. If their approach is to simply feed data into a complex and opaque artificial intelligence system, all they’ll know is they’re getting a supposedly “better” risk assessment with more data.
Recent reports of retailers collecting shopper data for facial recognition have highlighted how important it is for the Albanese government to urgently reform our privacy laws, and take a close look at other data laws, including proposals to expand the Consumer Data Right.
Zofia Bednarz receives funding from the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence on Automated Decision-Making and Society.
Kayleen Manwaring receives funding from the UNSW Allens Hub for Technology, Law & Innovation.
Kimberlee Weatherall receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is a Chief Investigator with the ARC Centre of Excellence on Automated Decision-Making and Society, and a Fellow with the Gradient Institute.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Patricia A. O’Brien, Faculty Member, Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University; Visiting Fellow, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University; Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC., Georgetown University
AAP/Department of Defence/Julia Whitwell
Foreign Minister Penny Wong was no doubt expecting a cooler reception than her three previous visits to the Pacific when she touched down in Honiara last Friday.
The Solomon Islands government website had not even listed the Australian minister’s visit – but it did note the first visit of a Saudi Arabian tourism minister, happening the same day. With this visit, Wong walked a diplomatic tightrope that no senior minister in the previous government appeared willing to.
Solomon Islands leaders have had a very crowded schedule of late, as highlighted by the Solomon Star newspaper. It said Wong was the latest foreign figure to arrive on Solomon Island shores after a number of “high-level visits from USA, Japan and China recently, before and after the signing of the security pact”.
The security pact in question is the one signed on April 20 between China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, and Solomon Islands’ foreign minister, Jeremiah Manele. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare explained the riots of November 2021 left his government with “no option” but to enter into such a security agreement to “plug the gaps that exist in our security agreement with Australia”. What these “gaps” are, he did not say.
Since that signing, the entire Pacific has shifted in myriad ways. Wong has been very busy in her first month in office trying to reduce its impact.
She has had some wins with Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. Also, Australia assisted with the rapprochement at the Pacific Islands Forum, which has emerged reinvigorated after the stress test of the past year, when one-third of the members threatened to leave. This was averted with a special meeting in Suva on June 7, with Micronesian leaders transported to it on Australian planes.
The biggest win so far, for which Wong can take some credit, was for her work in advance of the Pacific Islands Forum meeting on May 30. Here, the ten nations that recognise China did not collectively sign on to become “China-Pacific Island countries”. (Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuleo rallied the region with a stirring letter that instantly became a classic text.)
A whirlwind multi-nation visit by Wang before and after the May 30 meeting added inducements for working more closely with China through numerous bilateral agreements.
Wang spent the most time on his trip in the Solomon Islands. The effect of his effusive welcome by Sogavare, encapsulated in the photograph of the pair linking arms, denoted the “iron-clad” ties the two leaders were cementing between their nations.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare link arms in Honiara after making their security pact. Xinhua/AP/AAP
This is a template agreement Wang has already shopped around Asia in 2021, tweaked for national specificities and concerns. In the case of the Solomon Islands, it mentions working together on “climate change” and “marine protection”.
Given all that China has offered Sogavare and his political allies – to the great detriment of the nation according to Opposition Leader Matthew Wale, who has charged the security deal is “a personal deal to protect the prime minister” – what could Penny Wong offer?
On her visits to Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, not being a member of the Morrison government that clung to its coal power and climate policies gave Wong a lot of mileage. This is the most important issue facing the region, recently reiterated in an impassioned speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Fiji’s minister for defence and policing, Inia Bakikoto Seruiratu. The Solomon Islands is no exception.
That said, not being a Morrison government minister did not get Wong very far in Honiara. As she had signalled she would), Wong announced more vaccines donations and an expansion of the very popular (and desperately needed) labour scheme, the topic on which she got the most questions at her press conference.
She also visited a school and lunched with women leaders), who would have raised the dire need for improved medical facilities). Notably, it seems Wong did not meet Wale and other Sogavare opponents.
Very subtly, Wong presented an alternative to the China path. Unlike Wang’s visit, which greatly restricted press coverage, Wong encouraged it, no doubt hoping word would spread as it reportedly) had in other parts of the Pacific.
But what about “our shared security interests”, as Wong termed it? This got little traction in Honiara as Sogavare will not walk back from the China-Solomon Islands agreement. On the election campaign trail, Wong described the pact as “the worst foreign policy blunder since world war two”.
Many anticipate China will build a naval base, as appears to be happening in Cambodia). However, Sogavare has assured Wong, and others, this will not occur. What may happen is that maritime militias appearing as fishing vessels, which China has used to great effect in the South China Sea, will slowly build a China military presence if there is not a change of leadership and direction in the Solomon Islands.
The recent “dangerous” confrontation between a Chinese fighter jet and an Australian airforce plane in the South China Sea on May 26, the day Wong began her visit to Fiji, is another sobering instance of tactics that might move south.
While Wong’s visit did not deliver big wins, it did not make things worse. She got reassurances, but given what Sogavare has signed onto with China of late, there is a clear lack of connection between words and deeds. What Wong did do is signal another way forward for Sogavare’s considerable opposition.
In the coming week, a multilateral Pacific Islands effort will be announced in Washington DC that involves the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and France.
Given this, it is almost certain that the tempo of visits to the Solomon Islands and other Pacific nations is going to rise.
Patricia A. O’Brien received funding from the Australian Research Council as a Future Fellow, the Jay I. Kislak Fellowship at the John W. Kluge Center, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. and New Zealand’s JD Stout Trust.
Disadvantaged communities not only suffer disproportionately from COVID, they are even more likely to be impacted by the cascading effects of long COVID.
With a new federal government, now is the time to engage in transformative planning to address a range of societal issues, including the impact of the pandemic on the most disadvantaged Australians.
We outline three policy areas to address the impact of long COVID on disadvantaged communities.
The greater impact of pandemics on disadvantaged communities was recognised before COVID.
Along with medical risks such as obesity, these communities already contended with social risks such as poverty, unhealthy environments and disability.
The interaction between these risks produces sustained and multiplied disadvantage, compounding existing barriers to health care and other supports.
While the pandemic has taken a toll on everyone, there is growing international evidence of greater effects on disadvantaged communities.
Communities with greater insecure employment, housing density and linguistic diversity recorded a higher incidence of COVID infections.
Risk factors for poorer clinical outcomes from COVID – such as hypertension (high blood pressure), diabetes and respiratory disorders – are also more common in disadvantaged communities.
While many developed countries achieved good vaccine uptake, studies report greater vaccine inequity and hesitancy in these communities.
Low-paid, precarious, essential and manual workers also struggled to adhere to stay-at-home orders and social distancing in the face of food and financial insecurity.
All these factors – some in place before COVID, some new – contribute to a higher risk of COVID for disadvantaged communities. That’s even before we start considering the impact of long COVID.
Most people with COVID make a full recovery. But for some, symptoms linger. The World Health Organization defines long COVID as new, persistent or fluctuating symptoms present three months after COVID infection, lasting at least two months, and not attributable to other diagnoses.
Globally, 43% of people with COVID have ongoing symptoms affecting daily life six months after infection. Fatigue and memory problems are the most commonly reported of the diverse symptoms linked to long COVID. However, an Australian study of long COVID estimated 5% of people have symptoms after three months.
So we need to learn more why these percentages differ.
In addition to the higher risk of exposure to COVID in the first place, disadvantaged communities lack accessible services and resources to support full recovery.
You can see how issues such as the rising cost of living and the lack of sick pay for casual workers can have a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged people who need to
return to work before they are fully recovered.
Not everyone can afford to take time off with lingering COVID symptoms. Shutterstock
In disadvantaged communities, there are also more barriers to accessing health care, excluding people already experiencing disadvantage.
For example, we know asylum seekers and undocumented migrants have experienced worse mental health, social isolation and access to health care than other groups during the pandemic.
While telehealth has opened up access for some, it increases barriers for others.
Geographical location is also a barrier for many Australians with long COVID, with most specialist clinics in metropolitan health services.
The human and financial costs associated with the complex disadvantage resulting from COVID (and long COVID) are vast.
One analysis estimated there would be up to 60,000–133,000 long COVID cases as Australia eased restrictions.
Analyses by the Bank of England and the United States Brookings Institute flag long COVID as a significant factor in future labour shortages.
However, we have few mechanisms to measure and track any impacts. Even putting an accurate figure on the number of COVID cases is difficult due to the greater reliance on rapid antigen tests, rather than PCR tests.
The relationship between long COVID and disadvantage is a collision between two highly complex issues. With new variants and reinfections, long COVID will be with us for years, further increasing an already complex (or “wicked”) problem.
However, we are yet to see leadership from local, state and territory, and federal governments on this issue.
Disadvantaged communities (particularly those most affected) are yet to be mobilised, to identify and tackle the local problems most affecting their recovery from COVID. Policies to tackle the disproportionate impact on them are yet to be developed.
These three actions would make a meaningful impact on health equity for everyone with long COVID.
1. Measure and track the issue
We urgently need high-quality data on long COVID to understand the trajectory and duration of recovery, and its interdependence with social determinants of health, for example, living in rural/remote Australia or being unemployed.
Investment in nationwide standardised data collection would enable targeted support for the communities that need it most.
2. Acknowledge diversity and intersectionality
A reductionist approach to long COVID or disadvantage that targets single aspects of someone’s identity will not work.
That’s because long COVID symptoms can be multiple and diverse, affecting all body systems. People may also experience multiple layers of disadvantage. So an “intersectional” approach acknowledges how various factors – such as health, poverty, gender or visa status – interplay.
3. Work with disadvantaged communities
Disadvantaged communities are the ones most affected by long COVID. So
any policy needs to be developed with their meaningful involvement.
People know what tangible outcomes would work best (or fail) in their community. So it’s crucial to have this input if we are to make real improvements.
This story is part of The Conversation’s Breaking the Cycle series, which is about escaping cycles of disadvantage. It is supported by a philanthropic grant from the Paul Ramsay Foundation.
Evelyne de Leeuw receives funding from CIHR (the Canadian Institute of Health Research, the equivalent of NHMRC) for research into financial strain during the pandemic. The relevant resources have not paid her personally.
Aryati Yashadhana ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
After decades of avoiding inclusion in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), New Zealand’s primary production sector has begrudgingly acknowledged that reducing on-farm emissions of greenhouse gases is an imperative.
Charged by the government with developing a pricing mechanism and strategy as an acceptable alternative to joining the ETS in 2025 under the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, the sector finally released its proposal earlier this month.
Called He Waka Eke Noa, the partnership involves Federated Farmers, Dairy NZ, Sheep and Beef NZ, Horticulture NZ, the Foundation for Arable Research and the Federation of Māori Authorities.
Their recommendations have now been submitted to the government, which has until the end of this year to consider its options. However, numerous uncertainties surround the scheme, which will need to be addressed if it’s to work properly.
Farm emissions still rising
Since opposing a previous Labour government’s so-called “fart tax” in 2003, many farmers and their representative organisations have resisted inclusion in the ETS while also calling for government assistance to help cope with the impacts of climate change.
In 2015, Federated Farmers claimed voluntary levies had reduced emissions per unit of meat and milk produced by 1.3% a year since 1990 (achieving similar objectives to those of the loathed “fart tax”).
Regardless of these industry and government initiatives, however, annual agricultural emissions have risen 15%, from 34.1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (emissions of all greenhouse gas added together) in 1990 to 39.4 million tonnes in 2020 (the latest available data) with no signs of decline.
He Waka Eke Noa recommends all agriculture and horticulture businesses above a certain size should be registered and encouraged to calculate their annual emissions. This will include both short-lived biogenic methane from ruminants and long-lived nitrous oxide from soils, as well as carbon dioxide from fertiliser manufacture (though fossil fuel emissions aren’t included).
A split-gas levy will then be charged, but at a much lower price per tonne than all other sectors are being charged under the ETS. The levy would increase each year, with its price determined by a “systems oversight board”.
Typically the annual levy, as proposed for a large dairy, sheep or beef farm, could exceed NZ$30,000, whereas it might be only $100 for an orchard, based on synthetic fertiliser use.
Fossil fuel inputs are excluded from the partnership, reducing incentives for improving efficiencies. Shutterstock
Doubts and uncertainties
In order to reduce their annual emissions and hence the levy paid, the intention is that farm businesses will have an incentive to use carbon mitigation technologies and introduce forest sinks on their property.
Fossil fuel energy inputs are already covered under the ETS so have been excluded. Unfortunately, this prohibits any incentives being applied for reducing diesel consumption by improving the efficiency of machinery, displacing coal and gas used for heating, or even generating renewable electricity from solar, wind, micro-hydro, crop residues or animal waste resources available on the farm.
He Waka Eke Noa analysis points to a reduction of agricultural emissions of just a few percent by 2030 from both the uptake of new technologies and farm forest sequestration.
Assumed total administration costs of around $120 million to $130 million will be necessary to achieve an annual emissions reduction of about two million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2030 if successful. Such an annual reduction should be ongoing, although the levy prices charged are yet to be determined.
Therefore the overall cost measured in terms of dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided, and the revenue to be obtained from the levy for investment in research and development, are not known.
There are numerous other uncertainties. What percentage of farm businesses will register, calculate their emissions and then dutifully pay the levy? What happens to those who don’t wish to take part? Who will monitor the accuracy of their annual submissions and using what methods?
It has been acknowledged that much trust in the farming community will be involved.
A 2003 protest in Auckland against the government’s proposed ‘fart tax’. Getty Images
Unanswered questions
Furthermore, what happens when no more suitable, low-grade land is available for forest sequestration? Planting trees can only be a short-term measure to buy time before having to reduce domestic carbon emissions more stringently.
Under the ETS, the minimum land area for registering a forest sink is one hectare, so the carbon uptake can be measured and monitored. How will numerous small areas of trees on thousands of farms be monitored, and future carbon loss from harvesting, storm damage or fire accounted for?
Areas of mature indigenous forest are in carbon balance so they cannot sequester more carbon. However, if the trees have been damaged by stock or pests whose removal allows some regrowth, how will this be measured in practice?
Perhaps the main question to ask is, given the relatively low prices likely to be applied per tonne of emissions, how many mitigation technologies will prove economic to implement?
For example, if the 2030 levy price on methane is $15 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, whereas the cost of mitigation strategies (such as using seaweed additives in cow feed) comes in at $20, then why would a dairy farmer bother?
Ultimately for a farm business it will be a balancing act between costs and achieving emission reduction goals. As the Climate Change Commissioner has said:
Agricultural emissions pricing needs to achieve emissions reductions – but if implemented poorly it also has the potential to create financial hardship for farmers as they transition to low emissions.
And in the words of the president of Federated Farmers:
Like all of these types of agreements with many parties involved, there’s always going to be a couple of dead rats you have to swallow.
So whether the ministers of climate change and agriculture will swallow a dead rat or two and accept these industry recommendations – with all their uncertainties and lack of high ambition – remains to be seen.
Or will the primary sector be made to join the ETS after all? If so, the fart tax might have been a better outcome for farmers in the first place.
Ralph Sims does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The desire by people in richer countries for a diverse range of out-of-season produce imported from overseas is driving up global greenhouse gas emissions, our new research has found.
It reveals how transporting food across and between countries generates almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions from the food sector – and affluent countries make a disproportionately large contribution to the problem.
Although carbon emissions associated with food production are well documented, this is the most detailed study of its kind. We estimated the carbon footprint of the global trade of food, tracking a range of food commodities along millions of supply chains.
Since 1995, worldwide agricultural and food trade has more than doubled and internationally traded food provides 19% of calories consumed globally. It’s never been clearer that eating local produce is a powerful way to take action on climate change.
A web of food journeys
The concept of “food miles” is used to measure the distance a food item travels from where it’s produced to where it’s consumed. From that, we can assess the associated environmental impact or “carbon footprint”.
Globally, food is responsible for about 16 billion tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions each year – or about 30% of total human-produced carbon emissions. The sources of food emissions include transport, land-use change (such as cutting down trees) and the production process.
Our study used an accounting framework we devised in an innovative platform called the FoodLab. It involved an unprecedented level of detail, spanning:
74 countries or regions
37 economic sectors
four transport modes – water, rail, road and air
more than 30 million trade connections: journeys of a single food from one place to another.
Food miles measure the distance a food item travels from where it’s produced to where it’s consumed. Shutterstock
Our results
We found global food miles emissions were about 3 billion tonnes each year, or 19% of total food emissions. This is up to 7.5 times higher than previous estimates.
Some 36% of food transport emissions were caused by the global freight of fruit and vegetables – almost twice the emissions released during their production. Vegetables and fruit require temperature-controlled transport which pushes their food miles emissions higher.
Overall, high-income countries were disproportionate contributors to food miles emissions. They constitute 12.5% of the world’s population yet generate 46% of international food miles emissions.
A number of large and emerging economies dominate the world food trade. China, Japan, the United States and Eastern Europe are large net importers of food miles and emissions – showing food demand there is noticeably higher than what’s produced domestically.
The largest net exporter of food miles was Brazil, followed by Australia, India and Argentina. Australia is a primary producer of a range of fruits and vegetables that are exported to the rest of the world.
In contrast, low-income countries with about half the global population cause only 20% of food transport emissions.
Low-income countries contribute far less to the problem of emissions from food transport. Shutterstock
Where to now?
To date, sustainable food research has largely focused on the emissions associated with meat and other animal-derived foods compared with plant-based foods. But our results indicate that eating food grown and produced locally is also important for mitigating emissions associated with food transport.
Eating locally is generally taken to mean eating food grown within a 161km radius of one’s home.
We acknowledge that some parts of the world cannot be self-sufficient in food supply. International trade can play an important role in providing access to nutritious food and mitigating food insecurity for vulnerable people in low-income countries.
And food miles should not be considered the only indicator of environmental impact. For example, an imported food produced sustainably may have a lower environmental impact than an emissions-intensive local food.
But there is much scope to reduce food transport emissions, especially in richer countries. Potential measures include:
carbon pricing and import duties
investing in less-polluting vehicles
encouraging businesses to cut emissions in their production and distribution chains
planning laws that allow more urban agriculture projects.
Consumers also have the power to reduce food transport emissions by adopting a more sustainable diet. For instance, next time you go to buy fruit out of season – which may have been grown overseas or on the other side of the country – perhaps consider whether a local alternative might do.
The problem of food transport emissions will only worsen as the global population grows. Governments, corporations and everyday people must work together to ensure the production and consumption of food does not make climate change worse.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Over the decades, supportive parents of Australian students on the cusp of graduating from their undergraduate studies have occasionally been struck by a bewildering decision by their pride and joy. Instead of pursuing an appetising salary in a prestigious company, their student has instead decided to do the unthinkable: they’re going to do a PhD. Where’s the money in that? What will we tell the neighbours?
A PhD program is foremost a training experience. A PhD student works a full-time apprenticeship (38 hours a week on average) in their chosen research field, guided by expert mentors along the way. While the choice to enter a PhD program is primarily based on a student wanting to upskill and learn, much like the choice to pursue an undergraduate degree, the starting point, method of study and outputs of a PhD are very different.
In Australia, the standard scheme to fund the living costs of PhD candidates is a tax-free stipend from their university. The university is allocated the funds via the Research Training Program (RTP).
This stipend is now $28,854 a year (indexed annually against inflation). That’s only two-thirds of the national minimum wage after last week’s increase to $42,246.88.
In weekly terms an income of $554.88 puts PhD candidates well below the poverty line of $608.96 for a single person if they have to pay for housing. Further, it’s close to an all-time low of 30% as a proportion of average full-time earnings.
In 2017 a sliding scale of stipends was introduced. Looking at the websites of the 39 members of Universities Australia in June 2022, it is encouraging to see a few universities offer higher rates than the required minimum for their PhD programs. However, most universities still mandate the lowest base rate.
Advertised annual PhD stipend at 39 Universities Australia member institutions.
A fair shake of the sauce bottle
This funding arrangement has been in place for some time, serving the community reasonably well. However, in the current economic climate of uncertainty, rising costs of living, skyrocketing rents and the Fair Work Commission’s decision to increase the minimum wage by 5.2%, it is worth comparing historical stipend rates, dating back to 1959, with other relevant yardsticks of income.
To make a fair comparison, we could scale up historically recorded weekly average, median and minimum wages over a 52-week year, noting that most Australian PhD programs permit 20 days of paid personal leave per year. Below, we see how these annual incomes have evolved over time since the inception of the PhD stipend.
Historical PhD stipend rates in Australia, compared to average full-time earnings, minimum wage and median full-time earnings (where available) [Sources: ABS, OECD]
Alternately, we can plot the PhD base rate and minimum wage as proportions of the average full-time income. Also shown is the consumer price index (CPI) as a standard measure of inflation, to give us some context – especially at this time of soaring living costs.
On the left hand axis, ratios of the PhD base rate and minimum wage against the average full-time income. On the right hand axis we show consumer price index (CPI) as a measure of inflation context. [Sources: ABS, OECD, World Bank]
At present, PhD stipends languish far below the minimum wage, even allowing for tax on the minimum wage (take off roughly $4,600 for the new minimum wage). The PhD stipend is at a near historical low when compared to the average full-time annual income.
Clearly, from the historical trends in the above graphs, things weren’t always this bad. The minimum wage and PhD stipend values have been comparable, but now they are well and truly detached.
Most PhD candidates have already done four or five years of university studies and have advanced, valuable skill sets. Being asked to live far below minimum wage seems a little unfair.
It’s also worth considering the overall benefits and impacts of knowledge generated a PhD student generates. They produce journal articles throughout their PhD project. Being told to survive well below minimum wage, while making valuable contributions to society and the future of Australia, doesn’t sound like a fair go for those who have a go, as a former prime minister once said.
While these trends and current situations don’t make for happy reading, there is hope, and precedent for change. The above graphs show the Rudd-Gillard Labor governments arrested the free-fall in PhD stipend value around 2009. This happened in response to a proposal by the Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations after PhD students fell below the poverty line for the first time.
Looking abroad to Europe, countries like the UK, Germany and Italy show us it is possible to value the hard work of research students at universities.
Average PhD student salaries against average full-time salary in some European countries. [Source: Informatics Europe]
The COVID-19 pandemic allowed us to consider the immediate relevance of cutting-edge science, technology and medical research. As the world waited for an end to lockdowns and uncertainty, PhD students were making vital contributions to help find a way out of our global predicament. Although usually in a supporting capacity, their role required a significantly advanced and niche skill set.
Some of these PhD students across Australia probably could have made a bit more money working fewer hours if they did run off and join the circus instead, but we’re lucky they didn’t.
Nathan Garland has previously received funding from an Australian Postgraduate Award.
Shaun Belward works for James Cook University. He received an Australian Postgraduate Research Award to study a PhD in the 1990s and has also benefitted from federally funded learning and teaching grants.
Age and education levels were the most important demographic variables in the Coalition’s loss of support between the 2019 and 2022 elections, according to an Australian National University analysis released on Monday.
“These two factors were much stronger predictors than sex, country of birth, location, and even household income,” the study found.
The analysis, titled Explaining the 2022 Australian Federal Election Result, authored by Nicholas Biddle and Ian McAllister, is based on an ANUpoll/Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey of more than 3500 voters.
It compared people’s voting intentions in April and their actual vote in May, as well as how people voted in 2019.
The study found that in general 2022 Coalition voters tended to be older, indigenous, with low education, living outside the capitals and with household income that put them outside the bottom quintile.
Labor voters tended to have higher education levels, lived in the capitals, and had low incomes.
Greens voters tended to be women, young, born in Australia or another English-speaking country, and without a trade qualification.
Biddle said more than one in three voters under 55 (34.9%) who voted Coalition in 2019 voted for someone else this year. But only about one in five (21.1%) aged 55 and over did so.
The Coalition also lost more votes among the better educated, he said. Some 31% of those who had completed year 12 and voted for the government in 2019 changed their vote in 2022. In contrast only 14.8% of Coalition voters who had not finished year 12 changed their vote .
“Education, and particularly high school education, really matters when it comes to understanding this election result,” Biddle said.
The Coalition also lost more voters in capital cities compared to outside the capitals.
The analysis said the results suggested the change in government was mainly driven by “younger, urban and more well educated” Coalition voters moving away from the government, while Labor was able to maintain its support across most demographic groups, apart from those outside capital cities.
The study found women were less likely to vote for the Coalition compared to men. But the largest gender difference related to the Greens with 22.5% of women voting for them but only 16.4% of men.
Some 13.6% of voters made up their minds how to vote on election day.
Most people voted in May the way they had indicated in April that they would – but more than a fifth (21.9%) changed their mind in the campaign. The most common reason people gave was because their views about the local candidate changed.
The data on those who voted for candidates and parties other than the Coalition, Labor and the Greens has not been fully analysed yet, so there is no information specifically on the “teal” vote.
The survey found voter volatility in 2022 was similar to 2019. “A similar proportion of Australians voted for a different party across those two elections as between the 2016 and 2019 election, and there was a remarkably similar proportion across the two elections of Australians who voted for a different party to that which they had intended to vote in the last survey prior to the election.”
The proportion of people splitting their lower house and Senate vote was low in both elections but appeared to have declined in 2022.
The survey also found a strong post-election increase in people’s satisfaction with the direction the country is going in, from 62.4% in April to 73.3% in May. Biddle said this was one of the highest levels of satisfaction since the 2019-20 bushfires and the pandemic’s start.
But satisfaction did vary according to how people had voted. While satisfaction jumped among Labor and Green voters it went down among Coalition voters.
Most people thought the election had been conducted fairly.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
On June 17 2022, UK Home Secretary Priti Patel issued a statement confirming she had approved the US government’s request to extradite Julian Assange. The Australian founder of Wikileaks faces 18 criminal charges of computer misuse and espionage.
This decision means Assange is one step closer to extradition, but has not yet reached the final stage in what has been a years-long process. Patel’s decision follows a March decision to deny leave to appeal by the UK Supreme Court, affirming the High Court decision that accepted assurances provided by the US government and concluded there were no remaining legal bars to Assange’s extradition.
The High Court decision overruled an earlier decision by a District Court that extraditing Assange to the US would be “unjust and oppressive” because the prison conditions he was likely to experience would make him a high risk for suicide. In the High Court’s view, the American government’s assurances sufficiently reduced the risk.
Wikileaks has already announced Assange will appeal the home secretary’s decision in the UK courts. He can appeal on an issue of law or fact, but must obtain leave of the High Court to launch an appeal. This is a fresh legal process rather than a continuation of the judicial stage of extradition that followed his arrest in 2019.
Assange’s brother has stated the appeal will include new information, including reports of plots to assassinate Assange.
Several legal issues argued before the District Court in 2020 are also likely to be raised in the next appeal. In particular, the District Court decided the question of whether the charges were political offences, and therefore not extraditable crimes, could only be considered by the home secretary. The question of whether and how the home secretary decided on this issue could now be ripe for argument.
Assange’s next appeal will also seek to re-litigate whether US government assurances regarding the prison conditions Assange will face are adequate or reliable. His lawyers will also again demand the UK courts consider the role of role of freedom of expression in determining whether to extradite Assange.
Assange will remain detained in Belmarsh prison while his appeal is underway. The decision of the High Court on his appeal against the home secretary’s decision may potentially be appealed to the Supreme Court.
If, after all legal avenues are exhausted in the UK, the order to extradite stands, Assange could take a human rights action to the European Court of Human Rights.
However, the European Court has rarely declared extradition to be contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights, except in cases involving the death penalty or whole-life sentences. It has not yet considered freedom of expression in an extradition case.
Further appeals could add years more to the saga of Assange’s detention.
Responses from the Assange family and human rights advocates
Assange’s wife, Stella Moris, called Patel’s decision a ‘“travesty”. His brother Gabriel Shipton called it “shameful”. They have vowed to fight his extradition through every legal means available.
According to Secretary General of Amnesty International Agnes Callamard:
Assange faces a high risk of prolonged solitary confinement, which would violate the prohibition on torture or other ill treatment. Diplomatic assurances provided by the US that Assange will not be kept in solitary confinement cannot be taken on face value given previous history.
What role for the Australian government?
Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus responded to the latest development last night. They confirmed Australia would continue to provide consular assistance to Assange:
The Australian government has been clear in our view that Mr Assange’s case has dragged on for too long and that it should be brought to a close. We will continue to express this view to the governments of the United Kingdom and United States.
However, it remains unclear exactly what form Australia’s diplomatic or political advocacy is taking.
In December 2021, Anthony Albanese said he could not see what purpose was served by the ongoing pursuit of Assange. He is a signatory to a petition to free Assange. Since he was sworn in as prime minister, though, Albanese has resisted calls to demand publicly that the US drop its criminal charges against Assange.
In contrast, Albanese recently made a public call for the release of Sean Turnell from prison in Myanmar.
In a way, Patel’s decision this week closes a window for stronger advocacy between Australia and the UK. While the matter sat with the UK Home Secretary, the Australian government might have sought to intervene with it as a political issue. Now it seems possible Australia may revert to its long established position of non-interference in an ongoing court process.
Some commentators argue this is insufficient and that Australia must, finally, do more for Assange. Tasmanian MP Andrew Wilkie said it was high time Australia treated this as the political matter it is, and demand from its allies in London and Washington that the matter be brought to an end.
Barrister Greg Barns likened Assange’s situation to that of David Hicks, who was imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay:
The Howard government at the time brought him back to Australia. This is not unprecedented. It is important that Australia is able to use the great relationship it has with Washington to ensure the safety of Australians.
These comments suggest that Australia ought to focus any advocacy towards the US government, making a case for the criminal charges and extradition request to be abandoned. At this stage it is impossible to say if the Albanese government has the will to take a stronger stand on Assange’s liberty. The prime minister and foreign minister have certainly invested heavily in foreign relations in the early weeks of their government, with emphasis on the significance of the US alliance.
Perhaps strong advocacy on Assange’s behalf at this time might be regarded as unsettling and risky. The US has had plenty of opportunity, and its own change of government, and yet it has not changed its determination to prosecute Assange. This is despite former President Barack Obama’s decision to commute the sentence of Chelsea Manning, the whistleblower who provided classified material to Assange for publication through Wikileaks.
Stronger Australian advocacy may well be negatively received. Assange’s supporters will continue to demand that Albanese act regardless, banking on the strength of the Australia-US alliance as capable of tolerating a point of disagreement.
Holly Cullen has done occasional volunteer work with the Australian Labor Party..
Amy Maguire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Vanuatu Prime Minister has again failed to push through controversial constitutional changes.
These include extending the term of Parliament, changing the definition of a Vanuatu citizen, and increasing the size of cabinet by nearly a third.
A second session of Parliament yesterday was adjourned because of a lack of MPs.
Vanuatu Prime Minister Bob Loughman … facing opposition – even from his own Vanua’aku Pati – over proposed constitutional amendments. Image: RNZ
Prime Minister Bob Loughman wants to push through at least 15 constitutional changes which the opposition and some MPs in both his coalition and his own Vanua’aku Pati oppose.
On Friday there were only 31 of the 52 MPs present.
For a constitutional change a minimum of 34 MPs is needed.
They say the government’s plan to put the Chief Justice’s position on a fixed-term contract undermines the credibility of that judicial office.
Costly process The adjournment of the Vanuatu Parliament over the seven days to Friday cost the country’s taxpayers more than 3.7 million vatu (US$32,000).
This is because MPs and cabinet ministers each get daily allowances when the Parliament is in session.
“You cannot just pull a paper from a rubbish bin and bring it to Parliament for approval because you are dealing with Vanuatu’s Constitution,” former prime minister Charlot Salwai said. https://t.co/Bgq4z1XeXs
But on Friday a week ago the session was adjourned because many MPs had boycotted over government plans to push through the sweeping constitutional changes.
Ati George Sokomanu, who was the country’s first president, is calling for more communication among the leaders and respect for the procedures required under the constitution to avoid wasting taxpayers’ money.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
The Vanuatu Parliament in Port Vila … many MPs have boycotted the house over government plans to push through the sweeping constitutional changes. Image: Sally Round/RNZ
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern is expected to participate in the upcoming NATO Leaders Summit, becoming the first New Zealand leader to do so.
NATO’s Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, has invited the leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand to attend the military alliance’s meeting in Spain held on June 28-30.
Anthony Albanese, Fumio Kishida and Yoon Suk-yeol have already accepted the invitation.
Ardern is expected to participate in a session focused on the Asia-Pacific region and meet with a range of foreign leaders.
While ministers, including Foreign Affairs Minister Nanaia Mahuta, have attended previous NATO meetings, this is the first time New Zealand has been invited to the Leaders Summit.
Stoltenberg said the invitation is a “strong demonstration” of NATO’s “close partnership” with like-minded countries in the Asia Pacific.
NATO will set its strategy for the next decade at the summit and define the security challenges the alliance is facing and what it will do to address them.
‘Strengthened’ defence talks Leaders will also discuss “strengthened” defence, further support for Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden’s applications for membership.
Otago University professor of politics and international studies Robert Patman said the invitation is significant and “reflects the gravity of the international situation at the moment.”
The invitation has come at a “critical” time in Europe, he said.
“We live in such an interconnected world. We’ve seen in New Zealand how events far away from us, such as transnational terrorism, can impact on our own society…
“We live in a world in which increasingly all states, big and small, are confronted by problems which don’t respect borders.
“There’s a recognition among NATO that although New Zealand and Australia and South Korea and Japan are geographically a long way from NATO, they share a lot in common in terms of values and in their approach to international order.
“So I think that’s probably why, given the dramatic backdrop of the war in Ukraine, that we’ve been invited to NATO.”
At the summit, Ardern will likely want NATO leaders to “reaffirm the importance of a rules-based international order, on which this country critically depends,” Patman said.