• Why did Netanyahu and Trump attack Iran and start this war?
• Why did the US decide to attack without a clear reason to do so and without strategic planning nor a legal argument for it?
• What impact will this war in the Middle East have on US Midterm Elections?
• And what of independent operators in this conflict, such as European states, why do they risk being drawn into this US-Israel Middle East War?

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One of the United States’ navy ships heading towards the Persian Gulf is the USS Tripoli. (USS = United States Ship.) How the heck did it get that name? (Will the next two United States’ naval ships be called the USS Abbottabad and the USS Santo Domingo?)

The answer will be a surprise to many. The American Revolution which began in 1776 was completed in 1783, with the British capitulation to the American patriotic forces. So, the history of the United States as an independent sovereign state goes back to 1783. The British and Americans fought again from 1812 to 1815, during the Napoleonic Wars (what I suggest is better called either World War Zero or Great World War One, and my favoured dates are 1798 to 1815, with Waterloo being the final battle; Great World War One contextualises 1914 to 1945 as Great World War Two). Wikipedia describes the outcome of the War of 1812 as ‘inconclusive’.

We may note that Encounter Bay, in South Australia, is named after a World War Zero encounter between British and French naval ships – Investigator and Géographe. The encounter was in 1802. The name Tripoli dates from another encounter (a much more violent encounter) within World War Zero, in this case a war between Libya (then known as Ottoman Tripolitania) and the United States. That encounter, a war within a war, was the First Barbary War (1801-1805).

The genesis of the Barbary Wars (see this famous picture of the USS Philadelphia in Tripoli Harbour, depicting the saving-from-capture of that ship in February 1804) was an earlier war. The American-Algerian War of 1785 to 1795was the first foreign military adventure of the United States since its independence in 1783. Wikipedia lists the ‘result’ of this war as an ‘Algerian victory’. It will be a surprise to many people that America’s first foreign war was so soon after independence, and in the Mediterranean rather than somewhere close to home; independent America has a long history of violence in the ‘Middle East’. It will be no surprise that, in 1795, the United States lost that war.

The context of the 1785-1795 war was that Great Britain, piqued by the loss of its American colonies, refused the United States the ‘protection’ of the British Navy.

We note here that imperial nations traditionally extracted ‘tribute’ from both their subjugated territories, and other populated territories which might otherwise be candidates for subjugation. Further, smaller maritime states traditionally extracted rent from passing ships.

These ‘clipping-the-ticket’ relationships still exist, of course. Egypt, for example, extracts monopoly rents from its possession of the Suez Canal; as does Panama re the Panama Canal. As would New Zealand if South American merchant ships were to transit through Cook Strait on their way to Australia. Indeed, as international airports charge landing fees. Further, the extraction of imperial tribute has become apparent once again, as the American president tries to use import taxes – tariffs – and bilateral ‘deals’ as ways of ‘making lots of money’; as a way of leveraging imperial power. This is extortion through protection money, in the very worst sense of that concept of power.

In the 1780s, and before, Britain and Algeria ‘scratched each other’s backs’. Britain let Algeria – literally a ‘pirate state’ – do its thing, so long as it did not charge rents from ships under the protection of the British Empire. Thus, after 1783, American ships ceased to benefit from British protection. The conflict ended in 1795, with the United States agreeing to pay rents to Algeria, and – by implication – to other ‘pirate kingdoms’ on the North African Barbary Coast.

The Barbary Wars began when newly elected president – Thomas Jefferson – refused to pay rents to Tripolitania, aka Libya. As a result, Tripolitania declared war on the United States. The United States sent a number of frigates, including the USS Philadelphia.

To this day, the United States commemorates the 1804 burning of the USS Philadelphia by Stephen Decatur as a heroic rescue, an act of derring do which Lord Nelson reputedly claimed was “the most bold and daring act of the Age”. It was this action which led to the naming of three United States naval ships, including the current ship, as ‘Tripoli’. Decatur went on to become a hero, once again, in the 1812 to 1815 war with Britain. And many American towns came to be named after him. (We may note that, in another ‘heroic’ action in World War Zero, in 1812, the Russian military burned the city of Moscow in order to save it from Napoleon’s invading army. One significant aftermath was a literary novel: War and Peace.)

This war was not an American victory; importantly for the United States, it was not the ignominious defeat that it might otherwise have been. The United States – or at least mercenaries in the pay of the United States – did win the subsequent 1805 Battle of Derna, which the USS Tripoli officially commemorates.

The First Barbary War ended inconclusively in 1805, with a deal. Wikipedia says: “In agreeing to pay a ransom of $60,000 (equivalent to $1.3 million in 2025) for the American prisoners, the Jefferson administration drew a distinction between paying tribute and paying ransom.” Jefferson agreed to pay a ransom. We should note that the Second Barbary War of 1815, also involving Decatur, lasted just two days, and was an American victory (under President Madison).

Another reason for the naming of the USS Tripoli, which is essentially the same reason.

In 2011, the United States (as NATO), under President Obama, fought in another war against Libya. This was a successful war of ‘regime change’, this time through air power rather than sea power; though few would say that the replacement regimes have improved either the stability of Libya or of the Eastern Mediterranean. This war of ‘decapitation’ of Libya was Obama’s dress rehearsal for an even more ambitious attempt to do the same in Syria. The subsequent Syrian Civil War was another distressing failure of United States’ foreign bellicosity. At least Obama asked Congress, and as a result he was unable to escalate; Obama was thwarted in his further attempts to become a decapitating conqueror (noting Abbottabad as well as Tripoli). Much of Syria descended into anarchy, until Russia intervened.

The USS Tripoli was commissioned in 2012, as much in commemoration of recent American adventurism as it was in commemoration of that country’s earliest acts of violence in a land far far away.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

The human world changed twice during the twentieth century. The first transition lasted from 1914 to 1945. The principal cause of World War Two was World War One. So, to understand the drivers of that long transition, indeed a great levelling event, it is necessary to investigate the causes of World War One. What happened between those wars was not inevitable, of course. But those inter-war events formed part of a comprehensible transitional sequence.

The next transition began, I would argue, in 1967 and lasted until 1980. Though key pre- and post-transition events took place in 1948, 1953 and 1956; and 1989/1990. The 1967 to 1980 transition significantly involved both Israel and Iran. As a result, the post-war world of cold war and decolonisation gave way to a neoliberal world order in which the new financial and political elites increasingly ruled under the titular covers of ‘liberal democracy’, ‘global rules-based-order’, and the ‘unipolar moment‘.

Are we today in a new transition, away from neoliberalism; maybe into a bleak zero-sum order (or negative-sum) of right-wing identity politics? An order in which national or cultural identity groups seek to harm other such groups more than they benefit their own group. An ultra-Hobbesian world in which individuals and groups gain pleasure directly from the pain they cause to others? Or will such gratuitous and predatory behaviour be limited to a transition now under way? While such behaviour happened markedly during the last years of the 1914 to 1945 transition, there were also substantial precursors to it in the lead-up to World War One. Not least the Judeophobic pogroms in Ukraine and some of its neighbouring territories.

These remain open questions. My aim here is to outline the 1967 to 1980 transition, noting some parallels between that transition and present times.

Before that, I’ll just mention that, in 1948, Israel and Palestine were both granted, by the new United Nations, the status of sovereign nation states. The Palestine nation was stillborn, for a number of reasons, one of which was that the eventual borders of Israel split the Palestinian territories. And I’ll mention that, in 1953, the United States instigated a political and military coup in Iran, converting a developing independent democracy into an absolute monarchy whose role was to acquiesce to Washington’s stated and unstated interests.

Suez Canal: the First Crisis

Most wars start with a pretext, an event manufactured or exploited by the true belligerent to justify its aggression.

One country which had been subjugated – indeed occupied – by the United Kingdom for many years was Egypt. That’s why Egypt came to be so important for the New Zealand military in both WW1 and WW2.

The critical strategic asset in Egypt was the Suez Canal, built by French interests, opened in 1869, and effectively wrested by the British from 1882 (though France maintained a strategic interest). For the steamship age, that canal became the critical conduit for the British Empire, connecting London with India (which included modern Pakistan and Bangladesh), East Africa, the ‘Middle East’ (meaning the Persian Gulf), the ‘Far East’, and the Australian colonies which became Australia.

The Egyptian Revolution took place in 1952, and Egyptian president Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956. The result was a war in the latter part of 1956, in which the British and French persuaded Israel (only created in 1948) to invade Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. (These events were covered in an episode of The Crown.) The Israeli attack took place as Operation Kadesh. Less than two days after this pretext, presented as a threat to Israel’s security, Britain (and France) started bombing Egypt at Port Said, in an operation to ‘secure’ the Canal.

The end result was an ignominious defeat for Britain and France, unsupported by the US, but with no meaningful withdrawal by Israel; the Israel-Egypt border had become permanently militarised, noting that Gaza had been (by agreement) under Egyptian control since 1949.

The Suez Canal was closed for nearly six months, until April 1957.

Suez Canal: the Second Crisis

Ten years later, in June 1967, Israel went for broke. This was the much bigger second crisis for the Suez Canal. In six days, Israel conquered the entire Sinai Peninsula – therefore including Gaza – meaning that Israel had annexed the eastern side of the Canal. In addition Israel conquered East Jerusalem, which in 1948 was supposed to have become the capital of an independent Palestine, the West Bank (which the State of Tennessee, in an act of appeasement towards Israel, now wants to call Judea and Samaria; refer Bill requiring Tennessee to use ‘Judea and Samaria’ instead of ‘West Bank’ advances, Fox17, 6 March 2026), and Syria’s Golan Heights.

The principal consequence was that the Suez Canal, an even more important waterway than the Gulf of Hormuz, was closed from 1967 to 1975.

With hindsight, we can see that the global economic crisis of the 1970s began in 1967. It is understood as a crisis of inflation which morphed after 1973 into a crisis of stagflation; for an overview, biased towards the US and towards the received narrative, refer to The Great Inflation, in Federal Reserve History.

The closure of the Suez Canal had little impact on oil prices. But it did lead to a surge in the cost of international transportation, as Asia to Europe trade had to be diverted to the South African and Panama routes. The other two drivers of that inflation-surge in the late 1960s were the escalations of the Vietnam War, and the prevalence of a corporate structure – outlined by John Kenneth Galbraith in The New Industrial State (1967) and Economics and the Public Purpose (1973) – which made the global marketplace less responsive towards increases in global spending. That last point means that large corporate firms, like today’s energy companies, became predisposed to respond to increased demand by raising prices rather than by raising the quantities of output supplied.

Wartime is almost always associated with inflation, because it both raises costs and constrains the supply of consumer goods. (American wars since the 1970s can be an exception, because they are financed by instant money and readily-available imports; by US government-deficits and US economy trade deficits. Deficits which the rest of the world is eager to facilitate.)

Israel 1967 to 1973

With the partial exception of Syria’s Golan Heights, Israel did not formally incorporate the other conquered territories. This retention of these territories as subjugated territories was partly due to international pressure to not recognise conquests, but was probably more to do with their implications for the demographic balance of Israel. Integration would have led to the possibility of Jews becoming a minority of Israel’s population, and Arabs a majority.

(We should note that, for the secular Jews who run Israel, to be Jewish is understood more as an ethnicity than as a religious faith. Hence, Israelis tend to juxtapose Jews and Arabs, whereas people in the rest of the world juxtapose Israelis (understood to be mostly Jews) and Palestinians. Israelis favour the word ‘Arab’ over ‘Palestinian’, because of a popular Israeli narrative that the indigenous population of Palestine is descended from immigrants from Arabia.)

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War happened in October 1973, beginning with a surprise attack by Egypt, during the Yom Kippur holy day (and noting that the 2026 attacks on Iran occurred during Ramadan, Islam’s holiest period). Basically, Egypt wanted its Sinai Peninsula back, in part so that it could reopen the Canal. Other nearby countries joined-in, especially Syria, but also Jordan and Iraq. Not Iran, which was then under United States hegemony.

Despite Egypt’s initial advantage of surprise, Israel not only fought back defensively, but counterattacked. The counterattack included an Israeli army contingent crossing the Suez Canal and marching on Cairo; ie approaching the Nile River. Potentially this war could have led to the creation of a Greater Israel; from the Euphrates (in Syria and Iraq) to the Nile. But again, the problem of conquest becomes the problem of having to incorporate supposedly ‘inferior’ populations into the expanded nation state.

(We note that surprise attacks often do not bear fruit; noting the American president’s tasteless and quasi-triumphant comparison between 28 February 2026 with the ultimately unsuccessful attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. See Trump jokes about Pearl Harbour in meeting with Japan’s PM, TVNZ, 20 March 2026. For a brief moment, I wondered if the President was going to refer to the surprise attack of 6 August 1945, or that of 10 March 1945.)

Further, the international community had interests other than appeasing Israel. The biggest of these concerns was the price of oil. In the end the international community got its way, but at a cost of making Israel itself into a significantly more belligerent state than it had been hitherto.

Oil Prices

The 1973 Oil Crisis led to a quadrupling of crude oil prices by 1977, most of that taking place in 1974. Given the general inflation, much of it instigated by the oil price increases, real oil prices only increased by 150 percent in United States’ dollars.

The main reasons for the huge price increases of oil were the roles of the likes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – through the Vienna-based OPEC cartel – being able to push back against the encroachment of the Zionist project in their region, by using their effective near-monopoly power. In turn, these high prices led to the further development of the petroleum industries in the Persian Gulf, and of the Gulf States themselves. Additionally, we should note that oil was underpriced prior to the 1973 war; much as it can be argued that oil was underpriced in January 2026.

This had a much bigger economic impact on countries like New Zealand than anything we’ve either seen or projected in the present March 2026 crisis. (In my case, it brought forward my OE plans. At the end of 1973, for $400 I bought a ticket to sail to England via Acapulco, Panama, Curaçao and Barbados. By time the ship sailed in April 1974, the fare had been subject to two surcharges and I ended up paying more like $480. It could have been worse if the ship had not had access to cheap Venezuelan fuel in Curaçao.)

The result was a series of massive financial imbalances across the world; between oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, and also within larger oil-producing countries such as the United States. (New York’s loss was Texas’s gain.) While those 1970s’ financial challenges were navigated by the world’s finance ministers and central banks with a large measure of pragmatic success, the turmoil of the times let in a new and simplistic narrative around money and inflation; an unnuanced narrative that harked back to the classical stories about money during World War Zero (that’s the Napoleonic Wars of 1798 to 1815).

That new narrative was monetarism/neoliberalism, and placed itself perfectly to exploit the economic crisis – the Great Inflation– to create the neoliberal anti-intellectual hegemony which has ruled over the western world and hence over the whole world since the early 1980s. The guru of monetarism was a Chicago School economist; Milton Friedman. As an academic, Friedman and his acolytes had been plugging away through the 1950s and 1960s; well-placed to take advantage of a good crisis, especially a crisis centred around the word ‘inflation’. Chicago School economists experimented on Chile following its 11 September 1973 military coup.

If Israel had simply returned Sinai to Egypt in say 1970 – in circumstances similar to the eventual return of Sinai – allowing the Suez Canal to reopen, then the 1970s and 1980s could have turned out very differently.

Revolution, and Oil Prices again

One of the consequences of the political crisis in the Middle East was further crisis in the Middle East. Various latent nationalisms in the region intensified markedly; these intensifications turned for inspiration to the common faith in the region, Islam.

Hence, there was a direct – albeit convoluted – pathway from the 1973 war to the 1978/1979 Iranian Revolution. In February 1979 the Imperial State of Iran gave way to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(I could have gained a personal glimpse of revolutionary Iran. Returning from my OE in September 1978, my partner and I were on a PanAm flight from Rome to Istanbul. The flight originated in New York, and terminated in Tehran, and was running late. Many of the passengers were agitated, because the flight was now projected to arrive in Tehran during the evening curfew. I guess it was always possible that PanAm would take the decision to overfly Istanbul, in order to arrive in Tehran on time. The plane did land in Istanbul, later than scheduled, so I know not about what dramas may have unfolded in Tehran later that evening. I expect that the return flight out of Tehran was fully booked, given the deteriorating situation there for American citizens.)

An important result is that oil from Iran, a founding member of OPEC, came off the world market for a few years. (Although, Aotearoa New Zealand, in its own pragmatic navigation of the crisis, came to do a swap deal with Revolutionary Iran. Despite the fact that, for a few years instances of capital punishment in Iran came to exceed those in the United States, New Zealand negotiated a sheep-meat for oil swap, thereby saving this country’s critical sheep-farming industry.)

The result of the loss of Iranian oil from the word market led, in 1979, to a further doubling of the world price of crude oil. In the second half of the 1970s, many countries – including New Zealand and United States – cut their speed limits to 80kph (or 50 miles per hour). (I still remember, in October 1976, riding in a Greyhound Bus in Pennsylvania, watching big trucks traveling very slowly along the United States’ interstate motorway system.)

In 1979, the crisis became so difficult that the New Zealand government made the sensible though since-derided decision to ration petrol by requiring motorists to observe carless days each week.

Governments in oil-importing countries made the pragmatic decision to both conserve oil and, for balance of payments’ reasons, to develop their own oil, gas and exportable reserves. New Zealand electrified its North Island Main Trunk Railway, doubled its aluminium production capacity (in order to export renewable energy), substantially expanded its oil-refining capacity, developed the Maui gas field; and developed the Glenbrook steel mill as a means to gain export receipts from the sale of west coast iron-sand.

Eventually, in 1986, the world oil price collapsed, ushering in a new (and environmentally discordant) era of cheap oil. Inflation-adjusted oil prices in 1999 were even lower than in 1972.

The Great Deception

World price-inflation was on a substantial downward path once the leading economies’ central banks allowed interest rates to fall (through liberalising monetary policies) in the years 1983 to 1985, and once cheap oil resumed. But in some countries high consumer-price-inflation persevered until the end of the 1980s’ decade, especially as they shifted towards goods and services taxes.

New Zealand pioneered a particular form of illiberal monetary policy in 1989, when inflation was already falling back to normal levels; and claimed that the new simple-minded monetary policy was the sole cure. This policy, which was in fact very much associated with the aforementioned monetarist project, became akin to a biblical truth; and was successfully exported to the consolidating globalised political and financial elites, making this new quasi-biblical truth into a bedrock policy-of-faith in the post-1980 world order.

Today, we can easily observe how false this ‘truth’ of faith is. By looking at the United Kingdom and Australia, two countries which have minimally reduced interest rates since 2022, we can see how their inflation rates have remained stubbornly higher than those with lower interest rates.

The next political and financial world order?

Are we in a new transition? Probably yes. Will it take a decade or so? Probably yes. While there are many calamities that could happen – and remembering that the world faced the possibility of global nuclear war early in both the cold war world order and the neoliberal world order – an optimistic take is that the world will move into a multipolar principles-of-engagement world order in which no single polity (or alliance) can dictate terms to the rest of the world with apparent impunity.

A unipolar world order is an illiberal geopolitical monopoly. Present events may either entrench or destroy the forces pushing for geopolitical illiberalism. Multipolarity is geopolitical liberalism.

The next world order should not be reliant on cheap oil nor indefinite economic growth nor the idolatry of money. Money is a means, not an end; it is a technology, not a commodity. Capitalism can become a peaceful private-public partnership. If enough of us want it to be.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Iran is a crucial country in Southwest Asia. Not only is it strategically placed with respect to maritime transport, it also has land borders with seven countries. Most of these countries have been in the world news in the last decade, generally in relation to some conflict or other.

Two of these are currently at war with each other: Afghanistan and Pakistan (refer ‘I heard a huge blast’: Afghan journalist describes Kabul rehab hospital strikes, Sky News, 16 March 2026). Two others were at war a few years ago: Armenia and Azerbaijan. And Iraq has been in five separate wars, one against Iran itself, and one against Iran’s near-neighbour Kuwait, two against the wider West, and one against ISIL. Türkiye, by contrast, has been a sea of relative stability, and is indeed the main recipient of Iranian refugees at present.

But what about Turkmenistan, a country which has a 1,000km border with Iran; and important demographic and cultural links with Iran? A country successfully hiding in plain sight.

Korea was dubbed the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ in the nineteenth century, and since the Korean War (ceasefire in 1953) North Korea is not uncommonly still called that. But, at least in our awareness, Turkmenistan makes North Korea seem rather gregarious in terms of its relations with the world. I understand that it’s harder to get a visa to visit Turkmenistan than to visit North Korea.

Google: “Ashgabat, the capital, was rebuilt [after a big earthquake in 1948] in Soviet style in the mid-20th century and is filled with grand monuments honouring former president Saparmurat Niyazov.” This architectural gigantism is reminiscent of North Korea. BBC, 17 Sep 2016: “Turkmenistan has unveiled a gleaming new international airport with a roof in the shape of a flying falcon. … Ashgabat [the capital, and close to the Iranian border] boasts several other unique structures, including a publishing house in shape of an open book [and] two giant golden statues of both Mr Berdymukhamedov and his late predecessor Saparmyrat Niyazov.”

Economy

Turkmenistan, on the southeastern side of the Caspian Sea, has an ancient history in terms of trade along the Silk Road; it was indeed a land of transit in the times of caravans and camels.

In 1881 it was annexed and fully incorporated into the Russian Empire. And, during Soviet Union times, it was a full republic of that Union. Since the Soviet split-up, Turkmenistan, in true Orwellian fashion, has largely denied that it was ever part of the Soviet Union. Its population, believed to be just over six million, is kept in perpetual ignorance of the wider world. There is a relatively large regional diaspora of Turkmen people.

That ignorance is mutual. The West knows as little about Turkmenistan as Turkmen subjects know about The West. Interestingly, I looked up the CIA Factbook – a widely favoured reference resource for political geography – to verify my own knowledge. And I found this; the Factbook was closed last month (though see the wayback machine). Not widely reported, but note this on CNN: CIA terminates its World Factbook, overthrowing reference regime, 6 Feb 2026.

I found some maps still on the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/resources/map/india/ and https://www.cia.gov/resources/map/turkmenistan/. While the maps on India are reasonably current (2023), this map of Turkmenistan dates back to 2008. Not exactly state-of-the-art intelligence.

Turkmenistan is not a poor country. It has substantial oil reserves, and has huge barely tapped natural gas reserves, comparable to those of Qatar. Despite contrived inequality between rulers and subjects, its people are not as poor as North Korea’s. Its long-distance trade nowadays passes mostly either to The West via the Caspian Sea, then Azerbaijan and Georgia; or to China via just one other country, Kazakhstan. There will also be regional trade with its four land neighbours: Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

Strategic Matters

For reasons fully beyond its control, Turkmenistan finds its most natural neighbour and most natural ally, Iran, in fullscale war with both regional and global hegemons. I suspect that there are very few Iranian citizens seeking refuge in Turkmenistan, even though many living near Turkmenistan – including in bombed nearby cities such as Mashhad (refer Iran’s Mashhad Airport Targeted Amid Ongoing Israeli Strikes, The Caspian Post, 1 March 2016) – are now living in considerable danger.

Wars typically spill over, in one form or another, into neighbouring countries. Further, Turkmenistan might now become coveted for its geopolitically strategic location and resources. War might come in more than a local spill.

Airspace

Once upon a long time ago, the most strategic spaces in the world were land-spaces, especially central Asian steppes such as those of Turkmenistan. The last incursions from the East into Europe came from these lands: those invasions by Genghis Khan in the twelfth century, and Tamerlane in the fourteenth.

The last incursion from the East into Western Europe was that of Attila the Hun in the fifth century. Since those invasions – and since earlier western conquests, eg those of Alexander the Great – there have been many Western megalomaniacs invading Asia. The main opportunity for the West arose from the strategic development of seaspace trumping landspace.

Nowadays, airspace to a considerable extent trumps both landspace and seaspace. There are two components of this. The first is the military exploitation of airspace, a form of warfare favoured by most modern tyrants. The second is the civilian – and peaceful economic – use of airspace for long-distance transit and trade.

My guess is that, at least up until now, long-haul flights will have avoided overflying Turkmenistan. (Avoidance of countries’ airspace is not uncommon: in 2008 I flew Cathay Pacific from Hong Kong to Seoul return, and the flights avoided Chinese airspace. And I flew from Shenyang in China to Seoul by Korean Airlines, a flight that took a wide circle route to avoid North Korea.)

As it is now, if civil flights want to avoid both Turkmenistan and all countries currently at war, a flight from Singapore to London (say) would have to fly over Nepal, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and then over the Black Sea. That’s a very narrow corridor for two-directional long-haul flying. Turkmenistan airspace would ease this constraint somewhat. But how safe can we expect any of Iran’s neighbours to be in the future? Certainly, with airspace now being the geopolitically dominant space today, Turkmenistan comes at a premium; potentially a new aerial Silk Road.

Safe national airspaces are important, not only to avoid being shot-down as Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was in 2014, but also as potential emergency landing sites. How will long-distance civilian air travel function during a twenty-first century world war?

Conclusion

Most of us have some geographical blindspots and many historical blindspots. Some places and historical events are blind to most of us. If democracy is to survive in any form, we need populations – not just ‘experts’ – with more knowledge of the world. And, if not unbiased knowledge (very difficult to achieve), then at least knowledge with relatively balanced biases.

Turkmenistan is a strategically placed nation towards which most better-informed people have almost no knowledge. For us in the West, that lack of geographical knowledge is ignorance by choice, or by having priorities determined by our not knowing what we don’t know, even when those places are in plain sight. For the Turkmen subject people, their ignorance is different; it’s by design.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

For this, the sixth series of A View from Afar, political scientist and former Pentagon analyst Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning deep-dive into geopolitical issues and trends to unpick relevancy from a world experiencing rapid and significant change.

And, in this episode, the topic will be: How to Define A Way Forward When the World is in Chaos.

Since the re-election of the US President Donald Trump, Paul has been doing a lot of work… a lot of reading… and a huge amount of thinking.

Today we hear from Paul about:

1. The US Trump Administration’s “Authoritarianism at home, Imperialism abroad” currency.
2. How to deconstruct the entire “spheres of Influence” nonsense.
3. About United States fears of the rise of the Global South in a poly-centric world.
4. And Paul and I will lean-forward and consider; what to expect in the medium and longterm.

If listeners enjoy interaction in a LIVE recording environment, you can comment and question the hosts while they record this podcast. And, when you do so, the hosts can include your comments and questions in future programmes.

With this in mind, Paul and Selwyn especially encourage you to join them via YouTube, as on YouTube live interaction is especially efficient.

You can join the podcast here (and remember to subscribe and get notifications too by clicking the bell):

OK, let us know what you think about this discussion. Let the debate begin!

*******

SIGNIFICANT QUOTE PAUL G. BUCHANAN: “The sad fact, though, is that the US is the center of our earthly geopolitical universe, serving as the first rock to drop in the global pond whose ripple effects are extensive, negative, and washing up in unexpected and unforeseen ways. That rock, in fact, is a black hole sucking the remnants of the rule based order into oblivion, or if not oblivion, irrelevance in a new age of power politics (might makes right, etc.). It is a dark force from which things as they exist cannot return.”

You can follow this podcast via the following podcast platforms:

Israel’s President, Isaac Herzog, is due to arrive in Australia next Sunday. Why is a foreign Head of State asked to help heal an Australian community after an Australian tragedy?

Australia is being asked to accept something extraordinary as if it were normal.

Who invited Isaac Herzog in the first place, and why did Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese say yes? Presented to us not as diplomacy, not as geopolitics, not as a strategic signal, but as “healing”.

Before we swallow that story, one question needs to be put on the table and left there until someone answers it.

Where does this community’s allegiance align? Australia or Israel?

The visit is being sold as reassurance for Jewish Australians after the Bondi attack last December 14. And yet the reassurance on offer does not come from Australia at all.

It does not come from Australian civic leaders. It does not come from Australian law or Australian institutions. It does not come from Jewish Australian faith figures, nor even from Israeli rabbinical leaders rooted in this country and this community.

It comes instead from a foreign head of state, and that single choice does more than any speech. It quietly rewrites the relationship between citizenship, faith, and state power in Australia.

So ask the obvious questions. Who requested this visit? Who lobbied for it? Who thought it was wise to import a foreign political figure into the emotional aftermath of Bondi? And why did the Prime Minister say yes?

Why did Albanese say yes?
If the purpose is truly pastoral, then the choice makes no sense. The visitor is not a rabbi. Not a spiritual leader. Not an interfaith presence. Not a community counsellor.

He is an Israeli president. A political figure. The constitutional face of a foreign state. Politics, not pastoral care. Power, not solace.

That is the first truth we are being asked not to notice, but the second truth is even more uncomfortable.

For years, Australians have been hammered with a single instruction, delivered with the confidence of a moral rule. Judaism is a religion. Israel is a state. Zionism is a political ideology. Keep them separate. Do not conflate.

If you blur those lines, you will be accused of prejudice, sometimes fairly, sometimes strategically, but always loudly.

That instruction has been enforced through the culture. In media commentary. In parliamentary speeches. In complaints processes. In campaigns to delegitimise critics who would not repeat the approved formula with sufficient reverence.

Fine. If separation is the principle, then separation must hold when it matters most. Especially when grief is raw, and symbols do their sharpest work.

Separation is abandoned
But at the precise moment symbolism matters most, the separation is abandoned. Not by critics. Not by social media hotheads. By the state itself.

At a moment of Australian grief, it is not faith that is summoned. It is the Israeli state.

Its president is elevated as the symbolic consoler. Its presence is framed as essential to the healing of Jewish Australians.

This visit does not merely blur the line between Judaism and Israel. It erases it. Publicly. Institutionally. With government endorsement of inviting a man who, according to Labor Friends of Palestine, doesn’t pass the character test for a visa application:

1. “A person does not pass the character test if … the Minister reasonably suspects that the person has been or is involved in conduct constituting . . .  the crime of genocide, a crime against humanity, a war crime, a crime involving torture or slavery or a crime that is otherwise of serious international concern; whether or not the person, or another person, has been convicted of an offence constituted by the conduct . . . ”
   
2. “A person does not pass the character test if . . .  in the event the person were allowed to enter or to remain in Australia, there is a risk that the person would . . . incite discord in the Australian community or in a segment of that community . . . ’ 

— Migration Act 1958, Section 501

Judaism vs Israel
You cannot spend decades demanding that Australians keep Judaism and Israel separate, then place an Israeli head of state at the centre of an Australian tragedy and expect the public to maintain the fiction.

You cannot demand absolute separation when critics speak, then collapse that separation when power needs a stage.

That is not an oversight. It is a choice, and it leads to the real debate Australia has been pushed to avoid.

If Jewish Australians are Australians of Jewish faith, then their safety, grief, and belonging are matters for Australia to address. Australian law. Australian civic leadership. Australian institutions.

Or, if faith is the organising principle, rabbis and religious leaders who actually carry pastoral authority. They are not matters for a foreign head of state. Not for an overseas government inserting itself into an Australian tragedy.

The moment a foreign political leader is presented as necessary to healing, the issue stops being faith and becomes allegiance.

And allegiance is not some abstract thing in Australia. It is demanded constantly. Migrant communities are told, again and again, that Australia comes first. That loyalty must be singular. That old countries are left behind. That this nation, its laws, its institutions, and its flag are the sole point of civic attachment.

Except here, the rules bend. Here, the separation we are warned never to breach is breached from above. Here, the state quietly endorses the idea that

Jewish identity in Australia is incomplete without Israeli political authority standing behind it.

Divisive double standard
That is why this visit is divisive. Not because Australians lack compassion. Not because antisemitism is not real. It is real, and it should be crushed without hesitation.

The division comes from the double standard. The division comes from importing a foreign political symbol into Australian grief, then scolding Australians for noticing what that symbol implies.

And once Israel is positioned as the emotional guarantor of Jewish life in Australia, the logic runs further, whether anyone likes it or not.

Why does responsibility stop at speeches? Why does it end in symbolism?

Why is the Australian taxpayer funding security, policing, protective infrastructure, and now a full diplomatic visit, while the implication being advanced is that Jewish safety here is inseparable from the Israeli state?

If Israel is to be treated as the natural guardian, then why is Australia carrying the entire material cost?

The Prime Minister has not merely allowed a diplomatic courtesy. He has endorsed a narrative. One that collapses the very separation it claims to defend.

One that institutionalises the question of allegiance while pretending the question is offensive to ask.

It is not offensive. It is civic. It is democratic. It is necessary. So ask it clearly, without malice and without fear.

Who asked for this visit? Why did the government agree? And what exactly are Australians being told, in symbols rather than words, about where allegiance is supposed to lie?

Because if the answer is Australia, this visit makes no sense.

And if the answer is Israel, Australians deserve honesty about what has just been done in their name.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

With all the setbacks of recent years, Vanuatu’s citizenship sale schemes should be dead in the water — instead they are thriving, and geopolitical chaos is playing a part.

The citizenship-by-investment sector is the biggest single revenue earner for Vanuatu’s government, but lingering issues of integrity cast a shadow over it.

In 2024, when Vanuatu became the first country to lose its European Union visa-free access over concerns about its golden passport scheme, there were fears it would be a huge blow to the sector.

But designated agents for Vanuatu’s citizenship programmes have told RNZ Pacific this has not necessarily hurt them much, as their product has other benefits and passport holders can still apply to access Europe.

However, Vanuatu’s continued inclusion on an EU anti-money laundering blacklist hurts more, Francesca Grillon of approved agent Yawha & Associates said.

Currency hassles
Grillon said the decision to stop visa-free entry was not a major downfall for the citizenship programme.

“I think the main issue we are having is the blacklisting from Europe, because that that is an obstacle for receiving funds in foreign currency,” she said.

This issue came to a head last September when the Commonwealth Bank of Australia — which served as the correspondent bank for the National Bank of Vanuatu — advised it would no longer facilitate transfers for certified agents in the citizenship programmes

Melten Menauke of Smart Citizenship Vanuatu explained that this left the government in a bind over how it collects the donations and fees that foreign applicants pay.

“The National Bank is still looking for a correspondent bank to accept US dollars. I don’t know what is happening with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.

“US currency was the first one they blocked, and now they are no longer accepting [Australian dollars]. They’re only accepting Japanese yen,” he said, adding that this created costly hurdles for agents and applicants alike.

But integrity issues are not just creating pressure on Vanuatu’s citizenship sector internationally.

‘Nobody trusts anyone’
A Commission of Inquiry into the citizenship programmes was initiated by Vanuatu’s government in 2024 following concerns about corrupt practices involving the sale of citizenship and misuse of the programmes for personal and political gain.

But the inquiry report has still not been made public, eight months after it was officially handed to the government. As calls for its release continue, Jenny Ligo, the chairperson of Women Against Crime and Corruption in Vanuatu, said citizenship schemes had been misled by political interests.

“That programme needs to be taken out totally. Because most of the projects under programmes in Vanuatu, it always ties in with pollitics and politicians,” Ligo said.

“This is all wrong. We need neutral people to run these programmes. But at the moment nobody trusts anyone.”

Vanuatu’s government has had a lot to contend with in the last few years, including responding to major disasters — earthquakes and cyclones — and the challenge of creating much-needed political reform. However, addressing the integrity problems of the citizenship-by-investment schemes is high on its priotiy list

Grillon said the government had been taking the right steps to improve compliance with regulations and rules, including strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit which screens applicants.

“There’s a lot of effort, both from the high level government and directorship and public servants, in trying to really follow the international advice, and the newly introduced laws and doing everything properly.”

In demand
Overall, the sector is doing well. According to the Vanuatu Daily Post, citizenship sale receipts made up the bulk of the US$31 million in revenue in the past year — 24.3 percent more than what was forecast, with around 2000 foreigners granted citizenship last year.

Interest remains strong in several foreign markets, Norman Joseph of JG Marketing, Consulting and Recruitment Agency said.

“We have Chinese, we have Indonesians, we have Russians. Most of them are from different countries but they also have passports from different countries,” Joseph said.

“So they come in, for example, some might be Chinese but they also have a Mexican passport, so they apply from a Mexican passport.”

Ros Stanford of designated agent Stanford Knight said the Vanuatu passport was attractive for a variety of reasons.

“So, either for visa free travel — so global mobility is one option; for those that actually physically want to reside for tax benefits; and then we have a lot of clients currently who just want a safe like a Plan B, a safe alternative residence, in case things turn to custard globally.”

On the latter reason, Stanford said they had seen an uptick in the last couple of years, a reflection of ongoing ruptures in the global geopolitical order.

Even without visa-free access to Europe, and despite the concerns of ni-Vanuatu about its commodification, Vanuatu Citizenship is in demand — and agents tout it as one of the fastest citizenships to get any where in the world.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Truth in world affairs is not a single expert-narrated story.

National Politics

In our ‘official’ ‘United Nations’ world – the world referenced by the expression the international rules-based order – there are about 200 sovereign nation states (ie ‘countries’) which are equal members of the global community of nations. We mean equal in a juridical sense, not an economic or demographic sense; as recognised by ‘one nation, one vote’ in the United Nations General Assembly. Further, in this sanctioned and sanctified view – using the verb ‘sanction’ in its original old-fashioned sense – neither history nor geographical proximity matter; Mexico is as independent of the United States as it is of India.

Before moving on to geopolitics, there are four exceptions allowed within this official view. First is that there are numerous pieces of territory which are understood as too small – in population and/or land area – to be viable independent sovereign nation states. Second, some sovereign nation states – usually neighbours – may form a voluntary Union, whereby certain aspects of their sovereignty are ceded to centralised institutions. Third is that many citizens do not reside in the territories associated with their nationalities. And three exceptions not allowed for, but acknowledged to varying extents: countries that don’t exist but do exist; territories subject to internationally tolerated military occupation; and territories within recognised nation-states pushing for secession, though falling well short of either self-government or union with similarly-placed neighbouring territories.

An example of the first type of exception is Greenland, accounted for as a ‘realm’ territory of Denmark. (Other familiar realm territories are: Cook Islands [in the realm of New Zealand], American Samoa, and New Zealand’s closest foreign neighbour [Norfolk Island, in the realm of Australia].) The second exception is the European Union (noting that, in some circumstances – consider FIFA – the United Kingdom is also a Union of [four] nations). Might Canada join the European Union this century?

The third exception – the diaspora exception – applies to a degree to all nation states; and it applies particularly to New Zealand. New Zealand possibly has more citizens resident outside of New Zealand relative to citizens resident inside New Zealand; at least if we only consider countries with resident populations in excess of one million. Is New Zealand its citizenry or its territory? Given the realities of dual-citizenship, it is probably better defined as its territory along with its residentcitizens and denizens.

The fourth generally accepted exception is territories that are formally non-sovereign. Our example here is Antarctica. We may add the Moon.

Re the unsanctioned exceptions, Taiwan is the obvious example of the first type (other examples include Abkhazia and Somaliland) and Palestine is the obvious example of the second type. For the third (secessionist) type, I would cite Eastern Congo in which substantial domestic forces are in reality more aligned to nearby Kigali than faraway Kinshasa; I would also mention Myanmar’s Rakhine state, home to the Rohingya people.

Geopolitics

While the above ‘national politics’ narrative is real and contains a legal structure satisfying to its liberal architects, it is overlaid by an equally real (and quite different) geopolitical layer. Conflicts of big ego and big ideology can neither be understood nor resolved without substantial reference to geopolitics. Geopolitics is tied to both contested histories and geographical proximity. More than anything geopolitics is about empire (formal and informal), the unequal coalitions and powerplays among and between identities of people beyond and within territorial boundaries.

Geopolitics is about the centres of political power – the ‘great powers’ to use an expression from World War One – and their rival claims over the planet and its people. Geopolitical texts commonly refer to cities that are power centres, such as Washington and Berlin, rather than the countries in which those cities are located. Most conflict in the world can only be understood with recourse to geopolitics, which is largely the sociopathic politics of power masquerading as a set of struggles of ‘Good versus Evil’.

At least the president of the United States, DJT, is in a sense more honest than most ‘democratic’ leaders of powerful countries, in that he frames his acquisitive sentiments in the name of America rather than in the name of Good or in the name of God. Coveted Greenland looms larger in geopolitics than in national politics; in national politics it successfully hides in plain sight, as a large appendage of a semi-sovereign nation with a population barely larger than New Zealand.

Greenland: History

Greenland presently – at least formally – lies within the realm of Denmark, noting that ‘realm’ is itself a sanctioned rules-based exception. Denmark, as a member of the European Union, has delegated aspects of its sovereignty; from Copenhagen to Brussels and Paris and Berlin.

The first question to ask about Greenland is: why is it in the possession of the Kingdom of Denmark? Greenland was never conquered or colonised by Danes or by Denmark. Over 1,000 years ago, Greenland was colonised by Norse (ie Norwegian) Vikings. Greenland’s first people were Inuit, and the present population is substantially an Inuit/Norse mix. Around 500 years ago, Norway and Denmark formed a political union – a kingdom in which Denmark was the dominant partner – which lasted around 300 years. In that age of imperialism, Greenland became formally subject to that kingdom. This was a marriage between Denmark and Norway during the constrained period of the Little Ice Age. Greenland was ‘matrimonial property’ in this Union.

In 1814, Norway was passed on to Sweden through the Treaty of Kiel, in an era in which the wife was regarded as the property of the husband. Thus, Denmark formally gained Greenland as part of the divorce settlement. That remains the historical basis for Denmark’s claim over Greenland today. Though we remind ourselves that today’s reality is that Denmark is a somewhat junior partner in the polyamorous European Union. (Would Denmark get to keep Greenland if Denmark was to do a ‘Dexit’? Or would Greenland be passed on to the other husbands and wives?)

Greenland: Geography

Functionally, at least in geo-environmental terms, Greenland is the northern land-analogue of Antarctica. Arctica. While it doesn’t literally cover the North Pole (except that a large sheet of sea-ice extends from northern Greenland), it is near enough; and its land ice-sheet is certainly the northern analogue of the West Antarctica ice sheet. Based on this analogy, Greenland could become subject to a similar extranationalism to that which governs Antarctica. The difference of course is that Antarctica has no formally resident population; almost nobody was born there. The model could be adapted, with authentic Greenlanders becoming limited-power-landlords over an essentially international territory.

When I was a child, it was very common for families to have a globe in their living rooms, somewhere between the mantlepiece and the piano. About 15 years ago, I was lucky enough to have acquired a 3D jigsaw puzzle of the world; indeed, a small self-assembly globe. To see Greenland in perspective, it’s necessary to look at a globe. Short of that, see this satellite picture of North America from the Turtle Island page on Wikipedia.

(I was privileged to learn about Turtle Island when I visited Winnipeg in May 2019. When I walked through the Peace Park at The Forks, I learned for the first time about Turtle Island. See on YouTube: Winnipeg – the heart of Turtle Island. [And note this 16 December 2025 BBC story FBI foils New Year’s Eve terror plot across southern California, officials say relating to the Turtle Island Liberation Front.] I have a personal story about Greenland. While never having set foot there, I remember having a window seat flying from London to Los Angeles one October day. I saw the sun set somewhere northwest of Scotland; then a couple of hours later I saw it rise again, from the west, over Greenland. This was only possible because at such polar latitudes, an east-west flight is fast enough to be able to reverse the sunset.)

The map, in correct perspective, very much shows Greenland as a not-very-green part of North America. Its closest neighbour is of course Canada; indeed since 2022 Greenland has shared a land border with Greenland, on Hans Island in the Kennedy Channel, following the resolution of the Whisky War between Canada and Denmark. (It is unknown whether the Kennedy Channel was named after a Canadian fur-trader and politician, or the guy who was United States Secretary of the Navy in 1852 and 1853. If the latter, this might give false credence to DJT’s claim on Greenland for the United States.)

Greenland certainly looks to be geographically American – just as Norfolk Island geographically connects to New Zealand (on the Zealandia continent). But a geographical argument must also based on the connectivity between population centres. The flight distances from Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, to other capital cities are: Reykjavik, Iceland (1,430 km); Ottawa, Canada (2,560km); Dublin, Ireland (2,800km); Oslo, Norway (3,150km); London, UK (3,250km); Washington DC, US (3,260km); Brussels, EU (3,520km); Copenhagen, Denmark (3,530); Berlin, Germany (3,820); Moscow, Russia (4,630km); Beijing, China (8,400km).

Washington is closer to Nuuk than is Copenhagen. Dublin is the closest EU capital city to Nuuk, and is a more economically connected city to the North Atlantic than is Copenhagen. Brussels, formal capital of the EU is the same distance from Nuuk as is Copenhagen. Berlin, the geopolitical capital of the EU, is nearly 4,000 km from Nuuk (whereas New York, the power capital of the US is less than 3,000km from Nuuk). Moscow and Beijing are both much further from Greenland, have had no geopolitical influence there, and constitute no plausible geopolitical threat; future security issues in Greenland are more likely to emanate from piracy than from power centres in Asia.

While there is no argument in favour of the United States annexing or otherwise acquiring Greenland, the case for European Union control of Greenland is even weaker than that of the United States. The only European countries with credible claims to form a Union with Greenland are Norway and Iceland, on the basis of shared history and shared maritime geography.

Greenland: Demography

Greenland’s population of just under 60,000 is only slightly higher than the populations of the American realm territories of American Samoa and the Northern Marianas Islands. Guam has three times more people than Greenland. The American Virgin Islands, with 100,000 people, is more populated than Greenland. The largest American realm territory, Puerto Rico, has 300 times as many people as Greenland. Of these ‘countries’, only Puerto Rico is a serious candidate to become the 51st state of the United States. The Virgin Islanders don’t even drive on the same side of the road as the rest of the United States.

I suspect that the DJT vision for Greenland is for it to become something like the former Panama Canal Zone; a former American territory that existed when I sailed through the Panama Canal in 1974. Of course we are aware that DJT would like to re-acquire that Panamanian territory for the United States.

Greenland is different though, in the same way that Antarctica is. It has many potentially valuable mining resources; and it lies on economically significant sea channels which are becoming more navigable thanks to climate change. And it has global environmental values. A collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet would drown all of Manhattan and most of the rest of New York; as well as much of other cities mentioned above such as Dublin, London and Copenhagen.

Greenland as Arctica

Greenland’s people can become landlords – but not landlords with monopoly power – able to procure citizens’ royalties (public property rights) from both extractive industries and the use of its sea-lanes. Greenland requires a Treaty of Nuuk, with a limited concession of sovereignty in return for those benefits; but a concession that leaves property rights in Greenland essentially the same as property rights in Antarctica.

Antarctica today represents geopolitics done quite well.

The Greenland question needs to be addressed. It is not sufficient for it to become a de facto territory of Europe – which eventually means Berlin. And it is too large a landmass to be independent in the way that Iceland is.

Warning

By understanding Greenland essentially as an inhabited Anti-Antarctica – as Arctica – we have to realise that the present United States regime may seek to undermine (literally and metaphorically) current arrangements for Antarctica. And when DJT turns his gaze southwards, he may look upon independent sovereign countries in the South Pacific as parts of his growing fiefdom. The South Pacific is America’s gateway to McMurdo Sound, in Antarctica. A number of ‘independent’ and proud countries in the South Pacific – Tonga, for example – already dutifully vote largely according to the United States’ say-so in the United Nations.

If Antarctica becomes a template for Greenland, that’s a definite improvement on the present accidental and unsustainable arrangement; but only if Antarctica’s present governance arrangements are preserved.

Watch what happens if Nasa’s Artemis Program successfully re-lands American men on the Moon. The Washington regime may lay claim to privileged property rights over the Moon – much as Wentworth acquired New Zealand’s South Island in 1839, requiring a treaty (Treaty of Waitangi) to repudiate that claim. If the United States believes it owns the Moon, it may stake a similar claim on Antarctica; and also seek to extend its Pacific realm. Citing America’s security! And breaking the Seventh and Tenth Commandments.

While current American-led geopolitics poses a deeply problematic story for resource-rich and low-populated territories, the expert-led official story of international politics is problematic too. The status-quo is not necessarily the best solution.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

COMMENTARY: By Caitlin Johnstone

Is there anything more undignified than “leftists” and “anarchists” who cheer on the fall of empire-targeted governments even as the empire moves war machinery into place?

Ooh look at me, I’m sticking it to the man by supporting the same agendas as the US State Department. I’m being punk rock by regurgitating the same war propaganda talking points as John Bolton.

I’m fighting the power by backing the foreign policy objectives of the most powerful empire that has ever existed.

Embarrassing, man.

Anarchists, again, fail to understand that overthrowing the existing state infrastructure would create a power vacuum. And currently, there does not exist a revolutionary vanguard that can occupy that space with the mass line.

Which means that such a situation is prime for… https://t.co/a1OJqGzAQZ

— mischa ☭ (@redmischa) January 14, 2026

If you want to have a serious political outlook it is necessary to have a more layered understanding of the world than “tyranny bad”, because as Westerners we ourselves are ruled by the most tyrannical power structure on earth.

That power structure ceaselessly targets the few remaining states that have successfully resisted being absorbed into its globe-spanning power umbrella like Iran, Russia, China, North Korea, and Cuba.

Those states have successfully resisted being absorbed into the imperial blob exactly because they have strong governments that don’t hesitate to exert control to stomp out all the imperial operations and infiltrations which would otherwise have overthrown them.

This doesn’t mean these governments are wonderful and flawless, it just means they possess the qualities that enable a state to resist the empire’s coups, proxy conflicts, color revolutions and foreign influence operations.

If your only analysis of state power dynamics is “tyranny bad”, then you will naturally find yourself in opposition to the unabsorbed states and (whether you admit it or not) on the side of the most tyrannical regime on earth  —  namely the US-centralised Western empire.

No other power structure has spent the 21st century slaughtering people by the millions in wars of aggression around the world, attacking civilian populations with deadly starvation sanctions, staging coups, instigating proxy conflicts, and circling the planet with hundreds of military bases.

Only the US empire is doing that. Dominating the entire planet with murderous brute force is as tyrannical as it gets. If this isn’t true, then nothing is.

If you want to have a serious political worldview, you need to get real about this. The premise that the fall of an authoritarian government is always inherently positive has no place in the understanding of a grown adult, especially if that grown adult happens to live in the core of the Western empire, and especially if that empire is presently working to orchestrate the overthrow of the government in question.

The “I oppose all governments equally” flag. pic.twitter.com/MJGdXerObo

— Caitlin Johnstone (@caitoz) March 31, 2021

The more power structures are absorbed into the empire, the larger and more powerful the empire becomes. Desiring their absorption is desiring more power for the US empire.

And you can lie to yourself and say that you don’t want Iran to be absorbed into the control of the US empire, you just want its people to live in a free and democratic country. But we both know that’s not going to happen.

Once the strength of the Iranian government has been collapsed there will be a power vacuum that is filled by whatever faction is able to secure control, and the strongest faction will be whichever one is backed by the US and its allies. There is no organic faction within Iran that is strong enough to stand against the installation of a US puppet regime at this time, besides the one that presently exists.

That’s the reality of the situation. It’s not ideal, but it is reality. You can choose to be real about reality, or you can choose to psychologically compartmentalise away from it and tell yourself a bunch of fairly tales about a global people’s revolution which just coincidentally happens to be starting in all the countries the US empire hates most. I personally find the latter undignified, self-debasing, and power-serving.

Caitlin Johnstone is an Australian independent journalist and poet. Her articles include The UN Torture Report On Assange Is An Indictment Of Our Entire Society. She publishes a website and Caitlin’s Newsletter. This article is republished with permission.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

The signing of the Papua New Guinea-Australia Mutual Defence Treaty — officially known as the Pukpuk Treaty — marks a defining moment in the modern Pacific order.

Framed as a “historic milestone”, the pact re-casts security cooperation between Port Moresby and Canberra while stirring deeper debates about sovereignty, dependency, and the shifting balance of power in the region.

At a joint press conference in Canberra, PNG Prime Minister James Marape called the treaty “a product of geography, not geopolitics”, emphasising the shared neighbourhood and history binding both nations.

“This Treaty was not conceived out of geopolitics or any other reason, but out of geography, history, and the enduring reality of our shared neighbourhood,” Marape said.

Described as “two houses with one fence,” the Pukpuk Treaty cements Australia as PNG’s “security partner of choice.” It encompasses training, intelligence, disaster relief, and maritime cooperation while pledging full respect for sovereignty.

“Papua New Guinea made a strategic and conscious choice – Australia is our security partner of choice. This choice was made not out of pressure or convenience, but from the heart and soul of our coexistence as neighbours,” Marape said.

For Canberra, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese cast the accord as an extension of “family ties” – a reaffirmation that Australia “will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with PNG to ensure a peaceful and secure Pacific family.”

Intensifying competition
It comes amid intensifying competition for influence across the Pacific, where security and sport now intersect in Canberra’s broader regional strategy.

The Treaty promises to bolster the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) through joint training, infrastructure upgrades, and enhanced maritime surveillance. Marape conceded that the country’s forces have long struggled with under-resourcing.

“The reality is that our Defence Force needs enhanced capacity to defend our sovereign territorial integrity. This Treaty will help us build that capacity – through shared resources, intelligence, technology, and training,” he said.

Yet, retired Major-General Jerry Singirok, former PNGDF commander, has urged caution.

“Signing a Defence Pact with Australia for the purposes of strengthening our military capacity and capabilities is most welcomed, but an Act of Parliament must give legal effect to whatever military activities a foreign country intends,” Singirok said in a statement.

He warned that Sections 202 and 206 of PNG’s Constitution already define the Defence Force’s role and foreign cooperation limits, stressing that any new arrangement must pass parliamentary scrutiny to avoid infringing sovereignty.

The sovereignty debate
Singirok’s warning reflects a broader unease in Port Moresby — that the Pukpuk Treaty could re-entrench post-colonial dependency. He described the PNGDF as “retarded and stagnated”, spending just 0.38 percent of GDP on defence, with limited capacity to patrol its vast land and maritime borders.

“In essence, PNG is in the process of offloading its sovereign responsibilities to protect its national interest and sovereign protection to Australia to fill the gaps and carry,” he wrote.

“This move, while from face value appeals, has serious consequences from dependency to strategic synergy and blatant disregard to sovereignty at the expense of Australia.”

Former leaders, including Sir Warren Dutton, have been even more blunt: “If our Defence Force is trained, funded, and deployed under Australian priorities, then whose sovereignty are we defending? Ours — or theirs?”

Canberra views the NRL deal not simply as a sporting venture but as “soft power in action” — embedding Australian culture and visibility across the Pacific through a sport already seen as a regional passion.

Marape called it “another platform of shared identity” between PNG and Australia, aligning with the spirit of the Pukpuk Treaty: partnership through shared interests.

However, critics argue the twin announcements — a defence pact and an NRL team — reveal a coordinated Australian effort to strengthen influence at multiple levels: security, economy, and society.

The US factor and overall strategy
The Pukpuk Treaty follows last year’s Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed between Papua New Guinea and the United States, which grants US forces access to key PNG military facilities, including Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.

That deal drew domestic protests over transparency and the perception of external control.

The Marape government insisted the arrangement respected PNG’s sovereignty, but combined with the new Australian treaty, it positions the country at the centre of a US-led security network stretching from Hawai’i to Canberra.

Analysts say the two pacts complement each other — with the US providing strategic hardware and global deterrence, and Australia delivering regional training and operational partnership.

Together, they represent a deepening of what one defence analyst called “the Pacific’s most consequential alignment since independence”.

PNG’s deepening security ties with the United States also appear to have shaped its diplomatic posture in the Middle East.

As part of its broader alignment with Washington, PNG in September 2023 opened an embassy in Jerusalem — becoming one of only a handful of states to do so, and signalling strong support for Israel.

In recent UN votes on Gaza, PNG has repeatedly voted against ceasefire resolutions, siding with Israel and the US. Some analysts link this to evangelical Christian influence in PNG’s politics and to the strategic expectation of favour with major powers.

China has been one of PNG’s longest and most consistent diplomatic partners since formal relations began in 1976.

China’s role in Papua New Guinea is not limited to diplomatic signalling — it remains a major provider of loans, grants and infrastructure projects across the country, even as the strategic winds shift. Chinese state-owned enterprises and development funds have backed highways, power plants, courts, telecoms and port facilities in PNG.

In recent years, PNG has signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and observers count at least 40 Chinese SOEs currently operating in Papua New Guinea, many tied to mining, construction, and trade projects.

While Marape has repeatedly said PNG “welcomes all partners,” the growing web of Western defence agreements has clearly shifted regional dynamics. China views the Pukpuk Treaty as another signal of Canberra and Washington’s determination to counter its influence in the Pacific — even as Port Moresby maintains that its foreign policy is one of “friends to all, enemies to none”.

A balancing act
For Marape, the Treaty is not about choosing sides but strengthening capacity through trust.

“Our cooperation is built on mutual respect, not dominance; on trust, not imposition. Australia never imposed this on us – this was our proposal, and we thank them for walking with us as equal partners,” he said.

He stressed that parliamentary ratification under Section 117 of the Constitution will ensure accountability.

“This is a fireplace conversation between neighbours – Papua New Guinea and Australia. We share this part of the earth forever, and together we will safeguard it for the generations to come,” he added.

The road ahead
Named after the Tok Pisin word for crocodile — pukpuk, a symbol of endurance and guardianship — the Treaty embodies both trust and caution. Its success will depend on transparency, parliamentary oversight, and a shared understanding of what “mutual defence” means in practice.

As PNG moves to ratify the agreement, it stands at a delicate crossroads — between empowerment and dependency, regional cooperation and strategic competition.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

New Zealand’s foreign minister Winston Peters announced at the United Nations General Assembly that this New Zealand coalition Government will not recognise Palestine as a state – at this time.

Here, it is important to cite New Zealand’s foreign minister in relevant detail.

Winston Peters said at the United Nations General Assembly:

“We think a future generation when Israeli and Palestinian political leadership is an asset, not a liability, and where other situational variables have shifted the current calculus away from conflict and towards peace would be more conducive for recognising Palestinian statehood.

“There in lies our dilemma over any decision to recognise Palestinian Palestinian statehood now because statehood recognition is an instrument for peace as an instrument for peace also does not play because there are no fully legitimate and viable state of Palestine to recognise.

“Palestine does not fully meet the accepted criteria for a state as it does not fully control its own territory or population.

“There is also no obvious link between more of the international community recognised in the state of Palestine and the aimed objective of protecting the two-state solution.

“Indeed, what we have observed since partners pronouncements reveals that recognising Palestine now will likely prove counterproductive.

“That is, Hamas resisting negotiation in the belief that it is winning the global propaganda war while pushing Israel towards even more entrench military positions.

“Recognition at this time we also think is open to political manipulation by both Hamas and Israel. Hamas will seek to portray our recognition of Palestine as a victory as they have already done in response to partner announcements.

“Israel will claim the recognition toward rewards Hamas and that it removes pressure on them to release hostages and agree to a ceasefire,” Winston Peters said. (Ref. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/new-zealand-national-statement-un-general-assembly-%E2%80%93-%E2%80%98leadership-global-affairs-united )

In essence, I argue, that Peters’ speech kicks the problem down the road. He shifts the responsibility for developing a solution to the Gaza atrocities conditionally on to a future generation of leaders. And it fails to acknowledge that at the current rate of mass killings of Palestinian people, there will be no one left to create nor nurture a future generation of Palestinian leadership.

But the statement nuances a shift in New Zealand’s position geopolitically and within the rules-based-order community of nations. The statement will confuse many observers of global politics, not the least among New Zealanders and peoples who sought asylum in New Zealand far from the paces of their birth.

Let’s consider why.

International Law.

The speech will trigger a cringe for millions of New Zealand citizens and permanent residents at realising how this right-leaning nationalistic three-party coalition government has abandoned and failed to reflect their strongly held positions for human rights principles.

It is human rights principles that have long anchored New Zealand as a strong and unshakable advocate for an international rules based order, for international humanitarian rights, for recourse to international law and justice, and signatories to the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice.

It was this cumulative support for human rights and justice that compelled New Zealanders to reject the militant wing of Hamas for its atrocities against civilians in Israel on October 7, 2023.

But advocacy for human rights and justice is not a political expression. It isn’t tribal. It isn’t biased in favour of one peoples and not another. Advocacy for human rights and justice is universal and in this sense it is blind to the class or statehood where hate and atrocity originates from.

This is the same universal principle that the International Court of Justice applied when it found there was a prima facie case of genocide being committed by the state of Israel.

It is this same universal principle that the International Criminal Court applied when calling for the arrest of the state of Israel’s prime minister Netanyahu to be tried for crimes.

Peters’ speech to the United Nations General Assembly ignored these bodies and only waved a cursory glance at the ongoing murder of innocent children and peoples in Gaza, an apparent systematic act of mass murder, committed against people simply because they are of Palestinian birth. Peters’ speech failed these victims and rejected, by way of omission, their right to justice.

In a sense, this New Zealand coalition government has reflexively returned New Zealand back to that glitch-period where this nation fell estranged from the international common-good, in breach of the Gleneagles Agreement, and refused to cease engagement with Apartheid South Africa by allowing sporting contact with that murderous regime in 1981.

New Zealanders rejected that government in 1984, and today’s abandonment of New Zealand’s long held positions for rights and justice will certainly be a factor in the 2026 general elections.

Multilateralism is founded on rules and laws. Where rogue states abandon the principles that are universally agreed to by the majority, those nation states fail to advocate for the multilateral institutions that they rely on for social, judicial, and economic progress.

Peters, as the envoy for this current New Zealand coalition government cannot have it both ways. He cannot claim to be a voice for multilateralism and justice when he has delivered a decision that stands as contrary to the 81 percent of the United Nations general assembly nations who have announced and demand recognition for the State of Palestine.

Gaza and the occupied territories of the West Bank have recognised borders. Within those borders reside a peoples that reflect a common culture and a right to self-determination. They have a representative political structure that can engage itself in bilateral and multilateral forum and bodies. It cannot be ignored that it is being prevented from functioning as a state due to the atrocities that have been inflicted upon it by its occupiers.

It is the occupation that must be addressed, and the United Nations General Assembly, by way of a large majority, recognises this fact – ashamedly the New Zealand coalition government and Peters do not.

CANZ bloc and Like Minded Countries

In addition to New Zealand has long contributed to what is called the CANZ bloc at the United Nations.

The CANZ bloc is a group of nations consisting of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It has held together due to these nations sharing common values as ‘like minded countries’.

New Zealanders have long heard their representatives citing allegiance with ‘like minded countries’.

This too has been abandoned by New Zealand at a most important time for multilateralism, a time when supposed ‘like minded countries’ need to band together and present a solid powerful bloc on issues such as Palestine.

This is why Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited New Zealand on the weekend of August 9-10, 2025. Albanese sought the position of New Zealand’s current Prime Minister Christopher Luxon on whether New Zealand would recognise Palestine as a state in keeping with ‘like minded countries’ Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and France. Luxon couldn’t give him an answer. And New Zealanders were left wondering why.

On this issue, New Zealand will have sent a signal to other nations that it cannot be relied on anymore as a true advocate of peace and justice while it fails to life up to its long-held reputation as an honest broker on the world stage standing up for peace, justice and multilateral progress.

This is a day of shame that has dawned in New Zealand. And millions in this multicultural Pacific nation will feel ashamed that their political representatives have failed not only them, but victims of atrocities all over the world.

Failed Opportunity to Advocate for UN Reform

Peters’ speech before the United Nations General Assembly, while acknowledging the UN needed reform, failed dismally to present a reformist plan that New Zealand would advocate for. It was a glaring omission from a once seasoned politician that made his bones on matters of principle and law.

Peters speech also failed to identify the mechanisms and protocols that exist within the United Nations at this current time; principles like the R2P or responsibility to protect protocols that were advanced after UN observers were prevented from protecting victims of Rwanda genocide decades ago.

The United Nations (UN) Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a global political commitment adopted in 2005 by world leaders to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes – namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It holds that state sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect populations within their borders; when a state manifestly fails to do so, the international community has a responsibility to act collectively and decisively, in accordance with the UN Charter. 

All Peters and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials needed to do is indulge themselves for a moment to reflect on this R2P protocol as published by the United Nations office on genocide prevention and the responsibility to protect. (Ref. https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/responsibility-protect/about )

Put simply, within the UN charter there is the framework and mechanism for Peters, as a representative or a once principled nation, to cite and demand be applied to resolving the humanitarian crisis and murder taking place today in Gaza, and indeed in other parts of the world.

And it is this, that illustrates greatest the areas where reform of the United Nations is required and is at a critical juncture.

The United Nations was formed as a body to advocate and restore peace. For decades now, it has shifted its emphasis onto becoming a distributor of assistance and development. This is noble and it is vital in a complex world such as we live in. But it has become moribund where it comes to ensuring a mechanism or framework structured body where nations can cumulatively restore peace and prosperity to nations, peoples, and states that are victims of tyranny.

This is the kernel of need where reformist ideals are developed and implemented. And this was largely ignored by Peters and his coalition government colleagues.

As such, New Zealand faces headwinds. It may now be regarded by our once closest multilateral partners as an unreliable and immoral unjust state that waxes and wanes, dancing on the head of a pin on distorted legalese that offers more smoke and mirrors than principled solutions.

New Zealanders and Palestinian victims deserved to witness the very opposite of what was served up to them today. They deserved to witness a representative and true advocate for – particularly in the case of the Palestinian diaspora here in New Zealand and their dead and dying relatives back in the occupied territories and Gaza – rights to recourse as individuals and as survivors to universally applied justice.

But this current New Zealand government refused them. And as such it has sided with those nations that are a part of the problem manifest in Gaza, rather than being part of the solution.

Doing nothing is complicit.

Today’s geopolitics is already coming very close to a war (mainly of words, so far) between Asia and Europe (both entities broadly and loosely defined). For geopolitical purposes we may call this a war of hubris and cant between East and West. Conveniently for the West, the words East and Evil start with the same letter, so it’s easy for westerners to conflate East and Evil to the initial E.

What letter do we give greater Europe, aka The West? G for Good? Or B for Bad?

Consider the six principal political leaders of the West: Rutte, von der Leyen, Starmer, Merz, Trump, Netanyahu. What they have in common, to a lesser to greater degree, is their complicity re the genocidal Israel project. Can we call them Good? Clearly no. Can we call them Bad? Yes, we can.

It means that, from the point of view of an academic (ie disinterested to a point, not uninterested) Eurocentric observer, we are entering a geopolitical struggle between Bad and Evil. (Only people who advocate for the Israel project in its present form could claim that it’s Good versus Evil.) We note that the most obvious interpretation of ‘Bad’ is that Bad is the lesser Evil.

(We should also note that, from a Sinocentric or Russocentric or Iranocentric or Indocentric point of view, the expansionist West probably looks more like Evil than Bad. It may be that more people in the world perceive West to be the greater Evil and East to be the lesser Evil. The median viewer probably lives in India.)

From a Referee’s Eye

Let’s think of this geopolitical arm-wrestle as a game of rugby. The referee is obliged to favour neitherBad nor Evil. And it’s a game with an indefinite amount of ‘extra time’; only the teams themselves can call fulltime, though they may consult the referee. So long as the teams cannot agree to an outcome, the game simply continues ad infinitum. We may assume that each team has a very large ‘reserve bench’.

(We note that, and ignoring the case of Japan for simplicity, geopolitics from 1938 to 1990 was either ‘Good versus Evil1 versus Evil2’ or ‘Bad versus Evil1 versus Evil2’; it was multipolar then bipolar. For simplicity, for that historical war we may call Good/Bad the West, putting aside the issue of western motives and morality. In May 1945, Evil1 conceded to West and Evil2. In 1990, Evil2 conceded to West. There was no real argument about who were the winners and losers. There may be an argument about the use of the ‘Evil’ labels; but those labels accurately reflect the western view of both Nazi Germany and Communist Soviet Union.)

Most likely the referee secretly prefers the lesser Evil (Bad) to prevail over the greater Evil. But our referee is a professional, and must adjudicate according to the ‘plays’ that take place. A professional referee is neutral. Probably both Evil and Bad will try to cheat. The referee must deal with both sides’ cheating even-handedly. (Point of ethics. Would it be better for the game if such a referee is like a ‘bent cop’, in this case favouring Bad over Evil?)

What is the game’s best outcome if Evil is winning? Does Bad keep playing forever hoping for a Hollywood-style comeback? Or – if the only realistic alternative is total defeat – does Bad concede, offering a dishonourable draw in the hope that Evil will accept?

The Nuclear Option

What happens if, when we enter indefinite ‘extra time’, we abandon the rules and agree to start playing Nuclear Rugby; noting that this form of rugby involves both sides resorting to tactics of mass destruction. In the absence of rules, the referee relocates to Rapa Nui, hoping to be safe there. Further, the referee is now an observer, pronouncing on military advantage and nothing else; hardly anybody listens anymore. As before, the game only ends by mutual agreement; or by there being no players left alive.

Here we note that there are ‘third parties’. There are neutral nations which have joined neither team. And each nation has unwilling participants; people who do not like rugby. These people neither wish to support the same team as their government nor the other team; for practical purposes they are neutrals or pacifists, not traitors. They struggle to be heard above the noise of the binary contest. Then there are the non-human life forms on Earth; they are neutral third parties. Nuclear weapons, more than any other type of weapon, disproportionately affect third parties.

How does a game of nuclear rugby end? Is there an ‘offramp’ before The End? Presumably Evil will give up if it’s clearly losing; as eventually occurred in 1938 to 1990. But will Bad ever give up if Evil is winning?

If Evil is winning and Bad refuses to ‘sue for peace’, then the only hope for the birds and the bees is a quick extinction of all participating humans. Humanity’s only hope would be the survival of some neutrals; and the retention of a planet which can still support life. There will be no victor to collect the cup of Ashes.

The better option

Don’t play geopolitical rugby.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Luxon claimed the issue was ‘complex’ and New Zealanders should not expect a decision until well after his foreign minister Winston Peters has spoken on the matter at the United Nations in New York.

Advocacy group, Palestinian Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA), immediately issued a statement headlined: Genocide is not ‘complex’, it’s a ‘cowards’ way out’.

It the statement, PSNA co-spokesperson John Minto said the ‘complexity’ excuse for cabinet inaction on Palestine this morning is “a cowards’ way out for the government to avoid even the most tepid policy to oppose Israeli genocide in Gaza”.

John Minto, said the New Zealand Government recognised Palestine at the United Nations in 1947.

“It’s taken nearly 80 years to work out ways to make that real and it still can’t do it.

“(Winston) Peters needed very clear and strong instructions to take to the UN, where he could have joined the calls for the growing list of sanctions to be imposed on Israel,” John Minto said.

He added: “In just over two days last week, Israel demolished fifty of the tallest residential tower blocks in Gaza City.  That’s a rate of destruction of more than one every hour and thousands more people made homeless.

“There’s nothing about defending borders, or implementing a strategy of getting hostages released in all of this barbarous onslaught by Israel.  It’s self-declared ethnic cleansing.”

Minto said the Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, must face up to Israel’s blatant violations of international laws and conventions.

“At the same time, Israel has tried to kill the Hamas negotiations team by bombing them in Qatar.  New Zealand has declared that the issues can only be resolved through negotiations, but has said not one word of complaint that Israel is murdering the negotiators.”

He said there is a “yawning gap” between the government’s policy towards Russia and that towards Israel.

“Winston Peters has just implemented its thirty-second sanction measure against Russia. That does not seem to be complex,” John Minto said.

By William Camacaro

New York

One of the casualties of Washington’s get-tough immigration policy is the plight of children separated by U.S. authorities from their parents. The political party of “family values” has caused needless trauma for these migrant children and round the clock anxiety for parents desperately waiting to be reunited with their loved ones. 

The Venezuelan government, which has a longstanding policy–vuelta a la patria–of assisting the repatriation of their citizens– has reported that at least 66 children have been illegally held  in the United States since their parents were deported to Venezuela. At this writing the author has been unable to obtain information as to their circumstances or whereabouts. 

The most well-known case of a Venezuelan child held in the U.S. after her mother was deported is that of a two-year-old girl, Maikelys Espinoza. After an international campaign brought her plight to light, the United States repatriated Maikelys to Caracas on May 14, 2025 returning her to her mother’s embrace. Today, families’ pleas for the return of their children recall her story and have stirred the sympathy of the Venezuelan public.

This situation recalls the case of Cuban citizen Elián González, who, as a child, was known as “the raft boy,” and found himself at the center of a major international incident in 2000. He was found adrift on an inner tube after the boat carrying him, his mother, and other migrants en route from Cuba to the United States capsized. The child’s custody became the subject of a dispute between his father in Cuba (who was offered money by the U.S. to come and live here) and his relatives in Miami. The case caused an international uproar, filled with legal and media battles between Cuban and North American authorities. He was finally reunited with his father on June 28, 2000. Today Elián is a leading voice for resistance to more than a half a century of economic warfare waged by Washington against the Caribbean island.

The present case is also fraught with political complications. Given Washington’s antipathy toward the Bolivarian revolution, President Maduro’s administration has been under relentless attack since 2013, having to endure threats of direct military intervention, fanciful accusations of drug trafficking, and a previously unheard-of bounty of $50 million for the arrest of  Venezuela’s president. Despite these threats, Caracas has remained steadfast in defending Venezuelan migrants and seeking the return of all of the children who are being held in the United States against the will of their families.

So far, 21 children have been repatriated to Venezuela. This is in addition to the 252 Venezuelan migrants who were deported by the United States to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador and released on July 18 after a humanitarian exchange. According to government official Camilla Fabri Saab, Deputy Minister of International Communication of the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry and leader of the campaign to bring the children home, more than 10,631 Venezuelan migrants have been repatriated so far this year.

Each day that these children are separated from their families robs them of parental love during their formative years. For both the minors and their families time is of the essence. Accordingly, Caracas persists in demanding that they be reunited with their families, calling demonstrations and orchestrating a broad media campaign across official outlets.

A group of parents has issued the following open letter addressed to the First Lady, Melania Trump

Open Letter Page 1

Open Letter Page 2

Open Letter Page 3

William Camacaro is a  Senior Analyst for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). He is a co-founder of  the Venezuela solidarity network and holds a Master’s Degree of Fine Arts and a Master’s Degree in Latin American Literature from City University of New York. He has published in the Monthly Review, Counterpunch, COHA, the Afro-America Magazine, Ecology, Orinoco Tribune and other venues. He has organized delegations to Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela.

Banner Photo: Credit – María Isabel Batista/Ultimas Noticias

Photo: Elián González, Reunited with his father in Cuba. Credit – Granma