A New Zealand investigative journalist and author says the US spy system hosted by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) appears to be a controversial intelligence system used in global capture-kill operations.

Writing a commentary for RNZ News today, Nicky Hager, author of Secret Power, a 1996 book on New Zealand’s role in global spy networks, said the controversial and unidentified foreign intelligence operation cited in a report by New Zealand’s Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) last week appeared to be an “intelligence system with a ghostly codename”.

“The IGIS report said the GCSB decision to host a foreign system from 2012-2020 was ‘improper’ and that the GCSB ‘could not be sure the tasking of the capability was always in accordance with… New Zealand law’,” he wrote.

“The Inspector-General said: ‘I have found some of the GCSB’s explanations about how the capability operated and was tasked to be incongruous with information in GCSB records at the time’,” Hager wrote.

But the Inspector-General could not reveal details of the system to the public because they were “highly classified”.

“The name and function of the foreign spy spying equipment, the identity of the ‘foreign partner agency’ and the location of the ‘GCSB facility’ where foreign equipment was hosted all remained secret,” Hager wrote.

Hager argued that the mystery spy equipment appeared strongly to be a top secret US surveillance system that had been installed at the GCSB’s Waihopai base at the same time as the equipment in the IGIS investigation was installed at a “GCSB facility”.

25 years of investigations
Hager has worked as an investigative journalist for the past 25 years, and has been a New Zealand member of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists for 20 of those years.

In 2018, he was part of a reference group established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

Hager wrote that the top secret NSA spy equipment had the ghostly codename “APPARITION” and fitted with all the details presented in the IGIS report.

“APPARITION was owned by and controlled by the US National Security Agency — the world’s largest intelligence gathering agency and head of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance that includes the GCSB,” he wrote.

According to Hager, the NSA internal report, written after the launch of the APPARITION system in 2008, said that it “builds on the success of the GHOSTHUNTER prototype . . .  a tool that enabled a significant number of capture-kill operations against terrorists”.

“Capture-kill operations involve lethal attacks on targeted people using drones, bombs and special forces raids,” wrote Hager.

“Human rights organisations have documented numerous deaths of civilians during capture-kill operations — many of them ‘algorithmically targeted’ by electronic surveillance systems such as APPARITION.

‘Extra-judicial killings’
“They are also criticised as being ‘extra-judicial killings’.”

For decades, protesters had been calling for the GCSB’s iconic radomes at Waihopai Valley spy base in rural Marlborough to be dismantled, saying that when that intelligence was shared with Five Eyes partners — the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia — it made New Zealand complicit in the military campaigns of those countries, among other criticisms.

However, Anti-Bases Campaign (ABC) organiser Murray Horton said at the time of news of the domes’ redundancy in 2021 was nothing to celebrate, since the base itself would continue to operate at the site, “albeit without its most conspicuous physical features that stick out like dogs’ balls”.

The out-of-date domes were removed in 2022.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Te Kuaka, an independent foreign policy advocacy group with a strong focus on the Pacific, has called for urgent changes to the law governing New Zealand’s security agency.

“Pacific countries will be asking legitimate questions about whether . . . spying in the Pacific was happening out of NZ,” it said today.

This follows revelations that a secret foreign spy operation run out of NZ’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) for seven years without the knowledge or approval of the government or Parliament.

RNZ News reports today that the former minister responsible for the GCSB, Andrew Little, has admitted that it may never be known whether the foreign spy operation was supporting military action against another country.

New Zealand’s intelligence watchdog the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security revealed its existence on Thursday, noting that the system operated from 2013-2020 and had the potential to be used to support military action against targets.

The operation was used to intercept military communications and identify targets in the GCSB’s area of operation, which centres on the Pacific.

In 2012, the GCSB signed up to the agreement without telling the then director-general and let the system operate without safeguards including adequate training, record-keeping or auditing.

When Little found out about it he supported it being referred to the Inspector-General for investigation.

Refused to name country
But he refused to say if he believed the covert operation was run by the United States although it was likely to be one of New Zealand’s Five Eyes partners, reports RNZ.

Te Kuaka said in a statement today the inquiry should prompt immediate law reform and widespread concern.

“This should be of major concern to all New Zealanders because we are not in control here”, said Te Kuaka member and constitutional lawyer Fuimaono Dylan Asafo.

“The inquiry reveals that our policies and laws are not fit for purpose, and that they do not cover the operation of foreign agencies within New Zealand.”

It appeared from the inquiry that even GCSB itself had lost track of the system and did not know its full purpose, Te Kuaka said.

It was “rediscovered” following concerns about another partner system hosted by GCSB.

While there have been suggestions the system was established under previously lax legislation, its operation continued through several agency and legislative reviews.

Ultimately, the inquiry found “that the Bureau could not be sure [its operation] was always in accordance with government intelligence requirements, New Zealand law and the provisions of the [Memorandum of Understanding establishing it]”.

‘Unknowingly complicit’
“We do not know what military activities were undertaken using New Zealand’s equipment and base, and this could make us unknowingly complicit in serious breaches of international law”, Fuimaono said.

“The law needs changing to explicitly prohibit what has occurred here.”

The foreign policy group has also raised the alarm that New Zealand’s involvement in the AUKUS security pact could compound problems raised by this inquiry.

AUKUS is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US that aims to contain China.

Pillar Two’s objective is to win the next generation arms race being shaped by new autonomous weapons platforms, electronic warfare systems, and hypersonic missiles.

It also involves intelligence sharing with AI-driven targeting systems and nuclear-capable assets.

‘Pacific questions’
“Pacific countries will be asking legitimate questions about whether this revelation indicates that spying in the Pacific was happening out of NZ, without any knowledge of ministers”, said Te Kuaka co-director Marco de Jong.

“New Zealand’s involvement in AUKUS Pillar II could further threaten the trust that we have built with Pacific countries, and others may ask whether involvement in that pact — with closer ties to the US — will increase the risk that our intelligence agencies will become entangled in other countries’ operations, and other people’s wars, without proper oversight.”

Te Kuaka has previously spoken out about concerns over AUKUS Pillar II.

“We understand that there is some sensitivity in this matter, but the security and intelligence agencies should front up to ministers here in a public setting to explain how this was allowed to happen,” De Jong said.

He added that the agencies needed to assure the public that serious military or other operations were not conducted from NZ soil without democratic oversight.”

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The release of the threat assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) this week is the final piece in a defence and security puzzle that marks a genuine shift towards more open and public discussion of these crucial policy areas.

Together with July’s strategic foreign policy assessment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the national security strategy released last week, it rounds out the picture of New Zealand’s place in a fast-evolving geopolitical landscape.

From increased strategic competition between countries, to declining social trust within them, as well as rapid technological change, the overall message is clear: business as usual is no longer an option.

By releasing the strategy documents in this way, the government and its various agencies clearly hope to win public consent and support — ultimately, the greatest asset any country possesses to defend itself.

NZSIS’s first unclassified threat assessment targets competition, public trust, technology https://t.co/5wetaOL1oA

— RNZ News (@rnz_news) August 10, 2023

Low threat of violent extremism
If there is good news in the SIS assessment, it is that the threat of violent extremism is still considered “low”. That means no change since the threat level was reassessed last year, with a terror attack considered “possible” rather than “probable”.

It is a welcome development since the threat level was lifted to “high” in the
immediate aftermath of the Christchurch terror attack in 2019.

This was lowered to “medium” about a month later — where it sat in September 2021, when another extremist attacked people with a knife in an Auckland mall, seriously
wounding five.

The threat level stayed there during the escalating social tension resulting from the government’s covid response. This saw New Zealand’s first conviction for sabotage and increasing threats to politicians, with the SIS and police intervening in at least one case to mitigate the risk.

After protesters were cleared from the grounds of Parliament in early 2022, it was
still feared an act of extremism by a small minority was likely.

These risks now seem to be receding. And while the threat assessment notes that the online world can provide havens for extremism, the vast majority of those expressing vitriolic rhetoric are deemed unlikely to carry through with violence in the real world.

Changing patterns of extremism
Assessments like this are not a crystal ball; threats can emerge quickly and be near-invisible before they do. But right now, at least publicly, the SIS is not aware of any specific or credible attack planning.

Many extremists still fit well-defined categories. There are the politically motivated, potentially violent, anti-authority conspiracy theorists, of which there is a “small number”.

And there are those motivated by identity (with white supremacist extremism the dominant strand) or faith (such as support for Islamic State, a decreasing and “very small number”).

However, the SIS describes a noticeable increase in individuals who don’t fit within those traditional boundaries, but who hold mixed, unstable or unclear ideologies they may tailor to fit some other violent or extremist impulse.

Espionage and cyber-security risks

There also seems to be a revival of the espionage and spying cultures last seen during the Cold War. There is already the first military case of espionage before the courts, and the SIS is aware of individuals on the margins of government being cultivated and offered financial and other incentives to provide sensitive information.

The SIS says espionage operations by foreign intelligence agencies against New Zealand, both at home and abroad, are persistent, opportunistic and increasingly wide ranging.

While the government remains the main target, corporations, research institutions and state contractors are now all potential sources of sensitive information. Because non-governmental agencies are often not prepared for such threats, they pose a significant security risk.

Cybersecurity remains a particular concern, although the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) recorded 350 incidents in 2021-22, which was a decline from 404 incidents recorded in the previous 12-month period.

On the other hand, a growing proportion of cyber incidents affecting major New Zealand institutions can be linked to state-sponsored actors. Of the 350 reported major incidents, 118 were connected to foreign states (34 percent of the total, up from 28 percent the previous year).

NZSIS’s first unclassified threat assessment targets competition, public trust, technology https://t.co/5wetaOL1oA

— RNZ News (@rnz_news) August 10, 2023

Russia, Iran and China
Although the SIS recorded that only a “small number” of foreign states engaged in deceptive, corruptive or coercive attempts to exert political or social influence, the potential for harm is “significant”.

Some of the most insidious examples concern harassment of ethnic communities within New Zealand who speak out against the actions of a foreign government.

The SIS identifies Russia, Iran and China as the three offenders. Iran was recorded as reporting on Iranian communities and dissident groups in New Zealand. In addition, the assessment says:

Most notable is the continued targeting of New Zealand’s diverse ethnic Chinese communities. We see these activities carried out by groups and individuals linked to the intelligence arm of the People’s Republic of China.

Overall, the threat assessment makes for welcome – if at times unsettling – reading. Having such conversations in the open, rather than in whispers behind closed doors, demystifies aspects of national security.

Most importantly, it gives greater credibility to those state agencies that must increase their transparency in order to build public trust and support for their unique roles within a working democracy.

Dr Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of Waikato. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

MPs confront Iran’s Ambassador to New Zealand over protest crackdowns https://t.co/Mtqr5OLetS

— RNZ News (@rnz_news) August 3, 2023

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

New Zealand’s cyber security agency believes China has been behind numerous hack attacks spanning years.

The government joined Western allies and Japan in calling out Beijing for so-called state-sponsored hacks, including a major incursion in February when Microsoft email servers were targeted.

The US has charged four Chinese nationals — three security officials and one contract hacker — with targeting dozens of companies and government agencies in the United States and overseas under the cover of a tech company.

“What we do is when we see malicious cyber activity on New Zealand networks, that may be through our own capabilities that we have to help protect New Zealand networks or it may be something that’s reported to us, we look at the malware that’s used,” Government Communications Security Bureau Director-General Andrew Hampton told RNZ Checkpoint.

“We look at how the actor behaves. We look at who they might be targeting and what they do if they get onto a network.

“That allows us to build a bit of a picture of who the actor is. We then compare that with information that we receive, often from our intelligence partners who are also observing such activity.

“That allows us to make an assessment, and it’s always a probability assessment about who the actor is.

The APT 40 group
“In this case, because of the amount of information we’ve been able to access both from our own capabilities and from our partners, we’ve got a reasonably high level of confidence that the actor who we’ve seen undertaking this campaign over a number of years, and in particular, who was responsible for the Microsoft Exchange compromise, was the APT 40 group — Advanced Persistent Threat Group 40 — which has been identified as associated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security.

The RNZ National live stream.  Video: Checkpoint

“The actors here are state sponsored actors rather than what we would normally define as a criminal group. What we’re seeing here is a state sponsored actor likely to be motivated by a desire to steal information.”

Hampton said there was a blurring of lines between what a state agency does, and what a criminal group does.

“Some of the technical capabilities that previously only state organisations had, have now got into the hands of criminal groups.

“Also what we’ve seen in a range of countries is individuals who may work part-time in a government intelligence agency, and then may work part-time in a criminal enterprise. Or they may have previously worked in a state intelligence agency and are now out by themselves but still have links links back to the state.

“We don’t know the full detail of the nature of the relationship, but what we do know is the Ministry of State Security in China, for example, is a very large organisation with many thousands of of employees.

“So they are big organisations with people on their payroll but they also would have connections with other individuals and organisations.

Information shared with criminals
“Something else worth noting with regard to this most recent compromise involving the Microsoft Exchange, what we saw there is once the Ministry of State Security actors had identified the vulnerability and exploited it, they then shared that information with a range of other actors, including criminal groups, so they too could exploit it.

“This is obviously a real concern to see this type of behaviour occurring,” Hampton said.

All evidence showed the cyber attacks were all originating from mainland China, Hampton told Checkpoint.

He said such attacks would be aimed at stealing data or possibly positioning themselves on a system to be able to access information in the future.

“A common tactic we see, unfortunately, is there may be a vulnerability in a system,” Hampton said.

“It could be a generic vulnerability across all users of that particular system, and a malicious actor may become aware of that vulnerability, so they would use that to get onto the network.

“That doesn’t mean they will then start exfiltrating data from day one or something like that. They may just want to to sit there in the event that at some point in the future they may want to start doing that.

Malicious actors
“This exploitation of known vulnerabilities is a real concern. This is why all organisations need to keep their security patches up to date, because what can happen is you can have malicious actors use technology to scan whole countries to see who hasn’t updated their patches.

“They then use that vulnerability to get on the network and they may not do anything with it for some time. Or they might produce a list of all the organisations, say, in New Zealand who haven’t updated their patches.

“Then they make a decision – okay these are the four to five we want to further exploit.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

New Zealand has lost some of its independence within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and been “drawn in a lot closer” to the US-led spy network, former Prime Minister Helen Clark says.

She made the comments in new RNZ podcast The Service, which looks at the SIS during the Cold War.

Sir Geoffrey Palmer, who was deputy prime minister and then prime minister in the fourth Labour government, between 1984 and 1990, also spoke to the podcast about the Five Eyes, saying for New Zealand there was “always a feeling that we have to earn our stripes”.

THE RNZ PODCAST SERIES: The Service – The state, secrets and spies

“I remember doing things that the Americans wanted done on one occasion. I don’t think I can give the details of it. But it was quite important to them. And we facilitated it, and it was done.”

He also revealed that during the mid-1980s one of the Five Eyes partners knew more than most New Zealand Cabinet ministers about intelligence gathering by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).

When then-Australian Defence Minister Kim Beazley visited, he wanted to thank New Zealand Cabinet ministers for establishing the GCSB listening post at Waihopai, near Blenheim.

“I said, ‘Kim, you can’t do that. They don’t know anything about it.’ Only three ministers knew about that; the minister of defence, the prime minister and me,” Palmer said.

Clark said she believed the Five Eyes alliance was a net benefit for New Zealand, but it was vital that the country maintained its independence within the network.

“I think you’re as independent as you want to be. I consider we were independent in my time. I sense there’s been a bit of slippage since then, frankly.”

Clark said “sources in officialdom” had told her New Zealand had “got a lot closer back in” and that could threaten the country’s independent foreign policy, which went right back to the nuclear-free stance of the mid-1980s.

The nuclear-free law, which stopped port visits from US ships and saw New Zealand fall out of the ANZUS security pact, sparked the suspension of military exercises between the two countries.

But while the US and New Zealand parted ways on a political level – the relationship was downgraded from allies to friends – the flow of intelligence continued, according to Sir Bruce Ferguson, a former chief of Defence Force who went on to head the GCSB.

“I got everything I wanted. Right from when I became CDF, if I asked the questions, particularly with reference to Afghanistan, we got the answers, we got the intelligence,” he told The Service.

“There were definitely two levels: there was the political level … and the worker bee level. That was us – the intelligence side.”

Sir Bruce said he was plucked from obscurity to study at a US war college at the height of the anti-nuclear row. After he became GCSB director, he developed close relationships with Five Eyes spy chiefs, even playing golf “many times” with the heads of the NSA, CIA and FBI.

“We had very good, very strong relationships with all the personnel at the top. It was a very personal relationship, actually, with dinner at private houses. I would always be invited to their private houses for dinner with their families.”

Sir Bruce acknowledged there were often complaints – even from ‘friendly’ countries – about Five Eyes tactics, such as allegations that the NSA had hacked German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone.

“All those complaints are public knowledge. And that’s the way of the world. Yes, anyone’s fair game if it’s in your own national interests to look at them. And that could be for economic reasons, or whatever,” he said.

“There’s one very strong club: The Five Eyes. It’s jealously guarded. It’s looked on very enviously by probably every other western nation.”

He said people might ask why this group of five English-speaking countries was special or unique. “Well, they are unique. End of story. And we should safeguard that.”

Security expert Paul Buchanan, a former intelligence analyst for US security agencies, told The Service there were benefits to New Zealand but the downsides to Five Eyes should also be acknowledged.

“It’s made us a target,” he said. “Even though many people here may not think that, we’re squarely in the crosshairs of the intelligence services of adversaries of the UK, the United States, the whole Western alliance structure – we are.”

Because the bonds were so tight, and the eavesdropping equipment and methods so sensitive, Buchanan doubted New Zealand could extricate itself from the alliance, even if it wanted to.

“Trying to get out of the Five Eyes is – how can I put it? – it’s like trying to get out of the mafia.”

The Service was made with the support of New Zealand on Air.

More from this series

This article is republished by the Pacific Media Centre under a partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

by Dr Bryce Edwards

The week before Christmas was dominated by what may actually have been the most important political issue of the year in New Zealand – revelations that government agencies have spied on New Zealanders through the use of private investigators. The matter ended up being somewhat buried in the end-of-year chaos, and perhaps conveniently forgotten about by politicians with an interest in the issue remaining unresolved.

Yet the story isn’t going away. Today, the Herald published revelations about how the private investigations firm Thompson & Clark was previously employed by government-owned Southern Response insurance to review Official Information Act answers about the use of the private investigations firm itself – see Lucy Bennett’s Megan Woods seeks answers on Southern Response’s use of private investigators.

Here’s the key part of the story: “In January 2017, when Woods was the opposition spokeswoman on the Christchurch quake recovery, Thompson & Clark Investigations Ltd (TCIL) invoiced Southern Response $2070 for reviewing a response to an Official Information Act request from the Labour Party research unit on its use of TCIL.”

The article reports on how “TCIL also appears to advise Southern Response on how to circumvent public scrutiny.” For example, Thompson & Clark gave the following advice to Southern Response’s chief executive: “to get around disclosure, privacy and OIA issues, we normally set up a discreet email address for you – in Gmail or similar … do you want us to set up a discreet email account for you – or do you want to?”

The original “explosive” SSC report

Despite the State Services Commission report being released during the busy period just prior to Christmas – leading to what some see as a lack of media coverage and scrutiny of the issues – there have been some excellent articles and columns published about it.

Andrea Vance produced some of the best coverage of the report and the aftermath. Her first report, Security firm spied on politicians, activists and earthquake victims, detailed the full extent of what had been uncovered by the report into government agencies using private investigators. Overall, she said that the “explosive report details a slew of damning revelations”.

Vance followed this up with an in-depth article, Public service bosses ignored warnings about Thompson & Clark for years, which revealed that “for a decade public service bosses ignored the warnings about Thompson & Clark. Their tentacles were everywhere. Dozens of ministries and agencies used their services – and yet no-one in the upper echelons of the public service questioned their reach or influence.”

According to Vance, “officials became drunk on the power of the information offered up by security firms like Thompson & Clark. It allowed them to keep tabs on their critics and stave off any reputational damage.” She also argues that “A cavalier attitude to personal and sensitive information, and a troubling disregard for the democratic right to protest, was allowed to flourish within the public service over 15 years and successive governments.”

Hamish Rutherford produced some excellent analysis, explaining: “In an age where the use of contractors is already under scrutiny, a string of government agencies have effectively outsourced snooping, in some cases for highly questionable reasons. In some cases this was done with a lack of clear contracts, creating a fertile atmosphere for mission creep” – see: Use of private investigators exposes carelessness about role of the government.

Rutherford writes about how remarkable it is that public servants weren’t aware (according to the report) that what was going on was unacceptable. He therefore concludes: “we are reading about public servants who appeared to be seduced by private investigators, who decided to make their job easier without considering the implications for democratic rights, or the need to remain neutral. Weeding out improper behaviour may take work, but it seems the report exposes examples where public servants need to be told what their job involves, which would be a far more fundamental problem.”

RNZ’s Tim Watkin also has some strong analysis of what occurred, saying that the report on the state snooping “is a bit of a page-turner and a terrifying read for anyone who cares about the integrity of the public sector” – see: Heart of Darkness in the public sector.

According to Watkin, the situation is perplexing, given the risk-averse nature of the public service: “My concern is what this says about the culture at the heart of our public service. How did leaders who are by the very definition of their roles meant to be servants of the public decide that this level of covert surveillance was a good idea? Government agencies are typically so risk averse these days that they have multiple managers signing off press statements and an inability to make a decision on which pencils or toilet paper to buy without first clearing it with the minister’s office. Yet they are willing to subject those ‘ordinary New Zealanders” to secret surveillance.”

Possibly, Watkin says it’s the very risk-averse nature of the current public service that has caused them to be more open to snooping on citizens: “there seems to be a deep-seated sense of butt-covering and paranoia”. This is the very point made by Gordon Campbell in his blogpost, On why Thompson + Clark are just the tip of the iceberg.

In recent years, according to Campbell, the public service has become politicised, meaning that public servants have become more sensitive to the political needs of their ministers rather than the public good. This means that snooping on citizens and protestors starts becoming sensible, and to dissent against breaches of ethics in the public service has become much more dangerous for your career.

Not surprisingly, some of the strongest condemnation of state snooping on citizens has come from those organisations known to be affected – especially environmental groups. Former Green co-leader, and now Greenpeace head, Russel Norman emphasises the anti-democratic nature of what has been going on: “The chilling effect of being under constant and intrusive surveillance for simply campaigning on important social issues, fundamentally corrodes what it means to live in a free and democratic society. We’ve learnt that under the previous government, no-one was safe from being spied on if they disagreed with government policy” – see: Rotten to the core: The chilling truth revealed by the SSC report.

Norman concludes: “The State Services Commission (SSC) investigation may well be one of the most important examinations into the inner workings of the state that we’ve seen in New Zealand. I’d go as far as to call it our Watergate moment.”

If that sounds like the expected complaints of an activist, then it’s also worth reading what former United Future leader Peter Dunne had to say in his column, Only a first step in the data battle.

Dunne explains what has occurred as being “a gross breach of that implicit covenant between the Government and its citizens”, and he raises serious questions about how much more privacy is being curtailed by government agencies. In particular: “Was any information provided, formally or informally, to the intelligence services by Thompson and Clark, and was any information gathered at the behest of the intelligence services?”

Newspaper editorials have also condemned what has been uncovered in the public service. The Otago Daily Times has a strongly-worded editorial about the dangers to democracy uncovered in the report: “It blasts a warning about the insidious nature of state power and the need for vigilance and protection. Those who would disregard civil liberties for what they might think is the greater good should think again. Big brother and big sister are an ever-present threat. This is even more so in the electronic age. It was first thought the internet might lead to more freedom and more opportunity for dissent. But the massive losses of privacy, the ease with which data is collected and modern data analysis all hand more potential power and surveillance ability to big business and big government” – see: An ‘affront to democracy’.

In Christchurch, The Press has been asking important questions about what the report has revealed – see the editorial: More questions about spies and the public service. Here are the concluding questions: “The public needs to know more about this scandal that is so contrary to the way we expect our public servants to behave on our behalf. The public wants to know who approved of this surveillance, why it was considered necessary in a democracy and, perhaps most important of all, how much was really known about it by the ministers in charge.”

Will anything actually be done about the spying scandal?

The biggest risk to arise out of the controversial investigation into government agencies’ misuse of spying on citizens is that nothing further will now occur. So despite new stories being published about the state surveillance, there’s a danger that we are coming towards the end of the scandal, with no significant reform being offered to correct the problems.

Although the Thompson & Clark firm has been discredited by the scandal, many are arguing that they are not actually the real problem. For example, Andrea Vance says: “although they took advantage, Thompson & Clark aren’t responsible for public service culture and the undermining of democratic rights. That lies with Peter Hughes. For public confidence to be fully restored, the public service must demonstrate accountability and accept culpability, starting from the top down.”

Perhaps it’s time for a proper official and independent commission of inquiry into the spying problems in the public service. Security analyst Paul Buchanan has been arguing for this. And Gordon Campbell agrees: “given that the Thompson+ Clark problem is a by-product of the politicisation of the public service, security analyst Paul Buchanan is dead right in calling for a public inquiry. Only a wide-ranging investigation can address the attitudinal issues and power relationships between ministerial staff and public servants, of which Thompson + Clark are merely one of the end results.”

Tim Watkin has also argued that more needs to happen: “The proper response to this report is not a few hours of tut-tuting, the Prime Minister expressing formulaic concern that the spying was “disturbing” and the symbolic resignation of a single chair. No, the proper response is a change to the public sector culture. So who will lead that?”

Long-time political activist Murray Horton also proposes an inquiry – see: Thompson & Clark just tip of spyberg. Let’s have an inquiry into whole covert world of state spying. Horton explains the significance of the latest changes in state surveillance of citizens, saying that there’s been two major changes: contracting the spying out (perhaps deliberately in order to escape rules), and expanding the targets beyond just activists.

Other activists – especially those affected by the state spying – put forward proposals for reform in Jessie Chiang’s article, Environmental groups call for change after security firm revelations. For example, Russel Norman calls for prosecutions of those involved, and for the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment to be broken up. And Kevin Hague from Forest and Bird says: “I’m encouraging state services to go back to [learning] how to operate as a state service… and your obligations to the public and not just to the government of the day”.

For more thorough reform suggestions, also see blogger No Right Turn’s A private Stasi. He says “Businesses like Thompson and Clark, whose service is explicitly anti-democratic, need to be made illegal and put out of business.”

Finally, there’s the issue of the breaches of rules by Crown Law when working for the Ministry of Social Development – which Andrea Vance has described as “one of the most shocking findings”. The chief executive of MSD at the time was Peter Hughes, who of course is now chief executive of the State Services Commission, and therefore in charge of the whole of the public service. There will therefore be suspicions of conflicts of interest in terms of resolving that issue, and Hughes has handed the ongoing task to his own deputy at the SSC. For the best discussion of all this, see Aaron Smale’s Hypocrisy at the highest levels.

by Dr Bryce Edwards

John Key was once very candid in explaining the realpolitik reason New Zealand had to send troops to assist the US war on terror: it was simply “the price of the club”. He was speaking of the intelligence alliance known as Five Eyes involving the United States, Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand.

The Labour-led Government is unlikely to be equally upfront that this week’s decision to ban the Chinese company Huawei from supplying the infrastructure for the new telecommunications 5G network is also due to New Zealand’s membership of the Western allies’ club.

That reality is clear to political journalist Richard Harman, who says the Huawei ban “was the only one it could have come to. To have let Huawei in would have placed New Zealand at odds with its traditional friends – Australia, the United States and Britain – and offside with the Five Eyes alliance” – see: How the Huawei decision saw the old friends prevail.

This article points out that the Huawei decision “came coincidentally with the presence in the capital of a top-level delegation from the British Foreign office and also a senior FBI official from the US. The FBI official was here to open a new FBI liaison office in Police Headquarters.” And although it’s not clear that there was any recent pressure on the GCSB to ban Huawei, Harman points out that the signals from Five Eyes partners were very clear on the matter – especially with a British Government report in July, and then in “August Australia barred Huawei from participating in its 5G network.”

There is certainly going to be a cost for the ban. First, it seems that there will be consequences in terms of inferior and more expensive communications for consumers. Second, this country’s economic and diplomatic ties with the superpower of China will now be strained as a result.

Such costs could end up being significant, and will affect every New Zealander. In terms of Spark’s planned new telecommunications network, Barry Soper explains today: “they’ll probably have to settle for a more expensive and less efficient option. Huawei points out that in a trial for 5G in March they achieved a world record of more than 18 gigabytes a second while their competitors could only manage one gig. With data transfer rates at that speed perhaps that’s what spooked the GCSB” – see: Spy agency’s Huawei ban conveniences Government.

Soper says that essentially New Zealand has “finally picked sides” in the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US. He also stresses the economic and diplomatic prices that New Zealand will have to pay, saying “This decision has wide-reaching implications for this country with our biggest trading partner” and the “renegotiation of our Free Trade Agreement will now be on the back burner”.

In terms of diplomatic reaction, Soper says: “Now this is all out in the open it can come as no surprise the Chinese couldn’t find the time to see Jacinda Ardern in Beijing before Christmas, she was ready to go at the drop of a hat.”

Leftwing commentator Gordon Campbell seems to agree, saying “the Huawei ban is a hostile act”, and the “indefinite postponing of PM Jacinda Ardern’s trip to China is probably the first symptom of the cooling in our relationship” – see: On how banning Huawei fits into our new hostility towards China.

Campbell also suggests that the Huawei ban on involvement in the 5G project will be costly. He points to the fact that “In Australia, the Huawei bid was reportedly 30% lower than competing tenders”, and concludes that it “is reasonable to assume there will be extra costs for consumers as a consequence”.

As to why the Government is suddenly so sensitive about this new telecommunications network, when they haven’t been so worried in the past, Gordon provides a good explanation: “5G will be the key piece of architecture in the so-called ‘Internet of things’ that’s envisaged to connect our electricity and water systems, medical and driverless technologies, systems in homes and hospitals, factories and farms. The security concerns about China being central to the provision, installation and maintenance of such a massively interlinked system is not hard to imagine”.

Campbell argues that the Huawei ban is part of “a trifecta of measures via which the 5 Eyes allies have been beefing up their stance towards China” – the other two components being “(a) the increased defence spending in Australia and New Zealand for which countering China expansionism is the only conceivable rationale and (b) the massive increase in Australasia’s aid and diplomatic profile in the Pacific, in order to counter China’s ‘cheque book’ diplomacy”.

New Zealand really had no choice but to ban Huawei according to intelligence expert Paul Buchanan: “Diplomatically, it would be very difficult for the GCSB to green light Huawei’s involvement in the 5G upgrade in the face of the US request to withhold approval” – see: Huawei vs Five Eyes: NZ diplomatic ties at centre of dilemma.

Furthermore, “The fallout from such a decision could open a rift within the Five Eyes partnership because New Zealand is already seen as the Achilles Heel of the network given its past record of poor cyber security awareness (say, in the overlap between professional and personal communications). It is therefore prudent for the GCSB to side with the US on the matter.”

Siding with Western allies over China is evidence of New Zealand’s shifting orientation towards its biggest trading partner, according to Victoria University of Wellington’s strategic studies professor, Robert Ayson – see his Newstalk ZB interview: NZ’s relationship with China could suffer after GCSB decision – academic.

On the Huawei decision, Ayson says: “I think it’s an important sign that New Zealand’s approach to China is becoming more cautious. I think the special friendship between New Zealand and China is now a little less special in some ways”.

Ayson believes the reasons behind the ban would have been both genuine concerns for national security and about New Zealand’s alignment with the Five Eyes countries. He concludes: “I guess one of the question is, does New Zealand want to be seen as a weaker link?”

The cost of the Huawei ban is also well canvassed by Jamie Ensor in his article, NZ could see major fallout from Huawei 5G decision – expert. In this, Richard Harman is quoted on its impact on diplomatic relations with China: “The frequency of contact between New Zealand and China, and the intimacy of that contact, might slow down for a while”.

In terms of economic ties, Harman points to tourism and education as being the most likely hit. In terms of “worst case scenarios”, he says the Chinese Government “might try and restrain Chinese students who come here for education” and they might “take New Zealand off the preferred list of tourist destinations”.

Condemnation of the Huawei ban has been coming from both left and right. The former general secretary of the Labour Party, Mike Smith, has been highly critical of his own government: “The GCSB ban on Spark’s use of Huawei technology means this government has gone from ‘honest broker’ to poodle in a very short time” – see: Spooked!

He also suggests that it might be time for New Zealand to withdraw from Five Eyes, and says we shouldn’t believe much of what is being said about Huawei: “Maybe it’s time we got out of that too – it was designed for war. GCSB Minister Andrew Little argues that the GCSB decision is about the technology not the country. Nobody else believes that, certainly not the lobbyists and commentators including security analyst Adam Boileau, who said that argument didn’t make a lot of sense. He says Huawei’s engineering is pretty good.”

Rightwing blogger David Farrar appears to be in agreement on much of that, saying “the reality is that no one anywhere has ever been able to point to an actual security problem with Huawei. It is basically scaremongering” – see: We join the nonsense ban on Huawei.

Farrar elaborates: “Basically New Zealand has succumbed to peer pressure from our five eyes partners, primarily the US. Their motivations are protecting US companies from competition. They have never ever been able to say what exactly is it that Huawei has done wrong or could do wrong. They’ve been banned purely because of the country they are based in. This will increase the costs of telecommunications in New Zealand, by removing a preferred supplier. It will also be seen as a deeply offensive move by the Chinese Government and our exporters will probably end up paying the cost.”

Finally, for a fictional conversation about how the politics of the Huawei decision might be explained, see Chris Trotter’s From a table by the window.