Source: The Conversation – Africa
Many South Africans earn a living in the informal economy, with weak or lopsided links to the banks, supply chains and government systems that run the formal economy. This divide is a legacy of colonial and apartheid policies, and it leaves people exposed when shocks hit. Policy often assumes the answer is to formalise informal producers.
Our research points to another path: pair organisations rooted in informal communities with others at home in formal institutions.
I research and teach sustainability strategy, cross-sector collaboration and inclusive supply chains. With my former students Mandy Rapson and Thanyani Ramarumo, I recently published a study of what happened when COVID-19 lockdowns closed the markets smallholder farmers depend on, and an emergency supply chain was built in a matter of days.
We wanted to know what it takes for smallholder farmers working informally to reach the markets and institutions of the formal economy, and why this works in some places and not others. We were especially interested in the role of social intermediaries, which are organisations that try to support small producers’ access to markets, but often struggle to do so even during “normal” times.
Between April 2020 and March 2022 we followed eight intermediary organisations and 86 smallholder farmers in South Africa’s Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo provinces. We interviewed farmers and organisers and sat in on their meetings.
We found that farmers were well supported only when two kinds of intermediary worked together: a new national initiative that could raise money and deal with formal institutions, and long-standing local organisations that farmers already trusted. Neither could have done it alone. During the lockdowns, Limpopo smallholder farmers linked in this way kept or even grew their incomes, while similar farmers without these links buried unsold crops.
The lessons reach beyond the pandemic. Smallholder farmers and other informal producers or traders often struggle to access resources and markets. They are also especially vulnerable to disruption from climate-related disasters, such as droughts and floods, as well as economic shocks, such as fuel price increases. The collaboration we studied offers a potential response: start with local organisations that farmers already trust, and pair them with organisations that can bring in buyers, funders and formal institutions.
The donations that paid for the emergency supply chain have gone, but the pairing itself does not depend on charity. It can work just as well with a steady buyer such as a school feeding programme, a retailer or a municipality, as we explain below.
Creating an emergency supply chain, together
When the lockdown closed restaurants, schools and markets in March 2020, crops began rotting in the field. A manager at Sigidi, a small farmer organisation in the rural Eastern Cape, sent her employees home because she could not pay them.
Within days, a Cape Town initiative called FoodFlow began raising donations online to buy “harvest bags” of fresh produce from small farmers and deliver them to soup kitchens and community groups working to fight growing hunger during the lockdown. By August 2020 it had raised more than R2 million (about US$120,000) and bought over 14,000 bags from more than 400 farmers in four provinces.
FoodFlow could do things no farmer organisation could. Through its founders’ networks it had an online donation system running in a day or two, and partnerships with Oxfam and the Department of Social Development. What it lacked was any relationship with the farmers it wanted to buy from.
For that it needed partners.
Those partners were long-standing local organisations, such as Abalimi in Cape Town, Umgibe in KwaZulu-Natal, Sigidi in the Eastern Cape and Ga-Mphahlele Homecoming in Limpopo. They knew which farmers had produce ready, how to collect it from scattered homesteads, and how to make sure payment arrived. When Umgibe’s founder convened a meeting of farmers under a tree, it opened with a song, and their trust in her was plain for us to see.
That trust matters because small farmers have good reason to be wary of outside buyers.
Apartheid deliberately separated “white” and “tribal” economies, and middlemen have often exploited that gap. Farmers would only deal with FoodFlow once a local organisation they trusted had vouched for it.
We call these two kinds of organisation bonding and linking intermediaries. One draws on close ties within a community, the other on looser ties to more distant institutions. Neither could have built the supply chain alone.
The clearest test came in Limpopo, where we followed 21 farmers with different degrees of connection. Those linked to FoodFlow through Ga-Mphahlele Homecoming kept selling throughout the lockdown, and some earned more than before. One told us that FoodFlow
became an angel for us… our food did not go to waste.
Farmers got in through personal relationships with the local organisation’s founder, built up well before the crisis. Those without such ties were mostly left out. One, growing the same crops nearby, said simply:
We didn’t sell, we buried all of it.
Why this matters today
The emergency supply chain did not survive the crisis that created it. Once lockdown rules fell away in March 2022, so did the sense of urgency, and with it the donations. But it left behind more than its short life suggests.
Everyone involved learnt what a more inclusive supply chain could look like in practice. Farmer organisations now had more contacts in distant markets. And farmers told us they now saw what a trusted local organisation could do for them. Networks, learning and changed expectations are how such experiments have broader impacts, even if they do not scale themselves.
There is a wider lesson here about the informal economy.
Much economic and management thinking assumes that scaling requires formalisation: get small producers registered and contracted, and markets will open. In South Africa, local informal institutions have carried farmers through decades of exclusion, and they held up in this crisis too. The emergency supply chain worked by connecting them to formal institutions, not by replacing them.
But not all local intermediaries are up to this challenge. Our sample also included three farmer cooperatives in Limpopo. They had been set up mainly to access government grants, and when the crisis came they could not link their members to anyone. Pairing only works with capable organisations on both sides of the divide.
A clear opportunity lies in public procurement. The government’s school feeding scheme feeds millions of children every day, yet it mostly buys produce centrally to keep costs down. There have been some attempts to procure locally in places like eThekwini, but they have often run into problems.
Chances of success might be higher if more work went into connecting formal and informal organisations. The Southern Africa Food Lab and the Seriti Institute have spent several years on exactly that, also in eThekwini, to create employment opportunities by connecting local farmer groups with the government’s Social Employment Fund.
Our study shows what that connecting work involves: trust and local knowledge on one side, access to funders and formal institutions on the other. A single organisation can sometimes straddle both worlds, but it is a lot to ask. Collaboration between intermediaries with complementary strengths offers a way to create more inclusive supply chains that the next drought, flood or price shock will test again.
Mandy Rapson and Thanyani Ramarumo co-authored this article.
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Ralph Hamann is affiliated with the Southern Africa Food Lab, which is mentioned in this article, but receives no payment or funding from that organisation.
Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/17/informal-and-formal-economies-lessons-from-covid-on-how-supply-chains-can-connect-the-two-worlds/
