For this, the sixth series of A View from Afar, political scientist and former Pentagon analyst Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deep-dive into geopolitical issues and trends to unpick relevancy from a world experiencing rapid and significant change.

And, in this episode, the topic will be: How to Define A Way Forward When the World is in Chaos.

Since the re-election of the US President Donald Trump, Paul has been doing a lot of work… a lot of reading… and a huge amount of thinking.

Today we hear from Paul about:

1. The US Trump Administration’s “Authoritarianism at home, Imperialism abroad” currency.
2. How to deconstruct the entire “spheres of Influence” nonsense.
3. About United States fears of the rise of the Global South in a poly-centric world.
4. And Paul and I will lean-forward and consider; what to expect in the medium and longterm.

If listeners enjoy interaction in a LIVE recording environment, you can comment and question the hosts while they record this podcast. And, when you do so, the hosts can include your comments and questions in future programmes.

With this in mind, Paul and Selwyn especially encourage you to join them via YouTube, as on YouTube live interaction is especially efficient.

You can join the podcast here (and remember to subscribe and get notifications too by clicking the bell):

OK, let us know what you think about this discussion. Let the debate begin!

*******

SIGNIFICANT QUOTE PAUL G. BUCHANAN: “The sad fact, though, is that the US is the center of our earthly geopolitical universe, serving as the first rock to drop in the global pond whose ripple effects are extensive, negative, and washing up in unexpected and unforeseen ways. That rock, in fact, is a black hole sucking the remnants of the rule based order into oblivion, or if not oblivion, irrelevance in a new age of power politics (might makes right, etc.). It is a dark force from which things as they exist cannot return.”

You can follow this podcast via the following podcast platforms:

Source: Anonymous on X.com.

The lethal theatre of the absurd that has been the Trump administration’s sabre rattling performances in the Central American basin over the last few months culminated with the military attack on Venezuela and the kidnapping of its president and his wife in the early hours of Saturday morning, Caracas time. The tactical precision of the special operation was excellent, efficient and low cost when it came to human lives. While the number of Venezuelan casualties are yet unknown (although deaths are reported in the dozens and include Cubans among the victims), US forces suffered eight injuries and although some of the helicopters deployed received shrapnel damage, all assets returned to base safely. From a military tactical standpoint, the operation was a success and a demonstration of capability.

Even so, the broader picture is more complicated and therefore less straightforward when it comes to assessing the aftermath. Here I shall break down some of the main take-aways so far.

The strike on Venezuela was interesting because it was a hybrid decapitation and intimidation strike. Although US forces attacked military installations in support of the raid (such as by destroying air defence batteries), they only went after Maduro and his wife using their specialist Delta Force teams. That is unusual because most decapitation strikes attempt to remove the entire leadership cadres of the targeted regime, indulging its civilian and military leadership. They also involve seizing ports and airfields to limit adversary movements as well as the main means of communications, such as TV and radio stations, in order to control information flows during and after the event. The last thing that the attacker wants is for the target regime to retain its organizational shape and ability to continue to govern and, most importantly, mount an organised resistance to the armed attackers. This is what the Russians attempted to do with their assault on Kiev in February 2023.

That did not happen in this instance. Instead, the US left the entirety of the Bolivarian regime intact, including its military leadership and civilian authorities. Given reports of CIA infiltration of Venezuela in the months prior to the attack and the muted Venezuelan response to it, it is likely that US agents were in “backdoor” contact with members of the Bolivarian elite before the event, providing assurances and perhaps security guarantees to them (amnesty or non-prosecution for crimes committed while in power) in order to weaken their resistance to the US move. US intelligence may have detected fractures or weakness in the regime and worked behind Maduro’s back to assure wavering Bolivarians that they would not be blamed for his sins and would be treated separately and differently from him.

This might explain Vice President (now interim President) Delcy Rodriguez’s promise to “cooperate” with the US. That remains to be seen but other Bolivarian figures like Interior Minister Diosdaro Cabello and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, notorious for their leadership of Maduro’s repressive apparatus, may not be similarly inclined given that their post-Maduro treatment is likely to be very different–and they still may have control over and the loyalty of many of the people under their commands.

Trump says that the US “will run” the country for the foreseeable future until a regime transition scenario is developed, but in light of the limited nature of the military operation, it is unclear how the US proposes to do so. What is clear is that the US had real time intelligence from the CIA and perhaps regime insiders that allowed them to track and isolate Maduro in a moment of vulnerability. Ironically, for Maduro this proved fortunate, because given the surveillance that he was subjected to, any attempt to escape Caracas could have resulted in his death by drone. Instead, he and his wife get to be a guest of the US federal justice system.

(As an aside, it is noteworthy that the Maduro’s were indicted on cocaine trafficking charges and possessions of machine guns. No mention is mentioned in the indictments of fentanyl, the justification for the extra-judicial killings of civilians at sea by US forces and one of the initial excuses for attacking Venezuela itself (the so-called “fentanyl shipment facilities”). Possession of machine guns is not a crime in Venezuela, certainly not by a sitting leader facing constant violent threats from abroad. So the US is basically charging them with unlicensed firearms violations in the US rather than in Venezuela–where it has no jurisdiction–even though they do not reside there while switching the basis for the kidnapping from a fictitious accusation to something that may have more evidentiary substance. But in truth, the legal proceedings against the Maduros are no more than a fig leaf on the real reasons for their extraordinary rendition).

Even if limited in nature as a decapitation strike, the immediate result of the US use of force is intimidation of the remaining Bolivarians in government. Unless they regroup and organise some form of mass resistance using guerrilla/irregular warfare tactics, thereby forcing the US to put boots on the ground in order to subdue the insurgents (and raising the physical and political costs of the venture), at some point the post-Maduro Bolivarians will be forced to accept power-sharing with or replacement by the US backed opposition via eventual elections, and as Trump has indicated, the US will take control of Venezuelan oil assets (in theory at least). In his words: “they (US oil companies) will make a lot of money.” For this to happen the US will maintain its military presence in the Caribbean and adjacent land bases, in what Marco Rubio calls “leverage” in case the Venezuelans do not comply as demanded. This is coercive diplomacy in its starkest form.

Source: Wikimedia Commons, November 30, 2025

Put bluntly, this is an extorsion racket with the US military being used as the muscle with which to heavy the Bolivarians and bring them to heel. In light of Trump’s and the US’s past records, this should not be surprising. The question is, has the US read the situation correctly? Are the Bolivarians ao much disliked that the country will turn against them in droves and support an ongoing US presence in the country? Is the military and civilian leadership so weak or incompetent that they cannot rule without Maduro and need the US for basic governmental functioning (which is what the US appears to believe)? Have all of the gains made by lower class Venezuelans been eroded by Maduro’s corruption to the point that a reversal of the Bolivarian policy agenda in whole or in part is feasible? Will average Venezuelans, while thankful for the departure of the despot, accept abject subordination to the US and its puppets? Or will Cuban and Russian-backed civilian militias and elements in the armed forces retreat into guerrilla warfare. thereby forcing the US into a prolonged occupation without a clear exist strategy (i.e. deja vu all over again)?

There are some interesting twists to the emerging story. Maria Corina Machado, the US-backed opposition figure-turned-Nobel Peace Prize winner, has positioned herself to be the power behind the throne for Maduro’s heir apparent, Edmundo Gonzalez, who most election observers believe won the 2024 presidential elections but was denied office due to Maduro’s clearly fraudulent manipulation of the vote count. But Trump says that she “is not ready” and does not have the ” support” or “respect” within Venezuela to run the country. This seems to be code words for “too independent-minded” or “not enough of a puppet” (or even “female”) for Trump, who seems unaware of how a close overt association between his administration and any potential future Venezuelan leader may receive mixed reactions at home and abroad. In any event, sidelining Machado could have some unexpected repercussions.

Then there is the issue of how the US and its Venezuelan allies propose to purge the country of foreign actors like Hezbollah, Russians, Cubans and most importantly from an economic standpoint, the Chinese. Rounding up security operatives is one thing (although even that will not be easy given their levels of experience and preparation); dispossessing Chinese investors of their Venezuelan holdings is a very different kettle of fish So far none of this appears to have been thought out in a measure similar to the planning of the military raid itself.

Finally, Trump’s claims that Venezuela “stole” US oil is preposterous. In 1976 a nationalisation decree was signed between the Venezuelan government–a democracy–and US oil companies where Venezuela gained control of the land on which oil facilities were located and received a percentage of profits from them while the private firms continued to staff and maintain the facilities in exchange for sharing profits (retaining a majority share) and paying sightly more in taxes. That situation remained intact until the 1990s, when a series of market-oriented reforms were introduced into the industry that loosened State management over it. After Hugo Chavez was elected president in 1998 on his Bolivarian platform, that arrangement continued for a short time until 2001 when the Organic Hydrocarbon Law was reformed in order to re-assert State control and foreign firms began withdrawing their skilled labor personnel and some of their equipment when taxes were increased on them. By 2013 the oil infrastructure was decrepit and lacking in skilled workers to staff what facilities are still operating, so Chavez (by then on his death bed) expropriated the remaining private holdings in the industry.

This was clearly unwise but it was not illegal and certainly was not a case of stealing anything. Moreover, the Venezuelan oil industry limped along with help from Bolivarian allies like the PRC and Russia because it is the country’s economic lifeline (and cash cow for the political elite dating back decades). So it is neither stolen or completely collapsed. As with many other things, the complexities of the matter appear to be unknown to or disregarded by Trump in favour of his own version of the “facts.”

Regardless, the PRC has stepped into the breech and invested in Venezuela’s oil industry. They may resist displacement or drive a hard bargain to be bought out. It will therefore not be as simple as Trump claims it to be for US firms to return and “make a lot of money” from Venezuelan oil.

It is these and myriad other “after entry” (to use a trade negotiator’s term) problems that will make or break the post-Maduro regime, whatever its composition. In the US the word is that the US “broke it so now owns it,” but the US will never do that. It has seldom lived up to its promises to its erstwhile allies in difficult and complex political cultures that it does not understand. It has a very short attention span, reinforced by domestic election cycles where foreign affairs is of secondary importance. So it is easily manipulated by opportunists and grifters seeking to capitalise on US military, political and economic support in order to advance their own fortunes (some would say this of the MAGA administration itself). If this sounds familiar it is because it is a very real syndrome of and pathology in US foreign affairs: focus on the military side of the equation, conduct kinetic operations, then try to figure out what else to do (nation-build? keep the peace? broker a deal amongst antagonistic locals?) rather than simply declare victory and depart. Instead, the US eventually leaves on terms dictated by others and with destruction in its wake.

One thing that should be obvious is that for all the jingoistic flag-waving amongst US conservatives and Venezuelan exiles, their problems when it comes to Venezuela may just have started. Because now they “own” what is to come, and if what comes is not the peace and prosperity promised by Trump, Rubio, Machado and others, then that is when things will start to get real. “Real” as in Great Power regional conflict real, because launching a war of opportunity on Venezuela in the current geopolitical context invites responses in kind from adversaries elsewhere that the US is ill-equipped to respond to, much less control.

The precedent has been set and somewhere, perhaps in more than one theatre, the invitation to reply is open.

Stay tuned and watch this space.

Analysis syndicated by 36th Parallel Assessments –

By William Camacaro

New York

One of the casualties of Washington’s get-tough immigration policy is the plight of children separated by U.S. authorities from their parents. The political party of “family values” has caused needless trauma for these migrant children and round the clock anxiety for parents desperately waiting to be reunited with their loved ones. 

The Venezuelan government, which has a longstanding policy–vuelta a la patria–of assisting the repatriation of their citizens– has reported that at least 66 children have been illegally held  in the United States since their parents were deported to Venezuela. At this writing the author has been unable to obtain information as to their circumstances or whereabouts. 

The most well-known case of a Venezuelan child held in the U.S. after her mother was deported is that of a two-year-old girl, Maikelys Espinoza. After an international campaign brought her plight to light, the United States repatriated Maikelys to Caracas on May 14, 2025 returning her to her mother’s embrace. Today, families’ pleas for the return of their children recall her story and have stirred the sympathy of the Venezuelan public.

This situation recalls the case of Cuban citizen Elián González, who, as a child, was known as “the raft boy,” and found himself at the center of a major international incident in 2000. He was found adrift on an inner tube after the boat carrying him, his mother, and other migrants en route from Cuba to the United States capsized. The child’s custody became the subject of a dispute between his father in Cuba (who was offered money by the U.S. to come and live here) and his relatives in Miami. The case caused an international uproar, filled with legal and media battles between Cuban and North American authorities. He was finally reunited with his father on June 28, 2000. Today Elián is a leading voice for resistance to more than a half a century of economic warfare waged by Washington against the Caribbean island.

The present case is also fraught with political complications. Given Washington’s antipathy toward the Bolivarian revolution, President Maduro’s administration has been under relentless attack since 2013, having to endure threats of direct military intervention, fanciful accusations of drug trafficking, and a previously unheard-of bounty of $50 million for the arrest of  Venezuela’s president. Despite these threats, Caracas has remained steadfast in defending Venezuelan migrants and seeking the return of all of the children who are being held in the United States against the will of their families.

So far, 21 children have been repatriated to Venezuela. This is in addition to the 252 Venezuelan migrants who were deported by the United States to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador and released on July 18 after a humanitarian exchange. According to government official Camilla Fabri Saab, Deputy Minister of International Communication of the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry and leader of the campaign to bring the children home, more than 10,631 Venezuelan migrants have been repatriated so far this year.

Each day that these children are separated from their families robs them of parental love during their formative years. For both the minors and their families time is of the essence. Accordingly, Caracas persists in demanding that they be reunited with their families, calling demonstrations and orchestrating a broad media campaign across official outlets.

A group of parents has issued the following open letter addressed to the First Lady, Melania Trump

Open Letter Page 1

Open Letter Page 2

Open Letter Page 3

William Camacaro is a  Senior Analyst for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). He is a co-founder of  the Venezuela solidarity network and holds a Master’s Degree of Fine Arts and a Master’s Degree in Latin American Literature from City University of New York. He has published in the Monthly Review, Counterpunch, COHA, the Afro-America Magazine, Ecology, Orinoco Tribune and other venues. He has organized delegations to Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela.

Banner Photo: Credit – María Isabel Batista/Ultimas Noticias

Photo: Elián González, Reunited with his father in Cuba. Credit – Granma

By William Camacaro

New York

The Bolivian political landscape is currently characterized by a deep, self-inflicted crisis within the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) which has culminated in a devastating electoral defeat yesterday. As the country approached the crucial presidential elections of August 17, 2025, the party’s leaders—specifically former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce Catacora—engaged in a series of personal attacks and internal conflicts that paved the way for their own defeat. This political irresponsibility, driven by ambitions and factionalism, has enabled the return to power of the very right-wing forces that the MAS struggled for years to overcome.

This right-wing victory poses a significant threat to progressive governance, both in Bolivia and regionally. The presidential race featured prominent opposition figures such as Samuel Doria Medina, a billionaire businessman and member of the Socialist International. He immediately conceded defeat in the first round and endorsed Rodrigo Paz Pereira, a Social-Christian senator and son of former Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora. The senator has since mentioned the possibility of reforming the Plurinational Constitution, which has been a bedrock of the long process of decolonization. Another candidate, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, who finished second, has vowed to continue to the second round on October 19 in his quest to become president. He is a neoliberal ally of former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, as well as an associate of prominent right-wing figures in the region, including María Corina Machado of Venezuela, Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, Dina Boluarte of Peru, and Javier Milei of Argentina, forming a broad front against the Latin American left.

The left’s defeat was self-inflicted. On one side was Andrónico Rodríguez, an indigenous leader of the Chapare coca growers’ movement. Despite being a protégé of Evo Morales, he was branded a “traitor” by some Morales supporters for launching his own presidential candidacy with his fledgling political party, Popular Unity, following Morales’s controversial disqualification of his candidacy. The other leftist candidate was Eduardo del Castillo, the official candidate of the MAS, a former minister favored by the Arce government. The nomination of Del Castillo, a white man, in a country with an indigenous majority was a political mistake that made him an unviable candidate for the party’s core demographic.

The political consequences of this electoral loss are likely to be dire. Candidate Samuel Doria Medina has already stated, when endorsing the first-round winner, that political prisoners must be released. This paves the way for the resurgence of figures like Jeanine Áñez, whom Bolivian prosecutors charged with  command responsibility, during her interim presidency, for the murder of dozens of  indigenous people during protests in defense of democracy, and Luis Fernando Camacho, who was the architect of the coup d’état and responsible for the brutal repression of indigenous people during their resistance against the Áñez dictatorship in 2019.

A central factor in this crushing defeat is the dramatic division within the MAS itself. Just five years ago, the party secured 55% of the votes; today, divided, its two main candidates obtained a combined 11.3% of the electoral vote. This leaves indigenous communities facing three far-right parties, all of which are more or less neoliberal. All of them seek to reform the constitution and privatize state-owned enterprises, and indigenous people are very likely to lose the social gains they have achieved in recent years. Candidate Quiroga has already stated that “land is not communal; land always has one owner,” and some leaders of the opposition have announced the possible political persecution and imprisonment of some MAS leaders. Rodrigo Paz and Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga will be running in the second round. The right-wing victory in Bolivia is not simply a change of government; it heralds a return to colonial hierarchies of domination.

This internal conflict is especially tragic given the historical importance of the MAS. The party’s rise to power under the leadership of Evo Morales represented a revolutionary “process of change” that, for the first time in Bolivian history, allowed indigenous people to access the highest levels of government. Before this change, indigenous people suffered systemic discrimination, including being prohibited from entering official state buildings, such as Congress, while wearing their traditional clothing or speaking their native languages. The MAS was more than just a political party; it was an instrument of political and social liberation for a long-marginalized population, founded on a progressive agenda and led by indigenous peoples.

As Evo Morales was disqualified from running for office and expelled from the MAS, the infighting among party  leaders managed to undermine the party’s prospects of remaining in power. Evo Morales’s former vice president, Álvaro García Linera, stated to the BBC that the parties were “looking for ways to gain advantage in their battle against the other. Luis Arce is fighting to prevent Evo Morales from being a candidate. Evo Morales seeks to weaken Luis Arce to enable his candidacy.” 

In addition to the mutual accusations between Evo and President Arce, the leaders of the MAS in the Plurinational Congress, worked to torpedo the economic management of the president’s government. And of course, Evo Morales’ call to his followers to vote null was politically suicidal. It must be made clear that this is not a defeat for socialism; it is a defeat caused by divisions within the revolutionary ranks and instigated by the Bolivian mainstream media and elements of the corporate sector in Santa Cruz and the United States.

It is likely that Washington took advantage of  the divisions within MÁS leading up to this electoral disaster. The U.S. had backed the coup against Evo Morales in 2019. In 2024, a leaked audio recording of the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. embassy in La Paz confirmed the existence of a U.S. plan to intervene in Bolivia’s political affairs to undermine the process of change (proceso de cambio). Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz,  Debra Hevia said: 

“We have been working for a long time to achieve change in Bolivia. Time is of the essence for us, but for it to be a real change, Evo and Arce have to leave power and close that chapter. From now on, we are going to get more involved with our embassy to strengthen our allies, organizations, and collaborators. For example, our government has always offered scholarships in Bolivia, and now we are going to offer even more because young people are our agents of change and are very, very important.” 

Despite foreign meddling, it was internal divisions within the MAS that led to the alienation of the base and the resulting electoral outcome. María Soledad, a sociologist and activist from Cochabamba, affirms that what happened is a real tragedy:  

“Evo Morales and Luis Arce Catacora dedicated themselves to squandering and exhausting in three years all the strength accumulated over decades of political work by thousands of Bolivians. Now, a very long period of reconstruction will begin in a country where indigenous people are despised for their condition. The only positive thing is that this is not a start from scratch, because this country will never return to what it was before the process of change.”

The only way for the Bolivian left to recuperate the path of decolonization and the democratic participation of indigenous peoples is to re-establish the unity among the progressive grassroot movements. 

On December 8, 2012, in his last live televised speech, President Hugo Chávez spoke to the Venezuelan people. Shortly after this event, Chávez traveled to Cuba for medical treatment and passed away on March 5, 2013. In that speech, President Chávez said:

“Patriots of Venezuela, men and women, with a knee to the ground – Unity, Unity, Unity of the patriots. There is no scarcity of those who want to take advantage of difficult junctures to continue their efforts to restore neoliberal capitalism and to destroy the homeland. They won’t be able to succeed. No matter how great the difficulties that face us, no matter how serious, the responsibility of all patriots, revolutionaries, those who feel the homeland to the core . . .  is unity, struggle, battle, and victory!”

Banner Photo Credit: Radio Kawsachun Coca

William Camacaro is a  Senior Analyst for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). He is a co-founder of  the Venezuela solidarity network and holds a Master’s Degree of Fine Arts and a Master’s Degree in Latin American Literature from City University of New York. He has published in the Monthly Review, Counterpunch, COHA, the Afro-America Magazine, Ecology, Orinoco Tribune and other venues. He has organized delegations to Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela.

By William Camacaro

New York

Since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 Washington has waged a relentless war against the Bolivarian revolution. The Trump administration continues to deploy political, economic and military measures aimed at the overthrow of Venezuela’s government and the reversal of advances in regional independence and integration: the two pillars of the Bolivarian cause. At the present juncture, it is critically important to make no mistake about Washington’s duplicitous policy towards the Maduro administration of simultaneous negotiation and intensifying aggression. This aggression is not a mere show to placate the Trump administration’s hard line anti-Chavista allies in Miami; it is an imminent threat to Venezuela’s national security and part of a strategy to recuperate U.S. domination of the Americas. 

On June 12, 2024, newspapers astonishingly published Donald Trump’s incredibly candid opinion: “When I left, Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken all the oil.” This is why it comes as no surprise when Miami-based Venezuelan opposition journalist Carla Angola comments that Donald Trump is interested in having absolute control of Venezuela’s oil reserves. She adds that the opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado is promising the United States government absolute control of these natural resources, not because this radical sector of the Venezuelan opposition is interested in managing them, but rather in privatizing them.

Orchestrating Regime Change in Venezuela

The threat to Venezuelan security is no exaggeration. Last week Venezuelan intelligence discovered three kilograms of TNT planted in Caracas’s Plaza de la Victoria, a location of significant public importance. Officials said the bomb, which was found near gas pipelines,could have caused catastrophic destruction and an incalculable loss of life. Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello announced that a coordinated investigation with several security agencies successfully dismantled this plot, revealing a sinister connection between far-right opposition elements and their international allies.

This terrorist plot cannot be written off as an isolated incident. Washington is pulling out all the stops to prepare public opinion for new acts of aggression by portraying President Nicolas Maduro, through U.S. corporate media, as a narcotrafficker with a price on his head. 

The most recent and series of  attacks against the Bolivarian Revolution began with a press release by  the U.S. Treasury Department on July 25 of this year. Titled “Treasury Sanctions Venezuelan Cartel Headed by Maduro,” the release designated the so-called “Cartel of the Suns” as a terrorist entity and named President Maduro as its head. It further pointed to his alleged relationships with both the Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel, and accused them of being “violent narco-terrorists.” A few days later President Donald Trump directed the Pentagon to prepare options for the possible use of U.S. military force against drug cartels designated as terrorist organizations  authorizing military intervention in countries with drug trafficking. This came weeks after Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly accused Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro of being the head of the “Cartel of the Suns.” In a further escalation, Rubio stated that the recent designation of the “Cartel of the Suns” as a “terrorist organization” now provides a pretext for Washington to use military and intelligence tools against Maduro and his allies. 

All of these accusations sound very ominous, but there is no evidence for them. This narco-mythology is viewed by some political analysts as political cover for eventual attacks on not only Venezuela but also its regional allies like Nicaragua, Cuba, and Bolivia. For this reason Venezuelan security forces have issued strong statements of loyalty and defiance in the face of threats from the North.The Trump administration is doubling a reward to $50 million for the arrest of President Maduro, accusing him of being one of the world’s largest drug traffickers and working with cartels to flood the U.S. with fentanyl-laced cocaine. Historically, rewards of this magnitude for political leaders are rare. The first similar historical case was the reward for the apprehension of Pancho Villa after his raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916. The reward for Pancho Villa was $5,000, while a smaller reward of $1,000 was offered for his lieutenants. More recently, the State Department formalized its “Rewards for Justice” program in 1984. Its first high-profile case was Manuel Noriega of Panama in 1989, accused of drug trafficking. The reward for Saddam Hussein in 2003 was $25 million.

Drug trafficking ruse for U.S. intervention

Washington demonstrates its contempt for the people of the Global South by treating their presidents as pawns, making accusations without any evidence, and imposing unilateral and illegal sanctions against those who resist imperial domination. This latest bizarre accusation should remind us of the allegations of the existence of weapons of mass destruction that served as an excuse to destroy Iraq, murder a million people, displace thousands from their homes, and deprive the nation of control over their natural resources.

The hypocrisy of the narco-mythology could not be more blatant. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly supported former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, particularly in the context of Uribe’s recent conviction for witness tampering and bribery. Rubio’s statements have drawn criticism from some who view it as interference in Colombia’s judicial system. Rubio’s defense of the former Colombian president is nonetheless troubling given that the same entity he leads designated Alvaro Uribe in 1991 as a major drug trafficker, a member of the cartel of Medellin and a personal friend of Pablo Escobar. .

Colombian President Gustavo Petro affirmed that his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolás Maduro, has backed the fight against drug trafficking on the border and that this “support has been forceful and must continue.” Petro warned last Sunday that a military operation against Venezuela without the approval of “brother countries” would be an act of aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean. 

There have also been a series of strong pronouncements from Tegucigalpa, Havana, Managua, La Paz and the Caribbean countries against this designation that seeks to stigmatize the Bolivarian Revolution. After the US attorney general accused the Venezuelan president of working with the Sinaloa Cartel, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum responded, “Mexico has no investigation under way and no proof that Maduro is linked to the Sinaloa Cartel.” 

The statements by Secretary of State Rubio and Attorney General Pamela Bondi are extremely ridiculous, especially considering that the U.S. has been engaged in a “war on drugs” in Colombia for over 50 years.  Since the 1990s, this war has resulted in over 450,000 deaths. Far from diminishing drug production, this war has seen Colombia become the world’s largest drug producer.

It is notable that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its most comprehensive annual report on the subject, the 2023 World Drug Report, states that Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are the main cocaine producers. The same report identifies Australia, New Zealand, US, and Spain as the largest cocaine consumers worldwide. Curiously, Venezuela is not mentioned in any of these reports, neither as a producer nor as a major consumer.

At a press conference on August 9, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello reported that a foiled plot was sponsored by “narco-gangs” of the far-right Venezuelan opposition, in direct coordination with the US government. The plot involved a criminal group from the Zulia region, led by Francisco Javier Linol, and a representative from Colombia’s Guajira Cartel. The authorities arrested José Daniel García, who confessed to being offered $20,000 to carry out the attack. This confession led to the capture of 13 other individuals in Venezuela and an additional suspect in Colombia. 

Cabello’s said “This proves the ties between narco-paramilitarism, the fascist far-right, and the U.S. government… It confirms the script we’ve long warned about.” This underscores the Venezuelan government’s perspective that these are not isolated incidents but part of a larger, orchestrated plan. Two days later, in Monagas state, Cabello displayed a new, massive cache of explosives, including various types of explosives and electric detonators, found in boxes inside a warehouse.

History of US attacks on the Bolivarian Revolution

These actions are paralleled by diplomatic attacks. On August 6th of this year, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS), an organization from which Venezuela withdrew, launched a virulent attack on Venezuelan democracy. The Rapporteur on the Rights of Afro-Descendants, Gloria Monique de Mees, accused the government of a systematic violation of human rights and the imprisonment of more than 900 political prisoners. This accusation, coming a day before the foiled attack and Rubio’s militaristic rhetoric, adds another layer of coordinated pressure and raises questions about the political motivations behind such reports.

Since its inception in 1998, the Bolivarian Revolution has endured a large number of attacks. The first major blow was the 2002 coup d’état against the elected leader Hugo Chávez. This coup, which was widely celebrated by the corporate media, was ultimately reversed thanks to the massive public support that saw people take to the streets, risking their lives to defend the constitution and demand Chávez’s return to power. This was an unprecedented situation in Latin American history. The celebratory tone of the US media at the time is revealing. For example,the New York Times initially welcomed his removal before being forced to retract its triumphant narrative just a day later when Chávez was reinstated. Shortly after, at the end of that year and beginning of 2003, a brutal oil strike occurred, causing losses of billions of dollars.

After President Nicolás Maduro assumed the presidency, the attacks evolved into multiple hybrid forms, including assassination attempts. One of the most audacious was a drone attack on August 4, 2018, during a live-streamed military event in Caracas. Two drones loaded with explosives were detonated near the platform where Maduro was speaking. This event set a grim precedent as the first assassination attempt using commercial drones against a head of state.

In 2019, a virtually unknown congressman named Juan Guaidó swore himself in as interim president of Venezuela with the immediate support of the U.S. and the European community. This was followed in 2020 by another attack on Venezuelan democracy through a mercenary invasion known as “Operation Gideon.” 

Following the 2024 presidential elections, rioters ( comanditos ), some with firearms, took to the streets to demand foreign intervention, leading to small skirmishes in Caracas. The attacks against the Bolivarian Revolution are innumerable, and what has been truly amazing is its capacity to resist and reinvent itself in the face of every challenge.

Current threat

Despite this history of attacks, there is a belief among some supporters of the Bolivarian Revolution that relations with the U.S. are improving. They point to dialogue and the continued operation of Chevron in Venezuela as evidence of an evolving more cooperative relationship. The reality is that it is in Washington’s interest to maintain a foothold in the Venezuelan oil business. 

The Trump administration, however, has so far carried out only symbolic actions at détente. Concrete actions would involve dismantling the sanctions and eliminating the bounty on the president and members of his cabinet. They are not going to eliminate them. They do not want Venezuela to stand on its own two feet. The talks underway between Washington and Caracas do not preclude an attack on the constitutional government of Venezuela..

The proximity and interconnectedness of these events—the terrorist plots in Caracas and Maturín, the alleged links to Colombian paramilitary forces and the Venezuelan far-right, and the explicit threats from the United States—serve as a grave warning. 

For Venezuela and its supporters, these incidents are not coincidental; they represent a coordinated effort to destabilize the nation through a combination of domestic terrorism, international political pressure, and the looming threat of military intervention. The government’s successful dismantling of these plots has, for now, averted major disasters, but it also confirms the ongoing and complex nature of the threats facing the country.

The Bolivarian Revolution is a project of Latin American integration that represents the search for social justice; it is a project of liberation. Washington commits a huge injustice by deploying more than a thousand unilateral and coercive measures against Venezuela, as these only bring hardship and death to the nation’s most humble citizens.  

It is essential to reflect on the fate of Augusto Sandino, who, after leading a 21-year guerrilla war against the U.S. military occupation of Nicaragua, successfully expelled foreign forces from his homeland. A revered revolutionary and emblem of anti-imperialist resistance, Sandino was tragically assassinated by the Somoza regime shortly after initiating a dialogue with representatives of the North American government, following a dinner at the national palace—a dinner with the enemy.

Photo Credit: VTV

William Camacaro is a  Senior Analyst for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). He is a co-founder of the Bolivarian Circle of New York “Alberto Lovera” a holds a Master’s Degree of Fine Arts and a Master’s Degree in Latin American Literature from City University of New York. He has published in the Monthly Review, Counterpunch, COHA, the Afro-America Magazine, Ecology, Orinoco Tribune and other venues. He has organized delegations to Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela.

By John Perry and Roger D. Harris

By escalating deportations, ending humanitarian protections, and cutting remittances, Trump’s immigration policy threatens to destabilize Latin American economies and exacerbate humanitarian crises. Ironically, this might trigger a new wave of migration.

The economic importance of Latinos living and working in the US is enormous: if they were in a separate country, it would be the world’s fifth largest economy, bigger than even India. President Trump is recklessly attacking Latino migrants, inflicting calculated cruelty and disregarding the consequences for their home countries.

Disastrously, US immigration policy affects the very victims of Washington’s destabilization campaigns in Latin America and Caribbean, which drive people to leave their homelands in the first place. In effect, by exporting hardship, the hegemon paradoxically ends up importing immigrants. First Washington sanctions states based in part on allegations that they violate human rights. Then, the US contradicts itself by claiming those very sanctioned countries are deemed safe enough for deportation. 

Further, implementation is selective, privileging right-wing allies and punishing progressive states. The economic fallout from reduced remittances and mass deportations is not only politically opportunistic but has grave humanitarian consequences.  

Take the case of Haiti, which Human Rights Watch says is on the “edge of collapse.” Armed gangs control most of the capital, over a million Haitians have been displaced and there is acute food insecurity. The State Department’s travel advisory puts Haiti at its highest level of risk (level 4): avoid traveling there because gun crime is “common” and kidnapping is “widespread.” 

Yet, over at Homeland Security, Haiti is declared “safe” for people to return. Secretary Kristi Noem wants to force 348,000 Haitians who have temporary protected status (TPS) and another 211,000 who have humanitarian parole to leave for what Black Agenda Radio describes as “a country in turmoil.” 

Migrants – a threat worse than communism to nativist America

Under President Biden, Washington’s ideology-driven immigration policy led to the “humanitarian parole” program. Citizens of the targeted countries – Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela – were said to be “fleeing communism” and warranted preferential treatment. Trump has ended the parole scheme for those countries and the TPS protection for Nicaraguans and Venezuelans (Cubans never had TPS protection), yet their revolutionary governments now suffer even tougher US coercive economic measures than those imposed during the Biden administration.

Come Trump’s second term, US immigration policy sharply limits the pathways for Cubans to enter the US legally. Over a half a million Cubans in the US lost their status and work permission with the termination of humanitarian parole. Visa restrictions limit family, student, and visitor entry. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is now allowed to deport Cubans and other migrants to countries other than their own, with as little as six hours’ notice. Meanwhile US-Cuba bilateral immigration talks are indefinitely suspended. 

Trump’s malice against Cuba – a nation already teetering under the six-decade illegal US blockade – is causing a mounting humanitarian crisis. Tightening the economic embargo followed further restrictions on foreign investment and expanded sanctions. Biden’s earlier attempts to strangle the Cuban economy cut remittances sent by migrants from about $800 million in 2019 to just $35 million by May 2024. Trump’s new measures could sever the lifeline completely. Cuba is, of course, now looking to the BRICS countries, and specifically China, as alternative sources of investment and support.

Meanwhile Nicaragua, which has 93,000 in the parole scheme and about 4,000 under TPS, is deemed “safe enough” for its citizens to return home, according to US Homeland Security: 

“Nicaragua has become a worldwide tourist destination, while also promoting sustainability and revitalizing local communities. Technological innovation is empowering local farmers and fishers, making the agriculture industry more competitive and profitable… Nicaragua continues to show stable macroeconomic fundamentals, including a record-high $5 billion in foreign reserves, a sustainable debt load, and a well-capitalized banking sector.”

No one seems to have told Kristi Noem that her cabinet colleague Marco Rubio regards Nicaragua as an “enemy of humanity.” His officials briefed the New York Times that the country was “perilous for tourists.” 

Last month, President Daniel Ortega reassured Nicaraguans that the country’s “doors are open,” urging them to leave the “terror” of the US. Nicaraguan Eddy García, who along with 77 others arrived on a deportation flight in February, said that they were welcomed by officials, given refreshments and then offered transport home: “I’m extremely happy to be back because now no one is going to throw me out.” 

Opponents of Nicaragua’s Sandinista government have, until Trump’s shift in policy, argued that an “unprecedented wave” of migrants fled the country as a result of government “repression” following the failed coup attempt in 2018. Opposition figures are struggling to explain why, if this were the case, so few Nicaraguans are being sent back. In the six months until June, they accounted for less than one percent of the 239,000 migrants deported. 

Another political shift has been the marked hostility to Venezuelan migrants. By the end of Biden’s term, over half a million Venezuelans had been accepted under TPS and 117,000 given “humanitarian parole.” Under Trump, these Venezuelans are denounced for “invading” the US. Some are even accused of being affiliated to the violent Tren de Aragua gang, a dubious claim which, Trump baselessly asserted, is directed by Nicolas Maduro’s government. 

Meanwhile, US-Venezuela talks on migration continue. The Venezuelan government, for its part, has welcomed returning migrants under its “Return to the Homeland Plan.” The US deported over 200 Venezuelans, dubiously linked to gangs, to El Salvador where they were incarcerated and tortured in the infamous CECOT prison. They have recently been freed thanks to a prisoner exchange agreement between Washington and Caracas. Caracas’s other priority is to reunite children, thrust into foster care in the US, back with their deported Venezuelan parents. 

Driven out by ICE

Apart from the prospect of being dispatched to one of El Salvador’s notorious prisons or  being abandoned to an unknown fate in a remote country like South Sudan, thousands of Latino migrants are leaving the US on their own in the face of escalating threats from ICE.

Wilfredo, from the city of Masaya, Nicaragua, had voluntarily flown back from Miami with two others. Many more Nicaraguans were on the same flight anxious to leave, he told us, before ICE officials kidnapped them, took all their belongings and put them, handcuffed, on deportation flights. “The ‘American Dream’ has become a nightmare,” he said.

Even long-time naturalized citizens in the US are terrorized. In liberal Marin County, CA, Venezuelan-born Claudia now takes her passport with her whenever she leaves the house for fear of being seized. It’s happened already to other naturalized citizens. 

Costa Rica and Panama were persuaded by Trump to accept around 500 deported asylum seekers from third countries as diverse as Iran, Cameroon and Vietnam. These migrants are now in limbo, receive little assistance and – in most cases – are unable to speak Spanish. They have been pressured to accept repatriation flights to their home countries but many face persecution if they do so. 

Duplicitous immigration policy

The treatment of migrants from most Latin American countries contrasts sharply with Washington’s approach towards El Salvador. It has 174,000 citizens living in the US with TPS and – like Haiti – this protection was offered after the country suffered severe earthquake damage. However, El Salvador has been conveniently judged as “unable” to accept the return of so many of its citizens; their TPS continues. 

Despite the supposedly unsafe conditions used to justify TPS, the State Department downgraded the risk of travel to El Salvador to its lowest level, ranking it as one of the safest countries in Latin America. “Just got the US State Department’s travel gold star: Level 1: safest it gets,” Bukele boasted.

Remittances from the country’s estimated 1.4 million migrants in the US provided El Salvador with a vital 23.5% of its national income in 2022. Bukele’s White House visits, hosting Marco Rubio at his home and, above all, incarcerating migrants on behalf of the US – along with groveling before Trump – paid off. But it has also evoked the indignation of human rights defenders both in the US and throughout the region.

In a further attack on migrants, Trump is hitting them with new taxes on the remittances they send, which provide 23% of Central America’s GDP. Migrants struggling for survival are taxed in this way while the wealthy can move money abroad – through bank wires, investment accounts, shell companies, and real estate purchases – without similar penalties.

Many Latin American economies will be further strained by a combination of falling remittances, returning migrants who initially lack jobs, and, in some cases, harsher economic sanctions. Meanwhile, their exports to the US are being hit by new tariffs. Trump appears to be exacerbating the economic conditions that drove many migrants north under his predecessor’s administration.

Banner Photo: Credit VTV (https://www.vtv.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/MIGRA.png)

Nicaragua-based John Perry is with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition and writes for the Grayzone, London Review of Books, FAIR, and CovertAction. Roger D. Harris is with the Task Force on the Americas, the US Peace Council, and the Venezuela Solidarity Network.

By Roger D. Harris and John Perry

With the Trump imperium passing the half-year mark, the posture of the US empire is ever clearer. Whether animated by “America First” or globalism, the objective remains “full spectrum dominance.” And now with the neocon capture of the Democrats, there are no guardrails from the so-called opposition party.

Call it the “new cold war,” the “beginning of World War III,” or – in Trump’s words – “endless war”– this is the era that the world has entered. The US/Zionist war against Iran has paused, but no one has any illusions that it is over. And it won’t likely be resolved until one side decisively and totally prevails. Ditto for the proxy war with Russia in Ukraine. Likely the same with Palestine, where Israel is perpetrating genocide against the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, since Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” the empire is building up for war with China.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the empire’s drive for world hegemony assumes a hybrid form. The carnage is less apparent because the weapons take the form of “soft power” – sanctions, tariffs, and deportations. These can have the same lethal consequences as bombs, only less overt. 

Making the world unsafe for socialism

Some Western leftists vilify the defensive measures that Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua must take to protect themselves from the empire’s regime-change schemes. In contrast, Washington clearly understands that these countries pose “threats of a good example” to the empire. Each subsequent US president, from Obama on, has certified them as “extraordinary threats to US national security.” Accordingly, they are targeted with the harshest coercive measures. 

In this war of attrition, historian Isaac Saney uses the example of Cuba to show how any misstep by the revolutionary government or deficiency within society is exaggerated and weaponized. The empire’s siege, he explains, is not merely an attempt to destabilize the economy but is a deliberate strategy of suffocation. The empire’s aim is to incite internal discontent, distort people’s image of the government, and ultimately dismantle social gains. 

While Cuba is affected worst by the hybrid war, both Venezuela and Nicaragua have also been damaged. All three countries have seen “humanitarian parole” for their migrants in the US ended. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) was also withdrawn for Venezuelans and Nicaraguans. The strain of returning migrants along with cuts in the remittances they had been sending (amounting to a quarter of Nicaragua’s GDP) further impact their respective economies. 

Higher-than-average tariffs are threatened on Venezuelan and Nicaraguan exports to the US, together with severe restrictions on Caracas’s oil exports. Meanwhile, the screws have been tightened on the six-decade US blockade of Cuba with disastrous humanitarian consequences.

However, all three countries are fighting back. They are forming new trade alliances with China and elsewhere. Providing relief to Cuba, Mexico has supplied oil and China is installing solar panel farms to address the now daily losses of electrical power. High levels of food security in Venezuela and Nicaragua have strengthened their ability to resist US sanctions, while Caracas successfully dealt a blow to one of Washington’s harshest migration measures by securing the release of 252 of its citizens who had been incarcerated in El Salvador’s torturous CECOT prison.

Venezuela’s US-backed far-right opposition is in disarray. The first Trump administration had recognized the “interim presidency” of Juan Guaidó, followed by the Biden administration declaring Edmundo González winner of Venezuela’s last presidential election. But the current Trump administration has yet to back González, de facto recognizing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. 

Nicaragua’s right-wing opposition is also reeling from a side-effect of Trump’s harsh treatment of migrants – many are returning voluntarily to a country claimed by the opposition to be “unsafe,” while US Homeland Security has even extolled their home country’s recent achievements. And some of Trump’s prominent Cuban-American supporters are now questioning his “maximum pressure” campaign for going too far.

Troubled waters for the Pink Tide

The current progressive wave, the so-called Pink Tide, was initiated by Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s landslide victory in 2018. His MORENA Party successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, won by an even greater margin in 2024. Mexico’s first woman president has proven to be perhaps the world’s most dignified and capable sparring partner with a U.S. president  who has threatened tariffs, deportations, military interventions and more on his southern neighbor. 

Left-leaning presidents Gabriel Boric in Chile and Gustavo Petro in Colombia are limited to single terms. Both have faced opposition-aligned legislatures and deep-rooted reactionary power blocs. Chilean Communist Party candidate Jeanette Jara is favored to make it through their first-round presidential election in November 2025, but will face a challenging final round if the right unifies, as is likely, around an extremist candidate. 

As the first non-rightist in Colombia’s history, Petro has had a tumultuous presidential tenure. He credibly accuses his former foreign minister of colluding with the US to overthrow him. However, the presidency could well revert to the right in the May 2026 elections.

Boric, Petro, Uruguay’s Yamandú Orsi and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva met in July as the region’s center-left presidents, with an agenda of dealing with Trump, promoting multilateralism and keeping their distance from the region’s more left-wing governments. 

With shaky popularity ratings, Lula will likely run for reelection in October 2026. As head of the region’s largest economy, Lula plays a world leadership role, chairing three global summits in a year. Yet with less than majority legislative backing, Lula has triangulated between Washington and the Global South, often capitulating to US interests (as in his veto of BRICS membership for Nicaragua and Venezuela). Regardless, Trump is threatening Brazil with a crippling 50% export tariff and is blatantly interfering in the trial of former right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro, accused of insurrection. So far, Trump’s actions have backfired, arousing anger among Brazilians. Lula commented that Trump was “not elected to be emperor of the world.”

In 2022, Honduran President Xiomara Castro assumed office after being elected in November 2021, inheriting what many observers have described as a narcostate subservient to Washington; she has tried to push the envelope to the left. Being constitutionally restricted to one term, Castro hands the Libre Party candidacy in November’s election to former defense minister Rixi Moncada who faces a tough contest with persistent US interference. 

Bolivia’s ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) Party is locked in a self-destructive internecine clash between former President Evo Morales and his ex-protégé and current President Luis Arce. The energized Bolivian rightwing is spoiling for the August 17th presidential election. 

Israeli infiltration accompanies US military penetration

Analyst Joe Emersberger notes: “Today, all geopolitics relates back to Gaza where the imperial order has been unmasked like never before.” Defying Washington, the Hague Group met in Colombia for an emergency summit on Gaza to “take collective action grounded in international law.” On July 16, regional states – Bolivia, Cuba, Colombia, Nicaragua and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines – endorsed the pledge to take measures in support of Palestine, with other states likely to follow. Brazil will join South Africa’s ICJ complaint against Israel.

At the other end of the political spectrum are self-described “world’s coolest dictator” Nayib Bukele of El Salvador and confederates Javier Milei of Argentina and Daniel Noboa of Ecuador. As well as cozying up to Trump, they devotedly support Israel, which has been instrumental in enabling the most brutal reactionaries in the region. Noboa duly tells Israel’s Netanyahu that they “share the same enemies.”

In February, the US Southern Command warned: “Time is not on our side.” The perceived danger is “methodical incursion” into our “neighborhood” by both Russia and China. Indeed, China has become the region’s second largest trading partner after the US, and even right-wing governments are reluctant to jeopardize their relations with Beijing. The empire’s solution is to “redouble our efforts to nest military engagement,” using humanitarian assistance as “an essential soft power tool.” 

Picking up where Biden left off, Trump has furthered US military penetration, notably in Ecuador, Guyana, Brazil, Panama, and Argentina. The pandemic of narcotics trafficking, itself a product of US-induced demand, has been a Trojan Horse for militarist US intervention in Haiti, Ecuador, Peru, and threatened in Mexico. 

In Panama, President José Mulino’s obeisance to Trump’s ambitions to control the Panama Canal and reduce China’s influence provoked massive protests. Trump’s collaboration in the genocide of Palestinians motivated Petro to declare that Colombia must leave the NATO alliance and keep its distance from “militaries that drop bombs on children.” Colombia had been collaborating with NATO since 2013 and became the only Latin American global partner in 2017. 

Despite Trump’s bluster – what the Financial Times calls “imperial incontinence” – his administration has produced mixed results. While rightist political movements have basked in Trump’s fitful praise, his escalating coercion provokes resentment against Yankee influence. Resistance is growing, with new alliances bypassing Washington. As the empire’s grip tightens, so too does the resolve of those determined to break free from it.

Credit Main Photo: Teri Mattson, Workers’ Summit, Tijuana, at the U.S. Border Wall

Roger D. Harris is with the Task Force on the Americas, the US Peace Council, and the Venezuela Solidarity Network. Nicaragua-based John Perry is with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition and writes for MR Online, the London Review of Books, FAIR and CovertAction, among others.

Photo credit: Reuters.

Conceptual clarity is important in any context but especially when it comes to international relations, foreign policy and the initiation of conflict. Recent events in the Middle East have shown once again how clarity in the use of words is often deliberately obfuscated in pursuit of political agendas.

Unlike what is being reported in the corporate media and by some Western defense officials, the Israeli strike on Iran was not “pre-emptive.” “Pre-emptive” means “a sudden strike thwarting an imminent attack.” That is not the case here. Iran was not about to imminently attack Israel before Israel, and then the US, attacked it. What Israel did was a preventive attack designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear R&D/storage facilities, missile launcher sites and command and control capabilities. The IDF attack focused on preventing and delaying development of Iran’s nuclear strike capability before it reached operational status and was telegraphed in advance (remember the US pulling out embassy staff and military families from facilities in the Middle East in anticipation of an tit-for-tat Iranian response). Both suspected weapons-grade nuclear stores as well as launching platforms were on the target list, as were those responsible for them. The US then followed up with some preventive strikes of its own, using so-called “bunker buster” bombs to penetrate deep into suspected Iranian nuclear development and storage sites. The Iranians responded by lobbing some short and medium-range missiles in the direction of the main US base in Qatar.

Just like his response to October 7 with the ethnic cleansing of Gaza and expansion of illegal settlements in the West Bank, Netanyahu has seized his moment of opportunity because, quite frankly, he can. No one will stop him (certainly not the Iranians) and the US backs him, with most of the West tacitly supporting Israel with their silence or tepid responses to the conflict. This, I suspect, is due to Israel’s value as an intelligence partner of the West as much as any other reason.

The preventive nature and targets of the strikes may have helped moderate the Iranian response. On the other hand, killing the Revolutionary Guard Commander and Deputy Commander is a serious affront that will require a response in order for the Iranian regime to save face among its domestic audiences. So the escalation scenario is real, albeit not as bad as it could be. What is clear is that unlike preemptive attacks, the Israeli and US preventive attacks had no justification in the Laws of War (jus ad bellum) and were therefore illegal under International law. One might understand why the Israelis and US conducted the strikes and there is plenty of precedent for them, but that does not make them legal.

Deliberate conflation of the terms “pre-emptive” with “preventive” by security officials and media is either a product of conceptual ignorance or deliberate obfuscation in pursuit of  legalistic white-washing of a blatant violation of international law. If the latter is true we know why they do it, but that does not mean that we have to accept they’re doing so.

Analysis syndicated by 36th Parallel Assessments –

COHA

On June 29, Radio Negro Primero, a community-based station in Venezuela, and affiliates, will examine the jailing and prosecution of Peru’s constitutional president, Pedro Castillo. The program, Battle of Ideas, hosted by William Camacaro (Senior Analyst for COHA) and Mary Dugarte (Venezuelan Journalist), will feature distinguished panelists: Roger Waters (renowned musician and human rights defender), Lilia Paredes de Castillo (wife of President Castillo), and Walter Ayala (constitutional lawyer and former Minister of Defense for President Pedro Castillo).

Pedro Castillo’s 2021 presidential victory marked a historic shift: a rural schoolteacher and union leader, propelled by Peru’s rural poor, Indigenous communities, and working-class voters, defeated Keiko Fujimori by just over 44,000 votes. Although he won by a narrow margin, his win nevertheless signaled a rupture with Lima’s political elite and a call for reform.

From the outset, his administration was besieged. A right-wing Congress, dominated by Fujimoristas, obstructed his agenda and launched three impeachment attempts in 18 months. Cabinet instability—dozens of ministerial changes in his first year—reflected both internal tensions and external obstructionism.

On December 7, 2022, facing imminent removal, Castillo announced the dissolution of Congress and called for new elections. Lacking institutional support, he was swiftly arrested and charged with rebellion, conspiracy, and abuse of authority. The stakes are high. Prosecutors are seeking a 34-year sentence. After his ouster, Dina Boluarte took office with right-wing backing, unleashing state violence against protesters—predominantly Indigenous and rural—that human rights groups have condemned as serious violations.

Critics argue Castillo’s case exemplifies the weaponization of legal tools to neutralize progressive leadership. For example, the vague constitutional clause of ‘moral incapacity’ was invoked during the impeachment process in lieu of a legitimate legal rationale. Moreover, his legal defenders maintain that his trial, now underway in a highly politicized climate, is marred by procedural irregularities and prolonged detention.

Castillo’s removal reveals the fragility of Peru’s democratic institutions when faced with demands for structural change. This episode also reflects a broader pattern in Latin America: the criminalization of leftist leaders who challenge entrenched power. Castillo’s plight is not just legal—it’s part of an ongoing struggle against oligarchic resistance to a politics of liberation.

Zoon Link: https://mailchi.mp/7dd44aa5e764/peru-pedro-castillo-a-kidnapped-president

By Fred Mills and Evelyn Gonzalez Mills

Silver Spring, MD

Joaquín Domínguez Parada, a renowned Salvadoran attorney and tireless advocate for refugees of war and persecution, passed away on Thursday, June 26, 2025, four days after his 77th birthday in El Salvador, leaving a legacy of love, integrity, and moral courage.  He lived a relatively short period of time in the United States, about ten years, but left an indelible mark on our lives and communities.  

In the 1980’s, at a time when tens of thousands of Central American refugees were being denied asylum and deported back to the violence of civil war, Joaquín stood as a steadfast advocate. Through his tireless efforts, a generation of migrants found not only dignity, protection, and legal defense, but also a voice to fight for their human rights, to end the repression in El Salvador, and to challenge  U.S. intervention in the region.

For those of us in the solidarity movement, Joaquín set a lasting example. He was a guiding light, comrade and friend, advisor and mentor, and a talented artist. He made clear that it was time to assume co-responsibility for the safety of Central American refugees, and to oppose U.S. support for the oligarchic forces in El Salvador responsible for massive human rights violations and the forced displacement of tens of thousands of Salvadorans.

We remember Joaquín not only for his courageous work, but for the moral clarity with which he carried it out. Despite the relentless pressure of adversity and what appeared to be insurmountable odds, he retained a sense of humor and unwavering commitment that inspired others to fight on.

In 1980, Domínguez Parada was among the thousands of Salvadoran refugees who fled the escalating civil violence, settling in Washington DC. In 1981, he joined forces with attorney Patrice Perillie, who had recently graduated from the American University Washington College of Law, to form the non-profit Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN). As co-director, Domínguez Parada provided pro bono legal services to thousands of Central American refugees as part of an intense struggle to stem the tide of deportations perpetrated by the Reagan administration.

As CARECEN launched its legal fight for justice and dignity for refugees, a broad-based solidarity movement—including labor, faith, student, and human rights advocates—mobilized to oppose U.S.-backed wars in Central America. CARECEN not only defended asylum seekers but also pushed for broader immigration reform and an end to U.S. intervention in El Salvador’s civil war, contributing to outcomes like Temporary Protected Status for Salvadorans. Recognizing the  need to expand its urgent mission, CARECEN offices were established in other major cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Houston.

In 1982, on the second anniversary of the assassination of Archbishop Óscar Romero, he participated in a hunger strike in Lafayette Park, alongside other prominent human rights activists, to draw attention to the atrocities being committed both at home and abroad because of U.S. intervention in El Salvador.

Domínguez Parada was a tireless leader in the community. As CARECEN carried forward its vital work on a limited budget, it helped lay the foundation for other essential grassroots initiatives. Among these were the founding of the Central American Refugee Committee (CRECEN)—with Evelyn Gonzalez elected as its first Coordinator—and, in partnership with Plenty International, La Clínica del Pueblo in 1983, where both of us, along with many others, served as volunteers. This free health clinic, established to serve Central American refugees and staffed by volunteer doctors, nurses, and community members, provided a safe and dignified space for medical care. Guided by the classic training manual Donde No Hay Doctor, La Clínica expanded its corps of community health promoters, who became the heart of its mission. To this day, La Clínica remains a beacon of community-based health services.

After the civil war in El Salvador, Domínguez Parada returned home to help rebuild the country’s legal institutions. In 1994 his doctoral thesis titled La ley Simpson-Rodino, consecuencias jurídicas y sociales para los salvadoreños en Estados Unidos (The Simpson-Rodino Law: Legal and Social Consequences for Salvadorans in the United States) was published by the University of El Salvador. He served as a municipal judge in San Salvador, helped implement the city’s first ordinance on minor infractions, and later led the Police Appeals Tribunal, promoting accountability within the post-war Civil National Police. In keeping with his commitment to community, he was a strong advocate for the preservation of the historic Shangri La neighborhood where he used to live.

In March 2025, we had the privilege of visiting Joaquín in San Salvador, sharing moments of reflection on a life devoted to social justice—especially during those harrowing years when so many of our Central American brothers and sisters faced persecution and exile. He expressed a deep serenity in knowing he had given his all to the struggle for human dignity. Joaquin expressed gratitude to his first wife Marta Castrillo, her sister, Carolina, and their mother, Maria Pineda, for their unconditional support and love upon his return to El Salvador.  He reminisced about his late beloved son, Camilo; remembered with much affection his mother, Alicia Ulloa de Dominguez, an elementary school teacher who worked hard to raise her three children after losing her husband; and he evoked his life with Patrice Perillie, his second wife and companion in the struggle for refugee rights. He expressed a heartfelt desire to visit the United States—to learn about CARECEN’s continuing successes, reconnect with old friends, meet the new stewards of its legacy, and once more walk the familiar streets of Columbia Road and Mount Pleasant in Washington, DC.

With Joaquín’s passing, El Salvador and its diaspora has lost one of their most steadfast champions. We ask his family and friends to accept our deepest condolences. We take his legacy to heart as we navigate today’s perilous crossroads. Joaquín’s moral courage in confronting state violence and repression continues to guide our path, especially now, as we witness, in the United States, a campaign of state-sanctioned terror, where masked agents—unidentified and unaccountable—storm homes and workplaces, even court houses, sweeping up immigrants en masse and vanishing them into the machinery of deportation.  In honoring Joaquín Domínguez Parada, we renew our commitment to the world he struggled to bring forth—a world where no human being is illegal, and every sacred life holds the weight and wonder of a universe.

Photo of Joaquín Domínguez Parada: Credit Corolina Castrillo

Photo of Joaquín Domínguez Parada with first wife Marta Castrillo, Maria Pineda, and Carolina Castrillo: Courtesy of  Carolina Castrillo

Banner Photo of Joaquín Domínguez Parada and Patrice Perillie ca. 1981: From Carlos E. Vela Facebook.

Fred Mills is professor of philosophy at Bowie State University and English Language Editor for COHA.

Evelyn Gonzalez Mills is academic counselor at Montgomery College.  She met Joaquín Domínguez Parada and Patrice Perillie in 1981 and became a volunteer receptionist for CARECEN when it first opened. She later served as a board member of CARECEN.

Thomas Hobbes wrote his seminal work Leviathan in 1651. In it he describes the world system as it was then as being in “a state of nature,” something that some have interpreted as anarchy. However, anarchy has order and purpose. It is not chaos. In fact, if we think of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand of the market” we get something similar to what anarchy is in practice: the aggregate of individual acts of self-interest can lead to the optimisation of value and outcomes at the collective level. Anarchy clears; chaos does not.

For Hobbes, the state of nature was chaos. Absent a “Sovereign” (i.e. a government) that could impose order on global and domestic societies, humans were destined to lead lives the were “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” This has translated into notions of “might makes right,” “survival of the fittest,” “to the victor goes the spoils” and other axioms of so-called power politics. The most elaborate of these, international relations realism, is a school of thought that is based on the belief that because the international system has no superseding Sovereign in the form of world government with comprehensive enforcement powers, and because there are no universally shared values and mores throughout the globe community that ideologically bind cultures, groups and individuals, global society exists as a state of nature where, even if there are attempts to manage the relationships between States (and other actors) via rules, norms, institutions and the like, the bottom line is that States (and other actors) have interests, not friends.

Interests are pursued in a context of power differentials. Alliances are temporary and based on the convergence of mutual interests. Values are not universal and so are inconsequential. International exchange is transactional, not altruistic. Actors with greater resources at their disposal (human, natural, intellectual) prevail over those that have less. In case of resource parity between States or other actors, balances of power become systems regulators, but these are fluid and contingent, not permanent. Geography matters in that regard, which is why geopolitics (the relationship of power to geography) is the core of international relations.

It is worth remembering this when evaluating contemporary international relations. It has been well established by now that the liberal international order of the post WW2 era has largely been dismantled in the context of increasing multipolarity in inter-State relations and the rise of the Global South within the emerging order. As I have written before, the long transition and systemic realignment in international affairs has led to norm erosion, rules violations, multinational institutional and international organizational decay or irrelevance and the rise of conflict (be it in trade, diplomacy or armed force) as the new systems regulator.

These developments have accentuated over the last decade and now have a catalyst for a full move into a new global moment–but not into a multipolar or multiplex constellation arrangement in which rising and established powers move between multilateral blocs depending on the issues involved. Instead, the move appears to be one towards a modern Hobbesian state of nature, with the precipitant being the MAGA administration of Donald Trump and its foreign policy approach.

We must be clear that it is not Trump who is the architect of this move. As mentioned in pervious posts, he is an empty vessel consumed by his own self-worth. That makes him a useful tool of far smarter people than he, people who work in the shadow of relative anonymity and who cut their teeth in rightwing think tanks and policy centres. In their view the liberal internationalist order placed too many constraints on the exercise of US power while at the same time requiring the US to over-extend itself as the “world’s policeman” and international aid donor . Bound by international conventions on the one hand and besieged by foreign rent-seekers and adversaries on the other, the US was increasingly bent under the weight of overlapped demands in which existential national interests were subsumed to a plethora of frivolous diversions (such as human rights and democracy promotion).

For these strategists, the solution to the dilemma was not to be found in any new multipolar (or even technopolar) constellation but in a dismantling of the entire edifice of international order, something that was based on an architecture of rules, institutions and norms nearly 500 years in the making. Many have mentioned Trump’s apparent mercantilist inclinations and his admiration for former US president William McKinley’s tariff policies in the late 1890s. Although that may be true, the Trump/MAGA agenda is far broader in scope than trade. In fact, the US had its greatest period of (neo-imperial) expansion during McKinley’s tenure as president (1897-1901), winning the Spanish-American War and annexing Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa and the Philippines, so Trump’s admiration for him may well be based on notions of territorial expansionism as well.

Whatever Trump’s views of McKinley, the basic idea under-riding his foreign policy team’s approach is that in a world where the exercise of power is the ultimate arbiter of a State’s international status, the US remains the greatest Power of them all. It does not matter if the PRC or Russia challenge the US or if other emerging powers join the competition. Without the hobbling effect of its liberal obligations the US can and will dominate them all. This involves trade but also the exercise of raw (neo) imperialist ambitions in places like Greenland, the Panama Canal and even Canada. It involves sidelining the UN, NATO, EU and other international organisations where the US had to share equal votes with lesser powers who flaunted the respect and tribute that should naturally be given in recognition of the US’s superior power base.

There appears to be a belief in this approach that the US can be a new hegemon–but not Sovereign–in a unipolar world, even more so than during the post-USSR-pre 9/11 interregnum. In a new state of nature it can sit at the core of the international system, orbited by constellations of lesser Great Powers like the PRC, Russia, the EU, perhaps India, who in turn would be circled by lesser powers of various stripes. The US will not seek to police the world or waste time and resources on well-meaning but ultimately futile soft power exercises like those involving foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. Its power projection will be sharp on all dimensions, be it trade, diplomacy or in military-security affairs. It will use leverage, intimidation and varying degrees of coercion as well as persuasion (and perhaps even bribery) as diplomatic tools. It will engage the world primarily in bilateral fashion, eschewing multilateralism for others to pursue according to their own interests and power capabilities. That may suit them, but for the US multilateralism is just another obsolescent vestige of the liberal internationalist past.

Source: Northrop-Grumman.

A possible (and partial) explanation for the change in the US foreign policy approach may be the learning effect in the US of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s scorched earth campaign in Gaza. Trump and his advisors may have learned that impunity has its own rewards, that no country or group of countries other than the US (if it has the will) can effectively confront a state determined to pursue its interests regardless of international law, the laws of war or institutional censorship (say, by the UN or International Criminal Court), or any other type of countervailing power. The Russians and Israelis have gotten away with their behaviour because, all rhetoric and hand-wringing aside, there is no actor or group of actors who have the will or capability to stop them. For Trump strategists, these lesser powers are pursuing their interests regardless of diplomatic niceties and international conventions, and they are prevailing precisely because of that. Other than providing military assistance to Ukraine, no one has lifted a serious finger against the Russians other than the Ukrainians themselves, and even fewer have seriously moved to confront Israel’s now evident ethnic cleansing campaign in part because the US has backed Israel unequivocally. The exercise of power in each case occurred in a norm enforcement vacuum in spite of the plethora of agencies and institutions designed to prevent such egregious violations of international standards.

Put another way: if Israel and Russia can get away with their disproportionate and indiscriminate aggression, imagine what the US can do.

If we go on to include the PRC’s successful aggressive military “diplomacy” in East/SE Asia, the use of targeted assassinations, hacking, disinformation and covert direct influence campaigns overseas by various States and assorted other unpunished violations of international conventions, then it is entirely plausible that Trump’s foreign policy brain trust sees the moment as ripe for finally breaking the shackles of liberal internationalism. Also recall that many in Trump’s inner circle subscribe to chaos or disruption theory, in which a norms-breaking “disruptor” like Trump seizes the opportunities presented by the breakdown of the status quo ante.

Before the US could hollow out liberal internationalism abroad and replace it with a modern international state of nature it had to crush liberalism at home. Using Executive Orders as a bludgeon and with a complaint Republican-dominated Congress and Republican-adjacent federal courts. the Trump administration has openly exercised increasingly authoritarian control powers with the intention of subjugating US civil society to its will. Be it in its deportation policies, rollbacks of civil rights protections, attacks on higher education, diminishing of federal government capacity and services (except in the security field), venomous scapegoating of opponents and vulnerable groups, the Trump/MAGA domestic agenda not only seeks to turn the US into a illiberal or “hard” democracy (what Spanish language scholars call a “democradura” as a play on words mixing the terms democracia and dura (hard)). It also serves notice that the US under Trump/MAGA is willing to do whatever is necessary to re-impose its supremacy in world affairs, even if it means hurting its own in order to prove the point. By its actions at home Trump’s administration demonstrates capability, intent and steadfast resolve as it establishes a reputation for ruthless pursuit of its policy agenda. Foreign interlocutors will have to take note of this and adjust accordingly. Hence, for Trump’s advisors, authoritarianism at home is the first step towards undisputed supremacy abroad.

The Trump embrace of international state of nature differs from Hobbes because it does not see the need for a superseding global governance network but instead believes that the US can dominate the world without the encumbrances of power-sharing with lesser players. In this view hegemony means domination, no more or less. It implies no attempt at playing the role of a Sovereign imposing order on a disorderly and recalcitrant community of Nation-States and non-State actors that do not share common values, much less interests.

This is the core of the current US foreign policy approach. It is not about reorganising the international order within the extant frameworks as given. It is about removing those frameworks entirely and replacing them with an America First, go it alone agenda where the US, by virtue of its unrivalled power differential relative to all other States and global actors, can maximise its self-interest in largely unconstrained fashion. Some vestiges of the old international order may remain, but they will be marginalised and crippled the longer the US project is in force.

What does not seem to be happening in Trump’s foreign policy circle are three things. First, recognition that other States and international actors may band together against the US move to unipolarity in a new state of nature and that for all its talk the US may not be able to impose unipolar dominance over them. Second, understanding that States like the PRC, Russia and other Great Powers and communities (like the EU) may resist the US move and challenge it before it can consolidate the new international status quo. Third, foreseeing that the technology titans who today are influential in the Trump administration may decide to transfer there loyalties elsewhere, especially if Trump’s ego starts becoming a hindrance to their (economic and digital) power bases. The fusion of private technology control and US State power may not be as compatible over time as presently appears to be the case, something that may not occur with States such as the PRC, India or Japan that have different corporate cultures and political structures. As the current investment in the Middle Eastern oligarchies shows, the fusion of State and private techno power may be easier to accomplish in those contexts rather than the US.

In any event, whether it be a short-term interlude or a longue durée feature of international life, a modern state of nature is now our new global reality.

Analysis syndicated by 36th Parallel Assessments –

By Tamanisha J. John

Toronto, Canada

Introduction

The Caribbean region is an important geostrategic location for the United States, not only due to regional proximity, but also due to the continued importance of securing sea routes for trade and military purposes. It is the geostrategic location of the Caribbean that has historically made the region a target for domineering empires and states. As both geopolitical site and geostrategic location, U.S. foreign policy articulations of Caribbean people and the region have been effectively contradictory, but the contradiction has allowed the U.S. to maintain its hegemonic position: Caribbean peoples in U.S. foreign policy are rendered backwards, unstable, and dangerous or targets of xenophobic harassment; while the physical region is rendered as a place where U.S. foreign policy must maintain one-sided power relations, lest these sites come under the influence of other states that the U.S. views as impinging upon its sphere of influence. One can most readily look to Haiti to see these contradictory dynamics at play. Haiti has not had democratic elections for two decades and instead has been under United Nations (UN) sanctioned “tutelage” or occupation via the CORE group, of which the U.S. is a part.^[i] Over the past two decades, Haiti has been subject to a massive influx of U.S. manufactured weapons that fuel gun violence and murder in the country.^[ii] Meanwhile those Haitians fleeing this violence to the U.S. have been met with whips at the U.S.-Mexico border, deportation flights from the U.S., and dehumanizing mythological hysteria accusing Hatians of  “eating pets.”^[iii]

Given the domineering impact of the U.S. and its allies in Canada and Europe in the Caribbean region, states in the region remain deeply dependent on foreign investment and tourism from these powers. ‘Foreignization’ of Caribbean economies makes it hard for the peoples of the region to make a living. Many Caribbean governments, neoliberal in orientation, willingly support this dependent development scheme by promoting migration for remittances, service industries for tourism, and temporary foreign worker schemes abroad due to lack of worthwhile opportunities at home. A large part of what maintains this dependent relationship—that many would find to be demeaning in most circumstances—is the securitization of the Caribbean region by the U.S. and its allies, as well as the invocation of “shared cultures,” rooted in colonial histories which continue to impose multiple hierarchies of domination on Caribbean peoples.

Washington’s aim of permanent hegemony in the region is being challenged by an increasingly multipolar world, and this accounts for the US attempt to limit China’s influence in the Caribbean. For example, U.S. tariff assaults on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stems from U.S. insecurities about China’s economic growth alongside its manufacturing and technological developments.^[iv] China’s extension of infrastructural, technological, and other tangible material developments to states lower down on the global value chain, and at smaller costs to them is referred to by the U.S. and other western policy makers as “China’s growing influence.” This includes states in the Caribbean, which have not only become consumers of products from China but have also increased their exports to China since the 2010s. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. fears that China is gaining too much influence in the Caribbean given its developmental hand there. Although the U.S. is not directly competing with China on development initiatives, Washington’s reluctance to support meaningful progress in the Caribbean—where U.S. corporations continue to profit from structural underdevelopment—has led it to pursue strong-arm diplomacy as a symbolic stand against China instead.

China’s alternative to dependent development challenges Western Hegemony in the Caribbean

Western capitalist modernity, as an ideological, political, and socioeconomic project, is threatened by improvements to the global value chain. The issue at hand is that the U.S. and the Western-led capitalist system have long relegated states of the ‘Global South’ to lower positions on the global value chain. This has rendered development elusive for many states, to the sole benefit of Western corporations and their allies. Lack of development in places like the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Latin America actually benefits capitalist enterprises headquartered in the ‘Global North’ which extract surplus value by exploiting cheap natural resources, labor, and land in these regions. China’s accelerated advancement within the global value chain—alongside the rise of other partner states positioned lower on that chain—has not depended on economic or political subordination to the west. This trajectory is actively interpreted as eroding Western hegemonic dominance—even as the improved developments of states like China within the global value chain, have expanded global capitalism. Since 2018, the U.S. tariff assault on China, which has intensified under the second Trump administration, is a direct response to China’s economic growth propelled by China’s added value to the global value chain. In essence, the fear is China’s rise, while not reliant on the west, has made the West more reliant on importing cheap products and manufactured goods from China.

After the global 2007/8 financial crisis, China’s expressed strategy was to diversify its exports and import markets through helping other states improve their own conditions in the global trade value system. This of course, was due to the negative impacts felt by China in its export markets from the 2008 global financial crisis. Since then, China has increased the internal demand within China for Chinese goods, which also saw the purchasing power of Chinese citizens rise. This helped the growth of a middle class in China, and also allowed the Communist Party of China (CPC) to think more broadly about its continued growth strategy. By the early 2010s China sought to develop a wider external market that was not dependent on the U.S. and the other Western states. As China began formulating a broader development strategy, the growing purchasing power of Chinese citizens made the U.S. and other Western countries increase demands on China to have unfettered access to China’s internal market. The 2010s thus became rife with false accusations by Western commentators of China manipulating its currency to amass reserve wealth, and maintain competitive exports^[v] – which helped to spark Trump’s trade assault on China in 2018, and again during the second Trump administration in 2025.

While conversations in the West hinged on conspiracy, the CPC acknowledged that neither internal consumption nor reliance on the U.S. and Western markets would promote long-term sustainable development and growth of China’s economy. Greater emphasis was placed on increasing and improving relations with other developing states. In essence, helping the development of states lower down on the global value chain would be necessary—in order to make them consumers (thus importers)—of products from China. This became part of China’s long-term strategy to diversify its import and export markets. Thus, after the 2008 global financial crisis and especially after 2010, China’s investment in places like the Caribbean had a marked and noticeable increase. A decade later, this strategy has proven beneficial to China’s growth and development – as well as to growth and development of other developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean with more states engaging in, and pursuing trade and other relations with, China.

The impact of U.S. tariffs and fees on the Caribbean

Despite growing U.S. security concerns over China’s engagement in the Caribbean, the region remains largely dependent on the United States, and Caribbean states consistently run trade deficits in favor of the U.S. These trade deficits usually come at the expense of local Caribbean growers, producers, and artisans. According to Sir Ronald Sanders, Antigua and Barbuda’s Ambassador to the United States: “In 2024, the United States ran a $5.8 billion trade surplus with CARICOM as a whole. For a tangible illustration, Antigua and Barbuda’s imports from the U.S. exceeded $570 million, while its exports in return were a mere fraction of that total.”^[vi] Given Caribbean regional economic dependence on the U.S., Canada and Europe, many Caribbean people seeking employment and/or asylum opportunities typically see the U.S. as a destination of choice, contributing to the large Caribbean diasporic communities in North America and Europe. These Caribbean diasporic communities not only send remittances and goods back to their home countries to support family, friends, and communities – but also facilitate Caribbean state’s exports into the U.S. It is important to underscore these dynamics, as the longstanding U.S.-Caribbean relationship—rooted in dependency—remains firmly entrenched, despite growing investments in the region from China.

The U.S. tariff assault on China extended into a wider tariff assault by the U.S. against multiple countries, including states in the Caribbean. By April 3, 2025 the U.S. had imposed tariffs on 24 Caribbean countries: a 10% tariff on 23 of them,^[vii] and a 38% tariff on Guyana^[viii]—a Caribbean nation with extensive relations with China^[ix]—excluding its exports of oil (dominated by U.S. and other foreign corporations), gold, and bauxite. The U.S. tariffs on Caribbean states—levied amid fragile post-pandemic recovery and lingering hurricane damage—underscores a troubling, though not surprising indifference to the region’s economic vulnerability and ongoing efforts toward stabilization and renewal.^[x] During this time, the U.S. introduced a series of tariff increases on China, peaking at a 145% tariff after April 10, 2025, before settling on a 10% rate through an agreement reached on May 13, 2025.^[xi] In addition to the tariffs that Washington placed on China, the U.S. also announced that it would issue port fees on Chinese built ships entering U.S. ports. In all, these tariffs and fees being imposed by the U.S. meant that there would likely be negative impacts borne by Caribbean states that import U.S. goods, and Caribbean states that export goods to China. The overall impact of the tariffs and fees would be two-fold: First, U.S. consumers of goods imported from the Caribbean would have to pay more to access those goods. Second, increased costs accrued to Caribbean state’s importing U.S. goods due to port fees, would make it more cost effective for those Caribbean states to import more goods directly from China. However, in the immediate term, Sino-Caribbean trade, lacking established relationships on a wide range of import products, has the potential to lead to import shortages – particularly of food and other essential imports from the U.S.—in the Caribbean. Given global backlash from the shipping industry, the U.S. revised and changed its decision regarding port fees a week later,^[xii] and three weeks later, on April 28, it reduced the tariff on Guyana to 10%.

Political commentators recognize, contrary to the denials by the Guyanese government, that the initially high tariffs placed on Guyana were motivated by U.S. tensions with China. According to former Guyanese diplomat, Dr. Shamir Ally,^[xiii] and Guyanese political commentator, Francis Bailey, Guyana “is caught in a geopolitical battle between the US and China. Or more specifically – Washington objects to Beijing’s “very strong foothold” in Guyana.”^[xiv] This was made clear, when prior to the Trump administration’s announcement of the tariff’s on Guyana, Guyanese President, Irfaan Ali, pledged that the U.S. would “have some different and preferential treatment” from Guyana^[xv]— given a shared stance between the two countries in relation to Venezuela.^[xvi] This pledge by Guyana’s president took place within the context of the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to the Caribbean, during which Rubio chastised the construction of infrastructure in Guyana that he deemed subpar, and alleged must have been built by China, even though it was not.^[xvii] These kinds of geopolitical posturing by Washington stoke antagonisms, ignoring the negative impacts of Caribbean dependency, including that of Guyana. Caribbean economic dependency on the U.S. (Europe and Canada) will not be completely ameliorated by China, and neither will China be able to fill the role of the West for Caribbean exporters who, given histories of enslavement, indentureship, and colonialism, rely on diasporic taste and preferences for ‘niche’ exports (e.g., artisan goods, arts, entertainment). Given the high degree of U.S., Canadian, and European ownership in the Caribbean’s industrial and manufacturing sectors, the region’s capacity to produce “finished products” on an exportable scale remains limited. Despite the continued dependency relation of Caribbean states on U.S. markets, however, China can positively impact Caribbean economies by helping to diversify their trading partners, and by increasing local opportunities for people within Caribbean states, based on the kinds of new (or improved) infrastructure typically developed in partnerships with China.

Though on the rise, the trade relationship between China and states in the Caribbean is still quite limited. Caribbean states that are a part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) saw a notable increase in their exports to China, from less than 1% of their total exports in the 1990s and 2000s, to between 1% and 6 % of exports going to China after the 2010s.^[xviii] The majority of exports from the Caribbean to China from the 2010s forward have been agricultural and mineral in nature. Alongside the growing export potential of CARICOM states to China since the 2010s, there has also been an increase in Caribbean states importing Chinese goods. States such as Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname import about 10% of their goods from China. On the other hand, states like the Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago import less than 10% of their goods from China. The overall trend, then, is that CARICOM states have added some diversification to their trading partners since the 2010s but continue to remain firmly within the Western trading bloc. Given the structured dependency of Caribbean economies, they tend to import more from their trading partners than they export to them. However, as political analyst Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba points out, as a trading partner, China’s commitment to South-South partnerships has meant that trading disparities between itself and CARICOM states are “offset by investments flowing from China to the Caribbean […] broadly categorized into three key sectors: port infrastructure development, resource extraction, and the tourism industry.”^[xix] This way of tending to the trade disparity has had beneficial impacts—that can also be seen very visibly by those who live and visit states in the Caribbean. Additionally, China’s investments have not been limited to CARICOM states, or to states that recognize China and not Taiwan. For instance, China invests in Belize, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines—these are Caribbean states that recognize Taiwan.^[xx]

While China does not play a dominant import-export role in the Caribbean, given the system of dependency into which the Caribbean is already integrated, it also does not pose a security threat to the Caribbean region, despite Washington’s portrayal of China as a “bad actor.” The PRCs commitment to non-interference makes it extremely unlikely that China would use the Caribbean as a springboard for a security confrontation with Washington and its NATO allies. China does, however, have a strategic partnership with Venezuela, largely limited to a defensive posture given its relations with other states in the region, including the Caribbean. Further, with the large security presence of the U.S. and its allies in the Caribbean, China would have nothing to gain from an offensive military posture in the region. Though self-evident, this explains why the U.S has chosen to frame China’s presence in the Caribbean not in economic terms, but as a technological and geopolitical “threat”—going so far, on multiple occasions, as to allege that China is constructing covert surveillance facilities in Cuba to conduct espionage on the U.S.^[xxi]

The China-Caribbean “threat” from the U.S. Perspective

In 2018, Washington signaled its intent to limit Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy, and technology abroad; by 2023, U.S. Southern Command identified the Caribbean as a key region where China’s growing economic footprint should be restrained. In its effort to push China out of the Caribbean tech sector, the U.S. has allowed U.S. and other Western companies to develop 5G networks in Jamaica at virtually no cost in the short term—effectively subsidizing the infrastructure to block Chinese involvement and investments in the sector. This campaign has gone so far as to include veiled threats of sanctions toward Jamaica and other regional nations should they pursue connectivity projects with China.^[xxii] Since the 1940s, the U.S. has viewed government-controlled economies as threats to the Western capitalist order—a label that readily applies to China. In 2025, the trade offensive against China is markedly more severe, driven by Washington’s explicit goal of curbing the spread and stalling the advancement of China’s high-tech industries—an effort aimed at preserving U.S. dominance in the sector, which is increasingly seen as under threat. The trade war, which began openly during Trump’s first term, has only intensified in his second—driven in part by the growing influence of high-tech capitalists closely aligned with his administration. China’s advances in artificial intelligence, seen with the public release of DeepSeek AI, has only accelerated the U.S. assault.

According to  U.S. and other pro-Western security analysts who view China as a “threat” in the Caribbean, this threat manifests in three primary ways. First, they point to China’s development of internet-based infrastructure in Caribbean nations which they claim enables Chinese espionage operations that target the U.S. from within the region. Second, they highlight the fact that most Caribbean states recognize the People’s Republic of China, rather than Taiwan, under the One-China policy—a position they attribute to questionable dealings with Beijing, rather than to the exercise of Caribbean political agency in matters of state recognition. And lastly, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is portrayed as a nefarious development scheme that allows China to assert its influence globally. Notably, these accusations that form the “threat” narrative amongst U.S. and other pro-Western security advocates don’t hold up against the slightest scrutiny.

First, there is no evidence that there are “Chinese spy bases” in Cuba or in any other country in the Caribbean—despite these accusations being levied by both Trump White Houses, and various U.S. Republican politicians in Florida.^[xxiii] Second, the PRC does invest in, and maintain diplomatic relations with, Caribbean states that recognize Taiwan.^[xxiv]  This suggests that the PRC does not force a One-China policy on states in the Caribbean with which it has cooperative relations. Commenting on Sino-Caribbean relations, Caribbean leaders themselves often note that the recognition of China and not Taiwan is due to support for China safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, of which they include national reunification.^[xxv] Ultimately, the alleged “nefarious” nature of the Belt and Road Initiative stems from its core premise: that developing countries receive meaningful support from China to pursue their own development goals. Such efforts inevitably draw scrutiny from the U.S. and the Westbroadly, as genuine development in the ‘Global South’ is often perceived as a challenge to Western capital and hegemony. The BRI also encourages signatory states to build greater regional relationships with their Caribbean neighbors. It reflects a highly agentic approach, in stark contrast to the traditional way U.S. and other Western initiatives are typically implemented.

Ultimately, the BRI is seen as a threat by Western policymakers because they would prefer China not pursue its own global initiatives. Given that the BRI also supports states in developing technological infrastructure and other advancements—with backing from China—these efforts are viewed by the U.S. as a strategic threat, ensuring the initiative will remain a target of sustained opposition. In the Caribbean, the U.S. push to end their tech relations with China comes off as brash, given that U.S. technology investments in the region have declined since the mid-1990s, while China technology investments have increased.^[xxvi] In fact, the U.S. (and its Western allies) seem to only understand China’s investments, including the BRI, as lost market share. In essence, Washington and its Western allies seek to control economic development in the region. Two years ago for COHA, John (2023) argued that the U.S. and its allies were increasing their “diplomatic” presence in the Caribbean to maintain geostrategic influence, given China’s growing economic investments there.^[xxvii] John maintained that the dismal track record of capitalism—led first by the Western European powers and later by the United States—has entrenched Caribbean states in a position of structural dependency within the global capitalist system. Key features of this dependency include persistently high levels of unemployment, underemployment, poverty, and a heavy reliance on labor exportation. This dependence made the region very receptive to Chinese investment.

John (2023) concluded that influence is gained only where it aligns with local interests—and that investments from the PRC stood in stark contrast to Western strategies, which for decades have indebted Caribbean states, privatized their economies in ways that deepened foreign control, and consistently disregarded regional calls for reparations. This track record, it was argued, would only lead to increased militarization in the Caribbean by the U.S. and its Western allies, who have no tangible goal of helping Caribbean states to develop—but want confrontation with China. Two years later and the concluding remarks still stand.

Concluding Remarks: Dependent Development is the price of Western Capitalism in the Caribbean

In the Caribbean, the U.S. and its Western allies have long profited from—and perpetuated—the notion that foreignization is the norm. This extends beyond economic structures to encompass both domestic and foreign policies that effectively surrender the state, and its people, to massive  exploitation by foreigners. Some governments and local elites have been brought on as “shareholders” to maintain this backwards dependent status. That is because imperialism, especially in the Caribbean, has always been intent on establishing what Cheddi Jagan called “a reactionary axis in the Caribbean.”^[xxviii] U.S. ‘influence in the Caribbean region has historically centered around controlling the “backwardness” and “unstableness” of its people, in order to keep U.S. geostrategic and geopolitical interests intact. This is done in conjunction with Caribbean political elites, who subject their own Caribbean populations in perpetual servitude to Western capital. Caribbean neoliberal states have a disregard for the rights of their citizens (and diaspora), favoring almost exclusively (and predominantly) Western foreign corporations and wealthy individuals. Cuba, however, stands out as an exception to this trend, and this is why it has been under relentless attack by Washington for more than 62 years.  It is important to point this out, given that some in the Caribbean political elite classes also share the same regressive rhetoric from the Westabout the “threat of China” to produce reactionary mindsets and views amongst large swaths of Caribbean people— so that their hand in maintaining Caribbean dependency is not critiqued.

Caribbean people struggling to improve their societies for the better are continuously warned by the U.S. and its Western and Caribbean allies that they must maintain themselves in a dependent position. The truth is: So long as the majority of individual Caribbean states are importing finished products and agricultural goods from the U.S., Canada, and Europe—and to a smaller extent now China—the Caribbean will never have trade surpluses with these states. Lack of local businesses and the foreignization of Caribbean economies compound this contradiction that is perpetuated by the entrenched Western-led economic system. Political elites in the Caribbean frequently disregard local protests and locally developed alternatives that could threaten Western foreign corporations and investment. There is a real need for enhanced regional integration for Caribbean people, not only states, to improve their lot within the prevailing system. People will continuously be let down by formations like CARICOM, so long as these associations are dominated by Western development frameworks and have individual member states who care more about aligning their security interests with the West instead of their own region. While neoliberalism in the Caribbean is often attributed to structural constraints and the limited capacity of states to regulate foreign capital, such explanations fail to account for the extent to which Caribbean governments have themselves normalized and actively advanced neoliberal policy frameworks. The promotion of neoliberal policies both prolongs, and makes systemic, foreign dependence and domination.

U.S. fear mongering about China in the Caribbean is propaganda. It only serves to prevent people from questioning why Caribbean states are dependent and why there is rampant foreignization of Caribbean economies. Who owns these corporate entities that make life hard in the Caribbean? The “threats” from the U.S. perspective boil down to the fact that China, in the Caribbean, is taking advantage of Western policies that make the Caribbean exploitable. It is often noted—and indeed observable—that China imports its own labor for development projects in the Caribbean. However, this practice is neither new nor unique; countries such as the United States, Canada, and various European powers have long employed similar strategies. Understandably, this reliance on imported labor has generated frustration among Caribbean populations, particularly given the region’s high levels of unemployment and underemployment. Many local workers are both willing and able to acquire the necessary skills and trades to work on infrastructure and development projects that come to the region. Local Caribbean firms and entrepreneurs would also seize the opportunity to participate in these projects—including local sourcing of materials. But this beneficial type of development is not presently feasible given how Western capitalists have integrated Caribbean states into the global capitalist system.

The efforts of the Trump administration to cast China as a security threat in the Caribbean and to portray doing business with China as a security risk, have largely been unsuccessful. In the Caribbean, China simply takes advantage of Western policies that have made the region highly favorable and open to foreign investment, foreign entrepreneurs, and government dealings—in the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Letters of Agreement (LOA)—with other states and corporations. The acceptance of these MOUs and LOAs receive minimal, to no input from Caribbean citizens. Debt traps have been normalized in the Caribbean by the Western capitalist system, making the Caribbean one of the most highly indebted regions in the world. Today, propagandists tend to invoke the myth of the  “Chinese debt-trap” to attribute to China this false label of being engaged in “debt trap diplomacy”—a term popularized in 2018 during the first trade assault against China.^[xxix] In response to this myth, progressive commentators tend to highlight that China forgives a lot of debt, and has even helped Caribbean states to restructure debts owed to various financial institutions.^[xxx] However, the biggest elephant in the room is that even if China ceased to exist in the Caribbean region, the region would still be one of the most indebted within the Western capitalist system. The debt-trap narrative not only deflects attention from the significant role Western powers have played in producing Caribbean indebtedness, but also unjustly shifts the burden onto China to forgive obligations for which Western capital is responsible.^[xxxi] Lack of transparency in investment agreements and investor tax benefits, including profit repatriation, in the Caribbean has been normalized by laws first written by various European empires and later by Western capitalists that crafted structural adjustment policies. Yet, such arrangements, historically established by U.S. and Canadian capital interests, are often rebranded as evidence of corruption within the China–Caribbean relationship. Those concerned with the persistence of Caribbean dependency should critically engage with its structural causes and actively challenge Western propaganda regardless of the source from which it emanates.

Endnotes

[i] Pierre, Jemima. 2020. “Haiti: An Archive of Occupation, 2004-.” Transforming Anthropology 28(1): 3–23. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/traa.12174.

[ii] Kestler-D’Amours, Jillian. “‘A Criminal Economy’: How US Arms Fuel Deadly Gang Violence in Haiti.” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2024. web: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2024/3/25/a-criminal-economy-how-us-arms-fuel-deadly-gang-violence-in-haiti.

[iii] Mack, Willie. Haitians at the Border: The Nativist State and Anti-Blackness. Carr-Ryan Commentary. Harvard Kennedy School, 2025. web: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr-ryan/our-work/carr-ryan-commentary/haitians-border-nativist-state-and-anti-blackness.

[iv] Ziye, Chen, and Bin Li. “Escaping Dependency and Trade War: China and the US.” China Economist 18, no. 1 (2023): 36–44.

[v] Wiseman, Paul. “Fact Check: Does China Manipulate Its Currency?” PBS News, December 29, 2016. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/fact-check-china-manipulate-currency.

[vi] Loop News. “More Caribbean Countries Respond to New US Tariffs,” April 4, 2025, sec. World News. https://www.loopnews.com/content/more-caribbean-countries-respond-to-new-us-tariffs/.

[vii] TEMPO Networks. “Here Are All The Caribbean Countries Hit By Trump’s New Tariffs.” Tempo Networks, April 3, 2025, sec. News. https://www.temponetworks.com/2025/04/03/here-are-all-the-caribbean-countries-hit-by-trumps-new-tariffs/.

[viii] Grannum, Milton. “Oil, Bauxite, Gold Exempt from US Tariff.” Stabroek News, April 4, 2025, sec. Guyana News. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/04/04/news/guyana/oil-bauxite-gold-exempt-from-us-tariff/.

[ix] Handy, Gemma. “Was China the Reason Guyana Faced Higher Trump Tariff?” BBC, April 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjeww5zq88no.

[x] John, Tamanisha J. 2024. “Hurricane Unpreparedness in the Caribbean, Disaster by Imperial Design.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). The Caribbean. https://coha.org/hurricane-unpreparedness-in-the-caribbean-disaster-by-imperial-design/.

[xi] Grantham-Philips, Wyatte. “A Timeline of Trump’s Tariff Actions so Far.” PBS News, April 10, 2025, sec. Economy. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/a-timeline-of-trumps-tariff-actions-so-far.

[xii] Saul, Jonathan, Lisa Baertlein, David Lawder, and Andrea Shalal. “United States Eases Port Fees on China-Built Ships after Industry Backlash.” Reuters, April 17, 2025, sec. Markets. https://www.reuters.com/markets/global-shippers-await-word-us-plan-hit-china-linked-vessels-with-port-fees-2025-04-17/.

[xiii] Credible Sources interview on February 26, 2025. Guyana in U.S.-China Crossfire? Ex-Diplomat Weighs In, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtCNBiKdj-0

[xiv] Handy, Gemma. “Was China the reason Guyana faced higher Trump tariff?” BBC, April 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjeww5zq88no.

[xv] Chabrol, Denis. “Guyana Pledges ‘Preferential’ Treatment to US.” Demerara Waves, March 27, 2025, sec. Business, Defence, Diplomacy. https://demerarawaves.com/2025/03/27/guyana-pledges-preferential-treatment-to-us/.

[xvi] John, Tamanisha J. “Guyana, Beware the Western Proxy-State Trap.” Stabroek News, December 25, 2023, sec. In The Diaspora. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2023/12/25/features/in-the-diaspora/guyana-beware-the-Western-proxy-state-trap/.

[xvii] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun’s Regular Press Conference on April 3, 2025. Beijing Says That Road in Guyana Criticised by Rubio Is Not Built by China, 2025. https://youtu.be/6gljwDyW1qk?si=2QXhDUythljBsIcJ.

[xviii] Morales Ruvalcaba, Daniel. 2025. “National Power in Sino-Caribbean Relations: CARICOM in the Geopolitics of the Belt and Road Initiative.” Chinese Political Science Review 10: 28–48. doi: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-024-00252-4.

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Ibid. 

[xxi] Qi, Wang. “Hyping Chinese ‘spy Bases’ in Cuba Slander; Shows US’ Hysteria: Expert.” Global Times, July 3, 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1315376.shtml.

[xxii] Pate, Durrant. “US Warns Jamaica against Chinese 5g.” Jamaica Observer, October 25, 2020. https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2020/10/25/us-warns-jamaica-against-chinese-5g/.

[xxiii] Belly of the Beast. Investigative Report. May 30, 2025. Big Headlines, No Proof: Inside the Hype Over “Chinese Spy Bases”  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF87JJp8WIo

[xxiv] Bayona Velásquez, Etna. “Chinese Economic Presence in the Greater Caribbean, 2000-2020.” In Chinese Presence in the Greater Caribbean: Yesterday and Today, 599–661. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Centro de Estudios Caribeños (PUCMM), 2022.

[xxv] Loop news. “T&T, Caribbean countries pledge support for One China policy.” May 6, 2022. https://www.loopnews.com/content/tt-caribbean-countries-pledge-support-for-one-china-policy/

[xxvi] Ricart Jorge, Raquel. “China’s Digital Silk Road in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Real Instituto Elcano, April 21, 2021, sec. Latin America. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/commentaries/chinas-digital-silk-road-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

[xxvii] John, Tamanisha J. 2023. “US Moves to Curtail China’s Economic Investment in the Caribbean.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). https://coha.org/us-moves-to-curtail-chinas-economic-investment-in-the-caribbean/.

[xxviii] Jagan, Cheddi. “Alternative Models of Caribbean Economic Development and Industrialisation.” In Caribbean Economic Development and Industrialisation, 3 (1):1–23. Hungary: Development and Peace, 1980. https://jagan.org/CJ%20Articles/In%20Opposition/Images/3014.pdf.

[xxix] Chandran, Rama. “The Chinese “Debt Trap” Is a Myth.” China Focus, August 26, 2022,  http://www.cnfocus.com/the-chinese-debt-trap-is-a-myth/

[xxx] Hancock, Tom. “China renegotiated $50bn in loans to developing countries: Study challenges ‘debt-trap’ narrative surrounding Beijin’s lending.” Financial Times, April 29, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/0b207552-6977-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d

[xxxi] Kaiwei, Zhang and Xian Jiangnan. “So-called “debt trap” a Western rhetorical trap.” China International Communications Group (CN) , September 14, 2024, https://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0914/c90000-20219659.html

Featured image: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (centre) poses for a group photograph with representatives from the Caribbean countries that share diplomatic relations with China, May 12, 2025, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Beijing
(Source: Chinese State Media)

Tamanisha J. John is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics at York University and a member of the US/NATO out of Our Americas Network zoneofpeace.org/ 

Original article: https://cispes.org/article/resistance-mining-grows-environmentalists%E2%80%99-trial-approaches

By John Perry and Roger D. Harris

Migration, Drugs, and Tariffs.

With Donald Trump as the new US president, pundits are speculating about how US policy towards Latin America might change.

In this article, we look at some of the speculation, then address three specific instances of how the US’s policy priorities may be viewed from a progressive, Latin American perspective. This leads us to a wider argument: that the way these issues are dealt with is symptomatic of Washington’s paramount objective of sustaining the US’s hegemonic position. In this overriding preoccupation, its policy towards Latin America is only one element, of course, but always of significance because the US hegemon still treats the region as its “backyard.”

First, some examples of what the pundits are saying. In Foreign Affairs, Brian Winter argues that Trump’s return signals a shift away from Biden’s neglect of the region. “The reason is straightforward,” he says. “Trump’s top domestic priorities of cracking down on unauthorized immigration, stopping the smuggling of fentanyl and other illicit drugs, and reducing the influx of Chinese goods into the United States all depend heavily on policy toward Latin America.”

Ryan Berg, who is with the thinktank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, funded by the US defense industry, is also hopeful. Trump will “focus U.S. policy more intently on the Western Hemisphere,” he argues, “and in so doing, also shore up its own security and prosperity at home.”

According to blogger James Bosworth, Biden’s “benign neglect” could be replaced by an “aggressive Monroe Doctrine – deportations, tariff wars, militaristic security policies, demands of fealty towards the US, and a rejection of China.” However, notwithstanding the attention of Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, Bosworth thinks there is still a good chance of policy lapsing into benign neglect as the new administration focuses elsewhere.

The wrong end of the telescope

What these and similar analyses share is a concern with problems of importance to the US, including domestic ones, and how they might be tackled by shifts in policy towards Latin America. They view the region from the end of a US-mounted telescope.

Trump’s approach may be the more brazen “America first!,” but the basic stance is much the same as these pundits. The different scenarios will be worked out in Washington, with Latin America’s future seen as shaped by how it handles US policy changes over which it has little influence. Analyses by these supposed experts are constrained by their adopting the same one-dimensional perspective as Washington’s, instead of questioning it.

Here’s one example. The word “neglect” is superficial because it hides the immense involvement of the US in Latin America even when it is “neglecting” it: from deep commercial ties to a massive military presence. It is also superficial because, in a real sense, the US constantly neglects the problems that concern most Latin Americans: low wages, inequality, being safe in the streets, the damaging effects of climate change, and many more. “Neglect” would be seen very differently on the streets of a Latin American city than it is inside the Washington beltway.

Who has the “drug problem”?

The vacuum in US thinking is nowhere more apparent than in responses to the drug problem. Trump threatens to declare Mexican drug cartels to be terrorist organizations and to invade Mexico to attack them.

But, as academic Carlos Pérez-Ricart told El Pais: “This is a problem that does not originate in Mexico. The source, the demand, and the vectors are not Mexican. It is them.” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum also points out that it is consumption in the US that drives drug production and trafficking in Mexico.

Trump could easily make the same mistake as his predecessor Clinton did two decades ago. Back then, billions were poured into “Plan Colombia” but still failed to solve the “drug problem,” while vastly augmenting violence and human rights violations in the target country.

A foretaste of what might happen, if Trump carries out his threat, occurred last July, when Biden’s administration captured Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. That caused an all-out war between cartels in the Mexican state of Sinaloa.

Sheinbaum rightly turns questions about drug production and consumption back onto the US. Rhetorically, she asks: “Do you believe that fentanyl is not manufactured in the United States?…. Where are the drug cartels in the United States that distribute fentanyl in US cities? Where does the money from the sale of that fentanyl go in the United States?”

If Trump launches a war on cartels, he will not be the first US president to the treat drug consumption as a foreign issue rather than a concomitantly domestic one.

Where does the “migration problem” originate?

Trump is also not the first president to be obsessed by migration. Like drugs, it is seen as a problem to be solved by the countries where the migrants originate, while both the “push” and “pull” factors under US control receive less attention.

Exploitation of migrant labor, complex asylum procedures, and schemes such as “humanitarian parole” to encourage migration are downplayed as reasons. Biden intensified US sanctions on various Latin American countries, which have been shown conclusively to provoke massive emigration. Meanwhile Trump threatens to do the same.

Many Latin American countries have been made unsafe by crime linked to drugs or other problems in which the US is implicated. About 392,000 Mexicans were displaced as a result of conflict in 2023 alone, their problem aggravated by the massive, often illegal, export of firearms from the US to Mexico.

Costa Rica, historically a safe country, had a record 880 homicides in 2023, many of which were related to drug trafficking. In Brazil and other countries, US-trained security forces contribute directly to the violence, rather than reducing it.

Mass deportations from the US, promised by Trump, could worsen these problems, as happened in El Salvador in the late 1990s. They would also affect remittances sent home by migrant workers, exacerbating regional poverty. The threatened use of tariffs on exports to the US could also have serious consequences if Latin America does not stand up to Trump’s threats. Economist Michael Hudson argues that countries will have to jointly retaliate by refusing to pay dollar-based debts to bond holders if export earnings from the US are summarily cut.

China in the US “backyard”

Trump also joins the Washington consensus in its preoccupation with China’s influence in Latin America. Monica de Bolle is with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a thinktank partly funded by Pentagon contractors. She told the BBC: “You have got the backyard of America engaging directly with China. That’s going to be problematic.”

Recently retired US Southern Command general, Laura Richardson, was probably the most senior frequent visitor on Washington’s behalf to Latin American capitals, during the Biden administration. She accused China of “playing the ‘long game’ with its development of dual-use sites and facilities throughout the region, “adding that those sites could serve as “points of future multi-domain access for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] and strategic naval chokepoints.”

As Foreign Affairs points out, Latin America’s trade with China has “exploded” from $18 billion in 2002 to $480 billion in 2023. China is also investing in huge infrastructure projects, and seemingly its only political condition is a preference for a country to recognize China diplomatically (not Taiwan). Even here, China is not absolute as with Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, which still recognize Taiwan. China still has direct investments in those holdouts, though relatively more modest than with regional countries that fully embrace its one-China policy.

Peru, currently a close US ally, has a new, Chinese-funded megaport at Chancay, opened in November by President Xi Jinping himself. Even right-wing Argentinian president Milei said of China, “They do not demand anything [in return].”

What does the US offer instead? While Antony Blinken proudly displayed old railcars that were gifted to Peru, the reality is that most US “aid” to Latin America is either aimed at “promoting democracy” (i.e. Washington’s political agenda) or is conditional or exploitative in other ways.

The BBC cites “seasoned observers” who believe that Washington is paying the price for “years of indifference” towards the region’s needs. Where the US sees a loss of strategic influence to China and to a lesser extent to Russia, Iran, and others, Latin American countries see opportunities for development and economic progress.

Remember the Monroe Doctrine

Those calling for a more “benign” policy are forgetting that, in the two centuries since President James Monroe announced the “doctrine,” later given his name, US policy towards Latin America has been aggressively self-interested.

Its troops have intervened thousands of times in the region and have occupied its countries on numerous occasions. Just since World War II, there have been around 50 significant interventions or coup attempts, beginning with Guatemala in 1954. The US has 76 military bases across the region, while other major powers like China and Russia have none.

The doctrine is very much alive. In Foreign Affairs, Brian Winter warns: “Many Republicans perceive these linkages [with China], and the growing Chinese presence in Latin America more broadly, as unacceptable violations of the Monroe Doctrine, the 201-year-old edict that the Western Hemisphere should be free of interference from outside powers.”

Bosworth adds that Trump wants Latin America to decisively choose a side in the US vs China scrimmage, not merely underplay the role of China in the hemisphere. Any country courting Trump, he suggests, “needs to show some anti-China vibes.”

Will Freeman is with the Council on Foreign Relations, whose major sponsors are also Pentagon contractors. He thinks that a new Monroe Doctrine and what he calls Trump’s “hardball” diplomacy may partially work, but only with northern Latin America countries, which are more dependent on US trade and other links.

Trump has two imperatives: while one is stifling China’s influence (e.g. by taking possession of the Panama Canal), another is gaining control of mineral resources (a reason for his wanting to acquire Greenland). The desire for mineral resources is not new, either. General Richardson gave an interview in 2023 to another defense-industry-funded thinktank in which she strongly insinuated that Latin American minerals rightly belong to the US.

Maintaining hegemonic power against the threat of multipolarity

Neoconservative Charles Krauthammer, writing 20 years ago for yet another thinktank funded by the  defense industry, openly endorsed the US’s status as the dominant hegemonic power and decried multilateralism, at least when not in US interests. “Multipolarity, yes, when there is no alternative,” he said. “But not when there is. Not when we have the unique imbalance of power that we enjoy today.”

Norwegian commentator Glen Diesen, writing in 2024, contends that the US is still fighting a battle – although perhaps now a losing one – against multipolarity and to retain its predominant status. Trump’s “America first!” is merely a more blatant expression of sentiments held by his other presidential predecessors for clinging on to Washington’s contested hegemony.

The irony of Biden’s presidency was that his pursuit of the Ukraine war has led to warmer relations between his two rivals, Russia and China. In this context, the growth of BRICS has been fostered – an explicitly multipolar, non-hegemonic partnership. As Glen Diesen says, “The war intensified the global decoupling from the West.”

Other steps to maintain US hegemony – its support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza, the regime-change operation in Syria and the breakdown of order in Haiti – suggest that, in Washington’s view, according to Diesen, “chaos is the only alternative to US global dominance.” Time and again, Yankee “beneficence” has meant ruination, not development.

These have further strengthened desires in the global south for alternatives to US dominance, not least in Latin America. Many of its countries (especially those vulnerable to tightening US sanctions) now want to follow the alternative of BRICS.

Unsurprisingly, Trump has been highly critical of this perceived erosion of hegemonic power on Biden’s watch. Thomas Fazi argues in UnHerd that this is realism on Trump’s part; he knows the Ukraine war cannot be conclusively won, and that China’s power is difficult to contain. Accordingly, this is leading to a “recalibrating of US priorities toward a more manageable ‘continental’ strategy — a new Monroe Doctrine — aimed at reasserting full hegemony over what it deems to be its natural sphere of influence, the Americas and the northern Atlantic,” stretching from Greenland and the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and Antarctica.

The pundits may not agree on quite what Trump’s approach towards Latin America will be, but they concur with Winter’s judgment that the region “is about to become a priority for US foreign policy.” His appointment of Marco Rubio is a signal of this. The new secretary of state is a hawk, just like Blinken, but one with a dangerous focus on Latin America.

However, the mere fact that such pundits hark back to the Monroe Doctrine indicates that this is only, so to speak, old wine in new bottles. Even in the recent past, an aggressive application of the 201-year-old Monroe Doctrine has never seen a hiatus.

Recall US-backed coups that deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya (2009) and Bolivian Evo Morales (2019), plus the failed coup against Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2018), along with the parliamentary coup that ousted Paraguayan Fernando Lugo (2012). To these, US-backed regime change by “lawfare” included Dilma Rousseff in Brazil (2016) and Pedro Castillo in Peru (2023). Currently presidential elections have simply been suspended in Haiti and Peru with US backing.

Even if Trump is more blatant than his predecessors in making clear that his policymaking is based entirely on what he perceives to be US interests, rather than those of Latin Americans, this is not new.

As commentator Caitlin Johnstone points out, the main difference between Trump and his predecessors is that he “makes the US empire much more transparent and unhidden.” From the other end of the political spectrum, a former John McCain adviser echoes the same assessment: “there will likely be far more continuity between the two administrations than meets the eye.”

Regardless, Latin America will continue to struggle to set its own destiny, patchily and with setbacks, and this will likely draw it away from the hegemon, whatever the US does.

Nicaragua-based John Perry is with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition and writes for the London Review of Books, FAIR, and CovertAction.

Roger D. Harris is with the Task Force on the Americas, the US Peace Council, and the Venezuela Solidarity Network

Featured image courtesy of Cornell University/Wikimedia Commons

First published by Popular Resistance: https://popularresistance.org/whether-biden-or-trump-us-latin-american-policy-will-still-be-contemptible/