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SPECIAL REPORT AND ANALYSIS – by Stephen Minto.

Housing affordability is more than a simple case of demand and supply; there are structural factors creating too much investor demand for residential housing.  Because of this, New Zealand can’t just build its way out of this crisis. And removing planning restrictions will delay intensification and the supply of affordable housing, the exact opposite of what its proponents claim. The structural forces, in which the property market functions, must be fixed.

To see this we need to understand three things:

1. How we got here, and where here is.
2. Our current trends and economic forces.
3. What direction do we want to go in and how (possible solutions).

Part 1: How we got to this crisis – the NZ economy is a one trick pony; residential housing

We all know:

• The ‘normal principles of taxation’ favour holding a relatively low-effort, non-productive asset – residential property. Especially because you could claim the mortgage interest paid as an expense.
• There was no capital gains tax.
• The banks want to lend on leveraged property as a relatively secure loan. They are risk adverse.
• You can have a holiday home and rent it out occasionally as a pretend business to subsidise having it.
• Huge tourism to New Zealand along with AirBNB and ‘bookabach’ etc have given a lucrative income stream in the short-term rental market.
• Mum and dad savers/investors learnt from the 1987, 1998, and 2008 economic crashes that property was the best at retaining its value.
• The renters pay your mortgage, so there is little drain on your ‘income’ or there is positive enhancement from rental losses.
• New Zealand has had positive migration flows.

All these factors have been in place for many years making residential housing a fantastic investment, or superannuation scheme, or wealth–gain mechanism. It’s not clever to invest in residential property, it’s stupid not to.

But wait there’s more – the neo-liberal economic crisis

Commentators don’t talk about the neo-liberal structural changes in New Zealand and other first world economies from 1980 that have collapsed alternative investment opportunities.

The world economy was opened up on the mistaken belief that the great growth years of capitalism were made in an environment of little regulation and tax. A mantra to free up the private suppliers of goods and services (supply side economics) from laws, labour, and taxes was said to lead to an economic boom.

We all know there has been no boom for working or middle class people. There has been a boom for financial capitalism, technology, and billionaires.

What happened was skilled manufacturing and industrial jobs were exported to countries like China, Vietnam, and India. Many high income jobs evaporated in New Zealand leading to fewer people being able to save house deposits or save capital to start a business. Yes we got lower cost imports to match lower incomes, but we also got a throw away society with so much rubbish brought in.

Also, lower taxes and a smaller government meant the main source of apprenticeships, from Ministry of Works, Railways, Defence etc., dried up, leaving New Zealand small businesses without a source of trained and qualified people. They now had  to pay to train them. We now have to import skilled people. We have fewer skilled people to build houses. Fewer apprenticeships means fewer people to set up their own businesses meaning fewer opportunities for those wanting to strike out on their own. Fewer new businesses means fewer medium-sized businesses, which could be an investment option for those wanting to invest.

The above reality is compounded due to the absence of a capital gains tax as business owners have an incentive to take an easy-life option and sell up to overseas buyers. These overseas owners contribute tax and labour costs but they often do their best to avoid these. Businesses listed on the sharemarket are often sold overseas and pulled out of our sharemarket. We now have a thin share market. Profits from New Zealand assets are exported overseas. Most investment capital is not being invested back into growing the New Zealand economy, instead huge amounts of New Zealand’s investment capital is going to non-productive assets, such as residential property. These are all structural problems significantly damaging the ability of the New Zealand economy to grow.

New Zealand is now a service based economy but business set-ups in New Zealand are often for overseas franchises with low margins and wages. In fast food our small shop owners struggle. Retail as a business model is struggling because consumers have less disposable income because of high rents. High rents, and other utilities like power, suck money out of other areas of the economy. Our overall economy is being damaged by being skewed to the non-productive asset, residential property.

This is where the New Zealand economy is today; there is almost nowhere in New Zealand to invest except in residential property. Neo-liberal policies have shrunk our domestic economy and removed opportunities for investment. Entrepreneurs are risk averse – they minimise risk and buy property.

Is there a property bubble?

Yes. High house prices mean loans are beyond the ability of borrowers to ever repay. But that is still profitable for banks. The loans help push house prices higher, which rewards investment in property, and so it continues. But like the 25 July 2021 Radio NZ article ‘The problem with economists forecasts’, many have predicted a bubble burst but all have failed. Why? It’s obvious. The structural problems and incentives to buy residential housing are all still in place. Where else can the investors go? The economic signals from a dysfunctional economy trap investors in residential property. (ref. Radio New Zealand; July 25, 2021)

The property bubble can’t deflate until there is a functioning economy with alternative low-risk options for investment.

There are ways out of this, which is covered in Part 4 of this four part series.

Part 2: The current trends and economic forces shaping housing affordability

New Zealand can’t just build its way out of the affordable housing crisis. Previously I noted the ‘normal principles of taxation’ and the legacy of the neo-liberal experiment are skewing the economy to trap investors into holding residential housing as investments.  This part looks at the recent developing economic trends that now trap middle and working class people into renting for life and why that is bad for our economy.

Trends – big business residential renting

The New Zealand situation sits along with a trend in the United States where large corporations, e.g. the Koch brothers, have been investing in new rental properties because the returns on rentals are so strong. This is because house prices in the US, like NZ, are high. This shuts out most young middle- and working-class buyers. These people then become a captive market of renters as they are wealthy enough to pay high rents. And the high rents in turn make it almost impossible for renters to save a deposit to buy a home, and the captivity continues. The returns and prospects for business are great.

Over time, the rental investor market is moving away from mum and dad investors as they surrender their houses to pay for retirement homes or to release capital to live comfortably. Big business will take up a lot of that divestment; they can leverage far more and so are able to pay and sustain high prices for residential houses. They will also be buyers of older homes to redevelop into more ‘productive’ new builds. Banks will feel secure to lend to a large business with captive renters.

This means the future of housing is evolving into a big business ‘build to rent’ model, which means not ‘generation rent’ but ‘generations of rent’.

And this is bad for the economy. One of the ways it is bad is it leaves people with little capital to borrow against to take up a business option. It traps people as employees. And people renting won’t be able to build equity because there are fewer other investments options and those other options aren’t performing as well as residential property because all the investment capital to grow those other options is being sucked into residential property. And the chances of saving to build equity are low because rents are high. More reasons are given in the next trend (see below).

Some governments have also undermined social housing, which has exacerbated the problem, but that failure did not create the affordable housing crisis.

At this point, some people who own lots of properties will say, ‘So what?’

• Nothing is wrong with people renting.
• Nothing is wrong with high rent if the market is willing to pay it.
• The critics are all anti-business.

My response is this:

• Yes, it is wrong if there is no choice.
• People are not willing to pay high rents – they have to pay them.
• Redirecting investment to the productive economy (exports, innovation, producing goods and services) is good for business.

All businesses will benefit from a shift to investment in the productive economy except the types of business based on highly leveraged rental property. The property investor landlords that are not based on highly leveraged property will carry on renting.

Trends – high price houses and rents are here to stay.

In theory, increasing housing supply will bring down house prices, but that is not so in the economy we have.

For renters, the high prices paid for housing purchases are used to justify charging high rents. Also, big business is very keen on making sure there is a good rate of return on capital, so there’s an incentive to keep rents high.

Supply of housing and the rental price is not really linked. Pricing is about how much ‘consumer surplus’ the seller believes they can extract. It is not about the costs of the business so much as what they think the renter can pay e.g. linked to area, what others are charging in that area for that size of house. What the renter thinks the rent should be is not really relevant. Business costs do not really matter for price e.g. as a landlord pays down their mortgage on a rental property they do not reduce the rent on the property. Cost and supply do not drive rent prices.

The easiest example to see how supply and price is not linked is the car market (used and new). There are a huge number of cars in New Zealand and it is presented to the consumer as a myriad of choices about car style and performance, ‘why do you want the car?’. Each choice means it becomes a smaller range of cars to choose from. Every ‘extra’ feature is a way to distinguish one car from the hundreds of other cars; to push price up, or help hold it up.  This is what will happen with the housing market. The business model market will have a deliberate desire to push choice and variety up to push, or keep, the price up.

So for the ‘build to rent’ business model we will see tiny studio apartments marketed as the affordable option, which really primarily just suits a very young guy on his own, or short-term stays. As the size increases it will exponentially get more expensive. The business model will run that tried and true for-profit strategy. They will start organising your loans to make the purchase so they can get a commission.

Supply is only one of the many factors (e.g. location, quality, number of rooms), to set a rental price. Too many people are talking as if supply will fix the problem of affordability and this is a mistake. For example, a ‘tradie’ did a job at a rental house (almost $700 a week for a whole house in an outer suburb) there were several people home (a Polynesian extended family) and the rental owner, in casual conversation with the tradie, said as there were more people in the house than they thought, they would raise the rent, i.e. they can charge more. This is an insight to price setting. The idea, that people can just go somewhere else if rents rise, is silly. People want continuity with where they live, especially if they have children at schools. Also, demand to rent a property would generally be seen as inelastic, i.e. you need a place to live so you have to pay what is asked for. If you negotiate a rent reduction it tends to be by quite small amounts. (I’m sure there are anecdotes of some large reductions but clearly that is not the norm from the Trade me site or as renters report).

This shows cost, and supply, is not what primarily drives rent prices and this business model will work counter to the government’s, and most voters’ objectives, of ensuring there is affordable housing for our families, children and grandchildren.

Trend – a business ownership model versus a home ownership model

Residential housing is currently being repurposed into a very strong and profitable business model either with long term renting, or short term renting (Airbnb, book a bach etc) for tourism – when tourism returns – the previous model being high levels of home ownership. These business models will further push out home buyers unless they can pay a very high price. Therefore an affordable housing shortage will persist due to New Zealand’s lack of building resource capacity and a positive net migration. This is the nature of the private market and it has already shown it can’t deliver affordable housing. It needs a push, and help, to deliver affordable housing.

With a move to big business running more rentals, the chances of rents being lowered by supply are slimmer than if it was lots of mum and dads running the rental market. A large business will hold many properties and can carry empty property more easily as tax deductions can still be made against the property. High rents on some properties can cover for vacant periods on other properties.

Also the concept of ‘affordable’ is a monetary concept but housing is a qualitative experience. The economic/profit drive for business will be what is market ‘affordable‘ – e.g. those apartments that are south facing and that do not get any direct light, or they look onto a concrete wall. More planning rather than less will be needed to avoid these sort of outcomes.

The private rental market is not conducive to lower rents. For example, one rental comes onto the market and the fact that 10 or 100 people applied for that one new flat is taken as a signal to all the other people holding rentals (with that rental service company) to raise the prices on their other rentals. The private market tends to quickly inflate the impacts of scarcity. But when one rental takes a long time to rent there is no rush to drop their prices on their other rental properties. Private markets tend to hold prices high. So housing supply, if held in the private business model market, will not necessarily bring down rental prices. Anecdotally, I am personally aware of many houses in New Zealand’s capital city Wellington, that are not occupied. Ideally, this housing stock would be used for housing supply if done up, restored, renovated, or simply rented out. Some supply currently exists but is not being utilised. This is the scourge of land banking.

Rents are high now and deflation is only generally associated with economic crashes. There is nothing identifiable yet that would indicate rental prices will decrease. The whole discussion, about increasing the supply being the solution to the housing affordability crisis, is just magic thinking. If left alone, the economic forces at work will prevent increasing supply being able to have a positive impact.

Former BNZ economist (and now an independent economist) Tony Alexander made a point in a NZME bulletin that getting tough on landlords will just drive up rental prices. However, I argue, prices not quality have been rising anyway. Therefore, now is the perfect time to remove interest deductibility from residential rental property, particularly as interest rates are currently low. Nobody is getting tough on landlords, rather investor demand is being dampened and investment capital gently directed away to the productive economy. (ref. Youtube, NZHerald.co.nz; March 1, 2021)

I repeat increased supply and intensification definitely needs to happen but it is not going to launch a huge reduction in house prices or rent as the forces driving investor demand will still be in place. And supply is still a long way off.

But there are things that can be done to free renters and house buyers from high prices by making the market work better. See solutions in Part 4 of this four part series.

Trend – Government as the good quality high paying tenant

The outlook for investors in the rental business is getting even better if rent is made to beneficiaries as the rents are paid direct to the landlord by the government. If there is an overloaded or not properly funded bureaucracy any complaints about the quality of the rental may be slow for the government to follow up on, but the rent continues to be passed through directly to landlords. Business loves it as it is a very secure income stream. If government has to pay repairs for damage it may be a more reliable payer than a private tenant.

On rental price settings that impact government, it was strongly anecdotally reported that with the Government’s first budget, where the accomodation allowance was raised by $50 a person, rents increased correspondingly. This showed the rental business market’s true colours. The rental rise was not based on costs but on the ability to extract the money as the government had declared it available. This shows the government therefore will become trapped in a cycle of paying for high rents by leaving so much of the rental market in this growing private business model.

Trend – business model housing is bad for the economy.

This is bad for the New Zealand economy. High rents, or mortgages (and for other utilities) means less disposable income for renters/mortgagees which leads to less stimulus into the rest of the economy. More disposable income could mean more people seek education, experience the arts, take up exercise, domestic travel, etc. All these are NZ based service industries that are struggling at the moment. But landlords in particular have a captive inelastic market where they can continue to raise rental prices even though interest rates are at a record low.

As said before, high house or rental prices prevent/slows people developing capital on which to create a business opportunity and/or push an innovation they may have developed.

As bad if not worse is the diversion of so much of New Zealand’s investment capital into a non-productive asset, residential housing. We need that investment capital to go into innovation projects and/or producing things for export, or for the services industries that our economy employs most of our people in. The housing market, built on a business model, is not a service industry we want to encourage.

And once the ‘build to rent’ companies take over and they are big enough they might list on the stock market and then the chances of it being sold overseas – with all the rental profits going overseas – becomes very real.

New Zealand will not get wealthy selling houses to each other.

No business representative group should be upset about this redirection of investment into the productive sector of the economy. It will benefit most businesses. It is only those rental businesses built on being highly debt leveraged that will have to change.

There are solutions to high housing prices and the affordability crisis outside a big business rental model, I talk about some solutions in Part 4 of this four part series.

Part 3 – The problems that come from a supply fixation as a solution to housing affordability

The government is aware of complexity in dealing with the housing affordability crisis so it wants to include the private market as part of the solution. They have reflected this in the Urban Growth Agenda. It encourages changes to relax planning rules to facilitate residential development and intensification. This means developers can force their dreams and vision through, rather than a community’s visions of a city being realised. History shows this will inevitably result in conflict and a firestorm will come down on the government and councils as the private market will not deliver affordable housing. Again, inevitably, government and councils will be blamed for damaging the cities as developers will insist they are simply following the rules. And, in turn, opposition political parties can exploit that conflict. The places where these ideas arose from is as follows.

Alternative ideas on affordability

Tony Alexander in the YouTube clip ‘When will house prices cool down/Cooking the books’ from March 1, 2021 says house prices won’t go down because low interest rates are what is driving the high prices. This is a factor because it makes it easier to borrow and leverage a property. But pressed for his suggestion to solve the housing crisis, it is not to raise interest rates (I agree with him) but to remove planning restrictions. This solution is linked to the defective increase supply argument as explained previously. He expresses sympathy for first home buyers and has a great analysis but overall he is passive about most of the factors driving affordability, they just exist for him. Using the metaphor of climate change, I think his analysis is more as a weather forecaster looking at the factors of the day but not as a climate scientist looking at what is underlying and driving the factors.

Alexander’s suggestion on planning is to relax the rules so that six story buildings can be built beside single story buildings. To take Wellington as an example, when this sort of absence of rules existed back in the 1950’s and 1960’s, huge amounts of heritage (for example in central Wellington, Te Aro flats and into Thorndon and Mount Victoria) were destroyed in an ugly way. This is why protection rules were introduced.

Alexander also critiques actions that impact the landlord/investor as being counter productive as any costs placed on them will just be passed on in rents. But even without any government actions rent prices are unaffordable. Fatalism, or perhaps a desire for defeatism, pervades his argument. Because if the actions were successful and investors are less active in the market there would be less demand and less push for prices to rise. And the New Zealand Property Council has said actions on removing the deductibility of interest would dampen investor demand.

• Can planning laws alone fix supply?

The answer is no because of the structural problems created by the ‘normal principles of taxation’ and the neo-liberal economic legacy that encourages excessive investor demand and that will hold housing values up – which holds up rents as well. Planning laws are needed to drive intensification which I fully support, but not at a cost to the historic character and liveability of a city. However, it appears the policy ideas Alexander supports are being listened to by the government.

Urban Growth Agenda – right idea, wrongly executed

For those on the left, the government’s recently developed Urban Growth Agenda is a neo liberal’s dream come true. Why? It is predicated on giving ‘permission’ to private developers to disregard the needs and wants of the existing local communities so the developer can build a six story build right beside one story houses meaning they will loose their sun and privacy with no chance to complain. The developer’s dream or plan (to make money) will come first and be forced through.

The Urban Growth Agenda does not have urban planning as its primary focus. It does have a vision of urban growth intensification which I fully support, but it is not ‘urban planning’. It has a feature Housing Infrastructure Fund which is money set aside to pay for infrastructure to support the private developer’s vision. This fund could cover parks, play areas, but it could also cover drains and water etc. But that is not urban planning for the local community. The risk is the fund will just be mitigation after an eyesore is built and the damage done to the house values of surrounding private home owners – the result: one group is allowed to make money over another group.

Some developers may not care if large buildings are built beside their properties as they can put one up beside it and each building can look into each other. The private developer sector’s vision is bounded by the constraints of; – I have this bit of land here and I need to maximise the profit from it so I stay comfortably in business. Even allowing for ideas like stunning new architecture it is still bounded by those facts. And those facts are not transformative urban planning in a positive community-led way.

The Urban Growth Agenda  also has the Housing Acceleration Fund which provides for government directed as well as private developments. Why should it include private developments when these companies already have access to funds through debt leveraging, which banks seem quite happy to do? Our current housing experience in Auckland already shows private developers are not building affordable housing. They advertise studio apartments for $600,000. This suits short term rentals (Airbnb) investments, or young men looking for a bolthole to call their own. And if a studio costing $600K is rented out, the rent will be high, it will not be affordable.

The history of private developers conflicting with the Resource Management Act is simply their vision conflicting with others who are also stakeholders in the community. A simple way to fix this problem is for there to be an earlier process to identify needs in the city, a proper urban plan of what the housing should approximately look like in this or that area or site, and then for developers bidding or volunteering to be part of that development. The current connect of development and ownership of random pieces of land and then developers trying to impose their vision on that piece of land is causing conflict. Urban development should be more planned. Areas should change as part of a process that is well signalled and worked towards over time. In many areas of central Wellington for example, this can be done quickly as there is so much low intensity commercial use.

The current Urban Growth Agenda is not urban planning but a one sided urban permission to build. The plan too much takes the side of the developers’ interests. Once high rises are built there will be community reactions. Developers will then say we are just doing what we are allowed to within the rules. The public will then turn on the rules makers (the government and council). It is a recipe for anger and conflict which is generally not good long term politics.

There are many ideas to fix the affordable housing crisis while increasing intensification which I fully support. I cover these in Part 4 of this four part series.

Wellington City – an example of planning relaxation that will not lead to intensification and affordable housing supply

Presumably following the Urban Growth Agenda the current Wellington City Council has gone zombie-logic against historic suburbs in the mistaken belief that this is the cause of a lack of intensification in the central city where more people want to live. But a simple glance across the city shows there is lots of low-level commercial buildings and plenty of land on which to intensively build (e.g. Te Aro), and there is little heritage over large parts. Huge fields of carparks cover large amounts of Te Aro. So intensification is not happening in the non-heritage areas, which indicates that heritage is not the cause of a lack of intensification.

There is simply no economic push to intensity which is why intensification hasn’t happened. And reducing the planning rules to increase the amount of land that could be available to intensify (which is what the council has done) will actually reduce the drive to intensify in the central areas.  The issue is simply not about heritage holding back intensification, and counterintuitively, is not about relaxing planning restrictions to increase the supply of land.

There needs to be some scarcity and an economic push to intensify (profit is a good one but that won’t make for affordable housing), and not just a council or government planning rule ‘we want to intensify’ and a permission ‘you can’. Developers will be screaming at this point ‘there is scarcity now!’ Okay? So what is causing that scarcity for their development ideas? Landbanking.

Developers have their little pieces of land they want to develop but they can’t get central city pieces of land because others own it and are just holding it for huge capital gains, (and possibly a lack of finance, or ideas, or ability, or desire). As an example; Wellington City is underdeveloped for central city living because of previous lax misguided neo-liberal councils and in part caused by reducing rates on commercial ratepayers and shifting (the cost of commercial rates reductions) onto residential taxpayers as part of the user pays philosophy. With lower land/rates costs businesses can afford to sprawl and underutilise land. Land banking is more cost effective with low costs. This has encouraged a lack of intensification of land use in the central city and encouraged suburban sprawl up the coast and Hutt Valley to get affordable housing.

The Wellington City council is currently allowing several developments of low level townhouses in the city, (car yards in Taranaki Street, and near Vivian Street between Willis and Victoria streets). The obvious question ‘why aren’t these semi industrial/commercial areas (car yards and carparks) developed into quality high-rise intensified living areas? The owners likely answer is – that low level two story builds are lower-cost to build compared to multi-storey builds, and therefore profit is maximised. But the real answer is nobody is demanding they build up or else. Developers should be instructed that as this site/area is slated for medium to high density housing, therefore they must comply and build it that way. And, if they are unwilling to do so, then perhaps somebody else will.

Another example to demonstrate this lack of push to build up, is car parks in Wellington. Carparks used to be many stories high. Now Te Aro has many sprawling field carparks. Parking provides enough income to business to cover costs. There is no drive for central city landowners to intensify and make the most of their land, so they do not. Council has listened and responded to developers who argued about planning issues, because that is what developers see. But what residents see is liveability with heritage. There are plenty of other areas to build affordable housing without destroying heritage.

The new Wellington Spatial Plan, which has significantly relaxed planning rules, is a disaster for heritage housing in central Wellington and the liveability of the city for all ratepayers. Heritage brings tourism and is one of the main factors that makes a place special and gives it character. Successful central cities have gardens and trees connected to history that allow views and sun. For those who have lived in and hated dilapidated heritage houses; that fault lies with the landowners who are land banking and exploiting people. That is what needs to stop.  Heritage housing can easily be renovated and restored to a modern exciting excellent standard.

To those who say heritage is a poor use of land which is not permitting inner city development to occur so as to accomodate an increase in inner city residents; and people come first. Heritage is people coming first. The brand new two story no parking townhouses in Taranaki Street are no more effective at housing than low level heritage. Yes more people will live there than before (it was a car yard) but what about the long term opportunity cost of not having medium to high density intensification on those sites. More importantly these are crammed in with little outlook or privacy. The chances of them being subject to an urban ‘Vicious cycle’ is quite high, i.e. good residents move out as the units are too cramped/not private/noisy from wooden frames, ergo; rents drop, maintenance drops, those with little means arrive, poverty can drive overcrowding, meaning more people move out, repeat.

But even if we destroy all heritage and built residential Burj Khalifi towers over every block in Wellington, a time will come when all space will be used with a maximum possible number of people – then what for the people who still want to come? My point; there is a limit to the number of people who can live central. New York did not destroy Central Park to allow more people to live central. Beijing didn’t destroy the Forbidden city to allow more people to live central. Wellington should not destroy its heritage either.

Heritage (pre-1930’s houses) is a very finite and dwindling resource that is critical to the Wellington economy, i.e. tourism, including domestic tourism. It is also critical for the liveability of all residents. And unfortunately New Zealand history can’t just be corralled to a few tiny zones as proposed in the plan because historic houses in Wellington have not been corralled previously, so they are mixed in with other buildings, that is the nature of history. The problems arise as though the buildings do not mind a big new six story building beside it, the people living there do, and they vote.

Relaxing planning rules on heritage is not the solution to drive intensification of the residential housing supply.  More planning and direct requirements on developers is needed, not less. But their projects can be supported when they accord or are adapted to fit with the community’s vision of the city. It could be that a developer may have land in an unsuitable location for their desired project but there may be land in another location, held by council, or government, or somebody else that could fit with that development. So it could be supported by a land transfer or some such vision.

I put forward several solutions to the housing affordability crisis and the need for intensification in Part 4 of this four part series.

I also suggest that Wellington City councillors roll back their Spatial Plan before the next local body election as there is already talk about councillors being challenged. It is a political gift to an opposition when large buildings are built in low level residential areas. Councillors want affordable housing and intensification like I do, but the roll back of planning restrictions is the empowerment of big business to force through changes they want without direct community involvement. You are facilitating the old neo-liberal ideas that have failed. (So Ironic that Nicola Young didn’t vote for less planning rules. Good on her.) On affordability you are saying to developers ‘you do it, build it, save us’. But that is simply not how they operate. They are attracted by the high prices for high rewards. But the high prices can’t deliver the affordable rents as they must have a sufficient return on capital. Your permission to developers to ignore the community is going to come back and bite you.

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Part 4. Solutions – What can we do to fix the housing affordability crisis

SOLUTIONS: We first need to acknowledge there is an affordable housing crisis. Also, it is not a political issue but a fact that needs action to be taken to address it. The current actions will not fix it because the underlying economic forces are still in place that trap investors in the housing market and an increasing number of renters will be trapped renting, with long term equity consequences for the New Zealand economy. That is the basis for the following suggestions. It is the crisis that means we must look at things that may previously have been unthinkable for many.

No political party should be upset about redirecting investment into the productive economy for innovation and exports. No political party should want to stop voters, the average New Zealander, having the chance to build some equity through owning a house, and possibly create business opportunities for their family and for the rest of society from that equity. Those on the conservative side might reflect on the fact that homeowners have traditionally been more conservative. Voters who are eternal renters may be less conservative than you would like.  Tough confronting solutions have to be looked at; it is a crisis.

The following areas of action are needed:

1. ‘The normal principles of taxation’ are overdue for a reset – not just for housing, but in regards to how it directs and shapes the economy, and supports tax avoidance. If done right, it can lead to a less growth oriented economic model but a more sustainable one. Less chance of boom/bust, with more economic activity that benefits smaller entrepreneurs and NZ based businesses. If we don’t do this the lack of affordable housing will remain a problem for New Zealand as the principles are twisted in our economic environment and it will continue to push money into housing that is not affordable. I have developed a submission that reduces tax avoidance, and by shutting down some behaviours it redirects investment capital into innovation, exports, technology, and small local businesses.
2. Provide councils, communities and government with the tools to urban plan more forcefully and directly. These can then be used to ramp up affordable housing much more quickly. The current idea with reduced planning rules is to give that ‘force’ to private developers.
3. Ensure the current housing stock is available and being used to reduce the affordable housing crisis.  This is a cheaper and quicker option than building new, especially compared with intensification projects.
4. Create secure, profitable, alternative investment options other than housing.

Government must take the lead

To build an affordable housing market there is no escaping the fact that the government must take the lead. It must be government projects first. The recent trends show private enterprise does not deliver affordable housing. The burden must be on private developers to prove otherwise.

How can the Government build affordable housing?

The government is best placed to provide affordable housing but is constrained by not having much control over urban land on which to build and intensify housing. And it needs to be fiscally prudent to prevent inflation so it must be careful about borrowing. So as the need for social housing is in crisis, the government should take some or all of the following steps to get hold of existing residential housing.

• Trade in house for investment security – mum and dad investors with one or two rentals may be willing to trade the rentals in for a long term Government ‘term deposit’ paying a high rate of interest that is sufficient to compensate for loss of the rental revenue. This means government gets a house it can provide instantly to a family or person in social need (displacement of demand by another renter occurs but it is for a higher need).
• Public Works Act acquisition – we do it for roads so let’s use it for affordable housing. Sites close to transport could be taken if they were identified for development. From my understanding the Act is actually generous and some people dream of the cash injection from having some rural land taken. A question to consider is; should it be this generous? (In the Netherlands and Germany such acquisitions for housing are normally made at existing land use cost – I’ve not researched what happens in New Zealand).
• Trade up a home for a home – If an intensive development is going to occur but some local houses are needed for that development then perhaps they should be invited to choose one of the brand new houses at no cost to surrender their existing house. This policy would need to consider how much mortgage there is to pay. Should some of that mortgage be paid as well?
• Low intensity land use swap – a developer may have a vision for urban housing intensification and can think of a site where it would be good but does not own the land. In such a situation, a process could be initiated to evaluate the desirability of the low intensity land use versus the quality ‘affordable’ development, and whether the two could be integrated e.g. business on a lower level with apartments above. Once a decision is made, a swap of land could be enforced and perhaps a small compensation paid. Exemptions for historic buildings can be made for low intensity use. Other factors would need to be considered. The same could also apply for the government or local council around transport hubs where they have a desire for housing intensification, or other urban planning objectives, like parks that would support intensified housing.
• Reverse mortgages for house acquisition – the government eyeing up future development sites or as a more general service, could enter the reverse mortgage market with lower fees and protections for these people. A purpose in this is that the house could eventually become an asset for affordable housing.  It should allow transfers from other entities that hold reverse mortgages. These mortgages are generally not good for home owners in rising markets.

Several of these options are relatively low cost to the government or a council. There is a cost layout but the asset (house and land) will be on the government’s/council’s books.

Once land is accumulated the process may be the government/council create a site, designing and planning its function and then inviting tenders to build it. If land is going to ancillary services or activities attached to it e.g shops, there may be the possibility of a joint cost or build. It could be that a site or area is identified and developers are invited to make proposals and tenders for development of that site.

Redirecting investment from housing.

• Trade in house for investment security – The first bullet above is a key component for redirecting investment. In some ways it is similar to a mum and dad rental investors who pay a property company to handle dealing with the rental (maintenance and monitoring etc) and the renters. So they don’t really see the rental house. This option would have to be developed and promoted.
• Micro private/public partnership – The government can also rethink the private/public partnership model which is heavily centred on cooperation with large corporate enterprises. The government could trial a descale down to individual New Zealand investors. A series of infrastructure projects (e.g. transport, housing, education, research, stadium) could be announced  and people could choose to sign up to invest in the ones they want to. Their capital could be used to support the construction and then they would get some sort of reward over time as the asset is used. It means New Zealanders can use their capital to back New Zealand projects and they can see the result. The government would have to ensure there is not too much exposure to risk, just like they do with a big business.

Other options to deliver affordable housing sooner.

• Requiring maintenance of historic houses – For historic houses (pre 1930’s) the local council should have the power, whether the building is rented or not, to require the owner to bring the house up to a modern or restored excellent standard of housing. A house cannot be left to become dilapidated even if the owner chooses to do that, because it is an asset for the city and future generations. It is also a little piece of carbon capture. But as importantly the community must ensure a person living there is not at a health, fire, or safety risk to themselves or others.  If the house is rented then the renting standards should apply – there should be no slum landlords. But the local council or government (perhaps administered by Heritage New Zealand) must decide if any action is to be taken. Should the owner not be financially able to update the house professionally, then the council/government should undertake the work and the amount spent becomes a low interest loan that is secured over the property. They should not be permitted to do the work themselves unless it is professionally being done and checked. Timeframes would be established. When the person sells or dies the loan can be collected from the house sale/disposal, or the house can move into the council’s or government’s stock of affordable housing assets with any balance in value paid out to the estate.
• An ‘empty home tax’. This is a tax in Vancouver as I understand. Anecdotally around Wellington there are lots of empty houses that could be rented but aren’t. Such houses should be sold if the person doesn’t want to do it up. Neighbours could be one of the main way this is identified. Obviously more work needs to be done to investigate and establish how this would work before it is applied.
• If a house has no occupier, then the house must be required to be rented – this is similar to an historic houses requirement and an empty home tax. If the house is in need of repair so it can then be rented, the council can undertake the work (contract in) and the cost of the work becomes a loan (normal interest) secured against the house. In Wellington for example there is anecdotally many empty houses that are a little rough but could quickly and easily be brought up to an excellent standard for rental. If the house is still not rented then the ‘empty home tax’ would apply. Details to stop delaying tactics would all need to be worked out.

These options would all generate local work and open opportunities for apprenticeships. They are quicker than new builds to increase the housing supply.

How should the government/council treat housing ownership when built through schemes it leads or looks after

The ownership model for affordable residential housing is open.

• Government ownership with rotating occupancy as people move on (Traditional state housing occupiers and rents).
• Rent to buy with financial support schemes from government to make this viable.
• Government (creates and builds affordable housing) on sells. The price will vary according to each development. Price would be influenced by market but pushed down to make affordability possible.
• Government owns houses but rentals not targeted to any economic group, rents capped at affordability for the renter. e.g. 20% of income. As income rises so does the rent.

A mix of the above is possible, and there may well be others. e.g. below – rent capped.

Rent capped?

According to some economists there should be no need to buy a house but just rent which gives social/economic mobility if people need to move for work or there’s a change in family circumstances. I do not support this model but it is not without some merit. If this was the case most housing should be owned by government or other entities and rent capped according to an ‘affordability’ concept. e.g. 20% of income. Some push back may occur if private entities complain about the ability to maintain property, or to get a sufficient return on capital.

You can clearly see the housing investment sector is currently in a holding pattern due to the government announcements on removing interest deductibility and the Inland Revenue discussion document that holds out the prospect of options to get around the restrictions. But if this rent cap was required by government now, it would certainly create a very quick and immediate reaction in the rental and housing sectors. It is not something I would recommend but excess investor demand would dry up almost instantly.

In summary

The New Zealand economy is a one horse pony based on residential housing. Excessive investor demand, driven by ‘the normal principles of taxation’, leveraging, and a lack of safe alternative investor options is holding up prices leading to a housing affordability crisis. High prices shut out working and middle class people from buying, and make saving deposits impossible as high prices mean high rents. Even if banks make huge loans for people to buy, this strips disposable income out of the economy just as high rents do. This leads to less demand through all other sectors of the New Zealand economy, e.g. education, arts, domestic tourism, hospitality, the ‘trades’. As importantly it leads to less chance for a person to build equity, to one day take up a business opportunity of their own making, which in turn could employ others and turn into a medium sized business that further benefits New Zealand.

New Zealand has had almost forty years of a private business model focus on housing and it has not delivered affordable housing but rather the opposite. It can not deliver supply to meet demand. The new ‘build to rent’ model is driven off the current system and the prospect of good profit, not affordability.  But we cannot build our way to sufficient quality affordable houses because all the drivers of excess demand remain in place, so prices will remain high. We need to make a collective effort, not just our private effort, and use the strength of government for; tax reform, overhaul existing housing stock, and building.

The affordable housing crisis is not just about the low quality of the lives of New Zealanders now and the problems from low levels of disposable incomes. It is now about the strength of the economic future of New Zealand, for our children’s and grandchildren’s sake.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Stephen Minto lives in Wellington with his two children. He worked for New Zealand Inland Revenue Department for approximately 33 years and is now enjoying no longer being bound by public service etiquette of being non-political.

SOURCE: CORELOGIC: The CoreLogic Property Market & Economic Update for Q1 2021 reinforced the heated market conditions which led to the Government’s recent housing policy announcement.

Through the first quarter of 2021 sales activity remained high despite record-low listings, property values rose rapidly, and mortgaged investor participation surged from 27% to a record-high 29% share of purchases.

Kelvin Davidson, Chief Property Economist for CoreLogic, says the figures in the report are a clear “line in the sand” following the game-changing announcement by the Government in the final week of March.

“While the figures in our report largely pre-date the most recent housing policy changes, they are a valuable line in the sand as to where the property market was when the Government stepped in. Now the game has changed especially for investors, so we expect to start seeing through our various market measures how these changes flow through to our buyer classification data and ultimately, property values.”

Davidson says it’s now all about what happens next. “Buyer classification figures will be of most interest to gauge the fallout from the recent changes, particularly volume of investment purchases of existing property and new builds. Speculation about rents increasing and investors racing to sell rental properties is likely unfounded.”

Davidson also notes the mortgage deferral scheme coming to a close, with the majority of people now back on a form of loan repayments without undue strain. In addition, the unemployment rate fell in the fourth quarter of 2020 and at 4.9% is less than half the level that some thought it could be at this stage.

Mr Davidson says “These are positive indicators of the health of our economy, and of course the Australian travel bubble and vaccination programme are also encouraging. However, the economy is not out of the woods yet and we still face a slow recovery to get back to ‘normal’, while also having to face the reality of much higher government debt than before.

“Overall, the recent strength of the property market was always going to be unsustainable and a slowdown likely to occur in the second half of 2021 – the Government changes just reinforce that. We expect total property sales volumes to be lower in 2021 than they were in 2020 (and potentially fall a bit further again in 2022 too), with property value growth slowing quite markedly too – but not turning negative. Our expectation that price falls won’t be seen reflects underlying shortages of property around the country, although the incentives for investors to target new-builds should give developers the confidence to keep their output high.”

For more information or to read the full CoreLogic Property Market and Economic Update, visit www.corelogic.co.nz/reports

About the Quarterly Property Market & Economic Update

The quarterly Property Market and Economic Update for New Zealand delivers timely, detailed insights into the fundamentals that are affecting the residential property market. The report looks at property value growth, sales volume, time on market and rental growth, together with detailed charts and insights into housing market affordability.

* August 2000: IMF Report contends Irish property prices are almost certainly heading for a collapse in the medium-term.
* Between 2007 to 2013: Irish house prices (nominal) fall 54%.
* March 2021: IMF Report contends New Zealand’s unsustainable house price rises could trigger a pronounced correction.
* April 2021: New Zealand house prices up 16.1% in a year.

A ‘ghost estate’ of unoccupied homes in Ireland circa 2010. Even buoyant housing markets can change quickly. Source: Daily Mail

At a recent event in Auckland, I remonstrated that house prices could slide. It may not seem possible, but it is. You could have felt the perspiration dampen the room. As I provided an uncannily similar series of events in the mirror of history, the mood began to darken.

You see, when people’s hope is built on a beneficial pile they are invested in — and you point out that pile could reduce, you risk their aversion. Not because you may be right or wrong, but because you are dashing hopes in something they rely on to be true: That property prices will keep going up.

Wealth Morning does not exist to toe the line. We are here to challenge assumptions, provide warnings, and find opportunities beyond the radar.

The trite disclaimer that ‘past performance does not provide a guide to future performance’ is not entirely correct. It may apply to fund management returns over, say, a decade. But past performance over a much longer period — I’m talking 40 years or more — could provide signs.

Property prices have been shooting up. Because debt is cheap, supply is short, cashed-up migrant money is still evident, and high sale prices support the momentum. I will show you, in a moment, how these conditions can change on a dime and pull the rug from under you.

Look, it’s our job to point out risk factors. We may not be right. But if, in our view, we see a child about to get hit by a bus, we will shout.

Yet property, at least here in New Zealand, should always find some underlying support. It is another emerging asset class that may be looking more and more unsteady…

Bitcoin

‘You’re a sharemarket investor. What do you know about cryptocurrency?’

You may well ask this. And I will tell you I worked for the world’s first regulated Bitcoin fund in Europe for over a year. I understand that sophisticated investors can make money on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Because they are volatile.

But when you analyse the asset, you find support for the price to be flimsy.

No supporting assets.

No guarantee from a respected government.

Competition from 5,000 other cryptocurrencies.

Threat of regulation over concerns of widespread financing of illicit transactions.

An alternative digital payment system under discussion by the US Federal Reserve.

Climate change concerns: Bitcoin mining activity has an annual carbon footprint equal to New Zealand.

As an investor, I might buy Bitcoin if I could see a path for it to go from around 50k to 200k within a year. A 150k profit could cover the potential risk of near-total loss of my 50k. So you see the stakes.

But I do not see Bitcoin at 200k next year. Frankly, there are more risk-managed investments with attractive upside out there. Where the potential gain does not come with such heady downside.

It is all about pricing risk.

Is it worth it?

Often, when you run the ruler, it is not.

Property

‘You’re a sharemarket investor. You have a vested interest in seeing property slide!’

We do, in part. As residential property investment has become more challenging, our enquiry rate is up. For many people, there are simpler ways now to seek income and potential growth.

But this is not the whole story. We are also property owners and investors. And we still see attractions in the asset class, particularly with commercial property. So much so that many of the shares we analyse are based on property assets.

My sense of the risk currently on residential property begins with my memory as a kid in the 1980s. Actually being unable to sell a house. Having to rent it to a chain-smoking, deep-fat frying family from England to move on.

Then, after more than a year, seeing my parents get next to nothing for it.

In the late 1970s in New Zealand, house prices fell around 40% in real terms. In fact, it was a lost decade, with homes being worth no more at the end than they were at the start.

The run-up we saw from 1971 to 1974 has eerie similarities to the longer 2011 to 2021 build-up. It was based on high net migration and shortages of builders and materials.

Muldoon’s government became alarmed then, as Ardern’s one seems to be now. Planning controls were loosened to allow more flats to be built in cities. My neighbourhood is testament to this. Historic villas subdivided with 1970s units behind.

Even more compelling is the example of the Roaring Twenties. An economic boom period following the last world pandemic — the Spanish Flu — and heavy ‘money printing’ stemming from World War I. Pent-up demand and low interest rates fed raging asset prices. Manhattan real estate reached its all-time high in 1929, as did stocks across the New York Stock Exchange.

Then came the unravelling.

By 1932, Manhattan real-estate prices had fallen 67%. They did not fully recover until the 1960s.

The stock market lost more than 80% of its value from its 1929 high to its mid-1932 low.

In this case, the potential advantage of more liquid assets came to pass.

By 1936, stocks had in real terms fully recovered. They went on to outperform property growth by a factor of 5.2 between 1920-1939.

Of course, this discussion is speculative. The Roaring 1920s are very different from the Roaring 2020s.

Yet, if we look at other more recent bubbles a century later, we see some similarities here in New Zealand.

The Irish property bubble

In August 2000, the IMF warned that Irish property prices were almost certainly heading for a collapse in the medium-term.

Between 2007 to 2013, Irish house prices (nominal) fell 54%.

In March 2021, the IMF warned that ‘New Zealand’s unsustainable house price rises could trigger a pronounced correction’.

Yet there is a key point of difference.

Ireland in the 2000s was outbuilding demand. About 75,000 units were being built each year for a similar population size to New Zealand. By one estimation, about 12% of the workforce was engaged in construction.

In New Zealand, annual figures last year were just under 40,000 homes built. We’d need to see at least a 50% increase to get into Irish over-building territory.

The more likely source of risk here comes down to leverage. As it so often does.

When Ireland joined the European Union in 1999, it soon come to enjoy much lower interest rates than before. People were encouraged to take on debt to get into homes. Property was seen as a guaranteed bet, and mortgage debt exploded.

Household debt-to-GDP rates in Ireland reached very high levels, as we see today in New Zealand.

Interest rates in New Zealand now sit around their lowest levels ever. And the mortgage brokers we speak to routinely see DTIs (debt-to-income ratios) of 6x.

Ireland, in contrast, has learnt hard lessons in more recent times. And today, most residential lending in Ireland is restricted by the Central Bank to a DTI of 3.5x.

The Central Bank of Ireland refers to this as the Loan to Income limit:

‘The LTI limit restricts the amount of money you can borrow to a maximum of 3.5 times your gross income. So, for example, a couple with a combined income of €100,000 you can borrow up to a maximum of €350,000.’

It would appear the most significant risk to New Zealand property is the re-pricing or restricting of lending.

Interest deductibility rules have already re-priced loans to property investors. But the greater risk is the introduction of DTIs and inflation.

Inflation is now so evident in New Zealand it is hard to see interest rates staying low forever.

There are clear lessons from Ireland. And also Spain. You can out-build the market. And high leverage can, in the end, haemorrhage prices.

I do not see New Zealand out-building its supply gap any time soon. But I do see a lot more activity than before coupled with a twisted greed and fear gap, a debt bomb, and growing regulation.

In this regard, the ghost of Muldoon could well come to sit in auction rooms across Auckland. Especially for investor-focused residential properties.

The markets

Of course, many speculative stocks raise the same concerns in the financial markets.

Advisers will say you need to diversify. Which neutralises returns across the board and denies outperformance from a smaller number but still diversified set of high-conviction opportunities.

For those, you need to go back to assessing value. Price is what you pay. Value is what you get. A good investment should have a clear measurement of underlying value. And a view on how its price is really supported.

The key to identifying a bubble is to identify a lack of price support.

Markets are complex. But right now, we are seeing old support get shakier.

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is general in nature and should not be construed as any financial or investment advice. To obtain advice for your specific situation, please consult an Authorised Financial Adviser. The author is involved in portfolio management for Wholesale and Eligible Investors via Wealth Morning’s Vistafolio Managed Account Service.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

To the surprise of most pundits, substantial real estate price inflation has resumed, after a hiatus from 2017 to 2019. As to be expected, most of the usual tropes have been employed: a lack of supply, immigration (in this latest case returning New Zealanders), and low interest rates. The only missing trope this time is that of foreign buyers.

While none of these are wholly untrue, the real story is a ‘flow of money’ story, with the main issue being that money flows into certain places because it does not or cannot flow into other places. The second main issue is that financial bubbles have their own dynamic and momentum; so once started, bubbles can become quite difficult to stop.

We also should note that real estate bubbles – as monetary events – tend to coincide with sharemarket bubbles, and with exchange rate appreciations.

The central problem in 2020 is the inadequate flow of money into (and through) the government sector of the economy. In the absence of adequate lending into the government and real economy sectors, the money flows instead into the ‘bubble’ sector.

The 2003 to 2008 Bubble

From 2005 to 2007, the tradable section of the New Zealand economy was in recession; that’s the core section of the economy relating to businesses, such as primary industries and manufacturing, which compete internationally. Instead, in those years, an incipient bubble economy overtook the core economy. The Reserve Bank responded by tightening monetary policy, raising interest rates progressively towards a peak OCR (Official Cash Rate) of over eight percent early in 2008.

The underlying problem was the tradable-sector recession. It meant that money which would otherwise have been invested in the tradable-sector was diverted into the bubble sectors.

The actions of the Reserve Bank made the problem worse. By progressively raising interest rates, they kept pulling foreign money into New Zealand at a time when the core New Zealand economy was struggling, and no longer attractive to banks. This inflow of foreign money raised the New Zealand dollar exchange rate, further damaging the core tradable sector, and reinforcing the diversion of money into the bubble economy.

Many jobs were created in the growing bubble economy, and much tax was paid from the bubble economy. These were not the conditions which required the government sector to borrow money. So the New Zealand economy was awash with money, but neither the core economy nor the government were borrowing much of that money.

The money flowed into – that is, was lent into – the non-tradable economy of retail and real estate and financial (and related) services, despite high interest rates; indeed, because the high interest rates diminished the flow of money into the core economy, one can argue that, at that time, the house price and other bubbles persevered because of high interest rates. Further, if we go back to 2004 and 2005, it was probably higher interest rates that brought about the recession of the core economy that became New Zealand’s central economic problem of the years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

The 2012 to 2017 Bubble

This bubble came in the wake of the GFC, and was created in the global economy by the premature ending of ‘fiscal stimulus’ measures, given names such as ‘fiscal consolidation’ and ‘austerity’.

To get out of an economic depression, governments need to take the lead by running very large financial deficits. If done properly, much of this money flows indirectly into the core economy; employment and tax revenues increase, and government-sector financial deficits naturally fall to normal levels. This should be done in a way so that a country’s exchange rate does not rise prematurely; thus interest rates need to stay low for quite a long time.

A classic case of this recovery and expansion being done correctly was the 1935 to 1938 first term of the First Labour Government.

In the years 2012 to 2017, most countries’ governments did this incorrectly. While interest rates did stay low, there was a big push worldwide for governments to cut back, substantially, on their borrowing. A result was that many important government-led programmes were stifled, and an opportunity to reverse income inequality was lost. In many countries, money that should have gone into government social spending and universal benefits went instead into the bubble economy. In countries like New Zealand, this was reinforced by large inflows of foreign money relative to the size of their economies.

Bubble dynamics reasserted themselves this post-GFC time, with much lower global interest rates than in previous times. While interest rates are significant to the core economy, they are largely irrelevant to the bubble sectors. If an ‘investor’ with $200,000 can borrow $800,000 to buy a million dollar property, and then sell the property for $1,100,000 one year later, that’s a 50 percent return on their money; a substantial personal gain whether the mortgage interest rate was four percent or ten percent.

Bubbles do come to a natural hiatus after about five years. From 2017 to 2019, the capital gains from property speculation diminished, less money was flowing out of China and other saver economies, and conditions in the core economic sectors in the world became more favourable for bank lending. Economies grew, with 2019 becoming a very successful year in the global economy; though with the proviso that substantial environmental problems, inequality issues and identity issues came to the fore of our concerns. (And Brexit completely dominated United Kingdom politics.) In New Zealand in 2017, a new Labour-led government created sufficient uncertainty to quieten a bubble economy that was already running out of puff; and legislation prohibiting foreign purchases of New Zealand houses had some direct impact on dwelling purchases as well as indirect impact through perceptions that capital gains would diminish.

In New Zealand, neither immigration nor housing supply were the main causes of real estate inflation. In an economy with a growing population and a housing shortage, the first symptom should be an increase in market rents. Rising house prices should then follow, as landlords’ yields increase. That’s not what happened. Rather house prices increased first; rents eventually followed, though many property ‘investors’ did not care so much about their rental income because increasingly their ‘wealth’ came from capital gains rather than from collecting rents.

The actual housing crisis in New Zealand had little to do with house prices; and much to do with inequality, a lack of social housing, and a broken private rental market. In the 2017 to 2020 period, social housing and the private rental markets have improved in many cities; in Auckland there are many newly constructed apartments, recently completed or still under construction, sited close to public transport nodes.

The 2020 Bubble

At a time of Covid-19 pandemic emergency, there were few expectations that a property bubble could happen. But the conditions for such a bubble soon emerged.

The first thing to note is that the Reserve Bank is not the problem. Not only is it following its mandate by expanding its balance sheet, it is seeing that the bigger picture requires such an expanded balance sheet in order to play its part in preventing a pandemic from becoming a great economic depression. Under current conditions, monetary policy will not be able to induce the inflation that it is mandated to achieve – indeed that mandate is a case of bad social science (a story to be addressed elsewhere). If substantial inflation does recur in the world – and it might sooner than most of us expect – it will be due to covid-induced supply-chain breakdowns in the coming few years; nothing to do with monetary policy.

We need to picture a (monetary) basin with three plugholes; yes we can use water flows as a good analogue for monetary flows (its called liquidity). When more money is required for the economy, the Reserve Bank supplies the basin with money by expanding its balance sheet. The first plughole leads to the ‘real economy’, which is households buying goods and services and businesses making and selling them. The second plughole leads to governments – the government sector including local governments – the ‘fiscal’ economy. The third plughole leads to financial markets; to an inherently speculative ‘bubble economy’ that includes the market for urban land. The draining of the (monetary) basin represents the injection of necessary money into the economy.

The three plugholes are:

1.  real economy plughole (private sector)
2. fiscal plughole (public sector)
3. bubble economy plughole (speculative sector)

The Reserve Bank’s effective mandate is to ensure a sufficient flow of money into the real economy. But the commercial banks are the gatekeepers (plughole keepers!) which facilitate or inhibit the draining process.

The economy we inhabit can be likened to a human ecosystem below the plugholes, and the economy needs to be lubricated by sufficient quantities of money. Economic contraction (eg recession) occurs when the real economy is under-lubricated; inflation, on the other hand, may occur when the economy is over-lubricated. The bubble-economy is the part of the human ecosystem that is most susceptible to inflation; the real economy is usually able to slow down the circulation of money when it is over-lubricated, thus averting inflation.

The commercial banks manage these three plugholes, though unevenly. The extent of their gatekeeping relates to the different grades of ‘security’ that accompany different types of bank lending. Bank gatekeeping constrains the ‘real economy’ plughole, because ordinary business finance is the least secure form of lending. The fiscal plughole is subject to minimal bank gatekeeping, because governments’ legal powers to tax constitute a very high level of financial security. Bank gatekeeping is reflected in interest rates; ordinary businesses and consumers (eg via credit cards) pay the highest interest rates. Governments generally pay the lowest interest rates.

Typically, economic recessions follow financial crises. During financial crises, the ‘bubble economy’ plughole closes, precipitating the recession. This induces a loss of spending confidence, as people and businesses exposed to the bubble economy sharply retrench their spending. So the real economy plughole also closes; not fully, but substantially. This diminished monetary flow into the real economy is partly a result of less business and household desire to borrow, and partly a result of more stringent gatekeeping by the lending banks.

In such a recession, the ongoing success of the economy depends on the fiscal plughole. In 2009 we saw all governments open the fiscal plughole to save their economies – it was called ‘fiscal stimulus’. The New Zealand government response was comparatively muted; the New Zealand economy largely recovered as a result of new spending enabled by other countries’ governments’ stimuluses.

In 2020, the economic contraction had an unpredictable ‘exogenous’ cause rather than a predictable financial cause; namely, the Covid19 pandemic. In this case the bubble plughole never closed; that is the key point of difference this time. The private economy plughole, however, in 2020 closed to a similar extent to which it closed in late 2008 during the GFC. In response, the fiscal plughole briefly opened wide in New Zealand early in 2020, but then it closed again.

The result, by mid-2020, was a national economy with a basinful of new money, and only one substantially open plughole – the bubble plughole. So, guess what? The money drained through that plughole into the bubble economy. There was nowhere else for that money to go.

Who is to blame? Well, maybe the banks could gatekeep less re the real (private) economy plughole. But much of the private economy is in a balance sheet recession, so is not presently confident to borrow much, even if subject to reduced gatekeeping. Unsecured distress lending imposes high financial risks to the commercial banks.

The problem is the Government; in particular, the Minister of Finance. The fiscal plughole needs to be wide open, at least until the private economy plughole opens sufficiently as a result of increased governments’ contributions to the real economy. To discourage money from draining through the bubble plughole, and while awaiting the real economy plughole to reopen, the solution is one of fiscal policy. Opening the fiscal plughole is the solution.

The irony is that – by setting historically record low interest rates – the Reserve Bank is imploring both businesses and governments to borrow. The trouble is that businesses cannot borrow more (due to gatekeeping, and to their own balance sheets) and the government will not borrow more. The New Zealand government chooses to resist the strong price signals from a Reserve Bank which is implicitly begging the government sector to take the lead to defuse the now out-of-control bubble economy.

What the Government could do, this year

The newly-elected government is committed to passing legislation this year to reintroduce a 39 percent tax rate on high marginal incomes. While this tax increase may be an unnecessary expedient that complicates matters, we have to accept that this will happen.

So, as part of the same fiscal package, the government could and should also do the following, to be implemented on the same date as the new income tax bracket:

1.  Replace the lower income tax brackets with a Basic Universal Income of $9,080 ($175 per week) per year to all economic citizens (resident citizens, resident permanent residents, and other people presently resident in New Zealand with working or student visas. For present beneficiaries, the first $175 per week of their benefit would become unconditional. (This provision would have no immediate financial impact on either beneficiaries or on persons earning more than $70,000 per week. By ‘lower tax brackets’, I mean the 10.5%, 17.5% and 30.0% brackets.)
2.  Increase jobseeker and assisted living benefits by $25 per week, and accommodation supplements across the board by 10%. (This provision would mean that all such beneficiaries would be at least $25 per week better off.
3.  Place a substantial ‘stamp duty’ tax on all second homes, all rented homes, and all homes owned by trusts.
4.  Introduce a ‘good landlord’ voluntary warrant of fitness for rented houses, and exempt complying landlords and trusts from the new stamp duty.

The Basic Universal Income (BUI) and benefit increases, in an economy such at that in New Zealand at present, would soak up much of the money otherwise flowing into the bubble economy. The BUI would also free up labour supply – especially for young people presently constrained by the requirements of conditional benefits. And it will free up government agencies to help those people and families with more complex needs. The BUI will ensure that all adults in a household – including recently unemployed women with employed partners – will have unconditional access to a basic income.

The stamp duty will create a disincentive for speculative ‘investor’ money to flow into the real estate market. This money is pushing up prices in such a way that only people who already own houses – or whose parents already own houses – are themselves able to buy houses; and this money is treating houses as a form of financial wealth rather than as a place to call home.

The landlord warrant of fitness exemption becomes a ‘good landlord subsidy’, a way of using a monetary incentive to address the emerging problem of slum housing in New Zealand’s cities.

Summary

The present real estate price bubble is easily explained as the result of a lack of ‘rational’ fiscal policy. In economics, it is rational to respond to price signals; in this case the governments of New Zealand are not responding rationally to the lower interest rates made available to them, and are instead watching as much of the money they could and should be borrowing flows into the secondary housing market.

While there are many things the government could be spending money on – including higher wages in female intensive industries such as health and education – the Basic Universal Income and benefit increase cited above represent the best immediate uses of increased government borrowing.

The improved fiscal policy suggested is a case of win-win, immediately easing the stresses of daily life in today’s uncertain times, while also defusing the out-of-control real estate market.

I am not confident that the government will choose this or any other win-win option. Rather I believe they will choose a lose-lose option; continuance of unnecessary economic insecurity and escalating house prices.

The Weekly Overview is written by Tony Alexander, Chief Economist at the Bank of New Zealand. The views expressed are my own and do not purport to represent the views of the BNZ. This edition has been solely moderated by Tony Alexander. To receive the Weekly Overview each Thursday night please sign up at www.tonyalexander.co.nz

The Weekly Overview is written by Tony Alexander, Chief Economist at the Bank of New Zealand. The views expressed are my own and do not purport to represent the views of the BNZ. This edition has been solely moderated by Tony Alexander. To receive the Weekly Overview each Thursday night please sign up at www.tonyalexander.co.nz

This week we take a look at the dual long-term challenges facing farming – protein alternatives and environmentalism.

The Weekly Overview is written by Tony Alexander, Chief Economist at the Bank of New Zealand. The views expressed are my own and do not purport to represent the views of the BNZ. This edition has been solely moderated by Tony Alexander. To receive the Weekly Overview each Thursday night please sign up at www.tonyalexander.co.nz