One Nation this week promised to tighten visa rules and cut immigration to “net negative” for three years, in a suite of policies it said would help reduce pressure on housing and essential services. It also vowed to further restrict the ability of migrants to bring family members to Australia.

One Nation says it will preserve the existing Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme and the working holiday maker program.

Instead, the proposal focuses primarily on reducing the number of international students (on visa subclass 500), temporary graduate visa holders (on visa subclass 485) and family members of migrants.

For international education, the proposed cuts are substantial. One Nation wants to reduce the international student population from almost 590,000 now to 350,000. This represents a reduction of about 240,000 over three years.

It also proposes to cut the temporary graduate visa population from about 270,000 now to 40,000. This represents a reduction of about 230,000, or 85%, over three years.

This, combined with various other cuts and restrictions, would aim to reduce the number of temporary migrants in Australia by more than 760,000 over three years.

So, what would this mean for Australia’s labour market and economy?

Temporary graduate visa holders supply labour

One Nation’s plan to reduce the temporary graduate visa population by about 230,000 would leave the proposed population at less than one-sixth of its current size.

Census data from 2021 show that 88% of temporary graduate visa holders participated in the labour force. These graduates are already embedded across the Australian economy and are not only employed in professional occupations.

This Census data from 2021 show:

• 23.2% worked in professional occupations, including business, human resources and marketing, IT, engineering and science
• 10.9% worked in food and hospitality
• 6% worked in retail
• 14.8% worked as health professionals, carers and aides.

These workers form part of the everyday labour supply on which businesses and essential services depend.

The temporary graduate visa is not simply a pathway for retaining future professionals who have finished studying in Australia.

It also provides workers for restaurants and food businesses, hotels, retail, transport, cleaning, health and aged care and other services.

An 85% reduction would substantially shrink the pool from which employers can recruit.

Indeed, business groups have already flagged concerns with One Nation’s proposal. The Business Council of Australia has said it was

concerned that One Nation’s proposal to cut migration by more than 750,000 people risks holding back economic growth and worsening Australia’s skills shortages.

The Australian Industry Group has said the plan

risks severe economic self harm at a time when we are already bedevilled by significant labour and skills shortages.

Removing such a large group would reduce the supply of workers available to businesses at a time when recruitment remains difficult in many parts of the economy.

The pressure could be particularly acute in regional Australia.

Jobs and Skills Australia’s March 2026 data put the national vacancy fill rate (the percentage of job vacancies that are filled) at 68.2%. Regional employers recorded a fill rate 4.6 percentage points lower than metropolitan employers.

For labour-intensive industries such as hospitality, food services and care, a smaller pool of available workers could make it harder to hire.

It could mean employers have to pay more for labour or reduce business operating hours. They may face higher labour costs or have to put prices up. Some businesses may even be at risk of closing down.

International students are in the labour market too

International students are also an important part of the labour market.

ABS Census data show that 63.6% of student visa holders were employed. International students can work up to 48 hours per fortnight while they are studying.

Food and beverage services was the largest industry of employment, accounting for 23% of employed student visa holders. Other major areas included retail, cleaning, residential care and social assistance.

International students do not simply supply labour. They also spend money on accommodation, food, retail, transport and tourism. This creates jobs for Australians.

Employment prospects are also a significant part of how international students decide where to study.

Research has found graduate employment prospects ranked second among the factors international students considered when choosing a study destination, after quality of education.

A substantial reduction in post-study work opportunities could therefore make Australia less attractive in an increasingly competitive international education market.

In other words, the economic implications of One Nation’s proposal extend beyond the labour market. International education is Australia’s largest services export, generating almost A$55 billion in export income in 2025.

Its contribution extends well beyond universities. This sector also supports economic activity and employment in accommodation, hospitality, retail, tourism, transport and other services. It contributes to Australia’s future skilled workforce and builds longer-term connections with other countries.

International students’ fees also help subsidise the domestic higher education system, support university research and infrastructure.

The question raised by One Nation’s proposal is therefore broader than how many migrants Australia should admit.

It is also about how Australia’s economy functions when a large and diverse group of international students and graduates contributes both demand and labour.

Reducing these populations may reduce migration numbers, but could also weaken demand for Australian goods and services. It would shrink the number of workers available for employers to hire and could deepen labour shortages.

Ly Tran has received funding from the Australian Research Council, DFAT and the Department of Education for research on international students, international education and student mobilities.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/how-would-one-nations-immigration-plan-affect-the-labour-market-and-economy/

Australia is in the middle of a data centre construction boom. Driven by artificial intelligence (AI) and growing demand for digital services, global technology companies are expected to invest up to A$150 billion in Australian data centres by 2030.

The scale of the investment is hard to ignore. However, a more important question is whether Australia will benefit from higher productivity and economic growth, or simply from a brief construction boom.

Data centres can create jobs, strengthen digital infrastructure and support AI development. But they can also put pressure on housing, electricity networks and skilled labour.

Data centres have existed for decades. But something has changed, and this essential infrastructure is now at the centre of a major policy debate.

This article is part of The Conversation’s series on data centres – what they are, why we need them, and why they’re suddenly so controversial.

Why is Australia a favoured location?

Data centres are packed with computers that store, process and move digital information, the backbone of cloud computing. In theory, they can be built anywhere, so why does big tech have Australia in its sights?

Australia offers several advantages for global technology firms. It is politically stable, has strong institutions, and sits close to the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region.

The direct economic benefits are significant. Construction projects create work for engineers, electricians and builders. They also increase demand for materials, electricity infrastructure and specialised equipment.

Yet the boost to economic growth may be smaller than the headline investment figures suggest.

A large share of the spending goes towards imported goods, rather than production in Australia: servers, processors, chips and networking equipment. That means much of the money leaves Australia and does not reach the local economy.

The hidden costs of the boom

Every major investment boom comes with trade-offs. One of the biggest risks is competition for construction labour. Data centres require many of the same workers needed to build houses, roads and renewable energy infrastructure.

Australia already faces shortages of up to 72,000 electricians, engineers and skilled trades. There are media reports that electricians with just two years’ experience are being offered salaries of $200,000 a year to work on data centres.

If data centres hire more of these workers, labour costs could rise across the economy. Housing projects may become more expensive, infrastructure projects could face delays and renewable energy developments may struggle to secure workers.

This matters because housing affordability remains one of Australia’s biggest economic challenges.

Power, water and land are also under pressure

As more data centres are built, demand for electricity and water will increase. If supply doesn’t keep pace, prices could rise for households and businesses.

Land use is another challenge. Some sites allocated for data centres might otherwise have been used for housing, logistics facilities or other productive purposes.

These costs do not necessarily outweigh the benefits. But they form part of the economic trade-offs policymakers need to consider.

The inflation risk

The Reserve Bank of Australia has raised concerns about capacity pressures in the Australian economy and noted data centres could contribute to inflation in several ways.

First, stronger competition for skilled workers may push wages higher in construction and related industries.

Second, increased demand for construction materials could drive up project costs across and increase prices in the economy.

Third, a large inflow of investment can add to demand at a time when policymakers are trying to keep inflation under control. These factors could make it harder for the Reserve Bank to bring down inflation, which is well above the 2-3% target band.

A surge in copper

Data centres also use large quantities of copper for cables, power systems and cooling equipment. As data centres are built around the world, demand for copper is expected to grow. S&P Global forecasts that total global copper demand will surge by around 50%, climbing from 28 million metric tonnes in 2025 to 42 million metric tonnes by 2040.

Higher copper prices will benefit Australia’s miners. Indeed, BHP, the world’s largest copper producer, said last month copper contributed more than half of its earnings for the first time, overtaking iron ore, as the price of copper surged almost 50% in the year.

But there is also a downside. More expensive copper raises costs for domestic construction projects, electricity networks and renewable energy developments.

This highlights a broader theme of the data centre boom: the same economic trend can create gains for some industries while imposing costs on others.

Who captures the value?

Perhaps the most important question is who captures the value data centres create.

Owning the buildings does not necessarily mean owning the technology. Many data centres are operated by multinational companies that also control the software, intellectual property and AI systems running inside them.

If Australia hosts the infrastructure but develops few local AI-related capabilities, much of the long-term value may flow overseas. As assistant minister for the digital economy, Andrew Charlton said recently:

Simply building data centres in Australia does not necessarily mean that Australia captures the economics of AI. We can supply the land. We can supply the electricity. We can host the machines. And still find that much of the value […] flows offshore.

The biggest gains are likely to come from building domestic expertise in AI, software development and digital services.

How do we maximise the benefits?

The key policy question is how to maximise the benefits of data centres while minimising the costs.

This means expanding the supply of skilled workers, electricity infrastructure and industrial land so that construction does not crowd out housing, renewable energy and other important investments.

Training more electricians, engineers and technical specialists will be part of the solution. But training takes time. In the short term, carefully targeted migration policies may help ease labour shortages in critical occupations.

Australia’s data centre boom brings investment, jobs and the promise of a sophisticated digital economy, but it also creates new pressures on housing, energy and skilled workers.

The real challenge for policymakers is ensuring Australia captures enough of the value these investments create.

If governments strike the right balance with their policies, the current boom could boost productivity and strengthen Australia’s position in the global digital economy. However, if they do not, Australia may find that the benefits of the construction boom are fewer than the investment figures suggest.

Jak Kakhkharov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/australias-data-centre-build-out-carries-risks-for-the-economy-and-inflation/

The Scottish historian William Dalrymple recently argued that Big Tech has become the 21st-century equivalent of Britain’s famous East India Company.

It’s a comparison less fanciful than it might sound. At its height in the early 19th century, the East India Company controlled territory, collected taxes and fielded an army larger than Britain’s.

Today’s technology corporations may not have private armies or formally delegated sovereignty, but they control digital territories on which markets, communication and increasingly artificial intelligence depend.

There, they decide who may enter, what can be seen and the rules by which people and businesses participate.

Dalrymple asks what history can teach us about bringing such corporations under control. My recent research starts one step earlier: what is it about the corporate form itself that allows such power to accumulate and endure?

The legal machinery hiding in plain sight

Debate about Big Tech or corporate overreach usually begins after power has already accumulated.

Competition law addresses monopoly. Privacy law responds to surveillance and data extraction. Platform regulation tackles gatekeeping. All are necessary, but they mostly overlook the branch of law that creates the institutions they seek to regulate: corporate law.

Within corporate law, the significance of incorporation is often minimised.

Incorporation does something remarkable: it creates an artificial person. Like a human being, this legal creation can own property and enter into contracts. As with Theseus’s ship, its identity can endure even when every constituent part has been replaced.

In a business corporation, capital contributed by investors becomes its property. Investors receive shares, but don’t own its underlying assets. Shareholders can sell their shares and leave, while the corporate fund can keep growing for as long as the corporation exists.

Notably, a corporation can itself own capital – capital owning capital – as well as other corporations.

Subsidiaries can sit within wider corporate groups, allowing capital and control to expand while assets and liabilities remain legally partitioned. The result is an institutional structure capable of accumulating resources and pursuing objectives across generations.

Incorporation alone, of course, does not explain big tech’s dominance. Data, network effects, intellectual property, finance, technological design and political choices all play a part.

But the corporate form acts as a multiplier, allowing these advantages to accumulate and persist over time. Its distinctive superpower is not simply the accumulation of existing capital.

It can identify resources such as data, turn them into new forms of capital, and use that capital recursively to create still more value.

History (sometimes) repeats

The East India Company was chartered in 1600, acquiring permanent capital in 1657.

This attached investor capital to an enduring corporate person, allowing wealth to accumulate. By 1701 its governor, Josiah Child, could describe the company as a “Fund of Wealth”.

Its later territorial and governmental powers were delegated by the state, but its corporate structure allowed them to accumulate within a single continuing institution.

During America’s Gilded Age, corporations amassed capital and brought railways and other essential infrastructure under their control. American legal scholar Herbert Hovenkamp wrote that corporate law had “unleashed a power it could no longer control”.

The antitrust law that emerged in response sat outside the corporate law that had enabled these companies to grow.

Big Tech has again demonstrated the power of the corporate form. A dominant platform is not merely a participant in a market. It may own the marketplace, compete against businesses using it and write the rules for everyone involved.

Its power is not formally sovereign, as the East India Company’s became, but is produced through ownership, contracts, code, network effects and state acquiescence.

Like the East India Company, Big Tech corporations have used the corporate form to create new types of capital. For Big Tech, it is data. For the East India Company, colonisation turned India itself – its land, labour, revenues and trade – into capital.

Where corporate law can help

Competition, privacy and AI regulation remain indispensable responses to corporate overreach. But regulation need not wait until that power manifests as misconduct.

If incorporation law helps create and maintain these institutions, it can also place conditions on how they operate.

Legal scholar and former US Federal Trade Commission chair Lina Khan has argued for structural separation: a dominant platform should not both operate essential infrastructure and compete on it.

Separation must address ownership as well as conduct. Moving the competing business into a subsidiary would not solve the conflict if the same corporate group controlled both.

Law could also make platform corporations that control essential digital infrastructure subject to public-governance duties.

These could include non-discriminatory access, transparent rule-making and protection against the commercial use of data obtained from dependent businesses.

They could also give people whose livelihoods depend on a platform some representation in how it is governed.

Such obligations should follow access to a market, not merely the jurisdiction in which a company chooses to incorporate.

Corporations can create enormous value at scale. The corporation is one of humanity’s great social inventions.

For that reason, regulatory interventions should use a scalpel, not a sledgehammer. The challenge is to distinguish productive growth from the concentration of infrastructure, commercial activity and accumulated capital within the same artificial person.

Dalrymple’s history and the first Gilded Age demonstrate that states can curb extraordinarily powerful corporations.

But incorporation law points to something more fundamental: corporations are privately initiated but state-constituted institutions.

They are artificial persons we create. If incorporation law helped unleash their power, it can also reshape them to serve more than the gilded few.

Susan Watson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/incorporation-law-gave-big-tech-state-like-power-can-it-now-help-rein-it-in/

Parliament is back in session, and Andy Burnham is set to put his promise of becoming a “cost-of-living government” into practice. Since 2021, economic and geopolitical instability has led UK households to struggle with a fall in real disposable income and inflation, particularly around food and energy prices.

Families are under sustained pressure to meet essential costs. This pressure is likely to intensify as the US-Iran conflict and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz continue to affect energy prices and the wider economy.

The Centre for Economics and Business Research has estimated that rising inflation and weaker wage growth linked to the conflict will reduce average UK household real incomes by around £1,100 in 2026, with a further £1,300 reduction in 2027. The greatest burden will fall on those already struggling, and those furthest from the decisions being made.

The government has introduced measures to try to ease the pressure, including removing VAT from domestic electricity bills.

While it is too early to judge Burnham’s government on its record, research gives us an insight into what families have experienced through years of rising costs. If governments want to understand whether their policies are working, they need to actively listen to the people most affected.

Families offer a valuable test of whether policy is working in practice, as the combined pressures of supporting children and meeting essential household costs can expose gaps in support.

Since 2022, my colleagues and I have been doing this listening through Changing Realities, a collaboration between more than 200 parents and carers living on low incomes across the UK, academic researchers, and the charity Child Poverty Action Group. Through online diaries, participants share their experiences as they happen, giving us an ongoing picture of how rising costs are affecting families.

Our findings show that those already struggling to get by are making difficult choices every day. They must manage overstretched budgets while trying to protect their children from the worst effects of hardship. One participant wrote:

My son will be starting secondary school in September … I was looking forward to finally being able to receive free school dinners for him, but with another rise of gas and electricity bills announced and the constant increase in food costs it’s wiped out any hope of feeling a tiny bit financially better off.

A recurring theme in online diaries from 2022 is how financial strain compounded pressures families were already facing. People found it harder to meet essential needs and had little room to cope with unexpected costs.

Last winter, participant Gemma shared: “I can’t afford to take the kids anywhere, to warm them back up when we get home or dry their clothes when they’ve been out. Today, my son’s nursery offered to put all his outdoor clothes in their dryer because they know how much I’m struggling.”

Families most affected by high inflation are those with the least. Most of their spending is on food and energy, which are increasing in price the quickest. As participant Ella wrote: “We don’t talk about the cost of living any more – now it’s the cost of survival.”

Across our research, parents have called for social security that reflects the real cost of living, and changes to Universal Credit, such as ending the punishing five-week wait for a first payment and more support for families with children.

Listening to families

The current Labour government has already demonstrated an interest in listening to people on the receiving end of policy. Its commitment to working with low-income families in developing the UK Child Poverty Strategy was a step in the right direction.

Evidence was provided to the strategy by parents involved in Changing Realities, through online diaries, answers to questions on specific issues and discussions with policymakers. As they wrote in the strategy foreword:

With some of the changes, families like ours may start to breathe again. Not just survive but live with dignity. We’d all like to feel secure knowing that if something breaks, or a bill goes up, we won’t be pushed into crisis.

And while there is much more to be done to tackle child poverty, the removal of the two-child limit on benefits was a major policy change that will directly affect families’ incomes. Government estimates suggest that 450,000 fewer children will be in relative low income after housing costs by the final year of this parliament as a result.

Read more:
The two-child limit failed – all it did was increase poverty

The question now is whether the government will apply the same ambition to understanding what families need next. Commitments and targets on child poverty need to remain a priority, and families should be treated as an authority on whether those commitments are making a difference.

Burnham’s government is developing its response to a rapidly changing economic and geopolitical situation. Devolution adds a layer of complication, with devolved nations adopting different approaches to the cost of living and child poverty. There is an opportunity here to make families’ experiences part of how policy is understood and assessed.

People with experience of poverty and social security understand the barriers families face and have valuable ideas about what needs to change. If Burnham wants his government to give families “breathing space”, the first step is listening to what is making it harder for them to breathe.

Uisce Jordan works on the Changing Realities at the University of Glasgow.
This project has been funded by the Nuffield Foundation’s UK impacts of the US-Iran conflict fund, but the views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the Foundation.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/andy-burnham-wants-to-run-a-cost-of-living-government-heres-what-he-can-learn-from-families-living-through-the-crisis/

British politics looks set to be dominated in the coming weeks and months by the £72 million donated to Reform UK. This is because, and there’s really no other way to cut the cake here, this is an astonishing amount of money.

The donations to Reform came in the space of just one weekend – £36 million each from crypto billionaires Ben Delo and Christopher Harborne. Delo has ties to Hong Kong, while Harborne – whose self-confessed “competitive spirit” prompted him to match the first donation – is based in Thailand.

There’s a temptation to say I told you so (hands up if you were warning 18 months ago, as I was, about mega-donors). But it’s more important to think about what’s next – and the consequences for Reform of accepting these donations.

Read more:
Reform UK polling sting: why even small donations matter in politics these days

Both donors have said they expect nothing in return. But in terms of the legality of the donations, the case is complex because of the representation of the people bill, currently going through parliament. In March, Labour’s Steve Reed announced that it would include a £100,000 annual cap on donations from UK residents living overseas.

Importantly, he said that these changes applied from the day they were announced. Some believe, though nobody is quite sure, that this includes both Delo and Harborne.

Reports suggest that Harborne restored himself to the UK electoral roll in June, and in April it appeared that Delo was doing the same. If this is correct, although legally complex, it would seem that the £72 million donation would become just £200,000.

Reform’s leader Nigel Farage has hinted that this might be the case. He said the donations were “100% compliant with the law today” and that retrospectively declaring donations illegal “simply cannot be”. This suggests that this is a legal argument that Reform wants to have – and I can see the logic behind it.

Ready for a fight

In this case, Reform might see it as a win-win. If the party enters into legal proceedings and wins, it keeps the money. If it loses, it plays into the broader anti-establishment messaging. And even if it does lose and has to give the money back, by that point Harborne and Delo would likely have been UK resident long enough to simply return the donations to the party.

The problem, though, is one of optics. Going to court for your right to accept £72 million from a couple of crypto billionaires looks about as bad as accepting the money in the first place. And surveys conducted during the Makerfield byelection showed that when so-called Reform-curious voters were presented with information that linked its crypto-friendly policies to Harborne’s £5 million gift to Farage, it dampened their enthusiasm to vote for them.

This represents a starker truth for Reform. Much of the outrage over the 2024 gift to Farage may be less about whether he ought to have declared it, and more about the £5 million itself. Just as the interest in the £72 million donation has much more to do with the £72 million than with Harborne and Delo’s residency status. There’s no such thing as a free lunch, and accepting this kind of cash cannot be defined as risk free.

One thing that can be said with certainty is that the way politics is funded in the UK is a mess. All the political parties are protecting their interests – Labour wants money from the unions, and the Conservatives and Reform want money from wealthy individuals and businesses.

Interestingly, the representation of the people bill could sort this out (though it may be too late as the bill has already had its second reading in the House of Lords). However, this £72 million seems to have focused minds.

Consider the lobbying from the GMB union in July. It wrote to all union-affiliated MPs to say that they shouldn’t vote for amendments that would cap donations because it would “endanger union funding for the party”.

And more recently, the general secretary of the trade union umbrella organisation the TUC Paul Nowak warned Prime Minister Andy Burnham against capping donations. Now, days later, it appears that the unions are softening on the matter of capping donations from individuals. However, they seem determined that union funding should be ringfenced from any further controls.

Labour and the unions might not like this, but they have to find a way to include unions in a cap if any major reform is going to stick. Having opened the door on the £100,000 cap on overseas electors, they can’t now close it. Very simply, it is inevitable that the next time a right-leaning government wins office, union donations will be capped.

Moreover, exempting unions from a cap would place Labour massively out of step with public opinion. Voters of all political stripes (including Labour) support a cap on donations from individuals, businesses and trade unions.

There are functional differences between union funding and other forms of money in politics. The union political fund is paid into by union members, and as a union member you are entitled to opt out of this scheme. Nevertheless, exempting unions will look to the vast majority of people – as well as to opposition parties – like fiscal gerrymandering. When it comes to capping donations, you do nothing or you do everything. There is no in between.

My solution remains what it was 18 months ago. For now, they set a cap absurdly high, say £1 million. This would be higher than any other country and probably won’t improve public trust, but it will calm the waters. Everyone can catch their breath and begin a grown-up conversation about where to go from there.

Burnham entered Downing Street promising a new, collaborative politics. Fixing political financing could provide the opportunity to practice what he preached.

Sam Power has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. In July 2026, he was appointed as an Independent Member of the Ethics and Integrity Commission but writes here entirely in his capacity as an academic at the University of Bristol.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/why-72-million-doesnt-come-for-free-the-risks-to-reform-uk-of-taking-cash-from-mega-donors/

In December 2024, the share of South Koreans ages 65 and older surpassed 20% for the first time, making it what demographers like us call a “super-aged society.” By August 2026 that share had risen further, to 22.1%.

That label can sound like a diagnosis, but population aging is not inherently a problem. In part, it reflects demographic progress: Fewer people are dying prematurely, and people are living longer due to improved living conditions. Thus, an older population can simply be a sign of society having grown safer, healthier and demographically more mature.

The central concern, then, is not simply that a population is aging, but how quickly it is aging and whether society is prepared for it. South Korea moved from an aging society, meaning 7%-13% of a population is over 64, to a super-aged society in about 24 years. This transition was considerably faster than Japan, where it took 35 years. In the United States, older adults are projected to make up 23.4% of the population by 2060.

By 2060, about 41% of South Koreans are projected to be 65 or older, which would place the country to become the oldest. The country will face growing pressure on pensions, healthcare, workplaces and caregiving systems, but will have relatively little time to adapt.

We research population health and aging. In our most recent study, published in July 2026, we examined how South Korea is dealing with its aging population. South Korea is not the first country to become a super-aged society, but the pace of its demographic transition has been exceptionally rapid. We believe its experience offers an early view of the choices many societies will soon face.

Changing family life

In the 1990s, the largest age groups were those between 15 and 34.

Now, more than 30 years later, the youngest of these are more than 45 years old, and the oldest have already reached retirement age, which in South Korea is 60. Notably, the share of people ages 30 and younger is shrinking.

South Korea’s aging is also connected to a broader shift in fertility, family formation and family life. As people gain greater individual autonomy in deciding how to organize their lives, there is a demographic transition toward sustained low fertility, later marriage and parenthood, and more diverse family arrangements. Today, South Korea has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world.

Economic challenges

South Korea is still wrestling with the financial implications of being a super-aged society.

The country’s retirement system relies mainly on the National Pension Service, a pension fund financed by contributions from workers, employers and the self-employed, and the Basic Pension, a separate, tax-funded benefit for lower-income adults ages 65 and older.

But unless something changes, the national pension fund is projected to be depleted by 2054. Many older adults have incomplete pension contribution histories and receive only modest benefits. Among those born before 1950, poverty rates are higher due to limited access to pensions and limited wealth accumulation.

According to the latest Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, data, South Korea has the highest old-age income poverty rate among the OECD’s 38 member countries: 39.7% of people ages 66 and older live on less than half the national median household disposable income, compared with the OECD average of 14.8%.

Despite multiple efforts at policy reform, economic insecurity persists among older adults in South Korea.

Because many older adults are asset rich but cash poor – with more than 80% of their assets in real estate but only 12.4% in savings – many are pairing the Basic Pension with reverse mortgages to turn their assets into disposable income.

Raising the retirement age

Because pensions fall short for so many, South Korea has a high employment rate among older adults.

In fact, the average age at which South Korean older adults leave the workforce is higher than that in any of the other OECD countries. While men typically leave their longest-held job at about age 51, they continue to work until around age 72. Many spend those years in lower-paying, less secure “second careers.

Simply raising the retirement age is insufficient. South Korea is currently debating whether to gradually raise the statutory retirement age from 60 to 65. This would allow workers to remain in their primary careers longer, in order to narrow the gap between retirement and pension benefit eligibility.

But while this might ease financial pressures or improve older workers’ income security, it could also negatively affect the upward mobility of younger workers if older employees remain in senior positions for longer.

For now, South Korea has already begun making changes to both pension financing and late career employment. A 2025 pension reform will gradually raise the national pension contribution rate from 9% to 13% by 2033 and set the target replacement rate – that is, the share of preretirement income that the pension is designed to replace – at 43%.

New healthcare needs

One of the biggest challenges for South Korea’s rapidly aging society is healthcare.

In 2008, South Korea introduced long term care insurance, which supports home care, nursing, rehabilitation, daycare, assistive devices and residential care for people with physical or cognitive needs. The program is financed through National Health Insurance, government funding and user copays.

Adults ages 65 and older can qualify if they are assessed as having difficulty performing daily activities or have specific age-related conditions, such as dementia or cerebrovascular disease. Eligibility is not income-based, although lower-income beneficiaries pay reduced or no copays.

Demand for services is rising rapidly. In 2024, 10.8% of people 65 and older and 31.9% of those at least 80 were certified for benefits, and these percentages are expected to increase.

But the program isn’t perfect: Families still provide substantial care, the care workforce is concentrated among older women in economically insecure jobs, and rural areas have fewer services and limited infrastructure to address the growing needs. It also doesn’t help that many older South Koreans worry about becoming a burden on their families.

Staying connected

Mental health and social connection have also become important components of South Korea’s response to population aging. South Korea has the highest suicide rate in the OECD, and the suicide rate among adults 65 and older was higher than in other age groups.

Social isolation is another growing concern. According to the 2023 National Survey of Older Koreans, 6.6% of adults 65 and older reported having no one they could turn to for help when they were sick, feeling discouraged or depressed, or facing an urgent financial need. The share rose from 4.6% among those between 65 and 69 to 12.9% among those 85 and older.

The same national survey documented that 4.8% of older adults reported physical, sexual or emotional abuse in the previous year, while 26.3% reported age discrimination in at least one everyday setting. These vulnerabilities can intersect with access to care, particularly among older adults with low incomes or functional limitations.

Risks and vulnerabilities are especially high for people living alone, those in poor health and rural residents. Visits, phone calls and community programs help, but these cannot replace adequate income, transportation, healthcare, housing or sustained social and family relationships.

Takeaways for other countries

When our team compared South Korea’s experience to that of other aging societies at different stages of demographic transition, it became clear that South Korea’s policies cannot simply be copied and implemented elsewhere.

What travels more easily are the broader lessons South Korea can offer societies that are earlier in their demographic transitions and therefore have more time to prepare.

South Korea highlights the need to build long-term care capacity before existing systems become overwhelmed. It also demonstrates why policymakers need to coordinate pension reforms with employment policy, rather than attempting to fix just one or the other. South Korea also underscores the need to design programs for older adults to reach rural and disadvantaged communities.

But the strongest lesson from South Korea is about timing: Aging societies have more options when they act before fiscal pressure, labor shortages and unmet care needs become severe. South Korea has created important institutions and continues to adapt the system as needs change, especially in long-term care, but its experience also shows the costs of allowing policy and public attitudes to lag behind demographic reality.

Jeongmin Park is a Ph.D. candidate in Human Development and Family Studies and Demography at The Pennsylvania State University. She is affiliated with the Center for Healthy Aging and the Population Research Institute.

Alexis R. Santos-Lozada is affiliated with the Population Research Institute and the Center for Healthy Aging at Pennsylvania State University. He is also a Social Disparities faculty at the Social Sciences Research Institute.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/how-south-korea-is-tackling-its-super-aging-problem-and-what-other-aging-nations-can-learn-from-its-experience/

As a librarian who researches and writes about library history in Pennsylvania, I was delighted to see the American Library Association’s efforts to celebrate its 150th anniversary this year, while making several mentions of Pennsylvania.

The ALA highlighted its 1876 founding in Philadelphia; how Pittsburgh philanthropist Andrew Carnegie funded the construction of more than 1,600 library buildings throughout the United States; and Scranton’s Henry and Edith Carr, who attended and maintained records about the ALA’s early conferences for nearly 50 years.

But these stories just scratch the surface of how Pennsylvanians have contributed to American libraries and librarianship.

I published a book on Pennsylvania libraries from the 1700s through the 1940s, and I’m working on a sequel that extends the story to the early 2000s. Many scholars connect the beginning of public librarianship in the United States to ALA’s 1876 founding, but libraries’ roots go back much further.

America’s first ‘public’ library

The Library Company of Philadelphia, established in 1731 by Benjamin Franklin, was the nation’s first successful circulating library and was a model for many others.

These early “public” libraries – so called because they did not require users to affiliate with churches, colleges or other organizations – were run by stockholders who pooled funds to purchase books. The owners charged annual membership fees to others who wanted to join.

In the 19th century there was widespread desire among U.S. educators, women’s clubs, local government leaders and public-spirited citizens to provide libraries to everyone, whether or not they could afford to subscribe.

Today, some people incorrectly believe that steel magnate Carnegie was the first philanthropist to donate money for library buildings. However, a number of other Pennsylvanians preceded him.

In 1883, for example, Thomas Struthers, a lawyer and land developer, constructed a multipurpose building in Warren, Penn., that contained a theater and storefronts. Those spaces were to support a public library that was also in the building. The business plan didn’t work, however, and users had to purchase “tickets” to borrow books.

Given such situations, Carnegie’s philanthropy was especially impactful because it shifted some financial responsibility to local governments.

While some of the lavish libraries Carnegie first erected in the Pittsburgh area came with endowments – the Homestead library is one that still exists – he later developed a formula to ensure that other communities would not rely on his continuous generosity. As a condition of most of his grants, Carnegie insisted that municipalities provide land plus annual operating funds equivalent to at least 10% of the buildings’ costs. This effectively committed municipalities to finance libraries with public dollars.

Federal and state support for public libraries

In Pennsylvania, rural residents received a library boost with the passage of Act 329 in 1931. The legislation offered partial matching funds to counties that provided library services.

Notably, the law excluded the state’s two largest counties – Philadelphia and Allegheny.

The federal Library Services Act of 1956-1962, a forerunner of the current Grants to States program, further aided libraries in communities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. The funds supported book purchases and projects such as bookmobile services.

Until the 1960s, though, there were no parallel funding streams for larger communities. This may have compounded other inequities.

Pennsylvania libraries did not practice de jure racial discrimination as Southern libraries did. Nor did they deliberately exclude senior citizens or people with disabilities. But how they allocated resources, designed spaces, developed collections, recruited staff and engaged local residents through specialized programming favored some constituents over others.

Just a few weeks ago I uncovered a November 1969 article in the Pennsylvania Library Association bulletin that was written by Augusta A. “Gussie” Clark, once a librarian and later a member of Philadelphia’s City Council. Clark wrote about how she believed white librarians in the City of Brotherly Love were failing Black children. She described the librarians’ lack of respect for Black communities, their “pained tolerance” of Black people in their midst, and an unwillingness to render extra help – all of which, she said, prevented Black children from feeling “at home” in public libraries.

Using libraries’ records, I have also found many requests from both individuals and advocacy groups asking for ramps, elevators and other alterations to century-old libraries, and for additional listening and viewing equipment. In at least one case, a complaint reached the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights; it was investigated and ultimately dismissed.

Libraries strive to be more inclusive

Libraries in urban areas of Pennsylvania began to receive state support after the passage of Act 188 of 1961, which created a state aid program for municipal as well as county libraries. It also provided additional funding to the Free Library of Philadelphia and Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh, which became Statewide Library Resource Centers. As such, they received extra funding to provide services to other libraries and customers in the state.

On the national level, the Library Services and Construction Act, which replaced the Library Services Act in 1964, did not exclude urban and populous suburban areas as the Library Services Act had. In administering the new funds, the State Library of Pennsylvania approved many proposals that extended services to underserved residents, such as Montgomery County-Norristown Public Library’s outreach to public housing complexes and prisons, Altoona Area Public Library’s L.I.F.E. program for people with intellectual disabilities, and Cumberland County Library System’s STAR service for homebound senior citizens.

In the following decades, libraries continued to strive to become more accessible. In the 1990s the Library Services and Technology Act and state efforts such as Gov. Tom Ridge’s Link-to-Learn initiative addressed the digital divide between communities that had computers and internet connections and those that did not. It provided grants for libraries to acquire needed upgrades.

Thirty years later, there are still some places in Pennsylvania, especially in rural and mountainous areas, that don’t have broadband. However, that number shrinks each year thanks to federal and state efforts to build infrastructure in communities that corporate entities have neglected.

Role of librarians today

Some commentators argue that the internet, online databases and AI have replaced the need for public libraries and professional librarians. But a lot of information and recreational reading material is locked behind paywalls that Google and chatbots cannot circumvent.

Librarians today continue to play a crucial role in ensuring that resources remain available to the “largest number, at the least cost,” as American librarian Melvil Dewey articulated more than a century ago.

The Pennsylvania Library Association has found that for every $1 in tax investment, libraries return $5.50 in benefits. This is largely by acquiring materials at discounts and enabling library customers to share and reuse them.

Working in today’s libraries can require substantial courage, too, given current censorship trends in public libraries, including book bans. Requests to remove titles, or reshelve them in less-accessible areas, is nothing new. For example, I documented an example in Scranton in 1898 in which Catholic citizens urged the removal of Augusta Jane Evans-Wilson’s novel “Inez: A Tale of the Alamo,” due to its negative portrayal of a priest and inaccurate descriptions of Catholic sacraments. However, current activists’ tactics are becoming more broad-stroke, aggressive and even violent.

The American Library Association and EveryLibrary, a library advocacy group, have noted bills in various states that propose jailing library employees for the materials their institutions contain. There do not seem to be any bills presently of concern in Pennsylvania. But news reports about other book challenges and bans in Pennsylvania, especially in school libraries, regularly show up in my inbox and social media feeds.

When you view the centuries-long history of American librarianship through a Pennsylvania lens, it’s more complex, nuanced and fascinating than many people realize. And while today’s libraries face various challenges, I believe they continue to contribute enormously to residents across the entire state.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

Bernadette A. Lear is a member of the American Library Association and the Pennsylvania Library Association.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/how-libraries-in-philadelphia-pittsburgh-and-other-pennsylvania-communities-evolved-from-subscription-clubs-to-vital-public-institutions/

In January 2026, President Donald Trump told an audience of business and political leaders in Davos, Switzerland, that the United States needed the “right, title and ownership” to Greenland “because you need the ownership to defend it. You can’t defend it on a lease.”

A territory of roughly 57,000 people appears to the president as property to be acquired.

Trump’s various actions during his second term have prompted no shortage of explanations. The “flooding the zone” strategy treats his flurry of executive orders and legal battles as efforts to overwhelm the courts’ and news media’s ability to keep up. Psychological explanations of Trump’s behavior point to narcissism. Other political commentators interpret his actions through authoritarianism and demagoguery.

I believe these accounts overlook something simpler. Before entering politics, Trump spent five decades running a commercial real estate business. In my assessment, he still reasons the way his professional career taught him to.

I study how forms of reasoning shape political arguments, and in analyzing Trump’s rhetoric across his second term, I find a president who approaches governing through the same framework as his business career – a mode of thinking I call portfolio reasoning.

Portfolio theory

Portfolio reasoning is a financial way of thinking that treats what one has – from property and money to relationships and obligations – as a collection of holdings to be continually managed and reassessed to maximize its value.

The recurring questions are familiar: What do I have? What is performing well and what isn’t? What should I keep, acquire, renegotiate or get rid of? And how do I make sure I can walk away?

Modern portfolio theory originated with economist Harry Markowitz in the 1950s as a way to manage financial risk. As finance came to dominate the wider economy, these habits spread well beyond Wall Street.

Consider a college sophomore today who, between classes, checks which stocks to hold or sell on the financial services platform Robinhood, reshuffles a fantasy football roster based on changing player values, and adjusts bets on future cultural and political events on a prediction market. Across very different activities, the same habit is at work: managing a shifting set of positions as their value changes.

The US, a flagship holding

It’s not difficult to imagine Trump’s second term through this lens.

According to portfolio theory, the soaring stock market, foreign investment growth and more tariff revenue become proof of the United States’ rising value. Previous presidents were bad negotiators who left money on the table. Alliances, treaties and obligations become holdings whose worth depends on maximizing their returns through continuous renegotiation. And states that vote the wrong way become candidates for divestment.

But a resemblance is not evidence. The more important question is whether Trump’s own words show that he reasons about politics this way.

Trump’s rhetoric repeatedly casts the U.S. as the flagship holding whose value he was elected to increase. He opened his 2026 State of the Union address by announcing that the nation was “back, bigger, better, richer and stronger than ever before.” The evidence that followed read like an investment performance report: The stock market had set “53 all-time record highs,” and the typical 401(k) was “up by at least $30,000.”

At a Las Vegas rally in August, he put it in the language of capital flows: “Money is pouring” into the U.S.

In Davos in January, in the State of the Union in February and again in Las Vegas in August, Trump described the country he inherited as a “dead country” that is now “the hottest country anywhere in the world.”

It’s the language of a distressed property turned around.

Holdings are continuously reassessed

Existing holdings get reassessed by Trump, too, and those judged to be underperforming are repriced.

In his State of the Union, Trump reported that NATO members had “just agreed, at my very strong request, to pay 5% of GDP for military defense rather than the 2%.” He added that the U.S. had been “paying the freight of many of them” and that NATO now pays in full for weapons sent to Ukraine.

Canada has faced the same reassessment. When it sought coverage under the proposed Golden Dome missile defense system, Trump put a price on protection – some $71 billion. He then offered an alternative: “Why don’t you just join our country? Become the 51st state and you get it for free.”

In this case, long-standing terms are reopened because one side can afford to walk away and the other cannot.

Portfolios acquire new positions

A portfolio also grows by acquiring what it doesn’t yet own.

Greenland is the clearest geopolitical example – Trump wants ownership, not access.

Venezuela follows a similar logic. After American forces removed President Nicolás Maduro, Trump announced that Venezuela would transfer up to 50 million barrels of oil. He said U.S. companies would go in and “start making money,” and noted that the country had been “pumping almost nothing by comparison to what they could have been” – an underperforming asset with a plan to improve it.

Not every acquisition is territorial. Since 2025, the federal government has taken ownership positions in roughly 30 companies, including 9.9% of Intel.

Portfolio reasoning and democratic limits

It’s fair to ask whether this is simply a more explicit version of what presidents have always done: pursue growth, expand power, defend the country’s interests.

Trump officials have suggested as much. White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller has described a world “governed by strength,” “force” and “power” – what he called “the iron laws of the world that have existed since the beginning of time.”

The difference has to do with limits – what stays open to negotiation and what doesn’t. Democratic governments may renegotiate treaties and alliances, but they also make durable commitments that are not continually reassessed according to what produces the best return.

Portfolio reasoning favors keeping your options open as circumstances change. Commitments are therefore provisional: Keep a position if it yields a high return, renegotiate if it doesn’t, and exit if something better comes along.

Trump applies that logic to nearly everything, leaving few political commitments settled and helping to explain the turbulence of his second term.

A second limit concerns the public. Viewed through a portfolio framework, people appear less as parties whose claims must be answered than as positions to be valued – assets when they contribute, liabilities when they don’t. Portfolio reasoning can assess value and risk. It cannot, by itself, distinguish right from wrong.

Applied to a population, portfolio logic does not necessarily deny human rights, but it offers no reason of its own for putting them beyond the reach of calculation. A portfolio presidency is not anti-democratic so much as indifferent: Democratic commitments have no privileged place in its financial calculations.

J. Christian Spielvogel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/how-portfolio-reasoning-explains-trumps-constant-reevaluation-of-americas-value/

Throwing something away that is urgently needed, expensive and difficult to source sounds crazy. Yet out of the 60 metals contained in old electronic devices like phones, screens or washing machines, only a few get recycled. That includes precious metals like gold or silver and some other metals like aluminium or copper. The rest are effectively single-use metals, used once then lost during collection or through incineration.

Metals are mined from ore and refined by using a lot of energy and resources as part of complex global supply chains. Think of the diesel needed to power the huge trucks in the mine, the chemicals needed to extract the metals from the ores or the pollution from intense furnaces.

By throwing away metal-rich electronics and not recovering these precious resources, we lose all the effort we put into getting the metals out of the ground. Yet these metals are urgently needed for green technologies such as wind turbines and heat pumps, as well as for conventional industries including car manufacturing, aerospace or the production of machinery. At the same time, most of them are not physically accessible for mining within Europe.

In research published with my colleagues, we investigated the different stages at which metals get wasted when items like LED lights and air conditioners get thrown away.

We identified that a large quantity of electronic waste (56%) in the EU between 2006-21 was not collected. Metals, however, can only be recovered if they end up in the right treatment facilities. Old devices often get thrown into the household waste bin, and then electronics are too mixed up with other rubbish so the metals won’t ever get separated.

While the collected waste quantity has substantially risen in recent years in some EU member states, others still lag behind. Proper e-waste collection thus remains a top priority across the continent.

A large chunk of metals is also lost during the sorting and recycling stages, mostly due to inefficient sorting. For many metals, there are no available recycling technologies. Most precious metals like gold or silver are recovered, while economically critical and in-demand metals like cobalt, gallium, tantalum or tungsten are currently lost in incineration with other undesirable substances.

We identified the products that contain the most of each metal. This enables the collection and recycling sectors to prioritise the processing of key products.
For neodymium hi-fi devices and speakers, small IT devices like network routers or hard disk drives matter most. Laptops are a rich source of gallium, for example. Our interactive online dashboard outlines information about the metal content of 54 device categories. For a deeper dive, we have published the data available in an open access repository.

Securing the supply chain

E-waste collection and recycling is often overlooked as a resource. For example, the amount of gallium in our e-waste is enough to reduce the EU’s import dependency of this metal by up to 40%. Tantalum quantities are estimated at 23% of total demand, as well as magnesium and tungsten quantities both with 12%, along with several other critical raw materials.

The EU could build its own secure resource supply chain by using secondary European metals from old electronics, batteries and other sources like incineration ash. That protects the EU from geopolitical disruptions in unstable parts of the supply chain while substantially reducing the environmental consequences associated with producing these metals.

This contributes to building a circular economy in which waste becomes a valuable input for new products. It also generates employment and fosters the development of emerging technologies for efficient metal recovery.

To achieve this, the EU needs to focus on where e-waste is currently lost, namely in the wrong waste bins, both from consumers and businesses. Additionally, legal and illegal exports of e-waste from the EU also lead to loss of metal resources.

While primary responsibility lies with the regulatory bodies, consumers can help by taking e-waste to the correct collection facilities and never disposing of it in household waste bins. Combined with the development and deployment of enhanced recycling technologies, the desired metals can be recovered much more efficiently from the waste that is already collected.

Europe is not facing a scarcity problem but a recovery challenge, and one that can be solved. With better collection, targeted interventions and continued innovation in recycling, the metals in our e‑waste can become a secure domestic resource base that strengthens European industry, reduces environmental pressures and accelerates the transition towards a truly circular economy.

Nils Pauliks receives funding from the project Circular Circuits (P20-13) funded by the Dutch Research Council (www.nwo.nl).

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/europes-e-waste-is-a-valuable-resource-lets-not-throw-it-away/

Pauline Hanson has expressed “regret” for describing Australia’s Indigenous people as “the most primitive race on earth”, saying it “wasn’t my intention to hurt people”.

Speaking after a barrage of criticism from across the political spectrum at her remarks, made on a podcast last year, she also said she was referring to First Nations people at the time of settlement, not at present.

“If we go back at the time of settlement in Australia, they were primitive compared to the settlers that came out here from England”, she said on News24. “But I’m not talking those terms now.”

Questioned about the backlash against her, including from Liberal Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, Hanson said: “I’ve always put my foot in my mouth in the way I come out and say things. I’m not the most eloquent speaker in how I deliver something, what I say.”

She said she had always called for equality for all Australians and for people not to be treated differently because of their race.

“I’ve always called out for accountability. I’ve called out the third world living conditions. I’ve called out the rape that is going on in these communities, and no one has done a damn thing about it.

“I’ve travelled to these communities. A lot of Aboriginal people support me because they feel they have been used as pawns in this, and it needs to be addressed.”

She continued to criticise teaching Aboriginal children Indigenous languages that “no longer is going to give them a job or give them any future”.

Hanson defended her criticism of the prime minister’s late mother for living in public housing for decades, which have also come under attack. On this she also offered an apology.

“I raised a comment with regards to housing commissions. My comments were not in distaste towards Anthony Albanese’s mother.

“I was referring to housing commissions at the time, so if he’s taken offence to it, well I’m sorry for that,” she said.

At the Coalition parties meeting, Opposition Leader Angus Taylor said the opposition had to hold One Nation members to account when they misstepped. He praised Garth Hamilton, Andrew Hastie and Price for doing so. He said the test “will always be decency”, and One Nation’s comments did not meet the basic test on decency.

Hanson willing to have PBO cost migration policy

Hanson said she was willing to have her controversial immigration policy, released this week, costed by the Parliamentary Budget Office.

The policy, which would have negative net overseas migration over three years and cut temporary visa holders by 175,000 over this period, has been widely criticised for having no costings and for its potential to crash the economy.

Hanson said she did not believe it would bring a recession.

She didn’t trust economists’ critiques. The plan was taking migration back to 2017 settings. “Did the economy crash at that time? No.”

“We had better standards of living for people,” she said.

“We’re technically in a recession now anyway, so if it’s going to hit the bottom line for a couple of months, but I think then it will improve. People’s quality of life will improve.”

“I’m sick of listening to the bureaucrats. I’m sick of listening to the politicians who never get it right. I’m sick of listening to the big business who just want cheap labour into the country.

“The real things that we need to do is to actually train more Australians, getting them to TAFE colleges, apprenticeships schemes.”

Pressed on whether she would submit the immigration policy to the PBO, Hanson said she would have no problem with doing so, although she sounded sceptical about the worth of it.

“The thing is listening to the people out there. […] I’m implementing the will of the people and the people are behind One Nation because they trust us on immigration.

Complaints about Albanese refusing One Nation more staff

Hanson said she had had two meetings with Special Minister of State Don Farrell about trying to get more staff for One Nation. Staffing for politicians is in the hands of the prime minister, but he has allocated staff in an arbitrary manner. One Nation’s allocation is disproportionately low.

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/hanson-regrets-hurt-caused-by-remark-about-primitive-first-nations-people/

Not that long ago, Australians owned many public enterprises and lived behind high tariff walls. The country ran on cheap coal-fired power. A pro-China foreign policy and a large, bipartisan migration program worked to the country’s benefit.

Today’s policy landscape would have been unimaginable to many voters 40 years ago. Most of the old state-owned enterprises now belong to shareholders. National Party leader Matt Canavan is a very lonely voice in his calls for renewed tariff protectionism.

In the face of global heating, Australia continues to experience social division over the future of its energy generation. The nation’s flagship defence policy to tackle regional uncertainty involves closer ties with old Anglosphere allies. And politicians of every hue are tying themselves in knots in a quest to lower net overseas migration.

How do policy cycles come to be, and what causes them to be remade over time? There’s a concept that could help us answer these questions: the Overton window.

What is it?

To borrow a concise definition from foreign policy expert Thomas Wright, the Overton window is the idea that there is an “acceptable range of political discourse in a society” at a given time. For example, it was once crazy-brave to argue for the end of the White Australia policy – until it wasn’t.

In democratic systems, leaders and parties tend to stick within these boundaries to remain popular and legitimate.

The concept takes its name from the late Joseph Overton, an electrical engineer and senior figure at the influential Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Michigan.

His colleague Joseph G. Lehman recently blogged that Overton’s concept was intended to “describe what think tanks do and explain why someone might support one”.

Think tanks are research and advocacy organisations. Some are staunchly independent while others are explicitly connected with or aligned to a partisan cause. An instinctive libertarian, Overton thought think tanks could stretch the limits of political possibility where risk-averse, vote-chasing politicians never could.

Overton died in 2003, with no inkling his name would be associated with one of the most widely used political terms of our times. It has become a standard phrase among policy wonks and especially in think tanks (including progressive organisations whose politics Overton would have staunchly opposed).

Shifting windows, shifting climate

The Overton window seems convenient for explaining big shifts in public policy. But just how good is it?

Could it, for example, help us understand something as messy as Australia’s embrace, and then rejection, of an emissions trading scheme (ETS)?

By 2007, the idea of an ETS to price carbon and disincentivise carbon pollution had been circulating for at least two decades. It was, according to historian Ruth Morgan, an idea that fit within the “zeitgeist of sustainable development” (as well as pro-market internationalism).

Australian governments, both Labor and Coalition, had stumbled at the hurdle of a coherent emissions reduction policy. The Howard government chose not to consider a mandatory emissions trading scheme in 2003.

Just four years later, both major parties were promising voters they would introduce an ETS if (re-)elected.

Labor, under Kevin Rudd, comfortably won the 2007 election, but failed to secure the necessary support of either the Coalition or the Greens for his ETS in the Senate. The government ultimately shelved its proposal as the public mood turned sour.

Just three years after campaigning for an ETS, Labor’s climate policy offering at the 2010 election was noticeably threadbare. There was a proposal for a citizens’ assembly, a $2,000 rebate to encourage voters to trade in older vehicles, and a promise from the new prime minister, Julia Gillard, that there would be “no carbon tax”.

The Coalition had already committed itself to opposing an ETS. As the politics got tougher, Labor moved away from its former position and toward the position of its opponents.

Read more:
The carbon tax debate damaged Julia Gillard’s leadership – and good climate policy for years to come

Governing subsequently in minority with the support of the Greens, Labor passed a modified package, including an ETS with a three-year fixed price. This proved decisively unpopular and the critics, including Opposition Leader Tony Abbott, dubbed the measure a “carbon tax” and a “broken promise” at that.

Labor suffered all the way to a devastating election defeat in 2013. Abbott’s new government repealed the ETS. George Megalogenis, in his new book Three Shocks, offers a neat account of this protracted policy drama.

Pollsters and commentators have periodically floated the idea in the intervening years, and a modest substitute exists today for high-emitting industries in the form of the safeguard mechanism.

But voter sentiment on carbon pricing remains uneven despite the best efforts of proponents and economists.

Concepts that dare not speak their names

At its most superficial, the Overton window can be deployed to explain every one of the twists and turns above. It can be made bigger or smaller, more progressive or more conservative.

The causes of change can be anything from a shocking event to a concerted campaign of advocacy, a singular act of individual political boldness or a longer, slower process of social and cultural change.

On closer inspection, there’s not much in the way of precise explanation for how change happens. The Overton window’s magic is its ability to absorb and repurpose other models of political change without ever naming or explaining them.

A concept called issue salience – how important or prominent a given issue is to voters and policymakers – matters here. Voters in 2007 were more disposed to regard climate change and emissions reduction as a serious priority for several reasons.

The Millennium Drought, the worst in Australia’s modern history to that point, made the issue of global heating and sustainability more tangible for voters. Australia’s bushfire season had commenced early the previous summer.

Action on climate had broader cultural and policy legitimacy, too. Documentaries like former US Vice President Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth heightened public interest, as did a major report by Nicholas Stern for the British government on the economic costs of inaction.

The “framing” of an issue – the way it’s presented and pitched to align with existing worldviews and prior beliefs – is also important.

Outside of environmental and progressive circles, the idea of action on climate change had struggled against the more pervasive concern that Australia might cause economic self-harm if it curtailed use of its abundant coal.

By 2007, commentary had reframed Australia as a global laggard in the fight to reduce emissions. There were frequent appeals to the interests of “children and grandchildren”.

Abbott proved highly effective at reframing again the entire debate, describing Rudd’s ETS as a “great big new tax on everything” and Gillard’s clean energy future package as a “tax”.

That proved fatal to Gillard’s public standing, the government and the survival of the policy itself.

As other concerns, including the global financial crisis, came to the fore, climate change slipped down the list of issues for most voters. According to the Australian Election Study, climate change was “extremely important” in the federal vote decision for 52% of voters in 2007, but that figure was down to 30% in 2010.

There is a whole family of concepts in political science that try to explain how politicians respond to this type of change in voter sentiment. Among these concepts are convergence theory, rational choice theory, median voter theory and catch-all political parties.

These very different theories reach for a common set of conclusions. They hold that voters will follow their own perceived economic interests, and political candidates will converge on a position that causes the least offence to the greatest number.

Each of those concepts, in some way, sheds light on aspects of the rise and fall of the Emissions Trading Scheme policy in Australia – even if we are sometimes not our most “rational” selves at the ballot box.

The limits of boldness

The Overton window draws its appeal from the idea that impactful think tanks, landmark reports and leading advocates are the real change agents. The rise of the concept closely tracked the rapid proliferation of think tanks from 1990 onwards.

Such actors played a role in the national policy changes I referred to at the outset. And they’ve been major characters in the ETS story, too.

In his memoir, John Howard described Gore’s documentary and the Stern report as elements of a “perfect storm” that forced him into offering an Emissions Trading Scheme.

Journalist Marian Wilkinson shows in her book Carbon Club that when the tide ran against carbon pricing, there were business-backed right-wing think tanks leading the charge, including new outfits in the United Kingdom alongside older ones, such as the Institute of Public Affairs.

Individual politicians often make a difference. Many of Abbott’s opponents have credited him with singlehandedly killing off a generation’s hopes for a climate policy built around an ETS. In his memoir, Rudd calls Abbott a “giant wrecking ball” of “singular, destructive impact” on the nation.

But these are the judgements of the defeated and the frustrated – and they contradict the Overton idea that change comes from outside the political elites.

There is some room in the Overton model for social movements and rank-and-file party memberships, but not a lot. That’s perhaps not surprising, as there are ever-fewer members to exert real pressure on parliamentary leaders.

But they do still make their mark sometimes. This was true of Liberal members and their advocacy against an ETS in 2009.

Media space and political opportunity are central to the Overton concept. Yet one doesn’t need a copy of The Communist Manifesto in their lap to appreciate that larger social and economic forces shape political change. Those forces are slower to materialise and harder to evaluate, but that makes them all the more important.

The Overton window is not the only tool, and certainly not always the best, for that work.

Joshua Black has been a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at The Australia Institute and a media adviser and speechwriter in federal government.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/how-does-unthinkable-policy-become-inevitable-the-overton-window-is-one-possible-answer/

KNIGHTLY VIEWS: By Gavin Ellis

Two months out from New Zealand’s general election, and we have yet to see new policy from any of the seven main political parties on media and communication.

Only the Greens have a media policy on their website — and it is effectively a repeat of the 2023 policy that was heavy on high-minded rhetoric but very light on functional detail. No party has yet presented voters with practical initiatives that take account of the significant shifts in the media industry since the last election.

Admittedly, this is not the sort of policy that will sway voters, but manifestos are more than vote-grabbers. They represent commitments by each party to use their best endeavours during the coming Parliamentary term to give effect to what they say they will do in the interests of the public good.

• READ MORE: Other Gavin Ellis articles on media

Unless there is a sudden avalanche of media policy promises, the signal the parties are sending is that, in this area of public policy, they plan to do very little.

I do not believe our politicians are unaware of the precarious state of journalism in this country. They have been lobbied by every media organisation and left in no doubt that the cuts that have kept newsrooms in operation are not sustainable in even the medium term.

The have been warned we will see the loss of significant news publications and news broadcasts within the term of the next government unless there is a reset. The playing field needs to be levelled to overcome the pernicious effects of uncontrolled foreign digital players in our media market.

Those effects are not only financial. They include significant civic, social and cultural consequences. We have already suffered damage caused by years of political inaction and ineffectiveness, but believe me, worse will come unless significant change is forthcoming.

Comfortable with less scrutiny
One of my worries is that, irrespective of high-minded utterances about the importance of journalism to democracy, most politicians are comfortable with less scrutiny of their activities by journalists than with an enhanced ability to speak truth to power.

Too many politicians, and the functionaries who spread their messages, mistakenly believe that their responsibility to keeping the public informed is met by speaking directly to constituents through social media and email lists, and that news media are no longer needed.

They are mistaken because scrutiny is the missing element in that interpretation of their social contract. Scrutiny includes ferreting out those matters of public interest that politicians would prefer you do not see or hear.

There is also a prevailing view that commercial news media are creatures of the marketplace and should, like any other business, stand or fall on the basis of their ability to sell goods or services.

Under the model prevailing when they were created, that is a valid viewpoint. However, that model is broken and has been dysfunctional long enough for some parts of it to become almost irretrievable.

Some will say that is the nature of the marketplace — ever changing and requiring nimble business practices to keep pace. It is only to be expected that some businesses will fail because they do not (or cannot) adapt.

Again, that is a valid viewpoint. But it is one that does not recognise two things. The first is the civic and social roles that news media play in a society that requires diverse and independent sources of information to properly function. The second is the inequity of a marketplace in which foreign players can plunder content with impunity and avoid the taxes and regulations that burden domestic media.

Untouchable foreign players
Beyond the marketplace are the social harms that are undeniably caused by those apparently untouchable foreign players and the as-yet-unquantifiable effects of their use of artificial intelligence.

The present government’s introduction (not passage) of legislation to introduce an Australian model under-16 ban on social media appears to be a calculated pre-election move, rather than an earnest attempt to deal with the problem (see below).

That Bill may look as if we are catching up with other countries on media policy, but the reality is that we have been left far behind. Inaction and widespread political indifference could see an incoming government face a firestorm of compounding consequences.

There are eight areas that all political parties need to address. I would like to think they could reach consensus on most of them.

The first is to create an enforceable environment that will allow all news organisations to negotiate financial compensation from foreign digital platforms for the use of content. That use would include search and social media plus large language models and other artificial intelligence assets.

The Fair Digital News Bargaining Bill that has lain dormant in Parliament throughout the term of the present government should be resurrected, updated to bring its provisions in line with those of Australia, and extended to account for developments in artificial intelligence.

The second is to enforce the provisions of the OECD profit shifting framework to impose a tax on revenue that is currently moved offshore in the form of service payments. The resulting impost, which would be in addition to the money negotiated by news organisations, should be used to finance non-profit local and iwi news initiatives.

Sustaining local newsrooms
The third is the adoption of policies to help sustain local newsrooms. Two initiatives should be considered. Firstly, the State of California’s Community Newsroom Employment and Workforce Sustainability Act which will provide refundable tax credits to local newsrooms for each journalist they employ.

Such measures could be used to help sustain local and iwi news outlets. The Californian legislation, which passed the Senate and Assembly by overwhelming majorities and is awaiting Governor Gavin Newsom’s signature, extends eligibility to print, broadcast, digital, nonprofit, and independent family-owned news outlets. It is regarded as a blueprint for other states to follow.

Secondly, there is a British initiative that allows local authority rates relief on local news premises. The virtue of policies such as these is that they are effectively revenue neutral. Without the help, the newsrooms would not exist.

The fourth policy relates to public media. The amalgamation of Radio New Zealand and Television New Zealand should be resurrected in light of TVNZ’s increasingly problematic advertising revenue base and the need to affect cost savings in both organisations.

The funding system for both organisations, together with Whakaata Māori and Iwi Radio, should be reviewed and consideration given to triennial funding.

The fifth policy should be a comprehensive review of the future of terrestrial broadcasting and the consequences of moves to digital-only delivery. Its deliberations should include possible disenfranchising of the elderly and poor; the impact on Māori broadcasting; the impact on TVNZ news services that could arise in a move to video streaming on demand; and the consequential uses of radio spectrum.

The sixth policy should be an urgent review of the harmful effects of social media that would include, but not be limited to, the effects on those under the age of 16. The proposed ban is based on that currently enacted in Australia, which has been been ineffective. Australia’s internet regulator, eSafety, last month issued the results of a study that found that more than eight in 10 Australian under-16s are continuing to use social media despite the ban.

Platform operators as publishers
The review should consider deeming social media platform operators to be publishers (on the basis that their algorithms and AI tools manipulate content and determine audiences) and liable for infringements of law and regulation.

The seventh policy initiative should be a comprehensive review of media regulation and the development of an independent framework for complaint and adjudication. The review should embrace not only local media but also foreign-controlled digital platforms with New Zealand user bases over a certain size. Pending the adoption of findings from the review, existing regulatory bodies (state and industry-led) should remain in place.

Finally, any policies relating to artificial intelligence should make specific reference to news media, the integrity of news content, and intellectual property rights. It should include measures to limit the spread of disinformation, the verification and validation of legitimate news content produced by journalists, and the identification of AI-generated content.

Our political parties — and the public — need to understand the consequences of failing to deal effectively with what will become increasingly existential issues for journalism. Perhaps their starting point should be a general enquiry into the viability of New Zealand journalism and our media infrastructure, even if it tells them what some of us already know.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/nz-elections-where-are-much-needed-party-policies-on-media/

ANALYSIS: By Karen Scott

The New Zealand government has so far declined to join the United Kingdom and announce sanctions on goods produced in illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The UK is one of 12 countries, including France and Canada, which have announced similar trade restrictions or an intention to do so. The goal is to rescue an eventual two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

The sanctions are in response to what UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband described as “ethnic cleansing of Palestinians […] perpetrated by settler terrorists”, with the Israeli military “complicit” in those actions.

• READ MORE: Pioneer of Palestine protest in NZ warns against the IDF ‘obscenity’ becoming normalised
• Animated map shows spread of illegal Israeli settlements across Palestine
• Other Israeli illegal settlements in Palestine reports

While condemning the increase in illegal settlements, a spokesperson for Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters said New Zealand “has not traditionally used trade measures to address foreign policy issues”.

To do so would be complex and require a full policy process. We are not in a position to do that ahead of the election.

The official response to the UK initiative can be questioned on several grounds.

First, New Zealand has used trade measures in the past to address foreign policy issues, most notably against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. Imports of gold, oil and gas are prohibited and there is a 35 percent tariff on all imported Russian goods.

Second, while New Zealand needs to adopt special legislation to impose sanctions outside the United Nations regime, the Russian Sanctions Act — passed in 2022 just three weeks after the invasion of Ukraine — shows it can be done swiftly.

The precise nature of the sanctions may be complex to implement, as the UK has acknowledged. But the intent comes first.

Third, the proximity of a general election should not prevent New Zealand complying with its obligations under international law — especially when the opposition Labour Party has indicated it strongly supports adopting sanctions.

Israeli settler colonialism, explained in 15 seconds https://t.co/WFNekm8uhK pic.twitter.com/j0xgONzYyy

— Zachary Foster (@_ZachFoster) September 15, 2026

Saving a two-state solution
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, dates from 1967 and was characterised as a “flagrant violation of international law” by the UN Security Council in 2016.

In 2024, the International Court of Justice confirmed that Israel’s actions amount to an illegal annexation of territory and are contrary to the prohibition on the use of force and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Despite this, Israel has built around 160 settlements housing 700,000 people since 1967. In the past 18 months, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has estimated more than 300 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli soldiers or settlers (with 20 Israelis killed by Palestinians in the same period), and more than 6000 Palestinians displaced.

In August 2025, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced a plan to construct 3000 settlement homes east of occupied East Jerusalem, known as the E1 settlement plan. This would split the West Bank and isolate East Jerusalem, which Palestine regards as its capital.

This is intentional. Smotrich has asserted the E1 settlement plan “buries the idea of a Palestinian state”. In August this year, Israel opened tenders for the construction of 1200 settlement homes, prompting the UK sanctions response.

These UK sanctions go further than the limited restrictions on arms exports to Israel introduced in 2024 (extended in 2026), targeted sanctions on individual settlers and Israeli ministers, and even the UK’s recognition of Palestine as a state in 2025.

While trade more generally between Israel and the UK is unaffected, Israel has reacted furiously, closing the British consulate in Jerusalem (which operates as the de facto British Embassy in Palestine) and banning 12 British MPs from entering the country.

Israel in Panic: The Truth About UK Sanctions Revealed! @Lowkey0nline pic.twitter.com/61NhAACTh0

— Double Down News (@DoubleDownNews) September 14, 2026

Support for a rules-based order
All states have an obligation under customary international law to cooperate to bring an end to serious breaches of certain fundamental rules, including the prohibition on the use of force, illegal occupation of territory, and the right of self-determination.

The International Court of Justice explicitly highlighted this obligation in its 2024 Advisory Opinion which stipulated that states must not recognise Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. They must also “abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel” concerning the territories.

For New Zealand, joining trade (and other) sanctions adopted (or slated to be adopted) by 12 other countries would be an appropriate way to comply with this obligation.

Not doing so further risks undermining the international rules-based order on which New Zealand relies to protect its interests in trade, security and the environment — at a time when that order is under extraordinary strain.

New Zealand is already an outlier, given its refusal to join the 157 countries — including Australia and a majority of European countries — that have recognised Palestine as a state.

To join the UK and other nations sanctioning goods produced in illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in no way denies the existence of Israel itself as a state.

But by adopting comparable sanctions, New Zealand would strengthen the global response to Israel’s illegal activities, demonstrate regional leadership, and reassert support for the international rules-based order more generally.

Karen Scott is a professor of international law at the University of Canterbury and has produced more than 70 edited books/journal articles and book chapters in the fields of international environmental law, law of the sea and Polar law. She was president of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law. This article is republished from The Conversation under Creative Commons.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/15/the-case-for-nz-joining-the-uk-in-sanctioning-israel-over-illegal-west-bank-settlements-2/

Some of Australia’s most powerful policy institutions are now being led by female economists.

Between 2023 and 2026 came a remarkable run of firsts. Danielle Wood became the first woman to chair the Productivity Commission, Michele Bullock the first female governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), and Jenny Wilkinson the first woman to lead the Australian Treasury.

It might seem as though women economists have suddenly arrived at the top.

Yet these remarkable firsts began much earlier.

Did you know the first economics textbook used in Australian schools was written by a woman? In 1880, the writer, reformer and suffragette Catherine Helen Spence published The Laws We Live Under and it stayed on the curriculum for 20 years.

Or that Australian economist Marion Phillips became the first Australian woman elected to a national parliament – entering Britain’s House of Commons in 1929?

If these stories are unfamiliar, you are probably not alone.

A new book, Power in Numbers: Australian Women in Economics, by economists Melissa Bray and Catie Bradbear, tells the stories of 16 women who helped shape Australian economics.

Review: Power in Numbers: Australian Women in Economics by Melissa Bray and Catie Bradbear (Melbourne University Press)

Where are the women in economics?

Even today, economics remains stubbornly male-dominated. Women make up only around one-third of economists in Australia, and just 17% of economics professors.

Why does this matter? Because who becomes an economist can shape which questions are studied and which policies are recommended.

As Professor Betsey Stevenson writes in the book’s foreword:

Diversity matters because it gives us better perception, a better understanding of problems, of wants and needs, and of potential solutions.

And the pipeline is not encouraging. In the early 1990s, roughly equal numbers of girls and boys studied Year 12 economics. Today, boys outnumber girls by around two to one.

Part of the challenge is economics’ image problem. Reserve Bank research from 2021 found female students were less interested in economics, less certain they would be good at it and less clear about its career paths.

Role models matter and several women in the book supported women coming after them, including through the Women in Economics Network. By making these women and their achievements visible, the book can help younger women imagine a place for themselves in economics.

Their brilliant careers

The range is striking. Trailblazing policy reformer Meredith Edwards was the only woman in her economics honours class. She went on to become a key architect of child support, Austudy and HECS, reforms that affect millions of Australians.

In 2008, Besa Deda became the first female chief economist of an Australian bank at St George Bank. Former RBA assistant governor Luci Ellis later became the first at a big four bank (Westpac) in 2023.

The influence of female economists was not confined to Australia. Persia Campbell pioneered consumer economics in the US, arguing that economic progress should be judged by whether people’s basic needs were met and living standards improved – not just by economic statistics. She later advised US President John F. Kennedy and even had her own television show in the US in 1960s.

These are all exceptionally accomplished women. But that raises an uncomfortable question: how brilliant did a woman have to be just to enter spaces where men already belonged?

Did men have to be quite this brilliant?

Just a glimpse of the challenges

Power in Numbers deliberately does not dwell on the obstacles these women faced. There are glimpses – universities that did not admit women, jobs that were closed to them, and careers built in overwhelmingly male institutions – but the focus stays firmly on achievement.

The result is a celebratory account, rather than an even-handed one. That choice carries a risk: readers still confronting those barriers may fail to see their own struggles reflected in the stories.

The book’s admiring tone also comes through in its use of the women’s first names. At times it feels overly familiar for an account of their professional achievements.

The book would have benefited from photographs, particularly of the historical figures, putting faces to women whose stories have too often remained invisible. And for a book on Australian women in economics, an Australian economist might have been a more natural fit for the foreword.

Many ways to be an economist

Many of the women came from families that valued girls’ education and later found support from mentors and colleagues. But did they all come from similar backgrounds?

Far from it.

Some grew up in a farming community; others found economics by unexpected routes.

Leading businesswoman Jillian Broadbent, a former board member at Qantas, Woolworths and the ASX among others, never had a grand career plan. Yet her career took her from the Reserve Bank to chairing Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation.

Again and again, these women were willing to take a leap when an interesting opportunity appeared, tackle difficult problems and move into unfamiliar territory.

Danielle Wood advises: “Be curious […] Read broadly” and “be brave” enough to defend your views, even when they differ from those above you.

What many also share is a desire to make a positive difference.

Policy reformer Meredith Edwards describes her career philosophy as pursuing positions in academia and the public service

where I believed I could effect improvements in public policy and where my mind and heart were at one.

I particularly enjoyed the questions about each woman’s “superpower”, advice and how she would like to be remembered.

Broadbent stresses looking after your health and not carrying emotional baggage. A similar message recurs: learn from setbacks, move on and keep going.

Taken together, these stories leave a powerful message: there is no single path into economics, and no single way to belong in it.

Duygu Yengin is a co-founder and current Deputy Chair of the Women in Economics Network. She receives no financial benefit from this role.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/14/australias-female-economists-have-been-making-history-for-nearly-150-years-its-time-we-knew-their-stories/

Last week, the peak body for Australian universities called on the federal government to introduce concession cards and further discounts to all domestic uni students.

Universities Australia says the measures would ease cost-of-living pressures for students. Under the proposal, international uni students would also receive public transport concessions.

It comes after the peak body released data in June showing, since 2021, students’ basic living expenses jumped by 29%. Universities Australia said this figure was “well above economy-wide inflation” of 24%.

How do concession cards work again?

Concession card holders in Australia need to meet certain eligibility requirements in order to receive them. These requirements might be based on low-income status, disability and age (for pensioners). There are also various concessions for veterans offering different benefits.

Concession card holders receive discounts, subsidised by government, for everyday necessities such as medicines, public transport and utility bills and, in some cases, for car registration.

Some domestic uni students qualify for concession benefits through Health Care cards, Austudy, ABSTUDY or Youth Allowance. However, enrolling in university alone does not mean a student qualifies for these discounts. For uni students, eligibility for public transport discounts also differs between states.

The reality for students

Many uni students have to juggle the costs of tuition, housing, transport and groceries usually while working casually or in a part-time role.

Research published in May found one in three surveyed Australian uni students experience serious financial hardship.

My research with colleagues published last month mirrors these findings.

We surveyed a nationally representative sample of 2,731 people aged 18–24 about their education, wellbeing and finances between 2021 to 2025. About 48% of participants were studying full time and 22% were part time in vocational education, university or another tertiary institution at the time.

Struggling to afford basics

In our survey, food insecurity surfaced as a major problem for young people. This is when someone cannot access affordable, nutritious and culturally appropriate food. The most common cause for food insecurity was a lack of money.

We found, on average, about one in five young Australians experienced food insecurity between 2021 and 2025 – most of whom were students.

Over the five years, respondents who said they couldn’t afford or access healthy or nutritious food fluctuated between 58% and 69%. More than 50% reported they had to skip meals and were worried they would not have enough food to eat. The proportion of young people who went without eating for a whole day ranged from 49% in 2021 to 42% in 2025.

About 82–90% of participants reported experiencing financial difficulty every year. Of course, these pressures are not confined to this age group, and can affect students of all ages.

Another 2026 Australian study surveying university staff showed they observed 51.5% of students going without medical treatment due to financial difficulties.

What is the government currently doing to help?

The government has taken some steps to help with uni costs already. It wiped $3 billion in student HECS-HELP debts and increased rent assistance in 2023 and again in 2024.

At the same time the Job-ready Graduates scheme, which came into effect in 2021, has increased the cost of law and business degrees and doubled the cost of arts degrees.

Easing debt is only one piece of the mosaic of financial distress experienced by many students. These measures don’t necessarily make university financially viable while students are studying.

Financial stress can make it too hard for students to attempt or finish their studies. The government recognises university course completions are associated with lower financial stress for students.

Should more domestic students receive support?

The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare estimated about 172,000 students aged between 16–64 received Youth Allowance, Austudy or ABSTUDY payments as of March 2025. The most recently published government data shows 1,086,789 domestic students were enrolled in higher education in 2024. This equates to just under 16% of domestic students receiving Youth Allowance, Austudy or ABSTUDY around this period.

While these initiatives offer students financial relief, it’s worth noting that payments are below the poverty line.

Youth Allowance and ABSTUDY are also subject to parental means-testing. This means if a student is classified as a dependent (typically under the age of 22), their parent or guardian needs to provide their income details in a claim.

This income becomes a factor in determining how much financial support the student can receive, or whether they’re eligible to receive anything. Students are exempted from parental means-testing if their guardians receive particular government allowances.

Usually, students need to be studying full time to receive Austudy and Youth Allowance benefits.

System not up to scratch

Some student unions argue parental means‑testing incorrectly assumes parents or carers have arrangements with their children to support them financially. While some experts say students whose parents earn just above the income threshold may lock them out of payments.

All of this suggests the overall system is inconsistently targeted and not addressing broader cost‑of‑living challenges.

What next?

Expanding concessions to university students will cost money – so far, Universities Australia has not put a price tag on this. So the challenge will be funding concessions in a fiscally-tight environment.

But the federal government’s 2024 Australian Universities Accord also outlines its goal to increase Australia’s tertiary education qualifications from 60% to 80% by 2050. This means we need to find ways to support more students to study.

To reach its target, the government may need to consider easing daily costs for uni students now and into the future.

Lucas Walsh receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

Original source: https://analysis1.mil-osi.com/2026/09/14/1-in-3-uni-students-experience-serious-financial-hardship-could-concession-cards-for-all-help/