Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Protesters across the United States have brandished placards declaring “no kings!” in recent days, keen to send a message one-man rule is not acceptable.

The defeat of the forces of King George III in the United States’ revolutionary war of 1775–83 saw the end of royal rule in the US. Touting itself as the world’s leading democracy, kings have not been welcome in America for 250 years. But for many, Donald Trump is increasingly behaving as one and now is the time to stop him.

Having studied ancient Roman politics for years, America’s rejection of kingship reminds me vividly of the strong aversion to it in the Roman republic.

Early Romans too, sought a society with “no kings!” – up until, that is, the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar, when everything changed.

The seven kings of Rome

Seven kings ruled Rome, one after the other, after the city was founded in 753 BCE. The first was Romulus who, according to some legends, gave the city its name.

When the last of the kings of Rome was driven from the city in 509 BCE, his key opponent, Lucius Junius Brutus, vowed:

I will pursue Lucius Tarquinius Superbus and his wicked wife and all his children, with sword, with fire, with whatever violence I may; and I will suffer neither him nor anyone else to be king in Rome!

Tarquinius Superbus (meaning “the proud”) had ruled Rome for 25 years. He began his reign by executing uncooperative Senators.

When Tarquinius’ son raped a noblewoman named Lucretia, the Roman population rebelled against the king’s long-running tyranny. The hubris of the king and his family was finally too much. They were driven from Rome and never allowed to return.

A new system of government was ushered in: the republic.

The rise of the Roman republic

In the new system, power was shared among elected officials – including two consuls, who were elected annually.

The consuls were the most powerful officials in the republic and were given power to wage war.

The Senate, which represented the wealthiest sections of society (initially the patrician class), held power in some key areas, including foreign policy.

Less affluent citizens elected tribunes of the plebs who had various powers, including the right to veto laws.

In the republican system, the term king (rex in Latin) quickly became anathema.

“No kings” would effectively remain the watchword through the Roman republic’s entire history. “Rex” was a word the Romans hated. It was short-hand for “tyranny”.

The rise and fall of Julius Caesar

Over time, powerful figures emerged who threatened the republic’s tight power-sharing rules.

Figures such as the general Pompey (106–48 BCE) broke all the rules and behaved in suspiciously kingly ways. With military success and vast wealth, he was a populist who broke the mould. Pompey even staged a three-day military parade, known as a triumph, to coincide with his birthday in 61 BCE.

But the ultimate populist was Julius Caesar.

Born to a noble family claiming lineage from the goddess Venus, Caesar became fabulously wealthy.

He also scored major military victories, including subduing the Gauls (across modern France and Belgium) from 58–50 BCE.

In the 40s BCE, Caesar began taking offices over extended time frames – much longer periods than the rules technically allowed.

Early in 44 BCE he gave himself the formal title “dictator for life” (Dictator Perpetuo), having been appointed dictator two years earlier. The dictatorship was only meant to be held in times of emergency for a period of six months.

When Caesar was preparing a war against Parthia (in modern day Iran), some tried to hail him as king.

Soon after, an angry group of 23 senators stabbed him to death in a vain attempt to save the republic. They were led by Marcus Junius Brutus, a descendant of the Brutus who killed the last Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus.

However, the Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death. His great nephew Octavian eventually emerged as leader and became known as Augustus (27 BCE – 14 CE). With Augustus, an age of emperors was born.

Emperors were kings in all but name. The strong aversion to kingship in Rome ensured their complete avoidance of the term rex.

‘No kings!’

American protesters waving placards shouting “no kings!” are expressing clear concerns that their beloved democracy is under threat.

Donald Trump has already declared eight national emergencies and issued 161 executive orders in his second term.

When asked if he needs to uphold the Constitution, Trump declares “I don’t know.” He has joked about running for a third term as president, in breach of the longstanding limit of two terms.

Like Caesar, is Donald Trump becoming a king in all but name? Is he setting a precedent for his successors to behave increasingly like emperors?

The American aversion to “king” likely ensures the term will never return. But when protesters and others shout “no kings!”, they know the very meaning of the term “president” is changing before their eyes.

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too – https://theconversation.com/no-kings-like-the-la-protesters-the-early-romans-hated-kings-too-259011

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Middle East Studies, Australian National University

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could last for at least two weeks.

His timing seems precise for a reason. The Israel Defence Forces and the country’s intelligence agencies have clearly devised a methodical, step-by-step campaign.

Israeli forces initially focused on decapitating the Iranian military and scientific leadership and, just as importantly, destroying virtually all of Iran’s air defences.

Israeli aircraft can not only operate freely over Iranian air space now, they can refuel and deposit more special forces at key sites to enable precision bombing of targets and attacks on hidden or well-protected nuclear facilities.

In public statements since the start of the campaign, Netanyahu has highlighted two key aims: to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and to encourage the Iranian people to overthrow the clerical regime.

With those two objectives in mind, how might the conflict end? Several broad scenarios are possible.

A return to negotiations

US President Donald Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, was to have attended a sixth round of talks with his Iranian counterparts on Sunday aimed at a deal to replace the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated under the Obama administration in 2015. Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term in 2018, despite Iran’s apparent compliance to that point.

Netanyahu was opposed to the 2015 agreement and has indicated he does not believe Iran is serious about a replacement.

So, accepting negotiations as an outcome of the Israeli bombing campaign would be a massive climbdown by Netanyahu. He wants to use the defanging of Iran to reestablish his security credentials after the Hamas attacks of October 2023.

Even though Trump continues to press Iran to accept a deal, negotiations are off the table for now. Trump won’t be able to persuade Netanyahu to stop the bombing campaign to restart negotiations.

Complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program

Destruction of Iran’s nuclear program would involve destroying all known sites, including the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, about 100 kilometres south of Tehran.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, the facility is located about half a mile underground, beneath a mountain. It is probably beyond the reach of even the US’ 2,000-pound deep penetration bombs.

The entrances and ventilation shafts of the facility could be closed by causing landslides. But that would be a temporary solution.

Taking out Fordow entirely would require an Israeli special forces attack. This is certainly possible, given Israel’s success in getting operatives into Iran to date. But questions would remain about how extensively the facility could be damaged and then how quickly it could be rebuilt.

And destruction of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges – used to enrich uranium to create a bomb – would be only one step in dismantling its program.

Israel would also have to secure or eliminate Iran’s stock of uranium already enriched to 60% purity. This is sufficient for up to ten nuclear bombs if enriched to the weapons-grade 90% purity.

But does Israeli intelligence know where that stock is?

Collapse of the Iranian regime

Collapse of the Iranian regime is certainly possible, particularly given Israel’s removal of Iran’s most senior military leaders since its attacks began on Friday, including the heads of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian armed forces.

And anti-regime demonstrations over the years, most recently the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests after the death in police custody of a young Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, in 2022, have shown how unpopular the regime is.

That said, the regime has survived many challenges since coming to power in 1979, including war with Iraq in the 1980s and massive sanctions. It has developed remarkably efficient security systems that have enabled it to remain in place.

Another uncertainty at this stage is whether Israeli attacks on civilian targets might engender a “rally round the flag” movement among Iranians.

Netanyahu said in recent days that Israel had indications the remaining senior regime figures were packing their bags in preparation for fleeing the country. But he gave no evidence.

A major party joins the fight

Could the US become involved in the fighting?

This can’t be ruled out. Iran’s UN ambassador directly accused the US of assisting Israel with its strikes.

That is almost certainly true, given the close intelligence sharing between the US and Israel. Moreover, senior Republicans, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, have called on Trump to order US forces to help Israel “finish the job”.

Trump would probably be loath to do this, particularly given his criticism of the “forever wars” of previous US administrations. But if Iran or pro-Iranian forces were to strike a US base or military asset in the region, pressure would mount on Trump to retaliate.

Another factor is that Trump probably wants the war to end as quickly as possible. His administration will be aware the longer a conflict drags on, the more likely unforeseen factors will arise.

Could Russia become involved on Iran’s side? At this stage that’s probably unlikely. Russia did not intervene in Syria late last year to try to protect the collapsing Assad regime. And Russia has plenty on its plate with the war in Ukraine.

Russia criticised the Israeli attack when it started, but appears not to have taken any action to help Iran defend itself.

And could regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates become involved?

Though they have a substantial arsenal of US military equipment, the two countries have no interest in becoming caught up in the conflict. The Gulf Arab monarchies have engaged in a rapprochement with Iran in recent years after decades of outright hostility. Nobody would want to put this at risk.

Uncertainties predominate

We don’t know the extent of Iran’s arsenal of missiles and rockets. In its initial retaliation to Israel’s strikes, Iran has been able to partially overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system, causing civilian casualties.

If it can continue to do this, causing more civilian casualties, Israelis already unhappy with Netanyahu over the Gaza war might start to question his wisdom in starting another conflict.

But we are nowhere near that point. Though it’s too early for reliable opinion polling, most Israelis almost certainly applaud Netanyahu’s action so far to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, Netanyahu has threatened to make Tehran “burn” if Iran deliberately targets Israeli civilians.

We can be confident that Iran does not have any surprises in store. Israel has severely weakened its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. They are clearly in no position to assist Iran through diversionary attacks.

The big question will be what comes after the war. Iran will almost certainly withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and forbid more inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Israel will probably be able to destroy Iran’s existing nuclear facilities, but it’s only a question of when – not if – Iran will reconstitute them.

This means the likelihood of Iran trying to secure a nuclear bomb in order to deter future Israeli attacks will be much higher. And the region will remain in a precarious place.

Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netanyahu has two war aims: destroying Iran’s nuclear program and regime change. Are either achievable? – https://theconversation.com/netanyahu-has-two-war-aims-destroying-irans-nuclear-program-and-regime-change-are-either-achievable-259014

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joaquin Vespignani, Associate Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania

The weekend attacks on Iran’s oil facilities – widely seen as part of escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran – represent a dangerous moment for global energy security.

While the physical damage to Iran’s production facilities is still being assessed, the broader strategic implications are already rippling through global oil markets. There is widespread concern about supply security and the inflationary consequences for both advanced and emerging economies.

The global impact

Iran, which holds about 9% of the world’s proven oil reserves, currently exports between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day, primarily to China, despite long-standing United States sanctions.

While its oil output is not as globally integrated as that of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, any disruption to Iranian production or export routes – especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows – poses a systemic risk.

Markets have already reacted. Brent crude prices rose more than US 6%, while West Texas Intermediate price increased by over US 5% immediately after the attacks.

These price movements reflect not only short-term supply concerns but also the addition of a geopolitical risk premium due to fears of broader regional conflict.

International oil prices may increase further as the conflict continues. Analysts expect that Australian petrol prices will increase in the next few weeks, as domestic fuel costs respond to international benchmarks with a lag.

Escalation and strategic intentions

There is growing concern this conflict could escalate further. In particular, Israel may intensify its targeting of Iranian oil facilities, as part of a broader strategy to weaken Iran’s economic capacity and deter further proxy activities.

Should this occur, it would put even more upward pressure on global oil prices. Unlike isolated sabotage events, a sustained campaign against Iranian energy infrastructure would likely lead to tighter global supply conditions. This would be a near certainty if Iranian retaliatory actions disrupt shipping routes or neighbouring producers.

Countries most affected

Countries reliant on oil imports – especially in Asia – are the most exposed to such shocks in the short term.

India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil and are particularly vulnerable to both supply interruptions and price increases. These economies typically have limited strategic petroleum reserves and face external balance pressures when oil prices rise.

China, despite being Iran’s largest oil customer, has greater insulation due to its diversified suppliers and substantial reserves.

However, sustained instability in the Persian Gulf would raise freight and insurance costs even for Chinese refiners, especially if the Strait of Hormuz becomes a contested zone. The strait, between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, provides the only sea access from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean.

Australia’s exposure

Australia does not import oil directly from Iran. Most of its crude and refined products are sourced from countries including South Korea, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.

However, because Australian fuel prices are pegged to international benchmarks such as Brent and Singapore Mogas, domestic prices will rise in response to the global increase in oil prices, regardless of whether Australian refineries process Iranian oil.

These price increases will have flow-on effects, raising transport and freight costs across the economy. Industries such as agriculture, logistics, aviation and construction will feel the pinch, and higher operating costs are likely to be passed on to consumers.

Broader economic impacts

The conflict could also disrupt global shipping routes, particularly if Iran retaliates through its proxies by targeting vessels in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, or Hormuz Strait.

Any such disruption could drive up shipping insurance, delay delivery times, and compound existing global supply chain vulnerabilities. More broadly, this supply shock could rekindle inflationary pressures in many countries.

For Australia, it could delay monetary easing by the Reserve Bank of Australia and reduce consumer confidence if household fuel costs rise significantly. Globally, central banks may adopt a more cautious approach to rate cuts if oil-driven inflation proves persistent.

The attacks on Iran’s oil fields, and the likelihood of further escalation, present a renewed threat to global energy stability. Even though Australia does not import Iranian oil, it remains exposed through price transmission, supply chain effects and inflationary pressures.

A sustained campaign targeting Iran’s energy infrastructure by Israel could amplify these risks, leading to a broader energy shock that would affect oil-importing economies worldwide.

Strategic reserve management and diplomatic engagement will be essential to contain the fallout.

Joaquin Vespignani is affiliated with the Centre for Australian Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University.

– ref. Israel’s attacks on Iran are already hurting global oil prices, and the impact is set to worsen – https://theconversation.com/israels-attacks-on-iran-are-already-hurting-global-oil-prices-and-the-impact-is-set-to-worsen-259013

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

The scale of Israel’s strikes on multiple, sensitive Iranian military and nuclear sites on Friday was unprecedented. It was the biggest attack on Iran since the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.

As expected, Iran responded swiftly, even as Israeli attacks on its territory continued. The unfolding conflict is reshaping regional dynamics, and Iran now finds itself with no easy path forward.

Strikes come at a delicate time

The timing of the Israeli strikes was highly significant. They came at a critical point in the high-stakes negotiations between Iran and the United States over Tehran’s nuclear program that began earlier this year.

Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report accusing Tehran of stockpiling highly enriched uranium at levels dangerously close to weaponisation.

According to the report, Iran has accumulated around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity. If this uranium is further enriched to 90% purity, it would be enough to build nine to ten bombs.

The day before Israel’s attack, the IAEA board of governors also declared Iran to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in two decades.

The nuclear talks recently hit a stumbling block over a major issue – the US refusal to allow Iran to enrich any uranium at all for a civilian nuclear program.

Iran has previously agreed to cap its enrichment at 3.67% under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a nuclear deal between Iran, the US and other global powers agreed to in 2015 (and abandoned by the first Trump administration in 2018). But it has refused to relinquish its right to enrichment altogether.

US President Donald Trump reportedly urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to attack Iran last week, believing he was close to a deal.

But after the attack, Trump ramped up his threats on Iran again, urging it to agree to a deal “before there is nothing left”. He called the Israeli strikes “excellent” and suggested there was “more to come”.

Given this context, it is understandable why Iran does not view the US as an impartial mediator. In response, Iran suspended its negotiations with the US, announcing it would skip the sixth round of talks scheduled for Sunday.

Rather than compelling Iran to agree to a deal, the excessive pressure could risk pushing Iran towards a more extreme stance instead.

While Iranian officials have denied any intention to develop a military nuclear program, they have warned that continued Israeli attacks and US pressure might force Tehran to reconsider as a deterrence mechanism.

Read more:
As its conflict with Israel escalates, could Iran now acquire a nuclear bomb?

Why surrender could spell the regime’s end

On several occasions, Trump has insisted he is not seeking “regime change” in Iran. He has repeatedly claimed he wants to see Iran be “successful” – the only requirement is for it to accept a US deal.

However, in Iran’s view, the US proposal is not viewed as a peace offer, but as a blueprint for surrender. And the fear is this would ultimately pave the way for regime change under the guise of diplomacy.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to the latest US proposal by insisting that uranium enrichment remains a “red line” for Iran. Abandoning this right from the Iranian perspective would only embolden its adversaries to escalate their pressure on the regime and make further demands – such as dismantling Iran’s missile program.

The fear in Tehran is this could push the country into a defenceless state without a way to deter future Israeli strikes.

Furthermore, capitulating to the US terms could ignite domestic backlash on two fronts: from an already growing opposition movement, and from the regime’s base of loyal supporters, who would see any retreat as a betrayal.

In this context, many in Iran’s leadership believe that giving in to Trump’s terms would not avert regime change – it would hasten it.

What options remain for Iran now?

Caught between escalating pressure and existential threats, Iran finds itself with few viable options other than to project strength. It has already begun to pursue this strategy by launching retaliatory missile strikes at Israeli cities.

This response has been much stronger than the relatively contained tit-for-tat strikes Israel and Iran engaged in last year. Iran’s strikes have caused considerable damage to government and residential areas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Iran sees no alternative but to push forward, having already been drawn into open confrontation. Any sign of weakness would severely undermine the regime’s legitimacy at home and embolden its adversaries abroad.

Moreover, Tehran is betting on Trump’s aversion to foreign wars. Iranian leaders believe the US is neither prepared nor willing to enter another costly conflict in the region – one that could disrupt global trade and jeopardise Trump’s recent economic partnerships with Persian Gulf states.

Therefore, Iran’s leadership likely believes that by standing firm now, the conflict will be limited, so long as the US stays on the sidelines. And then, Iran’s leaders would try to return to the negotiating table, in their view, from a position of strength.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As war breaks out with Israel, Iran has run out of good options – https://theconversation.com/as-war-breaks-out-with-israel-iran-has-run-out-of-good-options-258916

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hassan Vally, Associate Professor, Epidemiology, Deakin University

On Thursday afternoon local time, an Air India passenger plane bound for London crashed shortly after takeoff from the northwestern Indian city of Ahmedabad. There were reportedly 242 people onboard, including two pilots and ten cabin crew.

The most up-to-date reports indicate the death toll has surpassed 260, including people on the ground.

Miraculously, one passenger – British national Vishwashkumar Ramesh – survived the crash.

Thankfully, catastrophic plane crashes such as this are very rare. But seeing news of such a horrific event is traumatic, particularly for people who may have a fear of flying or are due to travel on a plane soon.

If you’re feeling anxious following this distressing news, it’s understandable. But here are some things worth considering when you’re thinking about the risk of plane travel.

Just how dangerous is flying?

One of the ways to make sense of risks, especially really small ones, is to put them into context.

Although there are various ways to do this, we can first look to figures that tell us the risk of dying in a plane crash per passenger who boards a plane. Arnold Barnett, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, calculated that in 2018–22, this figure was one in 13.7 million. By any reckoning, this is an incredibly small risk.

And there’s a clear trend of air travel getting safer every decade. Barnett’s calculations suggest that between 2007 and 2017, the risk was one per 7.9 million.

We can also compare the risks of dying in a plane crash with those of dying in a car accident. Although estimates of motor vehicle fatalities vary depending on how you do the calculations and where you are in the world, flying has been estimated to be more than 100 times safer than driving.

Evolution has skewed our perception of risks

The risk of being involved in a plane crash is extremely small. But for a variety of reasons, we often perceive it to be greater than it is.

First, there are well-known limitations in how we intuitively estimate risk. Our responses to risk (and many other things) are often shaped far more by emotion and instinct than by logic.

As psychologist Daniel Kahneman explains in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, much of our thinking about risk is driven by intuitive, automatic processes rather than careful reasoning.

Notably, our brains evolved to pay attention to threats that are striking or memorable. The risks we faced in primitive times were large, immediate and tangible threats to life. Conversely, the risks we face in the modern world are generally much smaller, less obvious, and play out over the longer term.

The brain that served us well in prehistoric times has essentially remained the same, but the world has completely changed. Therefore, our brains are susceptible to errors in thinking and mental shortcuts called cognitive biases that skew our perception of modern risks.

This can lead us to overestimate very small risks, such as plane crashes, while underestimating far more probable dangers, such as chronic diseases.

Why we overestimate the risks of flying

There are several drivers of our misperception of risks when it comes to flying specifically.

The fact events such as the Air India plane crash are so rare makes them all the more psychologically powerful when they do occur. And in today’s digital media landscape, the proliferation of dramatic footage of the crash itself, along with images of the aftermath, amplifies its emotional and visual impact.

The effect these vivid images have on our thinking around the risks of flying is called the availability heuristic. The more unusual and dramatic an event is, the more it stands out in our minds, and the more it skews our perception of its likelihood.

Another influence on the way we perceive risks relevant to flying is called dread risk, which is a psychological response we have to certain types of threats. We fear certain risks that feel more catastrophic or unfamiliar. It’s the same reason we may disproportionately fear terrorist attacks, when in reality they’re very uncommon.

Plane crashes usually involve a large number of deaths that occur at one time. And the thought of going down in a plane may feel more frightening than dying in other ways. All this taps into the emotions of fear, vulnerability and helplessness, and leads to an overweighting of the risks.

Another factor that contributes to our overestimation of flying risks is our lack of control when flying. When we’re passengers on a plane, we are in many ways completely dependent on others. Even though we know pilots are highly trained and commercial aviation is very safe, the lack of control we have as passengers triggers a deep sense of vulnerability.

This absence of control makes the situation feel riskier than it actually is, and often riskier than activities where the threat is far greater but there is an (often false) sense of control, such as driving a car.

In a nutshell

We have an evolutionary bias toward reacting more strongly to particular threats, especially when these events are dramatic, evoke dread and when we feel an absence of control.

Although events such as Air India crash affect us deeply, air travel is still arguably the safest method of transport. Understandably, this can get lost in the emotional aftermath of tragic plane crashes.

Hassan Vally does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. News of the Air India plane crash is traumatic. Here’s how to make sense of the risk – https://theconversation.com/news-of-the-air-india-plane-crash-is-traumatic-heres-how-to-make-sense-of-the-risk-258907

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Erin Smith, Associate Professor and Discipline Lead (Paramedicine), La Trobe University

Vishwashkumar Ramesh, a British citizen returning from a trip to India, has been confirmed as the only survivor of Thursday’s deadly Air India crash.

“I don’t know how I am alive,” Ramesh told family, according to his brother Nayan, in a video call moments after emerging from the wreckage. Another brother Ajay, seated elswhere on the plane, was killed.

The Boeing 787-7 Dreamliner crashed into a medical college less than a minute after taking off in the city of Ahmedabad, killing the other 229 passengers and 12 crew. At least five people were killed on the ground.

Surviving a mass disaster of this kind may be hailed as a kind of “miracle”. But what is it like to survive – especially as the only one?

Surviving a disaster

Past research has shown disaster survivors may experience an intense range of emotions, from grief and anxiety to feelings of loss and uncertainty.

These are common reactions to an extraordinary situation.

Some people may develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and have difficulty adjusting to a new reality after bearing witness to immense loss. They may also be dealing with physical recovery from injuries sustained in the disaster.

Most people recover after disasters by drawing on their own strengths and the support of others. Recovery rates are high: generally less than one in ten of those affected by disasters develop chronic, long-term problems.

However, being a sole survivor of a mass casualty may have its own complex psychological challenges.

Survivor’s guilt

Survivors can experience guilt they lived when others died.

My friend, Gill Hicks, spoke to me for this article about the ongoing guilt she still feels, years after surviving the 2005 bombings of the London underground.

Lying trapped in a smoke-filled train carriage, she was the last living person to be rescued after the attack. Gill lost both her legs.

Yet she still wonders, “Why me? Why did I get to go home, when so many others didn’t?”

In the case of a sole survivor, this guilt may be particularly acute. However, research addressing the impact of sole survivorship is limited. Most research that looks at the psychological impact of disaster focuses on the impact of disasters more broadly.

Those interviewed for a 2013 documentary about surviving large plane crashes, Sole Survivor, express complex feelings – wanting to share their stories, but fearing being judged by others.

Being the lone survivor can be a heavy burden.

“I didn’t think I was worthy of the gift of being alive,” George Lamson Jr. told the documentary, after surviving a 1985 plane crash in Nevada that killed all others on board.

Looking for meaning

People who survive a disaster may also be under pressure to explain what happened and relive the trauma for the benefit of others.

Vishwashkumar Ramesh was filmed and interviewed by media in the minutes and hours following the Air India crash. But as he told his brother: “I have no idea how I exited the plane”.

It can be common for survivors themselves to be plagued by unanswerable questions. Did they live for a reason? Why did they live, when so many others died?

These kinds of unaswerable questions reflect our natural inclination to look for meaning in experiences, and to have our life stories make sense.

For some people, sharing a traumatic experience with others who’ve been through it or something similar can be a beneficial part of the recovery process, helping to process emotions and regain some agency and control.

However, this may not always be possible for sole survivors, potentially compounding feelings of guilt and isolation.

Coping with survivor guilt

Survivor guilt can be an expression of grief and loss.

Studies indicate guilt is notably widespread among individuals who have experienced traumatic events, and it is associated with heightened psychopathological symptoms (such as severe anxiety, insomnia or flashbacks) and thoughts of suicide.

Taking time to process the traumatic event can help survivors cope, and seeking support from friends, family and community or faith leaders can help an individual work through difficult feelings.

My friend Gill says the anxiety rises as the anniversary of the disaster approaches each year. Trauma reminders such as anniversaries are different to unexpected trauma triggers, but can still cause distress.

Media attention around collectively experienced dates can also amplify trauma-related distress, contributing to a cycle of media consumption and increased worry about future events.

On the 7th of July each year, Gill holds a private remembrance ritual. This allows her to express her grief and sense of loss, and to honour those who did not survive. These types of rituals can be a valuable tool in processing feelings of grief and guilt, offering a sense of control and meaning and facilitating the expression and acceptance of loss.

But lingering guilt and anxiety – especially when it interferes with day-to-day life – should not be ignored. Ongoing survivor guilt is associated with significantly higher levels of post-traumatic symptoms.

Survivors may need support from psychologists or mental health professionals in the short and long term.

Erin Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Just one man survived the Air India crash. What’s it like to survive a mass disaster? – https://theconversation.com/just-one-man-survived-the-air-india-crash-whats-it-like-to-survive-a-mass-disaster-258905

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Thomas Corben, Research Fellow, Foreign Policy and Defence, University of Sydney

Ahead of a prospective meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and US President Donald Trump at the G7 Summit Canada, two key developments have bumped defence issues to the top of the alliance agenda.

First, in a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles late last month, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth urged Australia to boost defence spending to 3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP).

This elicited a stern response from Albanese that “Australia should decide what we spend on Australia’s defence.”

Then, this week, news emerged the Pentagon is conducting a review of the AUKUS deal to ensure it aligns with Trump’s “America First” agenda.

Speculation is rife as to the reasons for the review. Some contend it’s a classic Trump “shakedown” to force Australia to pay more for its submarines, while others say it’s a normal move for any new US administration.

Read more:
Trump may try to strike a deal with AUKUS review, but here’s why he won’t sink it

The reality is somewhere in between. Trump may well see an opportunity to “own” the AUKUS deal negotiated by his predecessor, Joe Biden, by seeking to extract a “better deal” from Australia.

But while support for AUKUS across the US system is strong, the review also reflects long-standing and bipartisan concerns in the US over the deal. These include, among other things, Australia’s functional and fiscal capacity to take charge of its own nuclear-powered submarines once they are built.

So, why have these issues come up now, just before Albanese’s first face-to-face meeting with Trump?

To understand this, it’s important to place both issues in a wider context. We need to consider the Trump administration’s overall approach to alliances, as well as whether Australia’s defence budget matches our strategy.

Trump, alliances and burden-sharing

Senior Pentagon figures noted months ago that defence spending was their “main concern” with Australia in an otherwise “excellent” relationship.

But such concerns are not exclusive to Australia. Rather, they speak to Trump’s broader approach to alliances worldwide – he wants US allies in Europe and Asia to share more of the burden, as well.

Trump’s team sees defence spending (calculated as a percentage of GDP) as a basic indicator of an ally’s seriousness about both their own national defence and collective security with Washington.

As Hegseth noted in testimony before Congress this week, “we can’t want [our allies’] security more than they do.”

Initially, the Trump administration’s burden-sharing grievances with NATO received the most attention. The government demanded European allies boost spending to 5% of GDP in the interests of what prominent MAGA figures have called “burden-owning”.

Several analysts interpreted these demands as indicative of what will be asked of Asian partners, including Australia.

In reality, what Washington wants from European and Indo-Pacific allies differs in small but important ways.

In Europe, the Trump administration wants allies to assume near-total responsibility for their own defence to enable the US to focus on bigger strategic priorities. These include border security at home and, importantly, Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific.

By contrast, Trump’s early moves on defence policy in Asia have emphasised a degree of cooperation and mutual benefit.

The administration has explicitly linked its burden-sharing demands with a willingness to work with its allies – Japan, South Korea, Australia and others – in pursuit of a strategy of collective defence to deter Chinese aggression.

This reflects a long-standing recognition in Washington that America needs its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific perhaps more than anywhere else in the world. The reason: to support US forces across the vast Pacific and Indian oceans and to counter China’s growing ability to disrupt US military operations across the region.

In other words, the US must balance its demands of Indo-Pacific allies with the knowledge that it also needs their help to succeed in Asia.

This means the Albanese government can and should engage the Trump administration with confidence on defence matters – including AUKUS.

It has a lot to offer America, not just a lot to lose.

Australian defence spending

But a discussion over Australia’s defence spending is not simply a matter of alliance management. It also speaks to the genuine challenges Australia faces in matching its strategy with its resources.

Albanese is right to say Australia will set its own defence policy based on its needs rather than an arbitrary percentage of GDP determined by Washington.

But it’s also true Australia’s defence budget must match the aspirations and requirements set out in its 2024 National Defence Strategy. This is necessary for our defence posture to be credible.

This document paints a sobering picture of the increasingly fraught strategic environment Australia finds itself in. And it outlines an ambitious capability development agenda to allow Australia to do its part to maintain the balance of power in the region, alongside the United States and other partners.

But there is growing concern in the Australian policy community that our defence budget is insufficient to meet these goals.

For instance, one of the lead authors of Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Sir Angus Houston, mused last year that in order for AUKUS submarines to be a “net addition” to the nation’s military capability, Australia would need to increase its defence spending to more than 3% of GDP through the 2030s.

Otherwise, he warned, AUKUS would “cannibalise” investments in Australia’s surface fleet, long-range strike capabilities, air and missile defence, and other capabilities.

There’s evidence the Australian government understands this, too. Marles and the minister for defence industry, Pat Conroy, have both said the government is willing to “have a conversation” about increasing spending, if required to meet Australia’s strategic needs.

This is all to say that an additional push from Trump on defence spending and burden-sharing – however unpleasantly delivered – would not be out of the ordinary. And it may, in fact, be beneficial for Australia’s own deliberations on its defence spending needs.

Thomas Corben receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence.

– ref. Trump may push Albanese on defence spending, but Australia has leverage it can use, too – https://theconversation.com/trump-may-push-albanese-on-defence-spending-but-australia-has-leverage-it-can-use-too-258811

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Keersten Fitzgerald, Lecturer in General Practice, University of Sydney

We often use the word vagina to describe everything “down there”, but that’s not actually anatomically correct.

The vagina is the stretchy, muscular tube that connects the external genitalia, or vulva, to the cervix, which is the entrance to the uterus (womb).

Because it’s barely visible from the outside, many vagina owners wonder how long theirs is, or should be.

Worried teenagers going through puberty regularly asked “Dolly Doctor” – the medical advice column Melissa wrote for over 20 years in Dolly magazine – whether their vaginas were too small or short.

Often they were asking because inserting a tampon was difficult or painful.

The vagina is an incredibly adaptable part of the body and its length can change – across your lifetime, within the month, and with hormonal changes and sexual arousal.

Length at different life stages

Before puberty, the vagina usually measures between 5.5 and 8cm in length.

During puberty (usually between 8–13 years old), not only does the length of the vagina increase, but hormones also change the vaginal lining.

In the time of life between puberty and menopause, oestrogen levels rise and cause the lining of the vagina to thicken and soften. This is what makes the vagina moist and responsive to stimuli, such as when aroused.

By adulthood, the vagina is typically between 6.5cm and 12.5cm. This varies greatly from person to person and continues to change at different times during our lives.

What else can change the vagina’s length?

When someone has their period, generally the cervix sits in a lower position, meaning the vaginal canal is shorter. Then, after menstruation, the cervix lifts upwards again and reaches its highest point during ovulation.

The length of the vagina also changes during different reproductive stages. For example, in pregnancy the cervix sits higher up, meaning the vagina is longer.

On the other hand, menopause, along with many other impacts such as vaginal dryness, can shorten the vaginal canal.

A pelvic organ prolapse can also make the vagina shorter. This is when the pelvic floor becomes weakened and organs such as the womb or bladder bulge into the vagina.

Read more:
What is pelvic organ prolapse and how is it treated?

There are also some very rare conditions that can affect the development of the vagina before birth, such as vaginal atresia, which can cause the vagina to not fully form.

What about sex?

Sex also has a large impact on vaginal length.

When someone with a vagina becomes aroused the vagina gets longer and moves the cervix further from the vaginal opening, which allows for sexual penetration.

Despite this lengthening of the vagina, contact with the cervix can still occur during sex, for example with a sex toy, finger or penis. Some people will find cervical stimulation painful or sensitive, while for others it may be pleasurable.

How sex feels can also change depending on your menstrual cycle.

Remember, when you have your period, the cervix is likely to be sitting lower, so this can increase the chance of contact with the cervix during sex, especially during certain sexual positions.

Touching the cervix during sex is very unlikely to cause any damage, although sometimes with vigorous sexual intercourse it can cause bruising. This is not usually dangerous and heals on its own.

Ongoing communication with your partner is crucial to check in and see what feels good for both of you.

So, how long is my vagina?

It can be useful to feel the length of your vagina and the position of your cervix.

For example, if you want to use a menstrual cup during your period, some brands will have different sizes. If you have a shorter vaginal canal, then a shorter or smaller cup may achieve a better fit.

However, other factors – such as your age and how heavy your periods are – can also impact what size is right for you.

To feel the position of your cervix, first wash your hands with soap and water. This is best done around the time of your period, when the vaginal canal will be shorter.

Find a comfortable position, such as sitting, squatting or having one leg bent up on a chair. Then insert your finger into the vagina aiming up and back.

The vagina feels soft and squishy, whereas the cervix is smooth and firm, with a tiny divot in the centre – imagine a mini doughnut.

If you have to really stretch to feel the cervix, you may opt for a longer cup, whereas if you don’t need to insert your whole finger, it is probably sitting a bit lower and you may be more comfortable with a smaller size.

Keep in mind, this will just give you a rough idea of your vagina’s length and where your cervix is sitting (although it may change tomorrow).

Read more:
Menstrual cups are safe and sustainable – but they can be tricky for first-time users, our new study shows

Does the length of your vagina matter?

All of our bodies are unique and there is a wide range of “normal”. Generally, having a “short” or “long” vagina doesn’t make any real difference.

For example, a 2009 study of women over the age of 40 found vaginal length doesn’t affect sexual activity or function.

The vagina is extremely elastic and can stretch and mould to accommodate a variety of needs, before returning back to its baseline.

There are some symptoms that would be worth discussing with your GP though, such as pain during sex, difficulty inserting tampons or menstrual cups, or if you are concerned about a prolapse.

Melissa Kang is affiliated in a volunteer capacity with the Australian Association for Adolescent Health and the International Association for Adolescent Health. She was the medical writer for the Dolly Doctor column in Dolly magazine between 1993 and 2016.

Keersten Fitzgerald does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How long is a vagina? And how do I know if mine is ‘short’? – https://theconversation.com/how-long-is-a-vagina-and-how-do-i-know-if-mine-is-short-256206

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dana M Bergstrom, Honorary Senior Fellow in Ecology, University of Wollongong

When winter comes to Antarctica, seals and Adélie penguins leave the freezing shores and head for the edge of the forming sea ice. But emperor penguins stay put.

The existence of emperor penguins seems all but impossible. Their lives revolve around seasons, timing and access to “fast ice” – sea ice connected to the Antarctic coast. Here, the sea ice persists long enough into summer for the penguins to rear their chicks successfully.

But climate change is upending the penguins’ carefully tuned biological cycles. The crucial sea ice they depend on is melting too early, plunging the chicks from some colonies into the sea before they are fully fledged.

In the latest bad news for these penguins, research by the British Antarctic Survey examined satellite images from 2009 to 2024 to assess fast-ice conditions at 16 emperor penguin colonies south of South America. They noted an average 22% fall in numbers across these colonies. That translates to a decrease of 1.6% every year.

This rate of loss is staggering. As the paper’s lead author Peter Fretwell told the ABC, the rate is about 50% worse than even the most pessimistic estimates.

Breeding while it’s freezing

Just like polar bears in the Arctic, emperor penguins are the iconic species threatened by climate change in Antarctica.

Emperor penguins are a highly successful species. They’re the tallest and heaviest penguin alive today. They evolved about one million years ago, and are highly adapted to life in one of Earth’s harshest environments. As of 2009, the emperor penguin population was estimated at just shy of 600,000 birds.

Unfortunately, they are now in real trouble, because their breeding habitat appears to be reducing.

At the beginning of every Antarctic winter, the surface of the ocean begins to freeze and sea ice forms. Over March and April, emperor penguins aggregate into raucous breeding colonies along the coast of the ice continent. They need about nine months to care for their chicks, until the young penguins can go to sea and look after themselves.

The males frequently huddle to keep each other warm and their eggs safe. Meanwhile, the females spend months at sea catching krill, squid and fish, returning in July/August to feed their hungry chicks. When summer finally comes in December, the chicks start to shed their down and grow a dense, waterproof plumage – like a feathery armour against the intensely cold seas off the icy continent.

Breeding locations are a kind of “Goldilocks” zone. When choosing a home, the penguins have to find a place that is safe but not too far from the fast ice edge where they go to start hunting.

The greater the distance they have to travel, the longer it takes to return to their offspring, and the chicks may miss out on meals. But if a colony is too close to the edge of the fast ice, the risk increases that the ice breaks up before the chicks are ready to go to sea. Although fast ice can cover vast areas of the ocean surface, its edge is exposed to the swell of the Southern Ocean.

In recent years, the fast ice in different parts of Antarctica has been breaking up early, before the chicks have moulted into their adult plumage. Without waterproof plumage, chicks perish because the cold water kills quickly. As this happens more often, the size of a colony shrinks.

How bad is it?

We don’t yet know if this rate of loss is happening right across Antarctica. The study only covers a the part of the continent that includes the Antarctic Peninsula and the Weddell Sea.

What we do know is that Antarctica and its unique biodiversity are not immune to the consequences of still-rising global greenhouse gas emissions.

In 2021, emperor penguins were listed as endangered by the United States, because the risk of extinction by century’s end had increased. Australia has not yet listed the emperor penguin as a threatened species.

The new research suggests the future of these iconic birds is not looking good. Until the world gets serious about cutting greenhouse gas emissions, sea ice will retreat – and more chicks will fall into the icy water before they are ready to launch.

Seabird ecologist Dr Barbara Wienecke contributed to this article.

Dana M Bergstrom is affiliated with the Pure Antarctic Foundation, a group of scientists and artists interested in communicating science and knowledge to the broader community.

– ref. As Antarctic sea ice shrinks, iconic emperor penguins are in more peril than we thought – https://theconversation.com/as-antarctic-sea-ice-shrinks-iconic-emperor-penguins-are-in-more-peril-than-we-thought-258807

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Conrad Pilditch, Professor of Marine Sciences, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

For the past fortnight, the city of Nice in France has been the global epicentre of ocean science and politics.

Last week’s One Ocean Science Congress ended with a unanimous call for action to turn around the degradation of the ocean. And this week, the United Nation’s Ocean Conference agenda focused on better protection of marine biodiversity, sustainable fisheries and emissions cuts.

The message is clear. With only five years to the UN’s 2030 target for its sustainable development goal – to conserve the oceans, seas and marine resources – and the Global Biodiversity Framework requirement to protect 30% of the ocean, we need to make significant progress.

We all attended last week’s meeting, together with more than 2,000 marine scientists from 120 countries. Here, we reflect on New Zealand’s role and obligations to contribute to these global goals.

Legal imperatives

Globally, the ocean is warming and acidifying at accelerating rates. New Zealand’s waters are not immune to this, with more marine heatwaves which further stress our threatened marine biodiversity.

We depend directly on these ocean ecosystems to provide the air we breathe, moderate the impacts of climate change and feed millions of people.

New Zealand has significant influence on ocean policy – from Antarctica to the sub-tropical Pacific, and within its sea territory, which is 15 times the size of its landmass and spans 30 degrees of latitude.

The government is required by law to take action to secure a healthy ocean.

A recent advisory opinion from the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea unanimously found that states, including New Zealand, have obligations under international law to reduce the impacts of climate change on marine areas, to apply an ecosystem approach to marine law and policy, reduce pollution and support the restoration of the ocean.

New Zealand courts have recognised the need to take a precautionary and ecosystem-based approach to marine management, based on science, tikanga and mātauranga Māori. These legal cases are part of a global upswell of strategic environmental and climate litigation.

If New Zealand does not comply with these marine legal obligations, it may well find itself before the courts, incurring significant legal and reputational costs.

International agreements

In 2022, New Zealand was one of 196 countries that committed to protecting at least 30% of the world’s coastal and marine areas by 2030 under the Global Biodiversity Framework. New Zealand was an enthusiastic supporter, but only 0.4% of its marine territory is fully protected in no-take marine reserves.

Former prime minister Helen Clark has criticised the current government for lagging behind on marine protection, especially in failing to ban bottom trawling.

At this week’s UN ocean summit, a further 18 countries have ratified an agreement known as the High Seas Treaty, bringing the total to 50, still short of the 60 nations needed for it to enter into force.

New Zealand signed this treaty just before the last general election, but is yet to ratify it. Foreign Minister Winston Peters represented New Zealand at the UN ocean conference, but focused mainly on issues in the Pacific.

Meanwhile, the government announced sweeping changes to the national direction on environmental policy, including reworking the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement to better enable the use and development of the coastal environment for “priority activities” such as aquaculture, resource extraction, infrastructure and energy.

Oceanic environmental change is real and accelerating

Some countries showed that effective leadership can help navigate to a safe future for the oceans. For example, China’s commitment to clean energy has seen carbon dioxide emissions begin to fall for the first time despite higher power consumption.

At the UN ocean summit, French Polynesia’s president announced his administration would establish one of the world’s largest networks of marine protected areas.

The cost of inaction far outweighs the economics of the status quo. Ongoing ocean warming is already affecting weather patterns, with more extreme storms.

It is possible for marine ecosystems to recover quite rapidly if they are protected, at least temporarily. Yet this year, New Zealand’s government found itself in hot water (once again) with both conservationists and Māori for its management of fisheries.

We argue New Zealand has an opportunity and responsibility to demonstrate it can shift the downward spiral of oceanic degradation.

The overwhelming message at the half-way point of the UN Ocean Decade is that for marine science to transform the state of our oceans it needs to include Indigenous peoples who have routinely been sidelined from ocean policy discussions despite their longstanding rights and relationships with the ocean.

New Zealand already has a foundation of transdisciplinary and Indigenous ocean research to develop ocean policies that are fit for local purposes and to answer global calls to action. We have a unique window of opportunity to lead the changes needed.

Conrad Pilditch currently receives funding from the Department of Conservation and the Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment.

Elizabeth Macpherson receives funding from Te Apārangi The Royal Society.

Karin Bryan receives funding from the Marsden Fund, the Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment, the George Mason Centre for the Natural Environment and Waikato Regional Council.

Simon Francis Thrush receives funding from ERC, Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment and the Auckland Foundation

Joanne Ellis, Karen Fisher, and Rachael Mortiaux do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. NZ has a vast sea territory but lags behind other nations in protecting the ocean – https://theconversation.com/nz-has-a-vast-sea-territory-but-lags-behind-other-nations-in-protecting-the-ocean-258470

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jacob Ware, Adjunct Professor of Domestic Terrorism, Georgetown University

The U.S. Army will celebrate its 250th birthday on Saturday, June 14, 2025, with a parade in Washington, D.C., in which about 6,600 soldiers and heavy pieces of military equipment will roll through the streets. The parade aims to display the Army’s history and power.

“It’s going to be incredible,” President Donald Trump recently said. Trump’s 79th birthday also occurs on June 14.

Despite the festivities, however, the parade will occur amid bleak times for the U.S. military, as it experiences a multiyear decline in recruitment numbers. In the face of a pandemic and a strong civilian job market, the Army, Air Force and Navy all missed their recruitment goals in 2022 and 2023. In 2022, the Army missed its quota by 25%.

In 2024, the U.S. military met its recruitment target, which supports the argument that the bump is not due to Trump, as recruitment levels began to rise again before his reelection. But in some cases, the U.S. military has met its recruitment goals by lowering target numbers.

And as a scholar of terrorism and targeted violence, I believe a close reading of available data on military recruitment suggests U.S. gun violence may be largely to blame for the lack of interest in joining the military.

Gun violence data

Regardless of one’s personal politics, the data on U.S. gun violence makes for painful reading.

Almost 47,000 Americans died from gun-related injuries in 2023. In 2022, there were 51 school shootings in which students were injured or killed by guns. And gun injuries are the leading cause of death for Americans between ages 1 and 19.

Data about the perceptions of gun violence is equally staggering, especially among American youth between ages 14 and 30.

Four out of five American youth believe gun violence to be a problem, and 25% have endured real active-shooter lockdowns, according to data compiled by Everytown for Gun Safety, where I serve as a survivor fellow, the Southern Poverty Law Center and American University’s Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab.

Moreover, these perceptions have considerable impacts on youth mental health and their sense of safety. Studies have linked concern over school shootings among adolescents with higher rates of anxiety and trauma-related disorders.

As Arne Duncan, who served as President Barack Obama’s secretary of education during the Sandy Hook tragedy, said in 2023: “Unfortunately, what’s now binding young people across the country together is not joy of music, or sports, or whatever, it’s really the shared pain of gun violence – and it cuts through race and class and geography and economics.”

National security threat

In the past couple of years, polls taken of Generation Z youth, born between 1997 and 2012, suggest mental health and mass shootings are among the most important political issues motivating this band of voters.

Gun violence, in other words, is a national security emergency, undermining the U.S. government’s ability to protect its citizens in their schools, places of worship and communities.

As former Marine Gen. John Allen wrote in 2019: “Americans today are more likely to experience gun violence at home than they might in many of the places to which I deployed in the name of defending our nation.”

Rewriting American culture

Accordingly, gun violence has undercut American patriotism, corroding the U.S. government’s soft power within its own borders. Generation Z, termed by some as the “lockdown generation,” is often derided as less patriotic than its predecessors.

Also, the belief in American exceptionalism is dropping among millennials, born between 1981 and 1996. That perception is combined with less confidence in U.S. global engagement and the efficacy of military solutions.

American culture has long inspired military service, with recruits seduced by action movies and promises of heroic returns to the U.S. But American culture today is being rewired into one of suffering, pain and victimhood.

A fear of violence

Gun violence destroys youth tolerance for the violence that defines a career in the U.S. military.

Internal U.S. military surveys of young Americans show that “the top three reasons young people cite for rejecting military enlistment are the same across all the services: fear of death, worries about post-traumatic stress disorder and leaving friends and family — in that order.”

Generations already suffering a shattered sense of safety and place do not see the military as a viable option.

The explanations the U.S. Defense Department gives for dismal recruitment levels focus on the younger generation’s supposed lack of backbone or hatred of America.

Republicans, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, have blamed alleged “wokeness” for low recruitment levels.

And the Trump administration’s statements about improving recruitment numbers over the past several months overlook both a late Biden-era surge after a pandemic slump as well as the reality that numbers remain depressed due to military services repeatedly lowering their recruitment goals.

Very rarely are introspective questions publicly debated today about the objective attractiveness of military service or the appetite for violence among young people. The problem, I believe, is not that young people are insufficiently patriotic – it’s that they have already been fighting a war, daily, for their entire lives.

In reversing the slide in recruitment, then, the military could improve its sensitivity to these important concerns.

Highlighting the range of careers within the services that do not involve front-line combat and physical danger could encourage more reluctant would-be recruits to volunteer.

Mental health support also could be made an essential element of military training and lifestyle − not a resource only for those bearing the hidden side-effects of life in the ranks. Encouraging those suffering from treatable mental health issues to seek meaning in service could also boost recruitment numbers.

Jacob Ware is a gun violence survivor and serves as a Survivor Fellow at Everytown for Gun Safety.

– ref. US Army’s image of power and flag-waving rings false to Gen Z weary of gun violence − and long-term recruitment numbers show it – https://theconversation.com/us-armys-image-of-power-and-flag-waving-rings-false-to-gen-z-weary-of-gun-violence-and-long-term-recruitment-numbers-show-it-257090

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Duygu Yengin, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide

For the first time in its 124-year history, Treasury will be led by a woman.

Jenny Wilkinson’s appointment is historic in its own right. Even more remarkable is the fact she joins Michele Bullock at the Reserve Bank and Danielle Wood at the Productivity Commission.

Australia’s three most powerful economic institutions are now led by women economists. In economics, this is not normal. But it certainly does matter.

Stubbornly male

Imagine if only 17% of economics professors were men. It would feel unusual; people would ask why the field was so heavily skewed. But the reality is the opposite: 83% of economics professors in Australia are male.

And yet, this imbalance is almost invisible. Women make up just about one-third of secondary pupils studying economics and 40% of students enrolled in economics courses at university.

In the private sector, women economists are roughly one in three.

So while the appointments of Wilkinson, Bullock and Wood feels groundbreaking, the profession as a whole remains stubbornly male. Still, the leadership story is worth celebrating. When young women see leaders who look like them, they’re more likely to imagine themselves in those roles too.

As women increasingly take the helm, the old stereotype of a suit-clad man with a briefcase gives way to a broader, more inclusive image of what an economist can be.

The public service is leading the charge. As of 2023, women held 53% of senior executive service positions in the Australian Public Service, up from 46% in 2019.

Merit and diversity

Thankfully, unlike other parts of the world, we live in a country where these appointments haven’t triggered claims of so-called “diversity hires”. To be clear: these female pioneers weren’t appointed because they are women.

Each has decades of experience, technical firepower, and deep policy credentials. Wilkinson has led the Department of Finance and the Parliamentary Budget Office. Bullock has held almost every senior role at the Reserve Bank. Wood has shaped public debates on intergenerational equity and tax reform with clarity and rigour.

The idea that diversity is somehow in tension with merit is a false binary. Diverse groups make better decisions and are more creative, especially in high-stakes settings.

Decades of economics and business research has shown that incorporating diverse perspectives into decision-making only strengthens the outcomes. Decisions made and executed by diverse teams delivered 60% better results than those by non-diverse teams.

Merit isn’t just what’s on paper, it’s shaped by how we judge it.

When men and women perform equally well, success is more often credited to skill for men and to luck for women. Swap a male name for a female one on a CV, teaching evaluation or reference letter, and perceptions of competence, leadership and hireability start to shift.

These unconscious biases don’t just affect who gets ahead; they shape how we define merit in the first place.

Will it make a difference?

Economics often prides itself on being objective and neutral. While the economic models may be technically gender-blind, the questions we ask and investigate rarely are.

This is where gender diversity matters – not just in who holds the top jobs, but in what gets researched and how decisions are made. There’s growing evidence male and female economists don’t just ask different questions, they also approach problems differently.

One study found female central bankers tend to act with greater independence and deliver lower inflation. A United States study and another in Europe showed striking gender differences in how economists think about a range of areas, including labour markets, taxation, health and the environment, and more broadly on public spending – everything from welfare to the military.

Having more diverse perspectives doesn’t dilute economics – it deepens it. It makes the discipline more responsive to the diversity of the real-world challenges it’s meant to address.

Economic policies impact the whole society. So does the composition of economists.

So, what’s next?

Of course, three women in top economic roles won’t create miracles overnight – they all operate within existing systems and structures.

So, what can we expect from Wilkinson’s leadership? Her time at the Department of Finance suggests a steady, pragmatic hand: consultative, strategic and deeply experienced.

Wilkinson brings bipartisan credibility, a sharp grasp of fiscal discipline, and the capacity to act decisively in a crisis, as we saw during COVID. She won’t remake Treasury overnight, but she’s well placed to lead it with rigour, integrity and a long-term view.

This moment matters for women in economics. It shows change is possible in the profession, and it could mark the start of economic policy that truly reflects the diversity of the people it serves.

Duygu Yengin is affiliated with the University of Adelaide, Women in Economics Network, and the Economic Society of Australia.

– ref. It took more than a century, but women are taking charge of Australia’s economy – here’s why it matters – https://theconversation.com/it-took-more-than-a-century-but-women-are-taking-charge-of-australias-economy-heres-why-it-matters-258680

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alan Tidwell, Director, Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies, Georgetown University

Since 2018, the United States has worked, albeit often haltingly, to regain its footing with Pacific Island countries. It’s done this largely by reflecting a sentiment familiar in Pacific capitals: the region is not a geopolitical backwater, but a crucial strategic zone in the 21st century.

Spurred by China’s strategic expansion – security deals, port access, political influence – the first Trump presidency and then the Biden administration renewed the US focus on the Pacific.

Washington was also prodded by regional allies, including New Zealand. In 2018, Foreign Minister Winston Peters said: “We unashamedly ask for the United States to engage more and we think it is in your vital interests to do so. And time is of the essence.”

Building on the tentative steps of its predecessor, the Biden administration acted. It opened new embassies, invited Pacific leaders to the White House, unveiled a dedicated strategy for the Pacific Islands, and committed to recognising the Cook Islands and Niue.

It also negotiated more funding for the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Palau. Along with the 2022 Pacific Islands Summit, it all signalled Washington’s desire to be a better partner.

Crucially, the Biden administration recognised climate change and the economy, not great-power rivalry, as the region’s defining security concerns. Now, much of that progress is being eroded.

The second Trump administration has gutted key international development agencies, with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation shuttered.

More than mere symbols, these agencies were tools of statecraft, facilitating Washington’s capacity to compete with China’s “no questions asked” development model. Their removal leaves a vacuum, which Beijing will happily fill.

China pressing the advantage

Other signs of retreat are equally troubling. Congressional funding for the South Pacific Tuna Treaty – which pays for access for US fishing fleets and is the primary multiparty agreement the US has with the Pacific Islands – was tripled by Biden, but remains incomplete.

Trump recently signed an executive order opening the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument, a 1,282,534 square kilometre protected marine zone, to commercial fishing. This might be welcomed by the US tuna fleet, but it raises questions about Washington’s commitment to the tuna treaty.

Hoped-for expansion of US consular access, especially vital for Pacific Islanders who must travel long distances for basic services such as visa applications, is in limbo. The US embassy in Vanuatu, damaged by the earthquake in 2024, remains closed, leaving diplomats to work out of their hotel rooms.

China, by contrast, has not slowed down. Its security pact with Solomon Islands, its police training efforts in Samoa and Kiribati, and its growing intelligence presence across the region show a clear pattern of assertiveness.

Beijing has proven adept at offering timely, visible assistance. Its diplomats show up. Its companies build. Its promises, however opaque, are matched with resources.

The result has not necessarily meant Pacific nations have “chosen” China. Rather, most revert to the longstanding posture of “friend to all, enemy to none”.

In a region where non-alignment is both a survival strategy and a principle of sovereignty, the perception of US unreliability makes China’s attentions all the more welcome, or at least tolerable.

Not a binary contest

The US now appears to be abandoning efforts to break this cycle, and the Trump administration risks a genuine strategic error rather than a mere diplomatic misstep.

More than distant dots on a map, the Pacific Islands control vast stretches of ocean, including key shipping lanes and undersea cables. Their diplomatic weight matters in the United Nations.

And the region matters to Taiwan, which is recognised by 12 countries globally, three of which are in the Pacific.

Some argue the US should press Pacific nations to “choose” between Washington and Beijing. But that approach is shortsighted and counterproductive.

Most have no interest in being drawn into a binary contest. They seek concrete benefits – resilience funding, fair trade, visa access – not ideological alignment. Framing relationships as zero-sum contests misunderstands the region’s diplomatic logic.

Listening to Pacific leaders

To revive the relationship, the US will need to show up, follow through and demonstrate its partnership offers more than rhetoric.

This would involve restoring some elements of foreign assistance, fully funding the South Pacific Tuna Treaty obligations, opening and staffing embassies, and supporting Pacific regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum with meaningful recognition and resources.

But the US review of Pacific foreign assistance (a small portion of US development aid formerly administered by USAID) has been delayed once again, and likely won’t emerge until mid-July.

More importantly, the US will have to listen to Pacific leaders, who have articulated their priorities clearly. They do not want to be sites of contest; they want to be agents of their own futures.

In short, the US will have to treat the Pacific Islands as sovereign equals.
When Trump returned to the White House, he found a workable policy architecture for the Pacific. Its core elements could still be rescued.

But continued neglect, mixed signals and cost-cutting risk hastening the outcome China seeks – a region that finds Washington unreliable. Winston Peters, now foreign minister in a new government, might want to update his 2018 call for US engagement in the Pacific – with the emphasis on reliability.

Alan Tidwell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. With Trump undoing years of progress, can the US salvage its Pacific Islands strategy? – https://theconversation.com/with-trump-undoing-years-of-progress-can-the-us-salvage-its-pacific-islands-strategy-258679

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Hawkins, Head, Canberra School of Government, University of Canberra

As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Treasurer Jim Chalmers turn their attention to improving productivity growth across the economy, it will be interesting to see what the business community brings to a planned summit in August.

Labour productivity (output per hour worked) has barely grown this decade.

Much of the focus in the current debate has been on the role of workers (labour) and industrial relations. Less discussed has been low business investment (capital).

Labour will be more productive if each worker can use more capital: machinery, equipment and technology. Over the medium term, providing workers with more capital – “capital deepening”, in the jargon – tends to be the main contributor to labour productivity growth.

But business investment as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) is currently at its lowest level since the mid-1990s.

Investment is low in both the mining and non-mining sectors. In the latest national accounts report for the March quarter, business investment in machinery and equipment fell 1.7%.

The average worker now uses less capital equipment – machines and computers – than a decade ago. Investment just hasn’t kept pace with growth in employment.

Read more:
‘Hard to measure and difficult to shift’: the government’s big productivity challenge

Why is investment so weak?

One possible reason was put forward by then Reserve Bank governor Philip Lowe in 2023. He suggested that, during the COVID pandemic, firms concentrated on surviving. Seeking out more efficient ways to produce was a lower priority. But post-pandemic, firms seem to have been slow to pivot back to an efficiency focus.

Another reason may be that, until recently, wage growth has been slower than the growth in prices of goods and services produced. This may have reduced the incentives for firms to invest in the equipment needed to boost labour productivity.

A key driver of investment is profitability. Firms are more likely to fund investment from retained earnings than by borrowing or raising capital. But the share of corporate profits in the economy has been quite high in recent years. So this does not explain low investment.

The ‘animal spirits’ are lacking

Business confidence – what economist John Maynard Keynes famously called “animal spirits” – is another important driver.

Share prices, both in Australia and the rest of the world, have grown strongly in recent years. The S&P/ASX 200 index of Australian share prices is close to its all-time high. This would suggest financial markets are very optimistic about the prospects of Australian companies.

Direct surveys of Australian businesses from National Australia Bank suggest conditions (the current situation) and confidence (about the future) are around their long-term average level. So this also does not explain the low investment.

One contributor to low investment may be that firms are applying inappropriately high “hurdle rates”. These refer to the minimum return firms expect from an investment before they will undertake it.

Hurdle rates tend to be “sticky” over time, meaning they do not move much. Many companies still apply hurdle rates of over 12%. These were appropriate back when interest rates and inflation were much higher, but seem too high now as borrowing costs have fallen with interest rate cuts.

The Productivity Commission has suggested one contributor to low investment could be a higher risk premium. Since the global financial crisis in 2007-08, companies and investors may have become more cautious about taking on risk.

Another factor could be growing market power of Australian companies that dominate a sector, making them complacent rather than striving to improve their performance.

The high degree of uncertainty

The Reserve Bank recently compiled two measures of uncertainty. One is derived from stock markets. The other is based on the number of news articles about policy uncertainty.

Both show the current environment is as uncertain now as it was during the early stages of the global financial crisis in 2007–08 and the COVID pandemic.

A common response to uncertainty is to defer decisions on both investment and hiring new workers until the outlook is clearer. A study by the Reserve Bank found that greater uncertainty did indeed reduce investment. But the size of the impact was – you guessed it – uncertain.

What can be done?

Business lobbies often attribute low rates of investment (and anything else they think people may not like) to “excessively high” corporate tax rates. But at 30% for large companies and 25% for small, the company tax rate is low by historical standards.

Some multinational firms may be deterred from entering the Australian market as our company tax rate is above that in some other jurisdictions. It is hard to tell how important this effect is. Company tax is only one of many factors that affect the comparative risk and return of Australia as an investment destination.

The Productivity Commission is investigating whether the corporate taxation system could be made more efficient rather than just lowering rates.

In the meantime, however, firms may be encouraged to invest more by a more stable domestic economic outlook. Inflation is back within the central bank’s 2-3% target range. Employment is around an all-time high proportion of the working age population. The election has removed some political uncertainty with a government holding a clear majority.

Businesses should stop whingeing and start providing workers with the tools they need to become more productive.

This article is part of The Conversation’s series, The Productivity Puzzle. Read the previous article here.

John Hawkins was formerly a senior economist in the Reserve Bank and the Australian Treasury.

– ref. Workers need better tools and tech to boost productivity. Why aren’t companies stepping up to invest? – https://theconversation.com/workers-need-better-tools-and-tech-to-boost-productivity-why-arent-companies-stepping-up-to-invest-257806