• Why did Netanyahu and Trump attack Iran and start this war?
• Why did the US decide to attack without a clear reason to do so and without strategic planning nor a legal argument for it?
• What impact will this war in the Middle East have on US Midterm Elections?
• And what of independent operators in this conflict, such as European states, why do they risk being drawn into this US-Israel Middle East War?

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One puzzling feature of the present Israel-Iran war is the almost complete absence of reference – in the western media at least – to the Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian.

The American president claimed that Israel had killed the Iranian President, but he was referring to the Supreme Leader. Killing Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Shia Islam – and, when he was alive, the Patriarch of Iran – was comparable to the assassination of Pope Leo or King Charles. (These last two are both ‘supreme leaders’, though neither of these two are anything like the administrative or military leader of a nation state; they are moral and morale leaders.) Iran’s President, Masoud Pezeshkian, is still very much alive; and would prefer to build bridges than bombs.

Admittedly, the Iranian constitution is somewhat complex – especially to casual western onlookers – having distinct power centres for religious, military, and civilian authority. Do we dismiss Pezeshkian simply because he is neither a ‘cleric’ nor a ‘revolutionary guard’? I think there is much more to our dismissal of him than some consideration that he’s unimportant.

Ali Khamenei was, during the 1980s, the third President of Iran. His two predecessors had fewer religious credentials than Khamanei, reflecting the comparatively secular nature of the role of president. Their presidencies were short-lived however; the first president was impeached in mid-1981, and his successor was assassinated by bombing four weeks later; revolutionary Iran was a tumultuous place.

President Khamenei clearly played a critical role in the 1980s’ Iran-Iraq War, from which Iran survived; unexpectedly to many, and stronger from having been tested through a war in which the western powers supported the other side and its president Saddam Hussein.

The Presidency of Iran is clearly a very important political role. Problematically for the West, who wishes to cast Iran as an anti-democracy, it’s a highly-contested democratically-elected position of power. Indeed the President has featured in most political news stories throughout the history of the Islamic Republic, at least until the election of the present president in 2024 (following the death of his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, in a helicopter crash).

In the 2024 election, Pezeshkian, the ‘progressive left’ candidate defeated Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, the ‘conservative right’ candidates. I heard recently that, when Ingrid Hipkiss asked who the Americans might negotiate with, given President Trump’s claim to have killed several tiers of Iranian leadership, the answer suggested by Simon Marks was Ghalibaf, who was high up in the regime and had even stood for president. Not a single mention of the actual President! (Refer Morning Report, RNZ 24 March 2026, Trump suspends strikes on Iran’s power plants.)

I would argue that Pezeshkian’s success was more reflective of popular preference than the other elections that year, which delivered Donald Trump in the United States and Keir Starmer in the United Kingdom. Both Trump and Starmer were widely disliked by their countries’ electorates (now even more disliked than in 2024), only winning because the only other options for political leadership were deemed by voters to be worse.

Pezeshkian, on the other hand, was a progressive and genuinely popular choice; not a person wanting to align Iran with the West, but a person wanting to build strong relationships. Through, for example, Iran joining the BRICSnetwork of economically powerful countries which favour geopolitical multipolarity rather than Western unipolarity. (See this picture of BRICS 2024, with Pezeshkian very prominent, and neither looking like a Shia cleric – as Raisi had looked – nor conforming with western dress codes.) He comes across as a statesman, certainly not a demagogue.

My take on the Iranian presidential enigma is this. Politics is substantially propaganda – aka ‘narrative’ – and geopolitics involves such messaging on a global scale. Much narrative is conducted through images rather than through words, and is largely shaped by which images are missing; propaganda is as much about deamplification of unwanted messages as it is about amplifying regime (and prevalent media) narratives.

President Pezeshkian does not present the imagery of smarminess (being unpleasantly suave) or of evilness or of rigid fundamentalism; he does not present the images that Israel and the West would like to portray in conveying their story about Iran. Rather, he presents as honest, pragmatic, constructive, and electable. He is quietly spoken. I have heard mention that one of Iran’s political strategies is the so-called good cop, bad cop strategy. If so, Pezeshkian is certainly the good cop. I think he is a good cop, period.

Pezeshkian is neither a clerical ideologue nor a shouty military spokesperson. He is not a newsreader with head covered, dressed all in black. Those are the images which western media push about Iran. Too moderate to assassinate; such grotesque (albeit routine) geopolitical violence would increase Pezeshkian’s profile in the West, which the West seems not to want. Better to just pretend he doesn’t exist, even though he’s the President. (Though some – including Al Jazeera’s Israeli-born political analyst, Marwan Bishara – suggest that Israel prefers to assassinate their more moderate opponents, given that such people [when alive and visible] might distract us from consuming Israel’s dehumanising narratives.)

To glean a semblance of truth in contentious times, you often have to hear what is not being said, and see what is not being shown. You have to look out for softly spoken messages; looking past caricatures and scapegoats, and looking past CAPITAL LETTERS and !!!

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

One of the United States’ navy ships heading towards the Persian Gulf is the USS Tripoli. (USS = United States Ship.) How the heck did it get that name? (Will the next two United States’ naval ships be called the USS Abbottabad and the USS Santo Domingo?)

The answer will be a surprise to many. The American Revolution which began in 1776 was completed in 1783, with the British capitulation to the American patriotic forces. So, the history of the United States as an independent sovereign state goes back to 1783. The British and Americans fought again from 1812 to 1815, during the Napoleonic Wars (what I suggest is better called either World War Zero or Great World War One, and my favoured dates are 1798 to 1815, with Waterloo being the final battle; Great World War One contextualises 1914 to 1945 as Great World War Two). Wikipedia describes the outcome of the War of 1812 as ‘inconclusive’.

We may note that Encounter Bay, in South Australia, is named after a World War Zero encounter between British and French naval ships – Investigator and Géographe. The encounter was in 1802. The name Tripoli dates from another encounter (a much more violent encounter) within World War Zero, in this case a war between Libya (then known as Ottoman Tripolitania) and the United States. That encounter, a war within a war, was the First Barbary War (1801-1805).

The genesis of the Barbary Wars (see this famous picture of the USS Philadelphia in Tripoli Harbour, depicting the saving-from-capture of that ship in February 1804) was an earlier war. The American-Algerian War of 1785 to 1795was the first foreign military adventure of the United States since its independence in 1783. Wikipedia lists the ‘result’ of this war as an ‘Algerian victory’. It will be a surprise to many people that America’s first foreign war was so soon after independence, and in the Mediterranean rather than somewhere close to home; independent America has a long history of violence in the ‘Middle East’. It will be no surprise that, in 1795, the United States lost that war.

The context of the 1785-1795 war was that Great Britain, piqued by the loss of its American colonies, refused the United States the ‘protection’ of the British Navy.

We note here that imperial nations traditionally extracted ‘tribute’ from both their subjugated territories, and other populated territories which might otherwise be candidates for subjugation. Further, smaller maritime states traditionally extracted rent from passing ships.

These ‘clipping-the-ticket’ relationships still exist, of course. Egypt, for example, extracts monopoly rents from its possession of the Suez Canal; as does Panama re the Panama Canal. As would New Zealand if South American merchant ships were to transit through Cook Strait on their way to Australia. Indeed, as international airports charge landing fees. Further, the extraction of imperial tribute has become apparent once again, as the American president tries to use import taxes – tariffs – and bilateral ‘deals’ as ways of ‘making lots of money’; as a way of leveraging imperial power. This is extortion through protection money, in the very worst sense of that concept of power.

In the 1780s, and before, Britain and Algeria ‘scratched each other’s backs’. Britain let Algeria – literally a ‘pirate state’ – do its thing, so long as it did not charge rents from ships under the protection of the British Empire. Thus, after 1783, American ships ceased to benefit from British protection. The conflict ended in 1795, with the United States agreeing to pay rents to Algeria, and – by implication – to other ‘pirate kingdoms’ on the North African Barbary Coast.

The Barbary Wars began when newly elected president – Thomas Jefferson – refused to pay rents to Tripolitania, aka Libya. As a result, Tripolitania declared war on the United States. The United States sent a number of frigates, including the USS Philadelphia.

To this day, the United States commemorates the 1804 burning of the USS Philadelphia by Stephen Decatur as a heroic rescue, an act of derring do which Lord Nelson reputedly claimed was “the most bold and daring act of the Age”. It was this action which led to the naming of three United States naval ships, including the current ship, as ‘Tripoli’. Decatur went on to become a hero, once again, in the 1812 to 1815 war with Britain. And many American towns came to be named after him. (We may note that, in another ‘heroic’ action in World War Zero, in 1812, the Russian military burned the city of Moscow in order to save it from Napoleon’s invading army. One significant aftermath was a literary novel: War and Peace.)

This war was not an American victory; importantly for the United States, it was not the ignominious defeat that it might otherwise have been. The United States – or at least mercenaries in the pay of the United States – did win the subsequent 1805 Battle of Derna, which the USS Tripoli officially commemorates.

The First Barbary War ended inconclusively in 1805, with a deal. Wikipedia says: “In agreeing to pay a ransom of $60,000 (equivalent to $1.3 million in 2025) for the American prisoners, the Jefferson administration drew a distinction between paying tribute and paying ransom.” Jefferson agreed to pay a ransom. We should note that the Second Barbary War of 1815, also involving Decatur, lasted just two days, and was an American victory (under President Madison).

Another reason for the naming of the USS Tripoli, which is essentially the same reason.

In 2011, the United States (as NATO), under President Obama, fought in another war against Libya. This was a successful war of ‘regime change’, this time through air power rather than sea power; though few would say that the replacement regimes have improved either the stability of Libya or of the Eastern Mediterranean. This war of ‘decapitation’ of Libya was Obama’s dress rehearsal for an even more ambitious attempt to do the same in Syria. The subsequent Syrian Civil War was another distressing failure of United States’ foreign bellicosity. At least Obama asked Congress, and as a result he was unable to escalate; Obama was thwarted in his further attempts to become a decapitating conqueror (noting Abbottabad as well as Tripoli). Much of Syria descended into anarchy, until Russia intervened.

The USS Tripoli was commissioned in 2012, as much in commemoration of recent American adventurism as it was in commemoration of that country’s earliest acts of violence in a land far far away.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

A minute after my radio-alarm went off this morning, I was ‘privileged’ to hear this deeply scary interview with the Deputy Prime Minister: Deputy PM Seymour on NZ, Iran and fuel relief, RNZ 24 March 2026. For most of the interview David Seymour outlines why Ruthanasia politics is essential for New Zealand, even as a global existential crisis may be unfolding. While he didn’t use the word ‘Ruthanasia’, he may as well have.

(Ruthenasia was supposed to have been a policy to deliver relatively ‘more money’ to younger New Zealanders; that is, such policies of fiscal austerity are commonly conducted in the name of intergenerational equity, though that notion – as represented by the ‘financial literacy’ community – is a logical fallacy of the first order. Money, a set of claims on wealth, a social technology, is regarded by austerians such as Ruth Richardson and David Seymour as a form of intrinsic wealth. Seymour claimed that “the previous government maxed out the credit card”; New Zealand is about 105th out of 190 countries for government debt. Turkmenistan, Brunei and Kuwait are the top performers by Seymour’s criterion (with Afghanistan, Haiti and Russia also in the top 10); Sudan and Japan are the worst. According to Trading Economics, New Zealand now has a projected 47% government debt to GDP ratio, up from 39% in 2023. Truth is becoming an increasingly scarce commodity.)

NATO and the Greater Evil

The real problem though, contained in this interview, is in the presenter’s introduction, and also in the quasi-acceptance of the alarming content of that introduction.

In the recording, Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte claims that New Zealand has signed up to a 22-country Nato-led initiative “to implement his vision [referring to the President of the United States] of making sure the Strait of Hormuz is free, is opening up as soon as possible”.

First, we should note that the Strait of Hormuz is presently open to all neutral countries; it is not open to those countries waging a war of aggression on Iran (a country along with Oman which has, by virtue of geography, sovereignty over that narrow Strait). (Much as Egypt has sovereignty over the Suez Canal.) Although there is some ambiguity regarding countries (such as New Zealand) which condemn Iran but choose to not-condemn Israel or the USA.

What New Zealand should do, if it really wants trade access to the Persian Gulf, is to condemn – equally – all the belligerents in this war. Beyond that, the paucity of ships passing through the Strait is an insurance matter; a matter that can be most easily resolved by the aggressors stopping the present war rather than (literally and figuratively) inflaming it. Does New Zealand want to be safe, and to have safe access to the Gulf States, or does it want to be egregiously stupid?

Regional Wars too easily become World Wars

At present there are two ‘regional’ wars of global significance in ‘play’. We note that in World War Two there was something similar. In November 1941 there was an all-out European war in which Germany was fighting the Soviet Union on one front and fighting the United Kingdom on the other. And there was a war in the western Pacific in which Japan was fighting China and Indo-China; kind of a world war in that most of Indo-China was ‘colonies’ of the European powers France, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Then, in December 1941, Japan attacked the United States’ fleet in Hawaii (noting that Hawaii was not a part of the United States then). Three days later, Japan sank two British battleships – Prince of Wales, and Repulse – in the South China Sea, effectively declaring war on the United Kingdom. And then, another day later, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler declared war on the United States – his biggest strategic mistake. Two regional geopolitical wars had become a world war.

Goliath 2.0; a modern-day unsophisticate and anti-intellectual, and his band of orcs

In 2026, the two wars are between Nato and Russia, with most of the action taking place in the territory of the Nato proxy-state, Ukraine. The second war is between Israel and Iran, with Israel being helped out by its much larger proxy with its Goliath president. Much of the violence is taking place in other countries; countries either sandwiched between Israel and Iran or coveted by Israel as part of its Greater Israel project.

What is now connecting these two wars – both being fought in parts of central Eurasia – the war in Europe and the war in the ‘Middle East’? First is that Ukraine became involved, earlier this year, as a military ally of Israel. Second is that Nato, one of the combatants in the Ukraine War, is now trying to join in the Middle East War as a formal ally of Israel and its subservient Goliath. And little New Zealand is showing all the signs that it is trying to become a formal ally of Nato, a willing participant of both regional wars; awestruck by Goliath and his band of merry orcs.

When two globally significant regional wars combine today to become a single war, we have World War Three. Why, on Earth, would New Zealand want to be a part of that? Why would we want to be a party to both ecocide and economic suicide? And why would we want to become a target in a nuclear war? Is that egregiously stupid?

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

There is a widespread perception in Aotearoa New Zealand that the ‘Gulf States’ are similar, and closely aligned to each other. The States most familiar to New Zealanders are United Arab Emirates (‘Dubai’ to the many New Zealanders who do not appreciate that Dubai is just one of six Emirates) and Qatar.

Further we’ve long-forgotten the dispute which, not-so-long-ago, led to Qatar being isolated by the Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other Sunni Arab countries (noting Egypt in particular). This started with the Qatar–Saudi Arabia diplomatic conflict, which in 2017 escalated into the Qatar diplomatic crisis. This conflict related to allegations of inappropriate financial connections between Qatar and Hamas. While apparent resolution took place in 2021, there is now a new division; a division even more opaque to casual western observers, and noting that western observations of other parts of the world are rarely anything other than casual.

In October 2021, the popular government of Sudan (the result of a popular revolution in 2019) was overthrown by the Sudanese Armed Forces. On the eve of the coup, ‘Protestors held signs stating, “the Emirates will not govern us, nor the implementation of Sisi”.’ For Sisi, read Egypt.

Essentially the anti-Qatar nations were developing their interests in the military and economic exploitation of Sudan. Then, in April 2023, the two parties to the 2021 coup – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces – split in spectacular fashion, creating the present Sudanese Civil War. The UAE backed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Egypt and Saudi Arabia backed the SAF. This is a hideous civil war (see my War in Sudan), with most of the reported atrocities allegedly being committed by the RSF.

This present division of civil-war-sponsorship is compounded by the diverging relationships of these three Arab states – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE – with Israel. The Trump-sponsored 2020 Abraham Accords brought Saudi Arabia and UAE (and Bahrain) into line with Egypt as an ally-of-sorts with Israel. According to this Wikipedia account:

“On August 14, 2021, the Associated Press reported that a secret oil deal between Israel and the Emirates, struck in 2020 as part of the Abraham Accords, had turned the Israeli resort town of Eilat into a waypoint for Emirati oil headed for Western markets. It was expected to endanger the Red Sea reefs, which host some of the greatest coral diversity on the planet. As Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia also share the gulf’s waters, an ecological disaster was likely to impact their ecosystems.”

Since then, relations between UAE (and Bahrain) and Israel became particularly close. Relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia (and Egypt), on the other hand have soured since the outbreak of the present Sudan war. At the same time, as revealed by Sudan, relations between UAE and these two large Red Sea nations have substantially deteriorated.

That is the backdrop to Iran’s greater hostility, at present, towards the UAE than towards Qatar. Western reports of the present conflict tend to equate Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait as ‘peas in a pod’. The reality is that UAE is a substantial – albeit understated – ally of Israel. (There has been suspicion that UAE has provided substantial secret support for Israel in its recent wars, especially Israel’s genocidal war against Hamas in Gaza. Iran will be well aware of the extent of this UAE-Israel alliance.)

UAE is now in an antagonist relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. (Indeed, it’s now UAE rather than Qatar which is the isolate on the Arabian Peninsula.) In Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia back the SAF. The RSF, on the other hand, is funded and supplied through an opaque deal with UAE; which means that Israel – through its UAE proxy – may in fact be the most important backer of the RSF. And we should note that Israel is, formally, the most important global proxy of the United States; though it may now be that the United States has become Israel’s most important proxy.

(For security reasons, and as a protest against the UAE’s geopolitical cynicism, I decided that I would never again fly to London via the Emirates. Tip for Air New Zealand: put on more flights to Vancouver, and publicise the route to London via Canada.)

Qatar, Hamas, and Israel

The matter of Qatar’s financial connections with Hamas are distinctly murky. I quote here from the ABC (Australian) 60 Minutes documentary Gaza, the Forever War (11 March 2024). The programme features interviews with former senior Israeli political and military personnel.

Excerpt from transcript:

JOHN LYONS, REPORTER: It now appears that Netanyahu wanted to sow seeds of division between the hardliners who ruled Gaza and the more conciliatory Palestinian Authority, running the West Bank.

AMI AYALON, FMR HEAD OF SHIN BET: We did something very, very simple. We did everything in order to make sure that Hamas will go on controlling Gaza and Palestinian Authority will control the West Bank so they will fight each other.

JOHN LYONS, REPORTER: Netanyahu allowed Qatar to give massive amounts of cash to Hamas in Gaza.

AMI AYALON, FMR HEAD OF SHIN BET: So what we did with the permission of our prime Minister is to let Qatar to transfer a huge amount of money in cash, probably more than $1.4 billion, and to make sure that they will be able to send people to work in Israel and to achieve or to get intelligence if they need. By doing it, we increase the power of Hamas.

EHUD BARAK, FMR PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL: That served Netanyahu who wanted to avoid any discussion of two state solution.

JOHN LYONS, REPORTER: So, are you saying Benjamin Netanyahu deliberately boosted Hamas to try to prevent a Palestinian state?

EHUD BARAK, FMR PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL: Yeah, sure. He deliberately and systematically even told on record, whoever wants to avoid the threat of a two-state solution has to support my policy of paying protection money to the Hamas.

JOHN LYONS, REPORTER: Netanyahu maintains the Qatar money was to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. Having helped build up Hamas, Netanyahu has vowed to destroy it.

YEHUDA SHAUL, FMR ISRAELI ARMY COMMANDER: He fed the beast and it exploded in our face.

The Hexagon Alliance

From Netanyahu says Israel will forge regional alliance to rival ‘radical axes’ (Al Jazeera, 22 Feb 2026) we have: ‘Netanyahu, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges, also referred to Greece, Cyprus and other unnamed Arab, African and Asian countries. “In the vision I see before me, we will create an entire system, essentially a hexagon of alliances around or within the Middle East,” Netanyahu said, according to the Times of Israel. “The intention here is to create an axis of nations that see eye to eye on the reality, challenges, and goals against the radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis”.’

In Will Ethiopia be part of Israel’s ‘hexagon’ alliance rivalling its enemies? (Al Jazeera, 25 Feb 2026): “In December, Israel recognised Somaliland’s statehood, becoming the first country to do so. Months before, there were unconfirmed talks about plans to move displaced Palestinians to Somaliland or to South Sudan, another key Israeli ally in the region. Analysts speculate that countries like South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, another close friend of Israel, may also recognise Somaliland.”

So the hexagon would appear to be Greece, Cyprus, India, UAE, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has a Judeo-Christian heritage, in sharp contract to most of its regional neighbours. (See my reference to Judeo-Christian techno-supremacism in The Greater Evil, Scoop, 2 March 2026.)

Re the “emerging radical Sunni axis”, this article from India – The Hexagon Alliance, by Ayaan Ahmad and Arjun Dev Singh, 26 Feb 2026 – suggests “Sunni-majority states such as Türkiye, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, alongside Jordan and Iraq”. You would have to add Egypt to that.

In this context, we should note that Israeli politicians have already been talking up Türkiye as the next “threat”. See Turkish ‘threat’ talked up in Israel as Netanyahu focuses on new alliances, Al Jazeera, 23 Feb 2026. And, noting a joint expression of Islamophobia, Modi in Israel: ‘Hexagon’ alliance and the ideological convergence of Hindutva and Zionism, TRT World, 2 Mar 2026.

And from Is Türkiye Israel’s next target in the Middle East? (Al Jazeera, 21 Sep 2025): “In Washington, Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the right-leaning American Enterprise Institute, suggested that Türkiye could be Israel’s next target and warned that it should not rely on its NATO membership for protection.”

This reflects the significance of Greece and Cyprus within the hexagon. It also points to the United Kingdom, indirectly. Part of the island of Cyprus is British sovereign territory; ie not at all a ‘foreign airbase’. And another part of the island of Cyprus has been a Turkish realm state, albeit unrecognised by the international community (as Somaliland – formally British Somaliland – is also unrecognised).

We may note that the tension between UAE and Saudi Arabia is revealed in Google Maps. Despite there being a long border between the two countries, there is only one road crossing, to the far west of Abu Dhabi. Indeed, Doha in Qatar is closer to that border crossing than is either Dubai or the city of Abu Dhabi. 95% of UAE’s population lives in that country’s northeast corner. Along most of the border, there are parallel roads, but no crossing points. In Saudi Arabia that road is Highway 95. In UAE, its road is labelled ‘Boarder [sic] Patrol Road CIVILIAN VEHICLE PROHIBITED’.

The Yemen and Somaliland affairs

As noted by Al Jazeera: ‘Saudi Arabia is embroiled in an ongoing rift with the United Arab Emirates over how to deal with the conflict in Yemen.’

Yemen is one of those many places that are geopolitically important, but completely off New Zealand’s media radar. Historically Yemen was host to an important Jewish population (Yemenite Jews). Southern Yemen – especially Aden – was, for a century, a critical cog in the British Empire. Post-colonially, Southern Yemen became a ‘radical’ country in the world order, whereas Northern Yemen was a religiously conservative society, the Shia Zaydi Imamate until 1962 and then the Yemen Arab Republic.

In more recent years, that conservative north has become a Shia ‘Iranian proxy’, the ‘Houthis’. And the internationally recognised government of Yemen – operative in the south – has become, in that same sense, a Saudi Arabian proxy regime.

On 2 December 2025, the failed 2025–2026 Southern Yemen campaign began, essentially an attempt by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) to overthrow the Saudi-backed government. It was in the midst of this Israeli-backed campaign that Israel became the first country to recognise Somaliland – close to the geographical Horn of Africa’, and juxtaposed to Aden – as a sovereign state.

This has to be understood in the context of Israel’s Hexagon Alliance; indeed, an attempt to impose UAE/Israeli control over the geopolitically sensitive southern coastline of the Arabian peninsula. From Why Israel’s recognition of Somaliland backfired, (16 Jun 2026) by Abdi Aynte, former minister of planning and international cooperation of Somalia: “By empowering breakaway regions, Israel, with the backing of key regional partners, especially the United Arab Emirates, has sought to reshape the regional order.”

Aynte: “What some experts describe as an ‘Axis of Secession’ is already visible in Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Syria. Led by Israel and supported by a network of regional partners, this axis targets countries whose central governments, hollowed out by conflict, exercise only partial control over their territory. The logic is simple: weaken central authority, bolster breakaway regions, and cultivate dependent entities willing to align with Israel and sign onto the Abraham Accords.” Aynte calls these nations “emerging client polities” of Israel, though resistance remains strong in Somalia, Yemen and Sudan.

Beyond these smaller fractured nation states, there are several large nation states in the region which Israel is trying to fracture. While these attempts in Iran are all too visible, a literal smokescreen, quietly Israel is adding Ethiopia – a country with 100,000 people – to its client list. We note that Ethiopia is hosting RSF training camps, further undermining Sudan’s sovereignty. See Reuters: Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say, 10 Feb 2026.

This is not regional geopolitics which New Zealand can naively pretend-away. Aynte adds: “Somaliland’s decision to cultivate ties with Taiwan inevitably drew Beijing’s attention”. “The result [of Israel’s meddling through client third parties] is an increasingly crowded and volatile theatre, where global power rivalries intersect with unresolved local aspirations.” “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, once close partners, are now increasingly at odds, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt have begun coordinating to counter what they view as a destabilising ‘Axis of Secession’.”

And we note “widespread claims that Israel is exploring resettlement of Palestinian refugees from Gaza in Somaliland”. (An echo of Britain’s former plan to settle European Jews in Uganda!)

If we look at a map of the so-called ‘Middle East’ (nobody refers to Near East or Far East anymore!) and paint the hexagon countries in ‘Star-of-David’ blue – including Israel itself and its occupied territories, and including the RSF-controlled parts of Sudan – the obvious missing links are Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran. Hence the present war in Iran, and the concerns already noted re Türkiye. But what about Egypt?

Egypt, Iran and the Bible

Even today, Israel’s reference point is the Old Testament of The Bible. Note Al Jazeera’s Inside Story episode of 2 March 2026, What dangers does the Iran war pose for Israel?, featuring Mitchell Barak, “former speech writer for Israeli PM Ariel Sharon”, noting that Sharon was nicknamed Butcher of Beirut on account of his responsibility for the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre.

Interviewer: “Mitchell, I’m going to start things off with you. Please give us a broad brushstroke of how you see things unfolding.”

Barak: “First of all, I’d like to wish a Ramadan Kareem to all of the people watching who are celebrating and commemorating this holiday. It is also a fast day in Israel, the Fast of Esther, which commemorates ironically and interestingly enough the victory of the Jewish people over an evil Persian empire 2,500 years ago.”

He is referring to the Purim holiday. Note, in these Wikipedia references, the references to Amalek, the word that Benjamin Netanyahu invoked to justify the subsequent genocide of Gaza. Refer The Biblical story of Amalek evoked by Netanyahu, ABC24 Jan 2024.

Barak did not go on to answer the “broad brushstroke” question.

Two polities which feature strongly in that biblical narrative are Egypt and (in the guise of Babylon) Persia aka Iran. To fully understand Israel’s agenda today, we really need to see that regime and its cultural acolytes as playing a long game; a very long game. Israel is trying to reverse the wrongs that it believed it suffered, around 2½ to 3 thousand years ago, at the hands of those two ancient civilisations. (The irony is that Israel denied that there was any historical context – not even a day’s historical context – to the ‘blue-sky’ shock events of 7 October 2023.)

Seen in this context, it is credible that the principal target of the Hexagon Alliance is Egypt, not Türkiye.

And, re the current role of the United Arab Emirates in that fraught region, Australia should not provide military support to Israel’s secret ally and proxy. (See Australia to provide military support to Gulf states attacked by Iran, ABC 10 March 2026.)

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

New Zealand First has called for yet another inquiry into Covid-19 – this one focused on vaccine injuries.

The second phase of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, commissioned by the coalition, released its findings on Tuesday, unequivocally endorsing the use of vaccines.

It did, however, highlight that officials were warned about the risks of giving two doses to teenagers – and said that was not passed on to ministers.

In a statement, NZ First said the latest report did not go far enough when looking into vaccine safety and risks.

It called for a select committee to hold its own inquiry to give anyone injured a voice and to hold decision-makers accountable.

“The Crown needs to know how widespread any effects of those known risks that were mandated on New Zealanders but specifically those young people.

“The downstream health effects could be disastrous with the report identifying myocarditis as a specific health consequence.”

Speaking at Parliament, NZ First leader Winston Peters told reporters he had serious concerns about vaccine safety.

“Hundreds of thousands of people have been affected here. They need to know the truth. They need to know why they were denied the truth.”

ACT’s David Seymour said he was open to the idea of a select committee inquiry.

“A lot of people felt they were ostracized from society and if this helps them feel seen and heard, then it might not be a bad thing.”

Even with the support of NZ First and ACT, a select committee inquiry would require the backing of the National Party.

National leader and Prime Minister Christopher Luxon dodged questions over whether he supported an inquiry, saying only that there were “very serious questions” for Labour to answer.

Labour leader Chris Hipkins said two high-level investigations had already been carried out – including one commissioned by the current coalition government.

He pointed out that Peters was once a staunch advocate for vaccines, even calling for them to be a requirement for welfare and parole.

“One of the wonders of being Winston Peters is you never have to be consistent in your position on anything.”

Hipkins said the government needed to “move on” and focus instead on the cost-of-living and the country’s future.

In its report, released on Tuesday, the Royal Commission of Inquiry said the process and consideration surrounding the approval of vaccines could not have been more thorough.

“We acknowledge that some people disagree with Medsafe’s decision that the benefits of [the Pfizer vaccine] Comirnaty outweighed its risks. They consider the risks of the vaccine then, and now, well outweigh any perceived benefit.

“We do not agree with that view.”

The report said the evidence did not support arguments that Covid-19 was not “a significant threat to public health”.

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– Published by EveningReport.nz and AsiaPacificReport.nz, see: MIL OSI in partnership with Radio New Zealand

Willow-Jean Prime has lost the education portfolio, but picked up social development, as Labour reshuffles its decks ahead of the election.

Ginny Andersen will take on the education role, making her the third Labour MP to take on the role in just over a year.

Peeni Henare‘s departure from Parliament, along with Adrian Rurawhe earlier this year, has given Labour leader Chris Hipkins an opportunity to change things up.

“These refreshed portfolios ensure our team will hit the ground running when we win the election in November,” Hipkins said.

Willie Jackson, who had taken on the social development role last year, will instead take on Māori Crown Relations.

Speaking to the changes, Hipkins said Prime’s new social development role required “care, empathy, and a strong focus on improving outcomes for New Zealanders,” while Jackson would focus on running a “winning campaign” in the Māori seats.

Among the other changes are Damien O’Connor picking up Henare’s defence spokesperson role, Reuben Davidson taking over economic development, and Tangi Utikere becoming the spokesperson for state-owned enterprises.

Vanushi Walters moves considerably higher up Labour’s list, and takes over foreign affairs from Henare.

New list MP Georgie Dansey has been given the rainbow issues and regulation roles. Dan Rosewarne, who will re-enter Parliament following Henare’s retirement, has been given the rural communities and small business portfolios.

Duncan Webb, who has announced he will retire at the election, has lost all of his spokesperson roles.

His justice portfolio has been given to Camilla Belich.

Hipkins said Webb would instead take on a “mentoring role to support our team.”

The Prime Minister is also expected to announce a ministerial reshuffle in the coming weeks, following the retirement of Judith Collins and Dr Shane Reti’s announcement he will step down at the election.

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– Published by EveningReport.nz and AsiaPacificReport.nz, see: MIL OSI in partnership with Radio New Zealand

Technology entrepreneur Brian Cartmell appears to have donated at least half a million dollars to the coalition parties – and to the Opportunity party.

Cartmell moved to New Zealand in 2010 and gave up his US citizenship in 2015. His former professional background includes working for the Internet Entertainment Group, an online pornography company. It was a pioneer in live webcam shows and subscription services.

In a statement on his website, Cartmell said he had donated equally to the three coalition parties as well as to Opportunity. The ACT Party told RNZ it had received a total of $200,000 from Cartmell last year. The Electoral Commission said a $100,000 donation to Opportunity from Cartmell had been disclosed. Neither National nor NZ First would confirm donations from him.

But Cartmell himself said the current coalition parties represent “the best available chance of navigating” a period of significant economic, technological, and geopolitical change in a way that preserves New Zealand’s sovereignty, prosperity and independence.

He said he chose to donate equal amounts to National, Act and NZ First last year as none of the three represents his thinking, but he believed the three parties complemented each other. The donation to Opportunity was made because he feels healthy democracies need parties willing to put forward ideas major parties won’t.

“New ideas enter the political process from the edges, and parties like Opportunity play an important role in making sure that process doesn’t stagnate.”

Who is Brian Cartmell?

Cartmell lives in Queenstown with his partner. He says he has donated more than $1 million to a range of organisations including Starship Children’s Hospital, Cure Kids, Hato Hone St John and NZSAS Regiment Trust.

In the 1990s, he worked at Internet Entertainment Group helping it to develop live streaming technology.

Cartmell also founded a domain registry firm in 1997 which managed domain names with the .cc extension, associated with the Cocos Islands territory, an island territory with a population of around 600 people. He told the United States Senate Commerce Committee 400,000 domain names were registered to the extension. The Australian Financial Review reported the islands received no benefits from domain name sales, although Cartmell did distribute technology and grants. Cartmell sold the company to Verisign in 2001 for an undisclosed sum.

Cartmell also funded an anti-spam service called SpamAlert. This company won a court case against the food company Hormel, maker of tinned Spam, over the use of the word spam. He was also an early adopter of cryptocurrency Bitcoin and participated in the first funding round of Coinbase.

The Companies Register shows he is a director of three New Zealand companies and a shareholder in an additional 12 companies. These include crowdsourcing platform PledgeMe, food and beverage companies Angel Food and Yeastie Boys. He has a small shareholding in Invisible Urban Charging, an electric car charging company co-founded by former National Party MP Jake Bezzant.

According to Cartmell’s website he is seeking investment opportunities and is looking for innovative start-ups in transformative technologies.

Parties respond

Opportunity party general manager Iain Lees-Galloway said the cash injection, which was declared as being received on 25 February was incredibly helpful for the small party, which is not in parliament.

“We don’t have parliamentary resources to run our campaigns that sitting MPs do. So a donation like this makes a huge difference to us to be able to get our message out.”

Donations would be spent on marketing as well as travel and events. The party has received one other big donation of $50,000 from Phillip Mills, taking its currently declared total for 2026 to $150,000.

Donations made in the 2025 calendar year will be published in early May. Donations made in an election year must be declared within 20 days if they are more than $20,000.

An ACT party spokesperson confirmed Cartmell had made donations in 2025 but had not made any donations this year.

“ACT New Zealand received a donation from Brian Cartmell of $100k in December last year. He donated a total of $200k to ACT in 2025.”

New Zealand First party secretary Holly Howard said donations would be disclosed as required by law.

“Out of respect for our donors’ privacy and due process, we will not provide commentary or confirmation on individual donations ahead of the statutory reporting requirements.”

The National Party said it wouldn’t comment on individual donations, except where required by law through donation disclosures.

Information released on the electoral commission website shows coalition parties have received $750,000 in donations of over $20,000 so far this year. National has received $250,000, ACT $350,000 and NZ First $150,000.

The Greens have received $43,000 and Labour $22,000.

Cartmell’s statement says he supports transparent political donations, but will be making no further statements on the matter.

“These donations were made with that broader objective in mind – with the understanding that it is voters, not donors, who decide the direction of New Zealand.”

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– Published by EveningReport.nz and AsiaPacificReport.nz, see: MIL OSI in partnership with Radio New Zealand

MP Mariameno Kapa-Kingi says Justice Radich “brought justice to Te Tai Tokerau voters” when he ruled her expulsion from Te Pāti Māori “unlawful”.

It comes as a political commentator says the party might be looking to distance itself from the drama of last year, and focus on the election ahead.

The formally reinstated MP took to social media on Tuesday night to celebrate the verdict, saying her intention in bringing the case was not to incite division, but “seek clarity and ensure the processes we hold ourselves to – particularly those grounded in tikanga, are honoured”.

“Finally, today, the truth has risen,” Kapa-Kingi said following the release of the verdict on Tuesday afternoon, which ruled her suspension and subsequent expulsion as “unlawful”.

Radich said the tikanga principles that were infused into the kawa document “were not mentioned or applied” in relation to her suspension.

“Perhaps most fundamentally, the relevant tikanga principles – which must inform the way in which a decision-maker considers the kawa’s rules – were not applied in any way,” Radich said.

“This decision on its own will not heal all the mamae, but it is an important first step,” Kapa-Kingi said online.

Kapa-Kingi also mentioned she looked forward to meeting with those from Te Tai Tokerau to discuss their future strategy for the election in coming weeks.

She finished by acknowledging this week belonged to “my darling nephew Peeni Henare”, whose many years of service “deserve recognition and respect”.

Mike Colson KC – Kapa-Kingi’s lawyer – told RNZ it was nice to see an “unjust situation rectified”.

He was particularly interested in the judge’s assessment of the party breaching its own tikanga, acknowledging tikanga was a “fairly hot topic” amongst the legal profession at the moment.

“Many judges are slightly nervous dealing with it, or – one might expect very respectful of it.

“Here we had such a clear explanation of what the tikanga was of the party, and I thought it was quite brave and right of the judge to find that kawa and tikanga had been breached.”

He also acknowledged it might be considered “unusual” for a judge to “direct a party to take an action within Parliament”.

But Colson said the situation was so clear, and there was a lack of clarity last time as to whether that extra step was necessary.

“The judge thought it was proper to do so and to direct them to give a notice to the speaker.”

He said it was an unusual set of circumstances, and did not think it would set a major precedent.

The defendants had argued the case was a contractual matter, and should be dealt with privately, but Colson said the judge was quick to point out the “public character of the proceeding”, and that it was not just Kapa-Kingi’s case, but her electorate who voted her in.

“They, of course, also had a role to play and a voice to be heard, and that really pushed into very much the public arena.”

What will happen now?

On Tuesday Te Pāti Māori co-leader Rawiri Waititi told reporters he had attempted to make contact with Kapa-Kingi, but it was not clear what the process was for her reinstatement or how the apparent rift would be addressed.

Associate professor in politics at Victoria University, Lara Greaves, told RNZ she had expected this ruling from the case.

She explained Te Pāti Māori’s constitution “wasn’t particularly clear”, and it was “very hard” to figure out if the party had followed the rules in terms of her expulsion.

Greaves thinks the decision to go to court was Kapa-Kingi’s attempt at staying with the party, “to change it from the inside,”, and this was “politics pushing up against the law”.

“Legally, there’s a judgment, here that Kapa-Kingi is still part of the party, but it’s not clear what will happen next.”

She said the co-leaders had not spoken about the ruling much, and they had expressed a desire to limit any further drama, so “for a lot of us, it’s just going to be a case of waiting and seeing what happens”.

“Being within a political party where you’ve been expelled is probably not a comfortable place,” Greaves said.

She pointed to potential scenarios of further attempts at expulsion or further issues raised, “there’s still a lot of things that could happen here and happen here”.

Greaves said a lot of people, including herself, had made the assessment there was a “bit too much commentary” taking place last year from the party and others involved.

“So, just being a bit quieter might be a good solution there.

“Te Pāti Māori may have listened to a lot of their critics, listened to a lot of their whānau and communities, and thought – we need to keep this out of the media and keep a bit quiet on it going forward.”

Greaves also pointed to the Māori seats, and Labour and the Greens running strong candidates this election, “there are quite a few potential threats to their electoral success, so it’s kind of important that [Te Pāti Māori] sort it out now and figure out what they’re doing in order to get success in the election”.

“Te Pāti Māori may have made a decision in a way to hope that voters think that these issues are behind them and to move forward constructively.”

She said there would be a lot of scrutiny on the dynamics between Kapa-Kingi and the party leadership in the coming months, as well as a focus on MPs Hana-Rawhiti Maipi-Clarke and Oriini Kaipara and how they were fitting into the party.

It was possible, she said, that there would be enough time between the “drama” last year to the election this year that people did forgive and forget, “that would actually be a pretty good comeback”.

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The Green Party is welcoming news that the government has backtracked on plans to reinstate live animal exports.

Animal Welfare Minister Andrew Hoggard told 1 News he could not get Cabinet agreement on overturning the ban, which formed part of coalition agreements with both ACT and NZ First.

Green Party spokesperson Steve Abel said the news was a win for animals, the public and the groups campaigning against the move.

He said there had been backlash to the proposal right from the start.

“From the outset, there was overwhelming outrage from veterinary experts who expressed there was no way to maintain animal welfare standards and herd cattle onto ships where they spend weeks at sea wallowing in their own waste. It’s fundamentally cruel and there’s no way to uphold the barest animal standards while exporting at sea,” Abel said.

“They couldn’t get it across the line because New Zealanders didn’t want to see animals suffering in that way.”

A 57,000-strong petition calling for the ban to stay in place was presented to parliament in 2024.

At the time, Hoggard said he wanted the ban overturned by 2025.

In April 2025, Hoggard told RNZ he expected the legislation to go to Cabinet within months, but that a backlog had slowed the work of the Parliamentary Counsel Office in drafting the amendment.

Last month, Livestock Exports NZ chief executive Glen Neal said uncertainty around the bill was unhelpful, but the industry remained hopeful the ban would be overturned.

Parliamentary questions revealed the minister had not received any advice on the plan since mid-2025, despite telling scrutiny week committees the amendment had gone before cabinet in December last year, Abel said.

If the coalition intended to make it an election issue, it needed to tell the public immediately, but Abel believed “the handbrake had been pulled” at the Cabinet level because of the unpopularity of the move.

The Ministry for Primary Industries initiated an independent review of live exports in 2020, after the sinking of Gulf Livestock 1, which resulted in the deaths of 41 crew and nearly 6000 cattle.

The vessel, registered to Panama and owned by a UAE shipping company, left Napier in August 2020 bound for China, but sank off the coast of Japan in a typhoon.

In 2022, the previous government passed a bill banning live exports, beginning in April 2023.

At the time, National’s animal welfare spokesperson Nicola Grigg said the ban was disproportionate and ideological, and would hurt farmers and consumers.

The National Party had campaigned on overturning the ban, with a proposal it said would require greater regulation to protect animal welfare and safety, such as purpose-built ships and a certification regime for importers.

Hoggard, who is a former president of Federated Farmers, had previously said reintroducing the trade was one of his top priorities in the portfolio and he wanted to “progress with some haste”.

A 2024, an RNZ investigation revealed industry group Livestock Export New Zealand planned to spend $1 million to ensure the ban was dismantled, including on political lobbying, a “social media counter offensive”, a “trust and understanding” campaign, media training and creating the “gold standard” for animal welfare.

RNZ has approached Minister Hoggard for comment.

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Declining population in West Papua, and critical loss of life through clashes with the Indonesia military raise the question of genocide in a new book by Brisbane writer Dr Greg Poulgrain.

This work, Curse of Gold, published in English by Kompas, as the title indicates traces the roots of subjugation going on in West New Guinea (West Papua) to a cynical grabbing for resources. An Indonesian language edition is forthcoming.

The book is a history beginning with the discovery of huge deposits of gold in 1936, deposits more than twice the gold being mined at Witwatersrand, together with discovery of oil just off-shore.

The principal mine now, with an Indonesian billionaire as main owner, has 560 km of tunnels and produces 50 tonnes of gold annually.

The existence of the gold was kept secret, awaiting investment and development opportunities, held up by war with the Japanese, known just to Dutch interests, the Japanese, and significant for the future, the Rockefeller petroleum company Standard Oil in the United States.

The writer details the operation of a “Third Force” in a chain of political intrigues and manipulation over a half century: the US company, sometimes officers of the US government, and at all times an early player since the first discovery, Allen Dulles, who came to head-up the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Dulles as the lawyer for Standard Oil had already got a petroleum concession in Netherlands New Guinea before 1936, through forming a joint US-Dutch company with majority US interest.

Heyday of CIA operations
In the 1950s heyday of CIA undercover operations across the “Third World”, Dulles is depicted here manipulating political events in Indonesia, whether spreading disinformation, concealing information from governments, even setting up mysterious, destabilising armed skirmishes.

The objective given is always the same, to secure ownership of resources and a free hand for American commercial interests. At one point covert government help would be provided through some disingenuous work by Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State to Richard Nixon, and the always interventionist US Ambassador Marshall Green.

For people of West New Guinea the intriguing saga has been a catastrophe, seeing their rights, interests, existence and even human identity denied and ignored in the struggles over wealth and power.

The story is in two phases:

In wartime the occupying Japanese encouraged the Indonesian independence movement, as a block against any return to influence by European colonial powers, and naturally wanted Papuan resources themselves.

A Japanese intelligence operative, Nishijima Shigetada, familiar with the region, is given a key role. He had found out about the gold, and persuaded the Indonesian nationalists to include West New Guinea in their demands for a republic — the better to get the trove out of the hands of “colonial monopolies”.

The second phase of developments saw an ugly turn of events with the 1965 military coup in Indonesia, marked by large scale massacre across the country and coming to power of Suharto as President in 1967.

The new regime determined to build on the campaign by its predecessor, President Sukarno, to take over West New Guinea. In the calculus of Cold War rivalries, President John Kennedy had sought to keep him “on side” and the Russians provided guns and aid, in part to best their Chinese rivals.

Dutch gave in
The outcome was that the Dutch who had stayed on in the territory gave in to pressure and pulled out by the end of 1963. It was nominally then put under United Nations trusteeship until an “act of free choice” on independence.

But Indonesian forces moved in, violently put down any Papuan resistance, promulgated theories of an Indonesia Raya, a lost island empire to which all of New Guinea had belonged, and declared the decision on independence would be an issue of “staying” with Indonesia. Neither Kennedy nor Sukarno, who had planned to meet in 1964, is believed to have known about the gold in Papua.

Dr Poulgrain recounts the narrative of bullying and deception, including the sidelining of senior UN representatives, whereby the “act of free choice” became notoriously a series of managed gatherings, no plebiscite of the people ever countenanced. He argues that the “Third Party”, having helped to remove the Dutch, then moved in favour of its own preferred candidate, Suharto, no nationalist from the independence movement, a self-declared friend of US commerce and advocate for untrammelled investment:

“It could be argued that the fiery nationalism so characteristic of Sukarno, the tool that won him the right to enter the harbour of Soekarnopura (Jayapura) on board the Soviet warship renamed Irian, proved to be his own undoing. Under the mantle of Sukarno’s presidency, Indonesia ousted the Dutch from New Guinea, the goal of both Nishijima and the ‘Third Party’, finally bringing an end to the European colonial presence there.

“Only 30 months later, Sukarno was facing his own political demise …”

In case the reader considers this might all be a well-worn path, it should be emphasised there is new material and insight into the origins and enactment of cruelty, appropriation and dishonesty that became the pattern in Suharto’s New Order Indonesia and its captive provinces in West New Guinea.

It is a work of thoroughness and industry, especially where covert activity and actual conspiracy appears; extensive documentation has been provided making the case strong. Much of it is original material, such as diplomatic messaging obtained through libraries, and records of interviews or correspondence with leading figures, viz Nishijima or the former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Well defended
The thesis of the book is consistently propounded and well defended:

“This book is about the ownership of the immense wealth of natural resources in Western New Guinea”.

The colonised inhabitants did not get that ownership or any just share of it, with bad consequences for their culture and welfare. It was a bad beginning in 1963 with Indonesia in a dominating frame of mind:

“Papuan culture is the antithesis of life in Java.”

Where the Dutch colonisers are characterised as a very small population hardly penetrating the hinterland, the Indonesians who took over from them have been aggressive with their industry building, immigration and military occupation.

Papuans today make up barely half the population of 5.4-million, steadily outstripped by arrivals. Population growth in the comparable country, Papua New Guinea, since independence in 1975 has been much stronger, now pushing towards 11-million.

• Curse of Gold, by Greg Poulgrain (Jakarta, Kompas, 2026). ISBN 978, ISBN 978 (PDF)

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Education Minister Erica Stanford has been damning in her assessment of last week’s disastrous poll result for National, calling it a “bad week” for the party and for the caucus.

Speculation has been swirling about Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s leadership after the Taxpayers’ Union Curia Poll result put National on 28.4 per cent – the party’s lowest result since Luxon became leader.

Asked on Tuesday whether she was happy with the result, Stanford – often tipped as a possible leadership contender – said: “No, of course not”.

“We’ve got to do a lot better as a party, all of us pull together, we’ve got to respect what voters are telling us,” she said.

In addition to the horror poll, Luxon also struggled to articulate the government’s position on the Iran conflict and flubbed his answers to questions on the same topic at his post-Cabinet press conference last week.

Asked whether it was a bad week for the prime minister, Stanford said the result reflected poorly on the party.

“I would say it’s a bad week for the National Party and our caucus, and we’ve got to do better all of us together, pull together and remember that our focus is on the New Zealand people, and in my case, raising student achievement,” Stanford said.

Any speculation she was vying for the top job was “reporters interviewing their own typewriters”, Stanford said, adding that she supported the prime minister “100 percent”.

On Tuesday afternoon, Stanford ruled out making any bids for the leadership.

“We have a leader, he’s doing a really good job, and I am part of a high-performing team just doing my job, reforming the education system.”

In a busy day in Parliament – when the Covid-19 inquiry report was released, National MP and Minister Shane Reti announced his retirement, and MP Mariameno Kapa-Kingi was reinstated to Te Pāti Māori by the High Court – National Party ministers and backbenchers were resolute in their support of the prime minister.

Māori Development Minister Tama Potaka said he backed Luxon and looked forward to the coming election campaign.

Asked whether he wanted to be the leader, he repeatedly said he had “no intentions” to run for the top job but also refused to rule out a future bid.

“It’s got nothing to do with me… I’m not here to answer questions about me running for the leadership, because, as you know, I support the prime minister.”

Tim Costley, MP for Ōtaki, said that asking Luxon to step down, should his polling worsen, had never crossed his mind.

“We’ve got a strong caucus. We’ve got 49. We’re looking great.”

Banks Peninsula MP Vanessa Weenink said she was not concerned about her seat, which was one of the most marginal at the last election.

“I’m not worried about my job. I’m not worried about my seat. I’m worried about the country if we have an alternative government.”

Takinini MP Rima Nakhle put her level of support for the prime minister at “123 percent”, while Upper Harbour MP Cameron Brewer said the caucus was unified.

“We respect the guy, we’re tight, we’re disciplined, and you can see that with all our answers in the last 72 hours. You know, we actually just want to get on with the job.”

The prime minister himself continued to brush off concerns about the poll, telling reporters on Tuesday that the party’s caucus meeting would feature normal business, adding the team was “really united, really focused, really driven”.

But Labour leader Chris Hipkins blasted National for getting itself into “one heck of a mess”.

“They promised they were going to fix the economy, they’ve shrunk it. They promised they were going to get Kiwis into work, more Kiwis are unemployed now. They promised they were going to fix government debt, government debt’s gone up. They promised they were going to fix the cost of living, the cost of living’s got harder for New Zealand households.

“Whether it’s Christopher Luxon or one of the other ministers who was involved in all of those decisions leading the National Party, the problem is they haven’t done what they said they were going to do.”

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Yet this global diplomatic posture raises a critical question: how credible is Indonesia’s claim to peace leadership while a prolonged humanitarian crisis continues in West Papua?

In late February 2026, Prabowo offered Indonesia’s services to mediate rising tensions involving the United States, Israel and Iran, even stating he was prepared to travel to Tehran if both parties agreed to dialogue.

The message was reinforced when former Indonesian vice-president Jusuf Kalla met Iran’s ambassador, Mohammad Boroujerdi, on 3 March 2026 to reiterate Indonesia’s readiness to facilitate diplomatic engagement.

In response, Iran publicly welcomed the gesture but tempered expectations.

Iranian officials insisted that any meaningful mediation must include condemnation of US and Israeli military actions, warning that diplomatic initiatives without political clarity may have limited effectiveness.

The exchange highlighted both Indonesia’s aspiration to play a larger diplomatic role and the complexities of international conflict mediation.

Peacebroker limitations
However, Indonesia’s attempt to position itself as a global peace broker has already faced significant limitations. In 2023, Prabowo proposed a peace plan for the war between Russia and Ukraine.

The proposal, which included controversial suggestions such as a demilitarised zone and a referendum in disputed territories, was quickly rejected by Ukrainian officials. The response exposed the limited influence of Indonesia’s mediation efforts in conflicts far beyond Southeast Asia.

While presenting himself internationally as a peacemaker, critics argue that Prabowo has largely paid lip service to human rights at home, particularly regarding the unresolved crisis in West Papua.

Indonesian protesters denounce US link over Iran war         Video: Al Jazeera

While Indonesia promotes its diplomatic role in international conflicts, violence and instability continue to affect civilians in West Papua.

On 11 February 2026, only weeks before Prabowo’s international mediation initiative gained attention, a small civilian aircraft operated by Smart Air came under gunfire shortly after landing at Korowai Batu airstrip in Boven Digoel, West Papua.

A spokesperson linked to the military wing of Free Papua Movement (TPNPB- OPM) later claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that the aircraft had allegedly been used to transport Indonesian security forces.

The roots of the crisis stretch back to the early 1960s, when Indonesia invaded and took control of the territory following the withdrawal of Dutch colonial administration.

Act of Free Choice controversy
The subsequent 1969 referendum, known as the Act of Free Choice, remains one of the most controversial political processes in modern Southeast Asian and South Pacific history.

Rather than a universal vote, approximately 1025 selected representatives voted under significant political and military pressure.

Many Papuans and international observers argue that the process failed to meet internationally recognized standards for self-determination. As a result, the legitimacy of the referendum continues to be contested, and its legacy remains a central grievance fueling decades of political resistance and armed conflict.

For many analysts and human rights advocates, the Papua conflict cannot simply be framed as a domestic security problem. Instead, it represents a protracted humanitarian and political crisis that has yet to find a comprehensive and inclusive resolution.

In this sense, the issue has become what some observers describe as a long-standing wound within the Indonesian state.

Such incidents highlight the tragic reality faced by ordinary Papuans, who often find themselves caught between military operations and Papuan resistance attacks.

Civilians bear the brunt of a conflict that has persisted for decades without meaningful political dialogue capable of addressing its underlying causes.

Rising internal displacement in West Papua
According to reports by human rights organisations and humanitarian groups, displacement in West Papua has increased significantly in recent years.

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has risen dramatically, from roughly 55,000 at the end of 2023 to more than 103,000 by October 2025. Many displaced communities face severe shortages of food, healthcare, education, and basic security.

These figures reflect a broader systemic failure to protect civilians and provide sustainable solutions for affected communities. Despite decades of development initiatives and official rhetoric emphasising stability and prosperity in Papua, the lived reality for many residents remains defined by insecurity and displacement.

Prabowo’s own military history also continues to shape international perceptions of Indonesia’s human rights record. During the Indonesian occupation of East Timor between 1975 and 1999, Prabowo served as an officer in Indonesia’s elite special forces, Kopassus.

Human rights organisations have linked him to operations accused of abuses against civilians during that period.

Following the 1999 referendum that ultimately led to East Timor’s independence, the United Nations supported investigations into violence carried out by Indonesian-backed militias and security forces.

Although Prabowo was never tried or convicted by an international court, activists and some Timorese leaders have long argued that senior Indonesian officers should have faced deeper scrutiny.

Shaping of credibility
In international diplomacy, credibility is often shaped not only by external initiatives but also by a state’s domestic human rights record. When internal conflicts remain unresolved, claims to global moral leadership can face heightened scrutiny.

Prabowo was also involved in military operations in Papua during the 1990s. One of the most widely discussed incidents was the 1996 Mapenduma hostage crisis in the highlands of what is now Nduga Regency.

Human rights organisations have documented allegations of abuses committed by Indonesian security forces during that period.

Additional controversies have surrounded claims that aircraft bearing the emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross were misused during operations. Such allegations, whether proven or not, continue to raise questions about adherence to international humanitarian law and contribute to lingering distrust among Papuan communities.

Taken together, these historical and contemporary dynamics create a sharp contrast between Indonesia’s global diplomatic ambitions and the unresolved realities within its own borders.

In international diplomacy, credibility is closely tied to domestic consistency.
It is difficult to advocate peace abroad while unresolved grievances and allegations of human rights violations persist at home.

For Indonesia, genuine leadership in global peacemaking would require more than diplomatic offers on the world stage. It would involve confronting the deeper structural issues underlying the conflict in West Papua.

Ensuring accountability
This would include ensuring accountability for past abuses, protecting civil liberties, and opening inclusive political dialogue that allows Papuans to meaningfully participate in shaping their own future.

Without such reforms, Indonesia’s peace diplomacy risks being perceived less as principled international engagement and more as a form of strategic public relations. The gap between Jakarta’s diplomatic rhetoric and the lived experiences of Papuan civilians remains stark.

Ultimately, Indonesia’s credibility as a global peacemaker will depend not only on its willingness to mediate conflicts abroad but also on its ability to address the long-standing humanitarian and political crisis within West Papua.

Until that gap is bridged, Indonesia’s aspirations for global diplomatic leadership will continue to face serious questions about legitimacy and moral authority.

The continued instability in West Papua also has broader regional implications for the Pacific, where several governments and civil society groups have increasingly raised concerns about the humanitarian situation faced by indigenous West Papuans.

Ali Mirin is a West Papuan from the Kimyal tribe in the highlands bordering the Star Mountains region of Papua New Guinea. He holds a Master of Arts in international relations from Flinders University in Adelaide, South Australia.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

SPECIAL REPORT: By Brett Wilkins of Common Dreams

US and Israeli airstrikes have killed nearly 300 Iranian and Lebanese children over the past nine days as the attackers target apartment towers, single-family homes, schools, medical facilities, and other civilian infrastructure.

Iran’s Health Ministry said Sunday that 198 women and 190 minors have been killed by US and Israeli attacks since February 28, including six children under the age of 5. The youngest reported victim is an 8-month-old girl.

Children account for more than 30 percent of those killed, according to the ministry, which also said that 1044 women and 638 children have been injured.

Overall, Iran said that more than 1300 people have been killed by the airstrikes, which are reportedly targeting 30 of the country’s 31 provinces.

The Lebanese Health Ministry announced Sunday that 394 people, including 42 women and 83 children, have been killed by Israel Defence Forces (IDF) attacks after Iran-backed Hezbollah joined the war.

The US-based charity Save the Children noted yesterday that the number of slain Iranian and Lebanese minors is the equivalent of “10 classrooms full of children”.

“It is devastating that airstrikes in Lebanon have reportedly caused the deaths of 83 children… among nearly 300 children killed in the region,” said Save the Children Lebanon director Nora Ingdal.

‘Not just numbers’
“These are not just numbers — these are young lives cut short and children whose futures have been forever scarred by war.”

Israel claims it has killed around 200 Hezbollah fighters. However, the IDF’s routine attacks on apartment towers and other residential buildings have drawn widespread condemnation.

On Sunday, an IDF strike massacred 18 people sheltering in an apartment building in Sir El-Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh district. The building was housing some of the nearly 700,000 Lebanese forcibly displaced by Israeli attacks, including around 200,000 children.

Local officials said women and children were among the victims.

Another IDF aerial massacre in the southern Lebanese town of Tafahata killed eight people, including five members of the Ezzedine family, whose home was bombed.

“This time is much worse than the previous war,” Nabatieh Civil Defence chief Hussein Faqih told the National, referring to Israel’s 2023-25 attacks on Lebanon that killed more than 4000 people, including nearly 800 women and over 300 children, in retaliation for Hezbollah’s rocket strikes in solidarity with Palestine during the Gaza genocide.

Israeli attacks on Iran during last year’s 12-Day War also killed more than 1000 Iranians, including 436 civilians.

Worst reported bombing
In the worst reported bombing of the current war — and possibly the deadliest US massacre since more than 400 Iraqis were wiped out in a “precision strike” on a Baghdad bomb shelter during the 1991 Gulf War — around 175 Iranians, most of them young children, were killed in what first responders and victims’ relatives said was a so-called double-tap strike on an elementary school in Minab in southern Iran.

US military investigators reportedly believe the strike was carried out by US forces, but President Donald Trump has blamed Iran.

On Monday, a group of Democratic US senators lead by Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire said they were “horrified” by the school strike.

“The killing of school children is appalling and unacceptable under any circumstance,” the senators said in a statement. “This incident is particularly concerning in light of [Defence Secretary Pete] Hegseth’s openly cavalier approach to the use of force, including his statement that US strikes in Iran wouldn’t be bound by ‘stupid rules of engagement,’ in his words.”

Multiple members of the UK Parliament have condemned the killing of Iranian and Lebanese children.

Leftist Independent Jeremy Corbyn, a former Labour leader, said yesterday on Bluesky: “Classrooms of children in Iran. Hundreds of people in Lebanon. The ongoing genocide in Gaza. The message from our political and media class is clear: Their lives are less valuable than others.”

“Every human being matters, and every human being deserves a life of peace,” Corbyn added.

‘School girls slaughtered’
Zahra Sultana, who quit Labour and started the socialist Your Party with Corbyn last year, mocked US and Israeli pretensions, saying in a BBC interview on Sunday — International Women’s Day — that the girls in the Minab school were slaughtered “apparently to liberate women”.

Retaliatory attacks by Iran have killed at least 13 Israelis and wounded nearly 2000 others since February 28, according to Israel’s government. No Israeli child deaths have been reported. Seven US troops and at least 15 people in Gulf Arab nations have also been killed by Iranian counterattacks.

While the world’s focus is on Iran, Israeli occupation forces have continued killing and wounding people in Gaza and the West Bank of Palestine.

Drop Site News reported yesterday that eight Palestinians were killed in Gaza over the past 24 hours, including two women and at least as many children.

More than 250,000 Palestinians have been killed or wounded by Israeli forces since the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023. More than 20,000 children have been killed and over 44,000 others wounded.

More than 1 in 4 fatalities have been children in a war for which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes, and Israel is facing a genocide case currently before the International Court of Justice.

Since the 9/11 attacks, US-led wars have left nearly 1 million people dead in more than half a dozen countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa—over 400,000 of them civilians, according to the Costs of War Project at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs.

“Every war is a war on children, and once again we are seeing them pay the highest price for a conflict they neither started nor had a say in,” Ingdal said yesterday.

“Wars have laws, and children must be off limits in every conflict,” she added. “World leaders must act urgently to prevent further escalation. There must be an immediate cessation of hostilities, and all parties must uphold international humanitarian law and do everything in their power to protect civilians—especially children.”

Republished under Creative Commons.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

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