Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives
In the first round of the 2026 Brazilian presidential election, on Oct. 4, the politics of resentment prevailed. Frustration among those displaced from their jobs by automation and the newly self-employed – who sometimes wrongly see themselves as “entrepreneurs” – fueled the vote for the opposition of Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and favored far right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro.
In the runoff on Oct. 25, however, the driving motivation shifted from resentment to fear of a return of the so-called “Bolsonarismo” to power. President Lula was reelected in a second round whose outcome could hardly have been anticipated from his lackluster first round campaign and Flávio Bolsonaro’s lead of 2.2 million votes. So what changed?
First, Lula took his campaign to the streets, where it had been largely absent in the first round. And it also moved into social media, where Lula’s presence had preiviously amounted to little more than a translation of analog campaigning into digital formats.
Another important factor was the fear generated by Flávio Bolsonaro’s first round lead. Until then, there had been a widespread conviction – not only among Lula and his campaign team, but throughout democratic society in general – that the president would be reelected.
A change in attitudes
The shock with the results of the first round, followed by fear of a far right victory, brought about a change in attitudes and a spontaneous mobilization in the streets, beginning with students in Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro state and spreading to large and medium sized cities across the country. Fear intensified as Flávio Bolsonaro increasingly revealed his resemblance to his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, now jailed for attempting a coup after losing his bid for reelection in 2022..
In the 27 state capitals and 162 other major Brazilian cities, encompassing nearly 75 million voters – close to 47% of the total – Lula’s gains were decisive, according to a survey by news and data analysis website Dado Bruto. He won in 13 of the state capitals, including São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In Minas Gerais, he lost in capital Belo Horizonte, although he carried the state. Overall, in the state capitals, Lula gained 2.2 million votes in the runoff, offsetting Flávio Bolsonaro’s first round advantage.
Across the 189 Brazilian major cities, Lula’s vote share rose by nearly 3.5 percentage points. This result helped him make gains in every state. He reversed the first round defeat in Minas Gerais, improving his performance in the second round by more than three percentage points. Urban Brazil delivered Lula’s victory. He won in 12 states in the first round, and in 13 in the second.
Consider Osasco, a major city in the state of São Paulo, whose GDP is overwhelmingly generated by the service industry, particularly finance, technology, logistics, and ecommerce. The city has nearly 729,000 inhabitants and a GDP per capita of R$ 164,000 (US$30,000). Flávio Bolsonaro won the first round in Osasco by 191,700 votes to Lula’s 182,700. In the runoff, Lula reversed the result, winning by 234,300 votes to 213,200.
In many of these major cities, voters took to the streets in support of Lula. On social media, the extensive reach of the WhatsApp network “Exército do Lula” – or “Lula’s Army” –, with more than 10 million followers and managed by reelected congressman André Janones, certainly had a significant positive effect in generating additional votes for the president. The interaction between digital networks and street mobilization played a decisive, if not determining, role in his reelection.
In the major cities of agribusiness strongholds, Flávio Bolsonaro won more than 70% of the runoff vote. A particularly representative municipality is Sinop, in the state of Mato Grosso, where he won the first round by 73,700 votes to Lula’s 17,500. In the runoff, Lula gained another 4,700 votes, while the Liberal Party candidate added 3,800, making little difference to the final result: 77,500 votes to 22,200, with Flávio Bolsonaro winning 77.7% of the votes.
Urban-rural cleavage revived
The expansion of export oriented agribusiness, particularly in Brazil’s center-west and north regions, but also in the South and the north-central and northwestern regions of Minas Gerais, has revived the urban-rural cleavage of Brazilian politics.
This divide was at the heart of the most serious political and electoral conflicts of Brazil’s Second Republic, from 1945 to 1964. During that period, the troubled relationship between an executive branch elected by urban Brazil and a legislature whose majority was elected by rural Brazil produced legislative paralysis, contributing to the breakdown of democratic institutions that led to the 1964 coup.
Today, although the rural economy is technologically advanced, this divide has taken the radicalized form of political polarization, destabilizing the political system and threatening the country’s governability. It generates an authoritarian impulse that materialized under Jair Bolsonaro’s administration.
Jair Bolsonaro was convicted in September 2025 of attempting a coup and is serving his sentence. The prosecution and conviction of those involved in the attempted coup have dispelled neither radicalized polarization nor the authoritarian impulse. The latter resurfaced unmistakably in Flávio Bolsonaro’s refusal to accept the clean and democratic verdict of the ballot box.
It was precisely this persistent coup oriented impulse that made the runoff mobilization possible, through a clearly visible interaction between digital networks and the streets. The decline in voter alienation, which brought 4.8 million electors back into the pool of valid votes, vividly expresses this reaction driven by fear of a return to Bolsonaro’s attempts to overthrow democratic institutions. Nearly 2.9 million additional voters turned out at the polls. Invalid votes fell from 3.7 million to 2.7 million, while blank ballots declined from 2.3 million to 1.4 million. Voter alienation dropped by three percentage points.
The future of Lula’s fourth term
This coup oriented impulse is particularly important when we consider the composition of the newly elected Brazilian Congress. A majority of those elected to Congress in the first round are sided with Flávio Bolsonaro. Beginning in 2027, President Lula’s room for maneuver in Congress will be narrower. In both the House of Deputies and the Senate, it will be possible to assemble a majority coalition, but one in which the center-right and right will carry greater weight.
Members of the “Centrão”, Brazil’s parties known for their transactional politics, are inclined to align themselves with those in power by definition. In the House, the moderate right and the Centrão together would account for approximately 66% of a possible Lula’s coalition’s votes, and in the Senate, 56%. This would significantly alter the configuration of Lula’s fourth administration, which would rest on a broad democratic coalition, but not a progressive one.
Lula intends to add digital mobilization to his presidential toolkit, drawing on the experience of “Lula’s Army”. The objective would be to raise Lula’s public approval ratings, thereby strengthening his ability to negotiate with and exert pressure on Congress. Anyway, the president would have to open up his administration further and become more receptive to parties outside his traditional political and partisan circles.
This fourth term will mark the end of the Lula era. After this cycle, Brazilian politics will have to change, renew its leadership, and take into account the emerging generation of digital politicians. The end of this era also coincides with the departure from the political stage of the generation that resisted the military dictatorship that took power in 1964, from which three Brazilian presidents emerged: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula, and Dilma Rousseff. Generational succession is inescapable. Brazil’s new generation of politicians will be more attuned to digital society.
Sergio Abranches não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.
Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/10/28/in-brazils-election-first-round-voting-was-driven-by-resentment-in-the-runoff-it-was-guided-by-fear/