Over the last week I have subverted the western geo-cultural tropes of ‘Good versus Evil’ and ‘Beautiful versus Ugly’. (Geopolitical Rugby: Bad plays Evil, for the final World Cup 16 Sep 2025 and Lookism11 Sep 2025; both on Scoop and Evening Report.) Here I consider our new version of the former tripolar world; that  tripolar world prevailed from 1945 to 1990. Pole A, essentially the former First World, is now the Western Alliance. Pole B is equivalent to the former Second World; B is, as before, the geopolitical adversary of A. Pole C, the new Third World, is the equivalent of the former non-aligned Third World; yes, that’s the literal meaning of ‘third world’, non-alignment, neutrality.

The emergent new Second World includes the decentralised Muslim world; and has power centres in Beijing and Moscow; thus, its geographical and cultural loci are in Eurasia. The new Second World (pole B) is ‘united’ by comprising the various named enemies of the new First World; with West Europe being the geographical and cultural locus of pole A. West versus East, with substantial nuclear armaments; four nuclear countries in the West, four in the East.

The new Third World is defined neither by its geography nor its economic status. It is the neutral pole; pole C. India – the only nuclear power not in A or B – is potentially the leader of the new Third World, as it was the political leader of the old Third World. India’s future alignment remains the big geopolitical unknown.

Where does Australasia – Australia and New Zealand – fit? Given the geography (literally ‘south of Asia’), the common-sense position would be for Australia and New Zealand to become firm members of the new Third World; strictly non-aligned. But the signs are that Australasia, with only a tiny proportion of the old First World’s population, and on the opposite side of the world from the new First World, will contrive to be a fully aligned far-flung component of the new First World alliance. Though not formal members of Nato.

Nuclear Conflict

The most likely scenario for Nuclear War Two (NW2) would begin with a ‘nuclear attack’ across the present A-B (ie West-East) geopolitical boundary, noting that an important part of that boundary is inside Donetsk province; and also noting that one country – Türkiye – is ambiguously placed and may itself be regarded as a boundary-zone rather than a boundary-line.

(Both the words ‘nuclear’ and ‘attack’ come with some ambiguity. Would a strike on a nuclear power station by conventional weaponry count? Would any breach of airspace or sea-space by a nuclear-armed vehicle count as an attack?)

Any part of the world can be reached by perhaps five countries’ nuclear weapons, either from long-range missiles or launched from naval vessels (especially submarines).

Nuclear calculus is essentially ‘what happens next’, and the associated probabilities of the different scenarios. To keep my argument simple, I will assume that the first strike of NW2 is intentional, targeted, and includes at least one nuclear explosion. Such an explosion may not be on target for a variety of reasons; not least that an attacking missile may be intercepted.

My Scenario One is that of a smallish first strike on the East by the West. As, in my view, the East is more pragmatic than the West, a response would take place, but most likely would be de-escalatory or proportionate in nature; a calculated response, much as the recent responses by Iran to Israel’s provocations. The critical point would then be the next move by the West: escalation or de-escalation. De-escalation should lead to at least a temporary truce.

Escalation by the West would be problematic; presumably, and irrationally, it would target the eastern country which is already involved. Retaliation through nuclear escalation is not rational, in that the expected final outcome would be harmful to all; including harm to the retaliator. Nevertheless, the conventional presumption is that nuclear powers, if subjected to nuclear attack, would to the best of their abilities retaliate through nuclear escalation. The ‘rational’ calculus of the ‘mutually-assured-destruction’ dogma is that attacked countries would respond spitefully rather than rationally; so therefore peace depends on there being no first strike.

My Scenario Two is that of a smallish first strike on the West by one of the East’s nuclear nations. If the West – acting out of contrived fury rather than pragmatism – escalates in response, we are left with essentially the same situation as in Scenario One.

Scenarios Three and Four would be a large-scale first strike, either East on West or West on East. In these scenarios, de-escalation would be seen as capitulation with all the associated consequences of total defeat. Therefore, in these cases the response would almost certainly be proportionate or escalatory.

In all four scenarios we face situations of how to respond to a medium- or large-scale nuclear strike.

If the ‘ball’ is in the West’s court (Scenario Three), then the most likely response I would see would be an equal or larger response onto the Eastern power already involved, in the hope of splitting the East, and achieving a backdown by the East’s belligerent. The East’s non-belligerent powers would at this stage pitch for neutrality; they would ‘align’ with the new non-aligned Third World.

In the other three scenarios, we are faced with the perceived need by the East to respond to the West’s nuclear escalation. The context is the West’s alliances of ‘collective defence’; the legalised geopolitical contract (eg Nato’s Article Five) that an attack on one is an attack on all.

The situation faced by the East when de-escalation is not a realistic option.

There are two other options: escalation or deflection. Escalation, as already noted, is not rational. Its rationale is that of ‘globally-assured-destruction’, given the substantial third-party effects of nuclear warfare.

The other option for a large Asian nuclear superpower would be deflection. Deflection here means a proportionate retaliatory strike on one of the more expendable nations in the Western Alliance. Deflection lessens the probability of continued escalation.

Deflection could mean a significant nuclear strike on a non-nuclear Nato country, with the sense that Nato as-a-whole might renege on its ‘Article Five’ clause. Such a strike might end the war, with both sides preferring to pull-back from the brink; with both sides cutting their losses, so to speak.

A better deflective off-ramp might be a proportionate nuclear strike on a non-nuclear non-Nato country openly allied to Nato. That would further enhance the possibility that the nuclear war would come to an abrupt end. Would it be rational for the United States, United Kingdom, France or Israel to retaliate to a nuclear attack on a small distant non-Nato member of the Western Alliance?

There would be an awareness in all the main nuclear powers’ capital cities that, while distance can no longer prevent a country from being attacked, a nuclear calamity far away from the world’s major population centres would limit global loss of life and limit the impact on global food chains.

The Tyranny of Distance?

In 1966, Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey wrote The Tyranny of Distance. It was about the higher costs of such things as travel, trade and collective defence. Australia – especially White Australia – had a long-lasting neurosis about an East Asian lebensraum. New Zealand was always a bit more relaxed; practically the same distance to western markets and further from any putative East Asian adversary.

Nevertheless, the tyranny of distance did not prevent New Zealand’s ‘second people’ from coming from literally the other side of the world. Maritime geography and geopolitics had its own logic.

The traditional tyranny of distance hypothesis was overstated. In practical terms, in the era of sailing ships and no trains, it was much easier to travel from London to Dunedin than to Vancouver. The costs of long-distance compared to short-distance transport persistently declined. And, from the time of the telegraph coming to Australasia in the 1860s, communication between ‘down-under’ and Europe was hardly any more expensive than over much shorter distances.

But there is a new tyranny of distance for Oceania. We saw it in South Australia in the 1950s with the British nuclear testing at Maralinga. And American and French testing at Bikini and Mururoa. We have seen this tyranny of distance more generally in the mining exploitation of ‘distant’ ‘peripheral’ lands in Africa and South America. These parts of the world, distant from the world’s major population centres, are relatively exploitable and expendable.

There is a new component to the new tyranny of distance; New Zealand is coming to be treated as a billionaires’ nuclear bolthole. Refer to these 2025 stories (among many others): Billionaire boltholes: inside the doomsday hideouts of the super-rich (complete with picture of Peter Thiel), The oligarch’s guide to sitting out a nuclear winter, and Apocalypse now: Doomsday bunker secretly installed on New Zealand property – confirmed. In some privileged circles, there is a misguided belief in New Zealand exceptionalism; that Aotearoa New Zealand may be some kind of global life raft.

The presence of these people in Oceania increases the likelihood of Australasia being a nuclear target. So does Australia’s formal membership of AUKUS. So does New Zealand’s Minister of Defence signalling for Aotearoa to become an ally of Nato (refer: Judith Collins makes secret visit to site of Russian missile attack in Kyiv, TVNZ, 4 Sep 2025).

On Deflection

Far from being the least likely part of the world to become a victim of nuclear war, Oceania may indeed be the most likely venue for a deflective nuclear strike. If Aotearoa New Zealand can stifle its latent militarism (and can instead become an influential advocate for the new Third World), then the far side of Australia might be more at risk; Australia is already firmly in the European geopolitical camp, despite its obvious self-interest to maintain close ties with its Asian neighbours. Nuclear weapons are most likely to be targeted at cities, and any city far away from any other city becomes an excellent candidate for nuclear victimhood.

In the United States in 1945, there was a high-level debate about the best way to use its incipient nuclear weapon. Henry Stimson, United States Secretary for War, said “not Kyoto” (refer The man who saved Kyoto from the atomic bomb, BBC 9 August 2015). Even from the outset, war-torn Europe never looked like a good bet; indeed the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference was conducted on the basis that allied victory was just a matter of time. The ‘dovish’ option was to perform a ‘demonstration’ drop, to show what might happen if Japan did not immediately capitulate. The problem was that, by July 1945, Japan had already been bombed to smithereens and it had still not capitulated. The alternative to a demonstration drop was a gratuitous drop or two or three on a significant Japanese city. (The next two cities on the nuclear list were Kokura and Niigata; the plan was to bomb them around November 1945, when new warheads had been manufactured.)

In the end, the Americans did do two demonstrations. In August 1945, the value to Americans of a Japanese life was no higher than the value of life of a Gazan is to an Israeli Zionist. The bombs over Japan were demonstration drops; the real audience of the demonstrations was Josef Stalin, not Emperor Hirohito. Japan was a good site for a ‘show and tell’ because it was far from both Europe and North America. Japan – like Bikini and Mururoa, later on – was a Pacific test site.

In the present geopolitical environment, and if a nuclear war starts, a deflective proportionate retaliatory nuclear strike may be the only offramp; a way to avoid assured-global-destruction. From an Eastern standpoint the ideal target would be a place which is overtly allied to its Nato foe (and, to boot, is part of its adversary’s communications network), which can produce rockets and other high-tech componentry for Nato, which is sufficiently far away from major population centres to lessen environmental harm, which has a small (thereby relatively expendable) population, which has minimal anti-missile defences, and which has in its midst a number those enemy billionaires who helped to create the geopolitical problem in the first place.

Conclusion

Nowhere is safe. Rationally, distance may make a place less safe, not more safe, from nuclear destruction. While great-power brinkmanship is far from rational, rational thinking under great pressure will be required to end a nuclear war once started. Even the most rational decision-process will involve many casualties. The frontlines of a nuclear war are not the same as the frontlines of a conventional war.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

SPECIAL REPORT: By Michelle Fahy

The Australian counter-drone weapons system seen at a weapons demonstration in Israel recently is actually just one of a few that were sold by the Canberra-based company Electro Optic Systems (EOS) and sent through its wholly-owned US subsidiary to Israel, Declassified Australia can reveal.

It was the ABC who broke the news of the EOS weapons system being provided for the demonstration trial. In response, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese continued to insist, as he has since the war in Gaza began, that Australia does not sell weapons to Israel.

However the weapon displayed wasn’t just provided on loan for the demonstration – the weapon has been “sold” to the Israelis. Declassified Australia can reveal that EOS, by its own admission, sold more than one of its R400 weapons systems to the Israelis prior to the demonstration.

• READ MORE: Other Declassified Australia reports

An EOS company presentation, titled “2024 Full Year Results”, describes a “potential new customer” for the R400 weapon in the “Middle East” (page 36). The presentation, prepared for EOS shareholders and lodged with the Australian Stock Exchange, is dated 25 February 2025.

EOS describes this potential new customer for its R400 as a “Preliminary” stage opportunity, valued at less-than-A$100 million, and states that more than one weapon was sold:

“Sample products sold, demo held, discussions underway.” [Emphasis added]

The company also points out a sense of urgency with the potential sale:

“Potential to accelerate due to operational requirements.”

In another section of the report (page 16), EOS reports a single entry in the “Preliminary” stage of a potential sale of R400 weapons, with the “Bid being prepared or submitted”.

EOS states (page 36) the “estimated opportunity size” of the sale is up to “$100 million”. At a unit price per system of A$1.55 million that potential contract is enough to purchase 60 of the R400 counter-drone system.

Under the heading “Notable Demonstrations” (page 15), EOS refers to “Counter Drone evaluation testing with New Customer”, held in January 2025, with an accompanying photograph of its R400 counter-drone cannon with five senior Israeli defence leaders posing beside it at the testing site.

EOS itself has revealed that the new customer is clearly Israel.

EOS states it had “supported a local prime [a major local weapons company] to demonstrate counter-drone capabilities in a high profile local demonstration”. EOS states that its R400 weapon system had “performed extremely well, earning high praise from the organisers.”

The location of the demonstration of the Australian weapon is verified as being in Israel’s southern Negev Desert by a 5 February press release about the weapon testing, released by Israel’s Ministry of Defence.  [Note: Since publication of this article, the Press Release has been taken down from the Israeli Defense Ministry website, but is still available here, for now.]

An Israel Defense Force photograph included with the press release, is the same photo of the R400 weapon and Israeli officials, as published in the EOS document. Israel’s Ministry of Defence also posted this video of the final demonstration event, with a firing of the EOS R400 weapons system appearing at 01:06.

In the photograph standing behind the Australian company’s weapon are four senior Israeli defence officials, together with an Israeli defence industry CEO.

Countering drone attacks
EOS’ powerful R400 remote weapons system has a 2km range and is renowned for its lethality and precision in targeting. Using a sophisticated gimbal, its accuracy is maintained even when the system is mounted and used atop a moving vehicle. The weapon can be seen in use on a moving vehicle here in this video clip.

The EOS R400 is not solely a counter-drone weapons system. It can be configured to fire weapons ranging from machine guns, to 30mm cannons, automatic grenade launchers, anti-tank guided missiles and 70mm rockets, meaning it can be used against multiple types of targets in addition to drones — including people, buildings, armoured vehicles, and tanks.

The R400 Slinger variation is marketed by EOS as a system designed solely to counter modern drone threats with a single, lethal shot.

The Australian company’s customer in Israel is noted in the EOS company document as being an Israeli “local prime” arms manufacturer. Both Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems participated in the demonstration trials, each demonstrating a Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) that incorporated a 30mm cannon.

EOS sees a big future for the R400 and its suite of remote weapons systems. The EOS 2024 Financial Report was lodged with ASX on 25 February 2025. In the “Market Overview”section, it discusses weapons contracts signed in 2024, and notes (page 8) that:

“[EOS] Defence Systems is in active discussions and contract negotiations for the provision of RWS [Remote Weapons Systems] and related components with other potential customers.”

“Assuming the evaluation of these systems progresses positively, EOS would hope to move to sell larger, commercial quantities to these customers.” 

Australia obliged to act on defence transfers
In October 2024, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory reported on the implementation of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) findings that Israel may be committing “genocide”.

As reported by Kellie Tranter in Declassified Australia in November, the Australian government’s international legal responsibilities extend to investigating and regulating individuals and corporate entities who act in and from Australia to support the legally proscribed conduct of the Israeli State.

The Commission stated:

“Thus, the Commission recommends that any State engaged in such transfer or trade to Israel shall cease its transfer or trade until the State is satisfied that the goods and technology subject to the transfer or trade are not contributing to maintaining the unlawful occupation or to the commission of war crimes or genocide and thereafter throughout any period when the State is not so satisfied.” [Emphasis added]

The UN Commission makes clear what trade it refers to:

“On the issue of arms and military transfer and trade relating to Israel’s military capability, States have a duty to conduct a due diligence review of all transfer and trade agreements with Israel, including but not limited to equipment, weapons, munitions, parts, components, dual use items and technology, to determine whether the goods or technology subject to the transfer or trade contribute to maintaining the unlawful occupation or are used to commit violations of international law.” [Emphasis added]

If the government becomes aware of an impending military transfer of weapons or technology defined above, to Israel – as the stated intentions of EOS reported here make clear – it is obliged to investigate and if necessary intervene to halt the transfer:

“This includes both preexisting agreements and future transfers to Israel. States are obliged to demonstrate that any transfer or trade relating to military capability is not being used by Israel to maintain the unlawful occupation or commit violations of international law.” [Emphasis added]

Words are not enough
The Australian government and the Defence Department have continued their obfuscation of Australia’s weapons trade with Israel, as Declassified Australia has been reporting repeatedly.

ABC television has reported how the government continues to insist no weapons or ammunition had been supplied “directly to Israel” since its latest genocidal war on Gaza began. The addition of the word “directly” is a notable change to the government’s wording, since this EOS news emerged.

In response to the ABC report, Prime Minister Albanese said: “We do not sell arms to Israel . . .  We looked into this matter and the company has confirmed with the Department of Defence that the particular system was not exported from Australia. Australia does not export arms to Israel.”

Declassified Australia has previously reported on the Albanese Government’s repeated and misleading use of the phrase “to Israel”. Arms companies are known for exporting their weaponry, or parts and components thereof, via third party countries in an attempt to cover their tracks.

A defence industry source told the ABC the Australian-made components of the EOS R400 remote weapons system were assembled at the company’s wholly-owned US subsidiary in Alabama USA, before being shipped to Israel without an Australian export approval.

Military exports, including ammunition, munitions, parts and components, do not need to travel ‘directly’ to Israel to be prohibited under the Arms Trade Treaty.

Governments are required to find out where their weapons will, or may, end up and then make responsible decisions that comply with the treaty. A government must consider and assess the potential ‘end users’ of its military exports.

A UN expert panel has issued repeated demands that States and companies cease all arms transfers to Israel or risk complicity in international crimes, possibly including genocide. It stated:

“An end to transfers must include indirect transfers through intermediary countries that could ultimately be used by Israeli forces, particularly in the ongoing attacks on Gaza.…” [Emphasis added.]

Greens’ defence spokesperson, Senator David Shoebridge, has said, “What we might be seeing here is the impact of what’s called AUKUS Pillar 2, the removal of any controls for the passage of weapons between Australia and the United States, and then Australia permitting the United States to send Australian weapons anywhere”.

Not the first time
EOS has a history of supplying its remote weapons systems to military regimes accused of extensive war crimes.

During the catastrophic Yemen war which started in 2014, despite significant evidence of war crimes, EOS sold its weapons systems to both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. EOS enjoyed the full support of the Turnbull coalition government and its defence industry minister Christopher Pyne.

In early 2019, ABC TV reported, Saudi Arabia awarded Australian weapons manufacturer EOS a contract to supply it with 500 of its R400 Remote Weapons Systems.

The company has also benefited from the government-industry ‘revolving door’. Former chief of army, Peter Leahy, was on the EOS board from 2009 until late 2022, encompassing the period of the Yemen war. He served as the company’s chair from mid-2021 until his departure.

The two longest-serving current members of the EOS board are former chief of air force, Geoff Brown (joined 2016) and former Labor senator for the ACT, Kate Lundy (joined 2018).

The release of a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in 2023 raised serious concerns about EOS and its Saudi Arabian arms deals.

HRW’s report revealed that hundreds, possibly thousands, of unarmed migrants and asylum-seekers had been killed at the Yemen-Saudi border in the 15 months between March 2022 and June 2023, allegedly by Saudi officers.

Human Rights Watch says it identified on Google Earth what looks like “a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle” near a Saudi border guard posts north of the Yemeni refugee trail in January 1, 2023.

The vehicle has what appears to be “a heavy machine gun mounted in a turret on its roof”. This description closely matches the military equipment that Australia sold to Saudi Arabia a few years earlier.

Declassified Australia put a number of questions to EOS, the Department of Defence, and the offices of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and the Foreign Minister. None responded to our questions on this matter.

Michelle Fahy is an independent writer and researcher, specialising in the examination of connections between the weapons industry and government, and has written in various independent publications. She is on X @FahyMichelle, and on Substack at UndueInfluence.substack.com. This article has been republished from Declassified Australia with permission.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

Papua New Guinea police officers have been issued with a Commissioner’s Circular on the approved use of force in the execution of their duties to protect lives from domestic terrorist and other criminal activities.

With the escalation of violence in the Highlands and other parts of PNG, Police Commissioner David Manning said officers must be clear on the extent of their powers.

And criminals needed to be warned of likely outcomes if they used weapons.

“Today, I issued a Commissioner’s Circular on the use of force against criminals to reinforce the lawful authority of police personnel,” he said.

“This is not a circular issue I issue lightly, but it is necessary and done so with the full support of the government in order to quell violence, particularly in the Highlands region.

“I have directed RPNGC personnel to be prepared to deploy lethal force where this is required and reasonable commanders are instructed to incorporate this directive into respective operational orders,” Manning said.

He said as part of this, RPNGC members were reminded when using force and lethal force to act in good faith and sound judgment in accordance with PNG’s laws.

Commissioner Manning said reports of criminals armed with weapons terrorising people — particularly in Enga Province — would not be tolerated.

“Police and PNGDF personnel are responding to criminal elements that commit violent acts on law-abiding and vulnerable communities.”

The Commissioner’s Circular issued today provides clear direction as to when and how lethal force is applied.

In simple terms, if a person was brandishing a gun, an explosive device, or other weapons, — such as a bush knife or catapult — force would be escalated to protect the public and police.

Domestic terrorists and other criminals had now been given more than fair warning, and they could expect no tolerance by security forces responding to crimes.

Last week, two gang leaders in East New Britain felt the full force of the law when they confronted police with firearms. Both gang leaders were killed and their associates arrested.

Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Papua New Guinea police in Madang and the National Capital District have arrested a total of 101 men suspected of being involved in two separate incidents reported in both provinces over the long weekend.

In Madang, 34 villagers were arrested after they clashed with police over the death of a local man from Korak village identified as Joseph Masul.

After the death of Masul was reported, the villagers along the Bogia-Madang Highway were up in arms and retaliated by blocking the main highway.

The blocking of the highway, according to Madang police, hindered services and movement of people into Madang over the long weekend.

Police moved in after Assistant Commissioner of Police-Northern Peter Guinness assisted with police officers from Lae, who removed the roadblock and picked up 34 suspects.

While in NCD, 67 men were rounded up by police at Gerehu Stage 5 over a fight that erupted after the death of a man was reported during the third game of Australia’s State of Origin rugby league series two weeks ago.

The 67 men were on their way to instigate another fight when police were informed and moved in swiftly, arresting all 67 men and removing their weapons.

Murder suspect in hiding
NCD Metropolitan Superintendent Silva Sika said the suspect in the initial murder case had been hiding from police, angering the victim’s relatives.

The relatives approached a youth who lives at Banana Block who was about to leave for school and questioned him about what had happened a week earlier.

Superintendent Sika said the youth then went to the block, organised his friends who painted their faces black and and marched towards where the deceased’s haus krai (house of mourning) was. They were about to attack the mourners when police stopped them.

He said they would be charged for unlawful assembly, armed with offensive weapons and about to cause a fight in public.

Sika said the men were all armed and were moving in a public place that instilled fear in the public.

While speaking to the suspects at Waigani police station, Superintendent Sika told the suspects that people living Port Moresby must try to respect the rule of law.

‘Respect rule of law’
“I will not hesitate to demolish the areas where you are residing. Moving around in public places with weapons shows no respect for the rule of law,” he said.

“I am happy that the police responded on time to arrest and remove all the weapons from you. If they had not done that it [would] be another disaster in the city where innocent lives and properties will be lost or damaged.

“The weapons that you had in your possession are dangerous and life threatening so you must be charged for that to show others that carrying offensive weapons and moving in groups in public places is against the law.”

Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) has denied Indonesian media claims that Egianus Kogoya, the commander of a TPNPB faction, asked for money and weapons to free the New Zealand pilot they are holding hostage.

“No, we never asked for money and weapons in exchange for releasing pilot Philip Mark Mehrtens. That’s just propaganda from the Indonesian security forces,” said TPNPB spokesperson Sebby Sambom.

“This is a political issue, the New Zealand pilot is a guarantee of political negotiations.”

Previously, Papua Police spokesperson Senior Commander Ignatius Benny Ady Prabowo had said the police would not follow a request for firearms and cash in exchange for releasing the Susi Air pilot.

“That was their request at the beginning. But of course we don’t respond. We will not give weapons that will later be used to shoot the authorities and terrorise the community,” Prabowo told reporters.

‘Psychologically disturbing’
The Papuan Church Council said the capture of Philip Mehrtens as a hostage was “psychologically disturbing” for his wife, family and children.

The council demanded that the pilot be released in an open letter. With his release, of Philip Mark Mehrtens, the council said Kogoya would get sympathy from the global community and the people of Indonesia.

“There must be a neutral mediator or negotiator trusted by both the TPNPB, the community, and the government to release the pilot. Otherwise, many victims will fall,” said Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman, a member of the Papuan Church Council.

A New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said the welfare of its citizens was a top priority.

“We are doing everything we can, including deploying New Zealand consular staff to ensure the safe release of our citizen taken hostage,” she said.

The spokesperson added that New Zealand was working closely with Indonesian authorities to ensure the safe release of Mehrtens.

Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Papua New Guinea’s policemen and women around the country have been ordered to arrest and charge anyone in possession of illegal firearms — which carries life imprisonment under the amended law — from the May 19 deadline.

Police Commissioner David Manning, who is also the Registrar of Firearms, said that the directives were now being enforced.

Manning is urging all police officers around the country to enforce the law and implement the Firearms Amendment Act 2022 that was tabled and supported by all members of the 10th National Parliament recently.

“I gave a two-week amnesty period for people to come forward and surrender their firearms to the nearest police station,” he said.

“I am now appealing to anyone who has any information about the existence of any such illegal firearms to please come forward and assist your police force to remove these individuals and firearms from our communities.”

Papua New Guinea faces a general election starting in late July and security is an issue.

Miriam Zarriga is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Police have begun a “significant investigation” into yesterday’s events at the Parliament protest and say they will hold people accountable for any criminal behaviour.

Police Assistant Commissioner Richard Chambers has held a media conference to provide the latest information on the aftermath of the anti-covid public health measures protest.

Chambers said police made 89 arrests yesterday and there had been 11 further arrests today.

He said police had now entered a “significant investigation phase”.

“We are working hard to bring together a lot of footage, support from the public and other sources of information to help us hold people accountable for their criminal behaviour yesterday.”

Chambers said the investigation would continue “as long as it needs to”. He could not say how many people police were looking for.

“If any evidence demonstrates that someone’s behaviour was criminal then we will take the appropriate action,” he said.

“One of the things that we look at is funding streams. Work on that is underway.”

A ‘proportionate’ response
More than 40 police staff were injured yesterday. Injuries range from abrasions to bone fractures and head injuries. Eight staff who were admitted to hospital had since been discharged.

Chambers said police were thankful for support from Wellington Free Ambulance yesterday.

“Having them available alongside us … was something we are very grateful for.”

Watch the police media conference:

Video: RNZ News

Chambers said he did not have a total number of injuries for protesters, but medical support was available for them.

“I can’t comment on any admissions to hospital.”

He said the force that police used was “necessary and proportionate to the situation that was in front of them”.

He said police would look at anything that suggested police force was not appropriate.

The use of fire extinguishers and bricks being thrown at police by protesters changed the police response, Chambers said.

“We did use pepper spray yesterday and that was entirely appropriate.”

‘Close eye’ on remaining protesters
Police have had officers stationed around the perimeters of the CBD area today, but have not reported any issues.

Protesters have been gathering in other areas around Wellington, including on the Miramar Peninsula.

Police were keeping a “very close eye” on them, Chambers said.

“We are monitoring all behaviour and their activity to prevent and further situations.”

Assistant Commissioner Chambers said any protesters remaining in the Wellington region should go home. He said genuine protesters were long gone by yesterday.

Police would also monitor any activity in other parts of the country, Assistant Commissioner Chambers said. He added that police would be patrolling anywhere in the country where there are protests for as long as it takes.

Controller of the investigation
As national controller of the investigation into the protest, Chambers would be kept informed of any related activity elsewhere in the country.

“What we have seen today is a number of those protests, protesters, depart and go home as well.”

Before police involved in yesterday’s operation return to their part of the country they were required to have a RAT test, Assistant Commissioner Chambers said.

Assistant Commissioner Chambers said today’s efforts in Wellington had focused on reassurance patrols and visibility.

“I’d like to say a very big thank you to the people of Wellington. The support they have shown today to police staff that were involved yesterday and today has been phenomenal.”

He said police had received “thousands” of messages of thanks for their efforts.

Auckland Domain protest camp removed
Meanwhile, in Auckland the anti-mandate camp at Auckland Domain was being disassembled today.

Police and staff from Auckland Council were onsite.

The operation was peaceful and protesters were asking police if they could move somewhere else.

An eyewitness says initially four police and a mediator approached the occupation site, and later more than 10 officers and about 40 council workers were there.

Roads in the Domain were still closed.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

There’s an overlooked aspect of the New Zealand Defence Force’s account of Operation Burnham that when scrutinised suggests a possible breach of international humanitarian law and laws relating to war and armed conflict occurred on August 22, 2010 in the Tirgiran Valley, Baghlan province, Afghanistan.

According to New Zealand Defence Force’s official statements Operation Burnham ‘aimed to detain Taliban insurgent leaders who were threatening the security and stability of Bamyan Province and to disrupt their operational network’. (ref. NZDF rebuttal) We are to understand Operation Burnham’s objective was to identify, capture, or kill (should this be justified under NZDF rules of engagement), those insurgents who were named on a Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) that NZDF intelligence suggested were responsible for the death of NZDF soldier Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell.

When delivering NZDF’s official account of Operation Burnham before media, Lieutenant General Tim Keating said:

“After the attack on the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZPRT), which killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell, the NZPRT operating in Bamyan Province did everything it could to reduce the target profile of our people operating up the Shakera Valley and into the north-east of Bamyan Province. “We adjusted our routine, reduced movements to an absolute minimum, maximised night driving, and minimised time on site in threat areas. “The one thing the PRT [NZPRT] couldn’t do was to have an effect on the individuals that attacked Lieutenant O’Donnell’s patrol. For the first time, the insurgents had a major success — and they were well positioned to do so again.”

For the purpose of a counter-strike, intelligence was sought and Lt. General Keating said: “We knew in a matter of days from local and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intelligence who had attacked our patrol [where and when Lt. O’Donnell was killed].” The intelligence specified the villages where the alleged insurgents were suspected of coming from and Lt. General Keating said: “This group had previously attacked Afghan Security Forces and elements of the German and Hungarian PRTs.” The New Zealand Government authorised permission for the Kabul-based NZSAS troops to be used in Operation Burnham. “What followed was 14 days of reliable and corroborated intelligence collection that provided confirmation and justification for subsequent actions. Based on the intelligence, deliberate and detailed planning was conducted,” Lt. General Keating said. Revenge, Keating said, was never a motivation. Rather, according to him, the concern was for the security of New Zealand’s reconstruction and security efforts in Bamyan province. As stated above, Operation Burnham’s primary objective was to identify, capture or kill Taliban insurgent leaders named in the intelligence data. We know, from the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, Operation Burnham failed to achieve that goal.

Analysis of the NZDF Official Account The official account of events that occurred in the early hours of August 22, 2010, describe how Taliban insurgents, realising coalition forces were preparing to raid the area (marked as ‘Operation Burnham Area of Operation’ in a map (slide 3) declasified and released to media on March 27, 2017), formed a tactical maneuver using civilians (women, children and elderly) as a human shield.

Despite the official account placing this group within a building, within a small hamlet, within the area of operation, within Tirgiran Valley, there is no clear definitive official account yet given of what happened to either the civilians or the insurgents.

This appears to be an obvious void in the official record, but one that has failed so far to be scrutinised.

To follow the logic of Lt. General Tim Keating’s account (detailed below), is to discover our defence personnel, who were in charge of the ground and air operation during Operation Burnham, failed to identify what had become of those civilians (women, children, and the elderly), and also importantly the suspected insurgents who Lt. General Keating said during his briefing used the villagers as a human shield.

We know from the Chief of Defence Force’s notes as provided on March 27, 2017, that as Operation Burnham began, NZDF was in command of United States manned aircraft (including helicopters and possibly a AC-130). The aircraft were swarming above the Tirgiran Valley.

From the NZDF account an NZDF joint terminal air controller was in charge of the air attack against those NZDF had defined as insurgents. Lt. General Keating stated the alleged insurgents were armed and a NZDF commander authorised the US manned aircraft to commence firing.

Weapons-fire then began to rain down on the valley from above. Meanwhile NZSAS ground force soldiers prepared to secure their positions and to defend themselves against any potential enemy counter-attack.

Lt. General Keating stated the insurgents responded: “The insurgents, the guerrilla force, the tactic is mixed in with the civilian population, if you like, the term used is a human shield. So they use civilians as a shield.”

He added: “What occurred, is a helicopter was engaging a group of insurgents outside the village, on the outskirts of the village. During that engagement, it was noted by the ground forces there – the SAS ground forces – that some of the rounds [from the US manned aircraft] were falling short, and went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents.”

To be clear, from this account, Lt. General Keating stated a group of insurgents were being tracked, targeted, and fired upon by the US manned aircraft and under the command of a New Zealand Defence Force terminal air controller. Meanwhile, according to the NZDF record, one of the airborne helicopter’s weapon’s sights were not calibrated correctly, and, according to Lt. General Keating, 30mm projectiles went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents – remember these 30mm projectiles are capable of penetrating the side of a tank.

For accuracy, Lt. General Keating restated his account: “It is noted, the building, there were armed insurgents in there, but it is believed that there may have been civilians in the building.”

He then added: “There’s no confirmation that any casualties occurred, but there may have been.” He restated again: “There were civilians in that building.” Now, this is where the Chief of Defence Force’s account fails to further explain what occurred after that point. To summarise, the official position of the New Zealand Defence Force is:

• There were civilians in a building within the village that was fired upon by an armor piercing aircraft weapon
• That it was believed insurgents were also in that building
• That civilian casualties or deaths “may have been” or occurred inside the building.

At this juncture, we must consider whether the New Zealand Defence Force ground commanders had a responsibility to determine whether there were Taliban insurgents in the building?

And if so, whether they were the individuals listed on the JPEL list, those deemed responsible for the death of Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell?

And what of the ground commanders’ legal requirements, the duty of care with respect to civilians, were NZDF commanders on the ground or back in Kabul compelled by law to confirm the status of the civilians, whether they were injured or killed?

When asked by a journalist at the March 27, 2017 press conference: ‘If there may have been civilian casualties, why not have an inquiry to find out?’ Lt. General Keating replied: “Even if there was, as far as the New Zealand Defence Force has heard, the coalition investigation has, um, said that uh, if there were casualties, the fault of those casualties was a mechanical failure of a piece of equipment.” This reply does not appear to consider the legal requirements under:

• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 7: the obligation to provide medical assistance to all wounded, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 8: the obligation to search for and collect the wounded and to ensure their adequate care
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 13: the obligation to protect the civilian population against dangers arising from military operations
• Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, section 102. This section provides that the commanding officer of a person alleged to have committed an offence under that Act must initiate proceedings in the form of a charge or refer the allegation to civil authorities, unless the commanding officer considers the allegation is not well-founded. While little legal guidance is provided, it cannot be accepted that preliminary inquiries to determine whether an allegation is well-founded can be considered adequate where they fail to obtain evidence from the injured parties, determine their identities or even verify that they exist
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 28
• The NZDF Manual of Armed Forces Law provides that there are three types of inquiry in the NZDF: a preliminary inquiry, a court of inquiry and a command investigation. (It appears however the ISAF investigation cited by the Chief of Defence Force was not any of the above forms of inquiry).

Specifically, if you analyse Lt. General Keating’s account, the New Zealand Defence Force commanders failed to identify whether any insurgents were inside the building and whether there were dead or wounded civilians. Why was this the case? It seems reasonable to suggest, this is an abandonment of logic. It does not make sense.

We know from official NZDF documents the soldiers arrived at the scene of Operation Burnham at 0030 hours on August 22, 2010 and left at 0345 hours, that’s the official record. To clarify, the NZSAS commandos were in the area of operation for 3 hours 15 minutes.

Lt. General Keating stated, near the conclusion of the raid: “The ground force commander chose at that time that there was no longer a threat and they were leaving.”

How could that rationally be the case unless the suspected insurgents inside that building had been checked?

Was it not suspected that there were insurgents in that building? Surely the ground force commanders would be compelled to seek and identify the inhabitants of that building to see if they matched the names/descriptions on the JPEL list?

After all, the manhunt for Taliban leadership was the purpose of the raid that night. Also, logic would suggest, the people inside the building were in part civilians including women and probably children – by Lt. Keating’s account the group likely included wounded civilians and probably a dead child.

Also, it is reasonable to suggest, considering the events over those 3 hours 15 minutes, the survivors would have been crying, weeping, even howling, and the wounded would likely have been in agony.

It defies belief that the ground force commanders, and their counterparts back in Kabul, were not aware of this building, that the NZDF account states was housing suspected Taliban, and included a group of civilian victims that had been used as a human shield.

The entire area of operation specific to Operation Burnham is a skewed rectangle approximately 500 metres wide by 1 kilometre long, with an intensified operation plan focusing on two small hamlets, each approximately 50×200 metres in area [based on the scale measures of the NZDF map] – named Objective 1 and Objective 2 in the NZDF released material.

To state it simply, the official silence surrounding the above-mentioned building, and the fate of the people inside, speaks volumes. It leaves one to consider at worst whether a crime was committed by New Zealand Defence Force commanders that night – whether by failing in their duty to care for the injured they were in breach of Articles 8, 9 and 13 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

ADDITIONAL NOTE:
• The Statute of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as, inter alia, “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character”. (Ref. IHL Definition of war crimes, page 1 (pdf) – ICC Statute, Article 8 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 3))
• ‘The Statute defines as within the scope of the law, the “launching an attack without attempting to aim properly at a military target or in such a manner as to hit civilians without any thought or care as to the likely extent of death or injury amounts to an indiscriminate attack”.
• War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. Examples of the latter include failure to provide a fair trial and failure to provide food or necessary medical care to persons in the power of the adversary.’

At best, if NZDF’s official account is to be relied upon, we are to believe the NZSAS ground commanders failed to ensure the Taliban insurgents they sought were not holed up in a building that had sustained damage from coalition force aircraft. If this assumption is incorrect, at what point had the suspected insurgents left the building?

And what had become of the civilians that had been allegedly used as a human shield? Again, the vacuum of information specific to this aspect of the official account needs to be explained, including an explanation as to why NZDF’s account remains vague after six years since Operation Burnham was conducted.

It appears reasonable to assert that this single issue, notwithstanding the irregularities of official NZDF stated ‘facts’, warrants further official and independent investigation. As it is, at this juncture, we are left to consider a series of unanswered questions that to date the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force has failed to satisfy. Here are some of them. Key Unanswered Questions:

• What were the specific definitions of an insurgent that were used by NZDF for the purposes of evaluation during Operation Burnham and for the purpose of post-operation official analysis? For example; was it deemed that anyone who was male and of a fighting age was defined to be an insurgent?
• Were NZDF soldiers fired upon by individuals (villagers or insurgents) located within the confines of the villages or surrounding area during Operation Burnham?
• Was the individual who was killed by a NZSAS soldier or NZDF personnel carrying a weapon at the time of this shooting? If so, had he fired or attempted to fire his weapon in an attempt to kill or wound NZDF personnel?
• How long in minutes were the coalition forces’ helicopters, and any other airborne craft, firing their weapons on the villages and surrounding region during Operation Burnham?
• How long in minutes were NZSAS soldiers involved in securing the operational area from real or potential insurgent attack?
• Did NZDF personnel at anytime seek to identify individuals (and their status, injured, killed, or otherwise) who were located inside or near the building that Lt. General Keating said had suffered damage from an alleged mis-aimed firing from an airborne coalition aircraft?
• Were those who were injured or killed within sight of NZDF personnel before, during, and/or after the alleged mis-aimed firing?
• How many individuals did the NZDF personnel suspect were inside the building?
• How many of these people did the NZDF personnel suspect were civilians?
• How many were suspected of being women?
• How many were suspected of being children?
• Lt. General Keating suggested that one of the individuals that may have been killed during Operation Burnham was a six year-old child. What was the gender of this child?
• Was their any attempt to identify this six year-old victim?
• Was this child Fatima, the three year-old child identified in the Hit & Run [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] book? If not, then who was this child?
• What actions did NZDF personnel do to exercise their duty of care obligations to the injured and to civilians?
• What reports, cautions, evaluations were written and/or submitted regarding Operation Burnham to NZDF by the NZDF legal officer who was on the ground during Operation Burnham?

The Twisting Turning Official Account – Is This Smoke and Mirrors? As a consequence of the Hit & Run book [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] being published, New Zealand Defence Force’s top ranking soldier, Lt. General Tim Keating admitted civilians “may have been” killed during the operation.

Up until March 27, 2017, for the past six years, New Zealand Defence Force has insisted that no civilians were killed during Operation Burnham on August 22, 2010.

But on Monday, under questioning from the media, at the March 27 press conference, Lt. General Keating stated that the NZDF’s new “official line” regarding civilian deaths was “there may have been”. He then attempted to suggest that NZDF’s previously stated position – that claims of civilian deaths were “unfounded” – was basically the same thing. “I’m not going to get cute here and say it’s a twist on words, it’s the same thing, ‘unfounded’, ‘there may have been’. The official line is that there may have been casualties,” Lt. General Keating said.

A journalist then challenged him further suggesting: “They’re different things, one means they didn’t happen and one mean might’ve done.”

Lt. General Keating then replied: “You’re right…the, the, the official line is that civilian casualties may have occurred, but not corroborated.”

When asked how many insurgents were killed, Lt. General Keating replied: “A significant number of insurgents, identified insurgents, were killed during Operation Burnham.”

When asked again how many were killed, Lt. General Keating stated: “Nine.” When asked if NZDF had the names of the insurgents that were killed, he replied: “No, we do not have names of insurgents.”

This trajectory, inching toward a truth, occurred under tight questioning by a journalist, over just a few minutes.

What further truths will become relevant to understanding what occurred that night in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages should a commission of inquiry be established?

The Inconsistencies – A Summary

In evaluation, it is reasonable to assert the official Government inconsistencies observed along a six-year timeline offer the appearance of a military hierarchy that has being dragged, by degrees, (mainly by the work of Jon Stephenson, an investigative journalist specialising in war and conflict reportage) into an arena where the floodlight of public interest ought to shed light on secrets long since filed into a dark place.

However, considering the above, rather than responding openly to the challenge of meeting its responsibilities to the New Zealand Minister of Defence and public, the New Zealand Defence Force appears resistant to its obligations toward open and accurate disclosure of non-classified fact.

In conclusion, if this is true, this conduct exhibited by the officials of New Zealand Defence Force and its Chief Lt. General Tim Keating is hardly a defining benchmark of ‘exemplary’ standards.

Actually, the admissions of relevant information, that is forthcoming only when lanced from the New Zealand Defence Force under questioning, offers the impression of a smoke and mirrors operation – it may appear churlish to suggest, but perhaps the post-Operation Burnham aftermath ought to be referred to as Operation Desert Road (bleak, cold, inhospitable, proceed with caution).

The public deserves to know the whole truth, not spin or part-truths – both the public interest and the national interest depends on it.

By the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, it appears reasonable to suggest that the commanders overseeing Operation Burnham had legal obligations to civilians; that they were potentially negligent when considered against their stated rules of engagement, rules of conduct, obligations to international human rights law and international humanitarian law – negligent of their obligations to laws covering war and armed conflict, notwithstanding their obligations as representatives of the people and Government of New Zealand to observe the Bill of Rights Act.

It is also reasonable to suggest; there are significant established facts as mentioned above, as put by the New Zealand Defence Force, that require an official investigative response from the New Zealand Government.

It is also reasonable to insist that the matter of an absence of consistent fact emitting from the New Zealand Defence Force upon which a reliable opinion can be draw, adds weight to the burden on the Government to establish an inquiry into this matter.

If the New Zealand Prime Minister Bill English elects not to act then it will likely become a matter of political leadership or lack thereof.

If Bill English does not care to act on his office’s public interest obligations, then, it is reasonable to suggest he consider the empirical facts underlying this matter and the impact the matter has on New Zealand’s national interest. Should he fail to do so, this matter potentially could be argued before the International Criminal Court.

“It seems to me,” Lt. General Tim Keating stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.” – Lieutenant General Tim Keating, March 27, 2017.

On Monday, March 27, 2017 both the Prime Minister Bill English and the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force Lieutenant General Tim Keating countered details revealed in the book Hit & Run and argued facts stated in the work could not be relied upon because the authors ‘incorrectly’ alleged Operation Burnham took place in Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village deep in the mountainous Baghlan province of Afghanistan – two locations the Defence Force chief insisted his soldiers had never been to. Lt. General Keating asserted that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to the two villages (Khak Khuday Dad and Naik) and insisted Operation Burnham took place 2.2 kilometres to the south of where the authors Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson had marked the location of the villages (specifically on a map published in the book Hit & Run).

Lt. General Keating said: “As you will note from the book, the authors have been precise in locating these villages with geo reference points — so I have no doubt they are very accurate in the villages they are taking their allegations from.

“The villages lie in the Tirgiran Valley some 2 kilometres north from Tirgiran Village. In straight distance this is like comparing the distance from Te Papa to Wellington Hospital. However, if you overlay the elevated terrain, you will see we are talking about two very separated, distinct settlements,” Lt. General Keating said.

Beyond the obvious, it was a staggering claim, especially for those aware the New Zealand Defence Force had insisted one week prior, that its official position remained the same as stated in a media release dated April 20, 2011 that: “On 22 August 2010 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements, operating as part of a Coalition Force in Bamyan province, Afghanistan conducted an operation against an insurgent group.”

NZDF’s earlier position asserted New Zealand soldiers had not been in Baghlan province on or near August 22, 2010 the night of Operation Burnham. Now, the chief of New Zealand’s armed forces was admitting that they had.

At the press conference on Monday March 27, 2017 the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force prepared to stake his claim that the book could not be relied on as a factual reference.Before around 30 journalists, Lt. General Tim Keating pointed to four relevant bullet-points underlying key claims of fact in the book:

• Helicopter landing sites
• Location of houses that were destroyed
• Locations of where civilians were allegedly killed
• Presumed location of an SAS Sniper with evidence presented of SAS ammunition and water bottles which were found at the site.

A relationship was drawn between the Sniper location and the alleged killing of the individual Islamuddin, the School teacher. He acknowledged that the book contained a detailed list of those alleged to have been killed or wounded during a military operation in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages and a detailed list of the houses destroyed at the two locations.

Lt. General Keating then drove his point home that: “The underlying premise of the book is that New Zealand’s SAS soldiers conducted an operation on Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village…” “It seems to me,” he stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.”

Lt. General Keating pivoted. “Let me now talk about the ISAF Operation Burnham in Tirgiran Village.” The premise of the Chief of Defence Force’s position was; the book Hit & Run described events that may or may not have occurred in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages, but that these alleged events had nothing to do with New Zealand Defence Force soldiers as they had never been to the two locations as marked in the book.

Likewise, the Prime Minister, Bill English, said the book got it wrong, that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to either Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village.

The Prime Minister added: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

For some, it appeared the raid that night as described by the authors could have been committed by another force. For others, it seemed the authors had got a major fact wrong so therefore the remaining claims in the book were moot.

By mid-Wednesday morning, the Government and the public found out there was more to it, that the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force was also wrong with regard to his geography.

Unpicking the official line began in earnest late on Tuesday night (March 28, 2017) when the lawyers representing the alleged victims of Operation Burnham contacted their clients back in Afghanistan. The purpose of the contact was to identify the exact location of Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village; to confirm or otherwise disprove the existence of ‘Tirgiran Village’ (the NZDF stated official location of Operation Burnham), and to identify and confirm what village or villages are located at the exact co-ordinates as provided by Lt. General Tim Keating in his briefing to New Zealand media.

The lawyers’ clients, represented by a doctor from the region, stated categorically that ‘Tirgiran Village’ (as stated by Lt. General Keating) does not exist. That the region is known as Tirgiran Valley.

The lawyers evaluated from the new information, that to refer to the location of Operation Burnham as Tirgiran Village is like insisting an operation had occurred in Otago City (obviously Otago is a region and a city of that name does not exist, and as such would fail to offer an exact point of reference on a map).

Importantly, the lawyers confirmed, New Zealand Defence Force’ co-ordinates of where Operation Burnham took place were correct – but that the location was not as the NZDF had stated as ‘Tirgiran Village’ (an incorrect reference to a village that does not exist) but rather marks the geo-locations of where Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village are located.

Specifically, the villagers confirmed the red-rectangle as marked on the NZDF map provided by the Lt. General on Monday March 27, and referred to as the area specific to Operation Burnham, frames the exact positions of where Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages are located. So simply, the book contained a map that placed Khak Khuday Dad and Naik 2.2 kilometres north of there specific real locations.

And, the NZDF got it wrong by stating that those two villages were located where the book suggested, and that the village at the centre of Operation Burnham was a different village called Tirgiran Village (again, a place-name that does not exist).

So it turns out, according to those that live in the Tirgiran Valley, the Chief of Defence Force’s statement is incorrect or false; that when NZDF stated as a categorical fact that the New Zealand SAS commandos had never been to Khak Khuday Dad Village nor Naik Village, that that information was false.

At this point politically, it’s inescapable that the Prime Minister’s stated position ought to have taken a hit.

Remember back to the Prime Minister’s statement to media on Monday March 27, 2017 where he pitched his rationale: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

Surely, the same measure that was applied to the authors of Hit & Run now ought to be applied in equal measure to the New Zealand Defence Force chief and his officials.

After all, they also got their geography wrong. Since then, there has been stated unease about the whole issue by Internal Affairs Minister Peter Dunne (the minister who would have to sign off and authorise the costs of an inquiry should the Prime Minister order an inquiry be established).

By Thursday March 30, 2017 Dunne, through media, called for an inquiry into the whole affair. (ref. Stuff.co.nz ) Also on Thursday, the Minister of Defence at the time of the raid, Dr Wayne Mapp, wrote of his unease about Operation Burnham in a piece published on the Pundit website. (ref. Pundit ) Dr Mapp argued that the Government’s position, and that of the New Zealand Defence Force, cannot be the end of it. “Part of protecting their [the SAS’] reputation is also finding out what happened, particularly if there is an allegation that civilian casualties may have been accidentally caused. In that way we both honour the soldiers, and also demonstrate to the Afghans that we hold ourselves to the highest ideals of respect of life, even in circumstances of military conflict,” wrote Dr Mapp.

Common Statements Of Fact

The descriptions of Operation Burnham, in both the book, and, as stated by the New Zealand Defence Force, do mirror each account with precision on numerous vital points, including:

• The time of night Operation Burnham took place
• That New Zealand Defence Force was commanding and leading the operation (both on the ground and in the air)
• That the helicopters were manned by United States military personnel under New Zealand’s command
• That the purpose of the operation was to kill or capture those named as having been part of a Taliban insurgent raid that killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell
• That buildings were destroyed during the operation
• That people were killed at the villages.

However, anyone who has reasonably assessed the issue can see there is much more information to be revealed.

Conclusion: In concluding this analysis, it is an imperative that due to the highest levels of public and national interest concerning the alleged conduct, the seriousness of allegations, and the variables relating to the official account, that the matter be subjected to an independent commission of inquiry.