New Zealand’s international relations are under new management. And Winston Peters, the new foreign minister, is already setting a change agenda.

As expected, this includes a more pro-US positioning when it comes to the Pacific – where Peters will be picking up where he left off. Peters sought to align New Zealand more closely with the United States under his ‘Pacific Reset’ policy that he launched while serving as foreign minister under Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-New Zealand First coalition government from 2017-2020.

Peters is wasting no time in getting back on the foreign affairs horse.

Just three days after being sworn in as a minster, he gave his first speech on foreign policy at the US Business Summit in Auckland last week.

Peters was lavish in his praise for the US in his address, arguing that Washington had been ‘instrumental in the Pacific’s success’. But he noted that ‘there is more to do and not a moment to lose. We will not achieve our shared ambitions if we allow time to drift.’ Adding that ‘speed and intensity’ would be needed, Peters said ‘the good news is that New Zealand stands ready to play its part.’

The early timing of the speech itself is a sign that New Zealand’s new, yet very familiar foreign affairs minister is unlikely to wait around when it comes to taking major decisions.

It was an important, agenda-setting address.

There were strong hints that New Zealand’s new Government wants to move swiftly when it comes to Wellington’s potential involvement in in ‘Pillar II’ of the AUKUS defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Peters’ disclosed in the Q&A to the speech that he had already talked to Judith Collins, the new defence minister, about New Zealand’s AUKUS stance.

The previous Labour government’s position was that AUKUS remained a hypothetical question while no formal offer existed for New Zealand to join ‘Pillar II’ of the high-level defence pact that currently involves Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

But while playing for time in an election year, the then Prime Minister Chris Hipkins signalled in July that New Zealand was at least ‘open to conversations’ about joining the pact in some form. And Labour’s expedited release of three major defence strategy documents in August, just prior to the election campaign, laid the groundwork for at least formal consideration of involvement in AUKUS.

The reports also paved the way for New Zealand to spend vastly more on its military and to take a more security-focused approach to the Pacific – recommendations that Peters will probably be keen to implement.

Wellington and Washington have been becoming closer since at least November 2010, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited New Zealand’s capital to sign the ‘Wellington Declaration’. The relatively short agreement served to clear the air after decades of chequered bilateral relations stemming from the Fourth Labour Government’s introduction of a nuclear-free policy in the 1980s.

Going nuclear-free (which prevented visits from US warships) saw New Zealand cast out as a US ally. Washington formally suspended its obligations to Wellington under the ANZUS defence treaty in 1986. But nearly 40 years on, US-NZ relations are rapidly deepening, a trend that has been accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Western concerns over China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.

Since February 2022, New Zealand has imposed sanctions on Russia, joined US-led groupings such as Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and sent its Prime Ministers to successive NATO summits. And in May 2022, Jacinda Ardern visited Joe Biden at the White House, where a 3000-word joint statement called for ‘new resolve and closer cooperation’.

Meanwhile, a string of senior US officials have visited New Zealand just this year, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink and the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell (who Joe Biden recently nominated to become his new Deputy Secretary of State).

If New Zealand does join AUKUS, it could spell the effective end of the country’s ‘independent foreign policy’. The ANZUS break-up of the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalisation had allowed New Zealand to free itself from blocs. Wellington talked to anyone and everyone, building solid, trade-focused relations with China and others in the Global South – while not neglecting Western partners, including the United States.

Peters may think the current geopolitical environment justifies a new approach.

If he does, he should prepare for significant pushback. Helen Clark, who was Prime Minister during Winston Peters’ first term as foreign minister from 2005-8, posted on Friday that New Zealand was now ‘veering towards signing up’ to AUKUS despite bipartisan support over decades for the independent foreign policy stance.

This added to criticism from Clark earlier in the year, including in August, when she argued the new defence blueprint showed New Zealand was ‘abandoning its capacity to think for itself & instead is cutting & pasting from 5 Eyes’ partners’.

It should also be remembered that Winston Peters, while undoubtedly powerful and highly experienced, is only one Government minister. The views of Judith Collins – the defence minister – remain unknown in any detail, while the foreign policy positions of Christopher Luxon seem more centrist than radical.

Moreover, with the US now firmly focused on the war between Hamas and Israel – and its own presidential election year fast approaching – it is far from guaranteed that the hypothetical AUKUS question will turn into a concrete one for New Zealand anytime soon.

Moreover, Peters’ initial ministerial comments on New Zealand’s own position towards the Middle East suggest there is plenty of room for nuance. Calling the death toll in Gaza ‘horrific’, Peters welcomed a short-lived extension to the ceasefire on Friday, but called for all parties to ‘work urgently towards a long-term ceasefire’.

And in a radio interview earlier last week, Peters said ‘the ceasefire is not good enough, we’re going to have find a way forward through this and a peaceful solution – that’s what New Zealand and the Western world has got to put its focus on’.  Peters added ‘internationally we need to be talking to people across the political divide who are making sense on this matter’.

Talking to all sides and playing a small role in facilitating a sustainable political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would very much be in keeping with New Zealand’s independent foreign policy approach – and Winston Peters is already speaking out strongly about the war.

With Christopher Luxon passing up on the opportunity to attend COP28 in Dubai at the weekend, Winston Peters will have the chance to make the Government’s first ministerial trip to the Middle East to begin this dialogue. The Gulf states would be a natural starting point for these discussions.

Meanwhile, on Ukraine – the war that helped to speed up New Zealand’s alignment with the US in 2022 – Peters was open to the idea of New Zealand upgrading its military support to Ukraine by sending Kyiv light armoured vehicles (LAVs). While noting that the decision was not up to him alone, he added ‘if we can help we should be doing the best we can’.

Labour had denied a request from Ukraine to provide the LAVs in 2022 and of late had preferred to make financial contributions to Kyiv’s war effort – the most recent being a $NZ4.7 million package announced by Chris Hipkins in July at the NATO leaders’ summit in Lithuania.

It all adds up to a complex picture.

Winston Peters has no shortage of global issues to address.

And there could be some major changes ahead for New Zealand foreign policy.

*******

Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s geopolitical analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. He is currently working on a PhD at the University of Otago on New Zealand’s relations with the Gulf states.

In a watershed moment, Pacific Islands Forum leaders have agreed on terms to prevent Micronesian countries from breaking up the leading regional body.

The row, which came to a head in February last year, centred around the selection of a candidate for the top job at the Forum, with Micronesia feeling snubbed when its candidate Gerald Zackios was overlooked for the former Cook Islands Prime Minister Henry Puna.

The high level political dialogue was held in-person in the Fiji capital Suva yesterday.

It was hosted by Fiji’s Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama, the current chair of the Forum and attended by the leaders of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa and the Cook Islands.

To outsiders looking in, the Forum row over an executive position might have looked a bit silly.

But it was about more than just a job title.

As the president of Palau Surangel Whipps Jr explains it, it was a feeling on the Micronesians part of being excluded from the day to day business of the Forum and by extension the region as a whole.

‘Let us look long term’
“Micronesia said the SG (Secretary-General) is supposed to be Micronesian. But what is more important is, let us look long term.”

And it is that long term vision that clinched the deal for the Micronesians in Suva.

They came in wanting Puna out and were offered to have the rotation of the top job by sub-region put into writing and become a permanent fixture of the Forum going forward.

“By the Forum agreeing that now we are going to put it in writing. It is going to be rotational we are going to be more inclusive at the head office, have deputies that represent the region, and sub-regional offices and the other the oceans commissioner all those add to being inclusive.”

Samoa’s Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mataafa is new at the helm and was not part of the events that led up to the rift. But she said she was pleased to be part of the solution.

“We need to go through the process of all the members signing up, but those of us who are here, six of us, I think are representative of the three sub-regions and hopefully we will be able to implement what has been proposed and agreed to,” she said.

Clock still ticking
This is a crucial detail. The clock is still ticking towards when the formal withdrawal processes initiated by the five disgruntled Micronesian states last year becomes official. RNZ Pacific understands the first of them matures at the end of this month.

That being said, it is still a huge break through and one Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo said he was grateful for.

“Because just a few days a go it could have been that we will walk away and break up the entire Pacific Family but the common ground that we have reached has kept us together,” he said.

Both Panuelo and Whipps Jr acknowledged the mediation of Pacific Islands Forum chair Voreqe Bainimarama and the Troika plus members and all other leaders involved in the political dialogue leading up to this juncture.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Australia’s newly sworn-in Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, says the new Labor government “will be a generous, respectful and reliable member of the Pacific family”.

In a message addressing the region on Monday, Wong set the tone for Australia’s renewed priorities for its island neighbours.

Wong said Australia recognised climate change was “central to the security and well-being of the Pacific”.

She said the Labor government had heard the Pacific and would act to address the climate crisis.

She added Australia would also boost assistance to support the region’s pandemic recovery, enhance defence and maritime cooperation, as well as expand opportunities and improve the working conditions for more than 24,000 Pacific workers in Australia.

“I’ve become foreign minister at a time when our region faces unprecedented challenges. But we will face these challenges together, and we will achieve our shared aspirations together,” she said.

“We want to help build a stronger Pacific family. That is why we will do more, but we will also do it better. We will listen because we care what the Pacific has to say.”

The Australian Labor Party’s win in the 2022 general elections was its first such victory in almost a decade, defeating a conservative coalition government led by Scott Morrison.

While the count continues, Labor currently has 74 seats with independents holding 15 and the Liberal Coalition 53.

Labor needs 76 for an outright majority.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The invasion of Ukraine is likely to have a signficant impact on the Pacific, warns a senior USP academic.

On Thursday, Russia launched a massive invasion of neighbouring Ukraine.

More than 100 Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have been killed in the fighting so far, with no figures for the Russians.

The invasion has put a strain on diplomacy around the world, with both Australia and New Zealand imposing sanctions on Russia and protesters picketed the Russian embassy in the capital Wellington on Friday.

Although geographically removed from the conflict the Pacific Nations should be concerned about the negative effect this war will have on multilateralism says Sandra Tarte, an Associate Professor at the University of the South Pacific and the Acting Head of the School for Law and Social Sciences.

“Multilateralism is on its knees, it’s in tatters,” Professor Tarte said. “Particularly for the smaller island countries, we really need multilateralism to protect ourselves.

“We don’t have power as such in the entire system. We rely on multilateralism and institutions like the UN and the rule of law.”

Professor Tarte also said that Pacific countries would feel an economic impact.

“We will see perhaps markets react, we will see confidence plummet,” she explained . “There might be supply chain issues with the oil markets.

“We are all connected. Through this global supply chain, we will see potential effects.”

EU targets Russian economy
The European Union leaders agreed on Thursday to impose new economic sanctions on Russia, joining the United States and Britain in admonishing President Vladimir Putin and his allies for invading Ukraine.

Leaders of the 27-nation bloc lambasted Putin at an emergency summit in Brussels, describing him as “a deluded autocrat creating misery for millions”.

The EU will freeze Russian assets in the bloc and halt its banks’ access to European financial markets.

These moves are part of what EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell described as “the harshest package of sanctions we have ever implemented”.

The EU’s Ambassador to the Pacific, Sujiro Seam, echoed the sentiments of world leaders and “condemned the unprovoked and unjustified military actions” of Russia.

This is a gross violation of international law, Seam said, and he stated that the EU Office in Suva would reach out to its partners in the region to condemn Russia’s actions.

Seam hoped that Fiji, which had championed multilateralism in the United Nations, would support sanctions against Russia.

FSM severs diplomatic relations with Russia
The Federated of the Micronesia has severed diplomatic relations with Russia following the brutal invasion of Ukraine.

In a statement, the FSM government said it condemned the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine and the unjustified and brutal assault on its people and territory.

President David Panuelo said the FSM condemned any actions which threatened global peace and stability and the rules-based international order.

He said the FSM would only entertain renewing diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation when the latter demonstrated actionable commitments to peace, friendship, cooperation, and love in common humanity.

Fiji condemns Russia’s actions
Fiji has joined the international community in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In a Friday social media post, Fiji’s Acting Prime Minister Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum said that Fijians were praying for the people of Ukraine.

He called for an end to all the “hostilities and any violations of the international rule of law”.

Sayed-Khaiyum urged the warring parties to return to the diplomatic table, echoing the call for peace from UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

Guterres addressed the UN General Assembly calling for negotiations, to save the people of Ukraine from the scourge of war.

Fiji’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Satyendra Prasad, echoed his government’s support of the UN’s call for a de-escalation of conflict.

On his official Twitter account, Prasad stated that Fiji supported the “UN’s efforts to have a swift return to the path of dialogue between the two warring nations”.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The United States insists it is a Pacific nation and has unveiled a raft of new strategies to better engage with other nations in the Region.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is the first Secretary of State to visit Fiji in nearly 37 years.

During his historic visit, Blinken announced that the US was pursuing deeper engagement plans with Pacific nations.

A key element and motivation for those plans is the strengthening of the US presence to match the growing influence of China in the Pacific.

In its engagement strategy, he said that China had combined its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might to pursue “a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power”.

During an eight-hour visit to Fiji, while returning from a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) meeting in Australia, Blinken announced climate change financing, military and other exchange initiatives and plans for a new embassy in the Solomon Islands among other foreign diplomacy engagements.

Blinken has been on a world tour for the past several months to discuss two main issues: covid-19 and China, with his counterparts including Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Marise Payne, Indian Minister of External Affairs Dr S. Jaishankar and Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi Yoshimasa.

New Indo-Pacific engagement strategy
While in Fiji, Blinken met with acting Prime Minister Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum and 18 Pacific Island leaders virtually, during which he announced the US government’s brand new Indo-Pacific engagement strategy, calling the region “vital to our own prosperity, our own progress”.

Blinken said that the new strategy was the result of a year of extensive engagement in the Asia Pacific region and would reflect US determination to strengthen its long-term position in the region.

“We will focus on every corner of the region, from Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, to South Asia and Oceania, including the Pacific Islands,” he said.

“We do so at a time when many of our allies and partners, including in Europe, are increasingly turning their own attention to the region; and when there is broad, bipartisan agreement in the U.S. Congress that the United States must, too.”

This American refocus is a direct response to the increasing influence of China in the Pacific.

Since 2006, Chinese trade and foreign aid to the Pacific has significantly increased. Beijing is now the third largest donor to the region.

Although Chinese aid still represents only 8 percent of all foreign aid between 2011 and 2017 (according to The Lowy Institute), many Pacific island governments have favoured concessional loans from China, to finance large infrastructure developments.

Chinese ‘coercion and aggression’
In Solomon Islands, where Blinken announced the latest US Embassy would be opened, almost half of all two-way trade is with China.

In describing China’s actions toward expanding its influence, Blinken stated:

“The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbours in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behaviour.

“In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.”

When questioned by reporters about US intentions for “authentic engagement that speaks to the real needs of the islanders”, Blinken replied that the US sees the Pacific as the region for the future, and that their intentions were beyond mere security concerns.

“It’s much more fundamental than that. When we are looking at this region that we share, we see it as the region for the future, vital to our own prosperity, our own progress.

“Sixty per cent of global GDP is here, 50 percent of the world’s population is here. For all the challenges that we have, at the moment we’re working on together, it’s also a source of tremendous opportunity.”

Democracy and transparency
Blinken insisted that Washington’s new strategy was about using democracy and transparency to build a free and open Indo-Pacific which was committed to a “rules based order”.

Moving onto economics, the Secretary of State stated that the US intends to forge partnerships and alliances within the region, which will include more work with ASEAN, APEC and the Pacific Islands Forum.

Despite being headquartered in Fiji, the Forum was not invited to be part of Blinken’s visit.

At the Pacific Leaders meeting, Blinken announced a commitment to deeper economic integration including measures to open market access for agricultural commodities from the islands.

“It’s about connecting our countries together, deepening and stitching together different partnerships and alliances. It’s about building shared prosperity, with new approaches to economic integration, some of which we talked about today with high standards.”

Washington’s new Indo Pacific engagement strategy also includes commitments to develop new approaches to trade, which meet high labour and environmental standards as well as to create more resilient and secure supply chains which are “diverse, open, and predictable.”

Climate change strategy
Regarding climate change, Blinken announced plans to divert substantial portions of the US$150 billion announced at COP26 last year to the Pacific and also plans to make shared investments in decarbonisation and clean energy.

The Indo Pacific strategy announced commitments to “working with allies and partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and policies consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius”.

Blinken stated that the US was committed to reducing regional vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation.

On security matters, Blinken said the Pacific could expect power derived from US alliances in other parts of the world to come to the islands.

“The United States is increasingly speaking with one voice with our NATO allies and our G7 partners, when it comes to Indo Pacific matters, you can see the strength of that commitment to the Indo Pacific throughout the past year.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

ANALYSIS: By Anna Powles and Jose Sousa-Santos of Massey University

At the time of writing, there are 63 reported cases of COVID-19 in the Pacific.

This includes one in Papua New Guinea, three in Fiji, seven in New Caledonia, 23 in French Polynesia, 29 in Guam and suspected cases in Samoa.

The number is relatively low but there is a sense that tragedy is unfolding in slow motion across a region where health sectors are already under-funded and poorly equipped.

READ MORE: Covid-19 cases in Guam and Fiji on the increase

Official responses to the pandemic have varied across the region. Pacific states are implementing border protection policies including reducing inbound flights, banning cruise ships, restricting officials from travelling overseas and closing traditional border crossings.

New Zealand and Australia, gateways to the islands, have closed their borders.

In addition to the implications for health security in the Pacific, a number of observations can be made about Pacific regionalism and the longer-term consequences of Covid-19 for partnerships and trust.

Pacific states have responded in various ways, from Papua New Guinea elevating Covid-19 from a public health crisis to a national security issue, to Nauru declaring a state of emergency under the National Disaster Risk Management Act 2016.

Jointly funding WHO response
Australia and New Zealand are jointly funding the World Health Organisation’s Pacific response plan at a cost of around US$1 million. But there are differences in how the two countries are publicly responding to Pacific needs.

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern stated that New Zealand has a duty of care to the Pacific Islands, and has even made updates available in nine Pacific languages.

Meanwhile, the Australian government has come under fire for being missing in action and not providing public information about how Australia is protecting the region.

The Covid-19 pandemic demands a regional response, but one has not been forthcoming.

In a speech at the Global Focus Summit in Wellington in February, Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi identified a series of choices that Pacific countries face in addressing global challenges, from climate change to geopolitical competition.

Tuilaepa stated that Pacific countries will choose to address these challenges as a collective, in sub-regional groups, as individual countries or by embracing specific partnerships. He concluded that “it is the state of regionalism and interpretation that will shape national outcomes, experiences and wellbeing”.

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has been quiet on Covid-19, raising the question of what role it could — or should — play in formulating a collective response. The 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security affirmed an expanded concept of security inclusive of human security to protect the rights, health and prosperity of Pacific people.

‘Ensure health lives’
The 2019 Boe Declaration Action Plan seeks alignment with the UN Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG3) to “ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing”. But the Action Plan focusses exclusively on non-communicable diseases with no reference to communicable diseases, while SDG3 refers to both.

This is an odd oversight. The Boe Declaration states that climate change is an existential threat to Pacific peoples, yet climate-sensitive health risks, including infectious diseases, are not mentioned.

A collective response would fundamentally be about national-level responses and regional leadership. Linking Covid-19 to the Boe Declaration’s focus on human security would mandate the PIF to lead a coordinated regional response to monitor public health emergency preparedness and identify capacity needs and gaps within member states.

The PIF could also coordinate cooperation and technical support with partner countries and agencies, specifically the Pacific Community (SPC), the principal scientific and technical organisation in the Pacific region, whose mandate includes public health surveillance.

If the PIF does not step up in the face of Covid-19, it reveals a severe omission in forecasting and responding to regional health security threats.

A collective response is also about exercising leadership at a time when resilience is fundamentally important. Herein lies one of the strengths of the Pacific.

The Blue Pacific identity is the core driver of collective action to advance the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism, which calls for “a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy and productive lives”.

Collective response needed
The challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic presents to the Pacific are best met with a collective response and regional leadership.

It has also been suggested that COVID-19 demands a regional disaster response such as enacting the FRANZ Arrangement between France, Australia and New Zealand, which allows for the coordination of humanitarian relief assistance in the Pacific.

As Dan McGarry notes, this will take significant organisation. Although much activity is taking place to strengthen security sectors across the Pacific, such as Australia’s “Pacific step-up” and New Zealand’s “Pacific Reset”, there are some obvious missed opportunities.

In 2016, we argued that to enhance regional security architecture, the FRANZ Arrangement and the Quadrilateral Defence Coordinating Group between Australia, New Zealand, France and the United States should be expanded to include key Pacific Island actors.

This recommendation has since been advocated by Joanne Wallis in her submission to the Australian Parliament’s 2020 inquiry into Australia’s defence relationships with Pacific island nations. But given that Pacific partners — particularly Australia and the United States — tend to emphasise traditional security approaches, there are concerns about the securitisation of human security such as health.

These are unprecedented times, but there is an opportunity for the PIF to lead a collective response. This will demand more resources, expertise and capital.

This is also an opportunity for Pacific partners to demonstrate their commitment to engaging with the region, even in times when the temptation is to pull up the drawbridge.

Dr Anna Powles is a senior lecturer of security studies at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington. Dr Jose Sousa-Santos is a senior associate (Pacific regional security) at Victoria University’s Centre for Lifelong Learning and a Research Scholar at the Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University. This article is republished from East Asia Forum with the authors’ permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

This week New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern concluded her first bilateral with China’s two top leaders President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang and ended with clear signals the two countries are poised to build on the $30billion two-way trade relationship.

But there was more to this bilateral meeting than simply New Zealand – a comparatively small South Pacific economy – solidifying a progressive trade relationship with a global economic superpower. There were significant signals given by both state leaders involving multilateralism and a vision for a non-fossil-fuel future.

For more on this, listen to Radio New Zealand’s The Panel where Selwyn Manning joined Verity Johnson and Wallace Chapman to discuss the NZ-PRC bilateral (On fossil fuels + NZ-PRC’s Relationship )

***

As Ardern said: “We also discussed our shared interest in strengthening the international rules-based order and on climate change, as an issue of global importance.” As such, both New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China indicated significant stances in foreign policy terms.

Firstly, the reference to “international rules-based order” appears a signal that New Zealand Government would support China in principle should it seek recourse through World Trade Organisation rules when countering any escalation of the United States/China trade war. The WTO, and other multilateral bodies such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, are central to New Zealand’s independent foreign policy. There’s consistency here. New Zealand simply cannot support the alternative, unilateralism, even when disestablishment threats against multilateral bodies are being pitched by New Zealand’s most significant security partner, the United States.

This is a diplomatic delicacy, a courageous statement, that Ardern was willing to deliver.

On numerous occasions this year United States’ President Donald Trump warned that his administration would abandon the WTO should it not reform and emerge with a trade-rules framework that embraces US trade interests. Trump’s threats also signalled how his Administration would track further toward isolationist-unilateralism should China object to any abuses to WTO rules and international trade law.

You can expect that the US Embassy was busy overnight filing its briefing to Washington DC.

Secondly, China included a gutsy clause in the NZ-China Joint Climate Change Statement that was issued by both Premier Li and Prime Minister Ardern after their meeting.

The PRC and NZ stated: “Both sides recognise the importance of the reform of fossil fuel subsidies, which will bring both economic and environmental benefits, thereby supporting their shared global commitment to sustainable development.”

The idea of abandoning fossil fuel subsidies was first advanced by Jacinda Ardern at her first APEC leaders’ summit shortly after becoming prime minister. There, at APEC, she argued on a panel consisting of herself and the vice chair of Exxon Mobil that fossil fuel subsidies ought to be abandoned – that governments should cease subsidising fossil fuel industries and channel their economies toward developing a future free of fossil fuel carbon emissions.

Clearly, the PRC heard her message and was ready to signal support for it as an ideal. This is a win for Ardern. It is also a respectful acknowledgement that the Asia Pacific’s economic superpower rates her as a significant leader on the global stage.

Additionally, the clause also indicates China – in a week where reliable PMI figures showed it in a very favourable space – that it is confident that its future lies less with the old technologies that assisted the development of today’s western economies and more with the new-tech solutions to global economic development.

The USA will be aware that this move signals that China sees itself as more advanced in the area of AI, machine learning, alternative energy transportation and development than its European and United States counterparts.

Ardern has demonstrated how important it is to meet with significant powers face to face. At such bilaterals, she can offer respect and determination while her counterparts observe her honest, trustworthy, progressive no-nonsense leadership in action.

New Zealand will be the beneficiary of this approach: Ardern said: “I also raised with President Xi the importance New Zealand places on upgrading and modernising our Free Trade Agreement with China – an ambition that he shared.”

Both states have agreed to progress our trade relationship well beyond the current record levels of two-way trade (currently at $30b per annum).

With Premier Li, Ardern said: “We discussed the FTA upgrade, and agreed to hold the next round of negotiations soon and to make joint efforts towards reaching an agreement as soon as possible.

“We also discussed China’s Belt and Road Initiative, noting that the Minister for Trade and Export Growth, David Parker, would lead a business delegation to the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in April. This will help identify opportunities for mutually beneficial and transparent cooperation so we can complete a work plan as soon as possible.

“I reiterated to Premier Li that New Zealand welcomes all high quality foreign investment that will bring productive economic growth to our country.”

This latter point deserves some caution. China has expressed interest in furthering infrastructure investment within New Zealand – including investments that could be argued are contrary to New Zealand’s strategic interests, into the dairy and primary diversification sectors. While any New Zealand Government ought to proceed with caution here, if our diplomatic trade-negotiation team is buoyed by the country’s new leadership style, then perhaps mutual beneficial ventures can advance beyond a Joint Climate Change Statement.

PS: While in Beijing, the Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern also invited President Xi for a State visit to New Zealand as part of New Zealand’s hosting of APEC in 2021.

A traditional view of the tension between research and policy suggests that researchers are poor at communicating their research findings to policy-makers in clear and unambiguous ways.

I am arguing that this is an outdated view of the relationship between research and policy. Science, including social science, and policy come together in many interesting and creative ways.

This does not mean that tensions between the two are dissolved but the conversation between research and policy centre as much on ideological and pragmatic issues as it does upon the strength of the scientific evidence itself.

READ MORE: The DevNet 2018 conference

Researchers are increasingly “smart” in the ways that they seek to influence public debate while policy-makers genuinely value the insights that research can provide in supporting political and policy agendas that goes beyond simply legitimating pre-existing policy choices.

For example, in climate change debates science cannot be seen simply as an arbiter of “truth” that informs policy and political decision-making. Science also plays an advocacy role in alliance with some social interests against others.

Likewise, policy can draw on science but it can also reject the evidence of science where scientific evidence is weighed against the interests of other powerful voices in the policy-process.

Oceans research and policy provides a good example of this more sophisticated relationship between science and policy and suggests some of the significant disconnects and tensions that challenge the relationship as well as how creative tensions between the two operate in practice. Three areas of disconnect can be identified.

Practical disconnection
The first of these is practical disconnection of regulation with regard to the Oceans. An integrated legal framework for the ocean might be considered critical for progress towards meeting the objectives of SDG 14 (Life under the Sea) but complexity and fragmentation present many challenges which are both sectorial and geographical.

National laws lack coordination across different ocean-related productive sectors, conservation, and areas of human wellbeing. In addition, these laws are disconnected from the regulation of land-based activities that negatively impact upon the ocean – agriculture, industrial production and waste management (including ocean plastic).

“These disconnections are compounded by limited understanding of the role of international human rights and economic law, as well as the norms of indigenous peoples, development partners and private companies.” Image: David Robie/PMC

These disconnections are compounded by limited understanding of the role of international human rights and economic law, as well as the norms of indigenous peoples, development partners and private companies.

Disconnected science is itself a problem in this area. Ocean science is still weak in most countries due to limited holistic approaches for understanding cumulative impacts of various threats to ocean health such as climate change, pollution, coastal erosion and overfishing.

Equally, scientific understanding of the effectiveness of conservation and management responses is poor, so that the productivity limits and recovery time of ecosystems cannot be easily predicted.

Even when science is making progress, effective science-policy interfaces are often poorly articulated at all levels. As a result, there are significant barriers to effectively measuring progress in reaching SDG14.

Oceans research policies rare
National oceans research policies to support sustainable development are rare. This is compounded by limited understanding of the role of different knowledge systems, notably the traditional knowledge of indigenous people.

Third, there is a disconnected dialogue. Key stakeholders, most notably the communities most dependent on ocean health, are not sufficiently involved in developing and implementing ocean management; yet, they are most disproportionately affected by their negative consequences.

More positively, there are some good examples of effective science-policy diplomacy collaborations and networks. For example, in the Pacific my own university (University of the South Pacific) has worked very effectively to support Pacific island countries, especially Fiji, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, to successfully lead arguments at the International Maritime Organisation for international commitments to reduced carbon emission targets for shipping.

Technical, scientific support has been critical to support the advocacy of Pacific leaders and their ability to mobilise wider political support.

Building the capacity to achieve such outcomes within the regions of the world that confront these problems most sharply is a significant challenge. Aid policy can play an Important role in this respect – for example, by supporting capacity building through investment in local institutions such as universities rather than funnelling aid money back into donor countries through consultancies.

The scientific dominance of the global north is every bit as disempowering and threatening as post-colonial political domination.

For countries in the developing world, capacity building in research is critical to supporting their own countries. Another good example of this is found in the High Ambition Pacific coalition led by the Marshall Islands which secured significant support from European countries and elsewhere, in their campaign for a 1.5 degrees emissions target at the COP21 meeting in Paris in 2015.

Science-policy-advocacy alliance
This coalition was a good example of a science-policy-advocacy alliance which did not come from the global north.

Scientific as well as policy collaborations between the global south and the global north are certainly possible but it also the case that scientific research and intervention in the countries of the south from the outside can very easily reinforce the political domination that politicians and policy-makers from the south so often experience in international forums and through the aid policies bestowed upon them from outside.

The aggressive assertion of the privileges of Western science to do research in developing countries at the expense of building local capacity demonstrates another side of this post-colonial experience. It is impossible to credibly talk of “giving voice to the ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘vulnerable’” where the research practices of outside researchers and their institutions cripple the ability of local researchers to speak.

Yet, researchers in the Pacific are more effectively operating at the cutting-edge of the science-policy interface than many outside the region may understand or recognise.

In our own case at USP, genuine collaboration across the boundaries of south and north have been possible but just as our leaders and our communities have had to fight against patronising notions of “vulnerability” our scientific need is to build our own capacity to effectively engage with the priorities of our own region and its people. We aim to build a scientific and research capacity that is neither dominated by or exploited from outside.

So, in summary, the tensions that have traditionally been used to characterise the science-policy interface greatly oversimplify the reality. They oversimplify it at an abstract level by whether by characterising science as disinterested or by characterising the aim of policy-makers to rational and evidence-based.

They also oversimplify the relationships within and between scientific communities, ignoring the social interests and power structures that serve the continuation, whether intentionally or not, of post-colonial domination, restricting opportunities to build scientific capacity which enables the achievement of locally determined priorities.

Professor Derrick Armstrong is deputy vice-chancellor (research, innovation and international) at the Suva-based University of the South Pacific. This was a presentation made at the concluding “creative tension” panel at the DevNet 2018 “Disruption and Renewal” conference in Christchurch, New Zealand, last week.

Professor Derrick Armstrong speaking with other members of the final “creative tension” panel at the DevNet 2018 development studies conference. Image: David Robie/PMC

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

ANALYSIS: By Michael Powles with Anna Powles

Australia’s recent Foreign Policy White Paper says that Australia’s approach in the region will focus on “helping to integrate Pacific countries in the Australian and New Zealand economies and our security institutions”. Does this mean effectively a recolonisation of parts of the Pacific?

Terence O’Brien (Money, military keys to Australian foreign policy, December 15) refers to the Australian emphasis on the need for United States/Australian co-operation “to shape order” in the Asia Pacific.

O’Brien comments that the current aberrant behaviour of the Trump administration seems to be assumed by the White Paper to be a temporary phenomenon – “essentially bumps in the road on the highway of enlightened American-led progress”.

Few in New Zealand would agree the Trump administration is likely to change its ways. Recent presidential tweets suggest a determination to plumb new depths.

Many New Zealanders are puzzled by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s avowal that Australia and the Trump Administration are “joined at the hip” for security purposes.

Now, Australia is proposing changes which would have a profound impact on our own Pacific neighbourhood and on fundamental New Zealand interests.

-Partners-

“Integrating” Pacific countries into Australian and New Zealand institutions: to achieve anything, this would have to involve surrender of at least some sovereignty. It would be seen by many in the region as a form of recolonisation, a modern version of the way Britain colonised Fiji, New Zealand and others in the 19th century.

Compact-style arrangements
Australian analysts suggest this integration should be achieved by establishing arrangements with Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati along the lines of Compacts which the United States has with its former Trust Territories in the Pacific, Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands.

In return for significant aid, these Pacific countries agree to deny access to their countries for all nations except the United States. The arrangements between New Zealand and the Cook Islands and Niue have also been mentioned.

But all these arrangements were negotiated by the United States and New Zealand respectively before the Pacific countries became independent or self-governing. For them to move to a more limited form of independence would be seen by many as a step backwards towards their colonial pasts; and at a time when the focus in the Pacific is on increased self-determination for Pacific Island countries, not less.

An experienced Australian commentator, Nic Maclellan, has suggested, however, that it’s folly to believe that Pacific countries would allow Australia to set the security agenda: “That horse has already bolted”.

One of the authors of this piece knows very well Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu, having visited many times. They are proud of their independence and to suggest in this 21st century that that should now be qualified or restricted is simply remarkable. There would be strong opposition.

Pacific leaders have become increasingly outspoken pursuing or defending their own interests.
Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama of Fiji has developed his reputation for this over several years.

Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi of Samoa, current chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, has reacted angrily to the Australian government’s criticism of Chinese aid in the Pacific (“useless buildings” and “roads to nowhere”). The Prime Minister said these comments were “insulting to Pacific island leaders”.

Diminishing influence
The Australian initiative would hasten a trend which is already diminishing Australian and New Zealand influence in the region. Pacific island perceptions that the two countries are becoming less supportive of Pacific aspirations over recent years have already resulted in a significant backlash.

Climate change is understandably given a much higher priority by island countries than by Australia and New Zealand. Trenchant positions by these two countries have prevented the Pacific Islands Forum taking positions fully reflecting island countries’ intense concern about the potentially catastrophic impact of climate change on several Forum members.

A consequence has been an emphasis on island country roles outside the Pacific Islands Forum. This has given impetus to other regional groupings and there has been much talk of this “New Pacific Diplomacy”.

Without a change by Australia and New Zealand to more responsive reactions to island countries, giving them greater agency within the Pacific Islands Forum, this longstanding regional body is likely to continue to diminish in relative importance.

The new Australian policy, aimed at securing control of aspects of foreign policy in several island countries, will be seen as another, larger, step away from support for Pacific self-determination and agency.

The case against New Zealand supporting this latest Australian move is strong:

New Zealand support for national and regional self-determination in the Pacific, or “Pacific agency” as some call it, has been fundamental to its foreign policy for decades.

Significant break
Supporting this new initiative would be a significant break with this longstanding policy and would be deeply unpopular both in the region and overseas.

New Zealand’s relationships and influence in the Pacific would suffer from such a change, affecting also our influence on security issues – ironically the proposed policy is justified on security grounds.

New Zealand’s global reputation and influence, depending in part on our reputation and standing in our home region, would also suffer.

There is no evidence that interventions in the Pacific as proposed in the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper are actually necessary to preserve or ensure regional security, which is best served by effective collaborative diplomacy with Pacific partners.

Our Australian relationship is our most important and we should seek common policies where we can. This initiative, however, would be against fundamental New Zealand interests in our own neighbourhood. It would be a step too far.

Michael Powles, a former NZ diplomat, is a senior fellow of the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. Dr Anna Powles is a senior lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington. They are currently writing a book about New Zealand’s role in the Pacific. This article was first published in The Dominion Post and has been republished by Asia Pacific Report with the permission of the authors.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz