Virgin Australia customers with around A$90 million in unused flight credits from COVID cancellations between April 2020 and July 2022 have just one week left to spend those credits – or lose the money. However, following customer complaints, last Friday Virgin made changes to let people to book now and travel later than previously allowed.

If you have some of those unused COVID flight credits, what do those changes mean? And what are your options to try to get a refund? What are Virgin’s new COVID travel credits rules?

Under the airline’s newly revised policy, customers must still book their flights using the travel credits by next Tuesday, June 30. However, they can now travel until May 27, 2027. The airline’s February financial update said there were $93 million in unclaimed COVID credits.

Virgin says it has sent multiple reminders to customers with unused travel credits. However, important messages are often lost among promotional emails – or ignored because people think they’re scams. What Qantas and Jetstar have done During the pandemic, travellers accepted credits not as a preferred alternative to refunds, but because widespread cancellations left them with limited viable options.

For consumers, these credits represent money paid for a service that was never received. Earlier this year, Qantas agreed to pay $105 million to settle a class action brought against the airline over its COVID credits from 2020 to 2022.

If you still have Qantas COVID credits, you can request a refund of the remaining value anytime. Qantas subsidiary Jetstar also has no expiry dates on its COVID flight credits. In contrast, Virgin has set a June 30 deadline to use up the travel credits – and its refund policy, explained below, appears more complicated.

Three possible refund options Like most airlines, at the height of the pandemic, Virgin pledged to allow affected travellers to change their flight dates or receive travel credits. This “flexible flying policy” ended on April 30, 2022.

But travellers were still offered travel credits for flights booked up until July that year. Now, with only a week left before the June 30 booking deadline, credit holders might be seeking a refund. But is this even possible?

Here are three options to consider. Option 1: the airline’s refund policies Virgin’s flight rules at the time of these COVID bookings stated that refunds were only available if Virgin’s “Fare Rules” permitted.

The Fare Rules and Guest Compensation policy entitle customers to request a refund or travel credit. They do not state the grounds upon which Virgin will actually issue either. So the policy is ambiguous on refund rights.

A travel credit technically represents the total compensation for a cancelled flight. So under contract law, you would not necessarily have the right to a refund. Virgin stores all travel credits in a “travel bank”.

It has discretion on extending their expiry date.

If you still have unused travel credits, Virgin’s revised policy implies that you have a right to seek a refund, but loops you back to the Fare Rules, which again are silent on refund criteria.

In short: it can’t hurt to plead your case with Virgin, but there are no guarantees. Option 2: check your travel insurance Some travel insurance policies will cover you for unused airline-issued travel credits. Inclusions sometimes extend to lost prepaid expenses, unused vouchers and non-refundable portions of original fares (subject to limits).

If you had travel insurance, it’s worth checking the terms of the policy with your insurer. Option 3: Australian Consumer Law The Australian Consumer Law gives consumers certain rights. These rights override company policies, including on refunds.

Services must be: rendered with due care and skill reasonably fit for purpose supplied within a reasonable time. The courts have previously found these guarantees do apply to air travel. An airline refusing to issue a refund instead of travel credits due to COVID travel restrictions may risk violating these consumer guarantees.

If the airline cancels a flight and never provides the service, the passenger has not received what they paid for. Offering a time-limited voucher, instead of a refund, may not remedy that problem if it is later unusable, or expires before it can be spent.

In those circumstances, the airline arguably has not properly met its obligation to supply the service. Where these guarantees are “seriously” breached, the consumer is entitled to apply (under Section 267 of the Australian Consumer Law for compensation equivalent to the airfare initially paid.

This is open to interpretation. For example, cancelling an easily rebookable holiday is less likely to count as a “serious” breach. But a multi-stop trip planned for a special occasion, which can’t easily be rebooked, is more likely to count.

To try this option, submit a claim in writing to Virgin before June 30, citing your consumer law rights. If the airline does not offer reasonable alternatives, you could then try contacting the consumer watchdog, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.

Back when the pandemic prompted mass flight cancellations, the ACCC publicly encouraged airlines to fairly compensate customers. Clearer consumer protection is needed There’s a strong case to argue this whole process needs to be simpler for consumers, as it is in Europe.

Responding to a marked increase in complaints about airlines over recent years, the federal government recently allocated $40 million to overhaul airline passenger rights. But it’s still unclear what practical difference that, and proposed new aviation consumer protection laws, will make for travellers.

Simpler, stronger consumer protections would help avoid confusion for consumers in future.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/22/times-running-out-to-book-virgin-flight-credits-before-june-30-what-are-your-refund-rights/

Change is impacting on all of us, whether we are navigating a pathway ahead with our careers, balancing the pressures and increases in our cost of living, or considering the consequences of global systemic change.

Today, we will examine the structure of systemic change and approach it from four important angles:

• Systemic Change
• Geopolitical Change
• Normative Change
• Structural Change.

So, let’s deep dive into these issues with Paul and take the conversation to a deeper level of understanding.

Plus; for more on this topic, see 36th-Parallel.com where Paul lays out his analysis titled:

Systemic Change, Institutional Lag and Societal Resilience

Back to, A View from Afar podcast; we invite you to subscribe, like, and click notifications in the YouTube link so that you don’t miss another live episode.

And, remember, if you are joining us live , you can comment and lodge questions but remember we may include your comments and questions in our programmes.

You can also follow this podcast via the following podcast platforms:

Australia’s new law on supermarket “price gouging” (also known as excessive pricing) starts on July 1 2026.

It prohibits any very large supermarket with revenue exceeding A$30 billion – currently only Coles and Woolworths – from charging a price for a grocery product that is significantly excessive compared to the cost of supply, plus a reasonable margin.

The law is an addition to the existing mandatory Food and Grocery Code. It will be enforced by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Significant financial penalties apply for any breach. The law comes into effect at a time when the major supermarkets are under scrutiny for their pricing practices.

Recently Coles was found to have misled consumers under its “Down Down” promotion, where it advertised prices as reduced, even though the prices were higher than originally advertised. Significant penalties are expected. A similar action by the ACCC against Woolworths is awaiting judgment.

Why was the new law introduced? The new law fulfils the Labor government’s pre-election promise to ban supermarket price gouging as part of its commitment to address cost of living pressures. The law was introduced following evidence of rising grocery prices.

Last year, the ACCC’s supermarkets inquiry found Coles and Woolworths have significant market share – more than two thirds of Australian grocery sales. They are also among the most profitable supermarket businesses globally and face little competition.

Although the ACCC did not recommend an excessive pricing law, it anticipated that greater competition would reduce profit margins in the sector. Other inquiries into supermarket pricing, including by the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Senate Select Committee into supermarket prices, recommended an excessive pricing law.

Separate parliamentary inquiries in Queensland and South Australia also pointed to the need for tighter regulation of the sector. Australia’s law goes further than other countries Australia’s law is unique.

Countries that have introduced a dedicated price gouging law have done so primarily for a limited time in cases of emergency, like the COVID pandemic, when products (such as face masks) are scarce and the risk of price gouging is high.

The European Union uses its competition law to prohibit large companies from abusing their dominance to harm competition, including by charging excessive prices. However, excessive pricing is not expressly part of Australia’s competition law.

Instead, Australia chose to include excessive pricing in the Grocery Code. This approach confines excessive pricing only to large supermarkets, rather than to other sectors of the economy. Even so, it is expected Australia will rely on competition cases from the EU and the United Kingdom in applying the new law.

However, even in the EU and UK, the cases are not extensive and the principles around what constitutes an excessive price are not fully settled. How will the law apply in practice? The new law does not define when prices are significantly excessive (or provide examples), nor does it specify what is a reasonable profit margin.

In the EU, the overarching test of whether a price is excessive is if the price is significantly above what would be charged in a competitive market. However, the test will be difficult to apply because the nature of a supermarket business involves costs that are spread across a huge portfolio of products.

So it is hard to allocate costs and profits to a single product. Supermarkets also deal with hundreds of suppliers, with prices and costs changing frequently. Therefore, courts and regulators look to other means for determining whether a price is excessive.

This could be the price charged by other companies for a similar product, or the price charged for the product in different places or at different times. The new law places an emphasis on whether a supermarket is making a “reasonable” profit margin.

However, determining the profit margin of a business is notoriously difficult and what is “reasonable” is open to debate and proof. All this means the new law will be difficult to apply, as noted in Treasury’s consultation paper.

What can consumers expect from the new law? In practice, the new law is likely to be used only infrequently, given the difficulties of proof. Large supermarkets will also have an incentive to defend any excessive pricing claim brought by the ACCC.

The law is not a silver bullet for achieving fair grocery prices or for addressing cost of living pressures. Consumers need to manage their expectations of what it can realistically achieve on its own. It was always intended that the excessive pricing law would be part of a broader armoury of consumer measures.

This includes: the new merger law, which requires major supermarkets to notify the ACCC of certain acquisitions funding the consumer group CHOICE to provide greater transparency on consumer prices, and funding for the ACCC to address misleading conduct by supermarkets, including increased funding in the recent May budget.

The new law does put Coles and Woolworths on notice that their pricing practices are being watched. Will these July 1 changes transform the market dominance of Woolworths and Coles? It’s unlikely.

But having new commercial incentives for large supermarkets to review their pricing practices can only be positive for consumers.

Ray Steinwall is a member of the Australian Competition Tribunal and a member of the Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia.

These are his personal views.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/the-new-price-gouging-law-starts-on-july-1-can-it-rein-in-coles-and-woolworths/

A 12-year-old government with a premier under siege. An untried opposition that has weathered multiple scandals and leadership changes. And a right-wing populist party on the march among disaffected voters. With all this in play, Victoria’s November state election is shaping up to be one of the most significant in recent memory.

And while it is usually accepted wisdom that state elections are fought on state issues, the rise of One Nation at the expense of the two major parties could offer an insight into what is happening on a federal level.

Challenge of a fourth term At first glance, this election looks like a familiar story of a long-term government, a restless electorate, and an opposition waiting for its moment. Labor has been in office in Victoria for 12 years, and the weight of that tenure is showing.

Labor has dominated Victorian politics for over two decades, winning six of the last seven elections. Former Coalition PM John Howard dubbed Victoria the “Massachusetts of Australia” in reference to the Victorian Labor’s persistent success.

It is widely regarded as the most progressive state in the country, particularly in city seats. Since returning to office in 2014, it has faced few major electoral threats from the opposition. At the 2022 election, the government – at the time led by Daniel Andrews – was re-elected with 56 of the 88 seats in the lower house.

However, since 2024, Labor has lost its lead in the two-party preferred vote. Recent polls suggest the government is facing the prospect of electoral defeat. Labor has fallen behind the Coalition and One Nation on primary votes, while Premier Jacinta Allan’s net approval was –37.

Allan’s own seat of Bendigo East is likely also to be one to watch in a hotly contested battle against Nationals candidate Andrew Lethlean. In this context, there has also been frequent speculation over Allan’s leadership and campaigns targeting the premier personally.

Allan has managed to hold on to the position of party leader despite recurring rumours of impending spills. However, the underlying anxiety within Labor has not gone away. Last week, the secretary of the Victorian Trades Hall Luke Hilakari criticised Labor MPs for not campaigning enough in their constituencies to combat the rise of One Nation.

Hilakari urged MPs to “work their arse off” in the lead up to the election or to expect the withdrawal of union campaigning support in their electorates. This reveals the level of concern in the union movement at the threat One Nation poses at the next election.

Hilakari told Patricia Karvalas on ABC’s Afternoon Briefing they anticipate One Nation to pick up between 20 and 25 seats in November. A weakened opposition Heading into an election with an unpopular Labor government seeking a fourth term would normally pave the way for a Coalition victory.

However, the Coalition only holds 28 seats, a far cry from the 45 required to form government. Although the Nationals gained ground at the last state election, the Liberal Party went backwards, losing seats to Labor in the suburbs and regions.

The years since have been a turbulent period for the opposition in Victoria, with ideological divisions, factional in-fighting and three changes in leadership. The current leader, Jess Wilson, is a moderate who has managed to maintain relative party unity since stepping into the role in November last year.

Wilson has kept the party focused on sore points for the Allan government, such as crime levels, growing state debt and accusations of fraud and corruption on some of the state’s’ most significant infrastructure projects.

Along with cost of living, these issues have dominated the campaign so far. Although there have been some glimpses of successful campaigning communications, it remains unclear if it will be enough to win a majority Liberal-National Coalition government.

Australia’s evolving party landscape The accepted wisdom has been that Australian voters treat state and federal elections as distinct contests.

Although the issues dominating Victorian politics at the moment are largely state issues, the election is likely to be watched closely across the country because of what it reveals about the changing party system in Australia.

Both traditional parties of government are confronted with a declining vote share and the unpredictability of a fragmented electorate. The Liberals are facing challenges on both sides from One Nation and independents. Labor is being challenged by the Greens in the inner city, while One Nation and the Liberals pose a threat in the suburbs and regions.

There is no clear roadmap for the parties in navigating the path to government in a fragmenting party system. Currently, One Nation only holds one seat in the Victorian upper house, but given its current poll numbers, it seems likely to have a significant presence in the next parliament.

If a hung parliament is returned, One Nation may be potentially decisive in determining who forms the next Victorian government.

Whatever the results, November will reveal important insights into the trajectory of Australian party politics: whether the major parties can adapt to a fragmenting landscape, and whether minor parties like One Nation have the organisational capacity to sustain their rapid rise.

Emily Foley receives funding from the Australian Research Council

Nicholas Barry and Phoebe Hayman do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/why-the-whole-country-will-be-watching-victorias-november-state-election/

Alistair Berg/Getty Images Victorian high schools have been asked to include “planned device-free time” in their learning from term 1 2027. Schools will be able to make individual decisions on how this works, but it could include using whiteboards or paper, group debates, practical experiments or performances instead.

This follows a screen-time cap of 90 minutes for years 3-6, with minimal use in the first year of school to Year 2. How are other states approaching device use for school learning? What does the research say is needed?

What do other states do? Screen time guidelines are nothing new – but they were initially developed for health reasons, not for school learning. Many Australian states follow national movement guidelines, which recommend no more than two hours recreational screen time per day for children aged 5-17.

This does not include screen time needed for school work. Victoria is the first state in Australia to look at guidelines for schools. Some private schools around the country are also promoting they have “screen-free” time or are largely device-free.

While not a mainstream approach, these schools promote their screen-free time approach as a mark of quality education. There’s no ‘magic number’ There was some confusion around Victoria’s “device-free” announcement, over whether Education Minister Ben Carroll had suggested a specific time limit for screen use.

A spokesperson later clarified there was no set limit. This makes sense. Minute-by-minute counting of student technology use would not only be an administrative nightmare for schools, but meaningless when it comes to the type or quality of learning with screens.

The research tells us there is no “magic screen time number” to guarantee quality learning. It depends how the technology is used and for what. For example, a student can spend two hours writing, designing and creating a digital book.

Another can spend two hours watching videos on auto-feed with no decision-making, creativity or problem-solving involved. Rising concerns Public concern about young people’s technology use is real and important. In an attempt to address this, we have seen smartphones banned in schools across all Australian states in the last five years.

Further restriction of screens outside school are occurring with the social media ban for under 16s. But despite these concerns, there is also a risk that smartphones, social media, AI, recreational screen use and teacher-directed classroom activities are bundled together as one broad “screen-time” problem.

This means concerns about one form of technology can shape policy responses to another, even though they present different risks, purposes and educational possibilities. What does this mean for schools? According to 2022 OECD research, digital devices can distract students, particularly when used for leisure during lessons or when students are distracted by classmates’ devices.

The research also found devices can be associated with stronger learning outcomes – when they are used with a focused learning purpose. When used well they can make lessons more engaging and interactive in complex subjects like science and maths, and equip students with essential skills such as problem-solving and teamwork.

This means schools have decisions to make. Digital devices and uses might help students visualise a difficult idea, model a process, investigate an authentic problem, collaborate, create, receive feedback or improve access for students with different learning needs.

At other times, discussion, handwriting, sustained reading, physical materials or outdoor learning may be more effective. It depends on which bit of the curriculum is being taught and the purpose of the particular lesson. We are also immersed in more technology than ever and schools must prepare students for a world shaped by digital systems and artificial intelligence.

Students need to learn how to evaluate online information, identify misleading or biased AI outputs, protect their privacy, create with technology, behave safely online and manage distractions. What can parents ask their schools? For parents, it may not always be clear how screens are being used in their child’s day.

We know families have an important role here. They can support healthy routines at home, talk with children about their online experiences and ask schools how technology is being used more generally.

Useful questions to ask your child’s teacher or school could include: what is the learning purpose of the technology? how does it improve or extend the learning? how are distraction, privacy and online safety managed? how are students being taught to use digital tools and AI responsibly?

Students should also have a voice in decisions about their technology use. The ways they experience technology often differ to that of adults. Young people experience both the benefits and harms of digital environments directly.

They can offer important insights into how devices support learning, where they create distraction and any unintended consequences of planned policy changes.

Joanne Orlando receives funding from the NSW government and NSW Department of Education and Training.

Kate Highfield has received funding from the Australia government, but none in relation to this work.

Thembi Mason has received funding from the Australian government, but none in relation to this work.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/victoria-wants-daily-device-free-time-in-high-schools-what-works-best-for-learning/

The Conversation, CC BY-SA Canadian astronaut Jeremy Hansen had an emotional message before he and three colleagues set off for the Moon earlier this year on the Artemis II mission: “We go for all humanity”.

The successful ten-day lunar flyby mission was an impressive scientific feat. But its importance may not have been for all humanity: it was primarily geopolitical. Because, just like the 20th century space race between the Soviets and Americans, the new race to return to the Moon is highly politically charged.

To stop this race from morphing into a future catastrophe – one that could have debilitating consequences for life on Earth – there’s an urgent need to strengthen how space is governed. Only by fostering a deeper sense of “space citizenship” will all of humanity benefit from our journeys to the Moon – and beyond.

The race to the Moon and beyond is accelerating. Some say it’s for the benefit of all humanity. But is it really? In this seven-part series, we explore what our future in space will look like, how we might travel and survive out there, and what’s needed to stop a catastrophe from happening.

From space race to space war The new space race involves many more players than the first one. It includes Canada, China, Europe, India, Japan, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and, of course, the US.

It also includes private companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, Boeing, Space Machines, Intuitive Machines, iSpace, and many others. And why do they all want to reach the Moon? Because it contains resources – water and possibly helium-3 – which can be used as fuel.

Whoever has access to, and domination over, these resources, will have a major strategic advantage. All of this matters for very pragmatic reasons for those of us on Earth. You have probably already used space at least 20 times today – for example, to check the weather on an app or buy a coffee with your phone.

The satellites that orbit Earth enable all of this. They also provide crucial information about climate change, farming and fisheries, drinking water, and responses to natural disasters. But too many satellites and too much space debris could lead to catastrophic collisions and therefore outages of critical satellite connectivity.

Today’s militaries are also highly dependent on satellites for navigation, intelligence, communications and targeting. As a result, military operations regularly interfere with and target satellites in order to compromise adversaries. There’s a possibility this could lead to an all-out war in space.

This would potentially involve destroying satellites, creating uncontrollable debris, which in turn would lead to unusable orbits and a greater loss of critical connectivity. Current space governance and space law mechanisms do a lot to safeguard against these doomsday scenarios.

But just as with any system that depends upon international agreement, there are limitations to these mechanisms – especially given how international relations have ruptured recently.

A lesson from the Cold War Signed at the height of the Cold War, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty states: space is the province of all humankind there shall be no appropriation or claims of sovereignty weapons of mass destruction are prohibited space shall be used for peaceful purposes.

Some argue the treaty is outdated or not fit for purpose in the 21st century. But the best way to view it is as a constitution. Like national constitutions, it provides broad, enduring values and organising principles designed to withstand the test of time.

Just as in domestic legal systems, any specific technical and or behavioural rules need to be addressed by lower-level regulations that can be changed over time without disrupting the constitution. The challenge today is how to get to those lower-level rules.

If we leave it solely up to international relations between countries, there are so many politically unstable relationships we are likely to get nowhere. If we leave it solely up to the private sector, the rules will probably be based on self-interest rather than the common good.

We need to include as many different actors and interests as possible. This is not simple. But it’s the only way forward. A combined effort There are several initiatives under way to tackle space governance challenges which don’t rely only on states, and which include non-binding principles or guidelines.

Some of these are led by the private sector. They are therefore more likely to be flexible enough to adapt to changes in technology, and to gain support from commercial actors. Some are traditionally multilateral through the United Nations.

They are very slow moving and subject to politicisation, but at least they work towards political agreement.

Others are “minilateral” through smaller groups such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Quad (a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), NATO, the African Union, the European Space Agency.

These are more likely to come up with agreed norms because these groups already operate closely together. Others still are based on agreement of basic principles, like the Artemis Accords, which are a non-binding set of guidelines about activities on the Moon.

Securing our future in space We are at a crossroads in modern history. We can either allow Earth to suffocate under a blanket of space debris and space warfare, leaving humanity to flounder without access to all the things satellites make possible.

Or we can shift our very relationship to space. We inhabit space, we depend on space, and space is part of who we are. We are already space citizens.

Just as individuals and civil society have a growing role to play in the global governance of artificial intelligence, big tech, social media, climate response, and education, so too we have a role to play in how we use or abuse space.

By understanding that space is part of our life on Earth, we can close the gap between ourselves (individually and societally) and those who currently have a say in global space governance mechanisms. Approaching this shared responsibility as space citizens is the only way forward in the 21st century.

Our current and future generations depend upon it.

Cassandra Steer has received funding from the Canadian Department of Defence, the Australian Department of Defence, the Australian Space Agency, DFAT, Geoscience Australia, and Home Affairs.

She has received research funding from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Australian Research Council, and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. She is Currently CEO of the not-for-profit Australasian Centre for Space Governance.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/todays-space-race-could-turn-fatal-if-we-dont-agree-on-new-rules/

There is strong evidence that transitioning from animal to more plant-based diets could improve human and planetary health, but progress has been slow. This is partly due to a misunderstanding of what drives the behaviour of individuals and organizations alike.

If people know these foods can be better for themselves and for the planet, the thinking goes, they should buy and eat more of them. The foods we buy and consume are often discussed as if they are simply a matter of personal choice.

But grocery shopping rarely works that way. Most people make food decisions while managing a budget, comparing prices and relying on habits built over years. In that setting, good intentions can lose out to price, convenience and whatever products are most visible.

Governments and public health organizations are encouraging people to shift toward more plant-based diets. If the goal is to make sustainable eating more common, we need to understand how people actually shop. Our recent research suggests two things are especially important: affordability and visibility.

Plant-based foods need to be affordable for most people and visible enough to become integrated into their everyday choices. Price matters, but not in simple ways In our study, we analyzed grocery store loyalty card data from more than 29,000 consumers in Finland.

We compared how shoppers responded to price changes across plant-based and animal-based foods, including legumes, plant-based beverages, dairy products, meat, fish and eggs. We found that shoppers were price-sensitive across both groups. When prices rose, people generally bought less.

But consumers were less responsive to price changes for plant-based proteins than for animal-based ones. This may seem surprising. Plant-based foods are often described as expensive or inaccessible. We also found that plant-based proteins were more expensive.

Price does matter, but the story is more complicated than saying plant-based foods simply cost too much. One reason may be that shoppers often have fewer choices of brands and products in plant-based categories. If there are only a few brands or products on the shelf, consumers who want or need plant-based options have fewer alternatives when prices rise.

For people who are vegan, vegetarian or trying to avoid animal products, switching away may not feel like a real option, even when prices seem high. Affordability is an equity issue We also found that income and education shaped how people responded to prices.

Lower-income consumers were generally more sensitive to price changes. However, the gap between lower- and higher-income consumers was much larger for animal-based proteins than for plant-based ones. A similar pattern appeared when we tested grocery data from more than 58,000 consumers in Canada.

The results pointed in the same direction: price matters differently depending on the food category and the consumer. This has practical implications. Policymakers and retailers cannot treat all consumers or all plant-based foods the same.

Discounts, promotions or even taxes on different protein foods may have a larger impact on lower-income households, especially when budgets are tight. But affordability is only part of the story. Visibility changes what people buy In another study, we examined plant-based beverage purchases across 242 grocery stores in Québec.

We looked at how flyer, mobile app and in-store promotions affected demand. The most effective promotions were flyer promotions. These were visible before and during shopping: in paper flyers, digital flyers and on store shelves.

Mobile promotions also increased demand, especially when they offered bonus loyalty points. In-store promotions had a smaller effect. The lesson is not that one type of promotion always wins. Timing and visibility matter. A product is more likely to be bought when it is brought to mind before the shopping trip and remains visible on store shelves.

This matters because many consumers are still forming habits around plant-based foods. People may be open to buying them, but forget them in the store, miss them on the shelf or default to familiar animal-based products.

Promotions can help overcome the “out of sight, out of mind” problem. But frequent promotions can also train consumers to wait for discounts. That may increase short-term sales while making shoppers more sensitive to regular prices later.

For retailers, this means selling plant-based products should not rely only on temporary discounts. They should also make products easier to find and consistently affordable for shoppers. Equity should be central to sustainable food policy.

A sustainable food transition that ignores affordability risks becoming a project for people who can already afford to choose differently. Plant-based eating is not just about changing minds.

It is about changing the conditions in which food choices happen: the prices people face, the products stores carry, the promotions shoppers see and the everyday habits that guide what goes into a consumer’s basket.

Cameron McRae receives funding from Michael Smith Health Research BC and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

Laurette Dube receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the Public Health Agency of Canada.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/plant-based-products-need-to-be-easier-to-find-and-consistently-affordable-for-shoppers/

When Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation went to court recently to challenge Alberta’s handling of the proposed Wonder Valley AI Data Centre Park project, the dispute underscored a question that is increasingly difficult to ignore: What does Canada’s artificial intelligence future require from land, water and energy systems?

Wonder Valley, which would be located south of Grande Prairie, has been advertised as the world’s largest AI data centre park. Alberta’s major projects listing describes its first phase as a 1.4-gigawatt off-grid power system leveraging the provincial natural gas and geothermal resources.

The project is only one example of a broader trend. The federal government’s new “AI for All” strategy links AI to economic growth, jobs and national competitiveness. The strategy also points to expanding “sovereign compute” and supporting the construction of large-scale AI data centres.

Read more: Sovereign AI? Anthropic shutdown reveals Canada’s weakness AI is resource-dependent These ambitions make the environmental debates significant. AI is often described as if it lives in “the cloud.” The persistent controversies regarding Wonder Valley illustrate the fallacy of this metaphor.

Artificial intelligence relies on material resources: land, electricity, water, cooling systems, transmission lines, gas infrastructure, minerals and servers. When those demands become concentrated in one place, AI becomes an environmental and energy issue. My research focuses on environmental communication, including the politics of fossil fuel development in Canada.

In my recent book on Alberta oilsands communication, I examined how oilsands projects are framed as matters of prosperity, national interest and technological progress. As someone who follows Alberta’s energy politics closely, the media coverage of Wonder Valley caught my attention.

My analysis of articles published by mainstream Canadian outlets about the project’s launch phase revealed a telling pattern. Coverage was limited for a proposal of such scale, but the stories that did appear carried strong symbolic weight.

Wonder Valley has been touted for the substantial investment it could bring, and as an opportunity to convert Alberta’s energy resources into a competitive edge in the AI economy. That narrative, however, deserves scrutiny.

AI’s use of resources AI data centres are industrial facilities built to keep servers running continuously. This requires reliable electricity, cooling and backup systems. The International Energy Agency predicts that global electricity consumption from data centres, primarily driven by AI development, could more than double by 2030, reaching about 945 terawatt-hours.

Water is also crucial. Depending on design and location, data centres may use large amounts of water directly for cooling or indirectly through electricity generation. Reporting by The Narwhal has raised serious concerns about Canada’s data centre boom, especially where projects are proposed in water-stressed regions or on contested land.

The main concern raised by Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation regards the project’s potential water use and the duty to consult Indigenous nations on developments that could impact them.

This is why the Wonder Valley debate cannot be reduced to a simple narrative of “Alberta is open for business.” It is also about who gets access to water, whose power system is reorganized and whose land and resources are made available for AI infrastructure.

What the cloud hides The cloud metaphor makes these material demands less visible. It encourages us to think of digital services as weightless, clean and placeless. Researchers of digital infrastructure have long challenged this view.

Media scholar Mél Hogan’s research on data centres’ alarming water consumption shows how digital systems are bound to local ecosystems. Similarly, scholars like Sean Cubitt, Richard Maxwell and Toby Miller have argued that media technologies are never environmentally neutral.

They depend on extraction, energy use and waste. Another useful idea is the “digital sublime,” which describes how new technologies are often surrounded by myths of transformation, inevitability and national renewal. Such myths can make infrastructure projects appear almost beyond ordinary political debate.

The promotional language surrounding Wonder Valley are consistent with this pattern. The emphasis on scale, innovation and Alberta’s future as an AI hub resulted in environmental concerns being either disregarded or treated as technical issues to be resolved at a later time.

Data as the new oil One of the most revealing phrases in coverage of Alberta’s AI ambitions is that “data is the new oil.” In one sense, the phrase is meant to signal opportunity.

It suggests Alberta can use its energy expertise, gas reserves, cold climate and industrial land to compete in the global AI economy. But it also reveals continuity. The project is not presented as a break from Alberta’s fossil fuel economy.

It is framed as its next stage. Natural gas is positioned to power artificial intelligence. Recent reporting by The Tyee has shown how data centres are being discussed as “creating new markets for Canadian natural gas producers.” This should concern Canadians.

If AI infrastructure becomes a new justification for fossil fuel expansion, then the language of innovation may end up extending older forms of resource dependence. Rethinking AI infrastructure Canada needs a comprehensive AI strategy; however, a strategy that lauds data centres without adequately considering energy, water, land and Indigenous rights is insufficient.

Before governments promote AI data centres as engines of economic growth, they should require transparent public disclosure of expected electricity demand, water use, emissions, land impacts and consultation processes. Treaty obligations should not be treated as procedural hurdles.

They should shape whether and how projects proceed.

The key challenge confronting Canada is whether it will build AI infrastructure through the same old resource development playbook or whether it will use this moment to set stronger rules for a more accountable digital economy.

Sibo Chen receives funding from Toronto Metropolitan University and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

He is affiliated with International Environmental Communication Association and the Environment, Science, and Risk Communication Section of International Association for Media and Communication Research.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/canadas-ai-strategy-must-reckon-with-the-environmental-implications-of-data-centres/

The peace deal between the US and Iran calls not just for the cessation of hostilities between the two countries, but also between Israel and Hezbollah. It also calls for Lebanese territorial integrity and sovereignty to be respected.

This places Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a political conundrum, because ceasing hostilities against Hezbollah runs contrary to his government’s determination to finally crush its nemesis. Netanyahu now faces difficult decisions. Does he kowtow to the US, Israel’s longstanding ally and security guarantor, in an election year?

Or does he defy the US and continue Israel’s military onslaught against Hezbollah? An answer to these questions seemed to come in part on June 19, when Israel and Hezbollah agreed on yet another ceasefire.

However, the next day Israel bombed Lebanon, and Iran once again closed the Strait of Hormuz. Elections at home Since the beginning of Israel’s current war against Hezbollah in March 2026, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has advanced into southern and eastern Lebanon.

In the process, the IDF has pushed Hezbollah out of its traditional strongholds and bombed targets in southern Beirut. To date, the war has killed more than 4,000 Lebanese people and forced another 1 million to flee their homes.

On June 1, IDF units captured the strategically important Beaufort Castle, allowing the IDF to control most of southern Lebanon, including Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon. Within the areas it now occupies, the IDF has issued “don’t come back” orders, forcibly displacing thousands of Lebanese residents from their homes.

On June 15, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated, “Israeli forces will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza without any time limit” and the zones “would be cleared of local residents and all terror infrastructure including the houses”.

The war is immensely popular in Israel. An April 2026 poll revealed 80% of respondents favoured continuing the war against Hezbollah, even if that created friction with the US. The war’s popularity is crucial for Netanyahu, with national elections due to be held by October.

He is desperate to win another term as prime minister to forestall his long-running corruption trial and stifle debates over his culpability for the intelligence failures that lead to Hamas’s devastating October 7 attacks. In their aftermath, Netanyahu vowed to dramatically change the political landscape of the Middle East.

He did this with wars on Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah. But while these wars have significantly degraded the ability of his nemeses to threaten Israel, they have not been defeated as promised. This means while Netanyahu has indeed changed the political landscape of the Middle East, his wars have arguably made Israel less, rather than more, secure.

Criticism of Netanyahu’s handling of these wars has been growing, with Opposition politician Yair Golan declaring: Netanyahu lied. He promised a historic victory and security for generations, and in practice, we got one of the most severe strategic failures Israel has ever known.

Netanyahu needs continuing military successes in Lebanon to sustain his narrative that he is making Israel safer by defeating its enemies. Elections abroad However, US President Donald Trump is also facing an unfavourable domestic political environment in the lead up to US mid-term elections.

Trump needs an end to an unpopular war to try to create a positive political narrative to stave off potentially losing control of the House and the Senate. He does not want Israeli truculence to make already tense negotiations with Iran harder.

For their part, the Iranians have made the cessation of Israel’s war on Hezbollah and its withdrawal from southern Lebanon the central issue in deciding whether to continue negotiating with the US. This is why Iran again closed the vital Strait of Hormuz after Israel bombed Lebanon on the weekend.

So while Israel and the US may be allies, it is not an equal relationship. The geopolitical needs and desires of the US as the great power will always eclipse those of Israel as the middle power.

Therefore, as prime ministerial aspirant Yair Lapid, puts it, Netanyahu faces “either a direct and destructive confrontation with our greatest ally or a submissive surrender of Israeli interests”. Evidence of how strained the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu is came just before the president signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran.

Trump castigated Netanyahu for ordering the bombing of Hezbollah targets in southern Beirut. He later suggested Syria would do a better job at fighting Hezbollah stating: I’m not happy with the way Israel has handled themselves with Lebanon and with Hezbollah.

It just goes on forever and it throws a negative light on the big deal, and that’s the deal with Iran. Despite the president’s frustrations there has been push-back from senior Israeli ministers.

National Security Minister Ben Gvir said: The prime minister should have told President Trump: We appreciate you, but Israel is a sovereign and independent state that cannot accept the strengthening, or even the existence, of a terrorist organisation on its borders.

In response US Vice President JD Vance stated bluntly that Israeli critics of the US-Iran deal, “need to wake up and smell the reality of the situation that country is in”. In other words, Israel needs the US more than the US needs Israel.

Israel relies on US financial and military support for its security, with the two allies recently signing their own MoU that guarantees the US giving Israel US$3.8 billion per year, including US$500 million for missile defence.

Israel also needs ongoing US diplomatic support to shield it from any future United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions.

These may come from the concurrent investigations by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC) into allegations of Israel committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in its wars against Hamas and Hezbollah.

The situation in Lebanon remains highly volatile, the Israeli people are due to cast their votes before October, and the US is finalising a deal with Iran that will likely run contrary to Israel’s interests.

The question now is what Israel is going to do about it.

Martin Kear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/with-iran-and-the-us-signing-a-peace-deal-where-does-that-leave-benjamin-netanyahu/

ANALYSIS: By Lim Tean

An Israeli cabinet minister has named the new Middle East on live radio —  and he named it in alarm.
What Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli called the “Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis” is not a threat. It is the architecture of a new regional order.
And once you see its logic, you cannot unsee it. Here is what it means — and what it means for America.

READ MORE: Lim Tean: Why standing on the wrong side of history cost Germany its UNSC seat
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❝What we are witnessing is the rise of a new axis❞

Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli says Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis ‘is worrying’, linking three countries to recent US-Iran deal https://t.co/53i0KcwcAR pic.twitter.com/iOVMd6kEDI
— Anadolu English (@anadoluagency) June 17, 2026

The confession in the alarm
When Amichai Chikli went on Israel’s 103 FM radio this week to warn of the rise of a “Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis,” he wasn’t making a prediction. He was issuing a confession.
An adversary’s alarm is always the most reliable confirmation that a structural shift has occurred — and what Chikli named in anxiety, we must now examine with clarity.
The old Middle East is gone. What is rising in its place is an architecture that no Western foreign policy establishment has yet fully reckoned with — one in which American primacy has been displaced, Israeli military dominance has been exposed as insufficient, and the two great Indigenous powers of the region, Iran and Türkiye, are emerging as the twin poles of a new order.
The moment the Old Order broke
The proximate event was the US-Iran framework agreement — now signed and in force. Trump signing it at the Palace of Versailles during dinner with French President Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday evening, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signing from Tehran.
But the manner of its emergence is as consequential as its content.
Washington and Tehran reached their temporary truce on April 8 through Pakistani mediation. The framework itself was shaped by Pakistan, Qatar, and Türkiye — playing, as one account noted, “different but complementary roles.”
Qatar hosted senior Iranian officials and maintained communication channels. Türkiye provided consistent diplomatic backing and called repeatedly for a negotiated resolution. Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was the crucial bridge, maintaining simultaneous contacts with both Washington and Tehran.
Notice who was absent from this architecture — Israel. Notice who else was absent — the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia. These are the three traditional American-anchored Gulf states that for three decades defined the regional order alongside Washington.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself admitted the scale of his marginalisation. At his first press conference in three months, he conceded he did not know what was actually written in the agreement.
The leader of the Middle East’s most powerful military, possessor of an undeclared nuclear arsenal, was reduced to a bystander while the region’s future was negotiated without him.
Trump, at the G7 summit in France, publicly described Netanyahu as “crazy” and said “without me, there would be no Israel.” Strip away the Trumpian grandiosity and a devastating strategic truth remains: Israel’s security has never rested on its own foundations, but on American patronage. And that patronage is being fundamentally recalibrated.
For American readers, this demands a moment of honest reflection. The United States spent trillions of dollars and decades of strategic energy constructing a Middle Eastern order anchored on Israeli military dominance and Gulf monarchy stability. That order has not been dismantled by an adversary’s military victory. It has been quietly superseded — by diplomacy conducted through channels America did not control, by actors America did not invite, producing an outcome America did not architect. That is a more profound kind of displacement than defeat in battle.
The dual-hegemon architecture
What is emerging is not a successor Pax — not Chinese, not Russian, not any external power’s regional order. It is something rarer and more durable: a regional order anchored by Indigenous great powers.
Iran and Turkey are the twin poles. Between them they possess the military depth, the demographic weight, the geographic centrality, and the independent foreign policy capacity that no other regional actor can match. Iran controls the eastern arc — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen — through its network of allied movements and state relationships.
Türkiye commands the northern tier, projects power into Syria, maintains NATO membership as a strategic hedge, and has emerged as the region’s most consequential diplomatic broker.
This is not a partnership moving in perfect harmony. Türkiye and Iran are rival civilisational powers with a long history of strategic friction. The more precise framework is managed bipolarity — two hegemons who converge sufficiently on the containment of Israeli expansionism to cooperate diplomatically, while competing for influence across the Arab world’s contested spaces.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made his country’s position unambiguous. Speaking to Parliament, he declared that Israeli aggression in Lebanon and Syria had reached a point where it threatened Türkiye directly, and called Israel the single biggest obstacle to regional peace.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, speaking alongside Russia’s Sergey Lavrov in Moscow — a symbolically charged backdrop — welcomed the US-Iran agreement but crucially called for it to evolve into “a structural and lasting security architecture rather than a temporary period of calm”.
That phrase is the key to understanding Ankara’s ambition. Turkey is not interested in episodic crisis management. It is seeking to institutionalise a new regional order in which it is a permanent rule-setter — the Ottoman inheritance reframed for the 21st century.
Iran, militarily weakened by the six-week Israeli offensive but diplomatically rehabilitated by the agreement, emerges in a paradoxical position of strength. It has traded military confrontation for international legitimacy, secured the rehabilitation of its economy, and — crucially — retained its regional network intact. The agreement has not dismantled Iranian power projection. It has brought Iran back into the international system while leaving its strategic depth untouched.

Pakistan: The nuclear keystone
The actor most consistently underestimated in Western analysis is Pakistan — and yet Pakistan may be the keystone of the entire new architecture.
Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority nuclear power. Its Army Chief personally bridged Washington and Tehran to produce the April 8 truce. It sits at the heart of the Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan diplomatic axis. And it has recently formalised a defence pact with Saudi Arabia.
That last point demands careful attention — and contains a particular irony for American readers.
Saudi Arabia’s strategic anxiety is acute. If American primacy in the region is receding, Riyadh needs an alternative security guarantee. It needs, specifically, nuclear cover. China has been proposed as one possible guarantor. But Pakistan is the more structurally coherent answer — and the answer whose historical roots run deepest.
Saudi money was instrumental in funding Pakistan’s nuclear programme during the 1970s and 1980s. This was never a secret in strategic circles. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s original conception of an “Islamic bomb” was always partly conceived with the broader Muslim world — and implicitly with Saudi Arabia — in mind. The recent Saudi-Pakistan defence pact is not a bilateral footnote. It is the formal institutionalisation of a security relationship whose nuclear dimension has always been implicit.
Here is the American irony: Washington funded, armed, and sustained Pakistan through decades of the Cold War and the War on Terror. American taxpayers financed the Pakistani military establishment that built the Islamic world’s first nuclear arsenal.
That arsenal may now serve as the instrument by which Saudi Arabia quietly exits the American security umbrella — replacing it with an Islamic solidarity framework that carries far greater domestic legitimacy in Riyadh than any guarantee from Washington ever did.
History has a sharp sense of irony. America built the tools of its own displacement.
Lebanon: The proving ground
Lebanon is not a footnote to this architectural shift. It is its most immediate and visible proving ground — the theatre where the transition from old order to new is being tested in real time.
Israel’s continued strikes on south Lebanon, even after the US-Iran framework was announced, reveal the central tension of this transitional moment. Netanyahu, sidelined from the deal and facing devastating domestic criticism, is using Lebanon as the one theatre where he can still project agency. But in doing so, he is accelerating precisely the dynamic that isolates Israel further from the emerging order.
Erdoğan’s response was explicit and historically significant: Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria had reached a point where they threatened Türkiye directly, with Ankara’s security now tied to its two neighbouring countries. That is an extraordinary statement from a NATO member — effectively drawing a Turkish strategic red line over Lebanese and Syrian territory.
Under the old American-anchored order, no such red line existed. Lebanon was perpetually sacrificed, a weak state with no regional protector capable of imposing real costs on Israeli operations. That calculus has now changed.
Hezbollah emerges weakened militarily but strategically sheltered. Iran’s diplomatic rehabilitation does not require Hezbollah’s disarmament — it requires Lebanon’s stabilisation as a buffer state within the New Order. The agreement creates pressure for a ceasefire, not for the dismantling of the network that gives Iran its Lebanese strategic depth.
For Israel, this is the core dilemma: military operations in Lebanon that once carried manageable costs now risk triggering a broader regional response that the new architecture makes structurally coherent for the first time.
The coming reckoning: Bahrain, UAE and the Abraham Accords
The states facing the most acute strategic exposure in the new architecture are Bahrain and the UAE — the two Arab signatories of the Abraham Accords most deeply integrated into the Israeli-American axis.
They signed those accords in 2020 premised on a specific geopolitical bet: that American military primacy was durable, that Israeli military dominance was unassailable, and that normalisation with Tel Aviv was the winning ticket to regional security and economic modernisation.
Every one of those premises has now been shaken to its foundation.
American primacy has visibly receded — demonstrated not by any declaration, but by the simple fact that the most consequential regional agreement in a generation was negotiated without Washington in the lead role, and with Washington explicitly sidelining Israel from the process. Israeli military might, while still formidable, has been shown to have strategic limits.
And normalisation with Israel now carries reputational and security costs that were never priced into the original Abraham Accords calculation.
Bahrain and the UAE possess sovereign wealth, infrastructure, and relationships that retain value in any regional configuration. But they are now exposed on multiple flanks simultaneously — caught between an American patron recalibrating its commitments, an Israeli partner increasingly isolated from the new regional consensus, and an emerging order being constructed around axes from which they were conspicuously absent.
Their most likely path is quiet hedging rather than dramatic realignment. Expect both states to begin softening their public identification with Israeli positions, to deepen economic ties with Türkiye and expand back-channel contacts with Tehran, and to use their sovereign wealth funds as instruments of strategic repositioning — investments that signal accommodation with the New Order without requiring a formal rupture with Washington.
Abu Dhabi in particular, will seek to be useful to all sides simultaneously. But the window for comfortable hedging is narrowing. The longer Bahrain and the UAE remain identified with a receding order, the less leverage they will carry when they eventually seek terms with the one that is rising.
Oman and Qatar occupy the opposite end of the spectrum. Oman’s historic role as a quiet back-channel to Iran — it was instrumental in facilitating the early Obama-era nuclear conversations that eventually produced the JCPOA — gives it standing and credibility in the New Order. Qatar’s role in the current mediation, hosting senior Iranian officials and explicitly supporting Pakistani-led diplomacy, has purchased it significant goodwill from Tehran. Both states will navigate the transition with relative comfort.
Saudi Arabia’s inevitable pivot
Saudi Arabia’s position is the most consequential and the most delicate of all.
MBS built his regional vision on three pillars: American security guarantees, economic modernisation through Vision 2030 anchored in Western and Israeli-adjacent investment, and a forthcoming normalisation with Israel that was to be the capstone of the Abraham Accords architecture. That capstone now looks not merely delayed but structurally implausible.
The pivot toward Iran and the new regional order is not a choice Riyadh makes from strength. It is a response to the collapse of the strategic alternative. The 2023 Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement was the first clear signal. The new architecture now accelerating around the Iran-Türkiye axis makes the logic of that pivot not merely rational but increasingly urgent.
Saudi Arabia cannot indefinitely maintain a posture of confrontation with Iran while its American patron visibly disengages, while the new regional order is being built by actors — Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar — with whom Riyadh has workable and historically deep relationships, and while its own population’s Islamic solidarity instincts run counter to alignment with an Israel conducting military campaigns across the Muslim world.
The Pakistani nuclear umbrella is what makes this pivot strategically viable without strategic nakedness. It allows Riyadh to reduce its dependence on American extended deterrence without being exposed — and to do so through an Islamic solidarity framework that carries profound domestic legitimacy in a way that a Chinese or Russian guarantee never could.
A Saudi Arabia sheltered by Pakistani nuclear deterrence, reconciled with Iran, and aligned with the Turkey-Qatar axis is a Saudi Arabia that has successfully navigated the transition without catastrophic rupture with anyone.
The pivot will not be announced with fanfare. It will happen gradually — through accumulating diplomatic signals, quiet investment reorientations, and careful distancing from Israeli positions on Gaza, Lebanon, and the broader regional conflict. By the time it is fully visible to Western analysts, it will already be irreversible.
Conclusion: Reading the tide
What Amichai Chikli named in alarm this week, we should name with analytical precision: the emergence of a new Middle Eastern order anchored by Indigenous power, shaped by Islamic solidarity and civilisational assertion, and no longer organised around American primacy or Israeli military dominance.
Iran and Turkey will not always agree. Their rivalry is ancient and will resurface across multiple theatres. But on the foundational question of this historical moment — that the old externally-imposed order must be replaced by one reflecting the region’s own balance of forces — they are aligned.
And that alignment, backstopped by Pakistan’s nuclear capability, lubricated by Qatar’s financial diplomacy, and increasingly accommodated by a pivoting Saudi Arabia, is sufficient to constitute a genuinely new architecture.
For America, the lesson is not that it has been defeated. It is that it has been superseded — which is a more permanent condition. The tools America built, the relationships America cultivated, the arsenals America funded across decades of Cold War and counter-terrorism strategy, have been repurposed by actors pursuing their own civilisational interests.
That is not a betrayal. It is simply how history works when the tide turns.
The states that bet on the Old Order — Bahrain, UAE, and above all Israel — now face a reckoning whose full dimensions are only beginning to become visible. The states that positioned themselves wisely — Türkiye, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, and soon Saudi Arabia — will shape what comes next.
History rewards those who read the tide correctly. The tide has turned. The only remaining question is who moves with it — and who insists on standing still as the water rises.
Lim Tean is a Singaporean lawyer, politician and commentator. He is the founder of the political party People’s Voice and a co-founder of the political alliance People’s Alliance for Reform.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/the-new-middle-east-how-the-old-order-died-and-what-is-rising-in-its-place/

By Patrick Decloitre of RNZ Pacific

The Greater Nouméa bus network service will be maintained on New Caledonia’s provincial election day, Sunday June 28, bus operator Tanéo/Mixed Syndicate of Urban Transports (SMTU) has confirmed.

The announcement follows complaints by several political parties in the French Pacific territory, with less than two weeks to go before the crucial provincial elections.
The greater Nouméa bus network was severely impacted following the May 2024 violent unrest, which affected Nouméa and its immediate suburbs.

READ MORE: Campaigning in full swing as New Caledonia heads toward crucial provincial elections
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It has since resumed a limited service only from Mondays to Saturdays — but no longer on Sundays.
The new price of tickets (about US$4.8 for a single one-way fare) and the reduced number of stops has also come under heavy criticism.
Meanwhile, in a recent decision directly related to the provincial elections in the south of New Caledonia’s main island (including Nouméa), it was decided that the former 56 polling stations in the area have now been merged into 9 voting centres.
One of New Caledonia’s prominent pro-independence parties, the Union Calédonienne (UC), has recently challenged the polling stations re-jig in court, arguing that the merger of polling stations effectively penalises Indigenous Kanak and low income families who could not afford taxis or their own private vehicles.
No Sunday services
It also observed that the public bus service no longer operates on Sundays.
The situation forced some voters to walk several kilometres to reach the nearest polling station.
A similar network of merged polling stations was implemented during the municipal elections in March 2026.
However, Nouméa’s administrative tribunal dismissed the case on June 12.
In a media release on Thursday, Tanéo clarified that on an “exceptional” basis, their buses will operate on the Nouméa and Greater Nouméa network from 8am to 6pm at a pace of about one bus per hour on election day.
It said this was a similar service to the one usually practised on Saturdays for Nouméa and its suburban communes of Païta, Mont-Dore and Dumbéa.
The Nouméa and Greater Nouméa Area make up for more than 65 percent of New Caledonia’s total population of 265,000 people.
Advance tickets needed
But Tanéo said that passengers would have to buy their tickets in advance or recharge their bus passes because “no ticket will be sold onboard”.
Passengers who have already subscribed to a valid pass can also use it on election day.
Tanéo/SMTU said its decision to restore a minimum service on election day would be implemented at its own cost, estimated at around US$55,000.
Earlier this month, the company also announced the introduction of new subscriptions (including a monthly pass at US$57.64 or US$145 quarterly).
Reacting to the announcement which is being perceived as a significant gamechanger, Union Calédonienne said on social networks that it was “an important step forward”.
“It brings us closer to two fundamental principles in any democracy: voters’ equality in front of the suffrage and the sincerity of the vote, regardless of voters’ social condition, their commune of residence or their transportation constraints.”

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/greater-noumea-bus-service-to-be-maintained-on-election-day/

Africa faces declining aid, rising debt, climate pressure and a weakening global order. Official development assistance, the technical term for foreign aid, fell by 23.1% in 2025, the largest annual contraction on record. It’s projected to decline by a further 5.8% in 2026, before accounting for strain from the current crisis in the Middle East.

UN Trade and Development has also warned that debt servicing is diverting scarce resources from education, health, infrastructure and other development priorities. We believe that this moment is not only a crisis to survive. It is an opportunity to ask whether development can be renegotiated on more equal terms.

Our views are based on our earlier research on trust, corruption and tax compliance; ongoing work under the Africa-Europe Clusters of Research Excellence on African agency, development financing and sustainability, a collaborative hub connecting researchers, policymakers and practitioners; and recent roundtable discussions with policymakers, scholars, activists and civil society representatives in Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa and Mauritius.

The question is whether Africa will approach this moment with priorities shaped by donors, creditors and external policy agendas, or with its own policy compass. Agenda 2063, the African Union’s long-term development blueprint, was designed to provide that compass.

It speaks of inclusive growth, sustainable development, regional integration, good governance, peace, prosperity and citizen wellbeing. That matters because Africa does not need another grand vision. It needs to treat the vision it already has as a discipline.

That discipline begins with money. AU policy direction is clear that Africa must finance its own development, including Agenda 2063. In practice, this means African governments must rely less on external goodwill through fairer domestic revenue, more productive use of debt and firmer negotiations with donors, creditors and investors.

From aid dependence to ownership Aid has supported health systems, education, infrastructure and food security. But aid was never a secure foundation for sovereignty. Dambisa Moyo, the Zambian-born economist and author of Dead Aid, warned that the aid-dependency model keeps Africa in a “perpetual childlike state”.

When donor budgets shrink, geopolitical priorities change, or wars elsewhere redirect resources, African countries are left exposed. Malawi shows how sharp that exposure can be. Development partners have historically funded close to 40% of its national budget.

One roundtable participant in Blantyre put the stakes bluntly: if Africans do not do away with aid, aid will do away with them. If African countries do not shape what comes after the old aid model, its collapse will simply consume them.

Agenda 2063 cannot be implemented through permanent dependence on external goodwill. If African governments are serious about owning their development priorities, domestic resource mobilisation must move from technical language into the centre of politics. In our view, that means raising and spending taxes fairly, using borrowed money more productively, and standing together as a continent to increase bargaining power.

Tax justice, not just more taxes Citizens already carry heavy burdens through consumption taxes, fees, informal payments and the daily costs of poor services. Asking them to pay more while public money is wasted, elites avoid tax, and services remain weak is not domestic resource mobilisation.

It is extraction without accountability. The real issue is tax justice. People are more likely to accept taxes when they can see that public money is used fairly, services improve, and leaders are held accountable.

But citizens are unlikely to accept this bargain when corruption is widespread and institutions lack credibility. Evidence from fragile African states shows that corruption weakens public trust and can undermine citizens’ willingness to comply with tax obligations.

Revenue systems need to widen the tax base fairly, improve administration without harassing small traders, reduce illicit financial flows, and tax rents, wealth, property and extractive sectors more effectively. They also need to close exemptions that serve political connections more than development.

Citizens do not pay taxes so that governments can search for aid on their behalf. They expect services, security and accountability. Agenda 2063 will remain abstract unless it is felt in clinics, schools, roads, electricity, water systems and public institutions that treat people with dignity.

Debt as a development test Debt raises a similar issue: whether borrowed money strengthens development or deepens dependency. Africa’s debt problem is often discussed as if borrowing itself is the disease. That is too simple.

Roads, power systems, universities, irrigation, industrial corridors and climate adaptation require large investment. The issue is not only whether governments borrow. It is what debt does. Borrowing that expands productive capacity can strengthen a country.

Borrowing that finances recurrent spending, vanity projects or corruption leaves the next generation paying for yesterday’s failure. It weakens bargaining power and turns national policy choices into negotiations with creditors. Agenda 2063 should become a test of debt quality.

Does a loan increase a country’s capacity to produce, trade, employ and innovate? Does it support regional integration, food systems, skills, infrastructure or future revenue? If the answer is no, the debt may be legal, but it is not developmental.

Bargaining power A country that cannot finance basic services, manage debt or mobilise fair revenue will struggle to negotiate with donors, creditors and investors. It may speak the language of sovereignty while operating from dependency.

African agency depends on bargaining power. That power does not come from slogans. It comes from fiscal capacity, credible institutions, regional cooperation and the ability to say no. Rwanda offers a glimpse of what that looks like, directing its development partners towards national priorities rather than accepting whatever is offered.

Saying “no, thank you” requires somewhere else to stand: stronger continental and regional institutions, alliances within Africa, diaspora networks and South-South cooperation. This is why regional integration cannot remain ceremonial. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), one of the African Union’s flagship projects under Agenda 2063, aims to accelerate intra-African trade and strengthen Africa’s common voice in global trade negotiations.

That ambition should not remain on paper. The trade agreement should help African countries negotiate from stronger positions over debt restructuring, climate finance, investment, infrastructure, energy access, local processing and fairer value chains. Fragmented negotiations leave countries exposed to external terms negotiated one by one.

No more excuses The real danger is policy laziness: producing visions without financing them, announcing reforms without implementing them, and promising transformation while preserving the systems that block it. The danger also lives in language.

Buzzwords such as resilience, capacity building and localisation travel well across institutions precisely because they have stopped meaning anything in particular. Retiring them, or filling them with substance, is part of what reclaiming agency means.

African citizens are not asking for abstract development language. They want decent work, reliable electricity, functioning clinics, good schools, roads, water, security and accountable institutions. They want governments that do not use crisis as an excuse for permanent failure.

African countries are at a potential turning point, but only if today’s uncertainty produces more serious policy choices. Africa already has a vision.

The task now is to use it.

Dan Banik receives funding from the Research Council of Norway.

Hafte Gebreselassie Gebrihet does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/can-africa-survive-the-global-aid-squeeze-yes-but-it-will-take-financial-discipline/

EDITORIAL: Drop Site News

The Free Press, an American news organisation founded by the Zionist editor-in-chief of CBS News, Bari Weiss, and now owned by David Ellison, reported recently that the Trump administration had launched an investigation into Trita Parsi, one of America’s most prominent critics of the US-Israeli war on Iran.
The aim is to revoke his legal permanent residency, which he has held for some 15 years — and deport him.
In the wake of the article, the US State Department took the unusual step of denying that any such investigation exists; the article came after pro-Israel activist Laura Loomer has repeatedly pressured the Trump administration to deport Parsi, suggesting that the lobby is trying to produce an investigation where none exists.

READ MORE: Trita Parsi on the US-Iran peace deal and being threatened with deportation
US, Iran set to hold talks in Switzerland; Israel kills 16 in Lebanon
Other Trita Parsi articles
Other Gaza, Iran and Lebanon reports

That The Free Press would participate in this campaign is as shameful as it is expected. Anyone who supports an actual free press must speak out now.
The attack on Trita Parsi, co-founder of the think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and a well-respected and widely known advocate for a more restrained American foreign policy, is intended to stifle dissent.
If this debacle in Iran taught us anything, it should be that launching a new war without public debate portends catastrophe. Trita Parsi’s critics are calling him an enemy of the United States, but if the country had listened to him, we would be much better off today.
Best of being American
Trita truly represents the best of what it means to be an American with his courage to speak the truth no matter whether that truth is popular in the moment.
But it doesn’t even matter if he was right. In America, we believe freedom of speech is sacrosanct.
At Drop Site News, the American Conservative, and Breaking Points, we don’t agree on everything, but we do agree that without freedom of expression, without the freedom to criticize our government, all the other freedoms will fall by the wayside.

Trita Parsi on the deportation threat.                     Video: Democracy Now!
We stand with Trita Parsi and we hope you will too. Even if you don’t agree with what he says, we must defend his right to say it.
Petitions are already circulating with tens of thousands of signatures demanding that Parsi be deported.
No sentiment could be less American. But freedom can’t rest on the paper it is written on.
We as a people, right, left, and center, must insist it remain in force.
Republished from Drop Site News.

The petition against deporting Trita Parsi

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/21/drop-site-news-stand-with-analyst-trita-parsi-against-deportation-from-us/

On Saturday, a suspected case of deadly [H5 bird flu], also known as high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, was confirmed in a brown skua. This large seabird was found in Cape Le Grand National Park near Esperance, about 700 kilometres south-east of Perth in Western Australia.

The virus is also suspected to have affected another seabird, a southern giant petrel, found at the same area. Following the initial testing, samples collected from these birds were sent to the CSIRO to confirm the first Australian cases of H5N1, specifically the clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 lineage.

Avian influenza viruses are categorised by subtype (creating the H and N number combination, here H5N1) and specific clades within the H5 subtype. This virus has devastated wildlife populations in other continents, and this could be the start of a long push to protect Australian birds and wildlife in Australia.

Where did this virus come from? Avian influenza viruses, of which HPAI H5N1 is just one kind, have been around for millenia. In the vast majority of cases they cause no disease in birds.

These strains are referred to as low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. However, in 1996 one of these viruses evolved to become disease causing, and since then, this HPAI H5N1 has caused severe disease in poultry, and has become endemic in poultry.

With chickens now forming about 70% of all birds worldwide, this is a critical reservoir where the virus continues to evolve. The devastating effect of HPAI H5N1 is unfortunately not limited to poultry. Since 2021, HPAI H5N1 has caused a global animal pandemic, with enormous consequences for wildlife in all continents.

It has killed millions of wild birds and caused significant drops in the global population of some species. It has also spread into wild and domestic mammals, with various species of seals particularly affected. How it spreads Part of the challenge in controlling HPAI H5N1 is that it can spread through a wide range of transmission pathways.

For example, the virus typically spreads through faeces, especially when in water. Imagine infected ducks in a pond, where the pond water acts as a conduit to infecting other ducks which are feeding or cleaning themselves.

It can also be spread through direct contact and aerosol transmission, particularly in poultry farms. And it is spread through predation and scavenging, where animals like foxes maybe eat the carcasses of infected birds they find.

While it has so far been found in more than 400 different bird species, the spread of HPAI H5N1 in the northern hemisphere is facilitated by freshwater dabbling ducks. Dabbling duck species feed predominantly at the surface of the water, sometimes even grazing on land.

Importantly, ducks have very limited signs of disease when infected with HPAI H5N1, and appear to be able to continue to migrate while infected, allowing them to potentially spread the virus long distances. Overall, this virus has been devastating for wild birds.

For example, 33–47% of all adult northern gannets died in 2022 due to HPAI H5N1. On subantarctic Heard Island, 13,000 baby southern elephant seals died due to HPAI during the 2025–26 summer. Why has it taken so long to reach Australia?

Despite being in Asia since the 1990s, and in Antarctica since 2024, HPAI H5N1 has not been detected in Australia until now. This is likely because there are no duck species which routinely migrate between Australia and Asia, nor are there ducks that migrate through Antarctica.

Despite the lack of ducks in Antarctica, the virus did arrive there in the summer of 2023–24, and subsequently spread thousands of kilometres through the subantarctic in the summer of 2024–25. Available evidence suggests birds like gulls, skuas and giant petrels may have taken on the role of long distance virus carriers in the Antarctic and subantarctic.

The various species of skuas and giant petrels that breed in Antarctic waters go on to roam the Southern Ocean, also venturing into the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans during the southern hemisphere winter. While rarely seen on our shores, these species are not too far offshore, looking for food and occasionally gathering in large groups.

Now that HPAI H5N1 has been found on mainland Australia, it will not necessarily establish itself and spread across the continent into other birds and mammals, including livestock.

Given that skuas and giant petrels are marine rather than freshwater species, and do not occur on land in large numbers outside the breeding season, there is still a chance that it may not spread further.

The biggest risk is that infected, sick birds are eaten or scavenged by native birds and mammals, which could transmit the virus to ducks. Try to stop the spread Once in ducks, the likely spread of the virus increases dramatically, and the outlook would be grim.

But for now, we are a few critical steps away from that happening. Continued surveillance and testing, being led by Western Australia, is critical to reveal the extent of the virus and whether it has spread to local animals.

Vigilance is key – do not touch or take sick animals into your care. Rather, report suspected cases immediately to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

For farmers or people who own chooks, its critical to follow guidelines provided by government departments and report any suspicious mortality.

Marcel Klaassen receives funding from Wildlife Health Australia, Game Management Authority Victoria, Department of Health WA, Glenelg – Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, National Environmental Science Program (DCCEEW), Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry

Meagan Dewar has received funding from Department of the Environment and Energy and the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators.

Michelle Wille receives funding from the Australian Research Council, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Wildlife Health Australia, and the CSIRO.

In addition to the University of Melbourne, Michelle Wille is also employed at the WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/20/the-first-case-of-h5n1-bird-flu-in-australia-has-been-confirmed-what-does-this-mean/

By Penny Smith of RNZ

A New Zealand activist detained as part of a Gaza-bound aid flotilla is calling on the government to launch an independent investigation into allegations of mistreatment by Israeli forces, after Australia launched an inquiry into similar claims involving 11 of its citizens.

Hāhona Ormsby, a member of the Global Sumud Aotearoa delegation, said he and other New Zealand participants were assaulted after their vessel was intercepted by Israeli forces in international waters in May.
Ormsby (Ngāti Maniapoto) said he was disappointed by what he described as a lack of action from the New Zealand government.

READ MORE: Gaza flotilla victim blaming – time to expel Israel’s ambassador
A world first: Australia will now investigate Israel over Gaza flotilla brutality
‘You’re a liar! You’re a liar!’ NZ foreign minister Peters insults Gaza flotilla torture survivor in Parliament
‘Is it NZ First, or Israel First?’ Ormsby challenges NZ foreign minister Peters
Other allegations of Israeli brutality against Gaza flotilla activists

“I would like our government to actually take this seriously and actually hold Israel accountable for this,” he said.
The comments come after the Australian Federal Police launched an investigation into allegations of rape and torture involving Australian citizens detained during flotilla operations, following a request from Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.
Global Sumud Aotearoa has accused the New Zealand government of failing to investigate allegations made by New Zealand citizens.
“Unlike Australia, France, Spain, Malaysia, Türkiye and other countries, New Zealand and Foreign Minister Winston Peters have failed to launch a government investigation into the mistreatment of New Zealand citizens,” the group said.
Government response criticised
Ormsby also criticised the government’s response to the incident.
“Calling in the Israeli ambassador and slapping him with a wet bus ticket over tea and scones doesn’t count as meaningful action,” he said.
The activist was promptly ejected from Parliament this week after he questioned Peters during a scrutiny hearing.
Asked about contact with officials, Ormsby said he received an email from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) on Wednesday seeking further information about what had occurred, despite the fact he had been back in New Zealand for close to a month.
MFAT confirmed it was seeking information from those involved.
“We are concerned by the serious allegations raised by flotilla participants,” a ministry spokesperson said.
“We have sought further information from those involved in the flotilla interceptions in April and May. This information has yet to be received.”
Raised expectations with Israel
The ministry said the government had raised expectations directly with Israeli officials.
“At the time, the New Zealand government said it expected Israel to adhere to its international legal obligations, including in its treatment of New Zealanders participating in the flotilla. This expectation was raised directly with Israel’s Ambassador to New Zealand and with Israeli officials.”
MFAT also noted New Zealand’s long-standing travel advice for Gaza remains “Do Not Travel”, warning of the risks associated with attempting to enter Gaza by sea.
Global Sumud Aotearoa said New Zealand should formally interview returning activists and seek medical and forensic evidence gathered by Turkish authorities after detainees were transferred to Turkey.
Ormsby said he plans to respond to MFAT’s request for information and hoped the government would meet directly with New Zealand participants.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/06/20/take-this-seriously-flotilla-activist-claims-beating-allegations-ignored-by-nz-govt/