Afghanis who say they have witnessed torture and murder at the hands of Australian soldiers want the chance to testify in court as well as compensation, a journalist says.

Australia’s Defence Force Chief Angus Campbell announced yesterday that there is information to substantiate 23 incidents of alleged unlawful killing of 39 people by 25 special forces personnel in Afghanistan.

He was commenting on a four-year inquiry that found “credible information” supporting allegations of war crimes by the country’s special forces.

Major-General Paul Brereton’s report also said junior soldiers were often required by their patrol commanders to shoot prisoners to get their first kill in a practice known as “blooding”.

The inquiry also found evidence soldiers gloated about their actions, kept kill counts and planted phones and weapons on corpses to justify their actions.

One victim had told him four of his family had been killed – two brothers and two cousins.

In another village he spoke to a number of victims about their bad experiences and they described “murders after murders”.

“One man did say to me that he wanted to look up in the eyes of these killers and ask them why did they kill so many innocent Afghans.”

Another man he interviewed could not stop crying as he likened the sound of bullets from a gun with a silencer to “drops of water”.

“These families… have been telling me that they want to get justice, that they want to make sure this is a transparent process and that those responsible are brought to justice.”

They have asked him if those directly affected will get the chance to fly to Australia to give evidence in courtrooms there, Sarwary said.

Many of the people involved were very poor and they had also asked him about their chances of receiving compensation from Australia.

Sarwary said that the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission has demanded that Australia adopts a transparent process as it lays charges against the perpetrators and there should be compensation for victims.

‘We crossed a very bad line’ – ex-soldier
The Brereton inquiry heard from more than 400 witnesses, including former SAS paramedic Dusty Miller, who was deployed to Afghanistan in 2012.

He told the ABC he witnessed a number of unlawful killings and has since struggled with “psychological wounds”.

He said he felt vindicated after reading the report and was in no doubt that some of the soldiers needed to go to jail for their crimes. It might be hard for the Australian public to accept such behaviour had occurred, he said.

“We’ve got this proud ANZAC tradition that we’re trying to uphold but unfortunately it’s like finding out that Santa Claus isn’t real.

“We crossed a very bad line and we crossed it for a number of years and we need to pay that price now.”

The report also warned that more killings would be revealed in the future and Miller said he was sure that is true.

Some soldiers’ lives had been ruined by what they had witnessed in Afghanistan. It also meant the end of his own military career, Miller said.

‘Everybody knew what was going on’
“Everybody knew what was going on. It was a day-to-day occurrence. We normalised it… you certainly had to go along with what was happening because the alternative would have been professional suicide. You’d have been ostracised.

“There was no way you would have flagged this with the commanders or speak up – that would have been unthinkable.”

Miller said the commanders must have known what was happening especially as they had debriefs after every mission.

However, it was “a minority group” who acted badly and the majority of men he served with were “honourable” although they operated in a “dog eat dog” aggressive environment.

Clear differences between NZ and Australian troops, says author
Investigative journalist Jon Stephenson, the co-author of Hit and Run, the book which led to the Operation Burnham Inquiry, said there was a difference between the way Australian forces behaved and the conduct of New Zealand forces.

“It’s clear that for Operation Burnham the allegations concerned civilian casualties but they weren’t deliberate. The New Zealand forces were involved in an action in Afghanistan that led to civilian casualties but they didn’t intend for those people to die,” Stephenson told Morning Report.

“Whereas in the Australian case, there’s a clear difference, in that they deliberately planned and carried out unlawful actions, alleged war crimes – shooting people who were in their custody and posed no threat or civilians.”

Australian and New Zealand troops worked together in some places, such as headquarters, but they did not go out in large numbers on missions together.

After New Zealand troops had bad experiences working with the US in Afghanistan a decision was made that New Zealand troops would operate as independently as possible so they would not be “contaminated” by some of the behaviour they saw.

In some cases they did support missions, but generally they acted on their own or with the Afghans, Stephenson said.

Australian federal police will investigate the specifics and decisions will be made about which troopers should be prosecuted over the 39 alleged murders. This process may take years, he said.

“It would be my expectation, based on what I’ve heard, and the people I’ve spoken to, that there will definitely be a large number of prosecutions.

“It’s inconceivable to me given that, for example, people have been shown on camera shooting unarmed young men in a field who posed no threat, that there will not be successful prosecutions, convictions and some people will serve serious jail time.”

Defence Force chief General Angus Campbell identified a significant problem with what he called “toxic warrior culture” in Australian forces and this was not seen in the New Zealand forces.

However, Stephenson said it is important for New Zealanders to consider if their troops had served as many rotations in the same same high intensity conflict areas and had lost as many troops in conflicts as the Australians did whether such a culture might evolve.

He believes that NZ troops would not have resorted to this type of behaviour.

“I think there are significant cultural problems in the Australian military. They have got a very different attitude towards indigenous people than our troopers have.

“That’s not to say that our forces have acted impeccably at all times, but I do think there are significant cultural differences, training differences between New Zealand and Australia.”

With New Zealand’s smaller numbers it was also easier to identify bad behaviour.

This article is republished by the Pacific Media Centre under a partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The New Zealand government is being urged to launch an inquiry into its response to the covid-19 pandemic as soon as the Auckland outbreak is under control.

Public health experts say the government wasted the 100 days New Zealand was free of community transmission.

They say any inquiry could offer advice to officials every few months, guiding the response to any future outbreaks.

The last time a government reviewed its response to a pandemic was 100 years ago, after the 1918 Spanish flu outbreak.

About 9000 people died in about eight weeks as that pandemic swept through the country.

That review found the immediate outlook of New Zealand’s health services “did not inspire confidence”, isolating the sick could have been done better, and masks were found to have worked relatively well.

The review sparked wide ranging changes to the health system in New Zealand that are still praised today.

A dozen pandemics
Since then there have been a dozen pandemics of various intensity, including SARS, swine flu and Zika virus, but none of them convinced health officials nor the government’s of the time that a review of pandemic preparedness was needed.

Epidemiologist Professor Michael Baker said that needs to change, and quick.

“The classic comment from historians is that we never learn the lessons of history,” Dr Baker said.

“So I think it is quite profound if we look back on these past events and say, ‘did we learn from them?’ I think sometimes we have, and sometimes we haven’t.

“This one, I hope we do learn and I think the learning has to start right away rather than deferring it, because this is not like the 1918 influenza pandemic. This is going to be with the world for a long time, until we work out ways of controlling it.”

Dr Baker’s colleague at the University of Otago, public health expert Associate Professor Nick Wilson, said officials sat back and basked in New Zealand’s relative success during past pandemics, which meant systems and plans were not reviewed to an adequate standard.

“It is very difficult for the politicians and policy makers to say, this was a terrible thing overseas, SARS, let’s learn everything we can from it and incorporate it in our pandemic plan.”

A plan oversight
Dr Wilson said that was an oversight, and the government needs to launch an inquiry which can help determine New Zealand’s response as the pandemic continues.

“All the time we’re learning more about the epidemiology, how it’s transmitted.

“We’re learning more about how effective treatments might be, the potential for a vaccine, the potential for using digital technologies to dramatically improve the scope for contact tracing.

“We learnt recently how much more effective masks are.”

Both Dr Nick Wilson and Dr Michael Baker say the government wasted time by not launching an inquiry while New Zealand was at alert level 1.

They say it is understandable to wait until the Auckland outbreak is under control to begin a review.

But there are experts in place who could start reviewing the nationwide response right away, without taking away from the effort to eliminate community transmission in Auckland.

Cannot wait
Dr Baker said the inquiry cannot wait until the pandemic has passed.

“I think we need to do this now, because we have to think about at least another year when this pandemic will obviously be very intense globally, and before we might get a vaccine.

“And even if we get a vaccine, we still have to think about how to deliver that.”

Dr Baker said the government needs to follow the example of 1918, and not the public health performance since.

“New Zealand has systematically eroded and fragmented its public health capacity over the 25 years or more that I’ve been working in the system.

“We can just do so much better.”

Health Minister Chris Hipkins said the government would launch a review, but not right now.

“It’s inevitable that we will get to the point where that is sensible, but at the moment all of our focus is on the response.

“I don’t want to take people off the response to do too much reflective thinking when actually we need all eyes focused forward on making sure that we’re dealing with what is in front of us right now.”

The government has given no indication of when a review might begin.

that the government is bolstering the number of defence force staff at managed isolation facilities, in efforts to reduce the reliance on private security firms.

It comes after the revelation yesterday that a First Security guard at an Auckland hotel had been suspended after releasing the personal information of 27 returnees and five staff members on Snapchat over the weekend.

Today Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced the government is deploying an extra 500 defence force personnel, which would reduce reliance on security firms especially in high risk facilities.

This article is republished by the Pacific Media Centre under a partnership agreement with RNZ.

• All RNZ coverage of covid-19
• If you have symptoms of the coronavirus, call the NZ Covid-19 Healthline on 0800 358 5453 (+64 9 358 5453 for international SIMs) or call your GP – don’t show up at a medical centre.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Can we trust New Zealand’s military? There must now be serious doubt, given the landmark report released on Friday concluding the investigation into allegations made in the book Hit and Run by Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson about a 2010 SAS killing raid in Afghanistan.

The most recent Colmar Brunton Public Sector Reputation Index found the New Zealand Defence Force has the second best reputation with the public of any government agency in the country (behind the Fire Service, but ahead of agencies like the Department of Conservation, Customs, and Met Service). Trust in the agency is extremely high and has been improving lately – see: Public sector reputation 2020.

Yet Friday’s report would suggest the Defence Force can’t be trusted. Attorney General David Parker even stated, in releasing the report, that Government Ministers have been unable to exercise political control of the military. That is a serious problem in a democracy.

Severe criticisms of the military over Operation Burnham controversy

A Stuff newspaper editorial on Saturday says New Zealanders “will probably be shocked and saddened” by the report – see: A mix of shock and relief in the SAS report. Although the inquiry had some good news for the military, in that the raids were found to be legal and professionally carried out, the newspaper notes, “in significant ways the report agrees with the journalists” Hager and Stephenson.

The editorial is severely critical of the military, saying “a picture emerges of a defence force that does not consider itself to be answerable to its political masters and the wider public. Civilian control of the military is an important principle of New Zealand’s democracy.”

Today’s Otago Daily Times editorial is equally scathing, saying “there should be no chance of the Defence Force sitting back with satisfaction” after the report was so critical of its handling of the controversy – see: Operation Burnham.

Here’s the newspaper’s most interesting point: “These findings will sting the Defence Force, and rightly so. The New Zealand public needs to have confidence its national forces will not only operate in battle zones with the highest levels of integrity and professionalism but will come clean when things go wrong. It is of deep concern that multiple senior commanders at NZDF let the side down with actions that, to paraphrase Defence Minister Ron Mark, showed serious deficiencies. The inquiry has also shone a mostly favourable light on Hager’s work, and the worth of investigative journalism.”

The Spinoff’s political editor, Justin Giovannetti has summed up the report’s criticisms of the NZ Defence Force, saying it “reveals a military headquarters that is inept and disorganised. Records couldn’t be found. Contradictory reports were ignored. A senior officer in Afghanistan was misleading his superiors in Wellington about civilian casualties. Those superiors didn’t question reports, despite evidence that civilians had been killed in the August raid. As a result, the military misled the public for seven years” – see: SAS did nothing wrong, but senior military officers misled public: report.

Giovannetti reports on the Attorney General’s reaction to the report: “Parker was clear earlier in the morning that one of the country’s bedrock constitutional principles was compromised” by the operations of the military. He quotes Parker: “During those years, as a consequence of the ineptitude and the suppression of documents that should have been coming to ministers, ministers were not able to exercise the democratic control of the ministry. The military do not exist for their own purpose.”

Blogger No Right Turn says the operations of Defence Force bosses “obviously undermines the principle of civilian control of the military, striking at the heart of our democracy. These people need to be held accountable, dishonourably discharged and stripped of their honours, pour encourager les autres. Careers need to end over this, otherwise there is no incentive for NZDF not to do it again in future” – see: Vindicated.

According to Alexander Gillespie, professor of law at Waikato University, the actions of the military – particularly in their relationship with Government – have been a “disaster”, and the institution “has now bombed its own position as the trusted military arm of the state” – see: Operation Burnham: the New Zealand military’s self-inflicted wounds will not heal by themselves.

Gillespie says the military has “proved itself untrustworthy” in crucial ways, humiliating itself. He predicts the conclusion of the report “will almost inevitably mean it is stripped of the relative autonomy it has enjoyed to this point.”

Does the report agree with the military or Hager and Stephenson?

For a good summary of the report, see Thomas Manch’s Operation Burnham inquiry: Child was likely killed, SAS soldiers misled, prisoner was tortured. Here’s the top line version: “A damning report into the Defence Force’s handling of 2010 SAS-led raid in Afghanistan says a child was likely killed during the raid, elite soldiers misled ministers and the public about allegations of civilian deaths, and an insurgent captured by New Zealand troops was beaten while detained.” Most disturbingly, the report finds that New Zealand troops handed over one of their prisoners to the Afghanistan forces, knowing he would be tortured, meaning the “Defence Force was therefore in breach of Geneva convention.”

The official report doesn’t agree with all of the allegations made by Hager and Stephenson. Most importantly, it finds that the raid was legal and professionally carried out, and that there was no strategic cover-up by the military of the civilian killings.

Hager has responded – see: Nicky Hager welcomes the Op Burnham Inquiry report, the most serious findings against the NZSAS and NZDF in their history. He argues that “after nearly ten years of denials, the Inquiry has confirmed the main allegations in the book Hit & Run.” And he concludes “The report contains the most serious findings against the NZSAS and NZDF in their history. This should prompt a lot of soul searching inside the New Zealand Defence Force.”

Gordon Campbell doesn’t accept the report’s findings at all. He has written a scathing response, suggesting it amounts to a whitewash and does not sufficiently deal with the military misadventure and misinformation in question – see: On the virtues (and fluffed opportunities) of the Operation Burnham report.

Campbell doesn’t accept there was no Defence Force cover-up. Furthermore, he does not believe the Defence Force will fix the problems identified: “Can we really expect an organisation with this bunker mentality to reform itself voluntarily, from the inside?”

The response of the NZ Defence Force

Defence Force chief, Air Marshal Kevin Short, has responded by saying that the military must change as a result of the report, becoming more accountable and open, involving structural and cultural change – see RNZ’s Operation Burnham report: NZDF ‘deeply sorry’ for misleading ministers and public. Here’s his key statement: “If we are to maintain the trust and confidence of the people we serve, we must be accountable. We must be better at the way we record, store and retrieve information, and then subsequently present that information to ministers and the public. I will ensure this happens.”

But has the Defence Force really learnt anything from the report and demonstrated genuine willingness to change? Justin Giovannetti questions this, pointing out that on the release of the report, the military’s obfuscation has continued: “There seemed to still be a lingering reluctance today by the NZDF to take responsibility for what happened during the raid. In a prepared statement, Short said that the inquiry confirmed ‘New Zealand forces were not involved’ in the civilian deaths. That’s not correct.” In fact, although it was the US military that killed the civilians, it was in an operation in which New Zealanders were in control and gave the orders.

This is also dealt with by Thomas Manch, who points out that Air Marshal Kevin Short’s “charitable interpretation of the facts is what got the Defence Force into this mess in the first place” – see: Operation Burnham: An apology from the Defence Force, but redemption has just begun.

So, are the military bosses still playing down the severity of what happened? That’s the view of Hit & Run co-author Jon Stephenson, who says he feels vindicated by the report but “is worried its severity is not being fully conveyed” – see Katie Scotcher’s Operation Burnham: Former Minister Wayne Mapp ‘forgot’ about civilian casualties.

Here’s Stephenson’s view: “I’m concerned that they are being downplayed by the Defence Force, not only initially and throughout the inquiry, but even now it seems like the Attorney General is not really prepared to accept the extent to which the inquiry has condemned some of the actions of the Defence Force.” According to this article, Stephenson also says he has “serious doubts” on “whether the Defence Force could change because of their record and their performance throughout the inquiry”.

The role of former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp

Former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp, has been asked to account for his role, and has been contrite. He claims he continued to tell the public that allegations of civilian deaths were unfounded – despite being briefed that they were possible – because he forgot about a briefing informing him of this.

This is dealt well with in Katie Scotcher’s Operation Burnham: Former Minister Wayne Mapp ‘forgot’ about civilian casualties. Mapp is quoted as saying that it was “a major failing on my part” and that he had asked himself “a huge amount of times” how he could forget such a crucial piece of information.

Mapp says New Zealand now must remedy the damage caused by Operation Burnham: “I’ve always been of the view that New Zealand as a nation owes compensation to the victims. I have always felt that we haven’t done enough as a nation to find out. Well now we have the report, we have more information. And I think is now incumbent upon the government now having got the report to do more for the villagers.”

An apology is also being demanded by the Hit & Run campaign group. Spokesperson Sarah Atkinson says: “It is a huge injustice and the New Zealand Defence Force owes apologies and reparations to the Afghan families of the victims” – see RNZ’s Call for NZ Defence Force to apologise to villages where civilians were killed.

Others involved in the campaign for uncovering the truth about Operation Burnham are celebrating the release of the report. Amnesty International’s Meg de Ronde has written about how the report vindicates human rights defenders like Stephenson and Hager who have fought “tooth and nail to hold those in power to account”, and have had to battle not just an inquiry that was stacked in favour of authorities, but also faced ridicule – see: We shouldn’t have to work this hard to get transparency from our government.

Finally, cartoonists have been scathing over the years about the official version of what happened in Afghanistan, so for an updated view, see: Cartoons about Hit & Run, and NZ in Afghanistan.

By Rambo Talabong in Manila

The top lawyer of the Philippine Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) who was a controversial witness in Senate hearings on the Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) controversy has been shot dead.

According to the police report, lawyer Fredric Santos was gunned down yesterday afternoon by two unidentified suspects in front of his daughter’s school in Muntinlupa City, as he was about to pick her up.

Santos suffered gunshot wounds to the head and was declared dead on the spot by the Muntinlupa City rescue team, police said.

READ MORE: Timeline – The GCTA law and the controversy it has stirred

Santos was the legal division chief of the BuCor who was suspended by the Office of the Ombudsman and once detained by the Senate in September 2019 over controversies in the GCTA law’s implementation.

Santos’ office is not included in the process of screening for GCTA grants. But he was grilled by the Senate blue ribbon committee on his role in providing legal opinion on whether the BuCor chief needs the Justice Secretary’s approval to release inmates sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

At the Senate, Santos said he had told then-BuCor chief Nicanor Faeldon of the rule requiring the justice secretary’s approval for releases.

But when Faeldon denied this, Santos backtracked and said he could not recall whether it was just relayed to a staff member.

Rambo Talabong is a Rappler journalist. This report was written with a file by Lian Buan.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article was written for, and first published by, German magazine Cicero.de (ref. Attentat in Christchurch – Willkommen in der Hölle). Thanks also to Prof David Robie, Pacific Media Centre AsiaPacificReport.nz for providing the featured image for this article.

OUT OF THE BLUE:

It was 1:39pm, Friday March 15. As was usual for a Friday hundreds of people had turned up to pray at the Al Noor Mosque in Riccarton, Christchurch. All was peaceful, women, children, men, people of all ages young and old, both Sunni and Shia, were in contemplative repose free of worry. It was a mild, late summer, 20 degrees celsius day. Earlier, the touring Bangladesh Cricket Team had briefly visited the mosque, but left early to attend a press conference. By 1:39pm, they had returned and were outside exiting a bus, intending to continue with their prayers inside the mosque.

At 1:40pm, ahead of the team, a man entered the mosque walking quickly up the front steps. He was carrying an assault rifle and dressed in combat uniform. He immediately began shooting people who were kneeling in prayer. The shots rang out and the Bangladesh team members realising they were witnesses to an attack, retreated, and fled on foot to nearby Hagley Park.

Back inside the Al Noor Mosque scores of worshipers were being gunned down, some killed instantly, others bleeding to death. The victims included little Mucaad Ibrahim who was three years of age.

Mucaad was known by his loved ones as a wise “old soul” and possessed an “intelligence beyond his years”.

Eye witnesses said that once the killer began shooting people, little Mucaad became separated from his family. In the chaos, his family could not find him. The next day Police confirmed he too had been shot dead by the killer.

The murders continued at the Al Noor Mosque until the killer’s firearms ran out of bullets. Then, he simply walked out of the mosque, got in his car, and drove six kilometres to the Linwood Mosque. There too were people who had gathered for their regular Friday afternoon prayers.

Mr Aziz picked up an EFTPOS (electronic funds transaction) machine from a table inside the mosque. He ran outside. He saw a man he describes as looking like a soldier. He said to the man: “Who are you”. Mr Aziz then saw three people lying on the ground dead from shotgun blasts. He realised the man was the killer. He approached the attacker, threw the EFTPOS machine hitting the killer, who in turn took from his vehicle a second firearm (a military style semi-automatic assault rifle) and fired four to five shots at Abdul Aziz, missing him. Then, in an attempt to lure the killer away from other people, Mr Aziz shouted at the killer from behind a car: “Come, I’m here. Come I’m here!”

Mr Aziz said he didn’t want the killer to go inside the mosque and kill more people. But the killer remained focussed. He walked directly to the entrance, once inside the mosque he continued his killing spree. Survivors speak of the killer wearing “army clothes”, dressed in “SWAT combat clothing”, helmeted, wearing a vest and a balaclava.

Inside the Linwood Mosque, another witness, Shoaib Gani, was kneeling in prayer. He heard a noise like fireworks but he and others weren’t too concerned and continued with their prayers. Then, as he and his fellow worshipers were kneeling speaking verses from the Koran, the man next to him fell forward with blood pouring from his head. He had been shot and killed instantly, Mr Gani said. Then others too began falling to the floor dead.

Mr Gani crawled under a table. He saw the killer and his firearm. “Written on the rifle were the words, ‘Welcome to hell’,” he said.

Victims, who were wounded and bleeding, were pleading with Mr Gani to help them. But he was frozen to a spot under a table knowing that the killer was walking around the mosque killing as many people as he could. Mr Gani believed he too would also soon be dead, so he reached for his cellphone, he called his parent’s back home in India. But no one answered. He tried to call his father’s number, but the phone kept ringing. He saw people around him bleeding to death. Others with fatal head-wounds “their brains were hanging out. I just couldn’t do anything. I didn’t know what to do.” Mr Gani phoned 111 (the New Zealand emergency number) and told the authorities people were dead and injured: “The lady on the phone asked me to stay on the line as long as I could.”

Outside, Abdul Aziz picked up one of the killer’s discarded shotguns. Inside the mosque, the killer’s assault rifle ran out of bullets. The killer then “dropped his firearm” and ran back to his vehicle. He got in the driver’s seat. Mr Aziz then ran toward the car. He threw a discarded shotgun at the killer’s vehicle: “I threw it like an arrow. It shattered his window.” Mr Aziz thinks the killer thought someone had shot at him with a loaded gun. The killer turned. He swore at Mr Aziz. When the window burst it covered the inside of the car with glass. Mr Aziz said the killer “then took off” driving in his car. He then turn right away from the mosque driving through a red traffic light and out into Christchurch suburban streets.

Some minutes later, Police and ambulance officers arrived at Linwood Mosque. Anti-Terrorist armed Police entered the mosque. Inside, Mr Gani said the survivors were ordered to put their hands up above their heads. The mass murder scene was covered in blood. The Police then secured the area. Some victims survived because they were under the bodies of the dead. Police told survivors to gather near a grassed area outside. There, people began weeping for their husbands, wives, parents, children, friends.

THE ARREST:

Seventeen minutes later, two Police officers identified the killer, apparently driving his car. They drove the police car into the killer’s vehicle, ramming it against a curb. Immediately, they disarmed the killer, cuffed him, noticed home made bombs in the vehicle – IEDs (improvised explosive devices). They arrested the man and secured the scene.

The rest of Christchurch was in lock-down, children were kept safe inside their classrooms, hospitals began to prepare for casualties, the city’s streets became eerily quiet, people were locked in to libraries, shops, their homes. Police and armed forces helicopters networked the skies. No one knew if the terrorist attacks were committed by a group of people or a lone gunman.

But back inside and entrances to the two mosques, 50 people were dead – one of the dead was discovered the next day by Police, the body was laying beneath others who had been killed. Scores of others were in hospital fighting for their lives, at least another ten were in a critical condition in intensive care. Pathologists from all over New Zealand and Australia were heading to Christchurch to help with documenting the method of murder of the dead.

Within hours of the killings, Australian media named the alleged killer as an Australian born citizen named Brenton Tarrant, 28 years of age. On Saturday morning The Australian newspaper’s front page read “Australia’s evil export”.

Other media in New Zealand followed with details of the man’s background. Brenton Harrison Tarrant appeared in court the next day charged with one single count of murder. Other charges will follow. His duty lawyer did not seek name suppression nor bail, the lawyer told the judge: “I’m simply seeking remand and a high court next-available-hearing date.” Tarrant stood cuffed, smiling at those in the courtroom, at one point signaling with his fingers a ‘white supremacist’ sign. He will next appear in the Christchurch High Court on April 5.

THE AFTERMATH:

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern later told media: “It was absolutely his [the offender’s) intention to continue with his attack.” PM Ardern said: “Police are working to build a picture of this tragic event. A complex and comprehensive investigation is (now) underway.” To balance the requirement of investigation with the customs of Muslim burials, PM Ardern said liaison officers are with the victims’ loved ones to help “in a way that is consistent with Muslim faith while taking into account these unprecedented circumstances and the obligations to the coroner.”

PM Ardern said, survivors of the massacre had indicated that this attack was not “of the New Zealand that they know”.

One day later, Survivor Shoaib Gani (mentioned above) told media he still could not sleep or eat. The sounds and sights were still vivid in his head: “I still can feel myself lying on the floor waiting for the bullets to hit me.” He said, he will travel back to India to visit family, but he will return to Christchurch: “It’s just a few people, you know. You can’t blame the whole of New Zealand for this… It’s a good country, people are peaceful. Everybody has helped me here. One right wing (person) doesn’t mean everyone is bad. So I can come back here and live and hope nothing like this happens in the future.”

In the hours after the attacks, all around New Zealand, in the cities and in small country areas, Police were stationed and were ready in case others were involved and were preparing further crimes.

Beside the Police officers, people, of all races and religions, began laying flowers at the steps to their local mosques. Messages included read: “Salam Alaikum, Peace be unto you”, and, Aroha nui”, “Peace and love”, “You are one of us”. The outpouring of grief swept the South Pacific nation, and as this piece was written, a mood of support, comfort, reassurance and solidarity with those of Muslim faith was in evidence.

In Australia, Sydney’s landmark Opera House was like a beacon in the night; coloured blue, red, and white – the colours of the New Zealand flag embossed with the silver fern (Ponga) an emblem of Aotearoa New Zealand. Australia’s peoples, like in New Zealand, began laying flowers at the steps of its mosques in a gesture of inclusiveness.

In the aftermath, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has committed to ongoing financial assistance to dependents of those who have died or are injured, and assistance, she said, will be ongoing.

Questions are being leveled as to how a person with hate can enter, live, and purchase weapons in New Zealand while expressing hate toward other cultures and harbouring an intent to kill others.

PM Ardern said: “The guns used in this case appear to have been modified. That is a challenge Police have been facing, and that is a challenge that we will look to address in changing our laws… We need to include the fact that modification of guns which can lead them to become essentially the kinds of weapons we have seen used in this terrorist act.”

When asked how she was coping personally with the tragedy, she said: “I am feeling the exact same emotions that every New Zealander is facing. Yes, I have the additional responsibility and weight of expressing the grief of all New Zealanders and I certainly feel that.”

That responsibility includes ensuring New Zealand’s Police, the nation’s intelligence and security services and “the process around watch-lists, including whether or not our border protections are currently in a status that they should be, and, including our gun laws.”

THE BACKSTORY:

Indeed, New Zealand is part of the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network that includes the USA, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Global surveillance is coordinated and prioritised among the Five Eyes member states. While significant resource, technology and sophistication is committed to the Five Eyes intelligence agencies, New Zealanders fear that those who find themselves as targets, or within the scope of intelligence officers, are predominantly of the Muslim faith.

In contrast, the accused killer who allegedly committed the horrific Christchurch mosque attacks, has been active both on social media and the dark web expressing, with an intensifying degree, his ideology of hate and intolerance. It does appear of the highest public interest, certainly from an open source intelligence point of view, to ask questions of why New Zealand’s (and indeed the Five Eyes intelligence network’s) surveillance experts did not detect the expressed evil that had radicalised the heart and mind of the perpetrator of this massacre.

It is also fact, that New Zealand is a comparatively safe and peaceful nation. But within its midst are people and groups fermenting on racially-based hate ideas. Whether it be in isolation or among organised groupings, the threat of racially driven terror crimes exists.

The alleged killer, Brenton Tarrant, has lived among those of New Zealand’s southern city Dunedin for at least two years. It appears he was radicalised around 2010 after his father died and he toured Europe. He wrote about becoming “increasingly disgusted” at immigrant communities. In early 2018, Tarrant joined a Dunedin gun club and began practicing his shooting skills and allegedly planned his attacks.

Regarding Christchurch, while it has a history of overt white racist gangs, at this juncture, it does not appear they were directly involved in this series of crimes.

But this leads to many unanswered questions, including:

• Was the killer a lone mass murderer, a sleeper in a cell of one?
• Were those with whom he communicated and engaged with on the web in extreme white racist ideologies aware of his plans?
• Was Christchurch chosen by the killer for logistical reasons?
• Was it because the city is easier to drive around than Dunedin, Wellington or Auckland?
• Was it because Christchurch has at least two mosques within easy driving distance?
• Were the Bangladesh Cricket team in his scope of attacks?
• Was the killer attempting to incite a violent response from Christchurch’s burgeoning Muslim community, or, expecting a response from the Alt-Right, from white racist groups such as the Right Wing Resistance (RWR), the Fourth Reich, and Christchurch’s skinhead community?

THE FUTURE:

Survivors of Friday 15th’s terrorist attack say they have complained of an increase in racism and expressed hate in recent times. They say, their concerns have not been taken seriously. These are the concerns that Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has committed to listen to, has committed to represent, and, as the prime advocate for her country’s peoples, to act on to ensure cracks in New Zealand’s border, security and intelligence apparatus are corrected.

And, what of New Zealand’s social culture? How will it be affected? That will be determined by the actions of each individual person, each community, town and city and how as a nation New Zealand redefines “The Kiwi Way”.

Members of New Zealand’s media will also need to act responsibly. It is fair to say some have a reputation for argument that verges on alt-right intolerance, for example, on Twitter only two days after the mass murders, a prominent radio journalist, who is employed by one of New Zealand’s largest networks, tweeted: “28 years on an [sic] we still haven’t stopped madmen getting guns. #ChChMosque… [Replying to @Politikwebsite] And the neo nationalist right are the result of the virtue signaling exclusionary left.”

Perhaps such examples are out of step with New Zealand’s population. But such attitudes do create a dialogue of justification for those who harbour intolerance. However, if the outpouring of love and compassion continues to bind rather than divide, then perhaps New Zealand has received, as they say, ‘a wake-up call’, where racial intolerance and extreme ideologies have no place among peoples of all kinds, Maori and Pakeha, of all religions, political persuasions and creeds.

One thing is certain; to stamp out the evil of hate extremism, New Zealanders will pay a price that will be charged against the Kiwi lifestyle. Personal liberties of freedom, of expression and privacy will certainly be eroded further as this nation of the South Pacific grapples with how to keep its peoples safe. The means of how to achieve relative safety will be hotly debated, but it is a necessary juncture in this nation’s history, a moment when we all must confront and challenge ourselves so that people of innocence, people like little three year old Mucaad Ibrahim, can go about their days in trust, in peace, in joyful purpose and achieve their deserved potential. Anything less is a second killing for the victims of Friday 15, New Zealand’s darkest hour.

Accusations have surfaced alleging the current National Party leadership conspired to politically destroy Jami-Lee Ross – this after details of his affair with a fellow party MP became known to them. The allegations raise serious questions. Those questions include: what did National’s leader and deputy leader know and when did they find out?

A sworn-to timeline of events is now essential so that the public interest can be satisfied. This must be a crucial element that is cemented in to the methodology of Simon Bridges’ inquiry into the culture of the National Party. Above all, it must be independent and publicly accessible.

The inquiry must examine the National leadership team’s actions and culture, test whether they acted in a proper and timely manner, and assess whether their actions considered a concern for the welfare and mental health of an MP they had previously supported, promoted, and embedded within their leadership team.

It follows that allegations suggesting a “hit job” was orchestrated from inside the National Party leadership must also be independently explored.

If the inquiry finds that either the leader, or deputy leader, was part of a destructive and inhumane attack on Jami-Lee Ross – while it was known that he was at high risk of being pushed over the edge, was ill, and verging on suicide – and that they acted without reasonable regard for his welfare, then it must be accepted by the National Party caucus, its membership and the public, that this National leadership team is at the very least morally bankrupt.

This inquiry ought to be conducted amidst a background whereby Ross declared his role in the destructive side of politics; following the orders of Sir John Key, Bill English, Paula Bennett and Simon Bridges. Ross was afterall a ‘numbers man’ for Bridges, and benefitted from the patronage that the Bridges-Bennett leadership team offered.

There are a number of ‘ifs’ in this analysis, but the public interest demands that they be considered.

The allegations have surfaced on the blog-site Whaleoil which is owned and edited by controversial writer Cameron Slater.

Some may dismiss the allegations on the basis of tribalism, or ignore the allegations because Slater was centrally involved in National’s so called Dirty Politics as revealed in 2014. But the nature of the allegations are as serious as they get in politics, and, if accurate played a part in the sudden deterioration of Jami-Lee Ross’ mental health, the sectioning of Ross for his own protection, and the erasion of credibility of a potential political opponent who was determined to continue as a critical member of New Zealand’s Parliament.

This analysis’ argument suggests any such bias, on behalf by Cameron Slater’s opponents, ought to be ethically and morally put aside until such a time as the truth and facts are tested. Such an inquiry, preferably judicial but essentially independent, must be robust and critical in its analysis.

To reiterate; numerous elements of this saga elevate the issues to a matter of serious public interest.

And it must be noted at this juncture, that the party’s leader Simon Bridges insists he has acted appropriately and denies taking part in any political “hit job”.

Let’s examine what Evening Report has learned from contacts close to events.

Alleged details of events between Saturday-Sunday October 20-21

There is a txt-chain of events that investigators can forensically examine that are central to understanding who was involved in the sectioning of Jami-Lee Ross.

If the txts are examined they will determine if it is fact that the National Party MP, with whom Jami-Lee Ross had a three-year affair, rang the Police and that as a consequence of that call the Police used mental health laws to take Jami-Lee Ross into custody and contain him within the mental health unit at Counties Manukau Health.

Txts will also show whether it is fact that the female MP then called Simon Bridges’ chief of staff at 9:15pm on Saturday October 20 informing him of the events. If so Bridges’ office was aware of an alleged suicide attempt. Investigators would then be able to assess whether a txt message from Jami-Lee Ross’ psychologist, who Evening Report understands messaged Jami-Lee Ross at 9:28pm on Saturday October 20, asking if he was ok, and that the psychologist had minutes prior received a txt message from Jamie Gray, Simon Bridges’ chief of staff.

It is a matter of public record that Simon Bridges appeared on NewsHub’s AM Show on Tuesday October 23, denying all knowledge of events on the Saturday night – that is until a wider grouping within the National Party became privy to what had happened to Jami-Lee Ross.

It appears reasonable to form an opinion that Bridges’ chief of staff would have informed the leader of such an event. If he didn’t, why didn’t he inform Bridges?

The sectioning of Jami-Lee Ross ended a week where many National Party MPs, and a wider network of those loyal to the party, appeared to be actively orchestrating a coordinated campaign to destroy the so-called rogue MP’s political chances and to discredit his claims of corruption within the National Party leadership. Had Jami-Lee Ross abused his position as the senior whip within the party? It certainly appears so. Did he abuse the power he was afforded? Media reports would suggest this was so. Did he have an affair with at least two women? Yes. But it appears that the public attacks began, not at the time when senior members of the party were informed of Ross’ actions, but, once Ross began to attack the leadership. This is significant.

An Opposition’s Role As The Public’s Advocate

As senior representatives of New Zealand’s Legislature, leader Simon Bridges and deputy leader Paula Bennett can arguably be regarded as the public’s advocates within Parliament. Their job is to keep the Executive Government on its toes, challenge its policy and rationale, to be Parliament’s keepers of the public’s interest.

As such, the public deserves to know if the leaders, as a team or individually, conspired to destroy the political chances of an MP and former colleague, who they considered to have gone rogue, and who they knew was suffering a crisis of mental health so serious that it could have ended in death.

It is in consideration of the public interest, that this editorial is written.

We now know as fact, Jami-Lee Ross had a three year affair with a South Island-based National MP.[name withheld]. Like him, she has two children and was married.

While the affair was going ‘well’, contacts inside the National Party have told Evening Report that Jami-Lee encouraged Bridges to promote his lover above her standing and reputation in caucus, well above some high profile MPs like National’s Chris Bishop who are respected among colleagues and media and seen to have been doing their job well. The promotion was seen to give leverage, to sure up the numbers to stabilise Bridges’ and Bennett’s leadership team at a time when they sensed support was delicate.

Meanwhile, Jami-Lee Ross continued to pull in big donations from wealthy Chinese residents in his Botany electorate. As a reward, Bridges embedded him into his inner core, the top three. Politically, this is really an unsound move by a political leader. With Ross being senior whip, he is supposed to be directed by the leader to pull MPs into line, to do the leader’s bidding, and to do this without necessarily knowing the deep and dark details underlying the leader’s moves.

In effect, with Jami-Lee Ross becoming a central figure, knowing all the details, the dirt, the strategy and tactics, it centralised too much power into the whip position and elevated a real danger of a whip using the position for his own gain. To reiterate, this appears a seriously stupid move of Bridges and Bennett to pull a whip in on their machinations. And, in a significant contact’s view, it appears they risked this because Jami-Lee was pulling in the donor money.

Jami-Lee Ross had been on the rise for a time. Former Prime Minister John Key promoted him to the whips office. Then PM Bill English secured Ross’s rise by maintaining and elevating his whip role. Bridges and Bennett further empowered Jami-Lee Ross by cementing him into the whip position, a move that suggested National’s power-politicians were well satisfied with his service.

It’s hard to tell how far back it was when Jami-Lee Ross began to record Bridges. And, at this juncture, it’s difficult to know if he recorded Bennett as well. The public is left to fathom whether it was when his affair with the National MP went sour and perhaps Ross sensed Bennett having become close to her.

In any event, when Jami-Lee Ross fell out with his colleague and lover, sources say Bennett played a crucial role in the analysis of his conduct, in particular women who had allegedly been burned by Ross. Two women, contacts inside National state, were staff of the National Party leader. The MP (whom Ross had a three-year affair with) and the two staff members are said by National Party contacts to be the subject of NewsRoom.co.nz’s investigation into Ross’ activities, an investigation that is believed to have spanned up to one year in duration. Evening Report raises this aspect as the public interest demands to consider whether it is reasonable to believe that two staffers in the leader’s office never told nor informed Bridges, or the chief of staff, that they were cooperating in a media investigation into the leader’s chief and senior whip?

Contacts state that Bennett gained the women’s confidence, received information so it could be prepared as part of a disciplinary process. Did Bennett choose to engage media with this information? If so, once media received the information, what involvement did the deputy leader have or continue to have, or engage with, the complainants and media?

Sources inside National state Bennett then seeded info about Jami-Lee Ross having had an affair. They point to her having hinted at behaviour unbecoming of a married member of Parliament during an interview before TV, radio and print journalists. Did she do this without Bridges knowing or being forewarned.

If true, in effect, this would have driven the narrative ahead of the leader. If so, it is reasonable to fathom that a senior politician would know Bridges would be forced to defend the character-attack campaign that appeared orchestrated and designed to destroy Ross. Amidst the firestorm, National MP Maggie Barry spoke out against Ross with significant indignation. This will have been digested by the public that National had expelled a human predator from its midst. It also gave the impression National’s female caucus members were unified. However, respected MP Nikki Kaye kept out of it. Why?

Next, Bridges was forced to field political journalists’ questions about breaking the old convention that you keep affairs and family issues under the covers.

Bridges was then compelled to inform media that he had “told off” his deputy leader for giving credence that an affair had been ongoing between Ross and a Nat MP. This made Bridges look even weaker.

The future of National’s leadership

National Party contacts suggest Bridges is positioned where he will be forced to absorb the political fallout for what is seen by some as a character assassination campaign gone wrong. One contact states that once Bridges is rendered useless, and the issue dies down, Bennett herself will be well positioned to remove Bridges as leader in 2019.

It is reasonable to form an opinion that senior National MP Judith Collins will also be available if the leadership were to fall vacant. Her popularity is again on the rise.

At this juncture, for Bridges and Bennett, it appears wise for them to expect more National Party dirt to emerge before the end of the year. Evening Report’s sources say: “ample dirt lingers just below the surface.”

For a party that once stated it had no factions, it certainly seems its personality factions are now in all-out political warfare.

Judith Collins’ star has been rising since she returned to the front-bench in opposition. And it has been bolstered by a favourable Colmar Brunton Poll. It’s fair to suggest she has laid heavy hits on Labour’s Housing Minister Phil Twyford. As a consequence, her standing within the caucus has improved. On investigation, it is clear she has not had the loyalty of Jami-Lee Ross since he was promoted by John Key. He, along with Mark Mitchell, then supported Bill English for the leadership. Bennett and Mitchell are politically close. It does appear that moves by some media to connect Jami-Lee Ross’ revelations with a Judith Collins plan as not based on fact.

While there’s an expectation among interested public that Collins will be the next leader, she will need the support of what’s left of National’s social conservatives and those loyal to Nikki Kaye.

For Collins to succeed, she will have to be seen to inoculate the party from damaging information that may be in the possession of Jami-Lee Ross. All the while, she, like Bennett, needs Bridges to continue to fail as a leader.

It is fair to accept, the recordings and damaging information are now with Cam Slater and Simon Lusk. It is also reasonable to suggest that Bridges is a disappointment to some who once supported his bid for leadership. Cam Slater is clearly appalled at what he refers to as a “hit job”.

Slater is adamant that he is not motivated by an agenda, nor by a pitch by a fiscal conservative faction to gain leadership of the National party. Rather he said, he is motivated to help an old friend who the current leadership moved to destroy. He added on his blog-site, if the current leadership continues “to lie” he will continue to reveal the truth.

Meanwhile, Jami-Lee Ross is being reassured and cared for by a mutual friend of his and Slater’s who is a pastor with the Seventh Day Adventists.

Contacts say, with regard to Jami-Lee Ross and his National Party former lover and colleague, the three year affair was a relationship that in the end didn’t deliver what either banked on – despite promotions and connections and having benefitted politically from their association.

It’s fair to say, Jami-Lee Ross was out of his experiential depth and in part abusive from the point of view of how to handle political power, networks and consensual relationships.

Two other women who laid complaints about Ross, worked in the leader’s office.

Bridges is adamant he didn’t know about the abuse of power nor the complaints. Did Bennett know? At what point was she privy to the information?

One National Party contact said: “It defies reasonable belief that Bridges didn’t know.”

It is right that Bridges has initiated an inquiry into National’s culture. But that in itself falls short or what the public interest demands. Why? Because the inquiry reports back to Bridges, who as leader may well be one of the protagonists. Also, the report will not be released to the public which leaves it as a golden prize, the holy grail, for any journalist and, irrespective of who it damns or exonerates, will become a currency for any MP with leadership ambitions.

As it now stands, Bridges’ worst nightmare must be not knowing what Jami-Lee Ross recorded and at what point did he begin taping the National Party leader’s conversations.

If those recordings contain further embarrassing or damaging content and references, then he will be finished as leader. Bridges, as leader, even if he has a clear conscience, must be wracking his memory as to past conversations and comments while knowing the conversations may be in the hands of people with whom he has lost their trust.

And the question remains unanswered: Was Paula Bennett recorded as well?

If her actions are found by inquirers to have led an orchestrated political response to Jami-Lee Ross’ revelations, whether that be at the behest or otherwise of the current leader, then this will destroy any higher ambitions that she may have ever contemplated.

It follows, that if the report concludes that the rot inside National extends to its current leadership, then it may well be that Judith Collins will become the leader of the National Party, unopposed.

Whatever the future holds for the National Party, it is in everyone’s interests that an independent judicial investigation into this National affair be conducted in a spirit of openness and propriety.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Evening Report invites any individual connected to this analysis to have a right of reply. Footnote: Interview between the author and Jami-Lee Ross on his role as a new National Party MP (August 13 2012):

New Zealand’s military conduct in its longest running war ever – in Afghanistan – is finally getting an official government inquiry. This has the real potential to open up a can of worms. So far, the announcement of the Government’s inquiry into Operation Burnham has been met with a great diversity of reactions. Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson, and their supporters, have been “over the moon”, as Hager put it. But this doesn’t mean they don’t have concerns about the inquiry.

Validity of inquiry disputed Not everyone is happy to see the New Zealand defence forces being made accountable for the SAS raid in Afghanistan. Newstalk ZB’s Tim Dower represents one strand of opinion in his argument that the military should never be criticised or investigated – see his column condemning the new inquiry: When it comes to military operations, I’m taking the word of our guys. Dower makes the case that New Zealand soldiers were in Afghanistan to help the locals, and the chaotic nature of the conflict there meant “our guys were at a disadvantage from the get-go.” He goes so far as to say that, even if New Zealand troops killed Afghans in a botched raid, “I’d rather it was one of them – even a civilian – than one of ours.” Newstalk ZB’s political editor Barry Soper says that “in reality this was a firefight and unfortunately some innocents lost their lives, which tragically happens in war zones” – see: Little doubt in what SAS inquiry will come up with. He expects the defence forces to be exonerated, on the simple basis that: “the allied forces were under fire and responded”. Soper regards the inquiry as a “waste of money”, saying “surely the money would have been better spent on the mould and leaks at Middlemore Hospital.” This is a similar line to that being run by the National Party. It’s defence spokesperson, Mark Mitchell, has come out strongly against the inquiry, reiterating that when National was in office it carefully considered the evidence and was in no doubt an inquiry wasn’t needed. You can see his very good ten-minute interview with Breakfast TV’s Jack Tame here: Inquiry into deadly NZ-led Afghanistan raid labelled a waste of taxypers’ money by National. The New Zealand Defence Forces bosses remain confident they will be cleared by the inquiry. The head of the defence force, Lieutenant General Tim Keating, has emailed his staff to say that the “conduct of the NZSAS ground forces was exemplary” and the evidence he has will clear “the soldiers of any wrongdoing”. This email was leaked to Stuff journalists – see Laura Walters’ Over three hours of aerial footage of Afghanistan raid exists, NZDF says. This reports that “Keating also said there was ‘compelling material’, which could not be publicly released, including intelligence reports and video footage, which supported what NZDF had publicly said about the raid.” How well has the inquiry been set up? How any government inquiry is set up obviously has a significant impact on what is revealed, and whether justice is served. That’s why so much attention was paid to the terms of reference provided to the inquiry. Supporters of Hager and Stephenson had worried that these terms of reference would be too narrow, or that not enough resources or independence would be supplied by the Government. Such fears appear to have been unfounded. Both Hager and Stephenson have expressed their support for how the inquiry has been established. Stephenson has said, “It appears that the terms of reference are sufficiently broad to enable Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Sir Terence Arnold to ask the questions that I believe need to be asked”, and “I’m pleased that the issue of NZ involvement in transferring detainees to the Afghan secret police who are well known to torture detainees is going to be examined” – see Jo Moir and Henry Cooke’s Author Jon Stephenson pleased with inquiry, but queries Govt ‘muddying waters’. This article also reports Stephenson’s belief that witnesses would be dealt with appropriately: “He said the fact that the inquiry could take evidence under oath in secret and protect the identity of witnesses would mean his sources would be comfortable – particularly the ones who were serving at the time.” According to that article, the main issues that the terms of reference include are the following: “The allegations of civilian deaths. The allegation that NZDF knowingly transferred a man to a prison where he would be tortured. The allegation that soldiers returned to the valley to destroy homes on purpose.” There is one further, less publicised, focus of the inquiry, that has the potential to be even more explosive than the Hit and Run allegations: an examination of whether New Zealand soldiers were involved in assassination missions on behalf of other countries. Here are the terms of reference relating to this: “7.9 Separate from the Operation, whether the rules of engagement, or any version of them authorised the pre-determined and offensive use of lethal force against specified individuals (other than in the course of direct battle) and if so, whether this was or should have been a[aren’t to (a) NZDF who approved the relevant version(s) and (b) responsible Ministers.” Blogger No Right Turn has picked up on this, saying this “is a new and unpleasant issue, and highlights the dangers of letting foreigners decide when and in what circumstances NZ soldiers are allowed to kill” – see: Finally. He adds: “we know that many of NZDF’s allies (including the USA, UK and Australia) are not moral countries and their moral values around military action and assassination are deeply at odds with those of the New Zealand public (and with international law). It’s not clear whether there’s any allegation that NZDF soldiers have been involved in assassinations, but if they have, then they may have committed crimes under New Zealand and international law, for which they will need to be prosecuted.” Investigative journalists Eugene Bingham and Paula Penfold have worked on important stories about the 2012 Battle of Baghak, in which two New Zealand soldiers were killed in action. This controversy has been specifically excluded by the Government, which claims it has already been dealt with in an Army Court of Inquiry. Bingham and Penfold dispute this, and argue the inquiry needs to be considerably wider in scoop – see: Missing the target: The Government inquiry into Afghanistan raid. The journalists give kudos to the Government for establishing the new inquiry, but say “the specific concern over civilian casualties in Operation Burnham represents only a fraction of the problems with culture and lack of accountability at the top of Defence, particularly regarding the decade-long deployment to Afghanistan. Those problems run very, very deep. A bold Government would have taken on these issues. Instead, it has wilfully turned a blind eye.” They argue an inquiry needs to look broadly at the NZDF’s “lack of transparency and accountability. Of a culture of cover-up and obfuscation. And at the heart of it all are questions raised by families of fallen New Zealand soldiers in The Valley: why were we even in Afghanistan in the first place? What were we trying to achieve?” Muddying the waters In announcing the inquiry, the Attorney-General David Parker commented that he had been shown a US military video of the raid, and this “does not seem to me to corroborate some key aspects of the book Hit & Run”. Parker stated: “The footage suggests that there was a group of armed individuals in the village” and that this contradicted how Hager and Stephenson had portrayed the village as “non-threatening”. This is all best covered by Herald reporters Isaac Davidson, Lucy Bennett, Claire Trevett and David Fisher – see: Inquiry already prejudiced, say Hit & Run authors. The first problem with Parker’s actions is that he has refused to give further details, and has not secured the footage for the inquiry. Jon Stephenson believes Parker has pre-empted the actual inquiry: “In my view he’s prejudiced the inquiry and he’s provided that information without any context at all and refused to answer questions about it. He’s just muddied the waters… He’s essentially making statements that are prejudicial… Surely the professional and appropriate thing to do was to allow the inquiry to determine the facts, having heard all the evidence and render a verdict, not pre-empt that.” The must-read view on this is from Gordon Campbell, who sums up the situation like this: “at the outset of an independent government inquiry, the Attorney-General not only felt free to make unverifiable assertions about Hit & Run – but no guarantee can be given that even this august inquiry will be able to see the footage in question and draw definitive conclusions from it, either way. It seems amazing that NZDF is able to screen this footage for lobbying purposes with politicians whenever it suits NZDF to do so, while claiming that national security concerns prevent it from sharing the same information with either the public, the media, or – potentially – even with the $2 million inquiry set up to clarify the matters in dispute. As I suggested to Parker yesterday, we seem to be getting off on the wrong foot here” – see: On the Hit&Run inquiry. It opens the government up to criticism that Parker was deliberately throwing a bone to the defence forces with his reference to the video footage. After all, the Government has reportedly been under strong pressure not to hold the inquiry. Campbell’s column is also essential reading for anyone with concerns about what could go wrong with the inquiry. He points to a myriad of issues and dynamics that might allow authorities to effectively keep the lid on this particular can of worms. Finally, for satire from the past year on these issues, see my blog post, Cartoons about Hit & Run, and NZ in Afghanistan.

There’s an overlooked aspect of the New Zealand Defence Force’s account of Operation Burnham that when scrutinised suggests a possible breach of international humanitarian law and laws relating to war and armed conflict occurred on August 22, 2010 in the Tirgiran Valley, Baghlan province, Afghanistan.

According to New Zealand Defence Force’s official statements Operation Burnham ‘aimed to detain Taliban insurgent leaders who were threatening the security and stability of Bamyan Province and to disrupt their operational network’. (ref. NZDF rebuttal) We are to understand Operation Burnham’s objective was to identify, capture, or kill (should this be justified under NZDF rules of engagement), those insurgents who were named on a Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) that NZDF intelligence suggested were responsible for the death of NZDF soldier Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell.

When delivering NZDF’s official account of Operation Burnham before media, Lieutenant General Tim Keating said:

“After the attack on the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZPRT), which killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell, the NZPRT operating in Bamyan Province did everything it could to reduce the target profile of our people operating up the Shakera Valley and into the north-east of Bamyan Province. “We adjusted our routine, reduced movements to an absolute minimum, maximised night driving, and minimised time on site in threat areas. “The one thing the PRT [NZPRT] couldn’t do was to have an effect on the individuals that attacked Lieutenant O’Donnell’s patrol. For the first time, the insurgents had a major success — and they were well positioned to do so again.”

For the purpose of a counter-strike, intelligence was sought and Lt. General Keating said: “We knew in a matter of days from local and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intelligence who had attacked our patrol [where and when Lt. O’Donnell was killed].” The intelligence specified the villages where the alleged insurgents were suspected of coming from and Lt. General Keating said: “This group had previously attacked Afghan Security Forces and elements of the German and Hungarian PRTs.” The New Zealand Government authorised permission for the Kabul-based NZSAS troops to be used in Operation Burnham. “What followed was 14 days of reliable and corroborated intelligence collection that provided confirmation and justification for subsequent actions. Based on the intelligence, deliberate and detailed planning was conducted,” Lt. General Keating said. Revenge, Keating said, was never a motivation. Rather, according to him, the concern was for the security of New Zealand’s reconstruction and security efforts in Bamyan province. As stated above, Operation Burnham’s primary objective was to identify, capture or kill Taliban insurgent leaders named in the intelligence data. We know, from the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, Operation Burnham failed to achieve that goal.

Analysis of the NZDF Official Account The official account of events that occurred in the early hours of August 22, 2010, describe how Taliban insurgents, realising coalition forces were preparing to raid the area (marked as ‘Operation Burnham Area of Operation’ in a map (slide 3) declasified and released to media on March 27, 2017), formed a tactical maneuver using civilians (women, children and elderly) as a human shield.

Despite the official account placing this group within a building, within a small hamlet, within the area of operation, within Tirgiran Valley, there is no clear definitive official account yet given of what happened to either the civilians or the insurgents.

This appears to be an obvious void in the official record, but one that has failed so far to be scrutinised.

To follow the logic of Lt. General Tim Keating’s account (detailed below), is to discover our defence personnel, who were in charge of the ground and air operation during Operation Burnham, failed to identify what had become of those civilians (women, children, and the elderly), and also importantly the suspected insurgents who Lt. General Keating said during his briefing used the villagers as a human shield.

We know from the Chief of Defence Force’s notes as provided on March 27, 2017, that as Operation Burnham began, NZDF was in command of United States manned aircraft (including helicopters and possibly a AC-130). The aircraft were swarming above the Tirgiran Valley.

From the NZDF account an NZDF joint terminal air controller was in charge of the air attack against those NZDF had defined as insurgents. Lt. General Keating stated the alleged insurgents were armed and a NZDF commander authorised the US manned aircraft to commence firing.

Weapons-fire then began to rain down on the valley from above. Meanwhile NZSAS ground force soldiers prepared to secure their positions and to defend themselves against any potential enemy counter-attack.

Lt. General Keating stated the insurgents responded: “The insurgents, the guerrilla force, the tactic is mixed in with the civilian population, if you like, the term used is a human shield. So they use civilians as a shield.”

He added: “What occurred, is a helicopter was engaging a group of insurgents outside the village, on the outskirts of the village. During that engagement, it was noted by the ground forces there – the SAS ground forces – that some of the rounds [from the US manned aircraft] were falling short, and went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents.”

To be clear, from this account, Lt. General Keating stated a group of insurgents were being tracked, targeted, and fired upon by the US manned aircraft and under the command of a New Zealand Defence Force terminal air controller. Meanwhile, according to the NZDF record, one of the airborne helicopter’s weapon’s sights were not calibrated correctly, and, according to Lt. General Keating, 30mm projectiles went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents – remember these 30mm projectiles are capable of penetrating the side of a tank.

For accuracy, Lt. General Keating restated his account: “It is noted, the building, there were armed insurgents in there, but it is believed that there may have been civilians in the building.”

He then added: “There’s no confirmation that any casualties occurred, but there may have been.” He restated again: “There were civilians in that building.” Now, this is where the Chief of Defence Force’s account fails to further explain what occurred after that point. To summarise, the official position of the New Zealand Defence Force is:

• There were civilians in a building within the village that was fired upon by an armor piercing aircraft weapon
• That it was believed insurgents were also in that building
• That civilian casualties or deaths “may have been” or occurred inside the building.

At this juncture, we must consider whether the New Zealand Defence Force ground commanders had a responsibility to determine whether there were Taliban insurgents in the building?

And if so, whether they were the individuals listed on the JPEL list, those deemed responsible for the death of Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell?

And what of the ground commanders’ legal requirements, the duty of care with respect to civilians, were NZDF commanders on the ground or back in Kabul compelled by law to confirm the status of the civilians, whether they were injured or killed?

When asked by a journalist at the March 27, 2017 press conference: ‘If there may have been civilian casualties, why not have an inquiry to find out?’ Lt. General Keating replied: “Even if there was, as far as the New Zealand Defence Force has heard, the coalition investigation has, um, said that uh, if there were casualties, the fault of those casualties was a mechanical failure of a piece of equipment.” This reply does not appear to consider the legal requirements under:

• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 7: the obligation to provide medical assistance to all wounded, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 8: the obligation to search for and collect the wounded and to ensure their adequate care
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 13: the obligation to protect the civilian population against dangers arising from military operations
• Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, section 102. This section provides that the commanding officer of a person alleged to have committed an offence under that Act must initiate proceedings in the form of a charge or refer the allegation to civil authorities, unless the commanding officer considers the allegation is not well-founded. While little legal guidance is provided, it cannot be accepted that preliminary inquiries to determine whether an allegation is well-founded can be considered adequate where they fail to obtain evidence from the injured parties, determine their identities or even verify that they exist
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 28
• The NZDF Manual of Armed Forces Law provides that there are three types of inquiry in the NZDF: a preliminary inquiry, a court of inquiry and a command investigation. (It appears however the ISAF investigation cited by the Chief of Defence Force was not any of the above forms of inquiry).

Specifically, if you analyse Lt. General Keating’s account, the New Zealand Defence Force commanders failed to identify whether any insurgents were inside the building and whether there were dead or wounded civilians. Why was this the case? It seems reasonable to suggest, this is an abandonment of logic. It does not make sense.

We know from official NZDF documents the soldiers arrived at the scene of Operation Burnham at 0030 hours on August 22, 2010 and left at 0345 hours, that’s the official record. To clarify, the NZSAS commandos were in the area of operation for 3 hours 15 minutes.

Lt. General Keating stated, near the conclusion of the raid: “The ground force commander chose at that time that there was no longer a threat and they were leaving.”

How could that rationally be the case unless the suspected insurgents inside that building had been checked?

Was it not suspected that there were insurgents in that building? Surely the ground force commanders would be compelled to seek and identify the inhabitants of that building to see if they matched the names/descriptions on the JPEL list?

After all, the manhunt for Taliban leadership was the purpose of the raid that night. Also, logic would suggest, the people inside the building were in part civilians including women and probably children – by Lt. Keating’s account the group likely included wounded civilians and probably a dead child.

Also, it is reasonable to suggest, considering the events over those 3 hours 15 minutes, the survivors would have been crying, weeping, even howling, and the wounded would likely have been in agony.

It defies belief that the ground force commanders, and their counterparts back in Kabul, were not aware of this building, that the NZDF account states was housing suspected Taliban, and included a group of civilian victims that had been used as a human shield.

The entire area of operation specific to Operation Burnham is a skewed rectangle approximately 500 metres wide by 1 kilometre long, with an intensified operation plan focusing on two small hamlets, each approximately 50×200 metres in area [based on the scale measures of the NZDF map] – named Objective 1 and Objective 2 in the NZDF released material.

To state it simply, the official silence surrounding the above-mentioned building, and the fate of the people inside, speaks volumes. It leaves one to consider at worst whether a crime was committed by New Zealand Defence Force commanders that night – whether by failing in their duty to care for the injured they were in breach of Articles 8, 9 and 13 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

ADDITIONAL NOTE:
• The Statute of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as, inter alia, “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character”. (Ref. IHL Definition of war crimes, page 1 (pdf) – ICC Statute, Article 8 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 3))
• ‘The Statute defines as within the scope of the law, the “launching an attack without attempting to aim properly at a military target or in such a manner as to hit civilians without any thought or care as to the likely extent of death or injury amounts to an indiscriminate attack”.
• War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. Examples of the latter include failure to provide a fair trial and failure to provide food or necessary medical care to persons in the power of the adversary.’

At best, if NZDF’s official account is to be relied upon, we are to believe the NZSAS ground commanders failed to ensure the Taliban insurgents they sought were not holed up in a building that had sustained damage from coalition force aircraft. If this assumption is incorrect, at what point had the suspected insurgents left the building?

And what had become of the civilians that had been allegedly used as a human shield? Again, the vacuum of information specific to this aspect of the official account needs to be explained, including an explanation as to why NZDF’s account remains vague after six years since Operation Burnham was conducted.

It appears reasonable to assert that this single issue, notwithstanding the irregularities of official NZDF stated ‘facts’, warrants further official and independent investigation. As it is, at this juncture, we are left to consider a series of unanswered questions that to date the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force has failed to satisfy. Here are some of them. Key Unanswered Questions:

• What were the specific definitions of an insurgent that were used by NZDF for the purposes of evaluation during Operation Burnham and for the purpose of post-operation official analysis? For example; was it deemed that anyone who was male and of a fighting age was defined to be an insurgent?
• Were NZDF soldiers fired upon by individuals (villagers or insurgents) located within the confines of the villages or surrounding area during Operation Burnham?
• Was the individual who was killed by a NZSAS soldier or NZDF personnel carrying a weapon at the time of this shooting? If so, had he fired or attempted to fire his weapon in an attempt to kill or wound NZDF personnel?
• How long in minutes were the coalition forces’ helicopters, and any other airborne craft, firing their weapons on the villages and surrounding region during Operation Burnham?
• How long in minutes were NZSAS soldiers involved in securing the operational area from real or potential insurgent attack?
• Did NZDF personnel at anytime seek to identify individuals (and their status, injured, killed, or otherwise) who were located inside or near the building that Lt. General Keating said had suffered damage from an alleged mis-aimed firing from an airborne coalition aircraft?
• Were those who were injured or killed within sight of NZDF personnel before, during, and/or after the alleged mis-aimed firing?
• How many individuals did the NZDF personnel suspect were inside the building?
• How many of these people did the NZDF personnel suspect were civilians?
• How many were suspected of being women?
• How many were suspected of being children?
• Lt. General Keating suggested that one of the individuals that may have been killed during Operation Burnham was a six year-old child. What was the gender of this child?
• Was their any attempt to identify this six year-old victim?
• Was this child Fatima, the three year-old child identified in the Hit & Run [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] book? If not, then who was this child?
• What actions did NZDF personnel do to exercise their duty of care obligations to the injured and to civilians?
• What reports, cautions, evaluations were written and/or submitted regarding Operation Burnham to NZDF by the NZDF legal officer who was on the ground during Operation Burnham?

The Twisting Turning Official Account – Is This Smoke and Mirrors? As a consequence of the Hit & Run book [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] being published, New Zealand Defence Force’s top ranking soldier, Lt. General Tim Keating admitted civilians “may have been” killed during the operation.

Up until March 27, 2017, for the past six years, New Zealand Defence Force has insisted that no civilians were killed during Operation Burnham on August 22, 2010.

But on Monday, under questioning from the media, at the March 27 press conference, Lt. General Keating stated that the NZDF’s new “official line” regarding civilian deaths was “there may have been”. He then attempted to suggest that NZDF’s previously stated position – that claims of civilian deaths were “unfounded” – was basically the same thing. “I’m not going to get cute here and say it’s a twist on words, it’s the same thing, ‘unfounded’, ‘there may have been’. The official line is that there may have been casualties,” Lt. General Keating said.

A journalist then challenged him further suggesting: “They’re different things, one means they didn’t happen and one mean might’ve done.”

Lt. General Keating then replied: “You’re right…the, the, the official line is that civilian casualties may have occurred, but not corroborated.”

When asked how many insurgents were killed, Lt. General Keating replied: “A significant number of insurgents, identified insurgents, were killed during Operation Burnham.”

When asked again how many were killed, Lt. General Keating stated: “Nine.” When asked if NZDF had the names of the insurgents that were killed, he replied: “No, we do not have names of insurgents.”

This trajectory, inching toward a truth, occurred under tight questioning by a journalist, over just a few minutes.

What further truths will become relevant to understanding what occurred that night in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages should a commission of inquiry be established?

The Inconsistencies – A Summary

In evaluation, it is reasonable to assert the official Government inconsistencies observed along a six-year timeline offer the appearance of a military hierarchy that has being dragged, by degrees, (mainly by the work of Jon Stephenson, an investigative journalist specialising in war and conflict reportage) into an arena where the floodlight of public interest ought to shed light on secrets long since filed into a dark place.

However, considering the above, rather than responding openly to the challenge of meeting its responsibilities to the New Zealand Minister of Defence and public, the New Zealand Defence Force appears resistant to its obligations toward open and accurate disclosure of non-classified fact.

In conclusion, if this is true, this conduct exhibited by the officials of New Zealand Defence Force and its Chief Lt. General Tim Keating is hardly a defining benchmark of ‘exemplary’ standards.

Actually, the admissions of relevant information, that is forthcoming only when lanced from the New Zealand Defence Force under questioning, offers the impression of a smoke and mirrors operation – it may appear churlish to suggest, but perhaps the post-Operation Burnham aftermath ought to be referred to as Operation Desert Road (bleak, cold, inhospitable, proceed with caution).

The public deserves to know the whole truth, not spin or part-truths – both the public interest and the national interest depends on it.

By the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, it appears reasonable to suggest that the commanders overseeing Operation Burnham had legal obligations to civilians; that they were potentially negligent when considered against their stated rules of engagement, rules of conduct, obligations to international human rights law and international humanitarian law – negligent of their obligations to laws covering war and armed conflict, notwithstanding their obligations as representatives of the people and Government of New Zealand to observe the Bill of Rights Act.

It is also reasonable to suggest; there are significant established facts as mentioned above, as put by the New Zealand Defence Force, that require an official investigative response from the New Zealand Government.

It is also reasonable to insist that the matter of an absence of consistent fact emitting from the New Zealand Defence Force upon which a reliable opinion can be draw, adds weight to the burden on the Government to establish an inquiry into this matter.

If the New Zealand Prime Minister Bill English elects not to act then it will likely become a matter of political leadership or lack thereof.

If Bill English does not care to act on his office’s public interest obligations, then, it is reasonable to suggest he consider the empirical facts underlying this matter and the impact the matter has on New Zealand’s national interest. Should he fail to do so, this matter potentially could be argued before the International Criminal Court.

“It seems to me,” Lt. General Tim Keating stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.” – Lieutenant General Tim Keating, March 27, 2017.

On Monday, March 27, 2017 both the Prime Minister Bill English and the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force Lieutenant General Tim Keating countered details revealed in the book Hit & Run and argued facts stated in the work could not be relied upon because the authors ‘incorrectly’ alleged Operation Burnham took place in Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village deep in the mountainous Baghlan province of Afghanistan – two locations the Defence Force chief insisted his soldiers had never been to. Lt. General Keating asserted that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to the two villages (Khak Khuday Dad and Naik) and insisted Operation Burnham took place 2.2 kilometres to the south of where the authors Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson had marked the location of the villages (specifically on a map published in the book Hit & Run).

Lt. General Keating said: “As you will note from the book, the authors have been precise in locating these villages with geo reference points — so I have no doubt they are very accurate in the villages they are taking their allegations from.

“The villages lie in the Tirgiran Valley some 2 kilometres north from Tirgiran Village. In straight distance this is like comparing the distance from Te Papa to Wellington Hospital. However, if you overlay the elevated terrain, you will see we are talking about two very separated, distinct settlements,” Lt. General Keating said.

Beyond the obvious, it was a staggering claim, especially for those aware the New Zealand Defence Force had insisted one week prior, that its official position remained the same as stated in a media release dated April 20, 2011 that: “On 22 August 2010 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements, operating as part of a Coalition Force in Bamyan province, Afghanistan conducted an operation against an insurgent group.”

NZDF’s earlier position asserted New Zealand soldiers had not been in Baghlan province on or near August 22, 2010 the night of Operation Burnham. Now, the chief of New Zealand’s armed forces was admitting that they had.

At the press conference on Monday March 27, 2017 the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force prepared to stake his claim that the book could not be relied on as a factual reference.Before around 30 journalists, Lt. General Tim Keating pointed to four relevant bullet-points underlying key claims of fact in the book:

• Helicopter landing sites
• Location of houses that were destroyed
• Locations of where civilians were allegedly killed
• Presumed location of an SAS Sniper with evidence presented of SAS ammunition and water bottles which were found at the site.

A relationship was drawn between the Sniper location and the alleged killing of the individual Islamuddin, the School teacher. He acknowledged that the book contained a detailed list of those alleged to have been killed or wounded during a military operation in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages and a detailed list of the houses destroyed at the two locations.

Lt. General Keating then drove his point home that: “The underlying premise of the book is that New Zealand’s SAS soldiers conducted an operation on Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village…” “It seems to me,” he stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.”

Lt. General Keating pivoted. “Let me now talk about the ISAF Operation Burnham in Tirgiran Village.” The premise of the Chief of Defence Force’s position was; the book Hit & Run described events that may or may not have occurred in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages, but that these alleged events had nothing to do with New Zealand Defence Force soldiers as they had never been to the two locations as marked in the book.

Likewise, the Prime Minister, Bill English, said the book got it wrong, that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to either Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village.

The Prime Minister added: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

For some, it appeared the raid that night as described by the authors could have been committed by another force. For others, it seemed the authors had got a major fact wrong so therefore the remaining claims in the book were moot.

By mid-Wednesday morning, the Government and the public found out there was more to it, that the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force was also wrong with regard to his geography.

Unpicking the official line began in earnest late on Tuesday night (March 28, 2017) when the lawyers representing the alleged victims of Operation Burnham contacted their clients back in Afghanistan. The purpose of the contact was to identify the exact location of Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village; to confirm or otherwise disprove the existence of ‘Tirgiran Village’ (the NZDF stated official location of Operation Burnham), and to identify and confirm what village or villages are located at the exact co-ordinates as provided by Lt. General Tim Keating in his briefing to New Zealand media.

The lawyers’ clients, represented by a doctor from the region, stated categorically that ‘Tirgiran Village’ (as stated by Lt. General Keating) does not exist. That the region is known as Tirgiran Valley.

The lawyers evaluated from the new information, that to refer to the location of Operation Burnham as Tirgiran Village is like insisting an operation had occurred in Otago City (obviously Otago is a region and a city of that name does not exist, and as such would fail to offer an exact point of reference on a map).

Importantly, the lawyers confirmed, New Zealand Defence Force’ co-ordinates of where Operation Burnham took place were correct – but that the location was not as the NZDF had stated as ‘Tirgiran Village’ (an incorrect reference to a village that does not exist) but rather marks the geo-locations of where Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village are located.

Specifically, the villagers confirmed the red-rectangle as marked on the NZDF map provided by the Lt. General on Monday March 27, and referred to as the area specific to Operation Burnham, frames the exact positions of where Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages are located. So simply, the book contained a map that placed Khak Khuday Dad and Naik 2.2 kilometres north of there specific real locations.

And, the NZDF got it wrong by stating that those two villages were located where the book suggested, and that the village at the centre of Operation Burnham was a different village called Tirgiran Village (again, a place-name that does not exist).

So it turns out, according to those that live in the Tirgiran Valley, the Chief of Defence Force’s statement is incorrect or false; that when NZDF stated as a categorical fact that the New Zealand SAS commandos had never been to Khak Khuday Dad Village nor Naik Village, that that information was false.

At this point politically, it’s inescapable that the Prime Minister’s stated position ought to have taken a hit.

Remember back to the Prime Minister’s statement to media on Monday March 27, 2017 where he pitched his rationale: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

Surely, the same measure that was applied to the authors of Hit & Run now ought to be applied in equal measure to the New Zealand Defence Force chief and his officials.

After all, they also got their geography wrong. Since then, there has been stated unease about the whole issue by Internal Affairs Minister Peter Dunne (the minister who would have to sign off and authorise the costs of an inquiry should the Prime Minister order an inquiry be established).

By Thursday March 30, 2017 Dunne, through media, called for an inquiry into the whole affair. (ref. Stuff.co.nz ) Also on Thursday, the Minister of Defence at the time of the raid, Dr Wayne Mapp, wrote of his unease about Operation Burnham in a piece published on the Pundit website. (ref. Pundit ) Dr Mapp argued that the Government’s position, and that of the New Zealand Defence Force, cannot be the end of it. “Part of protecting their [the SAS’] reputation is also finding out what happened, particularly if there is an allegation that civilian casualties may have been accidentally caused. In that way we both honour the soldiers, and also demonstrate to the Afghans that we hold ourselves to the highest ideals of respect of life, even in circumstances of military conflict,” wrote Dr Mapp.

Common Statements Of Fact

The descriptions of Operation Burnham, in both the book, and, as stated by the New Zealand Defence Force, do mirror each account with precision on numerous vital points, including:

• The time of night Operation Burnham took place
• That New Zealand Defence Force was commanding and leading the operation (both on the ground and in the air)
• That the helicopters were manned by United States military personnel under New Zealand’s command
• That the purpose of the operation was to kill or capture those named as having been part of a Taliban insurgent raid that killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell
• That buildings were destroyed during the operation
• That people were killed at the villages.

However, anyone who has reasonably assessed the issue can see there is much more information to be revealed.

Conclusion: In concluding this analysis, it is an imperative that due to the highest levels of public and national interest concerning the alleged conduct, the seriousness of allegations, and the variables relating to the official account, that the matter be subjected to an independent commission of inquiry.

Heads roll and investigations begin over the Manumanu defence land deal. Video: EMTV

By Gynnie Kero in Port Moresby

Two Papua New Guinea cabinet ministers have stepped aside pending a Commission of Inquiry into the Manumanu defence ministry land deal in Central province.

Public Enterprise and State Investment Minister William Duma and Defence Minister Dr Fabian Pok voluntarily relinquished their portfolios to allow the commission to probe alleged illegal transactions of millions of kina in state funds.

Prime Minister Peter O’Neill yesterday announced the setting up of the inquiry to assess the allegations against senior ministers and senior members of departments.

O’Neill told a media conference that he had recommended the suspensions of the Defence Secretary Vali Asi, Lands and Physical Planning Secretary Luther Sipison, Valuer-General Gabriel Michael, Kumul Consolidated Holdings managing director Garry Hersey, Central Supply and Tenders Board chairman Philip Eludeme and Motor Vehicles Insurance Limited chief executive officer Joe Wemin pending the inquiry’s outcome.

The National Executive Council was expected to meet today to decide on the proposed suspensions.

“As of today (yesterday), I am also announcing that Minister for Defence Fabian Pok and Minister for State Enterprises William Duma will step aside from their ministerial responsibilities pending the conclusion and outcomes of the commission of inquiry,” O’Neill said.

“In the interim, the Ministry for State Enterprises will be taken care of by Charles Abel, Minister for National Planning, and the Ministry for Defence will be taken care of by Mao Zeming, Minister for Fisheries.

‘Best interests’
“It was the intention of the government to do this properly and fairly, and ensure NEC decisions, including the relocation of Murray Barracks and Taurama Barracks, are done in the best interests of the public.

“The people want to know the outcomes of these investigations and they will be given the opportunity to provide information to various investigations – through the Commission of Inquiry, Police Fraud Squad and the Ombudsman Commission.

“It is only proper that these allegations against senior members of the government and the public service, that they be afforded the principles of natural justice and be given the opportunity to answer these allegations.”

Gynnie Kero is a journalist with The National newspaper.