Source: The Conversation – Africa (2)
Every electric vehicle, smartphone and laptop battery begins with one essential ingredient: lithium.
The critical mineral sits at the centre of the global transition to cleaner energy. Lithium powers rechargeable batteries. Securing its supply is, therefore, an economic and geopolitical priority.
The International Energy Agency expects global lithium demand to increase as electric vehicle production and renewable energy storage expands. Africa, particularly the Sahel, is becoming increasingly important in the search for supply. The current top producers are Chile, Australia and China.
The Sahel is a semi-arid zone running from west to east Africa, between the Sahara Desert to the north and the tropical savannas to the south.
Across this vast region, armed groups are finding new ways to profit from the expanding lithium trade. Over 40,000 tonnes of lithium are already mined from African rock each year for international consumers. This figure is set to rise to an estimated 500,000 tonnes by as early as 2030.
I am a researcher specialising in geopolitics and war studies. In a recent study, I examined how expanding lithium extraction intersects with conflict across the Sahel. I studied Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Nigeria.
I found that growing lithium industries are becoming entangled in existing conflicts, insurgent activity and cross-border smuggling. These are all enabled by weak governance.
For instance, jihadist and criminal groups – particularly Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – are exploiting the weak oversight of lithium mining to generate revenue and expand their operations.
I argue that if Sahelian governments don’t strengthen oversight, lithium risks becoming another resource that funds conflict instead of development. Where governance is weak, valuable minerals such as gold and diamonds have previously fuelled conflict.
Lithium in the Sahel
Beneath parts of the Sahel lie some of Africa’s most promising lithium deposits, particularly in Nigeria and Mali. Exploration and geological surveys are expanding elsewhere in the region, including in Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad.
For governments facing persistent economic challenges, lithium reserves are attracting investment and creating jobs. Whether these early gains translate into broader economic development will depend on decisions related to governance, regulation and security.
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria are already grappling with violent insurgencies. They also face organised crime, weak institutions and limited government control over remote border regions.
The same natural resource conditions that attract investors also attract armed groups. There are dozens of examples across the continent.
Diamonds helped finance civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola. Gold mining has funded armed groups across west Africa. Oil wealth has fuelled corruption and political instability in Nigeria, Angola and Libya.
My research suggests lithium could become the latest example.
Following the money
Like any organisation, armed groups need money to sustain their operations.
They tax miners and control access to mining sites. They also charge traders and transporters moving minerals through their territory, and provide “security” where governments cannot.
In doing so, they perform some of the functions normally associated with the state. My research suggests that as lithium extraction expands, these same systems are adapting to the commodity.
I examined evidence from Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad to identify why some emerging lithium industries are more vulnerable to criminal and terrorist exploitation than others.
I compared differences in governance, the presence of artisanal mining, insurgent influence and the accessibility of cross-border smuggling routes. I drew on conflict databases, geological surveys, media reporting and publications from African and international organisations.
I found that the overall vulnerability of each country depends on the strength of local institutions, border controls and governance.
Nigeria: Lithium mining is expanding rapidly but remains largely informal and outside government oversight. Criminal groups exploit the lack of regulation. They demand protection payments and infiltrate both legal and illegal supply chains.
Mali: Armed groups embedded in the country’s gold economy have begun applying similar taxation and extortion models in lithium-producing regions. Weak state institutions and ongoing conflict have increased the risk of exploitation.
Burkina Faso: Jihadist groups have used informal mining networks to generate revenue from lithium and strengthen local influence. Limited government control in remote areas has created opportunities for armed groups to tax and regulate extraction.
Niger: Political instability and weakened border controls following the 2023 coup have increased the risk of mineral smuggling. Trafficking routes used for gold and weapons are being adapted for lithium.
Chad: Weak governance and corruption facilitate illicit cross-border trade. This is creating vulnerabilities that could be exploited.
Where governments regulate mining effectively and retain control over mineral supply chains – as Botswana has done with diamonds – the revenues generated are more likely to support infrastructure, public services and economic growth.
In the countries examined in my study where governance is weaker and state control is more limited, armed groups are able to insert themselves into supply chains.
What next
The global transition to cleaner energy depends on expanding lithium production. But rising demand also creates incentives for faster extraction. This can outpace governments’ ability to put effective regulation and oversight in place.
The batteries helping the world reduce carbon emissions could therefore, indirectly, help finance some of Africa’s deadliest armed groups.
The solution is to govern lithium better.
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Governments should bring artisanal and small-scale miners into the formal economy. This can be done through licensing, legal protections and transparent markets. State authority should be restored in mining regions.
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Regional organisations should strengthen systems for tracking minerals across borders and share intelligence on illicit trade.
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African governments should invest more in processing lithium instead of exporting raw ore.
But there’s no single solution for every context.
Formalising artisanal mining is likely to be most effective where governments control their territory. Sharing intelligence is important where trafficking routes span countries – like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Domestic lithium processing can deliver long-term benefits in countries with stronger institutions and the capacity to support industrial development.
These recommendations are grounded in approaches already adopted elsewhere in Africa. There are regional mineral traceability initiatives in the Great Lakes region and efforts by countries like Zimbabwe to promote domestic lithium processing.
Africa’s lithium reserves could help power one of the defining technological transformations of this century. They could also become the next chapter in a long history of resource-driven conflict.
Which future emerges will depend on the governments responsible for managing it.
Bradley A. Mortin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/08/16/lithium-in-the-sahel-how-armed-groups-are-exploiting-the-global-scramble-for-the-critical-mineral/