Based on provisional election results, New Zealand’s parliament could grow by up to 11 overhang seats – without accurately representing the proportion of party votes cast.

There are now growing calls for reform of the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system adopted after the 1993 referendum to avoid undermining the legitimacy of future elections.

MMP is based on two votes: one for a party and one for an electorate candidate. The party vote is intended to shape the overall composition of parliament, topping up seats from party lists after the electorate contests have been determined.

Overhang seats are added to parliament when a party wins more electorates than its party vote share entitlement. But for the party vote to have enough seats for this process to deliver proportional representation, there need to be enough list seats available.

In 1986, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System recommended a list to electorate ratio of 60 seats each. But parliament didn’t follow the recommendation and created 65 electorate seats and only 55 list seats for the first MMP election in 1996.

The ratio was not fixed because the number of general electorate seats was set to maintain 16 seats in the South Island. As a result, uneven population growth between the north and south islands led to an increasing number of electorate seats and fewer list seats.

By the 2020 election, there were 72 electorate seats and only 48 list seats. In 2026, because of population growth in the South Island, the number of electorate seats went down slightly to 71 and list seats rose to 49.

The Electoral Act acknowledges the possibility that parties might win more electorate seats than their party vote entitlement. In that case, the number of list seats rises but the calculation to ensure proportionality remains based on a 120-seat parliament.

For example, the Green party was assigned 16 seats on a party vote of 13.3%. But this calculation is made on a baseline of 120 seats, even though parliament will increase to adjust for the overhang of 11 seats. In a 131-seat parliament, the Greens’ seat share represents only 12.2%.

A baseline of 131 seats would give the Greens an extra seat – but also increase the size of parliament to 132. Applying the same formula to the other parties not benefiting from overhang would further increase the list seats and the size of parliament.

The baseline seat total would have to rise accordingly as other parties entitlements were calculated.

Germany’s amendments to MMP

Germany, whose MMP electoral system was the model for New Zealand’s, also encountered this problem as votes for smaller parties rose and larger parties fell, and overhangs became more prevalent.

The country’s constitutional court required an amendment to more fully compensate for overhang. But this led to a huge increase in the number of seats in the German Bundestag, its lower House of Parliament.

In 2023, the law was amended again to cap the size of the house and simply exclude candidates elected in overhang seats. They were ranked by vote share, with those with the lowest share losing their seats. This can leave those electorates unrepresented in the Bundestag.

Two reviews of New Zealand’s MMP system have recommended abolition of overhang seats, but not in a way that could restore proportionality. In fact, this solution would further reduce it.

The 2012 Electoral Commission’s review and the 2022 Independent Electoral Review Committee both proposed the size of parliament should be retained at 120 even if parties gained more electorate seats than entitled by their party vote. The number of list seats would go down, thus further reducing their compensatory role.

This reform could consequently enhance the incentives that promote overhang strategies, encouraging strategic voting that could reduce proportionality even more.

Te Pāti Māori could continue to employ its electorate-vote-only strategy and efforts to promote vote splitting on the right could intensify.

Larger parliament, more list seats

An increase in the number of list seats would go part way to addressing the problem.

The National Party’s provisional overhang of about seven seats is unlikely to have been generated by strategic voting intended to subvert proportionality, except on the very margins.

It is more likely an artefact of a population distribution across electorates that concentrates National votes and disperses Labour votes. Campaigning by Green candidates that split left electorate votes, and the incumbency advantages of National’s many sitting electorate MPs, would also have had an effect.

National’s overhang would probably be almost gone if there were 140 seats in parliament, with matching electorate and list seats of 70 each – the original half-and-half ratio proposed by the Royal Commission.

But this would not address the strategy employed by Te Pāti Māori, or more aggressive and persistent strategies on the right that would almost certainly continue, if only to try to offset that of Te Pāti Māori.

Germany’s solution to the problem almost completely destroys the incentives for the active pursuit of overhang. But it means some electorate candidates initially elected on low vote shares don’t sit in parliament and their electorates are not directly represented.

A unique variation of this model might allow those candidates to sit as MPs, but their party would only be able to cast party votes in the house consistent with its party vote share entitlement. Most significant votes in parliament are now conducted through this process.

A more dramatic solution would be to fuse party and electorate votes, thus moving to a one-vote version of the MMP system. But this would destroy one of the merits of New Zealand’s current model, which allows us to distinguish between our local MP and the party they represent.

Whatever the case, any changes to MMP will require decisions to be made in government and within and between political parties, all of whom have incentives to maintain their power and positions.

But we would all benefit from a system that ensures fair and proportional electoral outcomes that can be accepted as legitimate representations of public preferences.

Jack Vowles receives funding from the Research Trust of Victoria University of Wellington and the New Zealand Electoral Commission.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/what-really-drove-nzs-election-overhang-and-what-can-be-done-about-it/

There were lots of surprises on the evening of Nov. 3 when the picture of the Democratic midterm success began to be painted on network news touch screens.

The maps kept getting bluer. Eventually, it was clear that this was not an ordinary midterm cycle when the party out of power slaps the wrist of the sitting president and his administration.

It was much bigger than that, something on a scale the U.S. has seen only two times in the past half-century.

One was the Newt Gingrich “revolution” in 1994 that put Republicans in control of the House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years.

The other was the election of 1974 that flooded Capitol Hill with “Watergate babies” – new members elected just after the Nixon-era scandals.

In both cases there were high hopes that big changes would take place in the aftermath of remarkable midterm elections. The actual results were more modest than the victors expected.

1994’s wipeout election

The 1994 midterm elections gave the Republican Party a dramatic victory. The Democrats lost their majority in the Senate, and 54 seats were flipped in the House of Representatives, making Gingrich the first Republican speaker of the House since Eisenhower lived in the White House.

It was a wipeout election that had not been expected, and it changed the dynamics of Democrat Bill Clinton’s presidency.

The combative Gingrich emerged as a political celebrity; partisanship intensified and gridlock became the new norm. Confrontations over spending led to controversial government shutdowns and the first modern threat to default on America’s debt obligations.

Because the new Republican congressional majorities appeared to overreach in their efforts to cut taxes and spending, Clinton was able to recover sufficient popularity to win a second term.

In the run-up to his bid for reelection, Clinton took the electoral rebuke of 1994 to heart and followed a centrist strategy that represented a move to the right of longtime Democratic positions on welfare, crime and immigration. He continued to oppose many Republican policy proposals but worked with Republicans to craft welfare reform legislation and new bills dealing with crime and immigration. Budget confrontation eventually gave way to compromise, and for a few years in the late 1990s the United States had a balanced budget.

Partisanship became more personal in Clinton’s second term when Gingrich pushed for impeachment following the revelations of the president’s affair with Monica Lewinsky.

Clinton, with a tarnished reputation, survived his Senate trial. Ironically, it was Gingrich who resigned after failing to remove the president at the ballot box or in the impeachment process.

Gingrich, the biggest winner in the 1994 midterms, left office with a promised revolution largely unrealized.

1974’s Watergate reformers

Going back even further in American political history, the midterm elections following President Richard Nixon’s resignation after the Watergate scandal produced a Democratic Party victory.

That victory was not a surprise; the scale of it was.

Democrats, who already had majorities in the House and Senate, won a huge margin in the congressional popular vote and brought new members to both chambers who were younger, more liberal and reform-minded.

They wanted to prevent future Watergates. New laws would make the government more open, more honest and more accountable. New and more staff would allow Congress to be less reliant on executive branch information and better able to act in foreign policy and budget management. Special prosecutors would be appointed to investigate abuses of power and violations of law.

A Democrat, Jimmy Carter, would be elected president two years after the massive 1974 midterm victory, and more reform legislation would be passed.

The post-Watergate congressional agenda was long and bold – the war powers resolution, a freedom of information act, the creation of inspectors general, campaign finance reform, a presidential records act and new legislation to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance and the bribing of foreign officials.

These new laws were supposed to stop, or uncover, the kind of wrongdoing that made Nixon an imperial president.

The new laws and institutions certainly made a difference – but not without creating their own problems.

All the post-Watergate presidents thought the war powers resolution was unconstitutional, objecting to its restrictions on the president’s authority as commander in chief, and U.S. military interventions overseas continued to occur. Special prosecutors conducted many investigations, but often at great expense and without adequate supervision or meaningful results.

Carter, narrowly elected president in 1976, served only one term and lost reelection to Ronald Reagan, who fully restored the Republican Party’s dominance in presidential politics.

Over time, many presidents, especially Donald Trump, dismantled or ignored important elements of the post-Watergate reforms.

The large and enthusiastic congressional majorities that took power after the 1974 midterms were energetic but produced a political legacy with complicated and controversial results.

Chaos and conflict – or compromise?

What is the country likely to see in the next few months and the next two years?

Will it be chaos, conflict and occasional compromise, like the politics that followed the midterms in 1994? Or will it be earnest and sometimes heavy-handed congressional efforts to investigate and prevent presidential wrongdoing, like those that swept through Washington after 1974?

Surprising midterm elections that create new majorities on Capitol Hill look to be revolutions in the days after they occur. Years later, they often appear to be more complex – and less significant.

A number of my links to outside sources are links to the Miller Center website. I am currently a senior fellow at the Miller Center.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/what-happens-after-a-midterm-tsunami-lessons-from-1974-and-1994/

On Sunday, Israeli President Isaac Herzog announced he would grant Gadi Eisenkot – main challenger to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – the opportunity to form a new government in Israel.

It followed almost a fortnight of political gridlock, after what has been called the “most consequential election in Israel’s history” failed to produce a clear winner.

Eisenkot now has 28 days (with a possible 14-day extension) to attempt to convene a stable coalition government. He’ll have to bring together a deeply divided opposition.

Even if he succeeds, his government will face major challenges – including keeping his coalition together, a changing relationship with the United States, and escalating violence in the West Bank.

Read more:
Israel election by the numbers: who might form the next government?

An extraordinary election

In Israeli elections, it is standard practice for the president to formally nominate who should bring a coalition government together. This does not have to be the leader of the party that has secured the most votes – in this case, Netanyahu.

Israel’s voting system is intrinsically geared toward producing coalition governments. The country has never had a one-party government.

Netanyahu’s Likud party won the highest number of seats in Israel’s election on October 27. But his coalition lacked the 61 seats required for a majority in Israel’s 120-seat parliament.

The parties in opposition to Netanyahu – led by Eisenkot – also lacked the numbers to form a governing coalition.

Meanwhile, the two Arab-majority parties representing the interests of two million citizens of Israel (the Joint List and Ra’am) received 19 seats between them – more than ever before.

While the procedure that has given Eisenkot a chance to become Israel’s new prime minister is standard practice, the conditions in which this election has taken place are historically fraught.

This is the first time Israelis have gone to the polls since Hamas’ shocking attack of October 7 2023, and the devastating war in Gaza that followed.

Many challenging questions are raised by the fact that, at this momentous time in the history of the Jewish nation-state, the electoral process has ended inconclusively.

A new Israeli government, dependent on Arab parties?

The election outcome was made much more complicated by the tension between numbers and politics.

To form a potential governing coalition, Eisenkot’s Yashar party could be joined by Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad, Yair Golan’s Democrats and Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beytenu. But to achieve a majority in parliament, they would need at least one the two Arab parties to join a historically broad unity government.

Doing so, however, would require Eisenkot – and Bennett and Liberman – to go against campaign promises that they would not enter into coalition with the Arab parties.

This leaves Eisenkot in a difficult position. The support of these two Arab parties could help break the political deadlock. But it could also make what is already an improbable coalition of Israeli parties fall apart before it even starts governing.

The need for political cooperation and unity in Israel today is perhaps greater than ever before. Eisenkot has emphasised that “all of us will need to compromise”.

But compromising in principle needs to be possible in practice. A multi-party government that relies formally or informally on two different Arab parties may not be a feasible basis for political renewal in Israel.

Observing the political dilemma facing their opponents, members of Netanyahu’s Likud party have referred to them as “the disaster bloc”.

Coalition conundrums

There is no question that the enlarged parliamentary presence of the two Arab parties is significant. It poses fundamental questions about the nature of Israel’s democracy.

Israel’s 2018 Nation-State Law states that “the right of national self-determination in the state of Israel is unique to the Jewish people”. This makes it difficult for Arab parties to represent the national self-determination interests of Palestinians while also supporting an Israeli government.

Such cooperation has been tried in the past, and failed. In 2021, history was made when the Ra’am party joined a coalition government under Bennett, giving him a narrow majority. The experiment lasted 12 months, ending in the collapse of the unlikely coalition government.

Ra’am has now announced it will support an Eisenkot coalition government. But that is no guarantee the experiment would last any longer this time.

Even without the Arab parties, Eisenkot may struggle to hold a coalition together.

Formerly chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, he was seen as a down-to-earth antithesis of Netanyahu. Yet, he has limited political experience. He only entered politics in 2022, and his party, Yashar, was established only last year.

Less than six months ago, Eisenkot dismissed the idea of opposition parties joining forces, specifically criticising the opposition leader Yair Lapid.

But perhaps the most vexed question of coalition-building is how Jewish ultra-orthodox parties – mainly Shas and United Torah Judaism – will choose to align.

These groups strongly oppose compulsory military service for ultra-orthodox Jews, an issue that has caused deep divisions in Israel and given them a powerful role in Netanyahu’s current coalition government.

How they choose to align, and what demands they make, will now powerfully shape Eisenkot’s prospects.

Big challenges at home and abroad

The challenges facing Israel’s new government are formidable. The situation in Gaza is unresolved, Hamas remains armed, and war has now spread from the Gulf to Saudi Arabia.

Close to home, the ongoing violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank will pose another serious challenge to whatever government emerges.

And with the US midterm elections giving the Democrats control of both chambers of Congress for the remainder of US President Donald Trump’s term, US foreign policy could become more unpredictable.

Whatever shape the new government of Israel takes, its internal coherence will need to be sustained in a period of great uncertainty, from Washington to the West Bank.

In recent days, Eisenkot has emphasised that having received this opportunity to lead, he will do his utmost to be “worthy.” In order to sustain leadership and government – and avoid being at the head of a “disaster bloc” – he will also need to be effective.

Benedict Moleta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/can-gadi-eisenkot-turn-the-disaster-bloc-into-israels-next-government/

Canadians aged 65 and older want to decide where they live and most prefer that place to be their current home. The concept of an older adult aging in the place of their choosing emphasizes that preference. Preference, however, does not guarantee that aging in that place will be possible. Feasibility depends on an older person’s circumstances and supports available where they live.

John Amagoalik’s story illustrates the gap between preference and possibility when it comes to aging in place of choice. A lifelong advocate for Inuit self-determination and one of the key figures behind the creation of Nunavut, Amagoalik recently spent 16 months in an assisted-living facility in Ottawa after an infection resulted in the amputation of part of his leg.

Being more than 2,000 kilometres from Iqaluit, Amagoalik told the CBC, “The worst part was the loneliness.” Friends eventually helped arrange the housing and care that has allowed him to return to his home for now.

Although Amagoalik’s circumstances are particular to Nunavut, where some elders must leave the territory to access specialized services not available closer to home, his story raises a question relevant across Canada: What does it mean to say older persons have a choice about where they age if the supports they need are not available where they want to live?

What determines where people age

As occupational therapists and rehabilitation scientists, our research explores how engagement in everyday activities contributes to health and well-being in later life. Our work has led us to recognize that where people age is shaped not only by their preferences but also by their circumstances and supports around them.

For us, this research is also personal. Our mothers continue to live independently, and both chose to move closer to family. Like many with aging parents, we think about what will allow them to continue doing so if their health, mobility or circumstances change.

Having a choice about where one lives as one grows older requires realistic options. Rural communities can offer strong social connections and a sense of belonging, but as needs change, limited access to transportation, affordable and accessible housing, and other health and social services may constrain people’s ability to remain in the place they call home.

Rural aging and mobility

Research on rural aging has described a related tension between “aging in place” and being “stuck in place.” Remaining somewhere does not necessarily mean an older person had a meaningful choice to do so.

Transportation provides a good example. Our research with older persons living in rural areas and small towns around Hamilton, Ont., identified considerable reliance on personal vehicles. If few alternatives exist, losing the ability to drive can mean losing access not only to medical appointments and groceries, but also to activities and relationships outside the home.

Mobility, after all, is about much more than getting from one place to another. Being able to get around allows us to see friends and family, volunteer, exercise or simply participate in everyday activities that make life meaningful.

However, what happens when driving is no longer possible and there is no realistic alternative? If managing your current home becomes difficult, is there help or a suitable and affordable option nearby? Can needed services be accessed without leaving your community?

These questions also make us think differently about risk.

Risk and what matters

Families and health professionals understandably worry about falls, driving safety or whether an older adult can live at home alone.

While those risks matter, our research has identified that focusing too much on physical safety can sometimes overshadow what older people themselves value when decisions are being made about where and how they will live.

Stopping driving may reduce one kind of risk while increasing risks of isolation and loss of meaningful activities. Moving somewhere with more services may make some aspects of life easier or safer but moving away from neighbours, relationships and a place we call home has consequences for well-being.

A home that no longer meets an older person’s needs can carry risk, but so can leaving it.

Supporting real choice

Planning ahead for mobility changes matters but so do housing, relationships, finances and ensuring support is available. However, people cannot plan around options that do not exist.

Supporting real choice about aging in place also means asking:

• Can older community residents get where they need and want to go?
• Are housing, health and social supports accessible where people live?
• When those supports are not available, who fills the gaps?

Families, friends and neighbours provide extraordinary support and can expand an older person’s choices but should not be the only infrastructure upon which aging at home depends. Aging in a place of choice cannot simply mean asking older people where they want to live. Communities and governments must ensure people have meaningful and realistic options as their health, mobility and circumstances change.

Choice only means something when there are real options.

Brenda Vrkljan receives or has received funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation Road Safety Research Partnership Program, and AGE-WELL, a federally-funded Networks of Centres of Excellence program.

Evelyne Durocher receives or has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Canadian Institute for Health Research, the Canadian Occupational Therapy Federation and the Physiotherapy Foundation of Canada.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/older-adults-aging-where-they-choose-possibility-or-illusion/

With their spindly legs and geometric heads, they look more like miniature spacecraft than anything living on Earth. But bacteriophages, or simply phages, are among the most abundant biological entities on the planet.

These microscopic agents are viruses that can infect and kill bacteria, offering an intriguing alternative to antibiotics at a time that drug-resistant infections are threatening global health.

Despite decades of research, however, scientists still know surprisingly little about how most phages work. Many of their genes have functions that remain a mystery, limiting their potential in medicine and elsewhere.

Now, our new research offers a way to investigate them in greater detail. We’ve developed a method to pinpoint which genes phages need to function, and to insert new genetic material into their genomes within days.

This might eventually help researchers engineer phages that are better at attacking harmful bacteria – opening up possibilities for treating infections that conventional antibiotics struggle against.

Why phages are making a comeback

Long before antibiotics became the standard treatment for bacterial infections, doctors were using phages to fight them.

Phages were first used in this way a century ago. But with the arrival of antibiotics, inconsistent results from early phage treatments and the onset of the Cold War, their medical use declined in Western countries.

In his 1945 Nobel Prize lecture, Alexander Fleming, who discovered penicillin, warned that bacteria could develop resistance to antibiotics. His warning proved prescient.

As new antibiotics were developed, resistant bacteria emerged, helped by the overuse and misuse of these drugs. Today, antibiotic resistance is projected to contribute to more than eight million deaths annually by 2050, prompting renewed interest in phage-based treatments.

Despite their growing use in medicine and agriculture, much of what we know about phages comes from a small number of well-studied examples. Their vast diversity, and the functions of many of their genes, remain largely unexplored.

Like humans, phages have genomes containing genes that carry instructions for making proteins. These proteins determine how the viruses function, including how they infect bacteria and reproduce.

To investigate phage gene function, scientists need tools that can boost our understanding and turn new knowledge into practical applications.

Bridging the knowledge gap

Current methods for studying and modifying phages can be time-consuming, work only with certain bacteria, or require detailed knowledge of the phage’s genome.

We wanted to overcome these limitations by developing a method that could work across different phages and their bacterial hosts. To do this, we harnessed transposons – mobile pieces of DNA that insert themselves into random positions in a genome and disrupt gene function.

Our approach, called Phage Tn-seq (transposon sequencing), combines these insertions with DNA sequencing, allowing us to pinpoint where mutations occur and how they affect the phage.

Since the late 2000s, similar techniques have helped scientists understand bacterial gene function. Typically, transposons carry an antibiotic resistance gene, allowing bacteria that receive them to survive antibiotic treatment.

But this doesn’t work directly with phages, which aren’t affected by antibiotics. Instead, we exploited what has been described as a molecular “arms race” between bacteria and the phages that infect them.

Bacteria have evolved CRISPR-Cas immune systems, which recognise and cut up invading viral DNA, to defend themselves against phages. In turn, some phages have developed anti-CRISPR proteins that overcome these defences.

We used one of these proteins, carried on the transposon, instead of an antibiotic resistance gene. By applying CRISPR-Cas selection, we could eliminate phages that hadn’t received the transposon. This left us with a pool of phages carrying different mutations, which we could study to identify the function of their genes.

Disrupting a phage gene might have no noticeable effect, reduce the phage’s ability to function, or prevent it from replicating. By sequencing the DNA, we can locate these mutations and see which ones are rare or absent.

These gaps tell us which genes are essential for the phage to reproduce, allowing us to map the genes it needs to successfully infect bacteria.

Building better phages

Having developed a way to identify which genes phages need, we wanted to see whether the same technique could give them new abilities.

Our method automatically selects phages that survive transposon insertion. We tested whether we could use this process to introduce additional “cargo” genes into their genomes.

We then added a gene encoding green fluorescent protein, causing infected bacterial cells to glow bright green under a microscope. While this served as a demonstration, the technique could potentially introduce genes that make phages more effective at killing bacteria.

In this space, one promising application involves biofilms – communities of bacteria that clump together inside protective, sugar-based shells, making infections difficult to treat with antibiotics.

Using Phage Tn-seq, researchers might engineer phages to produce proteins that break down these layers while attacking the bacteria themselves. This could also make antibiotics, often used alongside phages, more effective.

Several countries, including the United States and some European Union members, have introduced programmes offering personalised phage therapy to selected patients, sometimes using genetically modified phages.

In New Zealand, however, phage therapy is not routinely available as a treatment option, partly because of regulatory hurdles and gaps in our understanding of these viruses.

Our research won’t overcome those barriers overnight. But by giving scientists new tools to understand and modify phages, it could lay the groundwork for a wider range of applications.

Manuela Fuchs has received research funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, with a Feodor Lynen Research Fellowship.

Leah Smith has received research funding from the Marsden Fund, Royal Society Te Apārangi.

Natalie Kyte does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/could-these-bacteria-killing-viruses-help-fight-antibiotic-resistance-a-new-discovery-takes-us-closer/

Artificial intelligence (AI) use among university students is now near-universal in many countries. Yet, as of a year ago, fewer than one in five universities in a 90-country UNESCO survey had a formal AI policy.

Since ChatGPT arrived in late 2022, the threat to academic integrity has loomed large. Unis must now ensure students earn degrees by showing what they can do, not what AI can do.

This requires policies that drive structural change to assessment and curriculum, not just rules about when AI can be used. But it’s not so straightforward.

The challenge for universities

Universities, in particular, have struggled to adapt to generative AI more than primary and high schools.

This is because university classes are often large and contact time between students and teachers is limited. Together, this makes it hard for teachers to get to know students personally and to ensure they learn what is required for their degrees.

UNESCO has published an AI competency framework, but it focuses primarily on schools and stops short of providing specific guidance for higher education.

University AI policies are often vague

A study published in July examined the public AI policies and guidelines of 39 Australian universities that teach information and communications technology. This is a subject area where AI can readily complete coding tasks.

The analysis found wide variation among the universities’ AI policies. Often, AI rules were buried in institutions’ misconduct policies rather than assessment design procedures. Out of the 39 unis, only one had published specific guidance around AI.

The universities’ general guidance on AI use was often vague, too. One simply required AI use to be “ethical, pedagogically sound, transparent and purposeful” but did not provide any further detail.

The researchers argued that AI was disrupting assessments faster than universities could build the structures to govern it. Only seven of the 39 universities had documented a body, such as a task force, to coordinate their response.

Many have also left it to individual unit coordinators to spell out what AI use is allowed. This means the rules can differ between units.

The risks also go well beyond cheating. Global discussion among leading researchers and policymakers this year has shifted to a deeper issue: using AI to avoid learning altogether. This is when students’ offload their work to AI entirely and, as a result, learn nothing themselves. It is difficult to gauge how much of this offloading is already occurring.

Universities’ current policies aren’t sufficient in addressing student offloading to AI. Students cannot be forced to learn through a policy.

Teachers have also been using AI tools to detect whether students have included AI-generated text in their submissions. But universities are now moving away from this as the technology is not always accurate.

Experts have warned that relying solely on AI detectors can lead to false accusations of student academic misconduct.

Assessment reform

Instead of focusing on more systemic responses, universities have mainly responded to AI by changing how assessments work. This has usually meant:

• a greater emphasis on in-person exams and oral presentations where AI cannot be easily accessed

• permitting the use of AI in some assessments, such as take-home essays, where students have cited their use of the technology.

But while redesigned assessments can show whether learning has occurred, it is still not enough. It also matters what students are assessed on.

What are other countries doing?

In other parts of the world, such as the European Union, attention is turning to explicitly developing students’ capabilities to adapt to constant change. These include teaching students to:

• make sound judgements about how much they know about a subject

• critically evaluate information, both with and without AI

• make decisions about their learning processes and goals independently of AI or an educator.

However, these capabilities are hard to develop and mostly don’t transfer between subjects. Instead, they must be taught explicitly to students, in the context of their subject area or discipline.

One way of doing this would be to incorporate specific modules into courses that teach this.

So, what’s the right approach?

In 2023, a number of academics, including myself, wrote evidence-based assessment principles for the Australian higher education regulator. The principles were formed to guide unis on how to adapt assessments to account for students’ AI use.

One principle focuses on assuring students are actually learning content and not offloading work to AI, which institutions have attempted to address through assessment redesign. These attempts at redesign are having an effect.

The second principle is about preparing students for a world where AI is ubiquitous. Students need to learn how to effectively use AI for when they enter the workforce.

This principle has proven much harder for unis to adapt to, as skills tied to today’s AI tools quickly become outdated as the technology rapidly advances. This means simple “AI literacy” is not enough for students alone.

While there is no one-size-fits-all approach, unis would also benefit from collaborating with each other to tackle the problem.

However, institutions tend to compete rather than share resources. Only one of the 39 in the study I previously cited mentioned learning from other institutions.

A national strategy would help

In 2024, the higher education regulator required every uni to submit AI action plans outlining what they are doing to adapt to AI. The regulator has also since published guides outlining strategies.

But a regulator can only set expectations. It cannot fund the long-term work of enabling changes to policy and practice across the country.

That was the job of the Office for Learning and Teaching, which funded teaching innovation and helped universities share what worked. It closed in 2016, and a promised replacement never materialised.

A national approach would mean an enabling body – independent of any single university – sharing evidence and guidance across the sector. This might look similar to Ireland’s Higher Education Authority, which has published a national framework on AI in teaching and learning.

However, there are challenges in setting this up in Australia, given how protective universities are about their autonomy. There would be questions around who funds such a body. And it would be difficult for a national authority to keep pace with technology that changes faster than policy.

Still, unis must engage deeply and collaboratively with this debate about how to adapt to AI. Otherwise they risk becoming redundant in the age of intelligent machines.

Jason M. Lodge receives funding from the Medical Research Future Fund and Studiosity. He has received funding from the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, the Australian Department of Education, Queensland Department of Education, the Office for Learning and Teaching, the Higher Education Research and Development Society of Australasia, Australasian Society for Computers in Learning in Tertiary Education, and Echo360. He is one of the convenors of the Castlereagh Statement: A cross-sector call to action on Australian education and training in the age of AI.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/ai-use-is-now-universal-in-higher-education-why-are-universities-failing-to-adapt/

The university experience has changed drastically since artificial intelligence (AI) became widely available four years ago.

Students are increasingly using AI for around-the-clock feedback, and most are required to use it as part of new assessment redesigns.

But as AI is used more in courses and changes how university works, how do students feel about it?

Our research

In 2024, we began a research project across four Australian unis – Monash University, the University of Queensland, Deakin University and the University of Technology Sydney – asking students about AI.
Undergraduate and postgraduate students were asked how frequently they use AI for study, their most common uses of AI, why they choose to use it and their concerns around the tech.

This year, we repeated the survey at the same unis, hearing from more than 10,000 students.

The survey included responses from neurodivergent students, students with disability, those who spoke languages other than English at home and students who were the first in their family to attend uni.

Students were recruited via email, posts on online university platforms, and signs with QR codes. We also ran 20 focus groups with 79 students online in 2024.

What we found

A published snapshot of our 2026 survey data shows the most common reason students use AI is to edit or improve their writing, with nearly 70% selecting this option. About 64% of students use it to generate ideas or examples, and 60% said they use AI to teach them how to do something.

Around half of students seek out information through AI and also ask it for feedback on their work.

We also know more students are using AI. When comparing the data to 2024 responses, the proportion of students who reported never using AI for their studies fell slightly, from 17% to 15%.

It mirrors findings from this year’s Australian Student Wellbeing Report, which found 84% of students have used AI tools for assignments and study, increasing 10% from the previous year.

Why students use AI

Students reported using AI for a range of different reasons.

About 55% use it to speed up their working process and also to help themselves overcome mental blocks. Nearly half of students said they use AI to make study easier in general.

Participants also reported using AI to help improve their personal wellbeing during study sessions. About 41% said the tech helps reduce stress and around 32% said they feel more confident when using AI in their work.

There are concerns

But using AI does not necessarily mean students are comfortable with it. We found many are limiting their AI use, some are trying to avoid using it, and 15-17% are avoiding it altogether in their studies.

The reasons for limiting AI use vary, but the most common explanation, selected by 67% of participants who use AI, related to concerns around AI’s accuracy.

About 62% of students said they limited or avoided AI use as it conflicts with their personal learning values and around 57% said they preferred to do the work themselves. Just under half of students expressed ethical concerns in using AI. These concerns might relate to AI presenting biased information, privacy issues, threats to academic integrity, and the environmental impacts of AI technologies.

Over the last two years, students have become less worried about breaking uni rules too. This year, 56% of participants said they avoided using AI out of a fear of being caught – decreasing 7% when compared with 2024 data.

Unis can help

Over the last four years, unis have been navigating complex changes. But their guidance on AI hasn’t always been clear to students.

Research shows students have learned more about AI on their own than they have from their unis.

Our 2024 survey and focus groups also showed widespread anxiety and confusion among students about using AI for study, partly due to confusing university academic integrity policies around AI rules.

One participant at the time asked for clearer rules:

just have some kind of concrete policy in place that you can look at and go like, ‘right, this is okay. This isn’t. Thank you.’ And even if it’s something I would personally disagree with, at least it’s set in stone.

Another student recognised the complexity of AI regulation too:

 we’re in this very grey area where nobody knows what’s really happening.

Guidance around AI has improved

Our findings show there has been some progress over the last two years. Students who reported receiving sufficient guidance from unis rose from 36% in 2024 to 47% in 2026.

This might be because unis are setting more consistent AI guidelines across their institutions, rather than putting the responsibility on educators to set rules around AI use for each subject. This is happening alongside changes to assessment that incorporate use of AI.

But our recent survey suggests there is more to do to help students feel confident they will not break rules.

Students’ perspectives matter

Of all the concerns about AI in higher education, perhaps one of the most important questions is whether unis are doing enough to listen to students about their feelings towards AI and how they use it.

When unis don’t engage students in these conversations, they miss opportunities to understand how AI is influencing learning. More importantly, they miss the opportunity to involve students in shaping how AI is used in education.

Kelly Matthews has received funding from the Office of Learning and Teaching (now ceased) and the Australian Department of Education as commissioned work for the Higher Education Standards Panel. The research mentioned in this article has been funded by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor Education Portfolios at Monash University, University of Queensland, Deakin University and University Technology Sydney

Tim Fawns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/most-uni-students-now-use-ai-but-that-doesnt-mean-they-like-it/

Did you know that global heating will unavoidably soar past the 1.5°C temperature goal over the next three to four years? This is certain, despite our efforts to address the climate crisis.

In fact, a recent United Nations report found that with current climate and energy policies, the world is on track to heat 2.6°C above industrial levels by the end of this century. This is well beyond the Paris Agreement target of 1.5°C, and we know the dangerous consequences: more forest fires, extreme weather, loss of nature and rising seas.

Governments, scientists and communities affected by climate change are meeting this week in the Turkish city of Antalya for COP31, the annual UN climate conference. Australia is leading the negotiations as part of a compromise deal struck with Turkey at last year’s meeting.

At COP31, expect to see a strong push for action to keep 1.5°C “within reach”. This means that even if the world temporarily overshoots 1.5°C, emissions cuts and massive carbon removal could, theoretically at least, bring temperatures back down by the end of the century.

So, why is the 1.5°C target so significant? And how was this goal decided?

Where did 1.5°C come from?

In the 1990s and early 2000s, scientists and policymakers aspired to limit global warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. But by the mid-2000s, there were concerns that limiting global warming to 2°C was going to be very challenging, if not unachievable.

Before 2015, the 1.5°C target received little attention in UN climate negotiations, with structured discussions only during 2013-15. In fact, its inclusion in the Paris Agreement – the international treaty to cut emissions — was pushed by an informal coalition of small island nations, supported most prominently by the European Union and the United States. Known as the High Ambition Coalition, this group said 1.5°C was the only target that could give citizens from their nations a future.

Following the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change immediately requested a special report on the implications of the 1.5°C target. It found major differences in the risks to natural and human systems between 1.5°C and 2°C.

So this more ambitious 1.5°C target came largely as a condition of small-island states accepting the Paris Agreement. It was acclaimed by some as a target set by the people, which superseded the 2°C target that resulted from sustained scientific and policy discussions.

Overshooting 1.5°C

A recent UN report confirmed that global emissions reductions have not been enough to stop global warming passing 1.5°C in the next few years.

While calls for the 1.5°C target came from the coalition of small island states, UN assessment reports published after the Paris Agreement showed it would be largely impossible to prevent global warming passing 1.5°C. Instead, they predicted temporary overshoot scenarios, where 1.5°C was initially exceeded and large-scale carbon dioxide removal used to bring temperatures back down by the end of this century.

The fact we are soon to cross 1.5°C is consistent with science that has been developed over the past decade. But it remains devastating to small island nations around the world, which are feeling the impacts of climate change and sea-level rise.

Importantly, every additional degree brings us closer to potential “tipping points” – where the complex systems we rely on, such as climates and ecosystems, can abruptly shift once a critical threshold is crossed. These include changes in the ocean currents that bring warmth to northern Europe and increased emissions from thawing permafrost.

Is it realistic to remove that much carbon?

The only way to reverse temperature increases once we overshoot 1.5°C is through deep emissions cuts and large-scale carbon dioxide removal. If we overshoot beyond 1.8°C, the science suggests it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to engineer a temperature decline. This is because of the extraordinary quantities of carbon dioxide removal required.

There are clear limits to the amount of carbon that can be removed from the atmosphere. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimated that for every 1,000 gigatonnes (billion metric tonnes) of carbon dioxide emitted, the global mean temperature increases by 0.45°C. This means, for example, we would need to remove 660 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide to correct an overshoot of 0.3°C. The more we go over our targets, the harder, longer and more costly it will be to return. At some point, damage becomes irreversible.

To put that in context, the global reforestation and the establishment of new forests captures and stores 2.2 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide each year, mainly in China, Europe and the US. This is equivalent to about a 5% carbon offset of current carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel.

It’s possible to increase forest area, but there are limits to how much land can be reforested without negative impacts on biodiversity, water availability and rural and Indigenous communities.

Meanwhile, technological solutions such as direct air capture provide only 0.002 billion tonnes of carbon removal annually. These technologies have the capacity to grow, but will need considerable development to reduce their cost and energy use.

The best chance we have

Over more than 30 years, the COP process has been central to making climate action a near-universal commitment. The Paris Agreement created a process for countries to continually strengthen their pledges to cut emissions, and improved transparency.

These annual summits have also created a crucial platform to pressure governments and foster cooperation, particularly between developed and developing nations. The exponential global growth in clean energy owes much of its success to government policies steered by UN summit negotiations.

While the UN’s climate agenda has not moved at the necessary speed, there is no alternative forum to these summits that offers a way to ratchet up global climate ambition.

This year, COP31 has the opportunity to turn the soon-to-be-crossed 1.5°C Paris Agreement target into more aggressive policies for faster emission cuts, and ensure the flow of finance to support sustainable development for all nations.

Pep Canadell receives funding from the National Environmental Science Program – Climate Systems Hubs

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/the-world-will-soon-shoot-past-1-5c-what-does-this-mean/

Around one in three women in Australia now have their labours induced rather than starting naturally, or spontaneously.

The rate of induction increased from 25% in 2010 to 33% in 2023. For first-time mothers, it rose from 30.6% to 39.7% in 2023.

Labour can be induced using the synthetic hormones such as prostaglandin or oxytocin. A balloon-shaped catheter can also be placed in the woman’s cervix to open it up. Additionally, midwives or obstetricians can break the bag of water around the baby.

Induction of labour can be life-saving when medically recommended. This might mean a sudden increase in blood pressure or fetal distress during labour, or going beyond 41 weeks’ gestation.

But induction of labour is linked to an increased risk of some complications and poor birth experiences, our new research shows.

When is labour induced?

Induction is often recommended when:

• pregnancy has gone over 41 weeks (to reduce the risk of stillbirth)
• the mother has high blood pressure or diabetes
• there is another significant issue threatening the health of the mother or baby.

The World Health Organization recommends advising healthy pregnant mothers to be induced after 41 weeks of pregnancy due to the risk of stillbirth.

What has our research shown?

Our research, based on data from the national Birth Experience Study, compared the experiences of 5,230 women in Australia whose labour began spontaneously and 2,561 whose labour was induced. We adjusted for demographic, medical, obstetric and mental health factors.

We found induction of labour was associated with higher odds of forceps or vacuum births, emergency caesarean, episiotomy and reported fetal distress during labour.

The differences extended beyond the birth room. Women whose labours were induced were significantly more likely to report:

• excessive post-natal pain
• poorer physical health
• reliving negative birth events
• birth trauma
• regret
• diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder
• experiences of disrespect and mistreatment by staff caring for them (known as obstetric violence).

Women who were induced were less likely to have immediate skin-to-skin contact with their baby or receive a postnatal home visit from a midwife.

Their babies were more likely to experience jaundice or receive formula when their mothers had intended to breastfeed.

There was no statistically significant difference in major perineal injury, which included major tears between the vagina and anus and episiotomy, ongoing pelvic-floor problems, admission to special care or neonatal intensive care, or the baby needing extra medical care after birth.

Women cared for through midwifery continuity of care models in this study had the lowest rates of induction out of all the models. Our previous study found this remains the case when differences in risk factors between models are taken into account.

Read more:
Seeing the same midwife or doctor in pregnancy and labour reduces the risk of birth trauma

There are limitations to our study

This study cannot prove induction caused the outcomes but rather is associated with them. This means something else may have caused or contributed to the outcome, such as the reason for the induction that women may not have mentioned.

Continuity of care relationships mean those things may also be picked up earlier, not just in the birthing moment.

The study was based on an observational, self-report survey. This means women decided to answer it or not. So it does not represent all women’s experiences.

We did not look specifically at stillbirth in this study; 28 women stated their baby died either during the labour and birth or after birth. As women are often induced when experiencing a stillbirth, and women who lose a baby are less likely to respond to surveys like this one, we have not reported further on this.

While we adjusted for characteristics and risk factors to make the two groups as similar as possible, we had to rely on women’s reports rather than having access to clinical reports.

What does this mean for women?

Induction can be beneficial and life-saving, but it’s not consequence-free.

Women need balanced information about potential benefits, interventions, physical effects and psychological experiences to make genuinely informed decisions.

Yet women aren’t always involved in decision-making during labour.

When might an induction not be indicated?

My previous research found Australian hospitals are inducing women at earlier gestations than previously. And we are doing this more often for no medical reason.

Our previous study found the induction rates tripled for women who were 37 and 39 weeks pregnant in NSW in the 16 years to 2016. And 15% of new mothers were induced without a medical reason listed.

This may have increased even more in the intervening ten years considering the rise in the induction rate.

Read more:
Too many healthy women are having their labour induced for no identified medical reason, our study shows

There is now clear advice for women and clinicians that “every week counts” when it comes to the timing of birth. Unless there is a significant clinical reason, this should not happen before 39 weeks, as the baby’s brain is still undergoing significant development in the last weeks of pregnancy.

In our previous research, over 90% of women who had previously been induced said they would try to increase the chance of spontaneous labour next time.

What do women need to make an informed decision?

It’s not ethical or legal to simply tell the woman that induction is required.

Better approaches are clearly outlined in national and international guidelines. Discussions must involve:

• what the treatment is
• why it is being recommended
• how, when and where it would happen
• what the alternatives are
• if it will impact the woman physically and mentally.
• what the actual increase in stillbirth risk is, such as one in 500 or one in 1,000.

Recent birth trauma inquiries in NSW, Tasmania and now in the ongoing Select Committee on Women’s Health show how ignoring women’s right to informed consent contributes to physical and mental trauma.

Women need balanced information about both its potential benefits and consequences before agreeing to induction.

Hannah Dahlen receives funding from National Health and Medical Research Council, Australian Research Council and Medical Research Future Fund.

Hazel Keedle receives funding from MRFF.

Kingsley Emwinyore Agho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/1-in-3-births-are-induced-it-can-be-life-saving-but-its-also-linked-to-more-complications/

A remarkably strong El Niño has formed in the Pacific.

This natural phenomenon drives variations in temperature, rainfall and winds across the globe. The ongoing El Niño has already contributed to sudden floods in eastern Africa, blistering heatwaves in Europe and intense hurricanes in the eastern Pacific.

Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology warned us of this El Niño in June, which is currently the earliest point at which reliable predictions can be made.

Our new study suggests it may be possible to accurately predict some El Niños up to 12 months ahead of time, buying valuable time for farmers, emergency services and disaster-prone communities.

How models predict El Niño and La Niña

Climate and weather forecasting largely relies on physics-based models of the Earth’s atmosphere and oceans. These models work by applying the laws of physics, such as Newton’s laws of motion, to Earth’s geography.

A model is given information like the shapes of continents, the locations of mountains and the speed of Earth’s rotation. The models then solve equations representing the laws of physics to simulate a version of our Earth, complete with its own storms, ocean currents, waves and wind patterns.

To make predictions of El Niños and La Niñas, forecasters supply these models with information about present conditions, including ocean temperatures, currents, winds and humidity. This data comes from a vast global network of satellites, weather stations, ocean buoys and moorings.

The models use this information about the present as a starting point. They then simulate the ocean and atmosphere’s movements and temperatures a few months into the future, showing whether an El Niño or La Niña is about to emerge.

Why is it difficult to make early forecasts?

In the 1960s, meteorologist Ed Lorenz and computer scientist Margaret Hamilton made a startling discovery. Using an early weather model, they found changing the starting conditions by a tiny amount, such as a millionth of a degree Celsius, could radically alter the model’s predictions.

This spawned the mathematical field of chaos theory, the idea that no matter how perfect a model is, there are some situations where the system being predicted is so sensitive to minuscule changes, it’s almost impossible to make correct predictions. This makes it extremely difficult to form accurate forecasts of weather more than a week or two in advance.

El Niños and La Niñas are largely shaped by the ocean, which moves much more slowly and takes longer to heat up and cool down, compared to the atmosphere. As a result, El Niño and La Niña predictions can be made over a longer period. These events typically peak around December and can be accurately predicted about six months ahead.

But these predictions also have limits. Forecasts made between March and May are notoriously unreliable. Because of the conditions in the atmosphere and ocean at this time of year, it becomes susceptible to the butterfly effect, with even small fluctuations preventing models from making accurate predictions. This period is like a Bermuda’s triangle for climate forecasting.

Read more:
A record-shattering El Niño is almost here. Here’s what that means for the world’s weather

What we studied

Our latest study examined whether it’s possible to overcome this uncertainty to reliably predict future El Niños.

Chaotic systems are not unpredictable all the time. Sometimes the conditions are right for good predictions. A few studies of particular years suggest some El Niño and La Niña events might be accurately predicted before the March-May period.

But our research team wanted to know for sure if we should believe early forecasts. To do this, we used a massive dataset of 7,500 forecasts generated by nine models, developed in different countries. By analysing this data, we were able to check whether early predictions came true and search for patterns in early forecast performance.

Our findings suggest the conditions in which a forecast is made has a significant effect on its accuracy. We sorted forecasts based on what was happening in the Pacific when they were first initiated – La Niña, El Niño or neutral conditions.

A clear pattern emerged: forecasts that began during a La Niña were most successful in predicting what would happen a year later. By contrast, forecasts initiated in neutral conditions were very likely to be wrong.

These findings were consistent across all nine models we studied. This suggests La Niña conditions have a stabilising influence, meaning predictions are more likely to be reliable.

What next?

These findings are valuable for communities worldwide. During La Niña years, we have an opportunity to make early forecasts and issue early warnings so communities, emergency responders and governments can prepare for future El Niños.

However, we need more research to translate these findings into practice. Studies should focus on why La Niña events support better model performance and if there are particular ocean or atmosphere patterns that can tell us when a model is making correct predictions. Research should also investigate how best to apply these findings to interpreting real-time forecasts.

This information will allow scientists to distinguish between unreliable predictions and those that might protect communities from harm.

Read more:
Extreme El Niños are coming. Reaching net zero sooner means facing fewer of them

Nandini Ramesh receives funding from the CSIRO. She has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Department of Energy. She is affiliated with the University of New South Wales.

Mandy Freund receives funding from The University of Melbourne and the ARC Centre of Excellence for 21st Century Weather.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/its-possible-to-predict-some-el-ninos-a-year-in-advance-heres-why-that-matters/

Being faced with an endless list of chores when it’s time to check out of your Airbnb stay isn’t the best way to end a holiday.

Facing complaints from travellers, Airbnb is changing the rules to limit what hosts can ask guests to do before checkout. The new policy starts on November 20.

What do the changes mean for hosts?

From November 20, hosts will need to re-check and revise their checkout chores to ensure they are simple and reasonable – and not “onerous”.

For instance, they could ask guests to place used dishes in the sink rather than washing them, or gather towels in a designated place rather than launder them. This may help to avoid guest complaints and action from the platform.

The company suggests hosts should fully disclose their updated house rules and requests on the property page, before guests get to the booking page.

Unexpected rules and requests after booking or during the stay can leave guests feeling misled, which can result in poorer stay experiences, bad reviews or complaints to the platform.

The changes may also leave hosts with more cleaning to do. If so, hosts need to ensure they have adjusted their cleaning fee to reflect the actual cost.

However, they should also check whether their total price remains competitive compared to similar properties in the area.

What do the changes mean for travellers?

Travellers can expect a better checkout experience during their stay due to less time-consuming checkout chores.

However, while they are not required to perform work normally handled by a professional cleaner, they must still be responsible guests and leave the property in reasonable condition.

One practical tip for travellers is to always check the house rules and requests before booking. They should keep a record, such as a screenshot or photograph, of any unexpected rules and requests introduced after the booking or during the stay. This can help if they need to report a problem to the platform.

Travellers should also be prepared for possible price increases. Some hosts may face higher cleaning costs if they can no longer rely on guests to complete certain tasks. They may pass these additional costs on to travellers through higher cleaning fees or nightly rates.

Why have these changes been made?

Guests have questioned why they should pay a cleaning fee while still being expected to complete cleaning tasks themselves before checking out. From their perspective, the problem is not simply how difficult each task is, but whether the overall exchange appears fair.

Guests may accept a cleaning fee when they believe it relieves them of the labour required to prepare the property for the next guest.

However, when the fee comes with a demanding list of chores, they may perceive the arrangement as less fair, as they may feel they are paying twice, once with money and again with their labour. The new changes are therefore intended to create a fairer division of responsibilities and protect the guest experience on Airbnb.

Keeping both sides happy

Airbnb is a service platform whose value depends on both guests and hosts. This means Airbnb must consider whether the new changes are fair to both groups.

So far, the changes have sparked strong opposition from hosts.

They have called for a booking blackout on November 20 by closing their properties to new bookings, and started an online petition asking Airbnb to reconsider the rules. The petition has attracted more than 27,000 signatures.

This response highlights the challenge Airbnb faces. A policy change that makes checkout easier for guests could leave hosts feeling neglected and with less control over their properties. This may simply shift dissatisfaction from guests to hosts.

In response, some hosts may reduce their dependence on Airbnb by listing their properties on other platforms. If enough disgruntled hosts switch completely to other platforms, it will risk the supply of properties on Airbnb and make the platform less attractive to guests.

What alternatives could Airbnb consider?

Rather than introducing policies that improve guest convenience at the expense of hosts, one possible way Airbnb could address this issue is to increase cost transparency to promote fairness to both guests and hosts.

For example, Airbnb could reintroduce a breakdown of cleaning fees in the pricing details. Hosts would need to explain how the fee is calculated and which cleaning services it covers.

This would help guests understand what they are paying for and what, if anything, they are still expected to do.

Andreawan Honora does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/changes-are-coming-to-airbnb-heres-what-travellers-and-hosts-need-to-know/

In the spring of 1933, an Austrian engineer was ambling through the outskirts of Soviet Ukraine’s capital city when he stumbled upon a horrific scene: a mass grave, and its gravedigger, who appeared to be smiling.

Such scenes were not necessarily all that unusual in the Ukrainian countryside that year, as millions died from a forced famine now widely known as the Holodomor engineered by the Stalinist regime.

What was unusual about this scene is that it was captured on film. This particular image, along with about 100 others, had to be secretly secretly smuggled out through the Austrian embassy’s diplomatic pouch.

The Soviet government had banned foreign journalists from Ukraine in early 1933 as it instituted a military blockade. This prevented starving peasants from leaving, even as state security forces rampaged through the countryside stealing or destroying much of whatever food remained.

The result was both massive death and destruction and its concurrent and subsequent dismissal and denial by authorities.

Today, destruction and denial continue to go hand in hand. For example, invading Russian forces have systematically destroyed Holodomor memorials in occupied Ukraine.

They have done this while denying that this tragedy and crime even occurred at all — while reportedly starving Ukrainian civilians in cities like Oleshky.

As a historian who specializes in media and mass atrocity, this intersection between what I call “ecosystems of destruction” and “ecosystems of denial” is key to understanding the history of modern famine.

It is also a prominent subject in my new book, Communist Propaganda in Pre-Cold War America.

My research digging through declassified Soviet archives and long-defunct newspaper issues revealed that Stalinist-controlled press outlets in the United States during the early 1930s attacked whistle-blowers and spread misinformation about the ongoing forced starvation in Ukraine. This was part of a long-running and globe-spanning Soviet — and now Russian — negation campaign that continues to this day.

Teaching the Holodomor

My course at the University of Alberta, “Famine as Genocide in the 20th Century,” similarly treats this theme in multiple historical contexts, as does an open online course I helped develop.

Now in its fourth year, the university course cap had to be raised above its normal student limit for the upcoming offering — something that may relate to the unfortunate relevance of the material.

As this year’s United Nations and World Food Program Global Report on Food Crisis warned, the spectre of famine and food insecurity has festered with frightful force from Sudan to Palestine, Myanmar and Ukraine.

For students with roots and cultural connections in Ukraine and other countries and regions impacted by deprivation, the subjects we explore can often have deep personal and political, and historical and contemporary, significance.

In teaching a subject that must contend with contested narratives and disinformation, I borrow from the field of comparative genocide studies to explore political machinations and the ensuing statistical evidence.

At the same time, in keeping with pedagogical approaches related to teaching sensitive topics, I incorporate personal stories and witness testimony, and introduce content and assignments that invite students to locate themselves in the histories we explore.

This supports students’ learning to lean into what can be intense connections to and emotions around famine and genocide.

Being of both Irish-Catholic and Belarussian-Jewish descent, I feel these connections and emotions too: Historian Tim Pat Coogan has argued that the Irish Famine constituted one of the first modern acts of genocide, and Belarus was at the epicentre of Nazi Germany’s food deprivation schemes in Eastern Europe during the Holocaust.

Powerful case study

What makes the Holodomor such a powerful case study of contemporary famine is that it is perhaps the prototypical one.

This is because, as the anthropologist Alex de Waal has observed, humanity has possessed both the materials and the means to feed starving populations across the world since about the middle of the 19th century.

As such, modern famine is invariably manufactured. It is enabled and engineered by human forces and political decisions, rather than being the passive product of the vagaries of weather and other circumstances.

In few historical cases is this as clear as in 1930s Ukraine. Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin admitted by mid-1932 that much of rural Ukraine was in a “state of impoverishment and famine,” while nonetheless telling his underlings to “fulfil the (grain procurement) plan itself at any cost” and “do not undertake additional grain deliveries to Ukraine.”

Free online course

My teaching of this sordid history has been aided by a growing and increasingly public-facing scholarship on the Holodomor.

Earlier this year, the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium, an initiative of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, launched a free online course that consists of 14 modules comprising short videos, readings and assignments related to the Holodomor, with units on:

• Famine in modern history;

• The Soviet context of the Holomodor;

• Defining genocide: origins of the concept and legal and public understandings;

• Efforts to cover up the Holomodor;

• Living and dying: survivor-witness testimonies from Ukraine.

I co-developed this course with more than a dozen scholars, and had the privilege of editing their contributions, which represent the culmination of decades of scholarship. In the process, I considered how I and other educators might be able to incorporate the course’s short, video-based modules into university classrooms.

The series of historical vignettes can work individually or as a group, and potentially serve as a resource for instructors focused not only on famine and genocide studies, or Soviet and Slavic studies, but also modern history more generally.

Lessons of the Holomodor

This public online course points to a lesson to be learned from the Holodomor and its aftermath: the need to fight what sociologist and historian Stanley Cohen aptly described as states of denial, which often surround crimes against humanity.

Faced with concerted dismissal and disinterest, Ukrainians and their diaspora communities — especially in Canada — engaged in concerted efforts in both scholarly fact-finding and public memorialization. These efforts continue to this day.

For other communities encountering comparable silencing in the wake of forced famine or similar forms of mass atrocity, the resilience and resourcefulness of Ukrainians and the ongoing battles over Holodomor recognition and remembrance can offer both cautionary and exemplary insight.

This Holodomor Memorial Day, on Nov. 28, I will speak at the Ukrainian Museum of Canada and reflect as both a scholar of, and a participant in, these ongoing personal, historical and political processes.

Dr. Henry H. Prown is an Assistant Lecturer in the History, Classics, and Religion Department at the University of Alberta and a Research Associate at the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium. His scholarship has been additionally supported by Global Affairs Canada, the Kule Institute for Advanced Study, the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory, and the Ukrainian Studies Fund. He is also affiliated with the Association of Academic Staff of the University of Alberta, where he serves as an elected Councillor and Member Organizer.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/the-holomodor-lessons-about-genocidal-famine-remain-important-today/

The trade war with the United States has put manufacturing at the centre of Canada’s economic agenda by exposing its dependence on a single trading partner.

U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, automobiles and other products have disrupted cross-border supply chains, reduced exports in key industries and increased costs for manufacturers, while leaving businesses uncertain about future trade conditions.

In response, the federal government is trying to strengthen Canada’s domestic industrial capacity and reduce its reliance on the American market.

Read more:
Tariffs are reshaping Canadian manufacturing, but not all workers are being impacted the same way

A Buy Canadian policy now prioritizes Canadian suppliers and domestic materials in federal procurement, while Ottawa’s Defence Industrial Strategy aims to create 125,000 jobs by expanding domestic defence production. Prime Minister Mark Carney has also pledged to double non-U.S. exports within a decade.

However, these initiatives say little about the people who will do the work. Canada’s industrial ambitions depend on having a skilled and available workforce, yet the tariff shock is affecting who works in Canadian factories.

Our analysis of Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey suggests immigrant workers are bearing a disproportionate share of the employment losses.

A recomposition of the factory floor

Manufacturing employment fell by only about three per cent between January 2025 and April 2026. But Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey shows a more substantial change in who holds those jobs.

Monthly estimates for smaller population groups can fluctuate considerably, but the pattern points to a growing disadvantage for immigrant workers.

Immigrants’ share of manufacturing employment slipped from just over 30 per cent to under 28 per cent by December 2025, and has recovered only slightly since.

The losses have come in waves. In 2025, immigrant workers accounted for a growing share of manufacturing job losses, before Canadian-born workers also began experiencing more layoffs as trade pressures persisted. By April 2026, immigrants remained disproportionately affected.

Nearly two-thirds of unemployed immigrants who had previously worked in manufacturing reported losing their jobs, compared with fewer than half of their Canadian-born counterparts, even as job loss became a less common reason for unemployment across the sector.

These losses also appear more permanent. More than half of unemployed immigrant manufacturing workers reported a permanent layoff in April 2026, compared with about 43 per cent of Canadian-born workers.

This coincided with the April 2026 decision in the U.S. to extend steel, aluminum and copper tariffs to the full customs value of covered products, including certain derivative goods, rather than just their metal content.

The skills Canada risks losing

Immigrant manufacturing workers are twice as likely as Canadian-born workers to hold a university degree — close to 40 per cent, compared with 20 per cent. This partly reflects Canada’s immigration system, which awards significant points for education when selecting economic immigrants.

Yet higher education has not translated into better employment outcomes. Immigrant manufacturing workers earned nearly $3 an hour less than Canadian-born workers in April 2026, a gap that has widened since late 2025.

One reason is that immigrants’ credentials are often discounted. Nationally, more than one-quarter of university-educated immigrants work in jobs requiring no more than a high school education, more than double the rate for Canadian-born graduates.

In manufacturing, immigrant workers hold far more degrees than their Canadian-born co-workers, yet earn less, suggesting many are working below their qualifications. Those roles, with shorter tenure and lower pay, are also more exposed to layoffs.

Canada will need engineers, technicians and quality specialists as it expands defence production, shipbuilding and advanced manufacturing. Many immigrants with these skills are already here, but are not working in their fields.

In Ontario, internationally educated engineering graduates outnumber those with Canadian engineering degrees, yet only 18 per cent work as engineers, compared with 40 per cent of Canadian graduates. Recognizing these credentials could be the fastest way to fill the skills gaps an expanding sector will face.

The disadvantages facing immigrant women

The employment changes are also gendered. Women make up about one-third of immigrant manufacturing workers, compared with just over one-quarter of Canadian-born workers.

When tariffs landed in spring 2025, women’s share of employment among immigrant manufacturing workers fell by two percentage points, while the share among Canadian-born workers barely moved.

Over the first eight months of 2025, immigrant women’s share of the overall manufacturing workforce shrank while Canadian-born women’s grew. Caregiving responsibilities, language requirements and difficulties getting foreign credentials recognized can make it more difficult for them to return to work after a layoff.

Defence and advanced manufacturing are among the most male-dominated parts of the sector. Women are manufacturing’s largest untapped talent pool, and industry groups have long argued that recruiting more women is key to easing chronic skills shortages in manufacturing.

Losing immigrant women already in the workforce further shrinks that talent pool, making it harder to fill the jobs Canada’s expanding industrial sector will create.

Policies pulling in opposite directions

Federal policy has not adequately addressed the vulnerabilities immigrant workers face. In August, Ottawa announced a $7.5-billion tariff-response package to support businesses and workers affected by U.S. tariffs. It includes additional income support, workplace training and a new Workforce Retention and Retraining Program. But these initiatives do not specifically address the employment barriers facing immigrants.

The same month, Ottawa launched the Advanced Manufacturing Workforce Alliance, one of six sector alliances designed to map skills gaps, align training with industry needs and help firms adopt new technologies. It brings together manufacturers, unions and training institutions.

But the launch announcement makes no mention of immigrant workers or credential recognition, referring only broadly to underrepresented groups. Identifying the skills of immigrants already in the sector could help move them into the roles an expanding industry will need.

Meanwhile, some services immigrants rely on to enter and navigate the labour market are shrinking. Settlement funding outside Québec is expected to decrease by about $98 million in 2026-27, and advanced language training is being phased out.

These reductions could make it harder for newcomers to develop the language skills, professional connections and other supports needed to find suitable employment.

The Buy Canadian framework sets out no workforce provisions. Canada is pledging to build more at home while weakening the systems that help skilled newcomers move into the jobs that effort requires.

Building a better industrial strategy

Canada has good reason to diversify its markets and strengthen domestic production as manufacturers continue to navigate uncertainty with their largest trading partner.

Trade tensions with the U.S. are likely to remain a defining challenge for Canadian manufacturing. The July review of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement ended without a deal to extend the pact, though it remains in force until 2036.

Expanding domestic production, however, requires workers with the skills to sustain it. An industrial strategy must therefore make workforce retention a priority.

Canada cannot strengthen its manufacturing sector while overlooking the immigrant workers already contributing to it or failing to recognize the skills of those who could contribute more. If Canada wants to make more of what it needs at home, it must stop losing the skilled people it has already recruited to make it.

Marshia Akbar receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

Devaanshi Khanzode does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/canada-wants-to-rebuild-its-manufacturing-sector-but-its-losing-the-immigrant-workers-it-needs/

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Policymakers do listen to research, but evidence is only one part of the decision-making process. Public opinion, political pressures, values and competing priorities also shape migration policies.

• How research is communicated matters. Evidence that is presented neutrally can help to build trust among citizens whose concerns and values must also be weighed in the balance.

• Researchers can have greater impact by acting as honest brokers by presenting credible policy options and their potential consequences, uncertainties and trade-offs.

Researching migration issues can be really frustrating. Years of effort can be put into talking to people, collecting data, testing theories and coming up with what you see as solid evidence, but then it can feel like nobody’s listening. The same old arguments and misconceptions pop up in public discussions, bearing little relation to the evidence you and other researchers have developed.

This matters for a variety of reasons, not least because migration is a big issue in elections across Europe, North America, and beyond. So why aren’t people paying attention to what experts are saying? Researchers are putting a lot of effort into understanding the issues, but it doesn’t seem to be changing what people think or what governments do.

Researchers have solid evidence, but if policymakers don’t listen, then the result can be bad and even counterproductive policies.

Perhaps the answer for researchers is to knuckle down, do even more research, get
better data and try to get through to the people making decisions. But what if we’ve been asking the wrong question all along? After all, why would policymakers listen this time?

Our research suggests that things might not be quite so straightforward and, we would argue, this is a good thing. We surveyed researchers and policymakers across Europe and 7000 citizens in four European countries: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

Bridging the research-to-policy gap

We found a lot of common ground between policymakers and researchers on their factual beliefs about migration. This challenges the idea that policymakers don’t really care about facts and evidence. Policymakers and researchers often agree on the basics of migration. This may come as a surprise given how often we hear that policymakers ignore evidence or are even immune to it.

The wider challenge is that research findings are just one voice in a noisy, crowded room. Policymakers must balance different priorities, values and interests.

And to make things even more complicated, the evidence itself is often unclear and tricky to understand – it’s rarely a simple, straightforward answer. Making decisions isn’t just about picking what’s true and what’s not. It’s about balancing different demands that can even contradict each other.

When policymakers decide, they look at research evidence, but they also think about their own beliefs, their sense of what the public wants and, of course, the political pressure they’re under. It’s not a straightforward battle between evidence and politics, it’s a complicated process of weighing different factors and making compromises.

This can mean evidence gets mixed with other factors, and policymakers have to weigh many considerations to make a decision. This means that the big gap isn’t where we thought it was. Policymakers do actually listen to researchers, but that’s not the whole story. What’s really going on is that policymakers care very much about what they think the public is concerned about.

And the public’s concerns aren’t just based on what experts say. They’re influenced by a lot of other things that have nothing to do with academic research.

Policymakers are trying to figure out what’s on people’s minds, and they’re not relying on research alone. Research and data can be helpful, but they can’t give us all the answers. This is because migration is often a deeply personal issue that also raises questions for all of us about what we value and believe in – it’s not just about numbers and statistics.

Consider, for example, the powerful images of thousands of people swimming toward the Spanish exclave of Ceuta in June 2026. The images that circulated shaped public reactions in ways that combined powerful imagery with emotional resonance. Research can put these developments into perspective, but representations of the events have entered the public consciousness and evoked underlying questions about identity, solidarity, belonging, rights and responsibilities.

People often think that citizens are stubborn and won’t change their minds, no matter what. But our research shows that’s not entirely true. When people have the chance to think through the facts, they can be open-minded and may even change their position after considering new information. This goes against the common idea that people are stuck in their ways and won’t budge. Many citizens will listen to opposing views and adjust their opinions accordingly. This challenges the stereotype that people are closed off to new ideas.

What really matters is how information is shared. When people believe that experts are trying to explain the facts, they’re more likely to trust them. But when experts come across as trying to sell an idea or point of view, it can have the opposite effect.

Rather than listening, people might become even more resistant to the idea, and it can even backfire. How evidence is presented makes a big difference in how it’s received.

What can researchers do to improve public discussions, create good policies, or fight misinformation?

We found that researchers can actually have more influence when

they don’t push their own views, but instead act as neutral experts – honest brokers, even – providing facts and helping people to understand the issues.

Being honest doesn’t mean you have to sit on the fence. It’s about being upfront with your thoughts and helping decision-makers and citizens see the potential outcomes of their choices. You’re not trying to sway them one way or the other, but trying to give a clear picture of what might happen if one option is picked over another.

In our study, we highlight the following key recommendations for helping migration researchers undo the disconnect:

• reach out to the public. There is both an urgent need and a clear potential for public outreach by migration researchers

• strengthen credibility by engaging in a nuanced discussion about values in migration research and how they can be coordinated in synergy with policymakers and citizens

• think carefully about which role to choose as an expert in policy debates and, in particular, consider acting as an “honest broker” who presents a menu of credible policy options and their likely consequences, including uncertainties and trade-offs

• consider using trust-preserving messaging: when presenting belief-challenging insights, explicitly state that the goal is explanation (evidence), not persuasion (advocacy)

• design outreach for polarisation: test messages experimentally, segment audiences, and avoid one-size-fits-all frames

• co-produce evidence communication: partner with decision-makers to communicate
  consequences of different policy routes without pushing a single preferred option

• expect narrative contestation: complement policy with communication strategies attentive to identity, emotion, and solidarity – not merely factual correction

• frame with care: avoid escalating threat cues unless the goal is mobilisation; where appropriate, use positive or efficacy-based frames that support constructive engagement

• combine methods: integrate experiments, political psychology, computational analysis (including LLM-assisted mapping of narratives), and interpretive expertise.

To make a difference in public discussions, researchers who want their research to have an impact need to factor in this complex mix of factors and find ways to address them. Doing so can help create a more nuanced, informed conversation about migration that accounts for the many different perspectives and emotions involved.

Migration is more than just a debate about numbers and facts – it’s about what people believe in and who they are. People are open to trusting experts to guide their decisions, and policymakers can align their factual beliefs with researchers.

Still, you can show people all the evidence you want, but it won’t necessarily change their minds or end arguments. This is because migration is tied to people’s values and sense of identity.

So, what if we’re asking the wrong question?

Instead of wondering why people don’t pay attention to what migration researchers have to say, maybe we should be thinking about how researchers can make a difference and how they can help to build trust by being honest about what they know and what they don’t know, and by listening to people’s concerns and the underlying values they can represent.

This means that it’s not just about coming up with new ideas – it’s about helping people make sense of difficult choices. That’s where migration research can make a real impact.

A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!

Andrew Geddes receives funding support from the European Union Horizon Europe programme for the project Innovating to Enhance Dialogues on Migration Policies and Practices (INNOVATE), 2024-2027, project number: 101132593.

Clare Llewellyn-MacRae receives funding support from the European Union Horizon Europe programme for the project Innovating to Enhance Dialogues on Migration Policies and Practices (INNOVATE), 2024-2027, project number: 101132593.

Eleonora Milazzo receives funding support from the European Union Horizon Europe programme for the project Innovating to Enhance Dialogues on Migration Policies and Practices (INNOVATE), 2024-2027, project number: 101132593.

Roderik Rekker receives funding support from the European Union Horizon Europe programme for the project Innovating to Enhance Dialogues on Migration Policies and Practices (INNOVATE), 2024-2027, project number: 101132593, as well as grants from the Dutch Research Council (VI.Vidi.231R.023) and the German Forschungsgemeinschaft (470816212/KFG43).

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/research-on-migration-is-going-unheard-how-can-we-remedy-that/

Jenny’s back pain usually settles within a few weeks. This time, 12 weeks have passed and it still intrudes on her life. Getting dressed hurts. Sitting through work is difficult. And something else is becoming harder to ignore: worry.

Why hasn’t it gone away? Is something seriously wrong? Will it ever get better?

Social media offers plenty of alarming possibilities. Jenny starts monitoring every twinge. Each painful movement seems to confirm that something must be wrong.

Jenny is fictional, but her experience may be familiar. When she consults her doctor, she might expect relief from exercise, medication or hands-on treatment. Could the consultation itself also influence her pain?

Imagine two versions of Jenny’s appointment. In one, the doctor interrupts her and describes her back as “worn out”. Jenny leaves with exercises, but also with a disturbing picture of a fragile spine.

In the other, the doctor listens, explores her concerns and examines her carefully. Finding no signs suggesting a serious underlying cause, they explain what they have assessed, acknowledge how disabling her pain is and discuss a manageable plan.

Both appointments might include the same exercises, but Jenny may leave with different expectations about her back.

Researchers call these surrounding influences “contextual factors”. They include expectations, past experiences, the doctor’s communication and the care setting.

Studies suggest these factors are linked to treatment outcomes. In one study involving 182 people with longstanding back pain, a stronger relationship with their physiotherapist early in treatment was associated with better outcomes after eight weeks.

Another UK study involving 960 patients receiving physiotherapy, osteopathy or acupuncture found that the relationship between patient and practitioner was among the strongest predictors of reduced disability. Agreement about treatment goals and how to achieve them was particularly important.

These observational studies cannot establish that the relationship caused improvement, but they suggest that what happens during a consultation deserves attention.

How words can influence pain

If Jenny’s pain is in her back, how could someone’s manner or explanation influence it?

Pain is not a straightforward measure of damage: its intensity does not always match the extent of tissue injury.

One possible explanation comes from predictive processing theories. These suggest that the nervous system interprets signals from the body alongside previous experiences, expectations and present circumstances.

Read more:
The surprising science of what pain is and why it hurts

For Jenny, pain that once meant “another episode that will settle” may now mean “something dangerous that nobody has identified”. This change in expectation could contribute to her pain feeling more threatening.

This is one possible explanation of persistent pain. It does not mean Jenny has consciously caused her symptoms.

There is experimental evidence that expectations can influence pain. In one study, healthy volunteers received a powerful opioid painkiller while experiencing painful heat. Positive expectations roughly doubled the drug’s pain-relieving effect, while negative expectations abolished it.

The drug was still being delivered, but participants received different information about it. Brain scans also showed changes in activity in regions involved in processing pain.

This suggests that expectations can influence pain through measurable biological processes. However, findings from short laboratory experiments cannot tell us exactly how much a particular consultation will affect someone with longstanding back pain.

Giving reassurance something to stand on

Simply saying “there’s nothing wrong” is unlikely to address Jenny’s experience. Something plainly is wrong: she hurts, cannot do what she normally does and wants to understand why.

A useful explanation would acknowledge this while distinguishing pain from evidence of serious disease. It would explain the assessment and give Jenny opportunities to ask questions.

The doctor might also ask what she fears. Perhaps her main worry is that bending will damage her spine. Exercises alone may leave that concern untouched.

A theory called “active inference” offers another way to understand this. It proposes that expectations influence what people do, while their actions provide new information that can change those expectations.

In a 2026 paper applying this approach to pain affecting muscles and joints, researchers suggest that movement, communication and other aspects of care may help patients develop different expectations about their bodies.

If Jenny expects bending to cause damage, she may avoid it. With appropriate clinical guidance, gradually exploring that movement could help her discover that her back is more capable than she feared.

This theory may help explain how care works, but researchers have not shown that applying it improves outcomes beyond existing treatments. Treatments also have specific effects that cannot be explained by context alone.

Context has limits

A reassuring consultation cannot replace appropriate assessment or effective treatment, repair an injury or guarantee recovery. Nor does the importance of context justify offering unproven treatments simply because they are delivered with a good bedside manner.

Patients should never be blamed for continuing pain or told they need to think positively.

For doctor, the practical message is to combine careful assessment and evidence-based treatment with explanations that inform without creating unnecessary alarm. UK clinical guidance supports shared decisions, advice about remaining active and individually appropriate treatment for lower back pain.

Patients can reasonably ask what might be causing their pain, whether there are signs of anything serious and what activities they can safely continue.

Jenny needs her pain taken seriously, her concerns heard and a credible way forward. The way that care is offered may help shape what happens next, including her confidence in moving and managing pain.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/11/09/back-pain-how-your-doctors-words-could-influence-your-recovery/