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		<title>Progressive Legislators Call to Cut Aid to Northern Triangle</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage By Patrick Synan Boston As the trial of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández proceeds,[1] as Guatemalan Attorney General María Consuelo Porras begins her controversial second term,[2] and as the state of exception in El Salvador enters its 3rd month[3], progressive members of Congress and the Senate maintain ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage</p>
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<p><strong><em>By Patrick Synan<br /></em> <em>Boston</em></strong></p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61393266.amp" rel="nofollow">trial</a> of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández proceeds,<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" id="_ftnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> as Guatemalan Attorney General María Consuelo Porras begins her controversial <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/guatemalan-prosecutor-labeled-corrupt-by-us-gets-tapped-new-term-2022-05-17/" rel="nofollow">second term,</a><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" id="_ftnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> and as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/26/el-salvador-extends-state-of-emergency-amid-gang-crackdown" rel="nofollow">state of exception</a> in El Salvador enters its 3rd month<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" id="_ftnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>, progressive members of Congress and the Senate maintain concerns about police and military funding for governments in the Northern Triangle.</p>
<p>In April, 11 Representatives signed a <a href="https://cispes.org/sites/default/files/quill_-_letter_l3588_-_suspend_security_assistance_to_northern_triangle_in_fy23_-_version_1_-_04-26-2022_11-14_am.pdf" rel="nofollow">letter</a> to House Appropriations State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chair Barbara Lee requesting an end to funds promised under the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" id="_ftnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> This follows a <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/388" rel="nofollow">bill</a> introduced in the Senate calling for a 5-year suspension of U.S. aid to Honduras. Presently, neither motion has enough support to move forward.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" id="_ftnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p>
<p><strong>CARSI failed to improve security<br /></strong><br />The reasons for such proposals merit consideration. The primary concern listed in each document is the fragility of human rights in the region, but the letter to the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee also explicitly addresses costs. CARSI is expensive and counterproductive, it argues. Literature from human rights organizations like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/previous-world-reports" rel="nofollow">Human Rights Watch</a> (HRW)<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" id="_ftnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> and <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/" rel="nofollow">The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</a> supports these claims.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" id="_ftnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a></p>
<p>According to John Lindsay-Poland, who has <a href="https://www.johnlindsaypoland.com/" rel="nofollow">researched</a> the sale of U.S. arms in Latin America for decades, “evidence is strong that CARSI failed to improve security for people in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, as evidenced by the massive numbers of people who fled during the period of CARSI, at great risk, and that instead CARSI strengthened corrupt anti-democratic governments in those countries. Most of the funds did not go to military and police forces, but benefited economic elites there. Whether CARSI caused the worsening situation or not, it’s at the least been a waste of funds.”<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" id="_ftnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a></p>
<p>Meanwhile, those who find value in CARSI’s continuation argue that its problems are more nuanced. Charles Call, non-resident Senior Fellow at Brookings, calls it “cherry picking to pull out CARSI (…) separate from the overall engagement with Central America.” According to Call, a more holistic review of U.S. policy in the region reveals “an approach that is highly technical and ignores the political dimension.”<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" id="_ftnref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a></p>
<p>CARSI began as the Central American component of the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-837.pdf" rel="nofollow">Mérida Initiative</a> in the last year of the Bush administration, but it was rebranded shortly after Obama took office.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" id="_ftnref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> According to the State Department <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/183768.pdf" rel="nofollow">one-pager</a>, its objectives were to:</p>
<ul>
<li>Create safe streets for the citizens of the region;</li>
<li>Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and between the nations of Central America;</li>
<li>Support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments;</li>
<li>Re-establish effective state presence, services and security in communities at risk; and</li>
<li>Foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation between the nations of the region, other international partners, and donors to combat regional security threats.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" id="_ftnref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></li>
</ul>
<p>The multi-million-dollar aid package remains in effect, despite over a decade of deteriorating human rights conditions, ongoing border insecurity and the consolidation of criminal infrastructure in much of the region.</p>
<p><strong>Real accountability, non-existent<br /></strong><br />In Honduras, while the new presidency of Xiomara Castro is a positive development, the state bureaucracy remains occupied by countless <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/honduras-congress-split-crisis-xiomara-castro-inauguration-corruption-libre-national-party/" rel="nofollow">Hernández loyalists</a><sup>.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" id="_ftnref12">[12]</a></sup> In Guatemala, President Giamattei has reappointed Attorney General Consuelo Porras after her first term produced the arrest or exile of nearly every anti-corruption or anti-impunity investigator working at the national level, most notably special prosecutor <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/guatemalas-former-top-anti-graft-prosecutor-decries-arrest-warrant/" rel="nofollow">Juan Francisco Sandoval</a><sup>.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" id="_ftnref13">[13]</a></sup> In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has embarked on a project of dismantling democratic institutions like the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56970026.amp" rel="nofollow">Supreme Court</a><a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" id="_ftnref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> and strengthening the state’s security apparatus, most recently through the <a href="https://www.coha.org/el-salvador-declares-state-of-exception-in-response-to-wave-of-murders/" rel="nofollow">state of exception</a>, which enables law enforcement to jail arbitrarily.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" id="_ftnref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> Each of the three countries receives millions in U.S. military and police aid each year through CARSI, but no serious accountability measures exist to ensure this money is used to accurately identify, capture, and fairly prosecute the perpetrators of serious crimes.</p>
<p>The U.S. federal government has been conspicuously critical of each country in the past year. Vicepresident Kamala Harris voiced her <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/amp/news/US-Rejects-Democracy-Violations-In-El-Salvador-20210503-0003.html" rel="nofollow">disapproval</a> when Bukele fired Supreme Court judges and the country’s chief prosecutor.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" id="_ftnref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced the government’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-attorney-general-maria-consuelo-porras-argueta-de-porres-for-involvement-in-significant-corruption-and-consideration-of-additional-designations/" rel="nofollow">designation</a> of Consuelo Porras as a “corrupt and undemocratic actor” earlier this month.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" id="_ftnref17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> Meanwhile, the Department of Justice’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1496096/download" rel="nofollow">indictment</a> of former President Juan Orlando Hernández alleges he “corrupted the legitimate institutions of Honduras, including parts of the Honduran National Police, military, and National Congress.”<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" id="_ftnref18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> Nonetheless, despite U.S. concern, designations, or outright criminal charges, the State Department’s police and military funding for regimes in the Northern Triangle has risen steadily.</p>
<p><strong>Honduras</strong></p>
<p>The case of U.S. funding for the Honduran military and police is particularly curious. CARSI coincided with the country’s 12-year descent into lawlessness. The State Department, meanwhile, never made a move to turn off the faucet.</p>
<p>The total disintegration of the rule of law in Honduras began abruptly on June 28, 2009 when then-president Manuel Zelaya was removed from office in a military coup. Zelaya’s increasingly progressive policies were not favored by the landed elite and corporate interests operating in the region. In the year leading up to his ouster, he had unilaterally ordered a 60% increase in the minimum wage and issued a public opinion survey on whether to form a <a href="http://ips.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/02/04/0192512112468918" rel="nofollow">Constituent Assembly</a><sup>.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" id="_ftnref19">[19]</a></sup> His removal ushered in 12 years of illegitimate rule by the conservative National Party, whose leaders famously declared Honduras was “<a href="https://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-for-business/" rel="nofollow">open for business</a>”<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" id="_ftnref20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> shortly after coming to power.</p>
<p>The degree to which the U.S. State Department was complicit in the coup is debatable. By referring to the ouster as only a coup and not a <em>military</em> coup, then <a href="https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gonzalez-clinton-policy-latin-american-crime-story-article-1.2598456" rel="nofollow">Secretary of State Hillary Clinton</a> performed a delicate legal maneuver to avoid placing the United States in a predicament where by law Congress was obligated to withhold military funding.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" id="_ftnref21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> Authors like Alexandra Gale at COHA have remarked on the United States’ “<a href="https://www.coha.org/the-state-departments-inconsistent-and-ineffective-response-to-the-undemocratic-proliferating-through-latin-america/" rel="nofollow">selective indignation</a>” towards dictatorships in Latin America, arguing that “Washington has endorsed (…) a range of military dictatorships in Panama, Honduras, and Guatemala, when they were seen as strategic geopolitical allies.”<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" id="_ftnref22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> By not condemning the Honduran coup, the U.S. continued to sponsor a regime that deliberately engaged in human rights abuses for the sake of international business.</p>
<p>In the 1996 HRW <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-08.htm#P719_175896" rel="nofollow">World Report,</a> Honduras received substantial praise for “establishing accountability for gross human rights violations that occurred in the 1980s.”<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" id="_ftnref23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> Also in the Honduras section of the report are seven paragraphs dedicated to U.S. policy. This subsection opens by reiterating that Honduras “has taken important and courageous steps to account for the horrific history of Battalion 3-16,” the CIA-trained unit of the Honduran army responsible for a litany of high-profile political assassinations. It then admonishes the U.S., which “has still to do the same.”</p>
<p>This is the last time Honduras appears in a World Report until <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010" rel="nofollow">2010</a>, a year after the military ouster of Manuel Zelaya, the country’s last democratically elected president at the time, and over a year after CARSI was instated. The nature of the abuses described in subsequent reports progressively worsens; furthermore, each new edition devotes increased text to address prior violations that had not previously been revealed. One particularly enlightening case takes place in the Bajo Aguán valley, in eastern Honduras. According to the 2012 <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012" rel="nofollow">Report</a>:</p>
<p>“More than 30 people were killed between January and August 2011 in the Bajo Aguán valley, a fertile palm oil-producing zone in northern Honduras. A long-simmering land conflict erupted in May when peasants occupied land being cultivated by large privately owned agricultural enterprises. Many victims were members of peasant associations who were allegedly gunned down by security guards working for the enterprises. In addition, four security guards were shot and killed in August 2011, when individuals armed with assault rifles and other arms reportedly tried to take over a ranch. In the absence of criminal investigation, the circumstances of each incident remained unclear. By September no one had been charged for the killings in the Bajo Aguán region.”<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" id="_ftnref24"><sup>[24]</sup></a></p>
<p>The 2013 <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013" rel="nofollow">Report</a> on the Bajo Aguán is virtually a repeat of 2012, only the victim tally was doubled.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" id="_ftnref25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> In the 2014 <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014" rel="nofollow">Report</a>, the 2012 number was tripled.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" id="_ftnref26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> By <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015" rel="nofollow">2015</a>, after less than a year of the Hernández administration, the case of the Bajo Aguán was replaced by a general section about population displacement, which owes largely to a concern that doesn’t appear in prior World Report analyses of Honduras: gang violence.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" id="_ftnref27"><sup>[27]</sup></a></p>
<p>A survey of HRW Reports on Honduras reveals two key points: one, that CARSI funding was practically simultaneous with the breakdown of security in Honduras, which law enforcement was either unsuccessful in preventing or actively promoting; two, the emergence of rampant gang violence in Honduras was a post-CARSI phenomenon, which contradicts the State Department’s allegations that such funding was necessary to stop it.</p>
<p>Honduras drew unprecedented attention from other watchdog organizations as well. Prior to the coup, Honduras had not featured on the Inter-American Commission on Human RIghts’ annual reports for nearly a quarter of a century, its <a href="http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/84.85sp/Honduras7951.htm" rel="nofollow">last appearance</a> pertaining to an individual case of citizenship dispute and a case of two missing persons.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" id="_ftnref28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> By contrast, the IACHR covered post-coup Honduras for 5 consecutive years and returned to include it in its 2016 and 2021 reports. Furthermore, the IACHR published 4 observation reports on Honduras in 2009, 2010, 2015 and 2019.</p>
<p>Predictably, each of the reports addresses the illegitimacy of the coup regime and the escalation of violence in the Bajo Aguán. However, certain sections of these texts go on to address the systemic changes that took place to consolidate the National Party’s control in spite of widespread popular resentment. A 2015 <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Honduras-es-2015.pdf" rel="nofollow">observation report</a> expressed concern over the weakened legitimacy of the police and the increasing presence of military forces throughout the country:</p>
<p>“The national police have lost the trust of citizens due to a lack of effective response, allegations of corruption, and links to organized crime. For this reason, the State has focused its efforts on legal and institutional reforms through which the Armed Forces have been gaining participation in functions that do not necessarily correspond to their nature, related, for example, to regular citizen security tasks. Various actors interviewed during the visit referred to the existence of a growing process of militarization to address insecurity, and therefore a greater presence of the military in the areas of greatest conflict, as well as an “open fight against organized crime,” without a clear process to strengthen the national police. Within this framework, the Military Police was created, as well as a group of judges and prosecutors of national jurisdiction whose objective is to accompany the Military Police to ensure that their actions are framed by law. These judges and prosecutors do not have sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality to hear known human rights violations by members of said Police. Based on its analysis, the IACHR has identified a series of concerns, among others, that military forces carry out activities that do not imply the defense of the country but rather enforce the law, issues that should correspond to the police.”<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29" id="_ftnref29"><sup>[29]</sup></a></p>
<p>The expansion of military power and purview in Honduras is one of the ways in which the National Party has maintained its political influence in spite of the leftward agenda of the newly elected Castro administration. It is also a source of concern when it comes to the current government’s stability. Allison Lira, director of the Honduras program for the Witness for Peace Solidarity Collective, says, “there continues to be a very serious risk of another coup in Honduras…the military structure is still very much aligned with the interests that led to the [2009] coup in the first place.”<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30" id="_ftnref30"><sup>[30]</sup></a> Essential to the Honduran military structure, of course, is the economic support it receives from the United States through programs like CARSI.</p>
<p><strong>Guatemala</strong></p>
<p>Guatemala, typically the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala.pdf" rel="nofollow">largest</a> recipient of CARSI funds,<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31" id="_ftnref31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> has appeared yearly on the World Report since the 1990’s. Prior to 2010, reports generally portrayed a society engaged in a hard struggle to heal after decades of civil war. However, a continuing feature of this struggle was the state’s inability to hold the military accountable for crimes against civilians. Reports from <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2006" rel="nofollow">2006</a> to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009" rel="nofollow">2009</a> open with virtually the same five paragraphs:</p>
<p>“A dozen years after the end of Guatemala’s brutal civil war, impunity remains the norm when it comes to human rights violations. Ongoing violence and intimidation threaten to reverse the little progress that has been made toward promoting accountability. Guatemala’s weak and corrupt law enforcement institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful organized crime groups that, among other things, are believed to be responsible for attacks on human rights defenders, judges, prosecutors, and others.</p>
<p>Guatemala continues to suffer the effects of an internal armed conflict that ended in 1996. A United Nations-sponsored truth commission estimated that as many as 200,000 people were killed during the 36-year war, and attributed the vast majority of the killings to government forces.</p>
<p>Guatemalans seeking accountability for these abuses face daunting obstacles. Prosecutors and investigators receive grossly inadequate training and resources. The courts routinely fail to resolve judicial appeals and motions in a timely manner, allowing defense attorneys to engage in dilatory legal maneuvering. The army and other state institutions resist cooperating fully with investigations into abuses committed by current or former members. And the police regularly fail to provide adequate protection to judges, prosecutors, and witnesses involved in politically sensitive cases.</p>
<p>Of the 626 massacres documented by the truth commission, only three cases have been successfully prosecuted in the Guatemalan courts. The third conviction came in May 2008, when five former members of a paramilitary “civil patrol” were convicted for the murders of 26 of the 177 civilians massacred in Rio Negro in 1982.</p>
<p>The July 2005 discovery of approximately 80 million documents of the disbanded National Police, including files on Guatemalans who were murdered and “disappeared” during the armed conflict, could play a key role in the prosecution of those who committed human rights abuses during the conflict. By October 2008 …the country’s Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office had processed seven million of those documents, primarily related to cases presently under active investigation. The office plans to open the first part of the archive in 2009.”<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32" id="_ftnref32"><sup>[32]</sup></a></p>
<p>Each of these documents identifies a perpetually weak judicial system and frightened civil societies fumbling in the shadow of an untouchable military and police force. Furthermore, the nearly identical text over four years suggests that no immediate improvements were likely without international pressure. But it isn’t obvious how channeling funds to an army that “resist[s] cooperating” and police who “routinely fail to provide adequate protection” would solve these issues. Subsequent reports do not tell a tale of success.</p>
<p>Far from being a repeat of the previous four years, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2010.pdf" rel="nofollow">2010 World Report</a> shows an even further decline in the state of human rights in Guatemala. The summary of the section reads:</p>
<p>“Guatemala’s weak and corrupt law enforcement institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful organized crime groups and criminal gangs that contribute to Guatemala having one the highest violent crime rates in the Americas. Illegal armed groups, which appear to have evolved in part from counterinsurgency forces operating during the civil war that ended in 1996, are believed to be responsible for targeted attacks on civil society actors and justice officials. More than a decade after the end of the conflict, impunity remains the norm when it comes to human rights violations. The ongoing violence and intimidation threaten to reverse the little progress that has been made toward promoting accountability.”<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33" id="_ftnref33"><sup>[33]</sup></a></p>
<p>Rather than aiding military and law enforcement officials in addressing violence and organized crime, CARSI coincided with the strengthening of “illegal armed groups” with ties to military forces. The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/wr2011_book_complete.pdf" rel="nofollow">2011</a> Report describes military efforts to address gang violence resulting in “social cleansing.” In other words, the detention and/or disappearance of union organizers and social activists,<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34" id="_ftnref34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2012.pdf" rel="nofollow">2012</a> Report describes similar activity.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35" id="_ftnref35"><sup>[35]</sup></a></p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf" rel="nofollow">2013</a> Report, “President Otto Pérez Molina (…) increasingly used the Guatemalan military in public security operations, despite the serious human rights violations it committed during the country’s civil war.”<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36" id="_ftnref36"><sup>[36]</sup></a> This tendency was identified again in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">2014</a><sup>.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37" id="_ftnref37">[37]</a></sup> In <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2015_web.pdf" rel="nofollow">2015</a>, HRW found that a force of 20,000 armed service members was active in a country whose territory measures 42,000 square miles.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38" id="_ftnref38"><sup>[38]</sup></a></p>
<p>In a 2015 <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Guatemala2016.pdf" rel="nofollow">observation report</a>, the IACHR echoes HRW’s concerns about the state’s overreliance on the military to address domestic security challenges; in response it recommends a “return to the police reform agenda, specifically the plan named ‘The Police We Want.’”<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39" id="_ftnref39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> This is a particularly intriguing recommendation because “<a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00HRND.pdf" rel="nofollow">The Police We Want</a>” is published by USAID, the organization through which CARSI funds are channeled. However, further IACHR reporting offers no indication that its recommendation was followed.</p>
<p>The USAID plan was supposed to operate from 2012 to 2020, but in 2014 a new framework for police reform emerged. The Integral Police Model for Community Security (MOPSIC) prioritized community-oriented policing (COP). According to Arturo Matute of the University of the Valley of Guatemala, it was popular among some of the largest foreign aid organizations operating in Guatemala.</p>
<p>“The donor community has backed preventive strategies in the police through the years, including the development of MOPSIC. The U.S. has provided the largest amounts of financial support through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).”<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40" id="_ftnref40"><sup>[40]</sup></a></p>
<p>Despite the promising nature of the framework, however, the rollout of MOPSIC has been weak. Matute observes that presently, “police agents are scarcely trained in it.”<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41" id="_ftnref41"><sup>[41]</sup></a></p>
<p>Despite the inefficacy of police reform, there were some advances in the justice system between 2013 and 2019. The World Reports during this timeframe applaud a series of high-level convictions. In 2013, former president Efrain Ríos Montt was found guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2015, Otto Pérez Molina was implicated in a tax fraud scandal and resigned. The major force behind this discovery was the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a UN-led investigative team operating in Guatemala since 2006 with a mandate to examine high level corruption cases. The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf" rel="nofollow">2016</a> World Report acknowledged this significant step forward along with restrictions on U.S. aid to Guatemala under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (this provision had a limited effect on <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41731.pdf" rel="nofollow">CARSI</a> funds).<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42" id="_ftnref42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> For a few short years, accountability appeared on the horizon.</p>
<p>The IACHR also expressed some cautious optimism in its 2015 <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/CIDH/informes/IA.asp?Year=2015" rel="nofollow">report</a>, writing: “ The IACHR notes changes in favor of a society committed with human rights, promoted by the work of public officials compromised with justice and human rights defenders as well as social leaders. The support of international human rights agencies, as well as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, for its acronym in Spanish), has been critical to those efforts.”<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43" id="_ftnref43"><sup>[43]</sup></a></p>
<p>The momentum dissipated, however, in 2018 when Jimmy Morales “flanked by military and police officers, announced that he would not renew CICIG’s mandate when it expire[d] (…) in September 2019. The following week, he announced that he had prohibited CICIG Commissioner Iván Velásquez—who was on a work trip abroad—from re-entering the country.”<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44" id="_ftnref44"><sup>[44]</sup></a> This was the beginning of a political purge that only advanced in both speed and intensity during the Giamattei administration under the Attorney Generalship of Consuelo Porras.</p>
<p>The current state of Guatemala is quite grim. Far from witnessing a reduction in crime and gang violence since CARSI was first enacted (despite the package’s stated purpose of addressing these problems), the country now faces a regime dedicated to erasing the branches of state that could make any positive difference. Like <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-attorney-general-maria-consuelo-porras-argueta-de-porres-for-involvement-in-significant-corruption-and-consideration-of-additional-designations/" rel="nofollow">Secretary Blinken</a>, the most recent HRW <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">World Report</a> condemns the dissolution of anti-corruption institutions by Consuelo Porras and Giamattei. Neither the White House nor Human Rights Watch, however, mentions the uninterrupted flow of military funding.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45" id="_ftnref45"><sup>[45]</sup></a></p>
<p><strong>El Salvador</strong></p>
<p>Until recently, El Salvador has hardly featured in the yearly reports from HRW and the IACHR. The reasons for this gap are unclear. However, reports from 2019 onward illustrate a disappointing decline in the state of human rights, largely perpetrated by the state, despite ongoing funding from the United States.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf" rel="nofollow">2019</a> HRW World Report reads a lot like the reports from Guatemala and Honduras with respect to the deployment of the military in domestic affairs. It also addresses the discrepancies that abound in the state’s system of reporting deaths at the hands of security forces.</p>
<p>Since taking office in 2014, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén has expanded the military’s role in public security operations, despite a 1992 peace accord stipulation that it not be involved in policing. Killings of alleged gang members by security forces in supposed “armed confrontations” increased from 142 in 2013 to 591 in 2016.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46" id="_ftnref46"><sup>[46]</sup></a></p>
<p>The placement of the phrase “armed confrontations” in quotes presumably refers to a reporting phenomenon in El Salvador, where practically any death at the hands of police was identified as the result of a confrontation, even when the victims were not in any position to defend themselves. <em>El Faro</em> editor Oscar Martínez details some of these curious blunders in his most recent book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/-/es/%C3%93scar-Mart%C3%ADnez/dp/8433926268?asin=B099HKQW65&amp;revisionId=e6631fc6&amp;format=1&amp;depth=1" rel="nofollow"><em>Los muertos y el periodista</em></a>, saying that “any ‘confrontation’ where no police were injured or they didn’t give access to the crime scene was a massacre.”<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47" id="_ftnref47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> In three years, the number of Salvadorans killed in operations of this kind more than quadrupled.</p>
<p>At the same time, U.S. bilateral aid to El Salvador appears to have escalated in kind. In 1996, HRW identified a decline in U.S. assistance, with $27 million being spent between the years 1992 and 1995 on the nascent peace process, whereas the 2019 Report estimated $42 million was delivered in the prior fiscal year alone<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48" id="_ftnref48"><sup>[48]</sup></a>. Much of this funding was withheld in 2019, according to the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104366.pdf" rel="nofollow">Government Accountability Office</a>, which states that CARSI was cut by over 176 million dollars to penalize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for the migrant crisis. GAO documentation, however, only identifies staffing cuts for non-State/non-<a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs/" rel="nofollow">INL</a> projects. As far as program cuts, the percentage of funding withheld from social programs is nearly twice that withheld from State/INL programs.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49" id="_ftnref49"><sup>[49]</sup></a> The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf" rel="nofollow">2021 World Report</a> subtly addresses this discrepancy when it notes that “the U.S. appropriated over $72 million in bilateral aid to El Salvador, <em>particularly to reduce extreme violence and strengthen state institutions</em> [italics added]” in the previous fiscal year, up from $62 million the year before.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50" id="_ftnref50"><sup>[50]</sup></a></p>
<p>Despite steadily increasing security aid, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">2020 World Report</a> once again identifies a rise in “confrontation” killings, stating that: “Salvadoran police and soldiers killed 1,626 people from 2010 through 2017. Authorities claimed that more than 90 percent of the victims were gang members and that nearly all were killed in ‘confrontations.’”<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51" id="_ftnref51"><sup>[51]</sup></a> The IACHR published similar findings in its 2021 <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-EN.pdf" rel="nofollow">report</a>, claiming:</p>
<p>“Civil society organizations have stated that, within the last five years, at least 2,173 armed clashes have been recorded, which have led to the death of 1,930 people. Out of these casualties, 96.8 percent were citizens who were identified as gang members according to the official sources. By the end of 2019, the number of recorded conflicts since 2014 rose to 2,514, in which 2,025 people died, out of whom 1,957 were civilians and 68 were police or military officers. In addition to the high number of civilians killed when compared to the number of state agents who were murdered over the same period of time, according to an analysis carried out by the University Observatory for Human Rights of the Central American University, the fatality rate in these clashes was alarming and “clearly indicative of the excessive use of lethal force. Thus (…) the number of dead people (193) was allegedly higher than the number of injured people (76) among those identified as ‘criminals or gang members.’”<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52" id="_ftnref52"><sup>[52]</sup></a></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf" rel="nofollow">2021 World Report</a> notes significant declines in homicides, but simultaneously remarks on egregious attacks on democratic processes and institutions. The introduction describes how then newly elected president Nayib Bukele “entered the Legislative Assembly with armed soldiers in an apparent effort to intimidate legislators into approving a loan for security forces.”<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53" id="_ftnref53"><sup>[53]</sup></a> The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">2022 World Report</a> details the nature of Bukele’s assault on the judicial sector, explaining that he “removed and replaced all five judges of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber, as well as the attorney general (…) appointed five new judges to the Supreme Court, in violation of the process established in the constitution (…) [and] passed two laws dismissing all judges and prosecutors over 60 years of age or with 30 or more years of service.”<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54" id="_ftnref54"><sup>[54]</sup></a></p>
<p>Bukele is not the military or the police, but his repeated and drastic power grabs consolidate his control over how these forces are deployed. His influence thus far over law enforcement is ethically dubious. <em>El Faro</em>, one of the most established Salvadoran press agencies, has <a href="https://elfaro.net/es/202205/el_salvador/26175/Audios-de-Carlos-Marroqu%C3%ADn-revelan-que-masacre-de-marzo-ocurri%C3%B3-por-ruptura-entre-Gobierno-y-MS.htm" rel="nofollow">linked</a> the lowered homicide rate in 2020 to negotiations between government leaders and gang leaders who received protections, privileges, and in some cases even freedom.<a href="#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55" id="_ftnref55"><sup>[55]</sup></a> The 2023 Report is likely to address the state of exception and the unprecedented rise in homicides that directly preceded it.</p>
<p><strong>Rooting Out Corruption</strong></p>
<p>“It’s not at all true that an increase in human rights violations is due to CARSI,” says Professor Call. The problem, in his view, is corruption and the slowness of U.S.-led efforts to recognize and penalize it; the aid itself, however, is a gesture of goodwill, without which peace in the region would be far more challenging to secure. As for the Senate bill to suspend aid to Honduras, Call says, “it’s stupid, period,” adding that the newly-elected Castro government is “moving in the right direction.”<a href="#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56" id="_ftnref56"><sup>[56]</sup></a></p>
<p>Call’s perspective is emblematic of the more moderate view that is likely to prevail in Congress when the budget for FY23 is passed: the dedication of funds to governments in the Northern Triangle is an otiose debate topic for most U.S. policymakers; among moderates, the more appropriate question is how to root out bad actors, whose actions dilute the efficacy of programs funded by plans like CARSI.</p>
<p>A number of arguably effective measures exist, such as indictments and extradition, <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-releases-section-353-list-of-corrupt-and-undemocratic-actors-for-guatemala-honduras-and-el-salvador/" rel="nofollow">the Engel list</a>, support and expansion of <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/guatemala-summary/" rel="nofollow">DEA-vetted units</a>, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CARSI%20IE%20Executive%20Summary.pdf" rel="nofollow">community violence prevention</a> (<a href="https://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/carsi-2016-09.pdf" rel="nofollow">CVP</a>) programs, and more frequent and thorough reviews of the kinds of military and police training programs the U.S. pays for in Central America. The extent to which such measures can be fully executed is limited by certain key factors. “It’s just unfortunate,” Call states, “the attorney general in all three countries is not someone who’s committed to fighting corruption (…) and is quite committed to impunity in Guatemala and El Salvador.”<a href="#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57" id="_ftnref57"><sup>[57]</sup></a> So far, the Engel list has not weakened commitments of this kind.</p>
<p>According to former U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, Stephen Macfarland, however, it’s still too soon to draw any conclusions about the efficacy of U.S. policy in Central America. In an <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/la-gente-tiene-hambre-de-saber-tras-la-investigaci%C3%B3n/id1223106393?i=1000551626260" rel="nofollow">interview</a> in February with <em>CNN en español</em>, he explained:</p>
<p>“The warning signs [in Guatemala] have gone basically unheard by politicians and shamefully the economic elite. If one thinks of what has happened in Honduras with Juan Orlando Hernández, all that is an investigation that did not begin with (…) the president, but rather with other drug traffickers (…) during three consecutive governments in the United States, that investigation went on. So Guatemalans need to ask themselves: how different are they from Honduras? I would say, in many respects, Guatemala is worse.”<a href="#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58" id="_ftnref58"><sup>[58]</sup></a></p>
<p>Macfarland implies that impunity has a lifespan, and like former president Hernández of Honduras, Guatemalan president Giamattei and his administration will one day face justice themselves. Bukele, as well. It’s a matter of time and patience. For the Senators and Congresspeople calling to suspend CARSI funding, however, time and patience have run out.</p>
<hr/>
<p><em><strong>Sources</strong></em></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" id="_ftn1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> “Juan Orlando Hernández: Honduran ex-leader pleads not guilty”, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61393266.amp" rel="nofollow">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61393266.amp</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" id="_ftn2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> “Guatemalan prosecutor labeled corrupt by U.S. gets tapped for new term”, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/guatemalan-prosecutor-labeled-corrupt-by-us-gets-tapped-new-term-2022-05-17/" rel="nofollow">https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/guatemalan-prosecutor-labeled-corrupt-by-us-gets-tapped-new-term-2022-05-17/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" id="_ftn3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> “El Salvador extends state of emergency amid gang crackdown”, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/26/el-salvador-extends-state-of-emergency-amid-gang-crackdown" rel="nofollow">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/26/el-salvador-extends-state-of-emergency-amid-gang-crackdown</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" id="_ftn4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> “Letter to Chairwoman Lee”, <a href="https://cispes.org/sites/default/files/quill_-_letter_l3588_-_suspend_security_assistance_to_northern_triangle_in_fy23_-_version_1_-_04-26-2022_11-14_am.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://cispes.org/sites/default/files/quill_-_letter_l3588_-_suspend_security_assistance_to_northern_triangle_in_fy23_-_version_1_-_04-26-2022_11-14_am.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" id="_ftn5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> “S.388 – Honduras Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2021”, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/388" rel="nofollow">https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/388</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" id="_ftn6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> This article examines World Reports from the 1990’s up to the present day and finds an overall decline in the state of human rights in the Northern Triangle. An archive of HRW World Reports is accessible at https://www.hrw.org/previous-world-reports</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" id="_ftn7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> This article also considers the less frequently published yet far deeper analyses of the human rights situations in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala issued by the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights; it finds police and military repression are consolidated practices in each state and inevitably result in the denial of basic freedoms, including the right to life.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" id="_ftn8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> Correspondence with the author</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" id="_ftn9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Interview with the author.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" id="_ftn10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> “MÉRIDA INITIATIVE The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures”, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-837.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-837.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" id="_ftn11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> “The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership”, <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/183768.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/183768.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" id="_ftn12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> “How Honduras’s Congress Split in Two”, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/honduras-congress-split-crisis-xiomara-castro-inauguration-corruption-libre-national-party/" rel="nofollow">https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/honduras-congress-split-crisis-xiomara-castro-inauguration-corruption-libre-national-party/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" id="_ftn13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> “Guatemala’s Former Top Anti-Graft Prosecutor Decries Arrest Warrant”, <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/guatemalas-former-top-anti-graft-prosecutor-decries-arrest-warrant/" rel="nofollow">https://insightcrime.org/news/guatemalas-former-top-anti-graft-prosecutor-decries-arrest-warrant/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" id="_ftn14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> “US concerned over removal of top Salvadoran judges”, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56970026.amp" rel="nofollow">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56970026.amp</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" id="_ftn15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> “El Salvador Declares State of Exception in Response to Wave of Murders”, <a href="https://www.coha.org/el-salvador-declares-state-of-exception-in-response-to-wave-of-murders/" rel="nofollow">https://www.coha.org/el-salvador-declares-state-of-exception-in-response-to-wave-of-murders/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" id="_ftn16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> “Kamala Harris Rejects Actions of the President of El Salvador”, <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/amp/news/US-Rejects-Democracy-Violations-In-El-Salvador-20210503-0003.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.telesurenglish.net/amp/news/US-Rejects-Democracy-Violations-In-El-Salvador-20210503-0003.html</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" id="_ftn17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> “Designation of Attorney General Maria Consuelo Porras Argueta de Porres for Involvement in Significant Corruption and Consideration of Additional Designations”, <a href="https://www.state.gov/designation-of-attorney-general-maria-consuelo-porras-argueta-de-porres-for-involvement-in-significant-corruption-and-consideration-of-additional-designations/" rel="nofollow">https://www.state.gov/designation-of-attorney-general-maria-consuelo-porras-argueta-de-porres-for-involvement-in-significant-corruption-and-consideration-of-additional-designations/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" id="_ftn18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> “United States of America v. Juan Orlando Hernández”, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1496096/download" rel="nofollow">https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1496096/download</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" id="_ftn19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> Cunha Filho CM, Coelho AL, Pérez Flores FI. A right-to-left policy switch? An analysis of the Honduran case under Manuel Zelaya. International Political Science Review. 2013;34(5): 526.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" id="_ftn20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> “Honduras is Open for Business”, <a href="https://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-for-business/" rel="nofollow">https://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-for-business/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" id="_ftn21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> “González: Hillary Clinton’s policy was a Latin American crime story”, <a href="https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gonzalez-clinton-policy-latin-american-crime-story-article-1.2598456" rel="nofollow">https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gonzalez-clinton-policy-latin-american-crime-story-article-1.2598456</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" id="_ftn22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> “The State Department’s Selective Indignation to Undemocratic Elections in Latin America”, <a href="https://www.coha.org/the-state-departments-inconsistent-and-ineffective-response-to-the-undemocratic-proliferating-through-latin-america/" rel="nofollow">https://www.coha.org/the-state-departments-inconsistent-and-ineffective-response-to-the-undemocratic-proliferating-through-latin-america/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" id="_ftn23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> “Human RIghts Watch World Report 1996”,  <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-08.htm#P719_175896" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-08.htm#P719_175896</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" id="_ftn24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2012”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" id="_ftn25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2013”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" id="_ftn26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2014”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" id="_ftn27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2015”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" id="_ftn28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> “Informe Anual de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 1984-1985”, <a href="http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/84.85sp/Indice.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/84.85sp/Indice.htm</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29" id="_ftn29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> “Situación de derechos humanos en Honduras”, ​​<a href="https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Honduras-es-2015.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Honduras-es-2015.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30" id="_ftn30"><sup>[30]</sup></a> Mendez Gutierrez, Maria José, “Delegation Report Back: Lessons from Central American Resistance &amp; Diasporic Solidarity,” Youtube video, 5:11, posted by “closethesoa,” May 24, 2022, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiImEOIRJr8" rel="nofollow">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiImEOIRJr8</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31" id="_ftn31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> “CARSI IN GUATEMALA: Progress, Failure, and Uncertainty”, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32" id="_ftn32"><sup>[32]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2009”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33" id="_ftn33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2009”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34" id="_ftn34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2011”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35" id="_ftn35"><sup>[35]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2012”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36" id="_ftn36"><sup>[36]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2013”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37" id="_ftn37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2014”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38" id="_ftn38"><sup>[38]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2015”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39" id="_ftn39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> “Situación de derechos humanos en Guatemala: diversidad desigualdad y exclusión”, <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Guatemala2016.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Guatemala2016.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40" id="_ftn40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> Matute, Arturo 2020. “Possibilities of Advancing Police Reform in Guatemala through Community -Oriented Policing,” Journal of Human Security, Librello publishing house, vol. 16(2), pages 97-110.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41" id="_ftn41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> Matute, Arturo 2020. “Possibilities of Advancing Police Reform in Guatemala through Community -Oriented Policing,” Journal of Human Security, Librello publishing house, vol. 16(2), pages 97-110.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42" id="_ftn42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2016”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016</a>; “ Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress”, <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41731.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41731.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43" id="_ftn43"><sup>[43]</sup></a> “Informe Anual 2015”, <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/anual/2015/doc-es/InformeAnual2015-Cap4-Guatemala-ES.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/anual/2015/doc-es/InformeAnual2015-Cap4-Guatemala-ES.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44" id="_ftn44"><sup>[44]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2019”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45" id="_ftn45"><sup>[45]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2022”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46" id="_ftn46"><sup>[46]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2019”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47" id="_ftn47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> Martinez, <em>Los Muertos y el Periodista</em> (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2021) 30.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48" id="_ftn48"><sup>[48]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-05.htm#P451_111820" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-05.htm#P451_111820</a>; “Human Rights Watch World Report 2019”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49" id="_ftn49"><sup>[49]</sup></a> “NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA: The 2019 Suspension and Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects”, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104366.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104366.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50" id="_ftn50"><sup>[50]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2021”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51" id="_ftn51"><sup>[51]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2020”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52" id="_ftn52"><sup>[52]</sup></a> “The Human Rights Situation in El Salvador 2021”, <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-EN.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-EN.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53" id="_ftn53"><sup>[53]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2021”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54" id="_ftn54"><sup>[54]</sup></a> “Human Rights Watch World Report 2022”, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55" id="_ftn55"><sup>[55]</sup></a> “Audios de Carlos Marroquin revelan que masacre de marzo ocurrió por ruptura entree Gobierno y MS”,  <a href="https://elfaro.net/es/202205/el_salvador/26175/Audios-de-Carlos-Marroqu%C3%ADn-revelan-que-masacre-de-marzo-ocurri%C3%B3-por-ruptura-entre-Gobierno-y-MS.htm" rel="nofollow">https://elfaro.net/es/202205/el_salvador/26175/Audios-de-Carlos-Marroqu%C3%ADn-revelan-que-masacre-de-marzo-ocurri%C3%B3-por-ruptura-entre-Gobierno-y-MS.htm</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56" id="_ftn56"><sup>[56]</sup></a> Interview with the author</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57" id="_ftn57"><sup>[57]</sup></a> Interview with the author</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58" id="_ftn58"><sup>[58]</sup></a> “La gente tiene hambre saber tras la investigación ‘Guatemala Testigo Protegido’”, https://www.audacy.com/cnnespanol/podcasts/conclusiones-23356/la-gente-tiene-hambre-de-saber-tras-la-investigacion-guatemala-testigo-protegido-segun-periodista-de-el-faro-1258204965</p>
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		<title>Phil Wheaton: Remembering an Exemplary Fighter for the People</title>
		<link>https://eveningreport.nz/2020/05/22/phil-wheaton-remembering-an-exemplary-fighter-for-the-people/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Evening Report]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2020 16:18:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Central America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central America (featured)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COHA in English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[El Salvador]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Human Rights]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Main 4 headlines]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Nicaragua]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phil Wheaton]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://eveningreport.nz/?p=35625</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage The Reverend Phil Wheaton, an activist and community organizer in the Washington D.C. area, passed away this month. He had worked tirelessly for humanitarian causes, including for Salvadorans who came to the United States in large numbers in the 1980s fleeing their country’s civil war. Sonia Umanzor is ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage</p>
<p><p><strong><em>The Reverend Phil Wheaton, an activist and community organizer in the Washington D.C. area, passed away this month. He had worked tirelessly for humanitarian causes, including for Salvadorans who came to the United States in large numbers in the 1980s fleeing their country’s civil war. Sonia Umanzor is one of many Salvadorans who experienced Phil’s solidarity and commitment first-hand. This is her tribute and homage to Phil.</em></strong></p>
<p><strong><em> </em></strong><strong><em>By Sonia Umanzor</em></strong><strong><em><br /></em></strong> <strong><em>Washington DC</em></strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_40543" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-40543" class="wp-caption alignright c2"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-40543" src="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-2-227x300.jpg" alt="" width="200" height="265" srcset="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-2-227x300.jpg 227w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-2.jpg 408w" sizes="(max-width: 200px) 100vw, 200px"/><figcaption id="caption-attachment-40543" class="wp-caption-text">Phil Wheaton in his neighborhood, Takoma Park</figcaption></figure>
<p><span class="c3">On the morning of May 9 and in the middle of this terrible pandemic, I awakened to the sad news of the physical passing of you, our great brother, friend, and compañero, Phil Wheaton. We knew you affectionately as Felipe. It seems that this world does not want to let you go because this world will never be the same without you, my brother.</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">Sometimes you seemed so tall and so brave to me, so enraged by the injustices and crimes committed by the most powerful people, while being so tender with us, the most vulnerable, the most long-suffering. You always had an answer, always looked for a path to oppose the mistaken policies of the Empire, and always sent a message of complete intolerance of barbaric acts and the suffering of the peoples of our AMERICA.</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">Losing you is causing me great pain, as if I had lost a close relative. It must be because we saw you take on our pain and undoubtedly become one of us.</span></p>
<figure id="attachment_40542" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-40542" class="wp-caption alignleft c4"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-40542" src="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-3-290x300.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="310" srcset="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-3-290x300.jpg 290w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-3.jpg 670w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px"/><figcaption id="caption-attachment-40542" class="wp-caption-text">Phil Wheaton and activist James Early.</figcaption></figure>
<p><span class="c3">Felipe, you were a true champion of solidarity—not from afar, not from a desk—but by putting your feet into the mud with the most humble people and sharing their risks. You supported Nicaragua throughout the Contra war and then went to live there. You strongly opposed your country’s policies towards our Americas, the Caribbean, and the world.</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">Honor and Glory to this comrade in struggle who fought shoulder to shoulder with us for a more just world for all people.</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">I recall how you worked to build the sanctuary movement. In your country you fought so that we refugees and persecuted embodiments of Christ who were fleeing war could have someplace safe to live. When I was granted sanctuary in 1984 at the Church of the Savior, it felt like I was being lifted by miraculous hands from the darkness into light, allowing me to rest in a safe place, no longer waking up screaming in the middle of the night with the recurring nightmare that my family and I would be beheaded by morning. That solidarity brought me back to life and gave me more strength to fight for those following in my footsteps and for my country, El Salvador, which was being bled to death by bombs Made in the USA.</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">Felipe, I know that you came to realize how important you were for the poor. You always fought to establish the Kingdom of God in this world. You knew that it was possible. You considered it an order from God, a just and generous God. That is why you were so committed to defend immigrants and the poor, without hesitation or doubt. You preached by example. I saw that until the last day of your life.</span></p>
<figure id="attachment_40541" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-40541" class="wp-caption aligncenter c5"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-40541 size-full" src="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-4.jpg" alt="" width="616" height="458" srcset="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-4.jpg 616w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Phil-Wheaton-4-300x223.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 616px) 100vw, 616px"/><figcaption id="caption-attachment-40541" class="wp-caption-text">Historic picture. Three outstanding reverends: Rev. Phil Wheaton, Rev. Edgar Palacios (left) and Father Vidal Rivas (behind).</figcaption></figure>
<p><span class="c3">So many times we sang those songs with you! “</span><em><span class="c3">When the poor people believe in the poor, we will be able to sing about FREEDOM! When the poor believe in the poor, we can build brotherhood!</span></em><span class="c3">”</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">And you celebrated the Eucharist with so much faith and together we sang, “</span><em><span class="c3">Let us go now, to the banquet, to the feast of the universe. The table’s set and a place is waiting, come everyone with your gifts to share.</span></em><span class="c3">”</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">And I will remember you and your long, chatty visits with Reverend Whit Hutchison at our Fr. Rutilio Grande House in Takoma Park, when you would pass by walking your dog, or when you would come to meetings or to celebrations of the lives and example set by the Jesuits who were murdered in 1989, or in honor of Monsignor Romero, or Father Rutilio Grande.</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">We Salvadorans are grateful to you for your love and devotion. We will stay with you and will not say goodbye, only, “You are with us always, my dear brother Felipe.”</span></p>
<p><span class="c3">Rest in peace.</span></p>
<p><a href="https://metrolatinousa.com/2008/12/19/reconocen-labor-de-activistas-en-washington/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><strong><em>Sonia Umanzor</em></strong></a> <strong><em>is a Community organizer in the Washington, DC metropolitan area.</em></strong></p>
<p><strong>Press materials in Spanish: <a href="https://metrolatinousa.com/2013/03/23/la-memoria-de-monsenor-romero-sigue-viva/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Phil Wheaton en español</a> (Metro Latino USA)</strong></p>
<p><strong>Obituary in English: <a href="https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/washingtonpost/obituary.aspx?fbclid=IwAR0mnVTWaCL0tXATpTa7YcwpLWi8Hm03Y6O7fon4BvRSia2QCAeWfOlz_rs&amp;n=philip-wheaton&amp;pid=196202394" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Phil Wheaton en Washington Post</a> </strong></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBMylB6TOSw" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Video interview of Phil Wheaton</a> </strong></p>
<p><strong>[All pictures taken by Phil’s beloved friends and published on Facebook]</strong></p></p>
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		<title>El Salvador: Bukele’s Heavy- Handed Response to COVID-19 Pandemic Violates Human Rights</title>
		<link>https://eveningreport.nz/2020/05/12/el-salvador-bukeles-heavy-handed-response-to-covid-19-pandemic-violates-human-rights/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Evening Report]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2020 18:16:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COHA in English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Coronavirus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[covid-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[El Salvador]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Latin America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Main Article]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Nayib Bukele]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://eveningreport.nz/?p=34873</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage By Alina Duarte From Mexico City Behind that jovial image of a president who takes selfies at the U.N. and governs over social media stands a strategic ally of the United States who has little regard for human rights. The social media presence of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage</p>
<p><img decoding="async" class="wpe_imgrss" src="https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/carc-el-salv-jpg-1.jpg"></p>
<p><strong><em>By Alina Duarte</em></strong><span class="c2"><br /></span> <strong><em>From Mexico City</em></strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">Behind that jovial image of a president who takes selfies at the U.N. and governs over social media stands a strategic ally of the United States who has little regard for human rights.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">The social media presence of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has transcended his country’s borders on at least four occasions in recent weeks. The first was when he used the armed forces to militarize the national legislature; the second was a speech in which he announced measures he was taking to confront the Coronavirus pandemic, suggesting that his government’s response would be “an exemplary model” for handling the health crisis;</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn1" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[1]</span></a> <span class="c2">the third was when his name and statements about “the use of lethal force” against criminals accompanied images of prison inmates in their underwear, sitting on the floor, crowded together in rows, with a heavy military presence standing over them; and the fourth was when he spoke to René, lead singer of the Puerto Rican rap group Calle 13, whose relevance will be discussed in a moment.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">These four events caused confusion among certain segments of the population, including some moderately progressive ones. And for those who are far removed from the situation in El Salvador or are deprived of real information by the media blockade against that Central American nation, the links between these events may seem contradictory or senseless. But they make complete sense. Bukele is much more than those four stellar examples, and that is where I would like to begin.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Bukele served as mayor of both Nuevo Cuscatlán and of San Salvador as a member of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), but in October of 2017 he was expelled from the party for “promoting internal divisions and defaming the political party.” He was also accused of physically and verbally attacking Council Member Xochitl Marchelli during a session of the San Salvador City Council.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn2" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[2]</span></a></p>
<figure id="attachment_40474" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-40474" class="wp-caption aligncenter c3"><img class="wp-image-40474 size-large"src="https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/carc-el-salv-jpg-1.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="537" srcset="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Carc-El-Salv-1024x687.jpg 1024w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Carc-El-Salv-300x201.jpg 300w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Carc-El-Salv-768x516.jpg 768w, https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/carc-el-salv-jpg-1.jpg 1241w" sizes="(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"/><figcaption id="caption-attachment-40474" class="wp-caption-text">Inmates packed together at a jail in El Salvador (Photo: Twitter account of Osiris Luna Meza, Deputy Minister of Justice and Director General Ad Honorem of the Penitentiary System)</figcaption></figure>
<p><strong>Bukele’s radical turn to the right</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">Once he was out of the FMLN, the right-wing ARENA party blocked his presidential ambitions through its electoral infrastructure. Bukele was also prevented from participating in the primary race of his Nuevas Ideas party, which had been created out of thin air for his presidential ambitions. So he then joined the Center-right GANA Party (Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional). This was the vehicle that allowed him to win the presidential election against the FMLN, which had been worn down by radical economic reforms that could not be fully enacted, as well as an unrelenting media campaign against the party during its two presidential terms. There was also the problem that the FMLN had made great strides in health and education for the most vulnerable population, but was unable to win over the new generation too young to remember the civil war that ended with the Chapultepec Accords of January 1992, when Nayib Bukele was just 10 years old. But the youth were won over by the discourse and youthful image of someone who portrays himself as an outsider and not a politician.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">The results of the 2019 presidential election were irrefutable: Bukele won 53.1% of the 2,701,992 votes cast, posing a tremendous challenge to the FMLN and the Left. The historic revolutionary party came in a distant third place with just 14.41% of the vote. It was clear that Salvadorans were looking for “a change,” whether or not they knew which direction it was going, and they said so very clearly.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">It did not take long for Bukele to show who his geopolitical friends and enemies are. He had already revealed this before arriving at the National Palace.</span></p>
<p><strong>Close friend of Donald Trump and the Right in the Americas</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">Bukele is the son of a multi-million-dollar business owner, and although his paternal grandparents are Palestinian, he had already expressed his ideological and political affinity with the government of Israel while he was mayor.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn3" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[3]</span></a> <span class="c2">As President he has expelled the Venezuelan diplomatic staff from the country, and at the Organization of American States (OAS) he supported the failed attempt to invoke the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Río Treaty) against the Bolivarian government.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">The President never hid the fact that bilateral relations with the United States were the priority. He met with Donald Trump (whom he called “simpatico and cool”), and he accepted an agreement that was framed as a tool to fight organized crime, reduce illegal drug trafficking and human trafficking, and to strengthen border security. The agreement, however,.included  the designation of El Salvador as “a safe third country” for Central American migrants seeking asylum in the United States. The conservative nature of his administration and its partnership—submission, actually—to the United States also led to a visit by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to El Salvador.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Ever the pragmatist, Bukele made a State visit to the People’s Republic of China and is currently collaborating with the Mexican government to foster economic cooperation and development in the Northern Triangle of Central America. These political chess moves do not contradict his undoing of the alliances the FMLN administrations had established with the progressive governments of Latin America.</span></p>
<p><strong>Using the military to pressure the National Assembly</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">Domestically, Bukele’s political practices have raised all kinds of red flags on more than one occasion.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">He instructs government staffers in their daily activities by governing through  social media. Donning a baseball cap worn backwards, the self-proclaimed “world’s coolest and best-looking president”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn4" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[4]</span></a><span class="c2"> was the object of international scorn during this first media episode when he decided to have the military take over the National Assembly on February 9.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn5" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[5]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">With a military presence in the streets, Bukele arrived at the legislative chamber and, surrounded by soldiers, proceeded to pray to “pressure” lawmakers to authorize him to negotiate a US$109 million loan with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration to fund the third stage of his Territorial Control Plan.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn6" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[6]</span></a> <span class="c2">The strategy seeks to militarize the country in the name of national security and resolve the crime problem with bullets, drones, and state-of-the-art technology, rather than by adequately addressing the prevailing structural inequality. As if that were not enough, there is insufficient transparency regarding the financial resources the legislature has already allocated to the plan.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn7" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[7]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">With a population of 6.4 million, of which 26.3%–or 1,683,200 people—are living in poverty, and 510,000 in extreme poverty,</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn8" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[8]</span></a> <span class="c2">Bukele has decided to implement the aforementioned Territorial Control Plan for a total cost of US$575 million by 2021.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn9" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[9]</span></a></p>
<p><strong>Political exploitation of COVID-19</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">Let’s go back to the four interlinked media episodes mentioned at the beginning of this article.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">We discussed the military takeover of the National Assembly. The second episode is Bukele’s handling of the pandemic, which goes beyond his remarks that went viral on social media.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Bukele announced the “Plan for Response and Economic Relief in the Face of the National Emergency caused by COVID-19,”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn10" rel="nofollow"><strong>[10]</strong></a><span class="c2"> which was extensively disseminated on social and conventional media. It established a US$300 subsidy for just over 1.5 million families and suspension of payments for such services as electricity, water, telephone, cable TV, and internet. It also announced postponement of rent and mortgage payments, and of consumer, credit card, and auto loan debts for three months. And it decreed that employers could not dismiss any employees during the time period, and were obliged to continue to pay their wages even if they were not working. The plan also opened lines of credit for micro, small, and medium-sized businesses. However, the testimony and complaints of the population began to refute the success of these measures. For example, not everyone received their $300,</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn11" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[11]</span></a><span class="c2"> and many of those who did not pay their bills in March, were billed late charges in April.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn12" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[12]</span></a></p>
<figure id="attachment_40475" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-40475" class="wp-caption aligncenter c4"><img class="wp-image-40475 size-full"src="https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tweet-osi-jpg-1.jpg" alt="" width="629" height="725" srcset="https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tweet-osi-jpg-1.jpg 629w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tweet-Osi-260x300.jpg 260w" sizes="(max-width: 629px) 100vw, 629px"/><figcaption id="caption-attachment-40475" class="wp-caption-text">“We are carrying out the plan of mixing members of the different criminal structures causing so much damage to the country in the same cells. Under this administration there will be no benefits or privileges for members of any criminal structure.” (Photo and text: Twitter account of Osiris Luna Meza, Deputy Minister of Justice and Director General Ad Honorem of the Penitentiary System.)</figcaption></figure>
<p><strong>Serious violations of human rights</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">But the most serious and concerning issue is that behind Bukele’s rhetoric lie multiple violations of human rights that have received scant coverage in the international press.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) documented this extensively in its Special Report “</span><strong>Human Rights Violations Abound in El Salvador as President Bukele Responds to COVID-19.</strong><span class="c2">”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn13" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[13]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">In its report, CISPES gives details explaining how although measures were taken such as “o</span><span class="c2">bligatory quarantine in government-established centers for all air and land travelers returning to El Salvador,” </span></p>
<p><em><span class="c2">“… many of President Bukele’s subsequent actions have raised concerns. His more stringent measures in particular, such as military enforcement of a national stay-at-home order and arbitrary detention of people accused of violating the quarantine, have been denounced as exceeding the limits established by the Constitution of El Salvador.”</span></em></p>
<p><em><span class="c2">“While human rights organizations, progressive social movements, and civil society leaders in El Salvador agree that comprehensive protective and preventive measures are necessary, many are denouncing a rising tide of human rights violations stemming from the suspension of constitutional rights and use of force that has characterized the government’s response to the threat of COVID-19, as well as President Bukele’s flagrant dismissal of recent Supreme Court rulings intended to curb his detention policy.</span></em><span class="c2">”</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">These complaints by human rights organizations and defenders have been growing by the day,</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn14" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[14]</span></a> <span class="c2">and</span> <strong>there is no doubt that coercion has been a key feature of Bukele’s measures</strong> <span class="c2">during the pandemic. The data confirm this. As of May 5, while the number of COVID-19 cases grew to 587, including 14 deaths, the number detained for “violating lockdown” rose to 2,394.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn15" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[15]</span></a> <span class="c2">Even after the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court banned Bukele from detaining curfew violators and placing them in forced confinement or health detention, the President tweeted that he would not comply with the order: NO COURT DECISION is above the Salvadoran people’s constitutional right to life and health.”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn16" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[16]</span></a><span class="c2">  </span></p>
<p><span class="c2">On May 5 the Legislative Assembly passed the</span> <em><span class="c2">Law on the Regulation of Isolation, Quarantine, Observation, and Surveillance for COVID-19</span></em> <span class="c2">by a vote of 56 to 26. The law “declares the entire national territory an epidemic zone subject to health controls to fight the harm and spread of COVID-19.”  Such controls include measures that continue to raise concerns about possible violations of the constitution.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn17" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[17]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">As if that were not enough, the conditions in which detainees are being held have caught the attention of human rights defenders. People say that once they are detained, they spend part of their confinement sleeping on the floor, and some have been held for over a month.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn18" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[18]</span></a></p>
<figure id="attachment_40477" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-40477" class="wp-caption alignnone c5"><img class="wp-image-40477 size-full"src="https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tweet-buk-jpg-1.jpg" alt="" width="615" height="769" srcset="https://eveningreport.nz/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tweet-buk-jpg-1.jpg 615w, http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tweet-Buk-240x300.jpg 240w" sizes="(max-width: 615px) 100vw, 615px"/><figcaption id="caption-attachment-40477" class="wp-caption-text">“From now on, all the cells of all the gang members in our country will remain sealed. Now they can’t look out the cell door. This will prevent them from using signs to communicate with people passing in the hall. They are locked in the darkness with their friends from rival gangs.” (Photo and text from Nayib Bukele’s Twitter Account)</figcaption></figure>
<p><strong>The United Nations certifies that there have been abuses by the Bukele administration</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">This situation has led Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to assert that the government of Nayib Bukele “is not respecting the fundamental principles of the rule of law.”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn19" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[19]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">The suspension of civil liberties peaked when Bukele first decreed a two-week state of exception on March 15, and then extended it for another two weeks on March 29, allowing it to expire on April 14. Bukele and the right-wing legislators, without the backing of the FMLN, have been insisting on passing another state of exception, but these efforts were soon translated into the Draconian quarantine regulations that were signed into law on May 5..</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">With regard to the coercive dimension of the government’s public health policy,, Bachelet added that, “even in a state of emergency, some fundamental rights cannot be restricted or suspended, including the right not to suffer mistreatment and the fundamental guarantee against arbitrary detention.” The UN official also demanded that all alleged human rights violations within the context of the health crisis be investigated.</span> <a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn20" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[20]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">Although the human rights violations by the Bukele administration during the pandemic have taken various forms and been amply documented, it is important to notice references to freedom of expression and access to information. Dozens such complaints have been filed with the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman. For example, the public has been denied access to reports on complaints by those held in the quarantine centers, which reveal that many detainees have not been informed of the results of their Coronavirus tests.</span></p>
<p><strong>Impact of the photos of inmates crowded together</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">A third media incident and perhaps the most controversial one came with the photos of prisoners packed body-to-body in jails, some of them wearing masks. But the most concerning thing was the authorization of the use of force in the streets.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">The Bukele administration is not the only one that has taken advantage of the pandemic to violate human rights and further harass political dissidents. Jeanine Añez of Bolivia is a great example of that as she not only pursues those who disagree with her during the pandemic,</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn21" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[21]</span></a> <span class="c2">but also continues to perpetuate the consequences of the coup d’etat against Evo Morales by forcing former members of his government to remain in the Mexican Embassy in La Paz because she will not authorize safe conduct passes.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn22" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[22]</span></a> <span class="c2">But unlike Bolivia, the situation in El Salvador has become a topic of international debate. As for the treatment of prisoners, El Salvador has bucked the trend set in countries such as Nicaragua (where it was announced that prisoners would be sent to home detention), and Mexico. In the latter country an Amnesty Law was enacted to release women convicted of interrupting a pregnancy. This law also benefits the doctors, surgeons, and midwives who helped them. Amnesty was also extended to those accused of possession and transport of narcotics if they were in a situation of vulnerability, as well as indigenous people who were convicted without due process guarantees.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">To understand the magnitude of the concern about what is happening in El Salvador’s jails (called “ticking time bombs”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn23" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[23]</span></a><span class="c2">), it should be noted that the country has the world’s second highest per capita incarceration rate in the world, after only the United States. This adds to the fact that the country’s detention centers have a capacity of approximately 18,000 inmates but currently house more than 38,000. The presence of COVID-19 in these facilities could give rise to a large-scale crisis.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Implementing a policy to relieve overcrowding in Salvadoran jails poses a big challenge. The population certainly supports measures that keep gang criminals behind bars. But a selective policy that could, for example, place people convicted of non-violent civil crimes under house address could be a temporary solution to reduce overpopulation in corrections facilities.</span></p>
<p><strong>Bukele’s use of lethal force on the streets</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">Amidst the pandemic there has been an outbreak of violence in the Central American country. Bukele has used this to intensify his “zero tolerance policy” against the gangs by not only “mixing” members of different gangs in the same cells, but also authorizing the use of lethal force by the police and the army in the streets.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn24" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[24]</span></a> <span class="c2">The order for the use of lethal force clearly reveals Bukele’s authoritarianism as he has carried out these policies in defiance of the express statements by national and international human rights organizations, who have issued alerts regarding the seriousness of the government’s actions.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">In what has become routine behavior, instead of acceding to the cries and recommendations of human rights agencies, Bukele defiantly does the opposite, such as sealing the cells of inmates. “Now they can’t look out the cell door. This will prevent them from using signs to communicate with people passing in the hall. They are locked in the darkness with their friends from rival gangs,”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn25" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[25]</span></a> <span class="c2">he tweeted.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">But there is another little noticed variable. While Bukele’s tweets and decisions may recall episodes in which authoritarianism led to dictatorships in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, or more recent suspensions of individual freedoms to contain popular unrest (such as by Sebastián Piñera in Chile, Lenín Moreno in Ecuador, and  Iván Duque in Colombia), Bukele enjoys around 90% approval ratings in his country.</span> <a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn26" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[26]</span></a><span class="c2"> But no matter how high his current popularity, Bukele does not have the right to violate the human rights of the population or carry out actions that violate the law, the Constitution of El Salvador, and international law. Bukele seems to think that support in the polls gives him legal impunity to impose arbitrary and anti-democratic policies.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Despite the violations of human rights, the Salvadoran population seems to believe that an iron fist approach to the gang problem</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn27" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[27]</span></a> <span class="c2">is a successful way to stop violence. But that is nothing more than the success of the neoliberal and punitive narrative of fighting violence with repression, incarceration, punishment, and lethal force. This dehumanizing narrative is purported to be more successful than a policy of redistributing wealth and eliminating the inequality gap by increasing social spending on education, health, and housing. These kinds of progressive policies would give the marginalized sectors of the population an alternative other than gang affiliation.</span></p>
<p><strong>The interview made it clear: Bukele is profoundly conservative</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">The fourth Nayib Bukele episode I wish to highlight was a social media interview with rapper René, also known as Residente, former vocalist with the group Calle 13.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn28" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[28]</span></a> <span class="c2">Behind the facade of “Mr. Cool” and “everything’s under control,” Bukele revealed in this interview watched by young people from several Latin American countries that he holds views of which many outside El Salvador were unaware. For example, he is openly against a woman’s right to control her own body, specifically the right to terminate a pregnancy, and the President showed evidence of homophobia and transphobia.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn29" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[29]</span></a> <span class="c2">During the interview in which Bukele said that “marriage is between a man and a woman,” he also said, “I do not favor abortion. I think that in the end, in the future, some day we will realize that we are committing genocide with abortions.” This statement did not sit well with the interviewer who said, “I do not agree with you.”</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">His personal views against marriage equality spurred a series of threats on social media against the LGBTI community in El Salvador.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn30" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[30]</span></a> <span class="c2">Consequently, multiple organizations in the Salvadoran LGBTI Federation demanded that the Ministry of Justice and Security and the Attorney General’s Office investigate and “stop any public figures from making statements regarding LGBTI issues based on their personal and religious beliefs.”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn31" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[31]</span></a></p>
<p><span class="c2">An organization that advocates for the rights of trans people,</span> <em><span class="c2">Comunicando y Capacitando Trans</span></em> <span class="c2">(COMCAVIS TRANS) says that between 2018 and September of 2019, 151 cases of forced displacement of LGBTI people in El Salvador has occurred. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has asked the Bukele administration to conduct investigations to ensure that hate crimes against this segment of the population do not enjoy impunity.</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn32" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[32]</span></a></p>
<p><strong>Conclusions</strong></p>
<p><span class="c2">There is mounting evidence that Nayib Bukele has not hesitated to violate the human rights of the population, openly practice authoritarianism, and illegally deploythe armed forces in an effort to increase and consolidate his personal power. To this end he uses and abuses El Salvador’s fragile democratic institutions. Proof of this is how he has used the COVID-19 pandemic to continue expanding authoritarian and illegal policies in violation of the population’s civil rights.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Furthermore, his policy of continuously incurring debt under the pretext of national security policy shows his ignorance of Latin American history. There is clear historical evidence that external debt and loans from international organizations (such as those Bukele is seeking), further entrenches the structural dependence of nations in the region.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Far from generating success through economic Independence, such international debt creates the exact opposite: austerity measures that condemn people to live in poverty. If such actions are not taken out of ignorance, then Bukele bears even more blame because he is acting as an agent to benefit the international financial institutions.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">In addition, he operates as an ally of the United States by not hesitating to follow White House imperialist policies against progressive governments, such as support for the illegal occupation of Palestinian territory.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">Given the now tarnished image of Bukele, at least on the international stage, the media is debating whether the Bukele administration is a success or failure. While Bukele commits systematic violations of human rights, outlets such as the Washington Post use an openly colonialist attitude when arguing that the United States should fix this, saying that, “The United States invested many years and billions of dollars in fostering democracy in El Salvador during and after its bloody civil war. It would be a tragedy if Mr. Trump allowed Mr. Bukele to undo that achievement on the pretext of fighting gangs and the pandemic.”</span><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftn33" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[33]</span></a> <span class="c2">Although such narratives criticize Bukele, they grant the U.S. President the authority to decide on the internal affairs of other countries. Such discourse must be challenged to thwart the neo-colonization of El Salvador.</span></p>
<p><span class="c2">It must be said time and time again: Bukele not only poses a danger to the Salvadoran people, he also endangers the ability of progressive forces to construct a new world order in which human rights are protected, in which violence is addressed as a consequence of the structural inequality created by capitalism. This can only happen, however, when there is mutual respect among and solidarity among nations.</span></p>
<p><strong>Alina Duarte is a COHA Senior Research Fellow.</strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Translated from the original Spanish by Jill Clark-Gollub. </strong></em></p>
<p><em><strong> <em><span class="c2">(Cover photo: Twitter account of Osiris Luna Meza, Deputy Minister of Justice and Director General Ad Honorem of the Penitentiary System.)</span></em></strong></em></p>
<hr/>
<p><strong><em>End notes</em></strong></p>
<p><span class="c2"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref1" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[1]</span></a><span class="c2">  “Coronavirus en El Salvador: El ambicioso plan de Bukele para reforzar la economía del país amenazada por el covi-19”, </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52013943" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52013943</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref2" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[2]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Nayib Bukele, expulsado del FMLN por estas razones”, </span><a href="https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Nayib-Bukele-expulsado-del-FMLN-por-estas-razones-20171010-0075.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Nayib-Bukele-expulsado-del-FMLN-por-estas-razones-20171010-0075.html</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref3" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[3]</span></a><span class="c2"> “His dad was an imam, his wife has Jewish roots: Meet El Salvador’s new leader”, </span><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/his-dad-was-an-imam-his-wife-has-jewish-roots-meet-el-salvadors-new-leader/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.timesofisrael.com/his-dad-was-an-imam-his-wife-has-jewish-roots-meet-el-salvadors-new-leader/</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref4" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[4]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Bukele es ‘el presidente más guapo y cool del mundo’ según perfil de Twitter”, </span><a href="https://www.milenio.com/internacional/bukele-presidente-guapo-cool-mundo-mundial" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.milenio.com/internacional/bukele-presidente-guapo-cool-mundo-mundial</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref5" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[5]</span></a><span class="c2"> “El Salvador: President Bukele abuses executive power and uses security forces to threaten congress”, </span><a href="http://www.coha.org/el-salvador-president-bukele-abuses-executive-power-and-uses-security-forces-to-threaten-congress/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">http://www.coha.org/el-salvador-president-bukele-abuses-executive-power-and-uses-security-forces-to-threaten-congress/</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref6" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[6]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Bukele irrumpe en la Asamblea Nacional con militares y abre una crisis institucional en El Salvador”, </span><a href="https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/342585-presidente-salvador-sesion-parlamento-militares" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/342585-presidente-salvador-sesion-parlamento-militares</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref7" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[7]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Nayib Bukele: por qué causa tanta controversia en El Salvador el préstamo internacional que enfrenta el presidente con la oposición”,  </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-51452497" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-51452497</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref8" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[8]</span></a><span class="c2">  “Encuesta de hogares de propósitos múltiples, 2018” </span><a href="http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/index.php/temas/des/ehpm/publicaciones-ehpm.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/index.php/temas/des/ehpm/publicaciones-ehpm.html</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref9" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[9]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Préstamo por 109 mdd desata crisis en El Salvador”, </span><a href="https://www.contrareplica.mx/nota--Prestamo-por-109-mdd-desata-crisis-en-El-Salvador20201021" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.contrareplica.mx/nota–Prestamo-por-109-mdd-desata-crisis-en-El-Salvador20201021</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref10" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[10]</span></a><span class="c2"> “El Gobierno del Presidente Nayib Bukele establece el Plan de Respuesta y Alivio Económico ante la Emergencia Nacional contra el COVID-19”, </span><a href="https://covid19.gob.sv/el-gobierno-del-presidente-nayib-bukele-establece-el-plan-de-respuesta-y-alivio-economico-ante-la-emergencia-nacional-contra-el-covid-19/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://covid19.gob.sv/el-gobierno-del-presidente-nayib-bukele-establece-el-plan-de-respuesta-y-alivio-economico-ante-la-emergencia-nacional-contra-el-covid-19/</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref11" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[11]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Marta, la vendedora que no recibió el bono de $300: ‘Grité por la angustia y decepción de no tener dinero’”</span><a href="https://www.elsalvador.com/eldiariodehoy/coronavirus-vendedora-reclamo-bono-300dolares-gobierno-cenade/702004/2020/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.elsalvador.com/eldiariodehoy/coronavirus-vendedora-reclamo-bono-300dolares-gobierno-cenade/702004/2020/ </span></a><span class="c2"> . “La pobreza y el hambre obligaron a Doña Victoria a buscar el bono de $300: ‘La fruta se me ha podrido’, </span><a href="https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/pobreza-coronavirus-senora-bono-300-gobierno/701572/2020/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/pobreza-coronavirus-senora-bono-300-gobierno/701572/2020/</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref12" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[12]</span></a><span class="c2"> “El señor presidente nayib bukele (sic) dijo que no nos iban a cobrar el agua, luz, asta (sic) después pero los recibos no paran de llegar. bueno (sic) hoy me vino el doble”, en: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/2535_9090/status/1247907309361090561?s=20" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/2535_9090/status/1247907309361090561?s=20</span></a><span class="c2">. Ver también: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/CarlosM83581821/status/1254066148561358848?s=20" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/CarlosM83581821/status/1254066148561358848?s=20</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref13" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[13]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Special Report: Human Rights Violations Abound in El Salvador as President Bukele Responds to COVID-19”,</span></p>
<p><a href="http://cispes.org/section/special-report-human-rights-violations-abound-el-salvador-president-bukele-responds-covid-19" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">http://cispes.org/section/special-report-human-rights-violations-abound-el-salvador-president-bukele-responds-covid-19</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref14" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[14]</span></a><span class="c2"> “El falso dilema entre los derechos humanos y el control del COVID-19”, </span><a href="https://elfaro.net/es/202004/columnas/24363/El-falso-dilema-entre-los-derechos-humanos-y-el-control-del-COVID-19.htm" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://elfaro.net/es/202004/columnas/24363/El-falso-dilema-entre-los-derechos-humanos-y-el-control-del-COVID-19.htm</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref15" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[15]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Situación Nacional COVID-19”, </span><a href="https://covid19.gob.sv/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://covid19.gob.sv/</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref16" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[16]</span></a><span class="c2"> Available from: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1250624235061592064?lang=en" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1250624235061592064?lang=en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref17" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[17]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Emiten ley para regular aislamiento, cuarentenas y vigilancia por COVID-19”, </span><a href="https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/node/10276" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/node/10276</span></a><span class="c2"> According to the summary of the law prepared by Mayra Escobar, the law establishes that “the entire population must remain in home protection. People may only leave their homes or residences to procure food, purchase medicines, medical treatment, urgent care for pets, and others seeking emergency care. If this provision is violated, such person shall be taken to a health establishment to conduct a medical evaluation. Once the procedure is completed and it is determined that the individual is a carrier of  COVID-19, s/he shall be transferred to a containment center for the mandatory quarantine; meanwhile if the person is an asymptomatic carrier of the virus, the Ministry of Health (MINSAL) must determine whether the individual will be transferred to a containment center or to home quarantine.” Other authorized health and food activities are specified in the law.</span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref18" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[18]</span></a><span class="c2">  “Pasé cuatro días en el suelo por violar cuarentena”, </span><a href="https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Pase-cuatro-dias-en-el-suelo-por-violar-cuarentena-20200426-0064.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Pase-cuatro-dias-en-el-suelo-por-violar-cuarentena-20200426-0064.html</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref19" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[19]</span></a><span class="c2">  “El Salvador:Bachelet preocupada por la erosión del estado de derecho en medio de las medidas para la COVID-19”,</span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.oacnudh.org/el-salvador-bachelet-preocupada-por-la-erosion-del-estado-de-derecho-en-medio-de-las-medidas-para-la-covid-19/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">http://www.oacnudh.org/el-salvador-bachelet-preocupada-por-la-erosion-del-estado-de-derecho-en-medio-de-las-medidas-para-la-covid-19/</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref20" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[20]</span></a><span class="c2"> Ibidem.</span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref21" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[21]</span></a><span class="c2"> More at: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/KawsachunCoca/status/1257396844017090560?s=20" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/KawsachunCoca/status/1257396844017090560?s=20</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref22" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[22]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Hugo Moldiz: Dictadura, represión y revanchismo”,</span></p>
<p><a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/bloggers/Hugo-Moldiz-Dictadura-represion-y-revanchismo-20200427-0001.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.telesurtv.net/bloggers/Hugo-Moldiz-Dictadura-represion-y-revanchismo-20200427-0001.html</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref23" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[23]</span></a><span class="c2"> “‘Bomba de tiempo’ en cárceles de El Salvador”, </span><a href="https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/mundo/2020/04/28/bomba-de-tiempo-en-carceles-de-el-salvador-8635.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/mundo/2020/04/28/bomba-de-tiempo-en-carceles-de-el-salvador-8635.html</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref24" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[24]</span></a><span class="c2"> Available from: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1254879597176512524?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1254879597176512524&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elfinanciero.com.mx%2Fmundo%2Fbukele-autoriza-uso-de-fuerza-letal-contra-pandillas-en-el-salvador" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1254879597176512524?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1254879597176512524&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elfinanciero.com.mx%2Fmundo%2Fbukele-autoriza-uso-de-fuerza-letal-contra-pandillas-en-el-salvador</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref25" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[25]</span></a><span class="c2"> Available from: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1254879597176512524?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1254879597176512524&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elfinanciero.com.mx%2Fmundo%2Fbukele-autoriza-uso-de-fuerza-letal-contra-pandillas-en-el-salvador" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/nayibbukele/status/1254879597176512524?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1254879597176512524&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elfinanciero.com.mx%2Fmundo%2Fbukele-autoriza-uso-de-fuerza-letal-contra-pandillas-en-el-salvador</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref26" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[26]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Bukele mantiene una aprobación del 86 por ciento en El Salvador”, </span><a href="https://www.elmundo.cr/mundo/nayib-bukele-mantiene-una-aprobacion-del-86-en-el-salvador/" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.elmundo.cr/mundo/nayib-bukele-mantiene-una-aprobacion-del-86-en-el-salvador/</span></a><span class="c2">. Boletín de prensa, Nayib Bukele con los índices más altos de su administración”, </span><a href="https://www.cidgallup.com/uploads/publication/publication_files/publication_1587421944000.pdf" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.cidgallup.com/uploads/publication/publication_files/publication_1587421944000.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref27" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[27]</span></a><span class="c2"> It should also be remembered that those gangs that are so widely condemned internationally, emerged in the 1980s in Los Angeles, California while there was a massive influx of Salvadorans into the U.S. fleeing the civil war underway in the Central American country. Through the U.S. deportation machinery thousands of those Salvadorans were sent back to their country and began using the criminal practices of kidnapping, extortion, and murder they had learned in the United States.</span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref28" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[28]</span></a><span class="c2"> Disponible en: </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O_AWaVehS5E&amp;feature=emb_logo" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O_AWaVehS5E&amp;feature=emb_logo</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref29" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[29]</span></a><span class="c2"> “El rapero Residente revela la postura de Bukele sobre aborto y matrimonio gay”,  </span><a href="https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/el-rapero-residente-revela-la-postura-de-bukele-sobre-aborto-y-matrimonio-gay/20000035-4205085" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/el-rapero-residente-revela-la-postura-de-bukele-sobre-aborto-y-matrimonio-gay/20000035-4205085</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref30" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[30]</span></a><span class="c2"> “Comunidad LGBTI demanda investigación de amenazas recibidas”, </span><a href="https://www.dw.com/es/el-salvador-comunidad-lgtbi-demanda-investigaci%C3%B3n-de-amenazas-recibidas/a-52946797" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.dw.com/es/el-salvador-comunidad-lgtbi-demanda-investigaci%C3%B3n-de-amenazas-recibidas/a-52946797</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref31" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[31]</span></a><span class="c2"> Comunicado disponible en: </span><a href="https://twitter.com/feslgbti/status/1243686422323826696?s=20" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://twitter.com/feslgbti/status/1243686422323826696?s=20</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref32" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[32]</span></a><span class="c2"> “ACNUR hace un llamado a la protección de comunidades LGBTI en El Salvador”,  </span><a href="https://www.acnur.org/noticias/press/2019/11/5dcade954/acnur-hace-un-llamado-a-la-proteccion-de-comunidades-lgbti-en-el-salvador.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.acnur.org/noticias/press/2019/11/5dcade954/acnur-hace-un-llamado-a-la-proteccion-de-comunidades-lgbti-en-el-salvador.html</span></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.coha.org/bukele-y-uso-politico-de-pandemia-en-el-salvador-entre-la-ilegalidad-y-la-violacion-de-ddhh/#_ftnref33" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">[33]</span></a><span class="c2"> “El Salvador’s president is using covid-19 as an excuse to abuse his power”, </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/el-salvadors-president-is-using-covid-19-as-an-excuse-to-abuse-his-power/2020/05/01/7941a4a4-8afd-11ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html" rel="nofollow"><span class="c2">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/el-salvadors-president-is-using-covid-19-as-an-excuse-to-abuse-his-power/2020/05/01/7941a4a4-8afd-11ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html</span></a></p></p>
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		<title>COVID-19 as Pretext for Repression in the Northern Triangle</title>
		<link>https://eveningreport.nz/2020/05/01/covid-19-as-pretext-for-repression-in-the-northern-triangle/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Evening Report]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2020 02:16:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Americas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COHA in English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[El Salvador]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guatemala]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Honduras]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Latin America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Main Article]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MIL-OSI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Narcotics and Corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nicaragua]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Northern Triangle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security and Defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security Intelligence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://eveningreport.nz/?p=34441</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage By John PerryFrom Masaya, Nicaragua “He’s not a doctor, I don’t think.” Trump had just finished a phone call with Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH), the de facto president of Honduras who runs a  narco-state[1]. On April 30, JOH was indirectly implicated in drug and murder charges by the ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs &#8211; Analysis-Reportage</p>
<p><img decoding="async" class="wpe_imgrss" src="http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/281398-Mangua-Cod.jpg"></p>
<p><em><strong>By John Perry</strong></em><br /><em><strong>From Masaya, Nicaragua</strong></em></p>
<p>“He’s not a doctor, I don’t think.” Trump had just finished <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALWq-iRdwIE#action=share" rel="nofollow">a phone call</a> with Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH), the de facto president of Honduras who runs a  <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez.html" rel="nofollow">nar</a><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez.html" rel="nofollow">co-</a><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez.html" rel="nofollow">state</a><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" id="_ftnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a>. On April 30, JOH was indirectly implicated in drug and murder charges <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-chief-honduran-national-police-charged-drug-trafficking-and-weapons-offenses" rel="nofollow">by the US Justice Department</a><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" id="_ftnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> in a case against a former chief police officer. This is merely the latest of several cases in which he is alleged to be involved, that include <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/president-of-honduras-implicated-in-1-5-million-drug-money-conspiracy-by-new-york-prosecutor" rel="nofollow">drug trafficking and money laundering</a><a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" id="_ftnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>,  as well as  <a href="https://apnews.com/e85a0f7b43264a5eb6b879701356e1f3" rel="nofollow">protection of drug dealers</a><a class="c2" href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" id="_ftnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a>. The criminal charges have also affected his close family, among them his brother<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" id="_ftnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>, including connections of both siblings with famous narco-dealer El Chapo<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" id="_ftnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a>. His sister, Hilda Hernández, was also under investigation<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" id="_ftnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> in Honduras for embezzlement of public funds<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" id="_ftnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a>, at the time she died in a helicopter accident.</p>
<p>But as he is also the latest person to support Trump’s controversial views on the use of the antimalarial drug, hydroxychloroquine to fight the coronavirus, he appears to hold a special place among Washington’s closest allies in the region. JOH, it appears, had called to thank him, Trump said, perhaps for medical supplies which the US had <a href="http://elpulso.hn/estados-unidos-apoya-con-insumos-contra-la-pandemia-del-covid-19/" rel="nofollow">sent to Honduras</a>.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" id="_ftnref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a></p>
<p>While the US props up the regime, public order in Honduras is nearing collapse. It faces the epidemic with a health and social security system that has been drained of resources, both through <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/28/covid19-and-central-america-a-learning-moment/" rel="nofollow">ra</a><a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/28/covid19-and-central-america-a-learning-moment/" rel="nofollow">m</a><a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/28/covid19-and-central-america-a-learning-moment/" rel="nofollow">pant corruption</a><a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" id="_ftnref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> and because the government prioritises spending on the security forces. When 2,600 of the demoralised medical staff were chosen to tackle the virus, <a href="https://confidencialhn.com/renuncia-el-25-por-ciento-del-personal-medico-contratado-para-atender-emergencia-por-el-coronavirus/" rel="nofollow">a quarter of them resigned</a>.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" id="_ftnref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> Hernández has been using <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/november/against-la-mano-dura" rel="nofollow">la m</a><a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/november/against-la-mano-dura" rel="nofollow">ano</a> <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/november/against-la-mano-dura" rel="nofollow">dura</a><a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" id="_ftnref12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> (the firm hand) to enforce a lockdown and nightly curfews, provoking hunger and repressing the <a href="https://hch.tv/2020/04/23/pobladores-protestan-por-falta-de-alimentos-en-la-colonia-las-torres-de-la-capital/" rel="nofollow">inevitable protests</a>.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" id="_ftnref13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> On April 24, three brothers selling bread <a href="http://defensoresenlinea.com/agentes-de-la-pmop-asesina-a-joven-en-el-paraiso-omoa/" rel="nofollow">were stopped by police</a><a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" id="_ftnref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a>: one was shot dead and two injured. Food parcels handed out to some families only contain two days’ worth of supplies. The state is buying medical equipment <a href="https://hondudiario.com/2020/04/20/habra-denuncia-con-nombre-y-apellido-por-compras-sobrevaloras-durante-emergencia/" rel="nofollow">at excessive prices</a><a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" id="_ftnref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> largely via companies owned by <a href="https://www.reporterosdeinvestigacion.com/2020/04/23/responsables-de-compras-directas-covid-19-en-honduras/" rel="nofollow">the president’s cronies</a>.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" id="_ftnref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a></p>
<p>Neighbouring El Salvador’s economy is also seriously stressed by the pandemic. President Nayib Bukele, who ran under the banner of the right wing GANA party, was <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-02-28/el-salvadors-bukele-reformer-or-autocrat" rel="nofollow">widely viewed as a reformist</a><a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" id="_ftnref17"><sup>[17]</sup></a>  when he took office last June, garnering votes from across the political spectrum. But since the election  he has turned autocratic: on February 9 he threatened the country’s parliament, reluctant to approve even more spending on security forces, by marching troops into the chamber.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" id="_ftnref18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> In early March, when El Salvador still had no confirmed virus cases, he imposed a complete ban on foreign travellers and sent locals returning from abroad into 30-day quarantine in make-shift hostels. A complete lockdown followed on March 22. To compensate those who now couldn’t work, Bukele promised a $300 handout to each family, which backfired when thousands of Salvadorans without bank accounts formed queues outside government offices. When the government could not accommodate the crowds and closed the offices, protests broke out and the security forces were deployed to restore order.</p>
<p>In addition to strengthening the security forces, Bukele seemed to have inadvertently given more power to El Salvador’s notorious gangs, who were enforcing his lockdown with <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/army-and-gangs-enforce-virus-curfew-in-el-salvador/" rel="nofollow">baseba</a><a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/army-and-gangs-enforce-virus-curfew-in-el-salvador/" rel="nofollow">ll ba</a><a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/army-and-gangs-enforce-virus-curfew-in-el-salvador/" rel="nofollow">ts</a>.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" id="_ftnref19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> But in the wake of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/el-salvador-imposes-prisons-lockdown-after-22-murders-in-a-day" rel="nofollow">a new peak</a><a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" id="_ftnref20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> in El Salvador’s notoriously high murder rate (22 in one day on April 24), he ordered an intensified crackdown on gang members in the country’s prisons.</p>
<p>The “northern triangle” countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala share common problems. Repressive governments are supported both by the US and by rich elites who disregard the poor majority’s need to work each day to put food on the table. Some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/central-america-unrest-repression-grow-coronavirus-crisis-200422202713659.html" rel="nofollow">28,000 people</a><a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" id="_ftnref21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> have been detained for breaching lockdowns. The traditional safety valve of these countries, migration to the US, has almost closed because of the tough measures introduced at Trump’s insistence, combined with fear of the virus. Hundreds of migrants are being sent back from the US and Mexico every week, exacerbating their countries’ economic crises and bringing <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/guatemala-official-44-deportees-tested-positive-virus-70194236" rel="nofollow">large numbers of new virus cases</a>.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" id="_ftnref22"><sup>[22]</sup></a></p>
<p>Nicaragua, though poorer than its neighbours, has some advantages in fighting the virus: limited emigration to the US, fewer tourists than before – after the <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/may/after-ortega" rel="nofollow">violent</a> <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/may/after-ortega" rel="nofollow">pro</a><a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/may/after-ortega" rel="nofollow">tests in 2018</a><a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" id="_ftnref23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> – and a community-based health system that is accustomed to dealing with epidemics such as dengue. Its approach has been completely different, involving medical checks at the borders, travellers being quarantined and regularly checked for symptoms, testing, and contact tracing. Checkpoints were kept open to minimise informal crossing of the porous land borders, especially from Costa Rica where <a href="http://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/" rel="nofollow">many Nicarag</a><a href="http://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/" rel="nofollow">uan</a><a href="http://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/" rel="nofollow">s work</a>.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" id="_ftnref24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> Some 250,000 volunteer ‘brigadistas’ were trained to take part in health brigades to dispense advice and identify possible virus cases. Practically every household has been visited, often three or four times. Sanctions bar Nicaragua from receiving US aid or support from the World Bank but it is getting technical help from Cuba, Taiwan and South Korea, all of which had early experience in tackling the pandemic.</p>
<p>As I write, the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRZPaRRNDFg&amp;feature=emb_logo" rel="nofollow">live map of coronavirus cases in Central America</a><a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" id="_ftnref25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> shows 8,880 cases and 286 deaths. By far the majority (6,378 cases) are in Panama, in part because it is the region’s transport hub but also because, as the richest country, it’s better equipped for testing and for producing reliable figures. The second highest, with 771 cases, is Honduras. At the other extreme are Belize with 18 cases and Nicaragua with 14. Belize has closed schools and some businesses but has held back from a full lockdown. Yet only Nicaragua and the other nearby country with <a href="https://prruk.org/mexicos-fourth-transformation-amlo-and-the-global-left/" rel="nofollow">a left-wing president</a><a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" id="_ftnref26"><sup>[26]</sup></a>, Mexico, have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566" rel="nofollow">criticised</a><a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" id="_ftnref27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> for their voluntary approaches to social distancing. A Mexican <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566" rel="nofollow">market trader’s sign</a><a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" id="_ftnref28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> summarises the dilemma facing all the regional governments, whatever their stance so far: “It’s hunger that’s going to kill me, not the coronavirus”.</p>
<p><em><strong>Photo Credit: Carlos Cortez, www.El19digital.com. A government worker cleans a market in Managua to combat the coronavirus</strong></em></p>
<hr/>
<p><em><strong>End notes</strong></em></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" id="_ftn1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> “Hondurans React to Bribe Offered by El Chapo to President: ‘We Live in a Narcostate’,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez.html</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" id="_ftn2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> “Former Chief Of Honduran National Police Charged With Drug Trafficking And Weapons Offenses,” <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-chief-honduran-national-police-charged-drug-trafficking-and-weapons-offenses" rel="nofollow">https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-chief-honduran-national-police-charged-drug-trafficking-and-weapons-offenses</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" id="_ftn3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> “President of Honduras implicated in $1.5 million drug money conspiracy by New York prosecutor,” <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/president-of-honduras-implicated-in-1-5-million-drug-money-conspiracy-by-new-york-prosecutor" rel="nofollow">https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/president-of-honduras-implicated-in-1-5-million-drug-money-conspiracy-by-new-york-prosecutor</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" id="_ftn4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> “US prosecutors tie Honduras president to drug trafficker,” <a href="https://apnews.com/e85a0f7b43264a5eb6b879701356e1f3" rel="nofollow">https://apnews.com/e85a0f7b43264a5eb6b879701356e1f3</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" id="_ftn5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> “Honduran president’s brother guilty of drug smuggling,” <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50081304" rel="nofollow">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50081304</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" id="_ftn6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> “Honduran president’s brother promised ‘El Chapo’ protection, witness says,” <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-honduras-drugs/honduran-presidents-brother-promised-el-chapo-protection-witness-says-idUSKBN1WO02J" rel="nofollow">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-honduras-drugs/honduran-presidents-brother-promised-el-chapo-protection-witness-says-idUSKBN1WO02J</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" id="_ftn7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> “Exclusive: A Pandora’s box of corruption in Honduras,”<a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/exclusive-a-pandoras-box-of-corruption-in-honduras" rel="nofollow">https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/exclusive-a-pandoras-box-of-corruption-in-honduras</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" id="_ftn8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> “How hitmen and high living lifted lid on looting of Honduran healthcare system,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/hit-men-high-living-honduran-corruption-scandal-president" rel="nofollow">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/hit-men-high-living-honduran-corruption-scandal-president</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" id="_ftn9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> “Estados Unidos apoya con insumos contra la pandemia del covid-19,” <a href="http://elpulso.hn/estados-unidos-apoya-con-insumos-contra-la-pandemia-del-covid-19/" rel="nofollow">http://elpulso.hn/estados-unidos-apoya-con-insumos-contra-la-pandemia-del-covid-19/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" id="_ftn10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> “COVID-19 and Central America: a Learning Moment?,” <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/28/covid19-and-central-america-a-learning-moment/" rel="nofollow">https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/28/covid19-and-central-america-a-learning-moment/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" id="_ftn11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> “Renuncia el 25 por ciento del personal médico contratado para atender emergencia por el coronavirus,” <a href="https://confidencialhn.com/renuncia-el-25-por-ciento-del-personal-medico-contratado-para-atender-emergencia-por-el-coronavirus/" rel="nofollow">https://confidencialhn.com/renuncia-el-25-por-ciento-del-personal-medico-contratado-para-atender-emergencia-por-el-coronavirus/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" id="_ftn12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> “Against ‘la mano dura’,” <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/november/against-la-mano-dura" rel="nofollow">https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/november/against-la-mano-dura</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" id="_ftn13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> “Pobladores protestan por falta de alimentos en la colonia Las Torres de la capital,” <a href="https://hch.tv/2020/04/23/pobladores-protestan-por-falta-de-alimentos-en-la-colonia-las-torres-de-la-capital/" rel="nofollow">https://hch.tv/2020/04/23/pobladores-protestan-por-falta-de-alimentos-en-la-colonia-las-torres-de-la-capital/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" id="_ftn14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> “Agentes de la PMOP asesina a joven en El Paraíso, Omoa,” <a href="http://defensoresenlinea.com/agentes-de-la-pmop-asesina-a-joven-en-el-paraiso-omoa/" rel="nofollow">http://defensoresenlinea.com/agentes-de-la-pmop-asesina-a-joven-en-el-paraiso-omoa/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" id="_ftn15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> “Habrá denuncia ‘con nombre y apellido’ por compras sobrevaloradas durante emergencia,” <a href="https://hondudiario.com/2020/04/20/habra-denuncia-con-nombre-y-apellido-por-compras-sobrevaloras-durante-emergencia/" rel="nofollow">https://hondudiario.com/2020/04/20/habra-denuncia-con-nombre-y-apellido-por-compras-sobrevaloras-durante-emergencia/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" id="_ftn16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> “Responsables de compras Covid-19 entre parientes e intereses,” <a href="https://www.reporterosdeinvestigacion.com/2020/04/23/responsables-de-compras-directas-covid-19-en-honduras/" rel="nofollow">https://www.reporterosdeinvestigacion.com/2020/04/23/responsables-de-compras-directas-covid-19-en-honduras/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" id="_ftn17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> “El Salvador President Nayib Bukele Is Flirting With Fascism,” <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/02/el-salvador-president-nayib-bukele-is-flirting-with-fascisms" rel="nofollow">https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/02/el-salvador-president-nayib-bukele-is-flirting-with-fascisms</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" id="_ftn18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> “El Salvador: President Bukele Abuses Executive Power and Uses Security Forces to Threaten Congress,” <a href="http://www.coha.org/el-salvador-president-bukele-abuses-executive-power-and-uses-security-forces-to-threaten-congress/" rel="nofollow">http://www.coha.org/el-salvador-president-bukele-abuses-executive-power-and-uses-security-forces-to-threaten-congress/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" id="_ftn19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> “Army and Gangs Enforce Virus Curfew in El Salvador,” <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/army-and-gangs-enforce-virus-curfew-in-el-salvador/" rel="nofollow">https://www.courthousenews.com/army-and-gangs-enforce-virus-curfew-in-el-salvador/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" id="_ftn20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> “El Salvador imposes prisons lockdown after 22 murders in a day,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/el-salvador-imposes-prisons-lockdown-after-22-murders-in-a-day" rel="nofollow">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/el-salvador-imposes-prisons-lockdown-after-22-murders-in-a-day</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" id="_ftn21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> “Central America: Unrest, repression grow amid coronavirus crisis,” <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/central-america-unrest-repression-grow-coronavirus-crisis-200422202713659.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/central-america-unrest-repression-grow-coronavirus-crisis-200422202713659.html</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" id="_ftn22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> “Guatemala official: 44 deportees tested positive for virus,” <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/guatemala-official-44-deportees-tested-positive-virus-70194236" rel="nofollow">https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/guatemala-official-44-deportees-tested-positive-virus-70194236</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" id="_ftn23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> “After Ortega?,” <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/may/after-ortega" rel="nofollow">https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/may/after-ortega</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" id="_ftn24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> “Nicaraguans in Costa Rica: A Manufactured ‘Refugee’ Crisis,” <a href="http://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/" rel="nofollow">http://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" id="_ftn25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> See <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRZPaRRNDFg&amp;feature=emb_logo" rel="nofollow">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRZPaRRNDFg&amp;feature=emb_logo</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" id="_ftn26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> “Mexico’s Fourth Transformation: AMLO and the Global Left,” <a href="https://prruk.org/mexicos-fourth-transformation-amlo-and-the-global-left/" rel="nofollow">https://prruk.org/mexicos-fourth-transformation-amlo-and-the-global-left/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" id="_ftn27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> “Coronavirus: por qué México y Nicaragua son los países de América Latina con menos medidas restrictivas frente al covid-19,”<a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566" rel="nofollow">https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" id="_ftn28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> “Coronavirus: por qué México y Nicaragua son los países de América Latina con menos medidas restrictivas frente al covid-19,” <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566" rel="nofollow">https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52059566</a></p></p>
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