Source: The Conversation – Africa (2)
In most multilingual African countries, language policy is a highly charged and controversial issue. It touches on regional identity, religion and political power – as is evident in Chad, in central Africa. Around 130 languages are spoken in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Chad.
The two official languages are Standard Arabic and French. Neither has its origins in the country and neither is the mother tongue of the majority of the population. Arabic has shaped the identity of most ethnic groups in northern Chad for several centuries, while French has done so for just under a century, primarily in southern Chad.
Having studied ethnic and religious conflicts in Chad for some time, I can suggest why the country’s new approach to language in education is not just about what happens in schools. The new education minister, Mahamat-Ahmat Alhabo, issued a circular in April 2026 demanding that, from the coming school year onwards, Standard Arabic be granted the same status as French as language of instruction and examination.
This circular sheds light on the political situation in Chad, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the immediate granting of equal status to both languages suggests a deliberate effort to promote the Arabic-speaking economic and political elite.
This comes at the expense of the Francophone population, from whom most of the political opposition originates.
It also reflects an ongoing shift away from the former colonial power, France, and an attempt by the current regime under Mahamat Déby to forge closer ties with the Arab world, particularly the United Arab Emirates.
Arabic and French: Islamisation and the colonial legacy Arabic and French have different historical roots in the country. It is believed that Arabic reached the north of what is now Chad as part of the Islamisation process between the 8th and 11th centuries.
As in other countries, alongside Standard Arabic, a distinct colloquial language known as Chadian Arabic has developed, enhanced by vocabulary from regional local languages. Today, Standard Arabic is the language in which the Qur’an is taught and recited.
It is spoken by a small, predominantly Muslim, educated wealthy elite with close links with Arabic-speaking countries, often through temporary migration for study or work. The majority of those who would call themselves Arabophone generally speak the local Chadian Arabic.
French colonial rule from 1900 to 1960 established French as the language of worship and instruction in the southern regions of the country. Employment in the colonial administration required knowledge of French. The southern part of Chad embraced the French language more.
However, the Islamised north largely rejected it and relied on its own schools instead. Chadian Arabic and French now serve as two lingua francas nationwide, especially in urban centres. However, they continue to represent different origins and religions: Muslims from the north and Christians from the south.
There are also political power dynamics: part of the Arabophone Muslim elite has held power for more than 40 years. Bilingualism: requirement and challenge Like many other states, independent Chad adopted the French education system and French as the official language under the leadership of its Francophone president, Ngarta Tombalbaye.
Although Arabic was recognised as a national language in 1962, French remained the sole official language of administration and education. Consequently, in the first decades following independence, the civil service and political power were dominated by a French-speaking elite.
After years of civil war, in 1978 power was transferred from the predominantly Christian south to the predominantly Islamic north. This was evident in the agreement to recognise Arabic as a second official language.
President Félix Malloum, who had only been in power for a few months, agreed with his prime minister, Hissène Habré, who would rule Chad with brutal force from 1982 to 1990, that Arabic should also be included in the constitution.
Following Idriss Déby’s seizure of power in 1990, the 1993 National Conference sought to establish a path towards democratic development in a unified Chad. The conference addressed the issue of language. However, the debate was no longer focused on Arabic or French.
Delegates from across the country agreed that the goal should be bilingualism. The question was: Standard Arabic or local Chadian Arabic? Standard Arabic was chosen. This presented an insurmountable challenge to the already poor education system for the coming decades.
There was, and still is, a severe shortage of Arabic teachers and educational materials. Consequently, few lessons took place, resulting in a low level of Arabic proficiency in state schools. Even universities where courses are taught in Arabic complain that they have to start with basic literacy.
Bilingualism in Chad’s schools is still a long way off. Furthermore, a large proportion of the Francophone population viewed Standard Arabic as a tool of political oppression and refused to learn it. Language as a political and economic force According to the circular, Standard Arabic is to be taught from the next academic year onwards with the same number of teaching hours as French.
It will also become an exam subject for the final school leaving exam with immediate effect. This will only benefit the children of the elite. They enhance their language skills by studying at the growing number of private schools that offer high-quality Arabic lessons or by studying abroad.
In practice, the groups that gained their wealth under Idriss Deby’s rule will retain their influence and status. By contrast, the Francophone former elite will be politically and economically marginalised. Conclusion The shift to Standard Arabic reflects the current direction of Chad’s foreign policy.
The country has ended its military cooperation with France and is seeking closer ties with the Middle East, particularly with the United Arab Emirates. Since Idriss Déby’s death, the Emirates have stepped in on several occasions to provide generous financial support.
But it’s come with conditions, such as Chad supporting Hemedti in neighbouring Sudan’s civil war, which risks involving Chad in the conflict. In summary, the language policy of the Chadian regime is not without risk.
Excluding a large part of the population from hopes of a better future could lead to conflicts that cannot be resolved peacefully.
Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/03/chad-is-making-arabic-equal-to-french-in-schools-the-politics-behind-the-move/