We have this pretty fiction that the world is made up of approximately 200 politically autonomous nation-states. This in the entrenched ‘Wilsonian’ view of the political world that, in particular, was sort-of realised after World War One; a view that rendered the national empires (such as the British Empire) of the past obsolete.

In the liberal world order, the ideal structure of international polities would be 750 nation states each with between (say) three million and twenty million people. (OK, the Olympic Games and the United Nations would struggle to cope with 750 independent members; but that’s not a problem for a liberal order. In a true liberal order, each entity is too small to influence the order itself. In such a liberal order, the collective good is meant to happen through a kind of international marketplace; in marketplaces, properly understood, ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’ are more like synonyms than antonyms.)

The twenty-first century is a quasi-liberal ‘rules-based’ order of nation states with populations ranging from about 1,000 to 1.5 billion, with a number of hegemon states. At present the major hegemons are: Washington, London, Berlin, Moscow, New Delhi, Beijing, Tehran, Riyadh. Minor hegemons include Paris, The Hague, Copenhagen, Addis Ababa, Ankara, and Wellington.

Nation States: Peoples or Territories?

Historically, a nation was a group of people – an uber-tribe – defined by ethnicity, language and culture. Thus, in the early days of nations, there were no formal territorial borders; though certain geographical features formed practical borders: seas, rivers, mountain chains, deserts. At some times in history, seas were the principal borders; at other times, seas became highway connectors leaving mountains and deserts as the main dividers.

Following World War One, and indeed through until the 1970s, the concept of nations as peoples (rather than as territories) remained dominant. Thus, while New Zealand became politically autonomous from Great Britain, New Zealanders continued to be British. (In my first passport, I was listed as a ‘New Zealand citizen’ and a ‘British subject’.) The practical extent of New Zealanders’ Britishness gradually diminished over the twentieth century; indeed when I sailed to the United Kingdom in 1974 – my ‘OE’ – my automatic right of permanent residence there depended on me having a British born grandparent. (I presume that would have included an Irish-born grandparent, given that Ireland was part of the United Kingdom from 1801 to 1921.)

The main point is that Anglo-Celtic ethnicity, English language, and recent history of empire all contributed to my being a part of a British nation. I even got to vote, in 1975, in the first Brexit referendum (though it wasn’t framed as Brexit then.) And in April 1976, with my then partner and on my trusty Honda 175 motorbike, I embarked on an all-Ireland tour. In Belfast and especially Derry, I ventured into a Civil War zone; the hegemony of London in Derry was not the benign British hegemony I grew up with in Palmerston North. Yet, even the independent Republic of Ireland was in many ways still British; the pound sterling circulated as equivalent to the Irish punt, there was no passport requirement of entry, and it was only in County Donegal that I heard the Irish language spoken in a natural setting.

The change came mainly in the 1980s; nationalism can be fuelled by economic hard times, and modern ‘territorial’ nationalism reflects the growth of liberal identity politics in a decade in which fresh thinking about capitalism and economics just got too hard. Then in the early 1990s, the cold war ‘evil empire’ that was the Soviet Union collapsed into constituent territorial nation states, as did the satellite empire of Yugoslavia. Some said that this was the ‘end of history’; the world order by 2000 was made up of about 200 nation states defined, not by ethnicity, language, or culture, but by (often arbitrary) territorial boundaries.

The 2000s’ decade represented the pinnacle of ‘globalisation’, a word interpreted in a number of ways, but whose key theme was the subjection of nation states to an imperfectly competitive global marketplace, through a mixture of neoliberal ideology and internet-based technology. The remaining substantially incomplete part of the globalisation ‘project’ was to liberalise the flow of people.

In the 2010s’ decade, however – the post global-financial-crisis decade – this era of international ‘market cooperation’ came to an end; most clearly within the European Union, and more latterly with the reassertion of Chinese and Indian hegemony within their extended territories. Nevertheless, by regarding most people as ‘labour’, certain free international flows of people expanded in the 2010s.

Today, the western liberal view of a nation state is that it is a tightly-bordered territory in which all resident citizens are equal beneficiaries of that state (territorial insiders), and with seven broadly defined groups of other people having lesser rights with respect to that state. New Zealand in 2021 represents a particularly extreme version of a territorially fundamentalist state; where, on the inside, any ‘unkind’ expression of traditional identity differences is virtually outlawed, but where it is open season to be unkind towards defined outsiders by virtue of their status as outsiders. This 2020s’ extension of deglobalisation in New Zealand is the ‘immigration reset’, which is being implemented under the cover of the Covid19 pandemic.

The seven outsider groups are:

• People currently living in New Zealand, but without political rights and subject to temporary permissions (some undoubtedly already expired) with respect to their legal right to be in New Zealand, and to pursue an economic life while in New Zealand. They are denizens rather than citizens of New Zealand.
• People who have the legal status of citizens or permanent residents (‘New Zealand insiders’), but who are not currently inside New Zealand. (We may include ‘realm citizens’ in this group, such as Cook Island or Niuean citizens.)
• People not in the former categories, but who have a familial relationship with New Zealand insiders, or have current or prospective employers (or education providers) in New Zealand, or are Australian citizens.
• People not in the former categories but who are in a position to buy their way into some form of residential status.
• People not in the former categories but who are in a circumstance to plead their way, as refugees.
• People – especially younger men – in the RSE (recognised seasonal employment) countries: Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Tuvalu and Kiribati. This is, formally, a labour relationship associated with New Zealand’s Pacific hegemony. Of these, Samoa has a further relationship with New Zealand; unlike the others, it was member of the ‘New Zealand empire’ in the mid-twentieth century. New Zealand continues to have a closer hegemonic relationship with Samoa than with the other RSE countries. Tonga is of particular significance, because most of the victims of the ‘dawn raids’ of 1975 and 1976 were Tongan citizens who had overstayed their temporary work permits.
• Everybody else in the world, including people from places such as Great Britain, South Africa and India who previously had favourable access to New Zealand through their empire links.

Thus, discrimination at present is based almost entirely on a person’s current location and their immigration status. That is the meaning of ‘territorial fundamentalism’; a nation state becomes simply an enforced piece of real estate, defined by its borders rather than by its people. That and nothing more.

We may note that Jacinda Ardern’s ‘Dawn Raids’ apology (1 August 2021) was carefully worded to emphasise the “discriminatory” nature of those raids (which mostly affected Tongan overstayers, people who had worked in New Zealand on RSE-like contracts), not their brutality. Essentially – and from today’s standpoint of territorial fundamentalism – that apology was for the failure to deport enough people whose passports were not of Pacific Island countries. We should have deported more Canadians, for example.

As noted (by the various bullet points above), New Zealand’s territorial fundamentalism has some exceptions, or at least gradations. One of these involves money; there is a suggestion that semi-billionaires will have privileged future access to New Zealand (although, within this group, the non-discrimination principle may be tested; will a Chinese semi-billionaire face more difficulties than an American semi-billionaire?). Another discrimination is that most citizens of most counties in close proximity to New Zealand will have less unfavourable future access to New Zealand than someone from, say, the United Kingdom; the most obvious example being Australian citizens.

Australia and United Kingdom

Australia and the United Kingdom are, like New Zealand, leaders in territorial fundamentalism, although I sense that both are more discriminatory than New Zealand on matters other than a person’s current location or immigration status. There is a sense that Māori in Australia are more likely to run foul of their ‘good character’ laws than are pakeha New Zealanders in Australia. Another difference in Australia is that most New Zealanders there form a whole category of denizens, essentially tenured guest workers.

For a few years now, especially after the 2015 refugee crisis (mainly characterised by boat-people – ‘refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’ – coming out of Turkey, headed for the European Union; also a year of accelerated boat-people arrivals from Africa), BBC-type television dramas have highlighted the cruel interactions between vulnerable people and government bureaucracies. (Examples of such dramas are Collateral, and the black comedy Years and Years; we also see patterns in which most TV lead-detectives seem to be women, and in which Britain is an overtly multiracial society to the extent that even ‘white’ historical figures are depicted by ‘black’ actors.) Being British is now solely about the legal right to occupy British real estate; a right that is getting ever more difficult to secure. Anyone presently in Britain who does not have a legal right to be there is vulnerable to deportation, preceded by police raids at dawn, dusk or any other time of any day. While I am not clear about the current status of Irish citizens living in the United Kingdom, I suspect that it is not unlike that of New Zealanders in Australia.

China and India

These are hegemonic powers with a very strong sense of what constitutes their own territory, with the only blurs being their borders with each other (either side of Nepal and Bhutan). India has recently asserted its sovereignty over Kashmir, and China over Hong Kong.

The rise of territorial fundamentalism in the west has enabled China to accentuate its own form of territorial fundamentalism, with the once blurred boundaries in China’s far west now being claimed as inextricably Chinese territory, and fully subject to the imposition of Han Chinese culture and bureaucracy.

Hegemonic boundaries

Modern hegemonies are territorial nation states with significant fringes-of-influence. China’s inclination is to absorb those fringes into its formal territory, when they become troublesome. In addition to its Indian borderlands, those remaining fringes include Hong Kong, Macau, Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia, Taiwan, North Korea, and islands in the South China Sea. And, one small step removed from these, is South Korea.

It will be interesting to see how long it takes before Hong Kong and Macau switch to driving on the right-hand side of the road; that will be a practical symbol of their full incorporation into China.

American hegemony was – in the Cold War period – the entire cultural west. Thus, the Chilean coup of 1973 was largely instigated in Washington, as was the bloodless Australian coup of 1975. New Zealand largely wriggled out of that hegemony in the 1980s, and now constitutes an independent hegemon (albeit a minor hegemon) in the southwest Pacific. While the United States of America does have a formal realm (including Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Marianas Islands – and noting that Hawaii was incorporated into its core territory much as Tibet was in China), its main ongoing hegemonic interest is informal and in the western Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines). Also, Israel.

In the 1990s, Berlin effectively freed itself from American hegemony, and extended a process of asserting hegemony over the rest of the European Peninsula. Thus, in the 1990s, Eastern Europe largely – and in accordance with its history – once again flipped between Russian and Prussian influence. Further, as the European Union became increasingly a Prussian hegemony, the United Kingdom – especially England – wanted out.

The United Kingdom

London remains a particularly interesting, and enigmatic territorial hegemon. The United Kingdom is itself a formal hegemony ruled from England. The United Kingdom has three further layers, all formally constituted. The first layer includes the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, both tax havens. (Indeed all aggregated financial data for the United Kingdom is severely compromised, mostly because of these Switzerlands of the Irish Sea and the ‘English’ Channel.) The next layer is Britain’s realm, which includes a number of Caribbean tax havens and mid-Atlantic islands, as well as Gibraltar and Pitcairn. The final layer is the Commonwealth, although this expanding club (which now includes Mozambique and Rwanda) is largely a symbolic community of nations, and no longer reflects any realpolitik.

While there has been much recent focus on the status of Scotland, and of the impracticalities of a hegemonic boundary through Irish farmland, the really interesting case here may well be the Republic of Ireland, caught between – though geographically to the west of – two rival hegemons: London and Berlin. Dublin was similarly caught, as an uneasy neutral, during World War Two.

The twentieth century in Irish history represented a struggle for the political independence of the Irish people (an ethnicity which did not include the Scottish ethnics in the north), and was for a while resolved by Dublin and London both being subject to the hegemony of a union (EU) whose real political centre had become Berlin. The present arrangement – with a ‘forward border’ in the Irish Sea is unsustainable.

Further, I’m not really clear that the people of Scotland will openly favour a switch to Berlin instead of London as its political bedmate. A geopolitical land border along the River Tweed could be even more problematic than one in Ireland.

What I can see is – in a few decades time – Ireland rejoining the United Kingdom, albeit on different terms to those of the 1801 to 1921 period. We have seen in covid times that Scotland is already substantially independent from England. What needs to happen is for Westminster to become a solely English parliament, and for somewhere like Peterborough or Swindon to become a kind of federal capital city, accommodating a British Council that coordinates fiscal and foreign policy throughout a British realm that would naturally include both parts of Ireland.

Russia and China

Within Russia there is a strong sense of ‘Greater Russia’ which incorporates, in particular, Slavic and Tatar ethnic territories. While there has never been a sense that Russia has sought world dominance – there was once a sense that a Marxist worldview (a view formerly associated with Russia) did seek such dominance. Likewise, an American interpretation of consumerist liberal democracy also reached out to the entire world, and that kind of cultural hegemony was often associated with the United States as a powerful territorial nation state. Neither view really holds today. (Nor does anyone seriously think that Han Chinese culture or Islamic culture will ever prevail much beyond their present hegemonic boundaries.)

Nevertheless, Russia’s strong hegemonic attachment to a Greater Russia (and China’s to a greater China) will continue to create geopolitical tension. Indeed, there is a sense of foreboding at present that George Orwell’s book 1984 is becoming an uncannily accurate projection of our human future this century. In that book, the world was a surveillance society of manipulated truth, and politically dominated by three hegemonic ’empires’: Oceania, Eurasia and East Asia. In Orwell’s story, Oceania would flip between cynical alliances with Eurasia or East Asia. (In the 2020s, we may see ‘Eurasia’ forging such an alliance with ‘East Asia’.)

We can expect that, as in the past, Moscow will resist any attempts for nations under its influence on its western fringe (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) to further distance themselves. And Moscow can be expected to be welcoming towards any Eastern European nations presently within the European Union who show signs of distancing themselves from Berlin (especially Poland and Hungary), and to develop political institutions more in line with the present Moscow model.

And we can expect the far east Asian nations (especially South Korea) to develop through the tension of being on a major hegemonic boundary.

Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific

One key area to watch will be Southeast Asia. Already the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is becoming the new geopolitical buzz phrase. Southeast Asia (even including Philippines with its entrenched post-colonial links with the United States) is a mix of independent and contested territory; by the latter I mean that it is contested for influence by different religions as well as diverse regional and post-colonial polities.

Hopefully, Southeast Asia – as a region – can remain relatively free of those hegemonic influences, and can flourish as a kind of ASEAN commonwealth; and keeps itself free from the territorial fundamentalism, where borders and visas – and only borders and visas – matter.

Summary

The system of territorial nation states has evolved, since the Post-WW1 Treaty of Versailles in 1919, towards its textbook optimum; a world of many independent territorial states, indeed a change from the recent globalised world of interdependent administrative states. The human world will always remain a mix of big states and small states; there is no prospect of the breakup of China, India, USA, Russia or any of the other G20 territories. (Though if my speculation re the United Kingdom comes about, I think it would have to become a British Union in which England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland etc. are recognised as separate countries, as they are indeed by FIFA.) And there’s no obvious prospect of any of today’s small nation states merging into any union beyond the scope of the present European Union.

Covid-facilitated (and GFC-facilitated) ‘Territorial Fundamentalism’ is an excessive backlash from the globalisation epoch of the 1990s and 2000s. After-all, humanity is a dispersed though connected fraternity of nearly eight billion people. Border-controls of the types that are emerging are fundamentally cruel; and cruelty towards any of us is ultimately cruelty to all of us.

Despite our present zenith of territorial independence, many nations are significantly influenced by regional hegemons; a few countries find themselves caught between two regional hegemons. New Zealand is one of those hegemons, in the south Pacific; albeit a minor hegemon. Indeed countries like Tonga are not only pulled towards New Zealand.

The wider solution to the problems of humanity is to develop a concept of global human rights – for example, through a public equity framework – while acknowledging a wide plurality of social and territorial identities. While movement across the global human landscape should be as politically free as can be practically managed, the economic, political and climatic incentives that persuade people to seek refuge from certain places need to be addressed and understood. Regional hegemons can choose to play benign rather than malign leadership roles in this process. And human rights principles should prevail over administrative rules. We need an order based on principles rather rules.

————-

Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

contact: keith at rankin.nz

by Dr Bryce Edwards

2019’s Waitangi commemorations will be mostly remembered for two debates – whether the Prime Minister should be able to recite the detail of the Treaty of Waitangi, and whether the teaching of the Treaty and colonial history in New Zealand should be compulsory.

PM’s unawareness of the Treaty Articles

Jacinda Ardern’s awkward answers about the Treaty of Waitangi were uncomfortable watching, not just for supporters of the Government and a more Treaty-driven politics, but also for anyone wary of being put on the spot about contentious issues. You can watch the encounter here, where TVNZ’s Maiki Sherman asks the PM what the articles of the Treaty say – see: Jacinda Ardern fumbles over what Treaty of Waitangi articles say – ‘Article One? On the spot?’

The Leader of the Opposition was also quizzed but had the great advantage of taking the test after the Prime Minister – see 1News’ Bridges has quick refresher to pass Treaty of Waitangi quiz after Ardern’s fumble yesterday.

So, was the PM’s ignorance of the Treaty something she should be criticised for? Definitely, according to Heather du Plessis-Allan. She says, “the country’s leaders have headed up to Waitangi to try to look woke around race relations. But, if you are aiming to look woke, you better be woke” – see: Jacinda Ardern should have been able to recite the Treaty.

Du Plessis-Allan expresses sympathy for Ardern but explains why we should take her failure seriously: “She is the country’s leader after all. She is the one who celebrated the launch of the Crown-Māori Relations Portfolio by saying, ‘My vision is that we as a country realise the promise of the Treaty.’ How can you deliver on the promise of the Treaty if you don’t know the promise of the Treaty? And she’s also the one using Waitangi Day as a PR opportunity.”

The unfortunate incident, in which “the PM’s lack of knowledge was exposed” also raises bigger questions for du Plessis-Allan about Ardern’s abilities: “It’s also a substance problem. This is a recurring theme with the Prime Minister. There’s a lot of style, especially on the international stage, but questions remain over substance back home.”

Similarly, former Act MP Rodney Hide writes today that the episode brings into focus the contrast between Ardern’s strengths and weaknesses: “She is wonderful wowing the people at Waitangi. She is great on the world stage. She exudes compassion. She makes a great celebrity. She would be tremendous addition to the Royal Family. But she’s Prime Minister. She’s responsible for the entire apparatus of government. She also needs to show depth. Her failure to know Article One reinforces a sense of shallowness that goes hand-in-hand with celebrity status” – see: Jacinda Ardern’s failure to recite Article One ‘inexcusable’.

For Hide, not all “gotcha questions” merit being taken seriously, but anything about the Treaty says a lot about an MP, because the “Treaty is a big deal politically, legally, constitutionally, and historically. It has a big impact” on government. He says that it’s “a basic expectation of being an MP” to be able “to rattle off the three Articles”. And he adds, “Don Brash could rattle it off in his sleep. Bill English could do so in Maori.”

Newstalk ZB political editor Barry Soper also argues that the Treaty question put to the PM was fair: “The question was asked for a reason, as the leader of the nation, attending what she’s turned into a personal five day event for her, she should have known the articles of the Treaty – there are only three of them. Forget the te reo version that she parroted, the English would have done. She was there after all, to commemorate the signing of the Treaty and should have been fully across its contents” – see: Our future generations need to understand the content of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Soper does, however, add a guess at how John Key would have dealt with the question: “his face would have broken into a wide smile but he more than likely wouldn’t have even attempted to answer.”

Some Māori leaders took Ardern to task for her inadequate response. Sonny Tau of Ngāpuhi chose to say the following in his Waitangi Day speech in front of Ardern: “Only one thing I’ve got to say this morning and that is: If we’re going to lead a country, we need to learn the articles of the Treaty of Waitangi… There are some of us, leaders, who have slipped up on that, and all I ask is by this time next year that we all know the articles of the Treaty of Waitangi” – see Zane Small and Jamie Ensor’s Ngāpuhi’s Sonny Tau takes jab at Jacinda Ardern’s Treaty knowledge in Waitangi speech.

Yesterday, Hinemoa Elder raised the bar even further, saying that it’s not “sufficient” to be able to just recite the words of the Treaty, but it’s important to also have a relatively sophisticated analysis of them. She puts forward this challenge: “How many can recall these in Te Reo Māori, and English, and talk about the differences in interpretation and the inherent cultural clashes?” – see: We should all be familiar with the Treaty of Waitangi, here’s a 101.

Teaching the Treaty in schools

In her column, Elder concludes: “If we learnt them at school wouldn’t that make things easier? What a radical idea! Then from a young age we can debate the very ideas that underpin our national sense of who we are. Is that really so hard to put into practice?”

Many other commentators have made a similar connection between Ardern’s lack of knowledge and the need to have much more colonial history taught in New Zealand schools.

For example, Liam Hehir has responded to the incident by arguing “When even the ‘woke’ are ignorant about Te Tiriti o Waitangi, it’s clear we need to make teaching its history compulsory in schools” – see: If Jacinda doesn’t know the Treaty, what hope is there for the rest of us?

Hehir, who has a strong understanding of colonial history from his Palmerston North schooling, says he asked around amongst friends and family and found a similar level of unawareness of Treaty details: “I did not expect this. What was also unexpected was the fact that relative wokeness seemed to have little bearing on knowledge or ignorance about what is, whether you like it or not, the foundational basis for the existence of the country. I had expected those who make a point of being sensitive to the Treaty to have a working knowledge of what was actually in it. If that sounds like a snarky point, it’s not supposed to. It genuinely surprised me.”

There’s a petition underway, asking that a law be passed to make the teaching of the Treaty and colonial New Zealand history compulsory – see Adele Redmond’s article, Petition reignites debate over teaching New Zealand’s colonial history in schools.

According to this, the New Zealand History Teachers’ Association wants to see the “coherent teaching” of colonial history, with chairperson Graeme Ball being reported as saying “New Zealand’s colonial history was taught in an ‘ad hoc’ fashion, and students were ‘lucky’ if they learned about Parihaka, the New Zealand Land Wars, or the Waitangi Tribunal.”

Bell says “New Zealand was experiencing a ‘zeitgeist moment’, with more Kiwis willing to engage with te reo and New Zealand’s colonial history”, and the Government should therefore seize the chance to introduce compulsory courses.

The response has been generally positive. The New Zealand Herald responded with an editorial pointing out that an understanding of New Zealand’s history is vital, and because the phase of Treaty settlements is nearing an end, “it ought now to be possible to find a balanced history for teaching in schools” – see: Our history is contentious, that is all the more reason to teach it.

The Dominion Post has shown even more enthusiasm, saying the government has an opportunity it must seize: “History is often considered boring because of the tyranny of distance and time. Imagine history delivered at a very local level, as an engaging, exciting introduction to a wider context; how issues and incidents in your town, on your street, played a role in the bigger story; one that culminated in a historic day 179 years ago. It just needs a little imagination and some effort” – see: Let’s go back to the future.

Politicians respond to calls for colonial history in schools

Politicians are always fearful of being on “the wrong side of history”, but initially the Government poured cold water on the idea of compulsory courses in colonial history.

Kelvin Davis, who is Labour’s Deputy leader, associate minister of education, minister of Crown Māori relations, and a former teacher, was reported as rejecting the idea, saying: “In terms of the teaching of Te Tiriti in schools, remember that schools are self-governing, self-managing. It’s inappropriate for governments to come along and dictate specifics of what’s taught in schools” – see John Gerritsen’s History teachers decry ‘shameful’ ignorance of colonial, Māori history.

The Prime Minister is also reported as deflecting questions about proposal for schools to teach colonial history. She said: “My first question would be how many aren’t? I would be surprised if it wasn’t being taught universally.”

The same article also reports that “New Zealand First MP Shane Jones said it was up to schools to decide what they taught but he expected most, if not all, would teach students about the Treaty of Waitangi.”

But it wasn’t long before the Government warmed up to the idea, especially because opposition politicians were embracing the proposal. Audrey Young reported that: “There seems to be a consensus across the political spectrum about the need for schools to actively teach the Treaty of Waitangi in the context of New Zealand history, but with caveats. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, National leader Simon Bridges and Hobson’s Pledge spokesman Don Brash all supported education on the Treaty of Waitangi for New Zealand children” – see: Broad political agreement to teach NZ history and Treaty of Waitangi in schools, with caveats.

On Māori TV, some further details of what politicians thought were covered in Talisa Kupenga’s item, MPs at Waitangi talk colonial history in schools. For instance, Kelvin Davis says, “It’s right to give the Māori version and other versions [of colonial history] but I am of the opinion that the Māori version is the correct version.” And Youth Minister Peeni Henare asserts: “I want a unified standard. It is ad-hoc when it comes to how and what is taught in each area but we are all wanting the same thing; to teach children our history.”

Difficult questions about teaching political history

There is no doubt that any moves to establish greater teaching of New Zealand history would raise big questions about ideological and political impacts. After all, such compulsory lessons would amount to a version of “civics education” being introduced by proxy.

This is the concern of economics blogger Michael Reddell who says he is highly supportive of the principle of teaching New Zealand colonial history in schools but also highly sceptical about what it might mean in practice – see: Yes, but…. In this, Reddell argues that the prospect of political indoctrination is always a factor when government seek to introduce civics lessons.

Reddell explains that despite his enthusiasm for the study of New Zealand history, “what leaves me rather more ambivalent (‘yes, but….’)  is the sort of people who would be teaching our history, and/or designing any curriculum. Few of them seem to see New Zealand history as something to celebrate (I’m going to be fascinated to see how our Prime Minister treats the 250th anniversary of Captain Cook’s first visit), and there is a strong theme of shame –  the ‘black armband’ approach to history –  combined with some agenda for how these people think society should be organised now or what role (say) the Treaty of Waitangi should play.”

Similarly, talkback radio host Sean Plunket believes there’s “a lot of BS in history”, and he “says it’s the version we learn that is important” – see Scott Palmer’s ‘Propaganda’: Sean Plunket slams ‘biased’ compulsory Māori history calls . He argues for a greater diversity of subject matter in the teaching of history.

Coming from a very different perspective, columnist Tom O’Connor says that a current lack of history in schools is leading to bigotry: “It is no wonder we hear such ill-informed and ignorant commentary every time the details of a Waitangi Tribunal hearing are announced. How can anyone be expected to understand the complexities of the issue if the underlying history is not known? In a vacuum of reliable and fact-based knowledge, mis-information and bigotry grow like mushrooms in a dark place” – see: Unacceptable not to teach children ‘complete’ NZ history.

O’Connor argues that New Zealand students learn their history too late, and contrasts this with other English-speaking countries: “American school kids begin learning their history from day one as do children in English and Irish schools. Some of us were taught selected parts of English history only, which had little if any relevance to us, but nothing of our own.”

In his opinion piece, Liam Hehir warns that it would be mistake to just replace English history with New Zealand history: “What happened in the United Kingdom – particularly during the period of the English Civil War – is also important for anybody who wants to understand the nature of our institutions and how they work. Anybody who has a good grasp of events of 17th century England and 19th century New Zealand will have a working knowledge of who we are and how we got here.”

As to the question of compulsion, University of Auckland history lecturer and Waitangi Tribunal member Aroha Harris takes on such questions, saying that compulsion is only necessary because a voluntary approach has failed – see: Don’t get me started on compulsion.

Harris lists other “compulsions” that she says Maori have had to put up with: “compulsory taking of Māori land, compulsory denial of te reo, compulsory restrictions on whāngai practices, on hapū fisheries, on customary resource management systems. Really. Just don’t get me started.”

And on the issue of what in the current school curriculum might be replaced by compulsory colonial lessons, Harris says: “(a) it doesn’t have to be a zero-sum game, and (b), shall we reflect a little on what we’ve already lost by remaining ignorant of our past and acting like it doesn’t matter?”

Finally, for his take on what is wrong with the supposed “conservative” version of New Zealand colonial history, see David Slack’s liberal parody: A brief impartial history of New Zealand.

OPINION: By Barbara Dreaver, 1 News Pacific Correspondent

Now that the phosphate dust has settled and the shameless self-promoting headlines about the Pacific being “leeches” and a waste of time and money have lost their hysterical edge – let’s take a look at some facts.

Jacinda Ardern serenaded with song written especially for her and Neve on arrival to Nauru
The song called Jacinda New Star in the Sky clearly delighted the Prime Minister. Source: 1 NEWS

Firstly to deal with the issue of “da plane, da plane” – it seems only appropriate here to bring in Tattoo from Fantasy Island for those old enough to remember this dubious 80s TV progamme.

Yes, it cost money to send up an extra plane to Nauru to make it possible for our Prime Minister to get there.

That is true.

What is also true is there have been several, not just the one, but several multiflight trips organised by the former National government around the Pacific because some politicians across the political landscape found it uncomfortable to travel on the C130 Hercules the whole way.

-Partners-

It’s not unusual, so I’m not sure why this suddenly became a big issue.

Multitude of reasons
It was important for the Prime Minister of New Zealand to be in Nauru for the Pacific Islands Forum for a multitude of reasons.

The geopolitical landscape in the Pacific has changed radically in the last couple of years.

Jacinda Ardern and Pacific leaders sport matching red threads during Nauru photo shoot
The Prime Minister is making a one-day appearance at the Pacific Island Forum. Source: 1 NEWS

At this Forum, Air Force 2 flew in a US delegation, a high profile Chinese delegation was there, other Asian countries, the European Union … all vying for influence.

From a geopolitical stance alone it’s crucial New Zealand is a player in this.

Just ask Australia, which is having kittens over the thought of Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu giving port power to the Chinese. Then there are serious security issues.

South East Asia and a bigger push since 2016 from South American cartels are pushing drugs through the Pacific to Australia and New Zealand, fisheries are being depleted – these are all issues that affect New Zealand – why wouldn’t we be there?

Instability bad for NZ
Instability in the region is bad for New Zealand.

Bilaterals with Pacific leaders are equally important.

New Zealand wants island country votes at regional and world level – the UN Security Council, which we headed at one point is a case in point, the World Health Organisation and many more. Votes are gold and don’t think that New Zealand doesn’t want to tie up Pacific votes any less than the big players.

Foreign Minister Winston Peters could easily have done the job but he is not Prime Minister.

You can throw money around the region as much as you like but to underestimate personal relationships in the Pacific is sheer ignorance.

Mana is quite rightly attached to New Zealand’s leader being there and if Jacinda Ardern hadn’t shown up for her first Pacific Forum we would have been penalised for it down the line one way or another.

New Zealand cannot afford to tread with the same ignorance Australia does as it blunders through the region – incredulous that things are happening that they don’t like.

PM holds her own
To suggest that Jacinda Ardern is not tough enough is ridiculous. I’m told by people who know first-hand that she more than holds her own in a bi-lat and so she should – it’s the very least we would expect any of our Prime Ministers to do.

While the above is important there is also something else. A palagi friend who I really respect had the following to say and I couldn’t agree more.

“For me the importance of the Pacific is much more cultural – we are part of this place and Pacific Islanders are part of us.

“It’s who we collectively are. We give to each other and sustain each other with language, music, laughter. And in doing so we are all creating a unique culture that is different – the rest of the world can only wonder and admire us.”

As someone who has lived and worked in the region for nearly 30 years I have nothing but contempt for the sheer ignorance I have been reading from those whose idea of the Pacific is lying poolside at Denarau with a pina colada.

New Zealand needs the Pacific as much as the Pacific needs New Zealand. In fact some countries have made it clear they don’t need New Zealand at all.

The National government understood this – so does this government. Let’s move on.

This Barbara Dreaver Television New Zealand blog posting is republished with permission.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz