It’s commonplace, especially in The West, to think of wars in binary terms. In those terms, wars are either won or lost, like a sports match. And the symbol of victory is a trophy. In a match-up, the symbol of defeat is the loss of a trophy.

In the days of the Roman Empire, the trophy might be a ‘barbarian’ leader being paraded in chains; or maybe his head in a box. ‘Decapitation’ is a crude trophy word, still very much in vogue.

In the present Iran War, the trophy of victory might have been the ‘head’ of the 86-year-old ‘Supreme Leader’; Iran’s former equivalent of the United Kingdom’s late Queen Elizabeth II. But in reality, the Iranians were waiting for Ali Khamenei to die; and all the signs were, so long as Iran was left in relative peace, that a liberalisation process was already in place.

Further the assassination of Khamanei could never have been an adequate trophy for the United States. Because it was actually done by Israel, another country, another nuclear power, indeed a highly secretive nuclear power, a genocidal power which terrorises its part of the world. And we note that it has always been in Israel’s interest to keep Iran on a war-footing; to keep it from being anything other than an enemy. A progressive Iran would have very much stymied the Greater Israel project. Hence the need to assassinate Khamanei before he died of natural causes.

For the United States, another trophy had to be found. Having co-started the present war, the United States needs to end it, and with a victory trophy.

It would seem that the trophy being demanded is Iran’s enriched uranium. Apparently, the United States wants to be allowed to go into Iran, excavate the enriched uranium, and then to truck it and ship it to some undisclosed destination. To facilitate this, the United States is trying to make its victory arrangements with ‘negotiations’ brokered by an actual pro-China nuclear power in Southwest Asia; namely Pakistan, a country over which the United States has intruded upon its political sovereignty on a number of occasions, a country with no popular love for the United States and its proxies.

We need to note that, for Iran to allow the United States to acquire its trophy would represent a military defeat; a capitulation in the eyes of the world in general, the Iranian population (both those in favour of the present Pezeshkian regime, and those opposed to it) in particular, and to the global community of Shia Muslims. (The total Shia population is estimated to be 350 million, 250 million of whom are faithful, and 90 million of whom are resident in Iran.)

Japan

On the matter of understanding the shortcomings of binary victory and binary defeat, we may turn to the matter of Japan in 1945. The trophy at stake was Emperor Hirihito. And, on the basis of this binary, it was Japan, not the United States, which was victorious. Japan retained its trophy.

On 9 March 1945, the United States embarked on its campaign for unconditional victory; meaning that Japan had to unconditionally surrender, which in turn would mean that Hirohito would be Japan’s last emperor, and that his reign would end in 1945.

For starters, the United States slaughtered 100,000 residents of Tokyo in four hours of one night; the wee hours of 10 March. Total Japanese deaths from that spring and summer bombing campaign – including the nuclear deaths – was between 500,000 and one million people.

None of these bombings came close to resulting in Japan conceding its Emperor. The United States was preparing to drop three more atomic bombs on Japan that year – production criteria meant that these bombs were scheduled for November and December 1945. If Japan still refused to give up its trophy, the city of Kyoto was scheduled for removal from the United States’s non-hit list. Also, to note, the United States kept up its non-nuclear aerial assault on Japan until the day before the deal was signed.

In August 1945, communications were not good in Japan. The leadership in Tokyo had heard that there was an unusually large explosion at Hiroshima, and then another in Nagasaki, but they didn’t really have time to process their limited information. They had already been hit by plenty of other big bombs. Meanwhile, the people on the ground in Hiroshima were able to restore electrical power within three days of that explosion; locals did what locals do everywhere, pick themselves up if they can, and try to keep living.

What happened to finish the war was the threat from the Soviet Union. After the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union returned its attention to the East. There had been longstanding territorial disputes – and cold dispute still continues in the Kuril Islands – between Japan and Russia. Russia, having been embarrassed in the 1904/05 Russia-Japan War, potentially had a score to settle; Manchuria, for much of the first half of the twentieth century, had been territory contested between Russia, China and Japan.

But it was the United States which most feared the Soviet Union’s advance into Northeast Asia. In Europe, the United States was pushing the narrative that the Soviet Union, which had ‘liberated’ Eastern Europe from the German Nazi regime, was intent on pushing Communism onto Western Europe, and would use military means to do that. The hoary trope in Paris and London, that the Russians would soon be at their front-doors if they could not be held behind an iron curtain within Germany, was a narrative very much adhered to by the Americans with regard to the Far East as well as to the Far West. Indeed, by the time of the end of hostilities in August 1945, Soviet Russia had already ‘liberated’ half of the Korean Peninsula; Korea was a mirror image of the emergent East-West faultline within Europe.

So, the Americans caved in. They agreed that Japan could keep its Emperor. Japan saved face. Hostilities in the Pacific War ended the next day.

Iran again

2026 hostilities could end as soon as the United States removes its demand for a trophy which the Americans know the Iranians cannot accept. The barrier to ending the war is that the American regime would lose face without a compelling victory trophy. In the earlier Japan situation, by contrast, the American occupation after August 1945 meant that the United States could easily obscure the fact that it had had to make a major concession to secure the end of that war.

Enemies of Convenience: On the matter of Non-Binary War

At one level there is the matter of stated and unstated goals, criteria for ‘success’ (which is not necessarily ‘winning’), and knowing how and when to ‘vacate the arena’. Re the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, they contributed very little to ending World War Two, but were successful examples of ‘live testing’, and had the huge impact on the new Cold War arena in Europe as ‘demonstration devices”. With the Cold War setting in, Japan proved to be a World War Two enemy of convenience.

Of particular interest is Is war more profitable than peace? David Keen explains, Talk to Al Jazeera, 5 April 2026 (and on YouTube).

Introduction: “What if ‘who is winning’ is the wrong question? Because in many modern conflicts victory is not the only or even the main objective. … It opens streams of profit, and, for many, it creates a constant state of threat that justifies its own continuation. … Wars evolve, adapt, and sometimes sustain the very actors fighting them. … To understand why some wars don’t end, we turn to a leading voice in the political economy of conflict, Professor of Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics, David Keen.”

Keen suggests that some of the benefits of war include “making money”, “suppressing dissent under the cover of war”, “divide and rule”, “painting dissent as disloyalty”, “turning your enemy into the image that you’ve put about in your propaganda”, … “taking actions that are predictably counterproductive”. For certain aims “the enemy can be surprisingly useful”.

David Keen (unassuming, quiet, thoughtful): “This division of people into ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ is incredibly simplistic, and goes back as far as the Vietnam War.” (And further, of course!)

The Soviet Union had proved so useful to the West, that from 1991, after the Cold War, a new bogeyman – convenient enemy – had to be invented. (Note Samuel Huntingdon’s influential 1992 thesis, The Clash of Civilizations, which facilitated the multi-decade employment of many people in high-paid jobs in Washington DC, and no doubt other federal capital cities with otherwise underemployed think tanks.) Iran had already become the enemy-in-waiting in the 1980s, albeit with a degree of secrecy, when a proxy leader for American interests (called Saddam Hussein) was called upon to deal to Iran. Saddam obliged; indeed, he over-obliged, taking his cut in the form of Kuwait.

In the midst of that Iraq-Iran War, in 1987, there was the Irangate scandal.

‘”Soon after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly changed United States policy.” Secret Israeli arms sales and shipments to Iran began in that year, even as, in public, the Reagan administration presented a different face, and “aggressively promoted a public campaign […] to stop worldwide transfers of military goods to Iran”. … After a leak by Mehdi Hashemi, a senior official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa exposed the arrangement on 3 November 1986″.’ From Wikipedia.

Revolutionary Iran (the new Islamic Republic of Iran, under Ayatollah Khomeini) was becoming an enemy of convenience. It was, in the 1980s, being armed by Israel and the United States. Some of those arms will have gone to Hezbollah, established as a Shia resistance movement in 1982, in response to an Israel-led genocide in Lebanon. We note that, today, Hezbollah is a critical and convenient element justifying Israel’s grand expansionist venture.

Today, Russia and Iran – even China – are enemies of convenience to a few; and of great inconvenience to the many. Indeed, re Russia and China, there is talk of the New Cold War. See, for example, The New Cold War: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, Fred Saberi, The Times of Israel, 19 April 2026.

Re Russia, the Cold War of the twentyfirst century represents the Third Cold War. In The First Cold War, historian Barbara Emerson discusses the ‘war’ against Russia that led to New Zealand’s fortifications on North Head and other places in 1885. (I also draw attention to this 2016 extended critique of President Obama’s ‘weakness’: War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, by Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, and its unsavoury ‘adversaries of convenience’ premise.)

Modern history (which includes 1885) matters very much; Biblical history (or even the slightly more recent Koranic history) matters less. But ancient history can still matter; it tells us some pithy stories about war trophies.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Despite the mega-commentary about the Israel-Iran war, and especially the United States’ participation in that war, almost nothing is being debated about how the war is being funded.

I’ll make some comments about Iran later. But we need to focus on the United States, which is by far the most profligate party to this war. And Israel is being funded, like a charismatic and entitled teenage brat, by its (American) sugar daddy.

Most of us should have noticed that, with the exception of new tariffs which are not a significant source of United States government revenue, there has been no move to raise taxes. (The President has clearly invoked the use of tariffs as means of leverage through extortion; though he doesn’t properly appreciate that these taxes are paid by American residents.) Nor has any explicit ‘war loan’ or ‘war bond’ been floated in Wall Street.

The United States is ‘printing money’ to fund the war. This expression is both pejorative and a misnomer. Because printing money is an unmentionable, it’s hardly ever mentioned! Though it should be, because it’s an important financial mechanism, and it is not as sinful as it’s made to sound.

‘Printing money’ is not a literal expression; actually printed (or photocopied) money, counterfeit money, is illegal. Printing money, a figurative moniker, is in fact the day-to-day business of banking, with billions of dollars printed every day (and a near-similar number of dollars unprinted). The technology of printing money is that of double-entry-bookkeeping. Money is a social technology, as is double-entry bookkeeping.

What matters most to us is the role of the central bank – the Reserve Bank – in creating new money. And in particular the relationship between the Reserve Bank and its privileged customers, most of which are governments’ Treasuries and commercial banks. Even more particularly, we are interested in the most highly privileged relationship of all, that between the United States Federal Treasury and the United States Federal Reserve Bank. This exceptional relationship arises because the United States Dollar is the world’s reserve currency.

The War

Here are two quotes from Al Jazeera’s This is America: War on Iran: Cost of weapons and shift in the nature of warfare, 1 April 2026

Richard Gaisford: “It’s a significant contribution being made to the US economy by the defence industries. The last figures we have were for 2024, and that showed that it generated [?] something near one trillion dollars …”.

This comment reflects a wide belief that money is made by economic activity, and that the United States makes money by making, among other things, military hardware and software. The reality, of course, is that the money is made first, and is then used to purchase such hardware and software.

Interviewer: ‘Who has got the means to keep fighting at those levels the longest?’ Kenneth Katzman (a former senior analyst on Iran at the US Congressional Research Service): “The US Dollar is the main reserve currency of the globe, which means that the United States basically has the capability to manufacture money. Your viewers may not understand the mechanics of it, but basically the United States can print money.” (Actually, not only the United States.)

He goes on to address the military asymmetry between Iran and the United States: “The United States is a 28-trillion-dollar economy; Iran is a 400-billion-dollar economy”. Here he is talking about each country’s capacity to produce goods and services; not its capacity to manufacture money. Any amount of money can be made by any country’s banking-government nexus, and at trivial cost.

The interviewer (New Zealand’s Anna Burns Francis), and the other panellist did not respond to that seemingly provocative comment about printing money; there was no further discussion about how the war is being financed, only about how much it is costing. Discussion about the mechanics (and constraints) of printing money would go against the grain that most of us are fed. The public is not supposed to know – and generally does not know – that money is itself costless and can be manufactured, at will, in smaller or larger quantities.

Kenneth Katzman’s comments are not controversial; they are a statement of fact that no economist would disagree with. All countries’ banking systems (of which the central government is a component) have the capacity to print money; indeed, the New Zealand system (and other countries’ systems) necessarily did so in 2020.

The United States has fewer constraints on printing money than do other countries, but not zero constraints.

We note that money, like all financial and financialised assets, is not wealth; it is claims on wealth. So, the affordability of money – in practice – is measured by the ability of the economy to meet those claims, in the event that those claims are presented. (Indeed, the world can afford an octillion dollars’ worth of financial claims if it can be 100% certain that those claims will not be exercised; will not be spent on goods or services. The current world is awash with massive private holdings of financialised assets which, for the most part will not be spent on anything other than other financial assets. In technical language, such money has a very low ‘velocity’.)

We note also that newly printed United States’ dollars permeate into New Zealand through exports, including New Zealand made supplies to America’s war industry; to the United States’ military/industrial complex, which includes the space industry.

How does a country fund a war by printing money?

There are two key issues: rationing, and responsiveness.

The liberal critique against governments’ printing money is a general claim that governments are untrustworthy and spendthrift. In the eighteenth century when the liberal critique emerged, one principal concern was government adventurism in the form of warfare. This classical liberal critique presents one consequence of such government largesse as inflation (extra spending coming up against finite resources), and also presents any instance of general price increases as a consequence of government largesse. When governments consume relatively more resources, then – through the catalyst of inflation – private households and businesses consume relatively less.

The classical liberal critique emphasises this rationing issue, known as crowding out; in doing so, that critique presumes that private spending on goods and services is, per se, more efficient than public sector spending and redistributive transfers. There are two parts to this rationing argument: first, private parties are deemed to better assess (compared to bureaucrats and politicians) which items of spending translate to greater utility (ie happiness); second that relatively more private spending can be classified as ‘investing’, meaning spending for future rather than for present happiness. (Neither of these two propositions is generally true.)

The second issue, less emphasised by classical liberals, is responsiveness or ‘supply elasticity’. Classical liberals tend to assume that spending enabled by printed money does not elicit new production; ie does not bring-about a supply response. While this is true by definition for a hyper-taut economy, for the most part, economies are not hyper-taut and are indeed responsive to additional spending.

In the present case of the United States, the Israel-Iran War – on the pro-Israel side – is being funded substantially by new money printed for the United States government by the United States federal banking system; in the public accounts, this shows up directly as a huge increase in the United States’ fiscal deficit.

While prices are rising faster in the United States than before, this increase in general prices would appear to be substantially due to the supply-side cost-impact of the war itself, and not by increased aggregate demand inside the United States and the countries the United States imports goods and services from.

The United States domestic economy is not as supply-elastic as it might have been, given what ICE is doing to that country’s labour force. Nevertheless, the United States’ economy has been sufficiently depressed that it is now able to increase output without much difficulty. Hence, extra United States’s government spending has not in itself caused consumer prices in the United States to rise. The present chokehold on imports – a result of the war – is however causing CPI-inflation in the United States and the rest of the world. Prior domestic underemployment is one reason why money-printing may not be inflationary.

The second component of a country’s economic responsiveness to wads of newly printed money is that much production can be outsourced to the rest of the world. Thus, United States’ imports increase, the United States’ current account deficit increases, and the rest of the underemployed world gets to benefit from this as an economic stimulus. So, if the New Zealand banking-government nexus refuses to print money as a form of stimulus, the present Trump-printed money does create an alternative stimulus in New Zealand.

Certainly, New Zealand has very high visible and hidden unemployment, so (at present) is easily able to respond to the Trump stimulus. On that basis, New Zealand’s economic growth this year may not be as slow as is widely anticipated; though domestic confidence – in itself, a form of stimulus – may be countering the stimulus coming from the United States. In New Zealand too, any rise in CPI-inflation will be almost entirely due to the global supply chokeholds, and not to the American president’s money printing largesse.

Essentially, the United States is funding its war through its twin deficits: the United States fiscal deficit, and the United States current account deficit. The war is being funded through increased utilisation of underemployed resources throughout the world. In New Zealand’s case, we can see this easily and directly, by observing New Zealand’s increased exports to the United States.

How easily can other countries print money?

Technically, it’s as easy to print money in New Zealand as it is for the United States. However, the New Zealand dollar is not a global reserve currency, so a flood of new New Zealand dollars into the global economy is likely to generate financial risk; or at least perceptions of financial risk. ‘Investors’ – that is, financial traders – out there most likely would be more cautious about holding large quantities of New Zealand dollars (or $NZ assets) than they would be about holding large quantities of United States dollars. That caution generates an exchange rate risk; a risk that would be communicated to financial-asset-holders by the New York based rating agencies such as Standard and Poors.

When the exchange-rate risk is not widely seen as a matter of concern, New Zealand benefits mainly through its routinely-high current account deficit; that is, just the same way as the United States is able to benefit from printing money and enjoying the economic bounty of the world.

If the exchange rate risk becomes a concern however, the world would discount New Zealand dollar assets, and New Zealand would experience high levels of domestic inflation; that is, higher inflation than most other countries. The resulting low New Zealand dollar would confer a ‘competitive advantage’ on New Zealand; the current account deficit would close, exports increase, and reduced imports would create an increased demand for New Zealand- made goods and services.

The issue then becomes how responsive (ie supply elastic) the New Zealand economy is. If the domestic economy is able to respond to these new circumstances (which is the more common experience of other countries), then New Zealand would recover and soon prosper. The alternative is that New Zealand would go into an inflationary tailspin; that is, if its productive system is so hamstrung that it cannot respond to the stimulus of a low dollar exchange rate. One bad sign is over-dependence (as distinct from over-reliance) on imports. A dependent economy cannot switch away from imports. A country which relies on imports by choice, because imports are easily funded by exports, can usually pivot – if required to do so – towards more ‘tradable production’.

So, New Zealand can print money too, though printing in the proportion that the United States does certainly would be unadvisable. However, if a country overprints money, the normal situation is that the extra money just sits there in the banking system. (The brief real estate boom of 2021/22 has been widely attributed to excessive printed money stimulating a process of real estate speculation; though the unique circumstances of that few months – including labour and capital pandemic lockdowns – have not been properly researched. The government could easily have borrowed and then parked that money, but chose not to.)

Generally, the rest of the world is accommodating when some countries print more money (though not when all countries print too much money). The world has been very responsive to the United States for the entirety of post-WW2 history; it was American spending of new money that drove the economic growth of the capitalist world for 80 years.

The present US money printing to fund a globally-significant regional-war can be expected, sooner or later, to encounter an inflationary wall of its own making. The consequences of this war are to make the world economy much less responsive (ie are breaking the world’s economy) just as the American military-industrial complex – indeed the world’s expanding military-industrial complexes – are placing so many extra demands on the world’s economic environments.

War funding under pressure

Countries’ invaded or otherwise attacked on the perception that they are ‘easy meat’ tend to be much more capable of defending themselves than is widely understood. Their monetary systems are not integrated into the orthodox channels of the wider capitalist system; but their domestic monies work to keep domestic economies fully employed while on a war-footing. Yes, Iran will be printing money, and Iranians will be facing substantial visible and suppressed inflation. For Iran, that monetary process is a necessary part of its own defence. Money printing facilitates both necessary rationing in favour of the public sector, and also necessarily pushes the production system to its limits.

War times, historically, have shown that our economic systems are generally much more responsive than we presume them to be. Surprisingly often, the bullies neither win nor even achieve a limited range of objectives. Syria may be coming right today, despite rather than because of the nation which set off that 2010s’ war; a war which cruelly sandwiched the Syrian people between foreign bullies and a consequently more oppressive domestic tyranny.

We note that, when the United Kingdom was under threat during the first years of World War Two, it was able to import much on credit – especially from the United States, which was then a neutral country. China has played a large role in facilitating the United States’ more recent wars, through its current account surpluses. This time China will be helping to fund Iran’s war; as well as accommodating the United States through its ongoing – almost infamous – trade relationship with that country.

Indeed, when the Israel-US-Iran War is eventually over, it will be China’s version of the Marshall Plan which will revive the degraded world economy; part of that revival will be to write-off war debts, just as the United States – through plenty of printed money – eventually accommodated Germany’s reparations bill after World War One, and the West’s war debts after World War Two.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Based on my reading of the latest upscaling of US rhetoric, one of the military options being considered by the Israeli-American axis is the nuclear option. Refer Trump says a ‘whole civilization will die tonight’ if deal isn’t reached, One News, 8 April 2026.

The possibility of Netanyahu and Trump thinking this way would reflect a widely-held understanding that World War Two ended not only with the atomic bomb, but because of those nuclear strikes on Japan. In particular, the prevailing American narrative is that Little Boy and Fat Man saved the United States from having to make a ground invasion of Japan.

My sense is that if Israel and/or the United States go for a nuclear strike, soon or sooner, it will be on a city or some other quasi-military site in the northeast of Iran, closer to Afghanistan than to the present Persian Gulf warzone; away from the energy infrastructure of the Gulf.

Not only is the northeast the birthplace of the late Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, it is also the part of Iran which gave least support to President Masoud Pezeshkian in the 2024 presidential election. Pezeshkian, a former heart surgeon, was elected as a moderniser. In 2024 and 2025 he was committed to evolving Iran away from being a Shia theocracy and towards being a typical BRICS’ middle-range geopolitical power. (See my The Enigma of the Iranian President, Scoop, 27 March 2026.)

If we look at the map here – the second round of the 2024 Iranian presidential election – we see that Pezeshkian’s support was most in the more secular northwest and least in the more Islamist northeast. I suspect that the Axis’ military planning will be to inflict as much damage as possible – in one or a few dramatic strikes – on the present Iranian civilisation which draws heavily on Shia Islam; hence focussing on the Shia heartland.

Finally, here, I draw attention to the movie Don’t Look Up. In that movie, the threat was an asteroid, not a nuclear war. The key theme was the widespread dispassion that prevailed, especially in the mainstream media, towards a known and imminent catastrophe. In the case of a nuclear strike on Iran away from Tehran or the Gulf or the Pakistan border, the present lack of mainstream outrage at the aggressions of the last month will probably continue on and beyond the day after.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

The human world changed twice during the twentieth century. The first transition lasted from 1914 to 1945. The principal cause of World War Two was World War One. So, to understand the drivers of that long transition, indeed a great levelling event, it is necessary to investigate the causes of World War One. What happened between those wars was not inevitable, of course. But those inter-war events formed part of a comprehensible transitional sequence.

The next transition began, I would argue, in 1967 and lasted until 1980. Though key pre- and post-transition events took place in 1948, 1953 and 1956; and 1989/1990. The 1967 to 1980 transition significantly involved both Israel and Iran. As a result, the post-war world of cold war and decolonisation gave way to a neoliberal world order in which the new financial and political elites increasingly ruled under the titular covers of ‘liberal democracy’, ‘global rules-based-order’, and the ‘unipolar moment‘.

Are we today in a new transition, away from neoliberalism; maybe into a bleak zero-sum order (or negative-sum) of right-wing identity politics? An order in which national or cultural identity groups seek to harm other such groups more than they benefit their own group. An ultra-Hobbesian world in which individuals and groups gain pleasure directly from the pain they cause to others? Or will such gratuitous and predatory behaviour be limited to a transition now under way? While such behaviour happened markedly during the last years of the 1914 to 1945 transition, there were also substantial precursors to it in the lead-up to World War One. Not least the Judeophobic pogroms in Ukraine and some of its neighbouring territories.

These remain open questions. My aim here is to outline the 1967 to 1980 transition, noting some parallels between that transition and present times.

Before that, I’ll just mention that, in 1948, Israel and Palestine were both granted, by the new United Nations, the status of sovereign nation states. The Palestine nation was stillborn, for a number of reasons, one of which was that the eventual borders of Israel split the Palestinian territories. And I’ll mention that, in 1953, the United States instigated a political and military coup in Iran, converting a developing independent democracy into an absolute monarchy whose role was to acquiesce to Washington’s stated and unstated interests.

Suez Canal: the First Crisis

Most wars start with a pretext, an event manufactured or exploited by the true belligerent to justify its aggression.

One country which had been subjugated – indeed occupied – by the United Kingdom for many years was Egypt. That’s why Egypt came to be so important for the New Zealand military in both WW1 and WW2.

The critical strategic asset in Egypt was the Suez Canal, built by French interests, opened in 1869, and effectively wrested by the British from 1882 (though France maintained a strategic interest). For the steamship age, that canal became the critical conduit for the British Empire, connecting London with India (which included modern Pakistan and Bangladesh), East Africa, the ‘Middle East’ (meaning the Persian Gulf), the ‘Far East’, and the Australian colonies which became Australia.

The Egyptian Revolution took place in 1952, and Egyptian president Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956. The result was a war in the latter part of 1956, in which the British and French persuaded Israel (only created in 1948) to invade Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. (These events were covered in an episode of The Crown.) The Israeli attack took place as Operation Kadesh. Less than two days after this pretext, presented as a threat to Israel’s security, Britain (and France) started bombing Egypt at Port Said, in an operation to ‘secure’ the Canal.

The end result was an ignominious defeat for Britain and France, unsupported by the US, but with no meaningful withdrawal by Israel; the Israel-Egypt border had become permanently militarised, noting that Gaza had been (by agreement) under Egyptian control since 1949.

The Suez Canal was closed for nearly six months, until April 1957.

Suez Canal: the Second Crisis

Ten years later, in June 1967, Israel went for broke. This was the much bigger second crisis for the Suez Canal. In six days, Israel conquered the entire Sinai Peninsula – therefore including Gaza – meaning that Israel had annexed the eastern side of the Canal. In addition Israel conquered East Jerusalem, which in 1948 was supposed to have become the capital of an independent Palestine, the West Bank (which the State of Tennessee, in an act of appeasement towards Israel, now wants to call Judea and Samaria; refer Bill requiring Tennessee to use ‘Judea and Samaria’ instead of ‘West Bank’ advances, Fox17, 6 March 2026), and Syria’s Golan Heights.

The principal consequence was that the Suez Canal, an even more important waterway than the Gulf of Hormuz, was closed from 1967 to 1975.

With hindsight, we can see that the global economic crisis of the 1970s began in 1967. It is understood as a crisis of inflation which morphed after 1973 into a crisis of stagflation; for an overview, biased towards the US and towards the received narrative, refer to The Great Inflation, in Federal Reserve History.

The closure of the Suez Canal had little impact on oil prices. But it did lead to a surge in the cost of international transportation, as Asia to Europe trade had to be diverted to the South African and Panama routes. The other two drivers of that inflation-surge in the late 1960s were the escalations of the Vietnam War, and the prevalence of a corporate structure – outlined by John Kenneth Galbraith in The New Industrial State (1967) and Economics and the Public Purpose (1973) – which made the global marketplace less responsive towards increases in global spending. That last point means that large corporate firms, like today’s energy companies, became predisposed to respond to increased demand by raising prices rather than by raising the quantities of output supplied.

Wartime is almost always associated with inflation, because it both raises costs and constrains the supply of consumer goods. (American wars since the 1970s can be an exception, because they are financed by instant money and readily-available imports; by US government-deficits and US economy trade deficits. Deficits which the rest of the world is eager to facilitate.)

Israel 1967 to 1973

With the partial exception of Syria’s Golan Heights, Israel did not formally incorporate the other conquered territories. This retention of these territories as subjugated territories was partly due to international pressure to not recognise conquests, but was probably more to do with their implications for the demographic balance of Israel. Integration would have led to the possibility of Jews becoming a minority of Israel’s population, and Arabs a majority.

(We should note that, for the secular Jews who run Israel, to be Jewish is understood more as an ethnicity than as a religious faith. Hence, Israelis tend to juxtapose Jews and Arabs, whereas people in the rest of the world juxtapose Israelis (understood to be mostly Jews) and Palestinians. Israelis favour the word ‘Arab’ over ‘Palestinian’, because of a popular Israeli narrative that the indigenous population of Palestine is descended from immigrants from Arabia.)

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War happened in October 1973, beginning with a surprise attack by Egypt, during the Yom Kippur holy day (and noting that the 2026 attacks on Iran occurred during Ramadan, Islam’s holiest period). Basically, Egypt wanted its Sinai Peninsula back, in part so that it could reopen the Canal. Other nearby countries joined-in, especially Syria, but also Jordan and Iraq. Not Iran, which was then under United States hegemony.

Despite Egypt’s initial advantage of surprise, Israel not only fought back defensively, but counterattacked. The counterattack included an Israeli army contingent crossing the Suez Canal and marching on Cairo; ie approaching the Nile River. Potentially this war could have led to the creation of a Greater Israel; from the Euphrates (in Syria and Iraq) to the Nile. But again, the problem of conquest becomes the problem of having to incorporate supposedly ‘inferior’ populations into the expanded nation state.

(We note that surprise attacks often do not bear fruit; noting the American president’s tasteless and quasi-triumphant comparison between 28 February 2026 with the ultimately unsuccessful attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. See Trump jokes about Pearl Harbour in meeting with Japan’s PM, TVNZ, 20 March 2026. For a brief moment, I wondered if the President was going to refer to the surprise attack of 6 August 1945, or that of 10 March 1945.)

Further, the international community had interests other than appeasing Israel. The biggest of these concerns was the price of oil. In the end the international community got its way, but at a cost of making Israel itself into a significantly more belligerent state than it had been hitherto.

Oil Prices

The 1973 Oil Crisis led to a quadrupling of crude oil prices by 1977, most of that taking place in 1974. Given the general inflation, much of it instigated by the oil price increases, real oil prices only increased by 150 percent in United States’ dollars.

The main reasons for the huge price increases of oil were the roles of the likes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – through the Vienna-based OPEC cartel – being able to push back against the encroachment of the Zionist project in their region, by using their effective near-monopoly power. In turn, these high prices led to the further development of the petroleum industries in the Persian Gulf, and of the Gulf States themselves. Additionally, we should note that oil was underpriced prior to the 1973 war; much as it can be argued that oil was underpriced in January 2026.

This had a much bigger economic impact on countries like New Zealand than anything we’ve either seen or projected in the present March 2026 crisis. (In my case, it brought forward my OE plans. At the end of 1973, for $400 I bought a ticket to sail to England via Acapulco, Panama, Curaçao and Barbados. By time the ship sailed in April 1974, the fare had been subject to two surcharges and I ended up paying more like $480. It could have been worse if the ship had not had access to cheap Venezuelan fuel in Curaçao.)

The result was a series of massive financial imbalances across the world; between oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, and also within larger oil-producing countries such as the United States. (New York’s loss was Texas’s gain.) While those 1970s’ financial challenges were navigated by the world’s finance ministers and central banks with a large measure of pragmatic success, the turmoil of the times let in a new and simplistic narrative around money and inflation; an unnuanced narrative that harked back to the classical stories about money during World War Zero (that’s the Napoleonic Wars of 1798 to 1815).

That new narrative was monetarism/neoliberalism, and placed itself perfectly to exploit the economic crisis – the Great Inflation– to create the neoliberal anti-intellectual hegemony which has ruled over the western world and hence over the whole world since the early 1980s. The guru of monetarism was a Chicago School economist; Milton Friedman. As an academic, Friedman and his acolytes had been plugging away through the 1950s and 1960s; well-placed to take advantage of a good crisis, especially a crisis centred around the word ‘inflation’. Chicago School economists experimented on Chile following its 11 September 1973 military coup.

If Israel had simply returned Sinai to Egypt in say 1970 – in circumstances similar to the eventual return of Sinai – allowing the Suez Canal to reopen, then the 1970s and 1980s could have turned out very differently.

Revolution, and Oil Prices again

One of the consequences of the political crisis in the Middle East was further crisis in the Middle East. Various latent nationalisms in the region intensified markedly; these intensifications turned for inspiration to the common faith in the region, Islam.

Hence, there was a direct – albeit convoluted – pathway from the 1973 war to the 1978/1979 Iranian Revolution. In February 1979 the Imperial State of Iran gave way to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(I could have gained a personal glimpse of revolutionary Iran. Returning from my OE in September 1978, my partner and I were on a PanAm flight from Rome to Istanbul. The flight originated in New York, and terminated in Tehran, and was running late. Many of the passengers were agitated, because the flight was now projected to arrive in Tehran during the evening curfew. I guess it was always possible that PanAm would take the decision to overfly Istanbul, in order to arrive in Tehran on time. The plane did land in Istanbul, later than scheduled, so I know not about what dramas may have unfolded in Tehran later that evening. I expect that the return flight out of Tehran was fully booked, given the deteriorating situation there for American citizens.)

An important result is that oil from Iran, a founding member of OPEC, came off the world market for a few years. (Although, Aotearoa New Zealand, in its own pragmatic navigation of the crisis, came to do a swap deal with Revolutionary Iran. Despite the fact that, for a few years instances of capital punishment in Iran came to exceed those in the United States, New Zealand negotiated a sheep-meat for oil swap, thereby saving this country’s critical sheep-farming industry.)

The result of the loss of Iranian oil from the word market led, in 1979, to a further doubling of the world price of crude oil. In the second half of the 1970s, many countries – including New Zealand and United States – cut their speed limits to 80kph (or 50 miles per hour). (I still remember, in October 1976, riding in a Greyhound Bus in Pennsylvania, watching big trucks traveling very slowly along the United States’ interstate motorway system.)

In 1979, the crisis became so difficult that the New Zealand government made the sensible though since-derided decision to ration petrol by requiring motorists to observe carless days each week.

Governments in oil-importing countries made the pragmatic decision to both conserve oil and, for balance of payments’ reasons, to develop their own oil, gas and exportable reserves. New Zealand electrified its North Island Main Trunk Railway, doubled its aluminium production capacity (in order to export renewable energy), substantially expanded its oil-refining capacity, developed the Maui gas field; and developed the Glenbrook steel mill as a means to gain export receipts from the sale of west coast iron-sand.

Eventually, in 1986, the world oil price collapsed, ushering in a new (and environmentally discordant) era of cheap oil. Inflation-adjusted oil prices in 1999 were even lower than in 1972.

The Great Deception

World price-inflation was on a substantial downward path once the leading economies’ central banks allowed interest rates to fall (through liberalising monetary policies) in the years 1983 to 1985, and once cheap oil resumed. But in some countries high consumer-price-inflation persevered until the end of the 1980s’ decade, especially as they shifted towards goods and services taxes.

New Zealand pioneered a particular form of illiberal monetary policy in 1989, when inflation was already falling back to normal levels; and claimed that the new simple-minded monetary policy was the sole cure. This policy, which was in fact very much associated with the aforementioned monetarist project, became akin to a biblical truth; and was successfully exported to the consolidating globalised political and financial elites, making this new quasi-biblical truth into a bedrock policy-of-faith in the post-1980 world order.

Today, we can easily observe how false this ‘truth’ of faith is. By looking at the United Kingdom and Australia, two countries which have minimally reduced interest rates since 2022, we can see how their inflation rates have remained stubbornly higher than those with lower interest rates.

The next political and financial world order?

Are we in a new transition? Probably yes. Will it take a decade or so? Probably yes. While there are many calamities that could happen – and remembering that the world faced the possibility of global nuclear war early in both the cold war world order and the neoliberal world order – an optimistic take is that the world will move into a multipolar principles-of-engagement world order in which no single polity (or alliance) can dictate terms to the rest of the world with apparent impunity.

A unipolar world order is an illiberal geopolitical monopoly. Present events may either entrench or destroy the forces pushing for geopolitical illiberalism. Multipolarity is geopolitical liberalism.

The next world order should not be reliant on cheap oil nor indefinite economic growth nor the idolatry of money. Money is a means, not an end; it is a technology, not a commodity. Capitalism can become a peaceful private-public partnership. If enough of us want it to be.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Over the last week I have subverted the western geo-cultural tropes of ‘Good versus Evil’ and ‘Beautiful versus Ugly’. (Geopolitical Rugby: Bad plays Evil, for the final World Cup 16 Sep 2025 and Lookism11 Sep 2025; both on Scoop and Evening Report.) Here I consider our new version of the former tripolar world; that  tripolar world prevailed from 1945 to 1990. Pole A, essentially the former First World, is now the Western Alliance. Pole B is equivalent to the former Second World; B is, as before, the geopolitical adversary of A. Pole C, the new Third World, is the equivalent of the former non-aligned Third World; yes, that’s the literal meaning of ‘third world’, non-alignment, neutrality.

The emergent new Second World includes the decentralised Muslim world; and has power centres in Beijing and Moscow; thus, its geographical and cultural loci are in Eurasia. The new Second World (pole B) is ‘united’ by comprising the various named enemies of the new First World; with West Europe being the geographical and cultural locus of pole A. West versus East, with substantial nuclear armaments; four nuclear countries in the West, four in the East.

The new Third World is defined neither by its geography nor its economic status. It is the neutral pole; pole C. India – the only nuclear power not in A or B – is potentially the leader of the new Third World, as it was the political leader of the old Third World. India’s future alignment remains the big geopolitical unknown.

Where does Australasia – Australia and New Zealand – fit? Given the geography (literally ‘south of Asia’), the common-sense position would be for Australia and New Zealand to become firm members of the new Third World; strictly non-aligned. But the signs are that Australasia, with only a tiny proportion of the old First World’s population, and on the opposite side of the world from the new First World, will contrive to be a fully aligned far-flung component of the new First World alliance. Though not formal members of Nato.

Nuclear Conflict

The most likely scenario for Nuclear War Two (NW2) would begin with a ‘nuclear attack’ across the present A-B (ie West-East) geopolitical boundary, noting that an important part of that boundary is inside Donetsk province; and also noting that one country – Türkiye – is ambiguously placed and may itself be regarded as a boundary-zone rather than a boundary-line.

(Both the words ‘nuclear’ and ‘attack’ come with some ambiguity. Would a strike on a nuclear power station by conventional weaponry count? Would any breach of airspace or sea-space by a nuclear-armed vehicle count as an attack?)

Any part of the world can be reached by perhaps five countries’ nuclear weapons, either from long-range missiles or launched from naval vessels (especially submarines).

Nuclear calculus is essentially ‘what happens next’, and the associated probabilities of the different scenarios. To keep my argument simple, I will assume that the first strike of NW2 is intentional, targeted, and includes at least one nuclear explosion. Such an explosion may not be on target for a variety of reasons; not least that an attacking missile may be intercepted.

My Scenario One is that of a smallish first strike on the East by the West. As, in my view, the East is more pragmatic than the West, a response would take place, but most likely would be de-escalatory or proportionate in nature; a calculated response, much as the recent responses by Iran to Israel’s provocations. The critical point would then be the next move by the West: escalation or de-escalation. De-escalation should lead to at least a temporary truce.

Escalation by the West would be problematic; presumably, and irrationally, it would target the eastern country which is already involved. Retaliation through nuclear escalation is not rational, in that the expected final outcome would be harmful to all; including harm to the retaliator. Nevertheless, the conventional presumption is that nuclear powers, if subjected to nuclear attack, would to the best of their abilities retaliate through nuclear escalation. The ‘rational’ calculus of the ‘mutually-assured-destruction’ dogma is that attacked countries would respond spitefully rather than rationally; so therefore peace depends on there being no first strike.

My Scenario Two is that of a smallish first strike on the West by one of the East’s nuclear nations. If the West – acting out of contrived fury rather than pragmatism – escalates in response, we are left with essentially the same situation as in Scenario One.

Scenarios Three and Four would be a large-scale first strike, either East on West or West on East. In these scenarios, de-escalation would be seen as capitulation with all the associated consequences of total defeat. Therefore, in these cases the response would almost certainly be proportionate or escalatory.

In all four scenarios we face situations of how to respond to a medium- or large-scale nuclear strike.

If the ‘ball’ is in the West’s court (Scenario Three), then the most likely response I would see would be an equal or larger response onto the Eastern power already involved, in the hope of splitting the East, and achieving a backdown by the East’s belligerent. The East’s non-belligerent powers would at this stage pitch for neutrality; they would ‘align’ with the new non-aligned Third World.

In the other three scenarios, we are faced with the perceived need by the East to respond to the West’s nuclear escalation. The context is the West’s alliances of ‘collective defence’; the legalised geopolitical contract (eg Nato’s Article Five) that an attack on one is an attack on all.

The situation faced by the East when de-escalation is not a realistic option.

There are two other options: escalation or deflection. Escalation, as already noted, is not rational. Its rationale is that of ‘globally-assured-destruction’, given the substantial third-party effects of nuclear warfare.

The other option for a large Asian nuclear superpower would be deflection. Deflection here means a proportionate retaliatory strike on one of the more expendable nations in the Western Alliance. Deflection lessens the probability of continued escalation.

Deflection could mean a significant nuclear strike on a non-nuclear Nato country, with the sense that Nato as-a-whole might renege on its ‘Article Five’ clause. Such a strike might end the war, with both sides preferring to pull-back from the brink; with both sides cutting their losses, so to speak.

A better deflective off-ramp might be a proportionate nuclear strike on a non-nuclear non-Nato country openly allied to Nato. That would further enhance the possibility that the nuclear war would come to an abrupt end. Would it be rational for the United States, United Kingdom, France or Israel to retaliate to a nuclear attack on a small distant non-Nato member of the Western Alliance?

There would be an awareness in all the main nuclear powers’ capital cities that, while distance can no longer prevent a country from being attacked, a nuclear calamity far away from the world’s major population centres would limit global loss of life and limit the impact on global food chains.

The Tyranny of Distance?

In 1966, Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey wrote The Tyranny of Distance. It was about the higher costs of such things as travel, trade and collective defence. Australia – especially White Australia – had a long-lasting neurosis about an East Asian lebensraum. New Zealand was always a bit more relaxed; practically the same distance to western markets and further from any putative East Asian adversary.

Nevertheless, the tyranny of distance did not prevent New Zealand’s ‘second people’ from coming from literally the other side of the world. Maritime geography and geopolitics had its own logic.

The traditional tyranny of distance hypothesis was overstated. In practical terms, in the era of sailing ships and no trains, it was much easier to travel from London to Dunedin than to Vancouver. The costs of long-distance compared to short-distance transport persistently declined. And, from the time of the telegraph coming to Australasia in the 1860s, communication between ‘down-under’ and Europe was hardly any more expensive than over much shorter distances.

But there is a new tyranny of distance for Oceania. We saw it in South Australia in the 1950s with the British nuclear testing at Maralinga. And American and French testing at Bikini and Mururoa. We have seen this tyranny of distance more generally in the mining exploitation of ‘distant’ ‘peripheral’ lands in Africa and South America. These parts of the world, distant from the world’s major population centres, are relatively exploitable and expendable.

There is a new component to the new tyranny of distance; New Zealand is coming to be treated as a billionaires’ nuclear bolthole. Refer to these 2025 stories (among many others): Billionaire boltholes: inside the doomsday hideouts of the super-rich (complete with picture of Peter Thiel), The oligarch’s guide to sitting out a nuclear winter, and Apocalypse now: Doomsday bunker secretly installed on New Zealand property – confirmed. In some privileged circles, there is a misguided belief in New Zealand exceptionalism; that Aotearoa New Zealand may be some kind of global life raft.

The presence of these people in Oceania increases the likelihood of Australasia being a nuclear target. So does Australia’s formal membership of AUKUS. So does New Zealand’s Minister of Defence signalling for Aotearoa to become an ally of Nato (refer: Judith Collins makes secret visit to site of Russian missile attack in Kyiv, TVNZ, 4 Sep 2025).

On Deflection

Far from being the least likely part of the world to become a victim of nuclear war, Oceania may indeed be the most likely venue for a deflective nuclear strike. If Aotearoa New Zealand can stifle its latent militarism (and can instead become an influential advocate for the new Third World), then the far side of Australia might be more at risk; Australia is already firmly in the European geopolitical camp, despite its obvious self-interest to maintain close ties with its Asian neighbours. Nuclear weapons are most likely to be targeted at cities, and any city far away from any other city becomes an excellent candidate for nuclear victimhood.

In the United States in 1945, there was a high-level debate about the best way to use its incipient nuclear weapon. Henry Stimson, United States Secretary for War, said “not Kyoto” (refer The man who saved Kyoto from the atomic bomb, BBC 9 August 2015). Even from the outset, war-torn Europe never looked like a good bet; indeed the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference was conducted on the basis that allied victory was just a matter of time. The ‘dovish’ option was to perform a ‘demonstration’ drop, to show what might happen if Japan did not immediately capitulate. The problem was that, by July 1945, Japan had already been bombed to smithereens and it had still not capitulated. The alternative to a demonstration drop was a gratuitous drop or two or three on a significant Japanese city. (The next two cities on the nuclear list were Kokura and Niigata; the plan was to bomb them around November 1945, when new warheads had been manufactured.)

In the end, the Americans did do two demonstrations. In August 1945, the value to Americans of a Japanese life was no higher than the value of life of a Gazan is to an Israeli Zionist. The bombs over Japan were demonstration drops; the real audience of the demonstrations was Josef Stalin, not Emperor Hirohito. Japan was a good site for a ‘show and tell’ because it was far from both Europe and North America. Japan – like Bikini and Mururoa, later on – was a Pacific test site.

In the present geopolitical environment, and if a nuclear war starts, a deflective proportionate retaliatory nuclear strike may be the only offramp; a way to avoid assured-global-destruction. From an Eastern standpoint the ideal target would be a place which is overtly allied to its Nato foe (and, to boot, is part of its adversary’s communications network), which can produce rockets and other high-tech componentry for Nato, which is sufficiently far away from major population centres to lessen environmental harm, which has a small (thereby relatively expendable) population, which has minimal anti-missile defences, and which has in its midst a number those enemy billionaires who helped to create the geopolitical problem in the first place.

Conclusion

Nowhere is safe. Rationally, distance may make a place less safe, not more safe, from nuclear destruction. While great-power brinkmanship is far from rational, rational thinking under great pressure will be required to end a nuclear war once started. Even the most rational decision-process will involve many casualties. The frontlines of a nuclear war are not the same as the frontlines of a conventional war.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

The failing nation-states of Western Europe are not peacemakers. They are warmongers, the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ – the Coalition of Sanctimony and Hypocrisy. They are trying to frame the current geopolitical struggle between a unipolar versus a multipolar world order as a struggle of the ‘Democratic’ Axis of Good against a strengthening ‘Autocratic’ Coalition of Evil located through most of Eurasia.

Germany’s new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, says “whatever it takes“. Twice this year the coalition of sanctimony has derailed opportunities to end the Russia-Ukraine War through the re-creation of a neutral Ukraine. (The present war is already nearly as long-lasting as World War One.) The re-creation of a neutral Ukraine is the only available off-ramp to end this war.

The anti-peace phalanx that pretends to be pro-peace – headed by Merz, Keir Starmer, Ursula von de Leyen, and Mark Rutter (and formerly including Joe Biden and Boris Johnson) – represents the expression of a clear and open geopolitical strategy of eastwards expansion, both further into the Slavic Heartland (refer to Mackinder’s Democratic Ideals and Reality, free on Google Books, published early in 1919 though mostly written late in 1918) and in Southwest Asia (aka the ‘Middle East’). (France’s Emmanuel Macron is more ambivalent than these others, and is expected to fade from the presentCoalition as his political career comes to an end, and as France becomes consumed by domestic problems.)

Considered to be the academic founder of the discipline of geopolitics, Mackinder – born in Lincolnshire, England – was then the Conservative MP for a Scottish constituency. In late 1918 – a critical pivot moment in world history – he held his seat in the House of Commons, with a comfortable majority in Britain’s immediate-post-war election. Mackinder saw the necessity of establishing a group of smallish neutral nation-states between the two potentially resurgent “Going Concerns” of defeated Germany and defeated Russia (Russia, then in a post-war civil war, and in the process of becoming the ‘Bolshevik’ Soviet Union). In line with Mackinder’s analysis, the World War reignited in the late-1930s partly as a result of those smaller states eschewing neutrality in favour of various mostly-failed attempts to form security alliances with former antagonists, and/or with Britain and France.

On the matter of Mackinder’s relevance to the 2020s’ world, note this quote re Heartland: Three Essays on Geopolitics, by Halford John Mackinder: “Heartland is a fascinating introduction to a pioneer of geopolitics. Halford Mackinder’s trailblazing ideas have influenced international politics to this day. His concept that world domination depends on the control of the global ‘pivot area’ or ‘heartland’ – the centre of the large land mass of Europe and Asia – has informed the political tactics and wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe through the decades. His theories have influenced politicians and political scientists for generations, most notably Zbigniew Brzezinski, adviser to a long line of U.S. presidents. In our times, the importance of Mackinder’s heartland theory for the United States’ fight to enforce global hegemony, Russia’s struggle to stay independent and relevant on a world stage, and China’s plans to establish a trade route between East and West, make Heartland essential reading for understanding our world.”

Ukraine and Israel as Western bridgeheads into the Eastern heartlands

In geopolitical context, both Ukraine and Israel can be seen as Western bridgeheads into the ‘Near East’ and ‘Middle East’ heartlands; bridgeheads against the west-resistant poles of Russia and Iran. Ultimately these geopolitical gambits seek as an end-goal the ‘containment’ of China; China being understood as the single biggest threat to the unipolar Western – essentially Christian, labelled ‘Democratic’ – world-order fantasy which prevailed especially in Washington in the 1990s. (In the Cold War, this geopolitical contest was presented as the battle of the Free against Communism.)

Since the demise of Joe Biden (dubbed ‘Genocide Joe’ by some, and not without reason), there has been a bifurcation of the western project.

The United States is most focussed on its Middle Eastern agenda (which, as in Obama times, very much includes geopolitical designs on Syria), so has doubled-down as Israel’s main sponsor of regional terror. Nevertheless, the self-appointed European coalition of sanctimony has been fully and consistently behind “Daddy’s” geopolitical interest in promoting Israel’s asymmetric war of aggression; and still is, despite some attempts to appear to be distancing itself from the Palestinian theatre of conflict. (On ‘Daddy’, see “Daddy” diplomacy: The politics of obsequiousness, Hugh Piper, Lowy Institute, 24 July 2025.)

Israel’s barbarism could only be tolerated by any group of countries if those countries had a ‘higher’ political purpose; namely opposition to a geopolitical adversary shared with Israel – an adversary which dares to resist western power. Any coalition facilitating Israel’s anti-human agenda (of erasing “human animals”, aka Amalek) has fully given up any claim to be considered The Good. In line with geopolitical realism, there are no Good Guys.

The European Coalition of Sanctimony quickly formed when peace threatened to break-out in Ukraine following the 28 February 2025 meeting in the White House. Their aim is to locate German soldiers in Ukraine; an insensitive act which to Russians would be as provocative as 1914 and 1941. If a post-war Ukraine is to have genuine peacekeepers, they cannot be belligerents; such peacekeepers would have to be there under the auspices of the United Nations, and only from countries which are verifiably neutral with respect to Eurasian geopolitics (India would probably qualify; so would South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Ethiopia, Egypt, Nigeria – and of course Fiji with its tradition of peacekeeping.)

The Coalition is, it claims, fighting for the ‘rules-based-order’ in one conflict while pushing-back against international law in the other (genocidal) conflict. A coalition of hypocrisy, indeed.

In the end, international rules are meaningless in a battle framed as Good versus Evil. Evil, by definition, does not follow the rules. So, if Good is to wage an unyielding war against Evil, why would Good handicap itself by following rules that Evil cannot be expected to follow? Laws can be applied to a real war – of A versus B – but not to a war when one or both sides claim to be Good combating Evil? For the sanctimonious, defeating the posited Evil is more important than following the rules.

These West European interests are pulling back from their unconditional support for Israel so that they can focus on their belligerence towards Russia. While they don’t admit the contradiction in their embarrassing support for one aggressor (Israel) and their adamant opposition to another (Russia), Israel’s war in Palestine has removed any possibility that the coalition can seriously claim the moral high ground.

In Aotearoa New Zealand – the little-West located in the far southeast – we need to show more empathy towards Asia, which has been invaded and abused many times by The West, and less towards West Europe which was last invaded by Asia in the fifth century (by Atilla the Hun). New Zealand (eg under Jim Bolger) once considered itself to be an Asian country. Now, New Zealand’s political class is at risk of reinterpreting the continent Asia – sixty percent of the world’s humanity – as a monolithic antagonist. Can the lands to the south of Asia – literally, Australasia – be trusted by Asia?

In geopolitical terms, the West are the aggressors – and the peace blockers – in both of the present faultlines.

The Central Issue: Unipolar versus Multipolar ‘World Order’

Realist scholars of geopolitics – including the conservative John Mearsheimer and the progressive development economist Jeffrey Sachs – are clear about the nature of and the openness of the western geopolitical project. They see the eastwards expansion of the west, cloaked in its narrative of sanctimony, as somewhat problematic.

A unipolar world order is not necessarily an overt dictatorship over every human on the planet. Rather, it is a system in which one central polity – potentially one man or woman, but more likely a technocracy of truth-guardians – has an effective global veto over the contest of ideas, should it choose to use that veto. In a multipolar world order, such vetoes may operate regionally, though there could be no ‘one-veto-to-rule-them-all’.

The first thing that people across the world should consider, is whether the one-empire world is a better aspiration than a multi-empire world; noting that empires come in both overt and covert forms, and that empires can vary from the somewhat benign (ie fraternal) to the severely malign. (Mackinder’s principal principle was that of ‘fraternity’.) Is a single benign empire best? The issues here are twofold: how easily can a benign empire become malign; and how can we be sure that a benign hegemon is really as benign as portrays itself? (We may note the more benign optics of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World compared to the chilling repression underpinning George Orwell’s 1984.)

The West’s illusion of being non-violent in achieving its objectives is a result of it using violence only as a last resort; the West favours heavy-handed diplomacy, known in earlier imperial times as gunboat diplomacy. Importantly – as we have seen in Palestine and Iraq, and as we saw especially in World War Two, Korea and Vietnam – the West will always resort to extreme violence if it feels it has no other choice. The West will always bring out its ‘big bazookas’ if it feels sufficiently threatened or sufficiently punitive.

The coalition of sanctimony, through Mark Rutter, let slip the truth that the President of the USA is ‘Daddy’. Another ingratiating word that I’ve noted, for example in Berlin Briefing podcasts, is ‘uncle’; a word that this year cost the Prime Minister of Thailand her job (see Thailand’s PM suspended over probe into leaked ‘uncle’ phone call with Cambodian official, Euronews 1 July 2025).

Daddy! says it all. The coalition wants a military presence in Ukraine. Please Daddy! Don’t stop the war in a way that obliges Ukraine to become a neutral country (eg in the way that Austria was obliged after World War Two).

Mackinder claimed: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island [Eurasia-Africa]; who rules the World-Island commands the world.” (Not unlike the Muldoon political stratagem which contributed to New Zealand choosing to adopt MMP. “Who rules the Cabinet rules the Caucus. Who rules the Caucus rules the Parliament. Who rules the Parliament rules the Country.”)

Mackinder, in his later writing, emphasised the lands between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea as the Heartland. The World Wars of the twentieth century can be seen as grabs by Germany for Ukraine, the heart of the Heartland. Which country is it today which – using ‘whatever resources it takes’ – most wants to gain effective control of all of Eastern Europe, including former Soviet republics. Who rules the European Union rules Europe. Who rules Nato rules the West. The United States’ role in Nato is diminishing. Who, who once played a back seat in Nato, is now muscling into the front row?

Let’s play Dominoes, noting that geopolitical advance is performed using various ways and means, soft power and economic power as well as hard power. From a European viewpoint, the final important dominos would be Georgia (an especially interesting prize, given the ambiguous statuses of Abkhazia as a seaside playground for Russia’s richest and South Ossetia), and maybe Belarus.

Further south, after Syria and Iran are neutralised by Israel and the United States (noting the events of 1953), there are – as dominoes for American imperialism – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia, with Belarus and Kazakhstan, would then be encircled. The geopolitical West then would be literally on China’s border; adjacent to China’s sensitive Xinjiang province (aka East Turkestan). It was Zbigniew Brzezinski’s published dream; to contain China, to effectively veto China as a ‘player’. Something like this was Brzezinski’s open conspiracy.

Conspiracy Theories

Yesterday we heard this (Donald Trump says China, North Korea and Russia ‘conspiring against’ US, BBC News, 3 Sep 2025) from the American president. Yes, he was probably baiting the media. But we have been told that only feeble-minded people believe in conspiracies. Are conspiracy theories only lulu-lala when they are espoused by anti-ruling-class people? Is it OK to laugh-off other people’s conspiracy theories while quite earnestly promoting one’s own?

I heard this just the other day on Berlin Briefing, Why military service is back on the table in Germany(14 August 2025; 28’20”); the 2029 hypothesis which is gaining all the hallmarks of a Euro-conspiracy theory. Young soldier: “For example, 2029, the date that is put there out in the room from all Nato allies…”. Nina Haase: “Hang on there, to explain what that means, the date 2029 is the date when most military experts seem to agree that Russia will be in a position theoretically to test Nato’s Article Five, so to test an attack on one of Nato’s countries to see just how Nato will react, whether the other countries will come to help, because that’s what Article Five means, an attack on one is an attack on all.”

A good reference for the 2029 story is Germany’s Army Is Rebuilding. What Could Go Wrong?, Politico, Jessica Bateman, 29 August 2025, ‘”We are now moving from a war of choice to a war of necessity,” he [Carsten Breuer, the Bundeswehr’s highest serving general] explained. From security analysis he believes Russia will be capable of attacking NATO territory by 2029, with the caveat that this depends on the outcome in Ukraine and whether the war exhausts the Kremlin’. Remember Iraq’s ‘weapons of mass-destruction’!

Nobody ever says why Russia would want to attack a Nato country in 2029 or any other year; allegations-of-evil by western soothsayers notwithstanding. Russia has never aspired to possess Western Europe, and its hegemony over Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989 was entirely in the context of the finality of World War in Europe. The coalition of hypocrisy simply asserts this conspiracy theory as a justification for the militarisation of a near-bankrupt Old Europe, to deploy Donald Rumsfeld’s2003 putdown.

Western Europe is undergoing an Economic Implosion

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are all now in economic crisis; in fiscal crisis. Their spending cuts led to revenue constriction, meaning that less government spending has led to bigger (not smaller, as the neoliberals presume) budget deficits. With France it’s especially political, given the present fiscal crisis, the looming presidential election there in 2027, and the lack of unifying candidates to replace Macron in that role. (Marine Le Pen, who has become a potential unifier of the non-Centre has been barred from running.) The United Kingdom government is imploding too, and for similar reasons (though Nigel Farage, continuing to espouse fiscal conservatism, remains a less likely unifier). Many people in Britain think that the Labour Government cannot survive even half of its five-year term, despite Labour’s huge majority in the House.

In Germany, there is some pressure on the right for the CDU to dump its SPD coalition partner in favour of finding common ground with the populist-right AFD. But ‘Putin’ has become the number one political issue in federal Germany, and the AFD are – at least in Merz’s eyes – ‘pro-Putin’.

In principle, Merz could revive Germany’s economy – and enhance his own political fortune – by practicing Hitlernomics; reindustrialisation through a government-spending initiative to invest in rearmament. Whatever it takes. Hitler’s popularity in the 1930s increased because he got Germans working again. But Merz has agreed to buy Germany’s weapons from the United States, so that the arm-twisting United States can make more money and less war.

Most European countries are facing radical demographic change. To fight wars, they will need to exploit immigrant labour. Of course that happened in World War Two, too. One thing we hardly ever heard about, re WW2, was Germany’s reliance on and exploitation of ‘immigrant’ slave labour. Many of the victims of the Royal Air Force in wartime Germany were in fact slaves from the places the RAF was supposedly trying to save.

It all leaves the polities of the countries which make up the coalition morally, intellectually and financially bankrupt.

The Rise of the Conservative Left

The nuanced political chatter in Europe now is about the rise of the ‘conservative left’. And, indeed, it appears that the ‘populist right’ is moving leftwards on economic policy. In practice, that will mean a return to something like Keynesian economics. To a degree this is what is keeping Giorgia Meloni popular in Italy, while the handwringers and conservatives to her north are tanking in the polls.

In New Zealand, there is one authentic party of the conservative left; New Zealand First.

The three policy-axes which determine elections are: economic (progressive [left; fiscal pragmatism] versus neoliberal [right; fiscal conservatism]); cultural [multiculturalism versus dominant-culturalism]; and geopolitical [conciliation versus belligerence re foreign states].

In Europe and elsewhere, the Left (Die Linke in Germany) is ‘progressive’ on fiscal policy, ‘progressive’ on identity politics (including open to immigration), and pro-peace. The Right (AFD in Germany) is becoming ‘progressive’ on fiscal policy, is conservative on identity politics (including immigration), and pro-peace in Europe. Two-out-of-three (potential points of agreement) ain’t bad; especially as left-identity politics is slowly giving way to ‘bread-and-butter’ issues.

So the left-Left and the right-Left may be able to ally to form future coalitions which will oust the “Saatchi and Saatchi” (to quote the late Jim Anderton, as in ‘the difference between National and Labour is the same as the difference between Saatchi and Saatchi‘) centrist legacy parties of the hitherto mainstream political class. (We note that ‘coalitions of opposites’ are not unknown to history; for example, the alliance between the West and the Soviet Union in World War Two.)

The legacy parties, though divided on cultural/identity issues (as are the new parties), are firmly neoliberal (ie fiscally conservative, claiming the virtue of balanced budgets), supportive of Ukraine, and facilitating Israel’s genocidal erasure of Palestine’s indigenous population. The legacy parties can only survive if their opposition remains divided. With the rise of the conservative left – the right-Left – such division can no longer be guaranteed.

Prediction

My sense is that, on or before 2030, there is a one-in-five chance (20%) that there will be a nuclear exchange between the world’s ‘great powers’. That ‘Third World War’ will have been caused by the last-gasp resistance – on the part of the West – to the new reality of a multipolar world order. If such a ‘last gasp of the West’ exchange does take place, my prediction is that there is a 50% chance of a mass extinction event on a scale at least as great as that of 65 million years ago. That’s a 10% chance of a mass extinction event.

Nevertheless ‘nine-out-of-ten’ (or ‘four-out-of-five’) ain’t’ bad, meaning it’s more likely than not that the world does eventually settle down. I am predicting a 50% chance that the politics of Europe will decisively shift towards the ‘conservative left’ in this half-decade (or in the 2030s, towards the radical centre, parties like TOP in New Zealand); and that there will be enough common ground between the old-left and the growing conservative left to make it possible for the two-lefts to form coalitions against the withering centre; against the diminishing hurrah of today’s elite political class. Something like this did indeed happen in the 1930s; then the creation of a coalition against fascism pushed the old conservative politics to one side.

Summary

The world is facing a dangerous moment. Sanctimony and hypocrisy are not the answers. Fraternity, trustfulness, dialogue, neutrality, sympathy; they are the qualities we need to embrace and project.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

World War One is really the first conflagration of a Great World War which lasted between 1914 and 1945. That great war was a ‘”game” of two halves’ with an extended and less violent mid-war phase; total war, with an interregnum which exacerbated rather than resolved the trigger issues of early twentieth century ideologies.

These mid-war events – in particular (but not only) the rise of the Stalin and Hitler regimes in Russia and Germany – could not have happened as they did without their being embedded in the Great World War. These regimes epitomised socialist and nationalist social pseudoscientific belief systems; two of the great pseudoscientific Utopias, Marxist Historicism and Social Darwinism. To them we may add the capitalist social pseudoscience (economic liberalism; liberal mercantilism; ‘Social Newtonism’ to coin a new label) which gave the Euro-dominant world the calamitous Great Depression of the early 1930s. These three potentially catastrophic ‘scientific’ Utopias dominated the intellectual ether, so to speak, before 1914. They manifested in their various deeply problematic and distorted ways within the context of the 1914-1945 world war experience. Fascism and economic liberalism had their roots in biology and physics. The socialist pseudoscience – aka Marxism – had its roots in historical materialism, a conflation of (Ricardian) classical economics and Hegelian historicism, an attempt to create a social science of history.

In this regard, we may see the denouement (WW2) of the Great World War as a battle between three problematic personalities: Stalin, Churchill, and Hitler. Each representing their own false depiction of the world as ‘scientific’ Utopia: Marxian Socialism (aka ‘Communism’, in its pejorative sense), Economic Liberalism, and National Ethno-Supremacism. (And we note that each of these pseudoscientific belief-systems carried seeds of each other. For example, Winston Churchill’s liberal mercantilist worldview was imperial, nationalist, and deeply racist. Adolf Hitler [with no interest in appeasing aristocratic or bourgeois interests] pitched his ‘Aryan’ nationalist poison to the German working precariat. And Josef Stalin terrorised and starved his own people, especially but not only in the 1930s while the world was distracted, as the mismatch between reality and Marxian ‘science’ became increasingly evident.)

(We note that, for the post-great-war generation, these issues of the three Utopias were practically resolved in ‘The West’, through for example decolonisation, Keynesian economics, and non-Marxian socialism. Though the Stalinist Utopia took on an even more demonic second phase in Mao Zedong’s China. The Social Darwinist Utopia took on a new life in South Africa and Israel; and for a while continued to inform the Dixie states of the US south. Racism never really left the United States. And Economic Liberalism – initially as neoliberalism, now as Liberal Mercantilism – returned to the world with a vengeance in the 1980s. Today, just as Stalin could not reconcile Marxism with reality; our western liberal elites cannot reconcile the diktats of the prevailing [and increasingly mercantilist] capitalist ideology with reality.)

Were there Goodies and Baddies in 1914?

However we choose to see this 1914 to 1945 period of widespread humanicide, it’s difficult to see a clear group of ‘Goodies’ and a clear group of ‘Baddies’ in June 1914. Thus, we can at least start our analysis of this war without succumbing to the ‘Goodies’ versus ‘Baddies’ (Good versus Evil) narrative. I would argue that the emergence of this as the predominant narrative of modern warfare, and its conflation with Winner versus Loser (‘we won, you lost, eat that!’) narrative, were themselves the single biggest cause of the world’s greatest conflagration to date. (For interest, see this New Zealand Journal of History review of Paul Goldsmith’s book We Won, You Lost. Eat ­That!; a book which derives its title from the late Michael Cullen, former Minister of Finance of New Zealand. Indeed it is Goldsmith who is easily the most qualified current politician in New Zealand to be Minister of Finance.)

Nevertheless, there is a compelling argument that Germany was ‘The Bad Guy’ in WW1 because it was the ‘principal aggressor’, evidenced by the fact that most of the fighting took place on other countries’ territories. True, but the story of aggressor versus aggressee – invader versus invaded – is more nuanced than that. Two comments here: the most significant battle in 1914 – in August 1914 – was the Battle of Tannenberg, fought in Germany (East Prussia); and much of the important action of the war was fought in Germany’s proxy territory, the lands of Austria-Hungary. Though almost none of these battle-sites are in modern Austria, Hungary, or Germany. On the western front, the earliest battles were fought in Alsace-Lorraine, territory then held by Germany.

In reality, the three-way war that ended inconclusively and abruptly in November 1918 (albeit with a clear but not huge ‘advantage’ to the Western Powers) was ‘settled’ as if there had been a decisive military victory to The West. (For the first half of 1918, Germany had won the war in the East and was winning the war in the West.) Victors’ justice soon followed, although the Americans prevented it from descending to show trials of war criminals only the losing side. (We note that a similar process had taken place on the Eastern Front, with Germany able to impose victors’ justice over Russia; indeed the German state had done all that it could to facilitate the second [Bolshevik] Russian Revolution of 1917. Leon Trotsky signed the humiliating Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918, which among other things granted most of Ukraine to Germany. Further, the Western Powers then [ie early in 1918] involved themselves in the subsequent Russian Civil War; see The Allied Intervention.)

In WW1, the victors – the western powers – became ‘The Good’; the ‘victors’ usurped the narrative (as victors do), and would consequently place themselves in the predominant position to determine how the subsequent ‘peace’ would play out.

In WW2, the sequence was reversed. Rather than the victors becoming The Good, ‘The Good’ became the victors (but not the only victors). Indeed from 1944 The Good puzzled over why it took so long for their adversaries to see ‘the writing on the wall’. The answer was largely obvious, the English-speaking ‘Good’ (aka The West) waged relentless terror campaigns against ‘The Bad’; most of The Bad had presumed they were The Good (and fought hard on that basis). The Good had (inadvertently?) reinforced the belief that The West was The Bad, through their malicious and relentless bombing of civilians. Who would surrender to such aerial firebombers; what other kinds of evil could they cook up? In reality The War – as are most wars – was waged between The Bad and The Bad; or – as in the Great World War, it became The Bad versus The Bad versus the Bad versus the Bad (now including Japan). In the end it was victor’s justice that prevailed, posing as the Judgement of The Bad by The Good. The West and Soviet Russia got away with their many pre-war crimes and war crimes, scot-free.

World War One was not a decisive victory on either front

In the land war, while in a stalemate on the western front in 1916 and 1917, Germany had the military upper hand in the first half of 1918. In the end though, the most vital factor was the British naval blockade, and the associated economic war. Germany was being starved. Yet the worst of the food shortages in Germany were in the winter of 1916/17. By early 1918, Germany was able to redeploy battle-hardened troops from the Eastern to the Western Front. And Germany now had access to food supplies from Ukraine.

On the adverse side for Germany, however, was the arrival of American troops into France. These were ‘green’ troops who could not compete with Germans in direct military combat. But they did bring with them, unintentionally, the lethal weapon which may have won the war for the West: influenza.

As I see it, Germany lost its advantage in World War One for three reasons: the economic blockade, the lack of strategic vision of what ‘success’ on the Western Front actually meant, and the influenza brought by the American troops. (The 1918 influenza pandemic was most likely due to a hybrid novel H1N1 virus, forged in France as a result of a combination of the lethal influenza strain traced back to military barracks in Kansas in 1917 and a severe seasonal strain of ‘Asian flu’ already present in France.)

With the lack of strategic direction and military setbacks from July 1918, the German leadership – a dynamic flux, with an overall focus on civilianisation – sought to freeze (or even make concessions in the form of withdrawals from occupied territories) the western frontline so that it could end the war with its eastern gains intact. To this end, a new liberal Chancellor – Prinz Maximillian von Baden (interestingly, in light of later Nazi developments, a known homosexual) – was appointed early in October 1918. Also interesting, Prinz Baden and half a million other German civilians, became “seriously ill” with influenza that spring.

Returning soldiers from the western front were the main transmission vectors of the 1918 influenza pandemic, the ‘Black Flu’, the misleadingly named ‘Spanish Flu’. It is very hard to avoid the conclusion that the influenza, brought in initially by the American troops, played a vital role in Germany’s military setbacks in the late-summer and spring of 1918.

There seems to be very little written about the contribution of either the influenza or the naval blockade to Germany’s truce (a truce which began through Germany’s leaders reaching out to US President Woodrow Wilson; but which morphed into a substantial political defeat) which, to the West, ended the war, but which to many Germans looked very much like a ‘stab in the back’. Hence, from the German point of view, scapegoats had to be found, and the events which led to an eventual continuation of the Great World War were set in train. This was not helped by poorly considered attempts (especially at Versailles in 1919) by France and Britain to make Germany – now firmly ensconced in the western mind as a comprehensive Loser – pay for the war. And, perhaps most significantly, Germany being stripped by the Western powers of the full suite of its military gain in the East. Ukraine and other German-acquired territories were returned to the Russian Empire; now in the form of the ‘Communist’ Soviet Union, although in 1919 very much in a state of a civil war in which the West had intervened.

These events clearly represent the foundations of the Nazi doctrine of Lebensraum; more than anything, Germany wanted Ukraine back. Germany’s main weakness in World War One had been its resource base, especially its inability to feed itself. Germany, from the 1870s onwards, had become a food importer following its rapid industrialisation and imperial outreach (which included Samoa and New Guinea). And Germany also needed time to repopulate, to breed a new generation who could fill and administer what it saw as its ‘rightful’ empire in the west, and in the world.

We can clearly see Germany’s growing vision to replace its former far-flung empire by acquiring – as a proxy empire – France’s overseas territories. We saw this play out in 1940, with the creation of ‘Vichy France’ a nominally independent client state of Nazi Germany, and to whom the whole of the French Empire was designated. (In this light, had Germany’s military plans worked out in the early 1940s, France’s interests in the Northern Levant – Syria and Lebanon today – represented a possible solution for the alleged ‘Jewish problem’ of Eastern Europe. The West had a similar ‘Jewish problem’, which was resolved initially in 1924 by shutting down Jewish immigration to the United Kingdom and United States; that shutdown was still in place post-1945, meaning that The West used the Southern Levant as a repository for its erstwhile Jewish immigrants.)

We might note that, today, Germany is very well aware that it has the same resource vulnerability that it had from 1914 to 1940; and must look East for a solution. In addition, many people in Germany are well aware of a new form of demographic ‘crisis’ that Germany is facing, and that immigration from Eastern Europe (and a further degree of proxy absorption of Eastern Europe) represents its only plausible hope for an ‘ethnic European’ future.

What Happens if The Bad wins a World War (or any war for that matter)?

In 1918 the politically victorious West was able to create a Goody-Baddy narrative, facilitating a victors’ justice by presenting it as Good judging and punishing Bad. One consequence, reinforced by the western campaign of terror over Germany, half of which took place from November 1944 to April 1945. (Documents which have since come to light suggest that this bombing campaign – with the loss of 800,000 German civilian lives through horrible fiery deaths – was a failed genocide. The Morgenthau Plan, for example, advocated what amounted to bombing Germany ‘into the stone age’ – an expression which, applied to Vietnam, resurfaced in the 1960s – reducing Germany’s population from 80 million in 1939 to 30 million. 80 million people standing side-by-side along the equator-line would complete a circle of the world; now imagine randomly executing five-of-every eight people in that circle. Nuclear weapons were one means of making that genocide of civilians and refugees ‘more efficient’, as was actually done in Japan. Britain’s genocide plans included Operation Vegetarian, a dastardly scheme of biological warfare.)

In the end The Good was able to conceal most of its many very Bad contemplations, in large part because it was becoming more concerned to turn its killing attentions onto its erstwhile ally, Stalin’s Russia. Interestingly, as A C Grayling noted in Among the Dead Cities, the British leader of its terror-bombing force equated his efforts (killing 800,000 civilians in Germany) with the numbers of civilians estimated to have died of starvation or malnutrition in World War One as a result of the naval blockade.

Of course, whoever ‘wins’ a world war will use the victors’ prerogative to call themselves The Good. But, if, during a world war, ‘we’ have fully convinced ourselves that we are The Good, and we are suffering unsustainable losses, at what point do we (aka The Good) surrender to The Bad? Do we fight on, futilely, to the last man and woman, as it seemed the Germans and the Japanese were doing in 1945? Do we call a truce, as ‘we’ did eventually in Korea in 1953, and in Vietnam in 1972? Looking back, we are truly grateful that we did end those two Asian wars, one with a result that would be called a ‘draw’, the other becoming a clear defeat in 1975.

In the Good versus Evil narrative, Good never capitulates to Evil; not even if the alternative is the nuclear destruction of all life on Earth.

Truth and Reconciliation versus Accountability and Retribution

As we have seen at the end of World War One, an attempt by Germany at reconciliation to end the conflagration – including a willingness to have war crimes assessed and adjudicated in an international court – turned into a humiliation of Germany; that humiliation, in turn, ensured that the conflagration would recommence at a time of Germany’s choosing.

Fortunately, we have the South African experience of the end of Apartheid as a template for another way: Truth and Reconciliation. The former can always win out over the latter. Processes of humiliation and punishment are accompanied by large-scale processes of evasion and concealment; the incentives are to conceal rather than reveal the evidence of what really happened. It is better to know and not punish, than to punish a few scapegoats and to conceal the rest.

The best outcome is Remembrance, not Punishment and Vengeance. Sunlight is the strongest disinfectant. And to remember all; not to over-remember some things while severely under-remembering most things. For most younger people in the world today, World War One is understood as gritty soldiering in the trenches of the Somme, or under the cliffs at Gallipoli. And World War Two is reduced to Adolf Hitler’s genocidal mania, and Winston Churchill’s ‘heroic’ campaigns to defeat Goering, Rommel and Hitler (thereby, though too late, to save the Jews). Even the Pacific War is largely forgotten, except for reminders every five-years or so of Pearl Harbour and Hiroshima; the rest is unfathomable nuance.

Today

The western powers have tried hard to present themselves as ‘The Good’ in a biblical struggle through their Ukraine client regime, against Vlad ‘The Bad’. Yet the paucity of western Goodness has been so deeply exposed by the western alliance’s complicity in the genocide by Israelis of their co-semitic Palestinians, with whom they share the land known from 1918 to 1948 by some as ‘Mandatory Palestine’ and by others as ‘Eretz Israel’. Whatever we think of the virtue of the various western alliances (starting with the French-British Entente of 1904), clearly they are not ‘The Good’. Like all the other dirty wars in the twentieth and twenty-first century, the contests are between The Grubby and The Grubby, each looking for an opportunity to impose victor’s justice over the other.

Israel is trying to create a nationalist ethno-Utopia in accordance with the principles of Lebensraum. Israel has been doing so since the newly formed United Nations inflicted WW2 victor’s justice upon an indigenous third party in 1948.

Truth and Reconciliation is the answer; researching what happened and how and why, noting the root of the word ‘publication’ is ‘public’. Not one-sided Accountability and Retribution.

Conflicts will always exist. If we can get past the Good versus Bad narratives, we can make deals  which are never perfect for either party; but better for all three parties (noting that world wars have major impacts on third parties, such as the indigenous people of the Levant; and such as the birds, bees, people and trees, all of whom will lose big-time in the case of a self-inflicted extinction event).

Two Interesting Historical Deals

In the Napoleonic Wars – World War Zero – we had the British on one side defending the ancien regime European orders of feudalism and merchant capitalism; versus the French side which (under Napoleon Bonaparte) both advocated for and subsequently destroyed the new revolutionary liberalism.

As in World War One, the British Navy played a major role. Important territories for France were the Indian Ocean islands of Isle de France (now Mauritius) and La Réunion. In 1810, Réunion Island was captured by the British. In 1814 a deal was done. Réunion was swapped for the more economically valuable Isle de France. Great Britain had the military advantage of having captured the less populated part of this ‘France in the Indian Ocean’. Hence, Britain in 1814, leveraging off its relative military success, instigated a swap deal; Britain gained Mauritius (reverting to its former Dutch name), and Réunion was restored to France. (As usual in those times, indigenous people didn’t get a look in!) For France, the only alternative was to continue the fight; in that event, France would eventually have lost both islands. Pragmatism prevailed; the 1814 swap took place.

A second event – also an allegory for our present times – involved a genocide; an event in the Banda Islands (in present Indonesia) described by Bengali writer Amitav Ghosh, in his 2021 book The Nutmeg’s Curse: Parables for a Planet in Crisis. This particularly problematic genocide was perpetrated by the Dutch East India Company (Dutch abbreviation ‘VOC’; Abel Tasman’s employer) in the 1620s. (Mauritius was then also part of the VOC territory; indeed that’s who ruled Mauritius when the dodo became extinct, in 1662.) At that time, England and the Netherlands were the great mercantile rivals in the North Sea, Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean spheres. England had possessed one of the more remote Banda Islands, Rhun. To settle the second Anglo-Dutch War in 1667, the Dutch formalised a land-swap deal which at the time seemed very advantageous to them (Manhattan or Pulau Rhun? In 1667, Nutmeg Made the Choice a No-Brainer, New York Times, 2024). England got the last laugh, however. It had acquired Manhattan Island; and, as they say, the rest was history – world history – the island in which fortunes were made from real estate deals.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

On Saturday I came into possession of this letter, transcript below.

I will note that the recipient of the letter is someone I know a bit about; I would like to know more about his time in London, circa 1930-1932. I understand that he attended the London School of Economics. I never met him; but, me being a student of the Great Depression, I wish I had known him while writing my MA thesis.

Eric Salmon lived from 1903 to 1990. Certainly a patrician, he was an Auckland City Councillor and associate of Auckland’s ‘Mayor Robbie’. While he would never have had any sympathy with the Nazi cause, I would like to think that, like me, he would have had some empathy for the German people in 1933; and the many other people then caught up in events – indeed zeitgeists – moving too fast, and on too great a scale.

Sadly, I will never be able to see Mr Salmon’s letter to his German contact (probably written late in 1932). I do not know if he replied to the letter below.

Home Address:

Schwelm (in Westfalen)
Kirkplatz 7

Schwelm, 6th VI. [June] 1933

Dear Mr. Salmon,

                                    Your letter with the interesting account of your native [town?] and the economic position of New Zealand was a great joy to me, and I thank you very much for it. I hope, you won’t take it amiss that my answer comes so late. During the last months I spent all my time in finishing the dissertation for my doctor examination. Some days ago I finally handed it to my professor, and I am now preparing for the oral examination which will take place in the end of July. – How are you getting on with your work?

                        In the course of rather a short time the political situation in this country has thoroughly changed, and the questions you put to me in your letter have found a sudden solution. I may add : also a good one. You are perhaps astonished to read that, for – as far as I know – most of the great newspapers of the world tell you just the contrary. The reason for it is that the European nations, above all France and Polonia [Poland], but England too, fear a new war, and this fear is in an inexcusable way nourished by all those German people who don’t agree with the new spirit and the new methods. The Jewish question is also of great importance. The measures we took against the Jews were not at all cruel or unjustified, as you read in English papers. All we try is only to reduce the enormous influence and power of the Jews in Germany to an extent which compounds to their small number. More and more their influence has become a destructive force in our national life. What you see nowadays in Germany is not a warlike or an extremely militaristic spirit or a mass barbarism (as many foreigners suppose), but the will to build a new nation, in which no longer the unchecked liberalism of the postwar years reigns. We were standing just before a complete breakdown and the chaos of Communism, which would have been fatal for the whole world. In this dangerous moment came the revolution of our nationalist party under the great leader Hitler. It marks the beginning of something quite new in Germany. We know that a great many tasks are waiting for us, but seeing them we are no longer desperate as it was the case in the last years. The new Germany has a new hope, a new will, and a new energy, and with them we shall overcome all problems and difficulties.

      What do you think about the change in Germany, and what do you read in the papers? I should be very glad to hear something about it from you. Hoping you are quite well I am with kindest regards, yours Theodor Hort.

Herr Hort – presumably Dr Hort, soon after – is writing from Schwelm, eleven kilometres east of the Westphalian city of Wuppertal. To the west of Wuppertal is Düsseldorf, on the Rhine; Cologne is to the south, near where the river Wupper flows into the Rhine. To the north of Wuppertal is the Ruhr Valley, Germany’s western industrial heartland. Between Düsseldorf and Wuppertal is Neandertal/Neanderthal. Most of the journey between Wuppertal and Schwelm can be taken on the ‘world-famous in Westphalia’ Wuppertal Schwebebahn, the suspension railway, built between 1897 and 1903, which runs above the Wupper River. I am privileged to have ridden on that railway in 1984.

I had hoped that, because the railway is still there, that Wuppertal had not been bombed by the RAF during WW2. No such luck. I found this article in the Burnie Advocate (Tasmania), 1 June 1943: Wuppertal raid one of heaviest of war. This was eight weeks before Operation Gomorrah decimated Hamburg. (On Wuppertal, refer also: Planning a Bombing Operation: Wuppertal 1943, My grandfather, the bomber pilot, When the singing stops on Christmas Eve, German tragedy of destiny, Wikipedia.)

I have no idea what Theodor Hort’s fate was. Maybe he was recruited for the notorious Einsatzgruppen, which was top-heavy with academic doctors? More likely he turned away, at least in his mind, from the excesses of the New Germany; nevertheless serving his country in some capacity, albeit out of the kind of obligation that would have been hard to refuse. There is a high chance he died during the war. I’m guessing he would have been about 35 years old in 1943.

Throughout the twentieth century, many young Australians and New Zealanders studied at the London School of Economics. (William Pember Reeves was its Director from 1908 to 1919.) So did many upper-middle-class Germans; Herr Hort clearly fell into that class-category. Other Germans to study economics at the LSE included Heinrich Brüning and Ursula von der Leyen.

Brüning was Chancellor of Germany from mid-1930 to mid-1932. Brüning was the centrist politician most associated with the economic collapse of Weimar Germany during the Great Depression, thanks to his ‘liberal’ policies of stubborn fiscal conservatism. He sought to balance the Budget at any cost. Germany and the world paid a very high cost indeed. I understand that the “unchecked liberalism” Hort refers to is the economic liberalism of Brüning and others (think today’s neoliberalism), and not so much the social liberalism of Berlin that was an icon of 1920s’ Germany. (As a part of that social liberalism, Germany in 1918 – Germany’s first annus horribilis last century – became a proper democracy, with proportional representation, and votes for women.)

I would imagine that Hort’s parents would have voted for Bruning’s Zentrum (Centre) party. While it started as a Catholic party, it was actually the foundation party of German ‘Christian Democracy’, having already broadened its base by 1930. Westphalia, Düsseldorf and Cologne represented the West German heartland of centrist Christian Democratic politics. And consistently these places cast the fewest votes for Adolf Hitler’s party. (The city of Cologne, the least-Nazi-supporting city in Germany, was the first large German urban centre to be carpet-bombed by the British, in 1942.)

Nevertheless, at least in March 1933, young Theodor probably voted for the National Socialists. (Although his “great leader” epithet was probably a direct translation of ‘führer’ rather than an expression of devotion.) The Enabling Act of 1933, which ended democracy in Germany, had been in force for three months before Herr Hort wrote this letter. He, like many others in a desperate country, was willing to forego democracy if other goals might better be achieved without it. Further, by 1938, Hitlernomics – borrowing ‘as much as it takes’ to re-arm and reorganise along Spartan lines – was looking like a great success. (Something suspiciously similar took place in the Bundestag in 2025, exactly 92 years after the Enabling Act, using the outvoted ‘lame-duck’ parliament to get the necessary two-thirds majority. This time it was the ‘fascists’ – AFD – who were against borrowing to re-arm; and the outvoted fastidiously-anti-borrowing neoliberal FDP, who should not have been there.)

Finally, here, we should note that Germany as a whole – and certainly western Germany – while Judeophobic, was probably not much more Judeophobic than other European countries (including the USA); and that most German Jews, to 1918 at least, had seen themselves as more Germans than Semites, and played a significant role in the German armed forces in World War One. The circumstances of 1918, however, made it a relatively easy task for would-be-politicians with nationalist agendas to scapegoat Jews. There were vastly more Jews living in the countries east of Germany, and they from 1940 to 1944 ended up being very much in the wrong place at the wrong time. In Germany in 1933, ‘Jewish’ identity was used very much as proxies for the twin-devils who many Germans believed had ‘stabbed Germany in the back’ in 1918 (at a time when Germany appeared to be winning on the western front) and again in (and around) 1931; ‘Bolshevik’ Communists and big-finance capitalists. The 1918 claim of a ‘stolen war’ was an evidentially-false conspiracy theory which had the appearance of credibility to many desperate people looking for simple answers, and scapegoats.

On the Bolshevik matter, while Theodor Hort and others will not have known about it until much later – the winter of 1932/33 was the peak of the Holodomor where four million mainly-Ukrainians were deliberately starved to death by Josef Stalin’s Moscow-based regime. Too many elements of the western press were looking the other way. Soviet Communism was being romanticised in certain middle-class and working-class circles in ‘the West’ (though demonised in others: refer Three Women who Launched a Movement); the mega-atrocities were downplayed by mainstream journalists such as Walter Duranty.

It was the full discovery in 1939 of the Holodomor and the later Great Purge(s) that enabled the Nazis to contemplate an even worse genocide, a substantial part of which became the Shoah. The Shoah, while the worst genocide ever, was neither the first nor the last real-world example of ‘hunger games’ in the last 100 years.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.