Most of Iranian oil — 96.7 percent — is destined for China. If you note this figure, you will realise that the Americans are really trying to choke off the supply of Iranian oil to China by blockading the Strait of Hormuz.

This is a major part of the American containment strategy against China.

Now that America will most likely lose control of the Strait of Hormuz to Iran, they are shifting their attention to the other most critical chokepoint in the world — the Strait of Malacca.

About 80 percent of China’s imported oil has to pass through the Strait of Malacca. Vessels come down the Strait, sail past Singapore which is at the southernmost tip of the Strait, before they swing upwards into the South China Sea to go to the Philippines and East Asia, including China.

The two most important countries which border the Malacca Strait are Indonesia and Malaysia, one on either side of the Strait.

A very interesting development took place on Monday in Washington when the Defence Minister of Indonesia Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin signed a cooperation agreement with US War Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Speculation on details
People are speculating about the details of the agreement:

• Will it allow the Americans to base troops in Indonesia and use Indonesian airspace for their air assets?
• Will American naval vessels be allowed to dock at the old Dutch port of Belawan, near Medan, in Northern Sumatra, which is near the opening to the Strait?
• Will the Malacca Strait now become the focal point in this great power struggle between America and China?
• What will Indonesia’s other BRICs partners, principally China and Russia think of Indonesia’s move in signing this agreement with the Americans?

To spice things up, Indonesian President Probowo Subianto was in Moscow a few days ago meeting with President Putin.

Lim Tean is a Singaporean lawyer, politician and commentator. He is the founder of the political party People’s Voice and a co-founder of the political alliance People’s Alliance for Reform.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

As concerns continue to emerge over China’s “unusual” naval exercises in the Tasman Sea, raising eyebrows from New Zealand and Australia, the Cook Islands government was questioned for an update in Parliament.

This follows the newly established bilateral relations between the Cook Islands and China through a five-year agreement and Prime Minister Mark Brown’s accusations of the New Zealand media and experts looking down on the Cook Islands.

A Chinese Navy convoy held two live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand on Friday and Saturday, prompting passenger planes to change course mid-flight and pressuring officials in both countries.

Akaoa MP Robert Heather queried the Prime Minister whether the government had spoken to Chinese embassy officials in New Zealand for a response in this breach of Australian waters?

“One thing I do know is that just in the recent weeks, New Zealand navy was part of an exercise with the Australians and Americans conducting naval exercises in the South China Sea and perhaps that’s why China decided to exercise naval exercises in the international waters off the coast of Australia,” he said.

“And I also know that in the last two weeks, the government of Australia and China signed a security treaty between the two countries.

“However in due course, we may be informed more about these naval exercises that these countries conduct in international waters off each other’s coasts.”

According to Brown, he had not been briefed by any government whether it’s New Zealand, Australia, or China about these developments.

Asking for an update
He added that while the Minister of Foreign Affairs Elikana was currently in the Solomon Islands attending a forum on fisheries together with other ministers of the Pacific Region, he would ask him about whether he could make any inquiries to find out whether the government could be updated or briefed on this issue.

Meanwhile, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters said after a meeting with his Chinese counterpart in Beijing, that lack of sufficient warning from China about the live-fire exercises was a “failure” in the New Zealand-China relationship.

A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defence, Wu Qian explained that China’s actions were entirely in accordance with international law and established practices and would not impact on aviation safety.

He added that the live-fire training was conducted with repeated safety notices that had been issued in advance.

Republished with permission from the Cook Islands News.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle

The Western media went into overdrive this week to work the laconic Kiwis into a mild frenzy over three Chinese naval vessels conducting exercises in the Tasman Sea a few thousand kilometres off our shores.

What was really behind this orchestrated campaign?

The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean).

 “We cannot hide at this end of the world anymore,” Defence Minister Judith Collins said in light of three Chinese boats in the Tasman.

Warrior academics were next . “We need to go to the cutting edge, and we need to do that really, really fast,” the ever-reliable China hawk Anne-Marie Brady of Canterbury University said, telling 1 News the message of the live-firing exercises was that China wants to rule the waves.

The British Financial Times chimed in with a warning that “A confronting strategic future is arriving fast”.

Could this have anything to do with the fact we are fast approaching the New Zealand government’s 2025 budget and that they — and their Australian, US and UK allies — are intent on a major increase in Kiwi defence funding, moving from around 1.2 percent of GDP to possibly two percent? A long-anticipated Defence Capability Review is also around the corner and is likely to come with quite a shopping list of expensive gear.

What’s good for the goose . . .
It is worth pointing out that New Zealand and Australian warships sailed through the contested Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in the South China Sea as recently as September 2024. What’s good for the goose is good for the Panda.

And, of course, at any one time about 20 US nuclear submarines are prowling in the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. Each can carry missiles the equivalent of over 1000 Hiroshima bombs — truly apocalyptic.

Veteran New Zealand peace campaigner Mike Smith (a friend) was not in total disagreement with the hawks when it came to the argy-bargy in the Tasman.

“The emergence apparently from nowhere of a Chinese naval expedition in our waters I think may be intended to demonstrate that they have a large and very capable blue water navy now and won’t be penned in by AUKUS submarines when and if they arrive off their coast.

“I think the main message is to the Australians: if you want to homebase nuclear-capable B-52s we have more than one way to come at you. That was also the message of the ICBM they sent into the Pacific: Australia is no longer an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

According to the Asia Times, China fired the ICBM — the first such shot into the Pacific by China — just days after HMNZS Aotearoa sailed through the Taiwan Strait with Australian vessel HMAS Sydney.

Smith says our focus should be on building positive relationships in the Pacific on our terms. “Buying expensive popguns will not save us.”

China Scare a page out of Australia’s Red Scare playbook
For people good at pattern recognition this week’s China Scare was obviously a page or two out of the same playbook that duped a majority of Australians into believing China was going to invade Australia. They were lulled into a false sense of insecurity back in 2021 — the mediascape flooded with Red Alert, China panic stories about imminent war with the rising Asian power.

As a sign of how successful the mainstream media can be in generating fear that precedes major policy shifts: research by Australia’s Institute of International & Security Affairs showed that more Australians thought that China would soon attack Australia than Taiwanese believed China would attack Taiwan!

Once the population was conditioned, they woke one morning in September 2021 with the momentous news that Australia had ditched a $90 billion submarine defence deal with France and the country was now part of a new anti-Chinese military alliance called AUKUS. This was the playbook that came to mind last week.

There are strong, rational arguments that could be made to increase our spending at this time. But I loathe and decry this kind of manipulation, this manufacturing of consent.

I also fear what those billions of dollars will be used for. Defending our coastlines is one thing; joining an anti-Chinese military alliance to please the US is quite another.

Prime Minister Luxon has called China — our biggest trading partner — a strategic competitor. He has also suggested, somewhat ludicrously, that our military could be a “force multiplier” for Team AUKUS.

We are hitching ourselves to the US at the very time they have proven they treat allies as vassals, threatened to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal, continue to commit genocide in Gaza, and are now imposing an unequal treaty on Ukraine.

Australia’s ABC News on Foreign Minister Winston Peter’s talks in China. Video: ABC

Whose side – or calmer independence?
Whose side should we be on? Or should we return to a calmer, more independent posture?

And then there’s the question of priorities. The hawks may convince the New Zealand population that the China threat is serious enough that we should forgo spending money on child poverty, fixing our ageing infrastructure, investing in health and education and instead, as per pressure from our AUKUS partners, spend some serious coin — billions of dollars more — on defence.

Climate change is one battle that is being fought and lost. Will climate funding get the bullet so we can spend on military hardware? That would certainly get a frosty reaction from Pacific nations at the front edge of sea rise.

The government in New Zealand is literally taking the food out of children’s mouths to fund weapons systems. The Ka Ora, Ka Ako programme provides nutritious lunches every day to a quarter of a million of New Zealand’s most needy children.

Its funding has recently been slashed by over $100 million by the government despite its own advisors telling it that such programmes have profound long-term wellbeing benefits and contribute significantly to equity. In the next breath we are told we need to boost funding for our military.

The US appears determined to set itself on a collision course with China but we don’t have to be crash test dummies sitting alongside them. Prudence, preparedness, vigilance and risk-management are all to be devoutly wished for; hitching our fate to a hostile US containment strategy is bad policy both in economic and defence terms.

In the absence of a functioning media — one that showcases diverse perspectives and challenges power rather than works hand-in-glove with it — populations have been enlisted in the most abhorrent and idiotic campaigns: the Red Peril, the Jewish Peril and the Black Peril (in South Africa and the southern states of the USA), to name three.

Our media-political-military complex is at it again with this one — a kind of Yellow Peril Redux.

New Zealand trails behind both Australia and China in development assistance to the Pacific. If we wish to “counter” China, supporting our neighbours would be a better investment than encouraging an unwinnable arms race.

In tandem, I would advocate for a far deeper diplomatic and cultural push to understand and engage with China; that would do more to keep the region peaceful and may arrest the slow move in China towards seeking other markets for the high-quality primary produce that an increasingly bellicose New Zealand still wishes to sell them.

Let’s be friends to all, enemies of none. Keep the Pacific peaceful, neutral and nuclear-free.

Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and he is a regular contributor to Asia Pacific Report and Café Pacific.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

What does the Geopolitical balancing that is taking place in the West and South-West Pacific mean for the region and the globe?

Analysis: Paul and Selwyn consider the question from several angles, and provide a context to the headlines that suggest both global powers, the USA and the Peoples Republic of China, are on a collision-course toward conflict.

Paul takes us through the US-PNG and Japan-NZ bilateral security/military agreements as a balancing response to the PRC-Solomons security agreement.

In addition, Paul considers the question: Does the PRC have legitimate interests in the Pacific and, as a great power, should those interests be understood and respected?

Selwyn considers whether China’s ascendancy as a global power threatens the United States’ position as the perceived ‘preeminent defender’ of the Global Order?

And Selwyn raises for debate, highlighting what the two global powers’ messaging was at the Shangri-La security dialogue that took place over last weekend.

Paul then analyses what this all means for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Recommended Links:

•  KiwiPolitico.com Ref. https://www.kiwipolitico.com/2023/06/…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; General Li Shangfu, State Councilor; Minister of National Defense, China Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…
•  Shangri-La Security Dialogue; Lloyd J Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US Ref. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/med…

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RECOGNITION:

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

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A View from Afar – In this podcast, Paul G. Buchanan and Selwyn Manning will analyse how Taiwan is delicately navigating its way between two clashing global powers. On one side there’s China and on the other is the USA.

Taiwan has been self-governing for over 70 years. It insists it wants to remain an independently governed economy.

But recently, the People’s Republic of China’s leader Xi Jinping stated China wishes to reunify Taiwan and assert control over the South East Asia nation.

And, on the other hand, the United States of America has restated its defence commitment to Taiwan. The Pentagon this week said the US’ commitment to Taiwan is rock solid, and, in recent weeks it has been reported that US military forces have been present on Taiwanese soil.

But how committed is the US really? Will the US come to Taiwan’s defence should China invade?

And, what would China gain strategically if it did invade, and, what would China lose if a regional conflict occurred?

Taiwan’s leader said this week that it will not submit to China’s will on the issue of its independence, but rather it will use diplomacy to find a way through – that is unless China did invade.

So what is the most likely outcome of this situation? How can China back off, save face, and get back to the business of economic mutual interest?

Join Paul and Selwyn for this LIVE recording of this podcast and remember any comments you make while live can be included in this programme.

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If you miss the LIVE Episode, you can see it as video-on-demand, and earlier episodes too, by checking out EveningReport.nz or, subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

A View from Afar: Selwyn Manning and Paul Buchanan present this week’s podcast, where they analyse the Australia-China-New Zealand relationship. Has this reached a tipping-point? Also, Israel. How stable will this cobbled together coalition of anti-Netanyahu parties be?

But first, Australia, China, and New Zealand:

• What are the main take-away points from the New Zealand-Australia leaders bilateral meeting this week?
• AU PM Scott Morrison referenced ANZUS while NZ PM Jacinda Ardern spoke of NZ’s defence requirements as an independent consideration.
• So who is correct here? Does Australia and New Zealand’s re-stated commitment to being a Trans-Tasman family drag NZ into supporting any future Australian conflict?

And then there’s China’s foreign ministry response, that states: “The leaders of Australia and New Zealand, with irresponsible remarks on China’s internal affairs relating to Hong Kong and Xinjiang as well as the South China Sea issue, have made groundless accusations against China…”

• Does AU and NZ governments’ renewed sense of self-identity indicate a rebalancing of a regional and global order? And has the PRC’s dominating influence in AU and NZ politics reached its zenith?
• And does the PRC’s increased authoritarianism at home and abroad reflect leadership weaknesses rather than strength?

*** Israel.

In the last quarter of this episode, Buchanan and Manning will discuss the latest from the Middle East.

• Will a cobbled-together coalition of anti-Netanyahu politicians succeed in creating a new Israel Government? How stable will it be, and, what does this mean for Palestinians in the West Bank of Gaza?

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The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

Threat.Technology placed A View from Afar at 9th in its 20 Best Defence Security Podcasts of 2021 category. You can follow A View from Afar via our affiliate syndicators.

There has been a lot of western angst shown towards China this year, only a miniscule amount of which can be attributed to geopolitical threats coming from China. Leading the charge of the anti-China brigade is Australia.

I commented about a month ago on this matter, noting the tendency amongst many of us to anthropomorphise countries. Thus, we get the idea that a country – eg China or Australia – is a single sentient being that has a single view, and makes decisions on that basis. It’s as if all the people in a country are passengers on a ship, and that the ship’s captain takes actions in the name of those (ultimately passive) passengers.

This view that a country is a living organism – with a tight leadership team who speaks for it – reflects the assumptions of a nation’s ‘establishment’, which is a coalition of national elites: essentially political, public service, seconded academics, business, and media insiders. And those elites tend the see the leader as a personality who symbolises the national leadership coalition.

Unlike people, who are approximately the same size as each other, countries are treated like people who vary in size by several orders of magnitude. (Countries like the United States, China and India are about three orders of magnitude larger – one thousand times larger – than, say, Fiji. Fiji, in turn, is nearly two orders of magnitude – one hundred times – larger than Tuvalu.)

The Coronavirus

When Donald Trump started calling the Coronavirus ‘the China virus’, his words resonated with many more Americans than his own political supporters. They fully resonated with the United States’ political establishment; and Australia’s too. The ‘China-virus’ rhetoric reflected a hostile political agenda, and that’s what Chinese political leaders are rightly concerned about.

My best guess is that the SARS-COV2 virus did ‘escape’ from the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Most likely a worker (or workers) there caught it, accidently, while doing their work. Possibly it was carelessness, but no systems are 100.000% foolproof. Chinese scientists were perhaps more aware than western scientists of the threat that viruses like SARS-COV1 posed to the public; it was their valid responsibility to do the difficult research. It is very unlikely that Chinese scientists in Wuhan were synthesising new ‘Frankenstein’ viruses. Yet the language used in the west suggests that SARS-COV2 [SARS2 for short] came from the lab, rather than coming from wild animals, insinuating that China had an agenda bordering on biological warfare. Most likely it came from both; it probably came from wild bats or other animals, via accidental exposure at the research institute.

Western leaders should spell out that this is a likely scenario, and that Chinese authorities did what any other country’s authorities would have done in a similar situation. Firstly, the managers in the research institute would have done their best to contain the problem, and would have only notified higher authorities once they understood that they had not contained the problem. We could call this a ‘cover-up’, but it’s human nature – probably wise human nature – to try and solve a technical problem before the bureaucrats get involved with such a problem that they might struggle to understand. Once the regional political bureaucracy becomes aware of a problem, they in turn may try to contain their problem rather than pass it up to the next level. This reluctance to ‘notify the boss’ is likely to be worse in a punitive culture. China has a punitive workplace culture, but is by no means the only country that pursues an ‘accountability and punishment’ regime; in New Zealand too many of us are still wanting to punish people for the Pike River disaster, rather to hold a ‘truth and reconciliation’ investigation.

Mistakes around the management of ‘the Coronavirus’ have been made in just about every country, with the political bureaucracy of the European Union probably being more responsible than any other party for the fact that SARS2 has been a vastly worse pandemic than was SARS1. It is important for the sake of the world that we learn about this coronavirus, and act in a globally cooperative way to practically eliminate it. Chinese authorities have done well towards this end, and only made political statements about alternative non-China origins after the Americans and the Australians chose to politicise the virus, for no obvious purpose other than to harass a country that they were already politically antagonistic towards.

Australia’s China Obsession

European Australians – a people thoroughly detached from their European tūrangawaewae – have always sensed a threat from their north. No matter that China – nor (until 1942), in historic times, any other Asian people – had never shown any aggression, or other hegemonic intent, towards Australia.

I like Australia, and I go there often – partly but not only for family reasons. I understand Australian political and economic history; hence I was invited to contribute a chapter to Only in Australia. In that chapter, among other points that I like to think of as insights, I likened Australia’s twentieth century relationship with New Zealand to Great Britain’s fraught relationship with Ireland.

(The initial analogy with Ireland came in England from the late eighteenth century, with the Tasman Sea coming to be seen as akin to a ‘New Irish Sea’ separating a new South Wales from a new Ireland. Indeed, just as New South Wales supplanted New Holland, the logic was that New Zealand would morph into New Ireland. The problem was that the name ‘New Ireland’ was already taken; it’s in modern-day Papua New Guinea. As consolation, Auckland province was named New Ulster, in 1841 by the British Foreign Office.)

Australia’s economic relationship with New Zealand came to be much like the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in the second half of the twentieth century.

But, constitutionally, the political relationship between Australia and New Zealand is (arguably) more like that between China and Taiwan. New Zealand is the missing province; Australia still hasn’t quite forgiven New Zealand for jilting the other six colonies at the altar of their group marriage, the union that in 1901 became the Commonwealth of Australia. (Australia even nicked our flag!) Australia’s establishment likes to present a single voice in the world of geopolitics – and the voice it has long-adopted is that of the United States’ pugnacious Deputy Sheriff. Like China re Taiwan, Australia’s leadership coalition does not like Australia’s missing province expressing an independent (and different) voice. New Zealand’s establishment remains somewhat muddled on the extent to which they should conform to Australia’s expectations of New Zealand.

Just as we once understood the bully-context of the expression ‘The Ugly American‘, we now have The Ugly Australian, most epitomised by Peter Dutton and his description of a group of mainly Māori New Zealand born Australians as “trash”. In that context, I was alarmed at the performance on New Zealand television of the burly Australian television personality Jason Morrison, positively demanding that New Zealand gets into line with the position of Australia (aka the Australian establishment).

This is particularly problematic at present, because the Australian leadership position represents a yearning for war with China. I don’t think many Australian establishment people really care about liberating the minority Uighurs from the yoke of Han Chinese oppression. Rather they want China to become a client democracy of The Sheriff (aka the United States); and they want China to be a pliant “customer” (ref. Jason Morrison).

It is this ‘customer’ reference that gives away the crude mercantilism that drives western establishment belief. It is the same mercantilist ideology that used military power in 1840 to protect British rights to smuggle opium to Chinese customers. And the same mercantilism that inspired American settlers in the 1770s to rise up against a British state that required settlers to be customers rather than competitors to British manufacturers (and to pay taxes on tea etc., for the privilege of being such customers).

It is this mercantilism – which China, especially the China of Deng Xiao Peng – more than happily subscribed to; the mercantilism which treats international trade as an arm-wrestling match rather than a partnership for mutual benefit. It is the mercantilism that makes too many people think of exports as ‘good’ and ‘imports’ as bad. It is the mercantilism that treats selling goods (including military goods) to other countries as a form of goldmining, and that the wealth of a country is determined by its success in ‘making money’ (ie in running a trade surplus, exporting more than it imports).

Mercantilism is a belief system that says that its OK to bully your customers, if that’s a way to ‘make money’ at their expense. It is a belief system that completely ignores the fact that the actual benefits of trade are the imports, and the cost of trade (what is given up) is the exports; and that Australia is unequivocally dependent on direct or indirect imports from China. (Indirect imports are when there are Chinese-sourced components in goods imported from other countries.)

Does the New Zealand establishment really feel that it must accede to Australian stand-over tactics? Australia’s elite know that Australia cannot bully China; but they believe they can bully New Zealand.

Yearning for War

For many people, especially establishment elites, a peaceful world is an unexciting world. For those elites – who think of themselves as countries rather than as people – the world is understood as a geopolitical struggle between rival countries. Elite lives are made exciting (ie more self-important, and more quixotic) by having enemies to ‘lord’ over, to antagonise, by commercial or other means.

I don’t believe anyone seriously thinks that rhetorical antagonism towards China can achieve any kind of beneficial change within China – eg on granting autonomous democratic rights towards Uighurs and Hong Kongers. And this belligerent approach will not change Chinese elite claims to Taiwan and the Spratly Islands. (China is more likely to respond to western approaches that set an example of how national communities can cooperate through tolerance, conciliation, and cultural understanding. The Coronavirus pandemic represented an excellent, though wasted, opportunity for leadership elites to collaborate for the common global good.)

National leaders should be careful what they wish for. We know that after 15 or so years in the early twentieth century, geopolitical nationalism produced, among other conflicts real and rhetorical, the Third Balkan War. That war became World War One.

————-

Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

contact: keith at rankin.nz

Rising tensions between Australia and China have raised the question of where New Zealand would stand if things escalate further.

Close trans-Tasman friend and ally Australia is taking a more aggressive stance against China – with South China Sea and Taiwan potential flashpoints.

And recent statements from its defence minister about a possible conflict with China have caused some alarm – a prospect that could put New Zealand under real pressure – to pick a side.

After a year of heavy trade strikes against Australian exports, diplomatic outbursts and increasing military activity in the region, new Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton told the ABC conflict with China over Taiwan “should not be discounted”.

New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs Nanaia Mahuta said she could not comment on “prospective thinking about what may or may not happen”, adding New Zealand “values” the important relationship with Australia.

It did “make for an uncomfortable situation” to have Australia and China at loggerheads and “where you see your neighbours being treated in such a punitive way”, she said.

Australia was in a different position to New Zealand and “obviously see things in a certain way, because they have neighbours and are in a part of the region where they feel several things more acutely and we will remain closely connected in the way that we share our view of what’s happening in our region”, Mahuta said.

‘Nimble, respectful and consistent’
If it came down to taking sides – what would New Zealand do?

“New Zealand is very aware that we are a small country in the Pacific,” Mahuta said.

“And we are also aware that the nature of our relationships, both bilateral and multilateral, require us to be nimble, respectful, consistent and predictable in the way that we treat our nearest neighbours, but also those who we have bilateral relationships with, no matter whether they are big or small relationships.”

Leading defence analyst Dr Paul Buchanan said storm clouds were gathering and armed conflict was now a “distinct possibility”.

“Maybe not directly between the Australians and the Chinese, unless there’s a miscalculation involving a Australian warship, doing freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea,” Dr Buchanan said.

“But more than likely, as part of a dispute that gets out of control and Australia, as part of a coalition of countries, probably led by the United States, that is duty bound to respond, so for example, Taiwan.”

If such a conflict erupted, that would leave New Zealand “between a rock and hard place” because it would be asked to join that coalition, Dr Buchanan said.

That would require some “hard decisions … that have been in the making for well over a decade when we decided to throw most of our trade ships into the Chinese market”.

“Now we’re in on the horns of a dilemma and a bit of a quandary should our security partners ask us to join them in the common defence of a country suffering from Chinese aggression,” he said.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

A View from Afar – Selwyn Manning and Paul Buchanan debate: how in the last two weeks, China and the United States have been advancing distinct and separate defence alliances – positioning that is akin to the old Cold War.

On one hand, the US has been building up a coalition of allies that is designed to contain China’s presence in the South China Sea.

On the other hand, China has been cementing its defence and trade ties with adversaries of the United States. The pacts include formal cooperative agreements with Iran, and the Russian Federation.

So what makes the last two weeks different from the last four years?

Are we witnessing an emergence of a Cold War II styled stand-off in a post-Trump world?

If so, where does that leave small powers like New Zealand, and a host of other nations that make up the economies of the Asia Pacific region?

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China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific region has the entire globe assessing how the future of the region might look. Delegates at February’s QS Summit in Wellington got a first-hand analysis from some leading academics on the subject, with debates over the nature of the power transition that is underway, and the contours of a new regional order. Graeme Acton looked in on the keynote address.   

Professor of International Relations at Oxford University Rosemary Foot kicked off the QS Summit debate, arguing that while a power transition between the US and China is obviously underway, China’s new vision for the region is being held back by its own policy decisions.

“It’s a question of China’s use of its new power as dominance, or power as authority, using ideas of consent, or coercion ..which is it?” she asked.

“You need to look at how wisely China is conducting state-to state relations in the region … is it attracting followers or not?”

READ MORE: The QS Summit on power relationships

She says China has held itself back with a perception of heavy-handedness on issues like the South China Sea, where new military installations have been constructed on a number of small, uninhabited islands an rocky outcrops.

She says any new order has to be attentive to the norms that have kept the region stable in recent times, and China’s rise now means it has a role to play in establishing and maintaining a stable regional order, focused on something more than just military dominance.

“The signals that China sends are mixed – the South China Sea has been militarised – that is seen as a defensive strategy by China, but as an aggressive move by its neighbours to take control of marine resources – it implies use of force, or at least a willingness to use force, and that creates distrust”

China though, regards the US as fundamentally disruptive to region order, dividing it into friends and enemies

Belt and Road ambitions
Beijing has spent a lot of time emphasising its own willingness and commitment to public goods, like the hugely ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). But the challenge, according to Professor Foot, is whether China can bring stability and development, and replace the US security order with something more firmly rooted in Asian economic power.

So, is China’s vision resonating anywhere?

The disruption caused by Donald Trump’s administration and its unilateral approach to international relations surely gives China a chance to corral some support.

”But China’s policies put China first and many in the region find it hard to see China ‘doing the right thing’,” says Professor Foot.

“China’s claim to be the main stabiliser in the region is put under question by its current attitude to the US and Japan, and its behaviour in places like the South China Sea.”

“Why is it that China is finding it so hard to move into the role of benign hegemon in Asia …I’m not sure, but I think there is a sense of entitlement and a sense of victimhood that is drawn on frequently … Xi Jinping has argued that China is in a “unique space”, not the post-colonial situation its neighbours occupy.”

Potential flashpoint warning
Professor Yuen Foong Khong joined the debate with a warning that political tensions in East Asia are a potential flashpoint for conflict.

“Asia is moving fast from uni-polarity to bi-polarity .. and the competition between the US and China could be reminiscent of the Cold War, but perhaps even more severe and dangerous than that period.”

“There are a number of flashpoints in Asia – the South China Sea, North Korea, Taiwan – and these flashpoints do not involve proxies. If they flare up then China and the US will find themselves directly involved very quickly”

But Professor Khong doubts a war will erupt, given the amount of economic integration between the two, and the fact neither would want any kind of nuclear exchange.

“China sees the current order as constraining on a number of fronts… China wants equality with the US in the region … but the US is very unlikely to cede to that, as it has more economic power, and stronger alliances in the region.

“Also China’s one-party political system is s serious stumbling block to it being accepted as a credible equal in the region at present.

His view was that the Asia-Pacific’s increasing instability could in fact result in a more pluralist future scenario, with no one power taking precedence over another.

“The bipolar scenario with China and the US may not eventuate. East Asia’s future may we be more diffusive and de-centralised than you might think.”

Graeme Acton, the new Asia New Zealand Foundation’s Asia Media Centre manager, is former foreign news editor of RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz