By Patrick Synan
Boston

As the trial of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández proceeds,^[1] as Guatemalan Attorney General María Consuelo Porras begins her controversial second term,^[2] and as the state of exception in El Salvador enters its 3rd month^[3], progressive members of Congress and the Senate maintain concerns about police and military funding for governments in the Northern Triangle.

In April, 11 Representatives signed a letter to House Appropriations State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chair Barbara Lee requesting an end to funds promised under the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).^[4] This follows a bill introduced in the Senate calling for a 5-year suspension of U.S. aid to Honduras. Presently, neither motion has enough support to move forward.^[5]

CARSI failed to improve security

The reasons for such proposals merit consideration. The primary concern listed in each document is the fragility of human rights in the region, but the letter to the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee also explicitly addresses costs. CARSI is expensive and counterproductive, it argues. Literature from human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch (HRW)^[6] and The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights supports these claims.^[7]

According to John Lindsay-Poland, who has researched the sale of U.S. arms in Latin America for decades, “evidence is strong that CARSI failed to improve security for people in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, as evidenced by the massive numbers of people who fled during the period of CARSI, at great risk, and that instead CARSI strengthened corrupt anti-democratic governments in those countries. Most of the funds did not go to military and police forces, but benefited economic elites there. Whether CARSI caused the worsening situation or not, it’s at the least been a waste of funds.”^[8]

Meanwhile, those who find value in CARSI’s continuation argue that its problems are more nuanced. Charles Call, non-resident Senior Fellow at Brookings, calls it “cherry picking to pull out CARSI (…) separate from the overall engagement with Central America.” According to Call, a more holistic review of U.S. policy in the region reveals “an approach that is highly technical and ignores the political dimension.”^[9]

CARSI began as the Central American component of the Mérida Initiative in the last year of the Bush administration, but it was rebranded shortly after Obama took office.^[10] According to the State Department one-pager, its objectives were to:

• Create safe streets for the citizens of the region;
• Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and between the nations of Central America;
• Support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments;
• Re-establish effective state presence, services and security in communities at risk; and
• Foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation between the nations of the region, other international partners, and donors to combat regional security threats.^[11]

The multi-million-dollar aid package remains in effect, despite over a decade of deteriorating human rights conditions, ongoing border insecurity and the consolidation of criminal infrastructure in much of the region.

Real accountability, non-existent

In Honduras, while the new presidency of Xiomara Castro is a positive development, the state bureaucracy remains occupied by countless Hernández loyalists^.[12] In Guatemala, President Giamattei has reappointed Attorney General Consuelo Porras after her first term produced the arrest or exile of nearly every anti-corruption or anti-impunity investigator working at the national level, most notably special prosecutor Juan Francisco Sandoval^.[13] In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has embarked on a project of dismantling democratic institutions like the Supreme Court^[14] and strengthening the state’s security apparatus, most recently through the state of exception, which enables law enforcement to jail arbitrarily.^[15] Each of the three countries receives millions in U.S. military and police aid each year through CARSI, but no serious accountability measures exist to ensure this money is used to accurately identify, capture, and fairly prosecute the perpetrators of serious crimes.

The U.S. federal government has been conspicuously critical of each country in the past year. Vicepresident Kamala Harris voiced her disapproval when Bukele fired Supreme Court judges and the country’s chief prosecutor.^[16] Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced the government’s designation of Consuelo Porras as a “corrupt and undemocratic actor” earlier this month.^[17] Meanwhile, the Department of Justice’s indictment of former President Juan Orlando Hernández alleges he “corrupted the legitimate institutions of Honduras, including parts of the Honduran National Police, military, and National Congress.”^[18] Nonetheless, despite U.S. concern, designations, or outright criminal charges, the State Department’s police and military funding for regimes in the Northern Triangle has risen steadily.

Honduras

The case of U.S. funding for the Honduran military and police is particularly curious. CARSI coincided with the country’s 12-year descent into lawlessness. The State Department, meanwhile, never made a move to turn off the faucet.

The total disintegration of the rule of law in Honduras began abruptly on June 28, 2009 when then-president Manuel Zelaya was removed from office in a military coup. Zelaya’s increasingly progressive policies were not favored by the landed elite and corporate interests operating in the region. In the year leading up to his ouster, he had unilaterally ordered a 60% increase in the minimum wage and issued a public opinion survey on whether to form a Constituent Assembly^.[19] His removal ushered in 12 years of illegitimate rule by the conservative National Party, whose leaders famously declared Honduras was “open for business”^[20] shortly after coming to power.

The degree to which the U.S. State Department was complicit in the coup is debatable. By referring to the ouster as only a coup and not a military coup, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton performed a delicate legal maneuver to avoid placing the United States in a predicament where by law Congress was obligated to withhold military funding.^[21] Authors like Alexandra Gale at COHA have remarked on the United States’ “selective indignation” towards dictatorships in Latin America, arguing that “Washington has endorsed (…) a range of military dictatorships in Panama, Honduras, and Guatemala, when they were seen as strategic geopolitical allies.”^[22] By not condemning the Honduran coup, the U.S. continued to sponsor a regime that deliberately engaged in human rights abuses for the sake of international business.

In the 1996 HRW World Report, Honduras received substantial praise for “establishing accountability for gross human rights violations that occurred in the 1980s.”^[23] Also in the Honduras section of the report are seven paragraphs dedicated to U.S. policy. This subsection opens by reiterating that Honduras “has taken important and courageous steps to account for the horrific history of Battalion 3-16,” the CIA-trained unit of the Honduran army responsible for a litany of high-profile political assassinations. It then admonishes the U.S., which “has still to do the same.”

This is the last time Honduras appears in a World Report until 2010, a year after the military ouster of Manuel Zelaya, the country’s last democratically elected president at the time, and over a year after CARSI was instated. The nature of the abuses described in subsequent reports progressively worsens; furthermore, each new edition devotes increased text to address prior violations that had not previously been revealed. One particularly enlightening case takes place in the Bajo Aguán valley, in eastern Honduras. According to the 2012 Report:

“More than 30 people were killed between January and August 2011 in the Bajo Aguán valley, a fertile palm oil-producing zone in northern Honduras. A long-simmering land conflict erupted in May when peasants occupied land being cultivated by large privately owned agricultural enterprises. Many victims were members of peasant associations who were allegedly gunned down by security guards working for the enterprises. In addition, four security guards were shot and killed in August 2011, when individuals armed with assault rifles and other arms reportedly tried to take over a ranch. In the absence of criminal investigation, the circumstances of each incident remained unclear. By September no one had been charged for the killings in the Bajo Aguán region.”^[24]

The 2013 Report on the Bajo Aguán is virtually a repeat of 2012, only the victim tally was doubled.^[25] In the 2014 Report, the 2012 number was tripled.^[26] By 2015, after less than a year of the Hernández administration, the case of the Bajo Aguán was replaced by a general section about population displacement, which owes largely to a concern that doesn’t appear in prior World Report analyses of Honduras: gang violence.^[27]

A survey of HRW Reports on Honduras reveals two key points: one, that CARSI funding was practically simultaneous with the breakdown of security in Honduras, which law enforcement was either unsuccessful in preventing or actively promoting; two, the emergence of rampant gang violence in Honduras was a post-CARSI phenomenon, which contradicts the State Department’s allegations that such funding was necessary to stop it.

Honduras drew unprecedented attention from other watchdog organizations as well. Prior to the coup, Honduras had not featured on the Inter-American Commission on Human RIghts’ annual reports for nearly a quarter of a century, its last appearance pertaining to an individual case of citizenship dispute and a case of two missing persons.^[28] By contrast, the IACHR covered post-coup Honduras for 5 consecutive years and returned to include it in its 2016 and 2021 reports. Furthermore, the IACHR published 4 observation reports on Honduras in 2009, 2010, 2015 and 2019.

Predictably, each of the reports addresses the illegitimacy of the coup regime and the escalation of violence in the Bajo Aguán. However, certain sections of these texts go on to address the systemic changes that took place to consolidate the National Party’s control in spite of widespread popular resentment. A 2015 observation report expressed concern over the weakened legitimacy of the police and the increasing presence of military forces throughout the country:

“The national police have lost the trust of citizens due to a lack of effective response, allegations of corruption, and links to organized crime. For this reason, the State has focused its efforts on legal and institutional reforms through which the Armed Forces have been gaining participation in functions that do not necessarily correspond to their nature, related, for example, to regular citizen security tasks. Various actors interviewed during the visit referred to the existence of a growing process of militarization to address insecurity, and therefore a greater presence of the military in the areas of greatest conflict, as well as an “open fight against organized crime,” without a clear process to strengthen the national police. Within this framework, the Military Police was created, as well as a group of judges and prosecutors of national jurisdiction whose objective is to accompany the Military Police to ensure that their actions are framed by law. These judges and prosecutors do not have sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality to hear known human rights violations by members of said Police. Based on its analysis, the IACHR has identified a series of concerns, among others, that military forces carry out activities that do not imply the defense of the country but rather enforce the law, issues that should correspond to the police.”^[29]

The expansion of military power and purview in Honduras is one of the ways in which the National Party has maintained its political influence in spite of the leftward agenda of the newly elected Castro administration. It is also a source of concern when it comes to the current government’s stability. Allison Lira, director of the Honduras program for the Witness for Peace Solidarity Collective, says, “there continues to be a very serious risk of another coup in Honduras…the military structure is still very much aligned with the interests that led to the [2009] coup in the first place.”^[30] Essential to the Honduran military structure, of course, is the economic support it receives from the United States through programs like CARSI.

Guatemala

Guatemala, typically the largest recipient of CARSI funds,^[31] has appeared yearly on the World Report since the 1990’s. Prior to 2010, reports generally portrayed a society engaged in a hard struggle to heal after decades of civil war. However, a continuing feature of this struggle was the state’s inability to hold the military accountable for crimes against civilians. Reports from 2006 to 2009 open with virtually the same five paragraphs:

“A dozen years after the end of Guatemala’s brutal civil war, impunity remains the norm when it comes to human rights violations. Ongoing violence and intimidation threaten to reverse the little progress that has been made toward promoting accountability. Guatemala’s weak and corrupt law enforcement institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful organized crime groups that, among other things, are believed to be responsible for attacks on human rights defenders, judges, prosecutors, and others.

Guatemala continues to suffer the effects of an internal armed conflict that ended in 1996. A United Nations-sponsored truth commission estimated that as many as 200,000 people were killed during the 36-year war, and attributed the vast majority of the killings to government forces.

Guatemalans seeking accountability for these abuses face daunting obstacles. Prosecutors and investigators receive grossly inadequate training and resources. The courts routinely fail to resolve judicial appeals and motions in a timely manner, allowing defense attorneys to engage in dilatory legal maneuvering. The army and other state institutions resist cooperating fully with investigations into abuses committed by current or former members. And the police regularly fail to provide adequate protection to judges, prosecutors, and witnesses involved in politically sensitive cases.

Of the 626 massacres documented by the truth commission, only three cases have been successfully prosecuted in the Guatemalan courts. The third conviction came in May 2008, when five former members of a paramilitary “civil patrol” were convicted for the murders of 26 of the 177 civilians massacred in Rio Negro in 1982.

The July 2005 discovery of approximately 80 million documents of the disbanded National Police, including files on Guatemalans who were murdered and “disappeared” during the armed conflict, could play a key role in the prosecution of those who committed human rights abuses during the conflict. By October 2008 …the country’s Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office had processed seven million of those documents, primarily related to cases presently under active investigation. The office plans to open the first part of the archive in 2009.”^[32]

Each of these documents identifies a perpetually weak judicial system and frightened civil societies fumbling in the shadow of an untouchable military and police force. Furthermore, the nearly identical text over four years suggests that no immediate improvements were likely without international pressure. But it isn’t obvious how channeling funds to an army that “resist[s] cooperating” and police who “routinely fail to provide adequate protection” would solve these issues. Subsequent reports do not tell a tale of success.

Far from being a repeat of the previous four years, the 2010 World Report shows an even further decline in the state of human rights in Guatemala. The summary of the section reads:

“Guatemala’s weak and corrupt law enforcement institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful organized crime groups and criminal gangs that contribute to Guatemala having one the highest violent crime rates in the Americas. Illegal armed groups, which appear to have evolved in part from counterinsurgency forces operating during the civil war that ended in 1996, are believed to be responsible for targeted attacks on civil society actors and justice officials. More than a decade after the end of the conflict, impunity remains the norm when it comes to human rights violations. The ongoing violence and intimidation threaten to reverse the little progress that has been made toward promoting accountability.”^[33]

Rather than aiding military and law enforcement officials in addressing violence and organized crime, CARSI coincided with the strengthening of “illegal armed groups” with ties to military forces. The 2011 Report describes military efforts to address gang violence resulting in “social cleansing.” In other words, the detention and/or disappearance of union organizers and social activists,^[34] The 2012 Report describes similar activity.^[35]

According to the 2013 Report, “President Otto Pérez Molina (…) increasingly used the Guatemalan military in public security operations, despite the serious human rights violations it committed during the country’s civil war.”^[36] This tendency was identified again in 2014^.[37] In 2015, HRW found that a force of 20,000 armed service members was active in a country whose territory measures 42,000 square miles.^[38]

In a 2015 observation report, the IACHR echoes HRW’s concerns about the state’s overreliance on the military to address domestic security challenges; in response it recommends a “return to the police reform agenda, specifically the plan named ‘The Police We Want.’”^[39] This is a particularly intriguing recommendation because “The Police We Want” is published by USAID, the organization through which CARSI funds are channeled. However, further IACHR reporting offers no indication that its recommendation was followed.

The USAID plan was supposed to operate from 2012 to 2020, but in 2014 a new framework for police reform emerged. The Integral Police Model for Community Security (MOPSIC) prioritized community-oriented policing (COP). According to Arturo Matute of the University of the Valley of Guatemala, it was popular among some of the largest foreign aid organizations operating in Guatemala.

“The donor community has backed preventive strategies in the police through the years, including the development of MOPSIC. The U.S. has provided the largest amounts of financial support through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).”^[40]

Despite the promising nature of the framework, however, the rollout of MOPSIC has been weak. Matute observes that presently, “police agents are scarcely trained in it.”^[41]

Despite the inefficacy of police reform, there were some advances in the justice system between 2013 and 2019. The World Reports during this timeframe applaud a series of high-level convictions. In 2013, former president Efrain Ríos Montt was found guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2015, Otto Pérez Molina was implicated in a tax fraud scandal and resigned. The major force behind this discovery was the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a UN-led investigative team operating in Guatemala since 2006 with a mandate to examine high level corruption cases. The 2016 World Report acknowledged this significant step forward along with restrictions on U.S. aid to Guatemala under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (this provision had a limited effect on CARSI funds).^[42] For a few short years, accountability appeared on the horizon.

The IACHR also expressed some cautious optimism in its 2015 report, writing: “ The IACHR notes changes in favor of a society committed with human rights, promoted by the work of public officials compromised with justice and human rights defenders as well as social leaders. The support of international human rights agencies, as well as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, for its acronym in Spanish), has been critical to those efforts.”^[43]

The momentum dissipated, however, in 2018 when Jimmy Morales “flanked by military and police officers, announced that he would not renew CICIG’s mandate when it expire[d] (…) in September 2019. The following week, he announced that he had prohibited CICIG Commissioner Iván Velásquez—who was on a work trip abroad—from re-entering the country.”^[44] This was the beginning of a political purge that only advanced in both speed and intensity during the Giamattei administration under the Attorney Generalship of Consuelo Porras.

The current state of Guatemala is quite grim. Far from witnessing a reduction in crime and gang violence since CARSI was first enacted (despite the package’s stated purpose of addressing these problems), the country now faces a regime dedicated to erasing the branches of state that could make any positive difference. Like Secretary Blinken, the most recent HRW World Report condemns the dissolution of anti-corruption institutions by Consuelo Porras and Giamattei. Neither the White House nor Human Rights Watch, however, mentions the uninterrupted flow of military funding.^[45]

El Salvador

Until recently, El Salvador has hardly featured in the yearly reports from HRW and the IACHR. The reasons for this gap are unclear. However, reports from 2019 onward illustrate a disappointing decline in the state of human rights, largely perpetrated by the state, despite ongoing funding from the United States.

The 2019 HRW World Report reads a lot like the reports from Guatemala and Honduras with respect to the deployment of the military in domestic affairs. It also addresses the discrepancies that abound in the state’s system of reporting deaths at the hands of security forces.

Since taking office in 2014, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén has expanded the military’s role in public security operations, despite a 1992 peace accord stipulation that it not be involved in policing. Killings of alleged gang members by security forces in supposed “armed confrontations” increased from 142 in 2013 to 591 in 2016.^[46]

The placement of the phrase “armed confrontations” in quotes presumably refers to a reporting phenomenon in El Salvador, where practically any death at the hands of police was identified as the result of a confrontation, even when the victims were not in any position to defend themselves. El Faro editor Oscar Martínez details some of these curious blunders in his most recent book, Los muertos y el periodista, saying that “any ‘confrontation’ where no police were injured or they didn’t give access to the crime scene was a massacre.”^[47] In three years, the number of Salvadorans killed in operations of this kind more than quadrupled.

At the same time, U.S. bilateral aid to El Salvador appears to have escalated in kind. In 1996, HRW identified a decline in U.S. assistance, with $27 million being spent between the years 1992 and 1995 on the nascent peace process, whereas the 2019 Report estimated $42 million was delivered in the prior fiscal year alone^[48]. Much of this funding was withheld in 2019, according to the Government Accountability Office, which states that CARSI was cut by over 176 million dollars to penalize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for the migrant crisis. GAO documentation, however, only identifies staffing cuts for non-State/non-INL projects. As far as program cuts, the percentage of funding withheld from social programs is nearly twice that withheld from State/INL programs.^[49] The 2021 World Report subtly addresses this discrepancy when it notes that “the U.S. appropriated over $72 million in bilateral aid to El Salvador, particularly to reduce extreme violence and strengthen state institutions [italics added]” in the previous fiscal year, up from $62 million the year before.^[50]

Despite steadily increasing security aid, the 2020 World Report once again identifies a rise in “confrontation” killings, stating that: “Salvadoran police and soldiers killed 1,626 people from 2010 through 2017. Authorities claimed that more than 90 percent of the victims were gang members and that nearly all were killed in ‘confrontations.’”^[51] The IACHR published similar findings in its 2021 report, claiming:

“Civil society organizations have stated that, within the last five years, at least 2,173 armed clashes have been recorded, which have led to the death of 1,930 people. Out of these casualties, 96.8 percent were citizens who were identified as gang members according to the official sources. By the end of 2019, the number of recorded conflicts since 2014 rose to 2,514, in which 2,025 people died, out of whom 1,957 were civilians and 68 were police or military officers. In addition to the high number of civilians killed when compared to the number of state agents who were murdered over the same period of time, according to an analysis carried out by the University Observatory for Human Rights of the Central American University, the fatality rate in these clashes was alarming and “clearly indicative of the excessive use of lethal force. Thus (…) the number of dead people (193) was allegedly higher than the number of injured people (76) among those identified as ‘criminals or gang members.’”^[52]

The 2021 World Report notes significant declines in homicides, but simultaneously remarks on egregious attacks on democratic processes and institutions. The introduction describes how then newly elected president Nayib Bukele “entered the Legislative Assembly with armed soldiers in an apparent effort to intimidate legislators into approving a loan for security forces.”^[53] The 2022 World Report details the nature of Bukele’s assault on the judicial sector, explaining that he “removed and replaced all five judges of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber, as well as the attorney general (…) appointed five new judges to the Supreme Court, in violation of the process established in the constitution (…) [and] passed two laws dismissing all judges and prosecutors over 60 years of age or with 30 or more years of service.”^[54]

Bukele is not the military or the police, but his repeated and drastic power grabs consolidate his control over how these forces are deployed. His influence thus far over law enforcement is ethically dubious. El Faro, one of the most established Salvadoran press agencies, has linked the lowered homicide rate in 2020 to negotiations between government leaders and gang leaders who received protections, privileges, and in some cases even freedom.^[55] The 2023 Report is likely to address the state of exception and the unprecedented rise in homicides that directly preceded it.

Rooting Out Corruption

“It’s not at all true that an increase in human rights violations is due to CARSI,” says Professor Call. The problem, in his view, is corruption and the slowness of U.S.-led efforts to recognize and penalize it; the aid itself, however, is a gesture of goodwill, without which peace in the region would be far more challenging to secure. As for the Senate bill to suspend aid to Honduras, Call says, “it’s stupid, period,” adding that the newly-elected Castro government is “moving in the right direction.”^[56]

Call’s perspective is emblematic of the more moderate view that is likely to prevail in Congress when the budget for FY23 is passed: the dedication of funds to governments in the Northern Triangle is an otiose debate topic for most U.S. policymakers; among moderates, the more appropriate question is how to root out bad actors, whose actions dilute the efficacy of programs funded by plans like CARSI.

A number of arguably effective measures exist, such as indictments and extradition, the Engel list, support and expansion of DEA-vetted units, community violence prevention (CVP) programs, and more frequent and thorough reviews of the kinds of military and police training programs the U.S. pays for in Central America. The extent to which such measures can be fully executed is limited by certain key factors. “It’s just unfortunate,” Call states, “the attorney general in all three countries is not someone who’s committed to fighting corruption (…) and is quite committed to impunity in Guatemala and El Salvador.”^[57] So far, the Engel list has not weakened commitments of this kind.

According to former U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, Stephen Macfarland, however, it’s still too soon to draw any conclusions about the efficacy of U.S. policy in Central America. In an interview in February with CNN en español, he explained:

“The warning signs [in Guatemala] have gone basically unheard by politicians and shamefully the economic elite. If one thinks of what has happened in Honduras with Juan Orlando Hernández, all that is an investigation that did not begin with (…) the president, but rather with other drug traffickers (…) during three consecutive governments in the United States, that investigation went on. So Guatemalans need to ask themselves: how different are they from Honduras? I would say, in many respects, Guatemala is worse.”^[58]

Macfarland implies that impunity has a lifespan, and like former president Hernández of Honduras, Guatemalan president Giamattei and his administration will one day face justice themselves. Bukele, as well. It’s a matter of time and patience. For the Senators and Congresspeople calling to suspend CARSI funding, however, time and patience have run out.

---

Sources

^[1] “Juan Orlando Hernández: Honduran ex-leader pleads not guilty”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61393266.amp

^[2] “Guatemalan prosecutor labeled corrupt by U.S. gets tapped for new term”, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/guatemalan-prosecutor-labeled-corrupt-by-us-gets-tapped-new-term-2022-05-17/

^[3] “El Salvador extends state of emergency amid gang crackdown”, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/26/el-salvador-extends-state-of-emergency-amid-gang-crackdown

^[4] “Letter to Chairwoman Lee”, https://cispes.org/sites/default/files/quill_-_letter_l3588_-_suspend_security_assistance_to_northern_triangle_in_fy23_-_version_1_-_04-26-2022_11-14_am.pdf

^[5] “S.388 – Honduras Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2021”, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/388

^[6] This article examines World Reports from the 1990’s up to the present day and finds an overall decline in the state of human rights in the Northern Triangle. An archive of HRW World Reports is accessible at https://www.hrw.org/previous-world-reports

^[7] This article also considers the less frequently published yet far deeper analyses of the human rights situations in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala issued by the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights; it finds police and military repression are consolidated practices in each state and inevitably result in the denial of basic freedoms, including the right to life.

^[8] Correspondence with the author

^[9] Interview with the author.

^[10] “MÉRIDA INITIATIVE The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures”, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-837.pdf

^[11] “The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership”, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/183768.pdf

^[12] “How Honduras’s Congress Split in Two”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/honduras-congress-split-crisis-xiomara-castro-inauguration-corruption-libre-national-party/

^[13] “Guatemala’s Former Top Anti-Graft Prosecutor Decries Arrest Warrant”, https://insightcrime.org/news/guatemalas-former-top-anti-graft-prosecutor-decries-arrest-warrant/

^[14] “US concerned over removal of top Salvadoran judges”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56970026.amp

^[15] “El Salvador Declares State of Exception in Response to Wave of Murders”, https://www.coha.org/el-salvador-declares-state-of-exception-in-response-to-wave-of-murders/

^[16] “Kamala Harris Rejects Actions of the President of El Salvador”, https://www.telesurenglish.net/amp/news/US-Rejects-Democracy-Violations-In-El-Salvador-20210503-0003.html

^[17] “Designation of Attorney General Maria Consuelo Porras Argueta de Porres for Involvement in Significant Corruption and Consideration of Additional Designations”, https://www.state.gov/designation-of-attorney-general-maria-consuelo-porras-argueta-de-porres-for-involvement-in-significant-corruption-and-consideration-of-additional-designations/

^[18] “United States of America v. Juan Orlando Hernández”, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1496096/download

^[19] Cunha Filho CM, Coelho AL, Pérez Flores FI. A right-to-left policy switch? An analysis of the Honduran case under Manuel Zelaya. International Political Science Review. 2013;34(5): 526.

^[20] “Honduras is Open for Business”, https://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-for-business/

^[21] “González: Hillary Clinton’s policy was a Latin American crime story”, https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gonzalez-clinton-policy-latin-american-crime-story-article-1.2598456

^[22] “The State Department’s Selective Indignation to Undemocratic Elections in Latin America”, https://www.coha.org/the-state-departments-inconsistent-and-ineffective-response-to-the-undemocratic-proliferating-through-latin-america/

^[23] “Human RIghts Watch World Report 1996”,  https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-08.htm#P719_175896

^[24] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2012”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012

^[25] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2013”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013

^[26] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2014”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014

^[27] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2015”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015

^[28] “Informe Anual de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 1984-1985”, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/84.85sp/Indice.htm

^[29] “Situación de derechos humanos en Honduras”, ​​https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Honduras-es-2015.pdf

^[30] Mendez Gutierrez, Maria José, “Delegation Report Back: Lessons from Central American Resistance & Diasporic Solidarity,” Youtube video, 5:11, posted by “closethesoa,” May 24, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiImEOIRJr8

^[31] “CARSI IN GUATEMALA: Progress, Failure, and Uncertainty”, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala.pdf

^[32] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2009”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009

^[33] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2009”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010

^[34] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2011”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011

^[35] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2012”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012

^[36] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2013”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013

^[37] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2014”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014

^[38] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2015”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015

^[39] “Situación de derechos humanos en Guatemala: diversidad desigualdad y exclusión”, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Guatemala2016.pdf

^[40] Matute, Arturo 2020. “Possibilities of Advancing Police Reform in Guatemala through Community -Oriented Policing,” Journal of Human Security, Librello publishing house, vol. 16(2), pages 97-110.

^[41] Matute, Arturo 2020. “Possibilities of Advancing Police Reform in Guatemala through Community -Oriented Policing,” Journal of Human Security, Librello publishing house, vol. 16(2), pages 97-110.

^[42] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2016”, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016; “ Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress”, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41731.pdf

^[43] “Informe Anual 2015”, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/anual/2015/doc-es/InformeAnual2015-Cap4-Guatemala-ES.pdf

^[44] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2019”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf

^[45] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2022”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

^[46] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2019”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf

^[47] Martinez, Los Muertos y el Periodista (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2021) 30.

^[48] “Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-05.htm#P451_111820; “Human Rights Watch World Report 2019”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf

^[49] “NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA: The 2019 Suspension and Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects”, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104366.pdf

^[50] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2021”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf

^[51] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2020”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf

^[52] “The Human Rights Situation in El Salvador 2021”, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-EN.pdf

^[53] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2021”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf

^[54] “Human Rights Watch World Report 2022”, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

^[55] “Audios de Carlos Marroquin revelan que masacre de marzo ocurrió por ruptura entree Gobierno y MS”,  https://elfaro.net/es/202205/el_salvador/26175/Audios-de-Carlos-Marroqu%C3%ADn-revelan-que-masacre-de-marzo-ocurri%C3%B3-por-ruptura-entre-Gobierno-y-MS.htm

^[56] Interview with the author

^[57] Interview with the author

^[58] “La gente tiene hambre saber tras la investigación ‘Guatemala Testigo Protegido’”, https://www.audacy.com/cnnespanol/podcasts/conclusiones-23356/la-gente-tiene-hambre-de-saber-tras-la-investigacion-guatemala-testigo-protegido-segun-periodista-de-el-faro-1258204965

By Patricio Zamorano
Washington DC

Brian Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, visited Honduras the week before the presidential elections. His stated purpose was to “encourage the peaceful, transparent conduct of free and fair national elections.” He did not meet with the de facto President, Juan Orlando Hernández.

The gesture was clear and illuminating on two levels.

First, it showed that the U.S. government had already accepted the irrefutable truth that the center-left coalition led by Xiomara Castro would earn the votes of the Honduran people (as we go to publication, she was in the lead with 53.6%).^[1] Honduras’ 5.1 million voters would also elect three vice-presidents, 298 mayors, 128 deputies to the national legislature, and 20 to the Central American Parliament.

Second, Nichols’ gesture of not meeting with the de facto president once again made clear that Honduras’ future continues to be overwhelmingly determined by the United States. The U.S. maintains its largest military base in Latin America^[2] at Palmerola and supported the narco-government of Juan Orlando Hernández for eight long years, with a clear electoral fraud in the middle of it.

The sanctions on Honduras that never happened

Supporting a third electoral fraud in Honduras would have been a political indecency that even the Northern superpower couldn’t stomach this time, as it did in 2017.^[3] In 2014 there were serious accusations of fraud to which the international community turned a deaf ear. And in 2017, even the Organization of American States (OAS) certified there was fraud when it publicly stated that it could not declare Hernández to be the winner and called for new elections.^[4] But the pressure for “hemispheric democracy” stopped there; the OAS never suspended Honduras from its Permanent Council in Washington, kept its country office in Tegucigalpa open, and basically gave the de facto Hernández government completely normal treatment. There were never any U.S. sanctions against Hernandez’ narco state. If that is not a scandalous double standard, what is?

In the meantime, the U.S. courts did not follow the Trump and Biden script. An investigation by New York prosecutors into drug trafficking by the de facto president’s brother, Tony Hernández,^[5] has placed Juan Orlando Hernández himself on the record as protecting drug traffickers, paying bribes, and engaging in organized crime.^[6]

Military presence of the United States in a narco-state

The levels of violence, crime, and corruption in Honduras have reached historic levels, causing the massive migration of thousands of desperate families to the United States’ southern border (Honduras has the third highest homicide rate in the Americas per 100,000 population^[7]). All of this is occurring under the watchful gaze of the U.S. military in Honduras, including troops and intelligence personnel who, for some reason, are almost comically ineffective against the organized crime that uses Honduras as a trans-shipment point for illegal drugs coming out of Colombia—another U.S. ally.

How is it that Juan Orlando Hernández’ family and dozens of drug cartels can operate so comfortably in the country while under the sophisticated technological surveillance of the U.S. government on Honduran soil? The United States, the biggest consumer of illegal drugs on the planet, is feeding the criminal network that has been rocking Honduras and all of Central America. This crisis also directly impacts Mexico, which has had to deal with major migration pressures at its own borders. Policies from the new Xiomara Castro administration will have influence in this area.

Political and economic feudalism kills thousands

Honduras’ history is one of political feudalism that continues to keep the country trapped among old political forces that have not been able to complete the urgent task of re-founding the country with a new social contract. Each day that the country remains in chaos, dozens of Hondurans lose their lives, are kidnapped, wounded, or forced to flee their country.

The United States and the OAS are directly responsible for the debacle of the past 12 years. The 2009 coup d’etat that overthrew President Manuel Zelaya exposed the fragility of  Honduras’ political institutions. One of the justifications of the coup was that the Zelaya administration was discussing the possibility of reforming the Constitution to democratize it, including opening the possibility of re-electing the president. Just a few years later, the constitutional branch of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hernández to allow that exact thing to happen; it issued a de facto authorization, without amending the Constitution, so that Juan Orlando Hernández could be re-elected even though Article 239 of the Constitution forbids it.^[8] This time there was no coup or complaint from the U.S.

In 2021 the U.S. and OAS seem to be washing their hands of this scandalous past, eliminating from the equation an undesirable de facto president who is no longer capable of serving the northern country’s geopolitical strategy when his party’s candidate, Nasry Asfura, from Partido Nacional (National Party) only garnered 34% of the vote.

A new stage of uncertainty

The isolation to which the U.S. subjected Juan Orlando Hernández these past few months simply reflected how unpopular the de facto president had become.

The big question is how the U.S. will behave toward the new president, Xiomara Castro. She is the wife of deposed president Manuel Zelaya, a large landholder who underwent a major ideological shift while in office, establishing close relations with the Bolivarian countries and becoming an ally of Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela during the deceased president’s halcyon years.

The alliance that got Xiomara Castro elected includes center-left forces that will face the arduous task of building a government and counteracting the penetration of drug traffickers and organized crime. The alliance includes the Partido Libertad y Refundación (LIBRE, whose coordinator is former President Zelaya), and the “Savior of Honduras” party, chaired by the presidential candidate from whom the election was stolen in 2017, Salvador (Savior) Nasralla. The coalition also includes the Partido Innovación y Unidad-Social Demócrata (PINU-SD), the Alianza Liberal Opositora, and others.

First urgent task: re-found the country politically and socially

But the most important task is to resume the process that was truncated by the 2009 military coup d’etat. The Honduran constitution is profoundly anti-democratic. It still contains articles that Hondurans say are “set in stone”—institutional areas that cannot be reformed (except through dubious acts such as when the Supreme Court allowed Hernández to stand for re-election).

The biggest challenge for Honduras is the new social contract between the State and the citizens, to “democratize access to democracy.” The retrograde, feudal elite that continues to run the country must give real space to allow the 50% of the population languishing in poverty to have representation.^[9] Groups in social movements over issues of gender, peasant and indigenous rights, trade unions, and cultural associations must be able to win seats in Congress, in the political parties, and be part of the presidential cabinet.

The international community could play a vital role in encouraging the democratization that Honduran voters are clearly demanding by giving the new Xiomara Castro administration room, support, and financial aid to make the necessary changes without suffering the economic and political attacks from the U.S. that some leftist governments in Latin America face. It can also put pressure on the entrenched local elites. The Honduran people have suffered enough, as witnessed by the humanitarian tragedy on the U.S. southern border. It is ethically incumbent on all parties that purport to believe in democracy to respect the wishes of the majority of Hondurans to take their country back from the drug lords and organized crime, and build their own form of democracy free from outside interference.

Patricio Zamorano is an international analyst and Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA)

Jill Clark-Gollub contributed as co-editor.

Translation by Jill Clark-Gollub

[Main photo: President-elect of Honduras, Xiomara Castro, shows her ink-stained finger during the presidential election on November 28. Photo credit: Alina Duarte, COHA Senior Research Fellow, from Honduras]

---

Sources

^[1] “Elecciones Nacionales de Honduras,” https://resultadosgenerales2021.cne.hn/#resultados/PRE/HN

^[2] “Max Blumenthal drops by the largest US military base in Latin America,” https://thegrayzone.com/2019/07/20/max-blumenthal-palmerola-air-base-honduras/

^[3] “US recognizes re-election of Honduras president despite fraud allegations,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/22/us-recognizes-re-election-of-honduras-president-despite-calls-for-a-new-vote

^[4] “Statement by the OAS General Secretariat on the Elections in Honduras,” https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-092/17

^[5] “US court sentences Honduran president’s brother to life in drug case,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/honduras-president-brother-sentenced-life-drug-trial

^[6] “Is the President of Honduras a Narco-Trafficker?,” https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/11/15/is-the-president-of-honduras-a-narco-trafficker

^[7] “Homicide rates in selected Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2020,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/947781/homicide-rates-latin-america-caribbean-country/

^[8] “Hernandez receives green light to run for reelection as Honduras president,” https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/hernandez-receives-green-light-to-run-for-reelection-as-honduras-president/50000262-3125310

^[9] “Honduras Poverty Rate 1989-2021,” https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/HND/honduras/poverty-rate

By John Perry
From Masaya, Nicaragua

Both Honduras and Nicaragua hold presidential elections in November 2021 and the US government has a strong interest in both, although for rather different reasons. Both have incumbent presidents who will either stand again or, in the case of Honduras, more likely be replaced as candidate by a successor seen as reliably committed to the same style of government. Given that both countries are economically and militarily tiny, it might be thought that Washington would be unconcerned by their internal affairs, but in reality it sees much at stake.

Promoting democracy or promoting “polyarchy”?

The issues that concern the US in Central America are rooted in more than a century of intervention in its politics. The forms of intervention have changed, of course, but always based on the fundamental aim of pursuing US corporate interests. For decades this meant supporting dictators like Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza or Guatemala’s Efraín Ríos Montt, but later it was more convenient to “promote democracy” until, two decades ago, democratic elections in Latin America produced the “wrong” results. This brought a further shift in US intervention, towards what William Robinson (who worked in Nicaragua in the 1980s) called promoting polyarchy,^[1] a limited form of democracy with “elite rule by transnational capitalists and agents or allies, in which the participation of the masses is limited to choosing among competing elites in tightly controlled elections” (a system which has applied in Honduras for several decades). Robinson added that “democracy promotion” and electoral intervention programs were combined with “coercive and other forms of diplomacy, economic aid or sanctions, international media and propaganda campaigns(…) military or paramilitary actions, covert operations and so on” to destabilize undesirable left-wing governments. Timothy Gill argues that this policy now has a further twist,^[2] towards “supporting opposition actors to unseat democratically-elected far leftist leaders,” using agencies like USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy. Such measures have been deployed in Nicaragua for the last 15 years.^[3]

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In considering the dilemmas Washington faces in pursuing its interests, this article sets aside for the moment the obvious case for respecting the sovereignty of both countries as the US has no legitimate right to interfere in them. Not only is this argument correct but it is one deployed by the US itself in relation to its own elections: it has complained loudly about alleged Russian interference and has strict laws in place to deter foreign influence in US politics. Yet it openly tries to influence other countries’ elections and condemns as ‘repressive’ those governments which deploy similar laws. A former US Congressman, the libertarian Ron Paul, is reported to have said that “It is particularly Orwellian to call US manipulation of foreign elections ‘promoting democracy.’ How would we Americans feel if for example the Chinese arrived with millions of dollars to support certain candidates deemed friendly to China?”^[4]

US concerns in Central America

What are US concerns in Central America? Foremost in its effect on US domestic politics is the issue of migrants crossing its southwest border, which in 2021 has hit levels not seen for two decades^[5] and is forecast by officials to reach one million arrivals over the course of the year,^[6] with many of these coming from Honduras but few from Nicaragua. Drug trafficking is another concern related to the US’s porous border, with Central America used as a staging post for shipments from Colombia and elsewhere. A third concern is that, despite their small size, the US considers both countries to be of strategic importance. Honduras is a US military asset because its base at Soto Cano (one of 76 in Latin America), gives it quick access to the rest of the region. In contrast, Nicaragua is categorized as “an extraordinary and unusual threat” to US security which, according to Admiral Fuller,^[7] head of the US Southern Command, is “trying to destabilize democracies in the area.” Fourth, in terms of human rights, the US categorizes both countries as deficient, although the State Department’s recent 2020 reports suggest far greater concern with Nicaragua (to which it devotes 39 pages) than Honduras (just 27 pages).^[8]

The fifth factor driving US interest in the outcome of the November elections is one largely unmentioned in official discourse but is perhaps the most important: that the two countries represent completely different economic models. While both are open to international markets and for both the US is their main trading partner, Honduras is pursuing an extreme, neoliberal development model based on the extraction of natural resources at whatever cost to local communities, a minimal role for the public sector, and maintaining the continent’s second most unequal income distribution (after Brazil)^[9]. On the other hand, Nicaragua has a mixed economy, with policies focused on public sector and social investment, anti-poverty initiatives, and promotion of small enterprise and food sovereignty, which have cut extreme poverty by more than half since 2007^[10].

Given the importance of this fifth factor, the US might be expected to support the present governing model in Honduras while favoring the opposition in Nicaragua. Indeed, as far as the latter is concerned, this is what is happening: the US has maintained an antagonistic stance towards Daniel Ortega’s government with sanctions aimed both at Nicaragua’s economy and at individual government officials; it has persuaded allies such as the European Union and the UK to follow suit; it is proactively funding opposition groups and local media through the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID, and it has instituted the “RAIN” programme (“Responsive Assistance in Nicaragua”)^[11] which is explicitly aimed at achieving Ortega’s electoral downfall.

However, while this may be the obvious stance for the US to take, with clear precedents from the 1980s and earlier, it is far from clear that it really serves US interests, as we shall see.

The US dilemma in Honduras

In Honduras, the US faces a dilemma. Its president, Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH), was favored by the Trump administration principally because he is a strongman (utilizing la mano dura, in Spanish) who is willing to forcibly stop Honduran migrants from leaving the country and who signed an absurd “safe country” agreement implying that Honduras was a haven for asylum seekers. A similar agreement with Guatemala led a Trump-era official to declare that “The Guatemalan border with Chiapas [in Mexico] is now our southern border.”^[12] In return, Trump was willing to acquiesce in the disastrous domestic policies being pursued by JOH even though they are pushing more Hondurans to attempt to leave.

Part of President Joe Biden’s problem in dealing with Honduras is that the blame for its disastrous policies extends back to Barack Obama’s presidency when, in 2009, he turned a blind eye^[13] to the military coup which deposed the progressive President Manuel Zelaya. The coup led to a succession of neoliberal governments and legitimized a series of flawed elections which culminated, in 2017, with JOH being returned as president even though the counting of the vote was clearly fraudulent.^[14] Since 2009, opposition has been suppressed by increasingly militarized police forces (the country has several different ones)^[15] which, far from preventing the endemic gang violence, appear to have fostered it, so that many migrants say they are literally running for their lives. Human rights abuses were brought to international attention by the murder of Indigenous land rights activist Berta Cáceres in 2016,^[16] the most notorious of a continuing series of assassinations and disappearances of community activists. Corruption is also rife, with the US-favored elites able to steal from the state with virtual impunity after the failure and disbanding of a US-sponsored anti-corruption body known as the MACCIH (Misión de Apoyo Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad en Honduras).^[17] Since it was closed, 93% of those accused in corruption cases begun by the MACCIH have been freed.^[18]

Honduras, a new “narcostate”

Nothing has illustrated Biden’s dilemma more clearly than two recent US prosecutions for drug-running which have implicated numerous Honduran government officials and led to it being labelled a “narcostate”. The first was the conviction of JOH’s brother Tony,^[19] who faces at least 30 years in prison for bringing 200,000 kilos of cocaine into the US. The prosecution concluded that drug traffickers “infiltrated” and “controlled” the Honduran government.^[20] The defendant in the second case, Geovanny Fuentes, claimed that his drug labs were protected by the military on the orders of JOH himself,^[21] quoting him as saying that he would “shove the drugs right up the noses of the gringos” by flooding the US with cocaine. While JOH was quick to deny the allegations and to remind Biden of their past friendship, the new administration has been obliged to distance itself, saying that “We are committed to partnering (…) with those in the Honduran Government that are committed to working with us to root out the corruption that has become really endemic to that country.”^[22] A US Special Envoy recently went on a four-day visit to Guatemala and El Salvador to investigate the root causes of migration, but not to Honduras.^[23] To worsen matters, Honduras is reported to have been “flooded” with Colombian cocaine since the start of 2021.^[24]

Corruption affects fight against COVID-19

A combination of natural disasters has highlighted the ways in which the narcostate fails not just the poor but the majority of Hondurans. In November 2020, two hurricanes hit a country totally unprepared for them, destroying 6,000 homes and seriously damaging 85,000 more.^[25] Six months afterwards, the international organization Médecins Sans Frontières said the government’s response had been “inadequate”, leaving more than 55,000 people still living in temporary shelters.^[26] Poverty in Honduras increased to 70% in 2020,^[27] up 10.7 percentage points from 59.3% in 2019, driven by tropical storm damage and by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The massive disruption has provoked a fresh peak of coronavirus infections in 2021. Honduras has the lowest COVID-19 vaccination rate in Central America, to the point where mayors in seven cities near the border with El Salvador asked for and received vaccines from their Salvadoran counterparts.^[28] Hondurans living near the Nicaraguan border are crossing it to get vaccinated.^[29] Weakened by corruption and underfunding, the health service has been overwhelmed. In April, a senior doctor reported “the collapse of the hospital network” which is now on a “war footing.”^[30] Of seven mobile hospitals ordered last year to fill the gaps, only two are working properly. The head of the agency which made the $47 million deal to buy the hospitals, accused of corruption, was sacked. People protested at one of the mobile units under the banner: “If it were a narco lab, it would be working.”^[31]

Despite its terrible track record, the National Party, in power since the 2009 coup, faces a divided opposition, posing further dilemmas for the US. Opinion polls suggest that the left-of-center LIBRE party, headed by Xiomara Castro, wife of Manual Zelaya who was deposed in the 2009 coup, is best-placed to threaten the National Party.^[32] Her position could have been strengthened via an alliance with other opposition parties but this has not happened. Although the Liberal Party represents the traditional opposition, its candidate Yani Rosenthal served a prison sentence in the United States in 2017 for money laundering, meaning that Biden cannot easily back him. In any case, most observers think that JOH’s National Party will prevail, either through renewed electoral fraud^[33] or by buying votes, or both, as it did in 2017. JOH has resisted pressure for transparency in election funding,^[34] was accused by opponents of having no interest in electoral reform,^[35] and pushed through purely cosmetic changes to electoral law on the last possible day in the election timetable.^[36]

Nevertheless, the US State Department urged the Honduran Congress^[37] to approve the new law and, when it did, the Organization of American States (OAS) called it a “significant step forward.”^[38] They did this despite having produced clear evidence of fraud in the last elections, which the OAS said had “low integrity,” even calling for the elections to be rerun.^[39] Maneuvers like these suggest that the US might well swallow its objections to corruption and back the National Party, while insisting that it choose a candidate to replace JOH. But – if his successor governs in the same mold – corruption, poverty, and violence are likely to continue, spurring fresh migration.

The US dilemma in Nicaragua: Ortega leads the polls

Notwithstanding its political hostility towards Daniel Ortega’s government, the US cannot avoid noting that few Nicaraguans head north towards its southwest border. Nicaragua is also more successful than its neighbors in combating the drug trade.^[40] It recently regained its status as one of the safest countries in Latin America,^[41] despite the violent protests of 2018, even while Honduras remains one of the most dangerous. After a two-month peak of COVID-19 infections and deaths in mid-2020, Nicaragua has had a much lower incidence of the virus than its neighbors; as a result, the  economic damage it experienced in 2020 was about half the average for Latin America generally.^[42] The two November hurricanes, which hit Nicaragua first, caused relatively few deaths and aid was quickly sent to the regions most affected.^[43]

As in Honduras, the Nicaraguan opposition is divided, but this gives the US a different problem: should it urge Ortega’s opponents to unite behind a single candidate whom it backs to win, or should it denounce the election as a fraud (as it last did in 1984), persuade the opposition to stand down, and attempt to delegitimize the winner? The latest opinion poll gives Ortega a substantial lead (69% of voting intentions compared with 21% for the opposition if it has a single candidate), making Washington’s dilemma worse: as things appear now, barely six months from the polls, there might be a decisive Sandinista win that would be difficult for the US to discredit, especially as several political parties are now committed to taking part. Inevitably Washington is laying the groundwork to do this, joining the OAS in criticizing Nicaragua for not implementing radical electoral reforms, even though there were no more than minor criticisms of the electoral process last time around (the OAS said at the time that any faults in the 2017 election “have not substantially affected the will of the people as expressed at the ballot box.”)^[44]

Most recently, Washington has had new opportunities to attack the Nicaraguan electoral process as its authorities have moved to take legal action against opposition figures involved in corrupt practices. Washington alleges that the Ortega government is trying to debar them from standing in the elections, describing as ‘candidates’ those accused of the crimes, even though no party has yet selected who will stand. The most notable case is that of Cristiana Chamorro, under investigation for illegal use of foreign funds sent to the Nicaraguan non-profit that she controls. The money came from USAID and other US or European sources of the kind noted by Timothy Gill (see above), and was redirected to right-wing media outlets hostile to the Sandinista government. Chamorro closed her non-profit foundation in February this year, ostensibly to avoid compliance with a new Nicaraguan law controlling the receipt of funds from foreign governments which is very similar to the US’s own Foreign Agents Registration Act. In other words, Nicaragua is now, and perhaps belatedly, using the same measures to control foreign influence over its politics as the US government has had in place since 1938. Ben Norton, who has analyzed in detail the sources of Chamorro’s funding, says that the Nicaraguan media it finances “are an integral part of a political opposition that Washington has carefully managed, trained, and funded with millions of dollars over the past decade.”

The US faces a deeper dilemma in Nicaragua of which it must surely be aware, even if it ignores it in public discourse. None of the Nicaraguan opposition groups which it supports have so far put forward any platform other than vague intentions to “promote democracy.” But several were Trump supporters or have befriended right-wing US politicians such as Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and others. Many were also prominent figures in Nicaragua’s neoliberal governments between 1990 and 2006, under which poverty deepened and corruption became rampant. The opposition coup attempt in 2018 was fueled by the free flow of money, weapons, and drugs to those who held cities under siege when the country was paralyzed by roadblocks.^[45] It therefore seems highly likely that if Sandinismo were to be displaced, the outcome would be a neoliberal government of the kind that has produced social collapse in Honduras.

In 2005, when neoliberal policies were at their worst, surveys suggested that almost 70% of Nicaraguans wanted to emigrate, compared with fewer than half that number now.^[46] This could easily change. It can hardly be in the interest of the US for “caravans” of Nicaraguan migrants to start heading north towards its southwest border, along with their neighbors from Honduras. Yet  Washington’s conflicted policies in Central America are likely to drive more migration, not reduce it.

John Perry is a writer living in Masaya, Nicaragua.

[Main Photo-Credit: Public domain, U.S. Joint Task Force – Bravo Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. Flickr.com]

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Sources

[1] “Promoting polyarchy: 20 years later,” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0047117813489655a

[2] “From Promoting Political Polyarchy to Defeating Participatory Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy towards the Far Left in Latin America,” https://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/jwsr/article/view/750/1020

[3] “How the USAID prepared the conditions for a non-violent coup,” https://bbackdoors.wordpress.com/2018/11/06/how-the-usaid-prepared-the-conditions-for-a-non-violent-coup-detat-against-the-nicaraguan-government-part-i/

[4] Quoted in “America’s new regime change formula,” http://dailyalochona.blogspot.com/2011/02/alochona-americas-new-regime-change.html

[5] “Southwest border crossings on pace for highest levels in 20 years, Biden admin says,” https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/southwest-border-crossings-pace-highest-levels-20-years-biden-admin-n1261192

[6] “More than a million migrants expected at U.S.-Mexico border this year – U.S. official,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-border-idUSKBN2BM3FN

[7] “Admiral Says U.S. Aims to Expand Competitive Space in Latin America,” https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2473739/admiral-says-us-aims-to-expand-competitive-space-in-latin-america/

[8] Available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/

[9] “Income distribution inequality based on Gini coefficient in Latin America as of 2017, by country,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/980285/income-distribution-gini-coefficient-latin-america-caribbean-country/

[10] Paper presented by Nicaraguan Government to the Virtual High-Level Meeting on Poverty Eradication “Trends, Options And Strategies In Global Poverty Eradication,” United Nations, 30 June 2020.

[11] “The US contracts out its regime change operation in Nicaragua,” https://www.coha.org/the-us-contracts-out-its-regime-change-operation-in-nicaragua/

[12] “Our southern border is now with Guatemala,” http://latinalista.com/general/historic-partnership-agreements-signed

[13] “Yes, it was a coup,” http://latinalista.com/general/historic-partnership-agreements-signed

[14] “Low integrity,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2017/december/low-integrity

[15] “The plunder continues,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/december/the-plunder-continues

[16] “The Murder of Berta Cáceres,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2016/march/the-murder-of-berta-caceres

[17] “A Death Foretold: MACCIH Shuts Down in Honduras,” https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/a-death-foretold-maccih-shuts-down-in-honduras/

[18] “El 93 por ciento de acusados por la extinta MACCIH fueron puestos en libertad,” https://elpulso.hn/2021/05/19/el-93-por-ciento-de-acusados-por-la-extinta-maccih-fueron-puestos-en-libertad/

[19] “The Hernández Brothers,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2019/october/the-hernandez-brothers

[20] “Honduran President’s Brother Is Found Guilty of Drug Trafficking,” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/americas/honduras-president-brother-drug-trafficking.html

[21] “If it were a narco lab, it would be working,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2021/february/if-it-were-a-narco-lab-it-would-be-working

[22] “Canciller Rosales discute sobre migración y daños de Eta e Iota con el titular de Seguridad Nacional de EEUU,” https://proceso.hn/canciller-rosales-discute-sobre-migracion-tps-y-danos-de-huracanes-con-el-secretario-de-seguridad-nacional-de-eeuu/

[23] “Subrayan que la no visita a Honduras de Ricardo Zúñiga, deja claro el rechazo del gobierno de Juan Orlando Hernández,” https://confidencialhn.com/subrayan-que-la-no-visita-a-honduras-de-ricardo-zuniga-deja-claro-el-rechazo-del-gobierno-de-juan-orlando-hernandez/

[24] “Carteles colombianos inundan de cocaína a Honduras,” https://proceso.hn/carteles-colombianos-inundan-honduras-de-cocaina/

[25] “Hurricane Eta hits the Mosquito Coast,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2020/november/hurricane-eta-hits-the-mosquito-coast

[26] “Respuesta de gobierno a seis meses de Eta y Iota ha sido insuficiente, alerta MSF,” https://proceso.hn/respuesta-de-gobierno-a-seis-meses-de-eta-e-iota-ha-sido-insuficiente-alerta-msf/

[27] “La pobreza en Honduras subió a 70 % en 2020 por culpa de Eta, Iota y la COVID,” https://proceso.hn/la-pobreza-en-honduras-subio-a-70-en-2020-por-culpa-de-eta-iota-y-la-covid/

[28] “Honduras recibe 17 mil dosis de vacunas,” https://www.elheraldo.hn/pais/1463583-466/honduras-vacunas-donadas-salvador-bukele-alcaldes

[29] “Hondureños ven a Nicaragua como destino de vacunación,” https://www.elheraldo.hn/pais/1466318-466/hondurenos-nicaragua-destino-vacuna-covid

[30] “HOSPITALES ACTIVAN “CÓDIGO DE GUERRA” ANTE COLAPSO POR COVID,” http://www.web.ellibertador.hn/index.php/noticias/nacionales/2825-honduras-hospitales-activan-codigo-de-guerra-ante-colapso-por-covid

[31] “If it were a narco lab, it would be working,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2021/february/if-it-were-a-narco-lab-it-would-be-working

[32] “Esposa de Zelaya en empate técnico por presidencia de Honduras,” https://www.radiotelevisionmarti.com/a/honduras-manuel-zelaya-esposa/18968.html; but see also this more recent poll showing the National Party in the lead: http://cespad.org.hn/2021/05/13/analisis-fragmentacion-y-necesidad-de-articulacion-politica-un-analisis-sobre-la-fidelidad-partidaria-y-la-intencion-del-voto-en-honduras/

[33] “Denuncian que el oficialismo se opone a nueva Ley Electoral para “cometer fraude” en noviembre,” https://elpulso.hn/2021/04/30/denuncian-que-el-oficialismo-se-opone-a-nueva-ley-electoral-para-cometer-fraude-en-noviembre/

[34] “Demandan organizaciones ante IAIP: Resolución que reserva información sobre campañas políticas debe ser anulada,” https://pasosdeanimalgrande.com/es-co/contexto/item/3161-demandan-organizaciones-ante-iaip-resolucion-que-reserva-informacion-sobre-campanas-politicas-debe-ser-anulada

[35] “Jari Dixon: El más interesado en no tener nueva Ley Electoral es el Partido Nacional,” https://confidencialhn.com/jari-dixon-el-mas-interesado-en-no-tener-nueva-ley-electoral-es-el-partido-nacional/

[36] “Nueva Ley Electoral de Honduras no garantiza evitar una nueva crisis, según analistas,” https://contracorriente.red/2021/05/27/nueva-ley-electoral-de-honduras-no-garantiza-evitar-una-nueva-crisis-segun-analistas/

[37] See https://twitter.com/WHAAsstSecty/status/1395873650386014215

[38] “OEA califica como avance significativo aprobación de la nueva Ley Electoral de Honduras,”  https://proceso.hn/oea-califica-como-avance-significativo-aprobacion-de-la-nueva-ley-electoral-de-honduras/

[39] “Low integrity,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2017/december/low-integrity

[40] “GameChangers 2020: The Resurgence of the Central American Cocaine Highway,” https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/resurgence-central-american-cocaine-highway/

[41] “Balance de InSight Crime de los homicidios en 2020,” https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/balance-insight-crime-homicidios-2020/

[42] See https://statistics.cepal.org/yearbook/2020/

[43] “Hurricane Eta hits the Mosquito Coast,” https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2020/november/hurricane-eta-hits-the-mosquito-coast

[44] See the OAS preliminary report at https://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-079/17

[45] “Objetivos y estrategias en el intento de golpe de Estado en 2018,” ​https://www.unan.edu.ni/index.php/articulos-entrevistas-reportajes/las-estrategias-en-el-intento-de-golpe-de-abril.odp

[46] See https://www.myrconsultores.com/nicaragua-rumbo-a-noviembre-2021/

By Lucy Pagoada-Quesada
From New York

Mr. President Joe Biden,

As a Honduran-US citizen, I am writing to urge you to change course in U.S. policy towards Honduras so that my country recuperates its democracy. You were Vice President when in 2009, the government of your party led by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, supported the military coup in Honduras against our Constitutional President Manuel Zelaya Rosales. This led to a series of events that undermined our democracy and forced thousands to abandon their homes for refuge in the United States.

In 2010, the US government imposed on us Porfirio Lobo-Sosa, whose son Fabio Lobo is imprisoned in the U.S. for cocaine trafficking. In 2013, they also imposed on us the narco dictator Juan Orlando Hernández whose brother Antonio (Tony) Hernández is imprisoned in New York for trafficking tons of cocaine and weapons to the United States. In 2017, the United States also imposed Hernández on us for the second time, and in an illegal reelection clearly fraudulent as the Organization of American States (OAS) also recognized. 

It was from the moment that this violent narco-dictatorship of the National Party was imposed on us that our country, Honduras, plunged into the worst social, economic, and political crisis in our history. It is for this reason and in the face of despair that the Honduran people flee in the massive exodus of displaced human beings called caravans. They do not come in search of the American dream but rather they flee from the nightmare that this country, the United States, has imposed on  them.

The Trump administration signed agreements with the countries of Guatemala and Mexico so that their security forces would be deployed to prevent the passage of the displaced victims in route to the U.S. border, thereby denying the right of those seeking asylum and refuge to emigrate.

So, President Biden, the caravans are the result of the failed policies of the “savage capitalist” system, as Pope John Paul II said, which the U.S. imposes on the Latin American region and the world. And if you and your government want the immigration “problem” to end, then we ask for a halt to U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Honduras. The neoliberal economic model that the United States imposes on other countries in the region, including Honduras, has not worked. On the contrary, it has produced and deepened extreme inequality, poverty, violence, and the massive and inhumane exodus of entire displaced families.

You have been elected at a time of profound racial division, inequity, and the economic and health crisis due to COVID-19. Therefore, you must understand how difficult it is to prepare and hold an electoral process under those circumstances.

Like you and the US people, we in Honduras are fighting to recover our democracy, justice, and peace, which was destroyed by the 2009 coup d’état. And this coming November 2021, we are going to hold presidential elections for the third time after that terrible historical moment that changed our lives. Therefore, the only thing we demand from your government is to allow us to cast our ballots without foreign interference and that our sovereign decision as a people be respected. I assure you, that, in this way, your government will not have to face the massive exodus of brothers and sisters who are fleeing from Honduras in search of what was unjustly taken away from them.

With all due respect and hoping that the purposes of your administration are fulfilled for the good of the people.

Lucy Pagoada-Quesada, U.S.-Honduran citizen, is a teacher from NY.

[Photo credit: Flirck, open license. 2009 coup d’état in Honduras]