Source: The Conversation – UK
Prime Minister Andy Burnham recently announced the creation of a National Centre for Information Defence that will disrupt disinformation campaigns by states hostile to the UK. The centre will bring together security services, police, tech firms and government departments.
But this new centre will have its work cut out. State-backed adversaries are supported by huge amounts of money – Russia alone has an estimated US$2.15 billion (£1.63 billion) annual budget for information manipulation. And China spends more, at an estimated US$10 billion (£7.6 billion). This is alongside AI-generated deepfakes and covert digital operations.
Russia, China and Iran are mounting simultaneous, coordinated operations to try to destabilise democratic governments. The UK’s new agency will have to bridge government departments and partner with and temper big tech in order to respond effectively.
Read more:
What Andy Burnham can learn from Sweden about defending against Russian disinformation
In a recent podcast interview, Burnham said there had been clear Russian interference in the UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum. He later made a similar claim in the Commons.
Charges of Russian interference in elections around the world are nothing new. After the 2016 US presidential election, the Mueller Report concluded that Russia interfered in the 2016 US presidential election in a “sweeping and systematic fashion”.
And the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee criticised the government for failing to properly investigate Russian interference in British politics. However, before Burnham’s podcast interview, the UK government had not confirmed Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, despite allegations circulating in the media.
More broadly, the level of disinformation attacks aimed at the UK is worrying. The head of MI5, Sir Ken McCallum, said that the UK is dealing with more threats from other states than during the cold war. He added that Russia was “aggressor number one” (but later clarified that Russia had not succeeded in influencing the Brexit referendum result).
Disinformation itself is as old as the hills – trickery is a fundamental instrument of geopolitical conflict. Election interference is also not new. But in the AI era, disinformation operates with unprecedented speed, precision and creativity. Modern disinformation misleads and spreads harm, operating in the shadows, and is specifically designed to fall beneath the threshold for war.
The rationale is simple: why bother lobbing weapons if you can destroy an adversary’s morale? A hostile state will spend more on disinformation if it means spending less on costlier conventional weapon systems. And states are less likely to be held accountable for any damage they cause.
The primary threats to UK democracy come from Russia, China and Iran – and to a lesser extent from North Korea.
Russia relies on a strategy called “reflexive control”. This involves trying to manipulate citizens in target countries into certain behaviour – such as voting in a way that benefits Russia. It seeks to paralyse political decision-making and fracture alliances, including Nato and the EU.
China approaches information conflict through its “three warfares strategy”. This refers to psychological, public opinion and legal domains. It could include attempts to shape narratives around China’s policies on trade, Taiwan or the origins of COVID; or it might use digital deception and intimidation to win support in disputes over borders or control of the South China Sea. The aim is to break resistance without fighting.
Meanwhile, Iran invests heavily in cyber-influence operations. It seeks to stoke dissent over Scottish independence, access and leak information on Iranian dissident journalists and attack infrastructure such as power plants. In this way, Iran could undermine regional stability, radicalise target groups and manipulate public debate.
North Korea uses similar tactics, but for espionage, disruption and theft. One example is believed to be the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, which disrupted 61 NHS organisations including hospitals.
The UK’s vulnerability
The UK’s main adversaries target the democratic process itself. They view democratic institutions, election campaigns and referendums as a country’s “centre of gravity”. As such, disrupting elections threatens the very stability of a democratic country.
The UK’s vulnerability was laid bare in a 2021 report by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). The report revealed that Russian interference in British politics was widespread. Social media manipulation, illicit financial flows and cyber-operations were listed as tactics.
The report concluded that the UK had seriously underestimated the Russian threat. Notably, the intelligence services were accused of not investigating credible allegations of foreign interference during the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 Brexit vote. This reluctance to scrutinise foreign interference had created a space for hostile adversaries to exploit.
Since the UK showed support for Ukraine, the threat has worsened. Former national security adviser Lord Ricketts recently warned that the UK faces the threat of cyber-attacks on its banking systems, energy or water supplies as the Kremlin seeks to undermine public support for Ukraine.
The new Centre for Information Defence has to do more than just rebut disinformation. It also needs to expose target audiences to common manipulation tactics and deepfake media. Archetypes like Project Servator and See It, Say It, Sorted point the way to communicating this type of threat to the public.
Beyond public awareness, resilience requires stronger media ecosystems and digital platforms. Social media companies need to enforce stricter rules over algorithms and quicker removal of fake accounts.
Sanctions against individual perpetrators could include naming and shaming, freezing assets or travel bans. The 2023 National Security Act criminalised covert foreign interference, but the legislation needs to be enforced more robustly. Fines could encourage digital platforms to comply, but governments must also do more to freeze hostile states out of diplomatic relations. They could also coordinate condemnation through alliances such as Nato, the EU and the G7.
Given the rapid evolution of AI and the blurring of boundaries between peace and war, a hesitant response is not enough. But to tackle the huge threat, the new centre needs to be well resourced – in funding, capability, human resources and leeway. Crucially, it should also focus on offence as well as defence. Boxers don’t simply parry opponents’ punches – they must land their own too.
Paul Baines is a Conservative Councillor at Charnwood Borough Council and Deputy Leader of the Charnwood Conservative Group.
Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/10/21/the-new-battleground-the-uks-disinformation-centre-faces-threats-on-multiple-fronts/