Keith Rankin, 18 June 2026 – The latest quarterly economic growth data were released by Statistics today. The following chart summarises eight-quarter (ie two yearly) economic growth rates from 1990. I have colour coded the data to match the political party leading the government for each period. (Shades are lighter where the data spans a change of government.)

In the charted data, it is clearly possible to see the effects of two international financial crises, one pandemic, and two domestic fiscal crises. While both of the two fiscal crises are/were associated with National governments, the first ‘Richardson crisis’ followed on from the Labour-associated economic crisis linked to Roger Douglas. (The data series available only allowed me to go back to 1990.)

An important point to note is that, historically, there has generally been a significant ‘bounce-back’ of economic growth following a period of economic slowth. (There was an exceptionally large bounce-back in New Zealand in the 1930s after the Great Depression.)

The two exceptions to this bounce-back generalisation are the two growth phases preceding the two National-led domestic fiscal crises. The Richardson recession followed a period of flat economic growth from 1986. And the Luxton/Willis recession seems to have flattened what should have been a post-Covid19 bounce-back.

Recession? Or just slow growth?

Although the chart above doesn’t show a technical recession in 2025 or 2026, there has certainly been a recession, according to the latest figures. Real production GDP was $73,625 million (expressed in 2009/10 prices) in the December 2025 quarter, whereas it was $73,752 million two years earlier.

It’s a similar story of decline for the June and September quarters of 2025 (when National was in charge), compared to the same quarters of 2023 (when Labour was in charge). It means that the total GDP for the year ended March 2026 was $282.97 billion compared to $283,180 billion for the year ended March 2024. This is despite significant population growth in New Zealand between 2023 and 2025. And this is despite a markedly improving terms-of-trade; meaning a highly favourable global economic environment for New Zealand.

GDP lower than it was two years earlier is a recession. This latest recession seems to have been particularly unnecessary, occurring in otherwise unusually favourable times. Why is there so little criticism? Where is Labour’s evidence-based critique of National?

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 17 June 2026 – Yesterday morning I listened to John Cambell (RNZ) interviewing an Iranian-born New Zealander, who came to Australia as a refugee 42 years ago, and subsequently moved on to New Zealand. (Refer Iranian-born Kiwi hopeful following deal signing, RNZ 16 June 2026.)

Iran was in the news that day both because of the previous day’s US-Iran armistice ‘deal’ and because New Zealand was scheduled to play Iran in the FIFA Football World Cup in Los Angeles yesterday afternoon (NZ-time).

Campbell (asking about the deal): “I suspect you have thoroughly mixed feelings this morning, do you?”

Kiwi-Iranian (who I will not name here, because he is not a public person): “Yes we do, and hopeful that peace is finally there. Talking to my family they still can’t believe that peace will be achieved there because the third party in that war has not fully committed themselves to that peace, and that’s Israel.”

Campbell: “And of course, sorry to interrupt but … [as Cambell shuts off the Israel talk with a few platitudes]. Can you describe what your family in Iran have been living through during this period?”

Kiwi-Iranian: “Two of my cousins got injured but they couldn’t go to the hospital because of the fear of America brutally attacking Iran; the hospital, the university, the infrastructure, the ping-pong execution of the regime [ie the assassinations of some of Iran’s leaders] … imagine living in there and when the bomb comes and thinking the next one is for me. On top of that the regime has expanded their executions …”. The interviewee finally said something in relation to what Campbell was probing for, evidence of governmental violence notwithstanding the fact that the nation of Iran may have been experiencing attack in early March from within as well as from without; given that such attacks from within – immediately after the start of the war – were the full expectation of the “brutal” American and Israeli aggressors.

Campbell: [more pushing for statements about whether the regime is more or less evil than before]

Kiwi-Iranian after giving answers to these questions as quickly as he could, resumed his own voice [which Campbell had being trying to hijack]: “John, one thing we’ve got to realise as Kiwis is that this war break the international law, the Article 51 of the United Nations – they violated that law – and New Zealand said nothing. New Zealand Kiwis give a lot in World War One and World War Two; a lot of Kiwis die to create an international law to protect human beings. If we don’t respect that, if we don’t follow that, if we don’t honour those laws, what do we expect tomorrow if they attack New Zealand; if somebody attack New Zealand, which law will protect us? We have got to point out that the New Zealand government failed to acknowledge this.”

Campbell [ignoring everything unprompted that the interviewee had said, from his own voice]: “I want to ask you about the failure of the justification of the war … [not at all acknowledging that the interviewee had clearly said that there was no justification for the war, and that the interviewee was speaking on behalf of the attacked party], so the regime [a loaded word, Campbell could have said ‘government’] – and you are not alone in saying this [and the interviewee said this only after having been earlier prompted by Campbell] is now tougher more hardline and less sentimental than it was before [failing to acknowledge that there has been no ‘regime change’, and that no nation or government under attack can ever act in exactly the same manner while defending themselves from multiple strikes than they were before hostilities commenced] and further emboldened by their leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, right [interviewee tried to get a word in edgeways], so in real terms what has this conflict achieved? What has President Trump achieved?” [The interviewee has already answered that, ‘mass destruction of civilian infrastructure’ and ‘ping-pong executions’ of political and military leaders; but Campbell is trying to extract a political comment from this guy as if he is a technocrat who can answer for the party attacking his country.]

Interviewee: “They have achieved nothing. What they have achieved is they have strengthened the regime [yes, Iranians are patriotic too; it is normal to put domestic politics aside when your country is being attacked with missiles]; they have realised that like China that maybe they are not a military force against America, they don’t have a nuclear bomb, but that they can turn the war to the economy, which affects everyone including you and I, our standard of living. So, they kill thousands of Iranians, Iran got stronger, Iran’s going to support the forces against Israel, the Hezbollah and the terrorists, and they’re going to get their money. The conversation is that the Europeans are going to ease the sanctions on Iran. By the way the whole sanction business will always say that sanctions should be aimed at governments not at the ordinary people; why don’t they release food and medicine for Iran; at the moment thousands of people are out of work, Iran doesn’t have social benefits like we have got in New Zealand, so people are struggling, really struggling, the condition of living is really worse for them. The regime has got their own supporters in the street flag-waving and destroying any oppositions; they [ie the aggressors] have achieved nothing but make the conditions worse for Iranians”.

Campbell gets his way in the end, in that the interviewee, who has not been in Iran for over four decades, does kind-of condemn the Iranian government, following a series of leading questions. Good on the interviewee for making his principal points, despite not having been asked (except in a very general way) about the external aggression that Iran has faced, and despite Campbell’s manoeuvres to shift the discussion from the interviewee’s narrative towards a validation of the Campbell narrative. And despite Campbell’s clear desire to push the story away from Israel. Interviewers need to appreciate that listeners want to hear the voices of the interviewees, not the interruptions, quips, and steering by the interviewers.

Campbell didn’t even ask the interviewee who he was supporting in today’s World Cup match!

Campbell’s ‘summary’ of this interview came half an hour later, in another interview, BBC’s Frank Gardner with latest on US/Iran deal signing: “We had an Iranian New Zealander on about half an hour ago, and he said that we have a new regime that in some respects is more hardline and tougher and less sentimental [whatever ‘sentimental’ means here] in its response to opposition in Iran”. These are Campbell’s talking points, John Campbell’s voice; not the voice of his interviewee.

John Campbell wouldn’t think that his style of journalism is propaganda; and he’s probably not pushing his own personal agenda here. Nevertheless, his line of questioning prompts certain kinds of answers and moves away quickly when the answers don’t fit the intended line of response. The propaganda lies in the presumptive Eurocentric narrative(s) which Campbell and his colleagues have absorbed through repetitive exposure to these narratives; and limited exposure to narratives which run counter to these. This uncritical absorption of narratives, unprofessional for an enquiring journalist, is professional practice to social technocrats (people who apply narrative ‘knowledge’ to their daily work practice). Indeed, Campbell treated his guest as a social technocrat rather than as a family member of victims of lethal aggression from the west beyond Iran’s borders.

This kind of ‘journalism’ has of course become commonplace, not only at RNZ. Indeed, almost every time I hear about Israel’s blatant military expansion into Lebanon, the story – whether on TV3, TVNZ, or RNZ – presupposes that every act by the Israeli military in Lebanon is a ‘defensive’ response to some past, present or future act by Hezbollah (subtext, by some Iranian-backed ‘terrorist’).

(Hezbollah, we should note, was formed among the refugee Palestinians and resident [mostly Shia] Muslim Lebanese in 1982, as a resistance movement – not a terrorist movement – in response to the terror invasion of Lebanon by the Butcher of Beirut, Ariel Sharom. I have a book at home – still on my bookshelf unread – called Assassination of the Butcher of Prague – which is about the (often counterproductive) resistance to the Nazi terror occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1942. That Czech resistance movement is never referred to with the disparaging sense of ‘evil’ which our media perpetually apply to Hezbollah.)

Re Lebanon, the New Zealand media almost never reports the ‘double-hit’ tactics by the IDF, whereby – after an allegedly anti-Hezbollah ‘operation’ – there is often a second strike which targets local paramedics or journalists. Further, the New Zealand media – and I mean the likes of RNZ and TVNZ – do not report the ongoing Israel genocide in Gaza (where it is common for ten or so people to have been murdered in their tents or their rubble in a single day and where there is now virtually zero Hamas or other resistance, given that the ‘terrorists’ largely observe the negotiated Cease-Fire). And, even – before 2026 – when there was much Hamas resistance in Gaza, these New Zealand media outlets barely reported the ongoing Israeli military and settler atrocities in the ‘West Bank’, where there was no Hamas, mainly Ghandi-like peaceful resistance.

Another issue with the journalism is the repeated presumption that there has been ‘regime change’ in Iran. Well, no! The democratically-elected president’s the same, the foreign minister is the same, the murdered Supreme Leader has been replaced by his son, and the important Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (who will sign the deal) has been there since 2020. Not only is the Islamic Republic still the same, three of the four most important personnel are the same, and the fourth appears to be a younger carbon copy of his elderly now deceased father.

The Following Day

This morning’s coverage of the football match was somewhat disrespectful, in that after an excellent game of football with four excellent free-flowing goals scored, the coverage barely mentioned the Iranian players’ contribution to the game. (Refer All Whites draw with Iran at FIFA World Cup.)

While the New Zealand players and fans clearly appreciated Iran’s contribution to the game – as indeed did the many expatriate Iranian fans, some of whom were politically ambivalent – the New Zealand media only described New Zealand’s performance and the excellence of  New Zealand’s goals.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, Thursday 11 June 2026 – On Monday night I watched the movie Truth (available on Netflix until 13 June), about the circumstance which ended the career with CBS of anchor Dan Rather and 60 Minutes investigative reporter Mary Mapes.

In September 2004, CBS ran a story about the probable facts that George W Bush, United States’ president: (1) avoided military service overseas in the late 1960s by using privileged connections to score a place in the National Guard as a trainee pilot, (2) had not graduated as a pilot, and (3) had been AWOL (absent without leave) for much of his time of service.

An important part of the backdrop to the story was that Bush’s opponent in the 2004 election – John Kerry – was being accused of falsifying aspects of his record of service in Vietnam. Kerry had become the victim of a dirty tricks campaign, commonly associated with Karl Rove. (See Why Bush’s man is fighting dirty, The Guardian, 5 Sep 2004; and Campaign ’04: Kerry in Combat: Setting the Record Straight, Time 30 Aug 2004. And note this 2008 movie, screened in the United Kingdom as Dirty Tricks: The Man Who Got the Bushes Elected, which outlines the backstory to the Bushes and the rise of ‘dirty trick’ politics.)

In the movie, Mary Mapes – under inquisition – was accused of conducting her research under a ‘liberal’ presumption that George Bush was guilty; whereas, under formal law, accused persons should enjoy the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise. Dan Rather was accused, implicitly, of lacking judgement by going along with this. The story itself is an example of conservative cancel culture in play (noting that cancel culture has, in recent times, been presented as a sin of the political Left).

The CBS story was somewhat rushed in being put together, due to scheduling constraints; and there were some editing constraints, to fit the story into the allotted time for the 60 Minutes format. Nevertheless, the story was made professionally. However, the movie Truth did suggest one issue about journalistic zeal which remains unresolved today; the idea that there are many secret truths out there – facts of public interest – for which journalists should have an investigative zeal to reveal.

That idea is that truth is a simple matter that is technically available, and for all to see once any ‘cover-up’ barriers are removed. It is arguably true that this CBS 60 Minutes story was such an example of ‘revelation journalism’. In reality, knowledge shortfalls are more complex than the ‘cover-up’ narrative would allow; indeed, facts really do vary with perspective. It is appropriate that truth should be contested, and to remain unresolved.

The accusation against CBS was that, on account of ‘liberal bias’, especially on the part of Mapes, there had been a lack of scepticism in the evaluation of one piece of evidence presented in the story. While it was technically difficult for anyone to prove that a relevant copied document might have been fraudulently created by a disaffected source, the 60 Minutes crew did indeed show that the document was credible by showing that some typewriters in 1968 could produce the relevant font and superscript.

Yet that document, which was most probably genuine, was only part of a web of evidence pointing to the veracity of the story. If this had been a jury trial, and based on the totality of the evidence presented, I am sure that George W Bush would have been ‘convicted’ of hiding the truth relating to his military service as a young man.

Truth and Proof are sticky concepts, both subtle and elastic

Real ‘practical world’ truth and proof are in fact statistical concepts; they have an attached probability. Almost nothing that is non-trivial can be known to be true with absolute 100% certainty; almost nothing – except abstract truths such as those of mathematics – can be known with zero doubt.

To establish truth in an inquiry (such as a Court of Law), the formal procedure is first to presume the innocence of the accused party; this presumption – that an accusation is false until proved – is known as a null hypothesis. In the trial itself, evidence is presented and interrogated by multiple parties. In the resulting evaluation, a jury or a judge effectively estimates the probability that the accused is innocent (as presumed); the name for this probability is doubt. In a criminal trial, to get a significant – ie guilty – result, the null hypothesis must be disproven beyond reasonable doubt. The null hypothesis is thus rejected. Social scientists typify reasonable doubt as five percent doubt, meaning that guilt is at least 95% certain.

If judges think that there is – based on the evidence presented to them – a five percent chance that an accused is innocent, then the judgement can be said to be on the cusp or balancing point of a guilty verdict. (A judge would resolve that balance one way or another, maybe with a coin toss; whereas a jury might be split and a retrial called for.)

For some purposes, for example in a capital trial where the accused is subject to the death penalty, reasonable doubt might be reclassified as one percent doubt rather than five percent doubt; that is, 99% certainty of guilt. (Indeed, one reason for scrapping the death penalty in many jurisdictions is that it makes it harder to get a conviction from a jury, given the greater burden of proof required.)

In the case presented in the movie Truth, my assessment of all the evidence presented against George Bush junior was a two-percent doubt of his innocence; meaning 98% certainty of his being guilty of using oligarch privilege to avoid military service in Vietnam. So, under the five-percent doubt rule, I would have found him guilty, regardless of a few technical misgivings relating to one item of evidence. But, if I was applying the one-percent doubt criterion, I would have been obliged to find him not-guilty. If one-percent had been the maximum doubt allowed and I had two-percent doubt, then I would have had too much doubt to establish the historical case against the then POTUS (President of the United States).

Had it been an accusation of treason rather than of privileged avoidance of military service, the president would have kept his head, on account of the high burden of truth faced by his accusers. And of course, based on the story as presented, Mapes and Rather should have kept their heads; metaphorical heads should never have rolled at CBS. There was massive doubt that they had been seriously unprofessional. They were doing their jobs, subject to the practical constraints that investigators face.

The process was, thanks to a low level of doubt, unable to disprove President Bush’s performance of obligation; and was also unable to prove the manifestly high (but not perfect) broadcasting standards of Rather and Mapes. Truth proved to be a capricious commodity. Thanks to about 2% doubt, Bush kept his reputation. Yet, despite perhaps 98% doubt, Mapes and Rather lost their broadcasting careers.

No ‘acceptable level of doubt’ was applied to Mapes and Rather. Instead, they were subjected to a reversal of the presumption of innocence, exactly what Mapes in particular had been accused of doing (towards George W Bush) by her interrogators.

Reversing the Presumption of Innocence

An important implication of the judicial process is that if a judge or jury believes that (based on the evidence) presented there is a 90% chance (or even a 94% chance) that an accusation is true, then that accusation should be evaluated as ‘not-true’ (the nuance being that ‘not-true’ is not the same as ‘false’). The more transparent language for such a finding is ‘not-proven’ rather than ‘not-guilty’. Further, in a court of law where only two verdicts are possible – guilty or not-guilty – then all ‘not-guilty’ verdicts are euphemisms for ‘not-proven’.

The only way that innocence can be ‘proven’ is to reverse the burden of proof. If you start from the premise that an accusation is true, then you can come up with verdicts of ‘innocent’, or ‘not-innocent’. If the criterion was ‘innocence beyond reasonable doubt’ – that is, a presumption of guilt – and evidence showed that there was ten-percent doubt of innocence, then the verdict would have to be ‘not-innocent’; someone would be deemed guilty (and punished) despite a 90% certainty that they were innocent! Even if the criterion was ‘balance of probability’ (where say 30% doubt is acceptable), if the evidence suggested a fifty-percent chance of guilt and a fifty-percent chance of innocence, the verdict would still have to be ‘not-innocent’. Having to establish innocence beyond reasonable doubt, having to face a presumption of guilt, would be a chilling legal requisite; the epitome of a police state.

So, there are various different standards of truth – indeed (literally) ‘extremely’ different standards of truth. That is not necessarily a bad thing, so long as context is taken into account; but it can be problematic, especially for accused parties who somehow find that their truths must bear the burden of proof whereas other dubious truths can hide behind a requirement of disproof.

University of Auckland case on RNZ on Tuesday 9 June

The introduction to this story played on RNZ goes like this: “Auckland University is facing criticism from its own staff over its handling of sexual assault, bullying and harassment allegations against a former [academic staff member who] left his role at the University of Auckland after an investigation late last year found that he had likely bullied and harassed a student. A legal academic at the university is now raising serious concerns about the investigation.” (Refer Sexual assault investigation at the University of Auckland, RNZ 9 June 2026.)

The word “likely” suggests that the case was conducted on the ‘balance of probability’ criterion, meaning that 30% doubt would have been acceptable to make a career-ending judgement. However, listening to the story itself, it is clear that the concern raised by academic critics is that the process is biassed in favour of the accused, and gives insufficient regard to the rights of the accuser(s).

While the investigation finding included the phrase “not enough concrete evidence” (meaning doubt in the 5% to 50% range; that is, certainty of guilt in the 50% to 95% range), the principal complainant had argued that there should have been a presumption of guilt – “she felt that the onus was on her [the accuser] to prove the allegations” – rather than a presumption of innocence towards the accused. Indeed, the accused was granted the appellation of “whistle-blower”. (If this was the Mapes versus Bush case, it would be like Bush having to prove his innocence rather than for Mapes – the whistle-blower – to establish his guilt. Indeed many ‘liberals’ would wish that were generally so; so long as the whistle-blower was neither the ‘state’ nor a litigious neighbour with a propensity to complain about anything.)

This University of Auckland case is a case in which some people (including at least one legal academic) believe that, for guilt to be established, the burden of proof – the presumption of innocence – should be reversed. (As indeed it was Mapes but not for Bush.) How then should a democratic society decide who should benefit from the presumption of innocence, and under what circumstances should a presumption of guilt apply instead? An important part of the context here is to ensure the ongoing safety of vulnerable potential victims; a consideration that was also applicable in the Mapes/Bush case, given the chilling effect that the case had on investigative journalism in the United States.

The issue really comes to a head when we consider binary cases. The classic binary case in New Zealand has been the 1994 Bain homicides.

The 1994 Bain homicides

This represents a binary situation whereby the innocence of one accused party necessarily means the guilt of the other.

Here we had a case of five violent deaths within a single family, where the only two possibilities considered were that the killer was either David Bain or Robin Bain. (A possibility not considered was that Robin killed four of the family, and then David killed Robin; a possibility of dual-guilt which I will ignore here.) Thus, if David was innocent then Robin was guilty, and vice versa.

David Bain was put on trial twice for murder, de jure. But, because there was a ‘binary’ truth to be established, Robin Bain was also on trial, de facto. A guilty verdict for David would have been a not-guilty verdict for Robin. And a not-guilty verdict for David would have been widely understood as the establishment of Robin’s guilt.

The criterion for guilt was ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which we may quantify as five percent acceptable (ie ‘reasonable’) doubt. In the first trial David was found guilty. Let’s say that the jury had a 3% doubt re David’s guilt, which would have been beyond reasonable, then there would have been a 97% doubt about Robin’s guilt. With David formally – ie explicitly – on trial, he benefited from the burden of proof, otherwise understood as the advantage of doubt. Whereas Robin, implicitly on trial, suffered from the disadvantage of doubt re David. Robin was implicitly cleared in that first trial; 97% doubt of Robin’s guilt meant 3% doubt re Robin’s innocence.

In the second trial, I believed the evidence presented against David Bain to be similarly strong as the evidence in the first trial. (Though, not having attended either trial, my impressions from media reports may have been awry.) The jury reached a ‘not-guilty’ verdict, which could have meant that they were ninety percent sure of David’s guilt; that is, a 10% level of doubt. Ten percent doubt for David – requiring a ‘not-guilty’ verdict – translates to 90% doubt for Robin. Yet, at the end of the second trial, the effective judgement was that Robin Bain was guilty; that is, despite there always having been more doubt about Robin’s guilt than about David’s guilt.

Robin was presumed to be guilty; not because there was less doubt about his guilt, but because he was subject to a different criterion for the establishment of guilt.

In a sense David Bain is George Bush in the original example; and Robin Bain is Mary Mapes. David and George benefited from the presumption of their innocence. Robin (and Mary) suffered directly from the presumption of innocence granted to David (and George).

I am not arguing that the legal system should drop the presumption of innocence. This presumption is required because of the consequences that could be faced by a party formally judged to be guilty. But the formal result of a trial is not the same as ‘the truth’, especially when the verdict is not-guilty. The formalised non-guilt of David Bain became the guilt of Robin Bain. The exoneration of the youthful George Bush became, despite about 98% doubt, the guilt of Mary Mapes and Dan Rather.

In the University of Auckland Case, the accused person vacated his academic career without the statistical establishment of guilt. The truth in that case remains firmly ambiguous. We can say, though, that the accusers in this case clearly had a weaker case than Mary Mapes had on that 60 Minutes program.

What about cases of scientific truth? There can be many public victims when private mis-truths are presented as protected public truths.

One final case: Cholera in London in 1849 and 1854, and epidemiologist John Snow.

Here we have a case where an orthodox professional narrative enjoyed the presumption of ‘innocence’, with a heterodox scientific investigator being required to bear the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt (eg 5% doubt), or even beyond unreasonable doubt (eg 1% doubt).

John Snow is now the de facto ‘patron saint’ of epidemiologists. (Refer Maps and Legends, Lee Jackson, The Lancet, 13 April 2013.) In those fatal cholera years nearly 200 years ago, Snow was a heterodox medical scientist who had already built something of a reputation in the field of anaesthesia. He was no crackpot or conspiracy theorist, as heterodox investigators risk being cast as.

In those days there was an established ‘scientific’ view that cholera was a lethal airborne disease. There was also an important heterodox view that it was a waterborne disease.

The established procedures for technocratic science – including social science – are that the heterodox community has to bear the burden of proof with respect to any disagreement over what is more likely to be true. That means, in practice, that the heterodox community has to deliver an evidence-based argument to the orthodox community or to the wider community (for example, to an imaginary jury) that would leave no more than five percent doubt.

Snow came to regard the waterborne explanation to be superior, and, during the 1849 epidemic, set out to investigate the matter. He investigated two nearby streets in Horsleydown (Southwark, London, south of the Thames close to the subsequent site of Tower Bridge) which consumed water from different sources; that is, water reticulated by different suppliers. In one street cholera was widespread. In the other cholera was practically absent. Further, for those streets with cholera, there were no discernible differences in air quality from those without cholera. (Refer On the Mode of Communication of Cholera, internet archive.)

My reading (from Steven Johnson’s The Ghost Map 2006) is that Snow’s 1849 research constituted proof, beyond reasonable doubt – ie with, at most, 5% doubt – that cholera was waterborne rather than airborne. The public health ‘establishment’ however rejected the finding on the basis that there was too much doubt, maybe 6% doubt. As a result of this rejection, and despite the balance of probability favouring the waterborne explanation, the authorities continued to ignore the requirement to replace wastewater facilities which would feed into someone else’s water supply.

The result of inaction was that, when the cholera returned in 1854, there were similar devastating consequences as in 1849. It was in 1854 that John Snow went on to create his famous map, which suggested a particular water-pump (Broad Street) in Soho (London’s West End, north of the Thames) was supplying cholera-contaminated water. The Broad Street pump was eventually closed.

The resulting aftermath, that the residents of Broad Street stopped getting cholera after the pump was closed down, is the more well-known ‘proof’ that cholera was waterborne.

In fact, the 1849 research was better proof (note Snow Mistake: Correcting Myths in the Mapping of Cholera Joshua Stevens 2025, and Our sense of Snow: the myth of John Snow in medical geography Kari McLeod 2000); there was evidence that the shutting-down of the pump made no difference because by time it was shut down its water was no longer contaminated. Further, abundant hydration has always been the primary cure for cholera, and the shutting down of a water source made that cure harder to attain.

Still, the further ‘proofs’ did not sway the established ‘scientific’ narrative. The final proof in London had to wait until 1866, after the new sewerage system (which down-rivered the city’s effluent) had been largely built. In 1866, the only significant outbreaks of cholera were in the East End districts which had not yet been connected to the new system. As stated in Cholera and the Thames: “The third outbreak of cholera hits the east end of London, an area of town which was not connected to Bazalgette’s system; the rest of the city is unaffected by the outbreak; Snow’s water-borne theory begins to become more widely acknowledged.”

Yet, even then, in many other countries and cities, establishment technocrats clung onto the airborne view (and imposed that view on their Ministries of Health and their Municipalities), resulting in lethal cholera epidemics in cities such as Hamburg and Naples decades after the matter was resolved in British public health policy.

This needless truth deficit, which condemned millions of people to ghastly and avoidable deaths, was that the established ‘scientific’ belief was shielded by the presumption of innocence; and that those who tried to meet an unnecessarily strict ‘burden of proof’ found that – as outsiders – the Inquiry system was biased against them. Just as the Inquiry system depicted in the film Truth was biased against the professional journalists (Mapes and Rather).

A public health system which was shown to be lethal ‘on the balance of probability’ was allowed to persevere for many decades in many places, thanks to a presumption of technocratic innocence that was quite inappropriate. Scientists with beliefs that were known to be most likely false – even 90% likely – were allowed to manage public health policy in many jurisdictions and to implement dangerous systems in light of those ‘scientific’ beliefs.

In the case of the technocratic establishment, the public requirement for the most accurate truth available outweighs the rights of these officials to the presumption of innocence. Wilful ignorance of probable or possible truths is not a defence. The choice – whether made consciously or not – to be ignorant of heterodox knowledge is not an excuse for public policy failure.

Finally

Mary Mapes in particular seems to have had one failing, which is common amongst investigative journalists. Such journalists tend to see truth as something that is known but all-too-often covered up on account of its inconvenience to some powerful party; and that their mission is to uncover these known truths. Reality is, however, that almost all important truths come with some degree of doubt; and that good science research increases or decreases those doubts, and good science practice acknowledges those doubts.

Journalists, scientists, and other professionals need to be humble in their relationship with truth. Few known knowns are free of doubt; and there are almost certainly many more known unknowns (knowledge subject to significant doubt) and unknown unknowns than most of us presume. Humans may be clever, though not as clever as is commonly supposed.

Truth-seeking is a worthwhile yet murky business. Truth is substantially unattainable, as is absolute proof. We need to build our lives around evidence, context, principles, enjoyment, compassion, respect, uncertainty, and openness to new information and ideas. Not around belief and opinion posing as faith or truth.

We have processes to make parties accountable for their alleged misdeeds. While we need such processes, we should also acknowledge their imperfections, their misuse, and indeed their contradictions. We should not go on believing improbable truths when more probable truths do not meet a sufficient threshold of certainty. To do so is a perversion of the scientific method.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 21 May 2026 – In 2026, a number of countries desperately need one or two circuit-breakers to trigger an increase in aggregate demand; an increase in spending which can induce both consumer spending and business confidence.

Keynesian economics tells us that the most reliable circuit-breakers are exports and government spending. New Zealand’s exports are booming, and have been for a while. But for New Zealand that’s still far from enough; New Zealand needs a government spending circuit breaker as well.

The United States last year sought to bully the world into buying more American goods. But that hasn’t been a circuit breaker for the United States (but it really boosted China’s trade with other countries), just as Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ of the mid-late-1930s was not enough. In that era, the final and successful circuit-breaker was American armament, in 1940 and 1941; armament in support of the United Kingdom in its war against Nazi Germany and also to prepare itself for a possible entry into war against Germany and/or Japan.

From 2023 to 2026, the United States economy is back into a growth phase, dramatically so this year; it’s Keynesian circuit-breaker has – once again – been armament for war. War production in support of others – including Ukraine and Israel – and war production in support of its own foreign adventures. Further, war has proved, literally, to be the killer application which makes AI (artificial intelligence) profitable.

The New Zealand Government this week, seemingly far from producing a circuit-breaking stimulus, has just announced a policy to retrench the public service. (Refer Scoop, Government plans to cut 8700 public service jobs over three years, 19 May 2026.) At first sight, it looks like Déjà vu, all over again; a quick exit to political ignominy for a failed government determined to not learn from the past.

Retrenchment in New Zealand’s past

What in the past was generally called ‘retrenchment’ is today, euphemistically, called ‘fiscal consolidation’. The worst two retrenching Ministers of Finance have been William Downie Stewart Jr., and Ruth Richardson. (Roger Douglas converted to that doctrine, but didn’t practice it to anything like the extent that Ruth Richardson did. Douglas and Richardson subsequently became principals of the ACT Party.)

During the second half of the twentieth century, it was well understood by most bureaucrats and relevant academics that the core political misdemeanour which converted the 1929 global financial crisis into a global Great Depression was government retrenchment.

Retrenchment was a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ policy whereby governments would undermine their own revenue bases in a misframed and impossible quest to ‘balance the Budget’. Undermining the revenue base through spending reductions at a time of already-low consumer and business confidence and already-growing unemployment could only be the height of fiscal folly. In the years from 1926 to 1933, New Zealand had a Minister of Finance who twice brought New Zealand to its economic knees through his ardent and ideological commitment to retrenchment; to a policy supposedly about reducing the size of government, but which actually achieved bigger size reductions to the private sector.

The global crisis around 1931 and 1932 was particularly bad, because the simultaneous retrenchment of almost all capitalist governments had the particularly discouraging effect of collapsing world trade. Government retrenchments and reduced spending on traded goods reinforced each other, creating a particularly problematic downward spiral.

William Downie Stewart Jr was Finance Minister from 24 May 1926 to 10 December 1928, and again from 22 September 1931 to 28 January 1933. During both of those comparatively short tenures, Stewart effectively waged fiscal war on the country. His first tenure as finance minister ended with an ignominious ousting of the Government which indulged his constipatory policies. The second stint ended with an internal putsch of sorts in January 1933 (a dispute around the issue of currency devaluation); a coup driven, ironically, by the man (Gordon Coates) who had been Prime Minister in the 1925 to 1928 government. (In both cases, the economy ‘turned the corner’ after the riddance of Stewart; though it took several years after 1933 to fully recover, meaning that the then proto-National government – led by the hapless George Forbes – was unceremoniously dumped in the 1935 election.)

In like vein, I think we can say that Ruth Richardson was the deserved victim of an internal putsch – a removal that was too slow, though, given that she was still able to do damage in 1994 – instigated by Bill Birch and Jim Bolger. In terms of the popular vote, in the 1993 election, the Left (deservedly trounced in 1990) thumped the Right. If that election had been held under MMP, the result would have been a landslide defeat for a one-term National Government.

Back to the Future

2026 is the future, as seen from 1933 and 1993. Indeed, the framed retrenchment undertaken this week by Willis and Luxon has optics similar to those of 1927, 1932, and 1991. But the then ‘future’ – ie today’s present – is different; subtly but importantly different.

Politically, Ms Willis and Mr Luxon are under pressure from the Treasury, from the New York credit-rating agencies, from David Seymour of the coalition’s Act Party, and from the whiney (but economically sub-literate) journalists whose first question is inevitably “where’s the money coming from?”.

Sending public servants down the road – and replacing them with bots – may be good optics for this kind of staunch masculine fiscal politics. But, to get re-elected, the government needs the circuit-breaker mentioned above. In economies, as in prostate science, flow works better than constriction.

So, what has the Government announced? Ahead of next week’s Budget, they have committed to more than a billion dollars of extra spending. That may be the circuit breaker. Here’s the crux of Nicola Willis’ announcement: “Over the next four years these initiatives will deliver savings of $2.4b which will be re-deployed“. Re-deployed when? In 2026, of course! (That is, predeployed rather than redeployed.)

Where will the money come from? From the public service retrenchment promised for 2027 to 2029. The promised retrenchment is in effect collateral for a loan to be drawn down this year, indeed this month. Based upon my reading, the announced public service disemployment probably won’t even happen; it’s like unmined gold used as collateral – alleged gold that will probably remain in the ground.

Labour, if returned to power in November, will almost certainly cancel National’s public servant retrenchment ‘plan’. And National, if returned to power, may simply move on to other policies and conjuring tricks; journalists are so easily distracted by political sleight-of-hand. Money, as always, is an illusion; a set of circulating promises.

Here’s hoping I’m correct; that this fiscal predeployment does represent a long-awaited expenditure stimulus.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 20 May 2026 – Recently, the New Zealand First Party released its KiwiSaver policy, promising to make this retirement savings scheme compulsory for New Zealand born citizens, and setting them up with a $1,000 startup deposit at birth. (See Winston Peters unveils KiwiSaver-from-birth NZ First policy, bank takeover plan, Scoop, 18 May 2016.)

The New Zealand First Party also promised that no government which they are a part of will be allowed to raise (from 65) the age of entitlement to New Zealand Superannuation, which is New Zealand’s universal pension. The National Party, on the other hand, plans to campaign on a promise to raise that age of entitlement. What National did not confirm or deny, is whether it will raise the age of entitlement for KiwiSaver.

I cannot imagine the age for KiwiSaver entitlement staying at 65 – what today is loosely called the ‘retirement age’ – while the age of pension entitlement is raised to 67 or higher. Requiring people to wait until they are 67 before they can access their retirement savings may prove to be even more unpopular than raising the pension-entitlement age.

But, back to Peters’ KiwiSaver startup plan.

In the last 24 hours I have heard references on RNZ (publicity excerpt from The Panel) and on Stuff News (TV3) to such start-up retirement savings. And how we can all become retirement millionaires on the basis of ‘the miracle of compound interest’.

The RNZ item considered a savings plan – at five percent interest – commencing at age 18, which would result in a lump-sum at 65 of well over a million dollars.

The TV3 item (This KiwiSaver change could give Kiwis a $53,000 retirement boost. It’s gaining high-profile support across the political divide, Damien Venuto, 19 May 2026) goes like this: “If $1000 was invested into an aggressive account for a New Zealander from birth that would compound to $53,000 by the age of 65 even if nothing else was invested. The one disclaimer here is that inflation will eat into that over time, making the buying power of that $53,000 far lower than what it would be in today’s terms.”

Two Examples of ‘Miracle’ KiwiSaver savings

In my first example, I start with $1,000, and put that aside in a ‘conservative account’ which we expect to yield five percent interest per annum. The result, after 65 years (daily compounding), is $20,081. That’s assuming tax-free interest. To get to $20,000 while paying withholding taxes, a gross interest rate – gross yield – of about seven percent would be required.

In the second example, I go for Damien Venuto’s target: $53,000. You would need a net annual yield of 6.62 percent. Venuto claims that this is possible in an “aggressive account”. We note Venuto’s inflation proviso, though clearly Venuto presumes that average inflation over the next 65 years will be well under 6.62 percent.

(Given that inflation compounds in the same way as savings’ deposits do, we can say that, if inflation averages five percent over those 65 years, our savers at birth would end up multiplying their birth ‘investments’ by a factor of 2.65; meaning that, after correcting for inflation, their $1,000 seed deposit becomes $2,650. However, if inflation averages 2.95 percent, the $1,000 starter rises to $9,000 after adjusting for inflation. My best guess is that inflation over the next 65 years will average over ten percent, given both the present state of the world and the demands on goods and services which will arise from baby boomers and Gen-Xers eventually cashing in their private pensions. At ten percent average inflation, the initial $1,000 would be worth just $132 in 65 years’ time.)

Risk and Uncertainty.

If you are looking for a risk-free Saver account, you should be expecting a gross interest rate of about the rate of inflation; that means a net interest rate below the rate of inflation. Otherwise, you have to accept risk (estimable) and uncertainty (unknown unknowns can be predicted, at best, with intelligent guesswork).

If you transport yourself back to 1961 (New Zealand’s year of maximum births, 65 years ago) and try to guess your way to the year 2026, what inflation, yields, and risks would you have predicted?

(Inflation has compounded since then at an annual average rate of 5.3%. $1000 saved in 1961 would have to have compounded to $29,400 in 2026 just to break even. Money passively – yet ‘aggressively’, in Damien Venuto’s sense – ‘invested’ in shares or property would have achieved an excellent long-run return, however. Money in a savings account would have fallen well short of break-even. It’s highly unlikely that the next 65 years will be as favourable as the last 65 years were. What actually happened in the last 65 years was not necessarily the best prediction; you might win a game of roulette, but the best prediction is that you will lose. In 1961, most people would have predicted some kind of nuclear war by 2026; indeed, with hindsight, the chances of such a war in 1962 may have been as high as 50:50.)

In an ‘aggressive account’, there are many associated risks. The essential difficulty relates to the fact that the returns are principally capital gains, which may or may not occur, and may or may not be taxed.

Capital gains are largely self-fulfilling in economies with a high degree of inequality, because those people with lots of money tend to use it to buy and sell financial assets from and to each other, boosting the prices of those assets in a financial merry-go-round. This situation can go on for a long time, though never forever. The break happens when more than a few people want to cash in their inflated financial assets at the same time; and such ‘corrections’ are almost certain to happen with rapidly aging (‘first world’) populations in the ‘global north’. After all, much of this money is in pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, which are both going to come under extreme pressure when those older persons seek to spend their savings (and require more services); savings which individual savers cannot take to the grave. And, while sovereign nations may not have an imminent grave, their Treasuries have certain expenditure obligations towards their aging populations, and towards the younger people struggling to support the older people.

While investment yields can be real, capital gains by their very nature are largely illusory, dependent on most of the ‘invested’ funds not being withdrawn. These financial assets will largely disappear in the event of another ‘levelling event’, such as the Great World War of 1914 to 1945; noting that that event included the Great Depression, part of the levelling process.

Who Pays the Interest?

Whenever we hear about the magic of compound interest, we hear very little about who pays that interest. Let’s start with a static, non-growing economy. This may be called the ‘zero-sum’ case.

In such an economy, interest (unless the interest rate is negative) represents an unrequited flow of money from debtors to creditors. In the twentieth century world, when it wasn’t at war, that largely meant from private businesses investing in growth to private savers ‘investing’ in financial assets. Governments tended towards balanced budgets from 1950 to 2000, so were more on the financial sidelines than they are today.

In the twenty-first century world, the debtors are mainly small businesses, relatively poor households, and governments. (In some but not all cases, the same governments which have trillion-dollar sovereign wealth funds.) There are other situations, especially around large leveraged ‘investments’, where interest is paid by the very rich to the very rich; these situations ‘net out’, so can be ignored when looking for the big picture around systemic interest flows.

Once netted out, the main flows of interest today are from small and medium size businesses and relatively poor households to the richest ten to fifteen percent of households. Interest flows from poorer households to richer households. And from younger households to older households. Further, dwelling rents constitute a form of interest; they represent a yield paid to landlords by tenants. The words ‘interest’ and ‘yield’ are close synonyms.

What this tells us is that it’s impossible for all of us to benefit from the ‘miracle of compound interest’. Every dollar of interest received must be paid by someone. It also tells us that one of the risks associated with the miracle is the possible default – or bankruptcy – of a smaller or larger proportion of interest payers.

An interesting finding in New Zealand in the late-2000s, when finance companies were going broke, was that there were actually two types of finance company. One was mainly financing property investments, and the interest payers were relatively affluent people. This type of finance company – eg Hanover – failed during or prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 to 2009. The second type of finance company were funding distress loans to the poor; they continued to thrive through the GFC. The poor struggle on, conscientiously.

Looking at this second type of finance company, we can see the emergence of a new ‘lower working class’ – many of them denizens rather than citizens of the countries they live and work in – who may be considered to be ‘debt slaves’ or something close to it. In that sense, the lucky Kiwi Savers are enjoying their credit miracle (in the cases when that miracle is not a mirage) at the expense of a global proletariat of debt slaves.

Now consider economic growth, real and nominal. Real economic growth is the ‘positive-sum’ case.

The standard growth story about ‘who pays the interest’, is that the savings are’invested’ in businesses that are creating economic growth. In this story the creditor ‘passive investors’ – the Kiwi Savers – and the debtor ‘active investors’ (small, medium and large businesses) are both receiving the yields arising from the societal process of economic growth. The yields are the increased amounts of goods and services made available through the growth process.

That’s real growth; indeed, exponential real growth. However, high-paced real growth can never go on forever. Eventually – later or sooner – it must crush the planet through depletion, waste, and (probably) the ‘laying waste’ of warfare.

If we don’t have indefinite real growth, we return to the ‘zero-sum’ case discussed above.

Now consider the forms of the nominal economic growth case. This is when apparent economic growth turns out to be inflation. This is benign compared to the zero-sum case outlined above, because inflation erodes both debts and savings. So, it means that the flows of interest from the poorer debtor community to the richer creditor community become sustainable, because these flows are always being ameliorated by inflation.

In the extreme form, the nominal economic growth case is a zero-sum case, because there is no real economic growth. In a less extreme form, there is a mix of some real growth and some inflation. This is probably the optimum. Modest real economic growth is sustainable if it does not intensely use non-renewable resources. And some inflation addresses the debtor-creditor inequity that the miracle of compound interest is predicated on.

In this relatively optimal case, interest rates will on average be approximately equal to the inflation rate. So the miracle of compound interest disappears. If interest approximately equals inflation, then $1,000 today will buy approximately the same amount of stuff in 65 years’ time. And that’s what should happen; we should save when we have a relatively high income, and withdraw our savings when we have a relatively low income. No interest, on balance. We should not kid ourselves that simply sitting on a nest-egg of magic money is going to make us fabulously rich!

Finally

There is another case where the debtor-creditor relationship becomes too exploitative, and when that broken relationship induces socio-economic breakdown. The result is a negative-sum game, whereby everyone – or just about everyone – loses.

Anyone trying to play the compound interest miracle game should understand that they are trying to get something for nothing; that they are playing the role of ‘exploiter’. Capitalism as we know it is a game of exploitation; indeed, low levels of ongoing exploitation can be sustainable.

Under our present order, of liberal private capitalism, the best possible option is a mix of low inflation and low sustainable growth based on renewable resources and accumulation of benign knowledge. Keeping this balance is a bit of a tight-rope walk. Today too many of us have slipped on the rope, and are hanging by our fingers. The more people who slip, the more the tight-rope wobbles, leading ever more people to slip in their wake.

There is a better capitalist order; a more democratic more sustainable form of capitalism which fully incorporates public equity – public property rights alongside private property rights – with appropriate public equity dividends to stem the growth of income inequality. This is consistent with a balanced mix of sustainable growth and sustainable inflation. It is not consistent with interest-rate exploitation.

In the meantime, why do we look kindly upon compound interest alchemists while lampooning conspiracy theorists? The worst offenders in both groups are equally bogus.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 14 May 2026 – Since the latest Household Labour Force data was released on 6 May, there has been quite a lot of unfocussed chatter about NEETs; young people not in employment, education or training. The standard narrative about NEETs is that they are disengaged young people, especially teenagers, not sufficiently motivated to undertake tertiary education or vocational training in order to find a job.

The latest overall statistic is that 14.4% of New Zealand resident people aged 15-24 are NEETs. In addition, there is an even higher ‘underutilisation rate’. These data are published in an awkward way which makes it hard to mesh them together. And there is a further unmeshed measure; persons aged 15-24 – especially 20 to 24 – who have emigrated.

The real story this year is about young adults aged 20 to 24, not disengaged teenagers. “Women aged 20 to 24 continue to have the highest NEET rate, rising 1.9 percentage points to 20.3 percent in the March 2026 quarter”. This 20.3% is well above the overall rate of 14.4%. The female adult NEET rate has jumped significantly, whereas the male adult rate is lower and has not jumped much this year.

NEETs can be separated into four groups: teenage males and females, and young adult males and females (‘adult’ here being defined as aged over 20). Of these groups, we would expect adult females to be least disengaged. The story that appears to be true is that many if not most NEETS aged 20-24 are young adults who have completed their education or training; rather than being disengaged, these NEETs are educated, trained, often graduated, and raring to commence their careers.

The problem, then, is that we have created an economy which is barely interested in employing our educated youth. This is especially ironic when we keep hearing superannuation scare-stories about how this group of young people will be required to ‘support’ in retirement their huge parental (Gen-X) and grand-parental (Boomer) generations. The statistics clearly show that we are not nurturing this very special cohort, born in the early 2000s.

(Re the underutilisation rates, males aged 20-24 have gone from 11.6% in early 2023 to 18.7% in early 2024 to 19.0% in early 2025 to 21.8% in early 2026. Females aged 20-24 have gone from 17.0% in early 2023 to 23.0% in early 2024 to 22.2% in early 2025 to 25.0% in early 2026. These worsening statistics cannot be blamed on the Israel-USA-Iran war.)

Why Females?

The latest data suggests that tertiary-educated young women are having more difficulty gaining employment than their male peers. Employment outcomes for this age group are very much about employers’ hiring practices.

Economists understand that the perceived labour-cost associated with new hires is all important. This is an age group with minimal work experience, so it means that demographic and educational attributes will be particularly used when making hiring decisions. Statistical profiling – something all employers (including female employers) do, even if they do so with a degree of distaste – is particularly relevant to this age group.

Is the expected cost – a statistical concept meaning the average perceived cost – of hiring young females greater than the expected cost of hiring young males? Especially in the context of very tight business profit margins.

(Differences in expected cost played a huge role in hiring decisions during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Teenage females were cheapest, then teenage males, and then adult females. Adult male joblessness was particularly high in the early 1930s because adult males were the most costly demographic to hire.)

Reasons why young females might be perceived as more costly to employ

Such reasons arise from both statistics and politics.

Individual employers will have access to their own company data. If females in the past decade or so have had a record of leaving their jobs sooner than males, or if they have had a record of taking more sick leave than males, then those records would influence the perceived cost of employing any given female job applicant. Willingness to work overtime – including unpaid overtime – is also something that employers have records of; such willingness, on average, may be different for males than for females.

In the realm of politics, there may be areas of actual positive discrimination – for example, menstrual leave, which exists in a few countries. (See What working women really want: Paid menstrual leave? Stuff 15 August 2023. And of course there are definite examples around maternity leave.) Or perceived positive discrimination; perceived, for example, because pay equity is widely confused with equal pay.

In relation to options like maternity leave and menstrual leave, one way to politically manage these is to offer men similar discretionary leave provisions as those offered to women, to the point that employers perceive the likelihood that a man will take discretionary leave is the same as the likelihood that a woman will take such leave. This, I understand, is the Swedish way. In order to maximise employment of both sexes, the Swedish authorities offer discretionary leave provisions to females and males in equal measure.

Another issue is the sensitivity around the ‘gender pay gap’. (For society as a whole, the ‘pay equity’ argument is that gender-based pay inequity is between occupations, not within occupations or within workplaces.) Such sensitivity is heightened if employers are required to report to some government ministry their firms’ gender pay ratios.

There is one relatively quick way through which employers can make their gender pay ratios more equal. It is to hire fewer young females, giving preference to males. Given that new hires are towards the bottom of employers’ pay scales, having more junior males and fewer junior females will have a significant impact on a firm’s reported gender pay ratio.

Unintended Consequences

The hiring practices mentioned above can all have unintended consequences. Very few employers nowadays – whether male of female employers – believe that it is a good thing to have a gender pay gap. All employers practice ‘equal pay’, as they have been mandated to do since 1972. But employers – under the pressure of legal or moral compliance to achieve one or two key statistics – can end up achieving problematic outcomes for other important statistics.

Is it possible that an unintended consequence of moral compliance in relation to pay equity – of attempts to equalise pay by gender, within firms and other employing organisations – has been to create more young adult female NEETs? It’s a hypothesis that at least deserves to be investigated further.

Of course, there is a wider problem than this female-adverse NEET outcome. There are far too many adult NEETs of both sexes. Our recent governments, through stifling fiscal policies which undermine their own revenue base, have been playing an unnecessary and brutal game of musical chairs; a game in which the odds are stacked against New Zealand’s young adults.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 13 May 2026 – On 7 May, Al Jazeera ran this alarmist programme about the ‘national debt’ of the United States: US borrowing exceeds GDP: What does it mean for the economy? (And here on YouTube.)

A topic surrounded by so much confusion. (Sigh!) The first problem is that what is commonly called the ‘national debt’ is actually the ‘government debt’. Second, we have the issue of which debt measure to use. By one measure the United States government debt has become equal to the United States gross domestic product (GDP). By another measure, that milestone or millstone was achieved long ago, and is now 123% of GDP. The Al Jazeera programme uses both measures interchangeably.

The programme host – Cryil Vanier, who I usually respect as one of the best news anchors in the world’s television media – commenced his contribution with an easily verified untruth; that is, untrue if using the usual measure of debt as a percent of GDP. He said: “The United States is the most indebted country in the world. Almost every year the United States Government has chosen to spend more than it collects. … The national debt now stands at $39 trillion dollars, exceeding the United States economy … for the first time since World War Two.”

($39 trillion dollars is 123% of the United States’ GDP! That 123% of GDP measure is exceeded by Venezuela, Japan [237%], Sudan, Singapore, Eritrea, Bahrain, Greece [146%], Lebanon and Italy [137%]. Government debt is not an indicator of a government’s economic performance, let alone a cause of poor ‘performance’; noting that the concept ‘performance’ itself is about optics – about theatre – rather than substance.)

Debt is owed by debtors, and owned by creditors. The Al Jazeera programme noted that ‘Japan’ is one of the big three foreign owners of the United States [government] debt. But note, above, that Japan is – among first-world countries – listed as the (proportionately) biggest ‘ower’ of debt. Indeed, Japan sees neither its large ownership of debt nor its large owership of debt as being a major problem; the Japanese economy is a sea of tranquillity compared to many other countries’ economies.

There is a problem though; the one trillion dollar interest bill. That’s unnecessarily large; indeed, that’s a much bigger problem for the United States’ government than for Japan’s government, due to very different monetary policies in the two countries.

The key question to ask about the interest is: ‘Where does the money go?’. It goes from the owers to the owners, of course; but who are the debt-owners who receive most of that interest, and to what extent do they represent the real problem (assuming there is a real problem)? For the most part, the interest-recipient owners – not exactly clamouring for repayment – are more than happy to return the interest to the owers, just so long as it is accounted for as additional debt.

The Al Jazeera programme, using one of the more egregious chart graphics that I’ve seen, shows that “debt has ballooned since the eighties”. Correct, though the chart (commencing around 1800) – not using the correct (logarithmic scale) fails to show earlier balloonings. The chart shows a tenfold increase in the dollar-debt – not the percent of GDP – from 1976 to 1996, and a just a 6½-fold increase from 2002 to 2026; yet the latter smaller jump looks dramatic. At the end of the chart-viewing, we are told that there’s “no plan to actively pay it back”.

Putting aside the one-third foreign ownership of the United States government debt, we can think of the remaining two-thirds – the domestically-held debt – as being owned by the ‘US banking system’ (the banks being a short-cut for what is a rather complex financial system). So, the United States domestic government debt – a liability of the Government – is an asset of the United States’ banking system. As is normal for asset-holders, the banks would rather retain and expand their assets; they would rather not liquidate their assets.

On the other side of the banking systems’ ledger lies the liabilities of the United States’ banks. These are the deposits of American households and businesses. The domestic debt is owned by Americans and owed by the American Government. Bank deposits are assets to depositors, and liabilities (ie debt) to banks. Banks hardly see this debt as ‘bad’ in any sense.

People would rather lend their governments than pay taxes, though most citizens realise that a substantial part of government spending should be funded by taxes rather than debt. A mix of taxes and debt works; it always has. Households and businesses prefer to own some government debt than to fund their governments entirely from taxes. It’s not a problem. Debt’s a solution.

The people own the debt that the government owes (albeit through the intermediation of the baking system). The people do not want the government to repay that debt. They just want the government to pay the interest. The people – the creditors, the debt owners – like it just as it is. The government debt is not a problem for them; rather it’s an income for them, and insurance for them.

What would ‘paying it back mean’?

So, if the government repaid its debt to the banks, the banks would either have to force the people to accept back their deposits, or would have to find other borrowers. In the latter case, some parts of the private sector would have to become substitute debtors, thereby adding much to the financial risk of the citizenry. In the former case, the people would have to accept banknotes – paper money – from the drastically shrinking banks; banknotes that could stand to become worthless.

In other words, if governments tried to pay back their debt, there would be a financial collapse on a scale which would make the global financial crisis seem like a non-event. (There was such a collapse in Romania in the 1980s.)

Looking at it from the point of view of the people, the banks’ creditors – especially consider the Mum and Dad savers. They, and ordinary people like them, are the government’s creditors. The government’s debt is an important part of their savings; indeed, of their retirement savings. Who would like their bank coming to them, saying that the bank’s main debtor (the government, as the banks’ biggest debtor) wants to ‘repay the debt’? So, they would have to take back their deposits; they would have to withdraw their funds; say, half their savings. And, at the same time, each other bank would be saying the same thing to its customers.

There is no clamour from the owners of the United States government debt to have that debt repaid. If anything, there is a clamour from would-be owners of United States government debt for the Government to take on more debt; not less. (In Japan, owning government debt is understood as ‘financial security’.)

Global Financial Balances

We can understand the world’s financial balance sheet, showing the net financial relationship between the two big sectors; the private sector (households and businesses), and the public sector (central and local governments).

Throughout the history of the world, the private sector has been the net creditor, and the public sector the net debtor. A financial balance sheet must add to zero; the net debt owed must be exactly equal to the net debt owned. It is not conceivable that the global balance sheet would have the worlds’ governments – taken together – owning the world’s debt, with the global private sector owing it; except possibly under a global soviet-style communist state, where we could imagine most people being in debt to the government.

The global balance sheet has two (net) components. The first component is financial stocks: assets (owning) set against liabilities (owing); these liabilities represent the global public debt. The second component is about financial flows: surpluses (credits) set against deficits (debits). Both components are, by definition, zero-sum games. Total assets minus total liabilities must equal zero. Total surpluses plus total deficits also must equal zero.

For the world as a whole, the public sector (the fisc) runs the deficits, and the private sector runs the surpluses. It is almost inconceivable that, in any year, there could be a global fiscal surplus, meaning a global private deficit. (In most years there are some countries’ governments which run fiscal surpluses.) This state of affairs is driven by the fundamental drive of private citizens to save parts of their income; if successful on balance, by definition a private sector surplus means a public sector deficit. Basic human nature dictates that there will be a global fiscal deficit, every year.

Public Debt management, in practice

The size of the global public debt, measured (appropriately) as a percent of the size of the global economy, goes up and down over time. This is because there are a numerator (the global fiscal deficit) and a denominator (nominal gross world product, the measure of the size of the world economy, the sum of all countries’ GDPs).

We note that the denominator is a nominal measure, meaning that we are referring to the monetary measure of the size of the world economy, not the production measure. Nominal GWP (gross world product) increases either if world production – global output – increases or if world prices increase. A major reason – but not the only possible reason – for increasing world prices is world inflation.

World public debt increases next year if the world’s fiscal deficit is greater than the increase in gross world product (GWP). Essentially, there are three possible reasons for an increase in world public debt: a big global fiscal deficit, a small (or negative) increase in global output, or low (or negative) world inflation. Commonly, then, rising public debt – as appropriately measured – is a result of slow economic growth and/or low inflation.

Conversely, world public debt decreases next year if the world’s fiscal deficit is smaller than the increase in GWP. Essentially, there are three possible reasons for a decrease in global public debt (expressed as a percentage of GWP): a smallish global fiscal deficit, a largish increase in global output, or highish world inflation. Commonly, then, falling public debt is a result of economic growth and/or inflation.

The most painless route to ‘acceptable’ public debt – what is acceptable is in the eye of each beholder – is through inflation. Far from being ‘economic public enemy number one’, inflation is the market’s method – capitalism’s method – of maintaining healthy and sustainable financial relationships within society. The more that financial relationships are ‘out of whack’, the more inflation is needed to put things right.

(We note that policies to raise the inflation rate are not easy to achieve; in the two decades most famous for such policies – the 1930s and the 2010s – it actually proved extraordinarily difficult to use monetary or fiscal policy to bring about reflation. Cutting interest rates did not achieve the inflation sought. Wars, on the other hand, did achieve inflation in the 1940s and 2020s.)

Of course, an ‘out of whack’ financial community is one with relative losers and perceived winners. A healthy correction restores over-indebted losers to a degree of financial health, and reduces the winners’ excessive winnings. That’s why we are in a battle today between the elite classes (including left [Bidenite/Starmerite] elites and right [Luxonite] elites) and the working classes (including most small and medium businesses).

Class conflict is real. Our political elites – left and right – have a policy bias towards high interest rates and low inflation. Our elites favour an ever-expanding flow of financial incomes from the poorer people to themselves. As debt-owners, they do not want inflation to make prevailing debt relationships more sustainable. (Smart elites might have more foresight than regular elites. Though ‘smart elites’ may be an oxymoron.)

Fiscal probity, its obsession and its distraction

Public debt is presented as a monster; public debt is posed as a fundamental cause of inflation. And inflation is posited as the problem which must be fixed before other problems are addressed.

When in the throes of (usually ineffective) inflation-fighting in the name of fiscal probity, the only thing that the established authorities allow as a distraction is the call to war. For some reason deep in the elite human psyche, financial probity has generally taken second place to the excitement of wars in which the elites become the generals and planners, and the working-classes become the planned.

We can easily see that the United States ‘national’ debt is on an upwards, not a downwards, trajectory; the Department of War can loosen Treasury’s guard-rails more easily than the Department of Health. (This is true in Germany too, with last-year’s partial removal of that country’s debt-brake.)

Wars have always been drivers of public debt; they are inevitably financed by huge fiscal deficits. Intractable wars have also been levelling events, wealth-collapsing events – accompanied by inflation – eventuating in relatively good times for working class survivors.

Elites start wars. Wars finish or diminish elites. Elites are poor learners.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 12 May 2026 – The outbreak of (Andean) Hantavirus on board the Dutch eco-adventure ship Hondius clearly is a matter of concern; and is not being played well by the experts who tell us one rather soothing thing about it only being transmitted through intimate contact, but then show up in the highest grade of Hazmat suit when evacuating people from the ship.

See this story Where did the hantavirus outbreak start, and where has it spread? from Al Jazeera (11 May 2026) and this Inside Story episode: Should we be worried about the hantavirus outbreak? (Al Jazeera 9 May 2026, and here on YouTube).

We keep hearing about the established history of the virus in southern South America, whereas we need to get a handle on the possibly quite different future of the hantavirus. This zoonotic virus has probably already changed; or it may have found an environment in which it is possible (or even necessary) to behave differently from the way it behaves in its endemic South American setting.

Around 16 minutes into the program, interviewer James Bayes asks: “This particular ship … is not your typical cruise ship. They describe it as an ‘expedition ship, often with scientific, wildlife or geopolitics lecturers on board’. … I am told that the experience of previous passengers is that they have very strict safety protocols because of the places they visit, mainly for biodiversity reasons. Previous passengers have recalled sniffer dogs and having to wear sanitised boots. If it can happen on a ship like that, do you have concerns in general? … Are cruises incubators for disease? Would you go on a cruise holiday?”  (The subsequent answers, by experts, trivialised this important question.)

The Hondius was as sterile as any ship could possibly be. Could the human-human transmission on board that ship be because of that sterility, rather than despite the sterile shipboard environment? In a sterile environment, a virus which has already infected an embarking passenger has no soil or other muck that it can transmit to; rather, the least sterile life-forms available are the other people on board. Hence an unusually sterile environment may be the counterintuitive cause of human-human transmission of a virus which ‘prefers’ other options.

Evolutionary variation of any life-form can arise in three ways: because of selection in favour of one existing variant over another; because of a mutation creating a favourable new variant; or because of a hybridisation of two quite different variants creating a genuinely novel form. The first of these three mechanisms of variation may have been enough to create a humanly-transmissible form of the Andean hantavirus. (We note that Covid19 was significant because it was transmitted by a novel virus; transmission of coronaviruses has been widespread throughout our lifetimes.)

This would be a nightmare scenario. Such a new-variant virus – maybe a novel virus – would still be lethal, would still have a long incubation period, would have an unknown duration of infectiousness before symptoms emerge, and an unknown rate of transmission.

The Black Death in Europe: 1346 to 1353

This historically famous pandemic reduced the population of Europe by about forty percent. It is generally attributed to a disease called Plague (aka Yersinia pestis), which comes in several forms, the best known being bubonic plague. The Plague pathogen – Yersinia pestis bacteria – was identified by Alexandre Yersin and Kitasato Shibasaburō during a much more recent pandemic; a pandemic which impacted seaports all around the world in the decade after 1894 (including Sydney and Auckland in 1900).

This disease – linked to rats and fleas – looked like a good fit for the Black Death; the descriptions of the symptoms were a good match. So, the Black Death narrative came to incorporate Yersinia pestis as the culprit. This pathogen is endemic today in some parts of the world, including the southwest of the United States, but generally confines its lethal mayhem to rodents. People die of it most years. The good news for later twentieth century human populations was that bubonic plague is treatable with antibiotics.

However, especially around the early twenty-first century, the ‘Yersinia pestis as the culprit’ thesis was substantially questioned. (See A plague on all your houses, The Guardian, 14 Aug 2004; I have read Return of the Black Death: The World’s Greatest Serial Killer by Susan Scott and Christopher Duncan.) This questioning has subsided of late, because of the discovery of Yersinia pestis DNA in the bodies of known victims of the Black Death. James Belich, author in 2022 of The World the Plague Made: The Black Death and the Rise of Europe, argues that those sceptical narratives were an important part of the scientific process, but settles on Yersinia pestis, based on subsequent DNA evidence.

Nevertheless, I was persuaded by aspects of Susan Scott’s argument. She agrees that bubonic plague was significantly present in Europe – especially in Mediterranean ports – in the late 1340s. Essentially, her argument is that there was another disease present at that time in Europe, and that this other disease played a greater role than bubonic plague in the lived experience of pandemic plague in the period from the 1340s to the 1590s. Scott made her argument using village studies which suggested that the three main epidemic parameters – transmissibility (especially from humans to humans), incubation, and duration of infectiousness – were a poor fit for the known information about Yersinia pestis. (We may also note that there is a variation of bubonic plague known as pneumonic plague, which is human-human transmitted, looks a more plausible fit for the 1340s to the 1590s than rat-flea transmission. But the parameters of pneumonic plague don’t fit, either.)

In Scott’s thesis the principal agent of the Black Death was what she calls Haemorrhagic Plague. It is well known today that there is a family group of lethal zoonotic viruses which cause haemorrhagic fevers in humans; these include ebola and hantavirus. For the vast majority of human cases, they are transmitted to humans from animal incubators. Her argument is that the majority of Black Death deaths were caused by one of these viruses, not by Yersinia pestisbacteria. The parameters she calculated from the historical data match haemorrhagic fevers rather well.

The pneumonic symptoms of the two diseases could be similar (albeit more blue than black). Indeed the 1918 influenza pandemic was known, at least in New Zealand, as the Black Flu. Plague is bacterial, treatable by antibiotics. Haemorrhagic fever is not treatable, except at the margins; it’s a viral illness.

We may also note that it’s rare to have two simultaneous epidemics. One epidemic of a viral disease tends to pre-empt another viral pathogen. However, simultaneous epidemics – even pandemics – of bubonic plague and haemorrhagic fever seem entirely plausible. Because the pathogens are so different, even if the end states of both diseases are quite similar. And we note that the stresses arising from one lethal illness may create malnutrition and other states of being likely to make us more vulnerable to a second quite different pathogen doing the rounds.

We should also note that, after much trial and error, the Black Plague could be contained by quarantine; isolation for forty days. Quarantines are particularly effective for human-human transmissible diseases. Presumably less effective at containing burrowing rodents (or mosquito-borne diseases for that matter). Rats don’t carry passports.

Warning

Susan Scott was particularly concerned about modern complacency towards the Black Death. The widespread perception in modern infectious diseases studies is that bubonic plague is treatable, and that the rodent-flea transmission mechanism is less plausible in modern more-sterile environments, reflecting the perception that modern cleanliness and bubonic plage are incompatible. (And noting James Bayes’ presumption that if hantavirus can transmit human-to-human on a sterile ship, then it must be able to so transmit anywhere.)

There is no complacency towards haemorrhagic fevers such as ebola (hence the PPE); although it’s still widely understood to be – in a sense, dismissed as – a ‘third world’ disease. Susan Scott was concerned that complacent modern public health systems would leave us completely unprepared for a pandemic involving a haemorrhagic virus, such as hantavirus; indeed, I did not sense sufficient concern among the panel of interviewees on Inside Story.

Even if it can be proved that Scott’s thesis about the Black Death is completely wrong, then nevertheless her research still represented an important warning to the world about what the next really lethal pandemic might look like. At the very least, the present hantavirus scare should be understood as an important wake-up call.

If we had learned much more about the history of coronaviruses – viruses which were known to have been long-circulating as ‘common cold’ viruses – after the 2003 SARS1 panic, we might have been much more prepared for the SARS2 Covid19 pandemic in 2020. Scientists should not be too quick to dismiss Susan Scott’s hypothesis about the causes of the ‘great levelling’ event which came to be called the Black Death.

A lethal transmissible disease which is asymptomatic for six weeks, and which is infectious before symptoms occur, is one of our worst public health nightmares. The present scare should remind us of that.

How can we cooperate through pandemics when we are too busy waging hot and cold wars? The 1918 novel influenza virus was forged on the battlefields of France; a hybrid of influenza strains from Asia and America. In the end, it killed as least as many people as were killed on the 1918 battlefields.

We should learn to question prevailing narratives. Experts – whether epidemiologists, economists, or geopoliticians – don’t have all the answers; too often they pontificate from professional scripts while ignoring inconvenient evidence. People, especially those with a modicum of power, should exercise their influence with more humility and less sureness.

The world is becoming more vulnerable; too vulnerable for badheads and hotheads and sureheads (such as Christopher Luxon) and bombastic appeasers (such as Keir Starmer) who cannot broach alternative explanations or strategies. These people simply ‘double-down’ when the evidence is that what they are doing is harmful or counter to their stated objectives.

Pestilence follows deprivation, closed-mindedness, and stupidity. These qualities are not confined to the uncivilised. Our environments fight back, often in ways that we least expect, often in places where we do not look.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Keith Rankin, 11 May 2026 – At the end of this month, the Russia-Ukraine War will have dragged out for as long as World War One, conventionally dated. It’s already much longer than World War One using Russian dating, given Russia’s early exit from that war.

World War One, especially in the East

Despite its minimal emphasis in the anglophile understanding of WWI, the central conflict of that war was between the German Second Reich (the Prussian Empire) and Russia (the Russian Empire). The war was started, with full intent, by the German military who were able to play the emotionally volatile Prussian Kaiser, Wilhelm II. Germany started the war because the Prussians had convinced themselves that Russia was becoming too strong and would inevitably – probably sooner rather than later – invade (and try to overrun) Germany and then the rest of Western Europe.

There was no evidence of such Russian intent. The German Prussians interpreted ‘could’ as ‘would’. So, they decided to attack Russia at a propitious moment, should such a moment arise. Germany had its opportunity in 1914 when Austria-Hungary deemed it necessary to start a Third Balkan War, against Serbia. The Germans adroitly manoeuvred the Austrians into pivoting away from the war the Austrians wanted, and to provide Eastern cover for the war against Russia which Germany wanted.

The reason Germany required Eastern cover was that they feared an attack from Russia’s ally, France. So, the Prussians decided to quickly deal to France, while Austria held back Russia to Germany’s east. Of course, the rest is history; the German army got bogged down in France and Flanders. Austria got exposed in the East. But Germany was able to fight on both fronts simultaneously, and eventually defeated Russia despite having to hold the Western Front.

Russia ratified its surrender in March 1918, when Leon Trotsky signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. In that 1918 Treaty, Russia – having just become the Soviet Union – surrendered Ukraine (though not Crimea) to Germany.

Luckily for the new Soviet ‘Bolshevik’ regime – in 1918, while running a substantially reduced Russian Empire – the forces of France, United Kingdom, USA, and influenza prevailed over the forces of the German Second Reich. (By giving Lenin free passage from Switzerland – the German military indirectly plotted the Russian counter-revolution that brought Lenin and his Bolsheviks to power in October 1917, nine months after Tsar Nicholas II was deposed in a popular uprising. Russia experienced regime-change twice that year.)

In the first half of 1918, Germany broke through in the West, bolstered by soldiers transferring from the East. But Germany’s supply lines were too stretched, and soldiers on both sides of the Western Front got very sick from the influenza which was the Americans’ principal contribution. It was only in July 1918 that France gained the upper hand over Germany on the Western Front; Germany quickly folded after that.

The result was the Armistice of November 1918, and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The 1919 Treaty stripped Germany of its March 1918 victory spoils; the principal of those spoils being Ukraine. The 1919 Treaty also humiliated Prussia, by separating Prussia’s eastern homeland (now Russia’s Kaliningrad) from the rest of Germany.

In 1919, Germany was not pleased about many things. Foremost among those things was the loss of its prize Eastern conquest. This humiliation formed a key part of reactionary Germany’s ‘stab in the back’ hypothesis; the hypothesis which galvanised the subsequent rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi (National Socialist) Party.

The Present War – which in an important sense is again Germany versus Russia

In normal ahistorical ‘rules-based’ discourse – the present war looks like an open and shut case. Bad Country A (Russia) invaded Good Country B (Ukraine). Naughty Vladimir. Solution: tell Vlad to take his war toys back home, and behave himself. (This narrative is hard to sustain now, though, given the 2020s’ behaviour of Israel and the subsequent suspension of the rules-based order.)

Seen through a geopolitical (and appropriately historical) lens, the Ukraine quagmire looks very different from the story that the anglophone world still clings to. A Nato/EU project of eastward expansionism – a ‘Greater Europe’, like a ‘Greater Israel’ but without the overt ethnic cleansing – threatens to return German troops to the heartland of what had been for centuries the economic core of the Russian Empire; namely the territory of Eastern Ukraine.

World War Two

From the Russian point of view, Germany has long coveted the entire territory of Ukraine; not just the bits of West Ukraine which once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire of Franz Josef of Hapsburg (who gifted Aotearoa New Zealand the name of a glacier).

Adolf Hitler’s principal aim was to reverse the humiliations of 1918 and 1919. Thus, once in power, and once Germany had restored its manpower and its gun-power, Hitler struck back into France, forcing the French to sign their surrender at the same place and in the same railway carriage which was used for the 1918 Armistice signing. This time, there was no Austrian Empire to attend to Russia in the meantime. So, Hitler, in 1939, did a deal with Stalin, so that Hitler could deal to France without too much simultaneous aggro in the East.

Once France had been pacified, Hitler turned back to what was really the whole purpose of World War Two in Europe; to win back the territories that had been won in 1918, but had been lost through alleged ‘backstabbing’ in late 1918 and early 1919. (For the 1920s’ ‘make Germany Great Again’ project, the events of late 1918 and early 1919 were the first ‘great steal’.)

The reason for Hitler’s war was lebensraum; it was Hitler’s expansionist project. The principal aim was to re-acquire Ukraine. Having done so – for example, in the First Battle of Kiev (1941) – Hitler’s main goal for the Third Reich was to match the ambition for the Second Reich in WWI, and proceed to take control of the Russian oilfields to the east of Eastern Ukraine.

The Reich held Ukraine for more than two years, until the second Battle of Kiev late in 1943. This time the Russians of the Soviet Union had to defeat Germany on the battlefield; which they did at a huge blood cost.

Just this last weekend, Russia commemorated its military defeat of Nazi Germany.

Finally

From Russia’s point of view, today, the Ukrainian battlefield represents a field in which Nato’s proxy – the Zelenskyy regime of Ukraine – is bringing a Fourth Reich (the European Union; understood to be German dominated, even if Germany’s strength in the European Union temporarily waned after Angela Merkel stepped down) to finally achieve the conquest of Ukraine; the conquest which, from a German perspective, twice in the twentieth century fell agonisingly short.

So, as I read it, no Russian regime – whether led by Putin or somebody else – will ever let Nato (meaning, from a Russian viewpoint, Germany) into Eastern Ukraine.

Militarily, after years of stalemate, Russia has had enough; it is now looking for an offramp by trying to do a deal brokered through former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Other than achieving an acceptable deal, Russia can only play for time; it cannot accept a ‘cease-fire’ involving ‘coalition of the willing’ ‘peacekeepers’. Western Europe – especially ‘Old Europe’ – is politically imploding at present; to sustain military ventures, it is dependent on an increasingly unwilling United States.

As I see it, the present war can end easily. But only under a Treaty which prevents Ukraine – or at least Ukraine east of the Dnieper River – from ever hosting German soldiers. The Russian history of World War One and World War Two is too recent for that. The American President, to his credit, has tried to broker a peace in Ukraine. But ‘Old Europe’ will not allow such a peace, as we have seen whenever such a peace deal seemed close.

The main reason Germany folded to the West in 1918 was the Royal Navy’s blockade of German ports; hence an important reason in the 1940s for Hitler’s emphasis on regaining Ukraine. Old Europe wanted, and still wants, Ukraine in its geopolitical orbit. Lebensraum, in the form of a greater western European geopolitical territory, is still at play.

This time Ukraine, Europe’s breadbasket, may be less required for the purposes of food security; though that may be changing with the protracted American and Iranian double-blockade of the Persian Gulf. My deeper sense is that the populist political right in Europe – which is slowly regaining ascendency – has demographic designs on Ukraine. Ukraine is a land with many white women; whereas Old Europe is much less white than it once was, and white women in Old Europe in the 2020s are having very few babies.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Note the following from An Economic Model for Securing Hormuz, 30 April 2026 for Project Syndicate, by three British-based emeritus professors of economics. Or see The Strait of Hormuz, Towards a Long-Lasting Solution 18 April 2026, CESifo Working Papers.

The authors say: “The need for solutions that rely less on coercion and more on aligning economic incentives with America and Iran’s shared interest in keeping the Strait open. That may mean institutionalizing today’s emerging arrangement, by which Iran, in coordination with the Gulf states, guarantees safe transit for a fee. Such a system would resemble the agreement under the Montreux Convention that governs passage through the Turkish-controlled Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. An Iranian toll based on Turkey’s current transit fee of $5.83 per net ton would be about $0.58 per oil barrel—small enough, relative to the value of the goods, that shipping firms would not balk at the expense or seek alternative routes. … such a toll would generate $4.3 billion annually, an amount large enough to create significant incentives for Iran to facilitate and ensure safe passage.”

Such an arrangement is described as a “service-based toll system”, and is arguably more efficient and stable than any alternative arrangements.

Clearly such ‘service-based’ systems are used in the Panama and Suez Canals. The service component of canal maintenance is obvious, and of course in the Panama case there is a substantial resource cost in terms of water required to run the locks. Yet in both cases the fees charged include substantial ‘rent’ or ‘royalty’ components. And for the Strait of Hormuz – along with the other examples – a significant service would be that of ‘protection’ or ‘security’.

Such a protection-fee may have the look of ‘extortion’ about it; but it also has the look of a regular ‘property right’; noting that property rights – and fees arising – form the centrepiece of liberal economics. Indeed, as it was, the world economy – and ecology – has been blighted by ‘cheap oil’. Every little bit to raise the price of oil – and oil-based products – towards their long-run opportunity costs can only be a good thing.

Under such a commercial regime, we could call the Iranians and Omanis (and whoever else becomes part of the service-consortium) Strait Lords or straitlords (like landlords). Indeed Egypt and Panama are – among other things – Canal Lords.

What would happen if the Strait of Hormuz was blocked by a giant earthquake? Then a pipe, tunnel, road or canal would have to be built. There would be no argument then about a portage fee being charged.

Indeed, there are many landlocked countries in the world. They expect to have to pay something to foreign authorities to access the international marketplace for goods. Ethiopia, with well over 100 million people, depends substantially on the port of Djibouti. Kazakhstan depends on China and Russia. Paraguay depends on access to the Paraná River. Switzerland depends on the Rhine and Rhone. Austria depends on the Danube. These passages all have associated commercial costs.

War and Sport

In the event of wars, Straits are typically the first passages to be blocked. Just think of the Strait of Dover, which connects the English Channel to the North Sea, in World War One and World War Two. The British used mines and submarine nets and guns to keep unauthorised traffic out. The best solution to wartime privations is to not start wars in the first place; and – if they happen anyway – to quickly find a pragmatic economic solution to end the war without creating ‘losers’; to end the war through negotiations rather than belligerent ‘demands’.

There is only one unreasonably belligerent nation-state in Southwest Asia, and it doesn’t have a coastline on the Persian Gulf. The rest of the states in a region – or in the world, especially when a Strait or a Gulf has global significance – can corral such a rogue state, if they choose to do so.

It is to the dismay of the vast majority of the world’s population that the rogue state of Israel has been allowed to operate uncorralled, and for so long; Israel with the thoughtless support – the uncritical loyalty – of its distant champion, its Goliath. Principles-based economic pragmatism can rule when rogues are constrained or reformed.

Iran is a proud nation that will play a fair game; it will, if allowed to, play fair and play hard. That’s the sporting mantra which reflects, for example, the New Zealand All Blacks.

Conclusion

The emeritus economists conclude: “The Strait of Hormuz is a cornerstone of the global energy system. For many years, the United States effectively managed its security; but this arrangement has become economically inefficient and politically asymmetrical in terms of responsibilities and burden-sharing. A cooperative regional security regime funded by transit charges [my emphasis] offers a promising alternative that would benefit oil exporters, shippers, and consumers.”

Yes, such a regime could contain a royalty component as well as a service component; ‘clipping the ticket’. Capitalism runs best with rents, but not excess rents, not Goliath rents.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

7 May 2026 – In Aotearoa New Zealand, citizenship functions as an exit permit. An adult New Zealand citizen is free to choose to become a foreign denizen.

A denizen (of New Zealand) is a person living and working in New Zealand, but who doesn’t qualify for a New Zealand passport. New Zealand has three tiers of denizenship, although the first tier are actually citizens who are perceived as immigrants. Too many New Zealanders – probably increasing numbers of New Zealanders – tend to regard all New Zealand residents who don’t look or sound Pakeha, Māori, Pasifika, white South African, or Australian as non-citizens; as not real New Zealanders.

New Zealand is increasingly becoming a country with a high denizen-to-citizen ratio. New rules intended to make it more difficult for New Zealand permanent residents to become citizens of Aotearoa New Zealand can be expected to keep more immigrants here. That may be the intention.

Probably the countries with the world’s highest denizen to citizen ratios are the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

First-tier denizens don’t count as denizens, because they are actually citizens; they are just casually perceived by many to be denizens. Citizens of Indian or Chinese heritage whose presence in New Zealand dates back to the nineteenth century may be perceived as denizens now, whereas they were once perceived as citizens.

Second-tier denizens are those people living in New Zealand with ‘permanent residence’ status. Except that we would regard New Zealand resident Australians as citizens, even if most of them are not, technically.

Third-tier denizens are any ‘visa-holders’ living in New Zealand with some ‘right to paid work’ provision in their permits. This does include many international backpackers and many international students.

The denizen to citizen ratio is the number of resident adult second- and third-tier denizens divided by the number of resident adult citizens. I don’t know what it is, but am guessing that it is about one-to-three, and growing. (In the United Arab Emirates the denizen to citizen ratio is about nine-to-one.)

Is the new policy essentially an immigrant-retention scheme? We need our immigrants to stay, so in that sense it may be good policy. And, as the financial literati keep telling us, we are going to need many workers in the 2030s and 2040s to sell or otherwise provide services to our seniors. It’s just a shame that New Zealand has so many jobless young people, including many NEETs – over 20% of women aged 20 to 24 counted as NEETs in early 2026 – who have finished their tertiary education yet are not able to secure employment.

Young and Old

Just a note, if a decision is ever made to income-test New Zealand Superannuation, then many New Zealanders aged over 65 will choose retirement over employment, aggravating the pensioner to worker ratio. New Zealand has one of the world’s highest pensioner employment rates, thanks to its universal system of retirement income which enables people to delay retirement. Statistics New Zealand should keep more granular data about the employment attributes of people aged over 65.

And they should keep statistics of the numbers of qualifying people aged over 65 who choose to not opt-in to New Zealand Superannuation. The fiscal cost of qualifying older cash millionaires signing up for a superannuation income which they don’t need – all citizens and denizens with permanent residence – may be smaller than is widely presumed. We should find out.

The cost of income-testing seniors may be less than the actual savings. Further, given that the universal model works best for seniors, it most likely works best for juniors, too. Too many NEETs are trapped into the targeted benefit system. New Zealand is too poor to sideline its young citizens; too many respond by using their citizenship as an exit certificate; exit from Aotearoa New Zealand.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

6 May 2026 – While I have been aware for some time about Sweden’s difficulty in adjusting to its large inflow of refugees in the 2010s – especially African and Muslim refugees – I was nevertheless shocked by what I saw in the 2025 alternative travel documentary series Scandinavia with Simon Reeve, broadcast in New Zealand by SkyGo. The particular episode which compares and contrasts refugee ‘integration’ in Sweden and Denmark is here on DailyMotion, with a full transcript.

Before mentioning crime, cocaine and apartheid, we should note that Sweden is a large-scale military systems exporter. For Sweden, the ‘big gun’ industry is equivalent to the dairy industry in New Zealand as a source of foreign exchange revenue. Reeve notes: “There is really no other country of comparable size, of comparable population that can produce its own fighter jets and submarines. … The Swedes make some of the most advanced weapon systems in the world.”

In still-mainly-white and privileged central Stockholm, a quasi-progressive economist who appears to have a Jesus-complex notes among other things that Sweden’s much vaunted (though targeted) tax-subsidy system is “ensuring that women not just continue to provide economically for the family, but also for the state as well.” He notes “they contribute so much to our economy and welfare”. Sweden is the archetypal liberal mercantilist state that insists on running huge current account surpluses, and interprets national success as making vast amounts of money; it’s a corporate society which engineers people into making choices which reflect the ‘rainy day’ values of its state system.

In six out of seven years, Sweden ran current account surpluses in excess of five percent of GDP. Sweden has always run such surpluses for more than thirty years; as a country, it keeps putting ‘money in the bank’ and not spending it. It could be said that its foreign ‘investments’ support New Zealand’s inflated standard of living. New Zealand hasn’t had a current account surplus since 1973, and typically has a current account balance of minus five percent of GDP; mirror image of Sweden.

Despite (or because of) its liberal and mercantilist credentials, Sweden is a failing state. Reeve visits the police bomb squad. We learn that: “Deadly shootings among drug gangs, largely run by people from immigrant backgrounds, have more than tripled. The gun murder rate in Stockholm is now roughly 30 times that of London. Sweden has the highest gun crime death rate in Europe, after Montenegro and Albania. And it’s not just guns. … Somewhere around 2018, [Sweden] experienced rapidly increasing numbers of homemade bombs, hand grenades and so on. … Most of the hand grenades being thrown are being thrown by very young boys and girls. … Bomb units can get four callouts a day.”

He goes on to note: “Gang warfare has exploded here, fuelled by the rise in cocaine use in Sweden and across Europe. Gangs have taken advantage of liberal policies that children shouldn’t be arrested and actively recruited them. … Most of the perpetrators, as well as the victims, come from immigrant communities. … In recent decades, Swedes welcomed refugees from world conflicts, more than 100,000 from the wars in the Balkans, and hundreds of thousands from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan. … Housing’s been provided, but often far from city centres, in estates where up to 90% of residents are now from immigrant backgrounds. … Two areas of suburban Stockholm … estates are cut off, hemmed in by motorways.”

The main problem growing up in those estates, mentioned by a Swedish-born woman of Somali descent, is “poverty”. “When I was 15 years old, I lost my best friend at this gang war that has been happening for 10 years, for decades. … The first thing is they need to see us as humans.” Yes, in Sweden, with its much-vaunted welfare state. (The Somali refugees came in the early 1990s, as a result of one of the United States’s failed foreign adventures.)

Reeve concludes: “We can debate whether there’s been a failure to integrate, but there has definitely been a failure of integration. The consequences are now being felt.”

The present government – in office since 2022 – is, more than most governments in Sweden’s history, heavily into New Zealand’s Luxon/Willis style of fiscal consolidation. Albeit with higher taxes and targeted subsidies.

We may note the following recent stories hosted by Al Jazeera: ‘Ready to murder?’ How criminal networks in Sweden are recruiting children to kill (15 Dec 2025), and Gangland wars killing dozens of bystanders, report Swedish police (4 May 2026). The former states that “What began as a utopian welfare project [of public housing in the 1960s and 1970s] gradually evolved into the physical framework of today’s segregated suburbs.” (Is this a portent of the fate which will befall the Unitec housing project, Te Kukūnga Waka, still very much in its early days? See my Carrington Precinct, Aka Unitec, 5 February 2026, Scoop) The latter story notes that “the minority right-wing government, propped up by the far-right Sweden Democrats, has been pushing through proposals to crack down on crime and immigration ahead of a general election on September 13.”

Sweden, reflecting its exceptionalist image as a warmly welcoming country, rejected any attempts to ‘assimilate’ its refugee immigrants; supposedly leaving them to retain their cultures of origin while being supported in deep poverty traps, in a suffocating welfare state of targeted housing and tightly means-tested hand-outs.

Denmark

Denmark, in recent years has gone the other way, heavily restricting refugee immigration and forcibly removing people from their immigrant silos into ‘mixed communities’. They have done much as what ACT in New Zealand wants to do here; mix them up, and sign them up to traditional national values.

Simon Reeve notes: “It would be wrong to think there are no problems in Denmark. All this social cohesion means outsiders can sometimes feel unwelcome. If you don’t conform here, it can feel uncomfortable.”

“The government even introduced what was called a ghetto law, aimed at preventing neighbourhoods being dominated by so-called non-Western immigrants. … One designated ghetto was the multicultural neighbourhood Mjolnaparkin. … Some families were actually forced to relocate. … It’s been described as the social experiment of the century. It’s also being described as social policy with a bulldozer. … Non-western parents in ghetto areas are now required to send their one-year-olds to preschools to ensure they learn Danish and traditions and values, or they lose government welfare benefits. Ghettos have since been renamed parallel societies …  an attempt to enforce and impose fundamental Danish values.”

Current policies; and multiculturalism in Aotearoa New Zealand

“Sweden’s reduced overall net immigration to zero. Denmark has the same target … they’ll offer up to £26,000 for immigrants to return home.” And “even in liberal Sweden, I met indigenous people who feel forgotten and excluded.” Shame, shame, shame. Sweden functions now too much like an apartheid state. And Denmark too, in its own less violent and less overt way.

In my view, genuine multiculturalism – cultural fusion – works best. In Aotearoa New Zealand that’s an absolute requirement, given the extent of demographic turnover, losing so many New Zealand citizens as well as welcoming immigrants. New Zealand will progress best without particular immigrant cultures becoming too dominant in any suburbs.

The word I like is ‘fusion’. Certainly not ‘assimilation’! Think of it like a ‘fusion restaurant’. We like immigrants to become fully integrated New Zealanders. But, in that process, New Zealand and ‘New Zealand values’ change; they adapt in a progressive way. In New Zealand we are doing this so much better than in Scandinavia. Especially in my own community of West Auckland which is financially poor but culturally rich, and has no ethnic or cultural silos or ghettos.

New Zealand of course could do much better. But it’s so important that neither overt nor covert racism creep further into the mainstream political discourse here. In New Zealand, relatively recent immigrants and their descendants supply so many of the goods and services which sustain us. Thankyou.

About the writer:

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Not me personally; and, of course, all ethnicities are equal. A week or so ago, as I was casually doing something else, I saw being interviewed a gentleman who I understand was a Gazan intellectual.

When asked about antisemitism, on the presumption that many Gazan people are somehow ‘antisemitic’ (and that somehow that alleged attitude is how so many people of Gaza got to be slaughtered with minimal western sympathy), the gentleman paused (in a kind of déjà vu frustration at the question), and then said “I am a Semite”.

Our use of the word ‘Semite’ (and its derivative words) is reminiscent of the widespread usage – between around 1875 to 1945 – of the word ‘Aryan’. Both words have been used as racial tropes. The correct word to describe people who are ‘anti-Jew’ is Judeophobia.

In my estimation, people who favour the term ‘antisemitism’ over ‘Judeophobia’ are too lazy to resist time-worn tropes. Through that laziness they become perpetrators of casual racism. Language matters.

Something else. I have only just come to hear about Israel’s Dahiya doctrine, of terrorising populations through the practice of domicide. James Bayes on Inside Story (Al Jazeera, 1 May 2026) quoted Daniel Reisner, lawyer for the IDF in 2009, saying: “If you do something for long enough the world will accept it, international law progresses through violations.” Such pursuits of domicide are the same dehousing and famine doctrines as those prompted by Churchill’s bestie Friedrich Lindemann during World War Two. Repetitive justification of collective terror does not make wrong behaviour right. Cases of domicide are motivated by racism and supremacism.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Analysis by Keith Rankin, 1 May 2026.

New Zealand is almost completely dependent on four things for its survival in the contemporary world. Imported wheat, rice, and refined fuel. And ships.

Wheat

New Zealand grows wheat in the South Island, most of which becomes animal feed. Reliance on New Zealand grown wheat is forestalled by a lack of milling capacity, and a lack of inter-island shipping. Eighty percent of New Zealand residents live in the North Island.

In the last week I have seen stories of South and West Australian wheatfields being plagued by mice. It’s a recurring story in Australia. I have also seen a story about a coming ‘super El Niño’ weather event. Such an event would hit the Australian wheatfields hard; drought and fires in South Australia, and too much rain in Queensland’s Darling Downs. Further, coming constraints on fertiliser supply can be expected to hit Australia hard,

In most years, 100% of New Zealand’s imported wheat – on which the North Island is totally reliant – comes from Australia. Much of that comes in processed form, given the constraints on flour milling in northern New Zealand.

What if Australia get better offers for its possibly compromised wheat crop? New Zealand may find itself in a diminished bargaining position for its usual slice of the Australian wheat pie.

New Zealand could transition to an economy based on balanced farming, with crop-farming and horticulture taking an essential and strategic place. But that would take time. It could only happen in the medium or long term.

Rice

Rice is a second staple food in New Zealand; a grain food which is entirely imported. Reliable supplies may become hard to secure in the future; though New Zealand’s traditional reliance on Australian rice means that there may still be a degree of rice-supply security.

We note however that rice is a staple of Asia, and that East and South Asian countries are likely to be among the most adversely affected by the imminent blockade-induced global economic crisis. Rice is a Giffen good, meaning that, as its price increases, Asian consumers eat more rice, not less. (Such Asian consumers can be expected to respond to a severe economic crisis by cutting back on the kinds of foods New Zealand exports, and to eat more rice instead; this is because rice will remain cheaper in Asia than long-haul imported foods, even when the rice price increases markedly.)

New Zealand should, from next week if not last week, establish a store of rice to ensure food security during a coming crisis; a crisis which seems increasingly likely. Rice, available now, may not always be available. Rice, once cooked, can be eaten directly; it does not require milling.

Ancient Romans, at times, depended on a universal bread allowance (as well as on circuses!). A society under deep strain depends on food benefits. For New Zealand in a future crisis, rice could be the best option as a dominant emergency food staple.

Fuel and Ships

While a producer of crude oil, New Zealand imports practically all the oil-based refined fuel that it consumes. 43% of New Zealand’s diminishing oil exports went to Australia for refining in 2025, down from 99% of a much larger amount of oil in 2011. Most of the rest is now refined in South Korea and Singapore.

For fuel, New Zealand is almost completely dependent on long-haul imports on fuel-consuming ships. At least this is a two-way trade with Korea and Singapore, though imports far exceed exports. So oil tankers taking New Zealand’s oil can at least be guaranteed to return with oil. But there is no guarantee that the rest of New Zealand’s scheduled oil imports will not be redirected, in response to better offers.

On the matter of fuel, it’s very distressing to see Ukraine – now a NATO proxy – doing its best to exacerbate the global fuel crisis by destroying the oil-export capacity of Russia, the one country best placed to relieve the present global crisis. When shortages of Ukrainian wheat threatened Africa’s food supply in 2022, arrangements were made between the combatants to free-up wheat exports. I see no sign of Ukraine or NATO taking the responsible option re the global fuel supply. (Even worse, King Charles – in the King’s speech – tried to incite the United States’ president to escalate the Ukraine-Russia war; a war that can never be resolved by escalation, but which can be resolved by a neutrality deal which would ensure that German troops would never again occupy places like Kharkiv.)

Finally, there’s the issue of ships. What is happening in the world’s shipbuilding industries at present? Are aging and eroding oil tankers and container ships being replaced as they normally would be in peace times? Will there be too few ships next decade to sustain re-established global supply chains; chains which, if similar to those of recent years, almost disregarded shipping as a cost?

Conclusion

For its most basic living commodities, New Zealand is almost completely dependent on long-haul shipping; or, in the case of wheat and rice from Australia, medium-haul shipping. By sea, Adelaide is a long way from Auckland. And New Zealand has minimum short-haul (ie coastal) shipping, which could serve – in a crisis – as an efficient domestic distribution mechanism.

To avoid a food security catastrophe, New Zealand needs to store more food. Food stores facilitate any transition in land use. A substitution to the production of food staples which will feed New Zealanders will take many years.

Rice is the best staple food to store, as well as being a staple much more widely consumed in the existing new New Zealand than in the previous century.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

There is a narrative going around that the war in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman – Israel/USA versus Iran – is a training exercise for the big one, a war between the United States and China centred on the Taiwan Strait.

In Hormuz Today, Taiwan Tomorrow (Project Syndicate, 20 April 2026), Todd G Buchholz argues “By closing the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has handed the Trump administration a practice test. To pass – and preserve deterrence against a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan – the United States must reopen the Strait decisively and visibly with escorts, minesweepers, and strikes on launch sites.”

Also, from Project Syndicate (27 April 2026), we have The Hidden Chokepoints Threatening the Global Economy, by Diane Coyle. She says: “Most notably, Taiwan dominates advanced semiconductor production through TSMC, which accounts for more than 90% of the global supply.” Should military means be used to protect the Taiwanese monopoly of a strategic commodity? That’s not how capitalism is supposed to work.

What would be a geopolitical solution to the presumed – albeit poorly researched – allegation that China plans to exploit the Taiwan Strait chokepoint to bring down The West?

The Asian political territory called China – a mix of continent and islands – is claimed by two rival regimes; one in Beijing, one in Taipei. There is an obvious solution; that the territory presently controlled by Beijing becomes the Sovereign State of China and the territory presently controlled by Taipei becomes the Sovereign State of Taiwan.

Obvious to most people, because most people believe that the boundary between the two territories is the Taiwan Strait. A big miscomprehension, which the geopolitical agitators seem very keen to never discuss; because those agitators – for their own reasons – want to present the Taiwan Strait as the world’s most consequential and unresolved geopolitical boundary.

The principal boundary between the two territories is Xiamen Harbour. There is a second boundary off the coast of Fuzhou. Xiamen is a Chinese city of just over five million people, the population of New Zealand. Fuzhou is a Chinese city of over eight million people, the population of London. Both cities are in the Chinese province of Fujian. The Taiwanese counties of Kinmen and Lienchiang sit on the western (Chinese) side of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan proper sits on the eastern side of the Taiwan Strait.

Solution

Taiwan could cede the two counties of Kinmen and Lienchiang to China; not necessarily as counties of China’s Fujian province, but as economic zones comparable to Macau and Hong Kong.

In return, China could drop its claim to Taiwan proper. China would drop its claim to the vast majority of Taiwan, which is on the eastern side of the Taiwan Strait.

The result would be two clearly distinct countries – China and Taiwan – internationally recognisable as such, separated by the wide-enough Taiwan Strait; much wider than the Strait of Hormuz.

Yes, both China and Taiwan would be making concessions. But each would be making gains in excess of those concessions; a win-win solution based on reciprocity. China already has substantial pragmatic trade relations with Taiwan; there need be no barriers to the continuance of those relations. Indeed, Taiwan’s relations with all nations could improve, with international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation state.

The world could then heave a sigh of relief; the normalisation of a piece of geography deeply politicised by three small but powerful groups of people – cliques in Washington DC, Beijing, Taipei – cliques with narrow and potentially destructive nationalist and mercantilist agendas.

The people – and other species – of this world should never be held hostage to egos; to bigheads, some of whose natural inclinations are to resort to massive externalised violence if they cannot prevail upon their rivals by ‘peaceful’ means.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.