Imagine if the Olympic Games were currently being held in Wuhan, China. There would be widespread mentionings of it having been the starting place of the Covid19 pandemic, in December 2019.

But pandemics (not ‘global pandemics’; pandemics are global by definition, as are world wars) have two places of origin, though those two places could be the one-and-the-same. For Covid19, Wuhan was certainly the first place; the root source, to use a tree analogy. The second source is the base of the stem, the place from where a pandemic fans out and becomes almost unstoppable.

In the case of Covid19, the events in February 2020 in Milan and Cortina d’Ampezzo – the jewel of the Italian Alps – were the origins of the pandemic. Without their role, Covid19 might have been a contained epidemic such as SARS (2003).

Since the near-run-disaster that was the SARS-Cov1 panic in 2003, the amount of useful epidemiological work on coronaviruses has been minimal. There was clearly research work being done, including in Wuhan. But that was mainly on the zoonotic origins of coronaviruses, and not on the administration of outbreaks. SARS-Cov1 was a severe novel coronavirus. Novel respiratory viruses – such as the 1918 influenza pandemic – are lethal, spread fast, and are hard to contain. More lethal than Sars-Cov1 was MERS which emerged around 2012. Yet preparations for a respiratory-illness pandemic were focussed almost entirely on a new strain of influenza. No prep for a new novel coronavirus. SARS-Cov2 was ‘tricky’, in that – less lethal but more transmissible than SARS-Cov1 – it fell on the cusp between being dangerously lethal and dangerously transmissible.

Geographic Analysis

The pandemic events of 2020 were not – at least not in any popular awareness – subjected to a proper geographical analysis. Most of the initial outbreaks of the SARS-Cov2 virus which escaped China were largely contained. There were relatively small outbreaks in Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and Seattle in the United States’ northwest; in some cases transmitted by passengers from a few cruise ships. And larger but still largely contained outbreaks in South Korea and in Iran. These outbreaks came directly from China. The containment of the Iran outbreak was facilitated by the West’s generally hostile attitude towards that country as a geopolitical ‘bad guy’; Iran was easier than most countries for the West to quarantine.

More problematic were the outbreaks in Spain and Italy, which can also be traced back to January 2020. In Spain the initial outbreak, direct from China, was more in the south; most likely linked to escapees from China. There was relatively little subsequent movement across the land border into France, though Andorra experienced a separate outbreak. The main risk from the south of Spain was the United Kingdom, given that, for many British people, southern Spain is either their first or second home. It would have been relatively easy to quarantine British arrivals from Spain; the British authorities ‘dropped a ball’ by being tardy here.

The main blind spot was that Spain is a western country, and westerners had become ingrained in the supposition that pandemics (and all things bad) come from other countries; or, more accurately phrased, ‘countries of others’. Guard rails that were up for China or Iran or even Japan and South Korea, were not there for ‘threats’ from West European countries.

The notion came about that the pandemic radiated out of southern China, rather than having flowed out of all of the places which had experienced outbreaks. When eyes should have been watching Spain and Italy, they were still firmly focused on China, and in a finger-pointing way.

The West could have learned much from China’s data about the impact of the new virus in terms of the demographics of victims and non-victims, and the extent and duration of their exposures and their symptoms. However, the western countries were more predisposed to put up the shutters with respect to that amazing country.

A large part of the problem in the 1918 influenza pandemic was the high numbers of younger adults who caught it and died from it. Covid19 was never like that. Data from China showed that few younger people had died from Covid19; unless, that is, they had had sustained exposures. For younger people, and for society as a whole, it was better for otherwise healthy non-allergic people to have early and tentative exposures to Covid than to be on tenterhooks awaiting what became the inevitable, and would become worse the longer the wait.

Milano-Cortina

More problematic than Spain was the coronavirus outbreak around and to the east of Milan – the ‘tech’ centre of Italy, and the fashion centre – and the connection of Milan to the ski resorts during the peak of the ski season; indeed during the February school holidays in Europe. Milan is the most monied city in Italy. It is an important entry-point for affluent techies on business, and for sundry one-percenters. Once the epidemic began in Wuhan, many of the monied of and around Wuhan (many were foreign nationals) had the nous to ‘escape’ – including to Macao and Hong Kong – before the Chinese central government closed the ‘stable doors’.

Milan and environs became a hotspot for witting and unwitting coronavirus refugees – affluent exiteers – just at the time Europe’s ten-percenters were heading to and from the ski resorts.

Further, there was the World Economic Forum, at Davos, Switzerland; a one-percenter retreat. A few of the delegates may have, unknowingly, arrived with Covid. Following the Forum, many delegates – coming straight from a transmissible environment – will have visited the other hotspots for the rich and famous; the other alpine resorts, and the principalities Monaco, Liechtenstein, Andorra. And San Marino, which is a centre for the world’s semi-licit arms trade. All of these places had significant outbreaks of Covid19 during February and March 2020. These were perfect environments for the rapid spread of SARS-like coronaviruses. While coronaviruses are not winter viruses as such – compared to other cold and influenza viruses – they nevertheless thrive in winter when not obstructed by those other winter pathogens.

Essentially the most significant locations for amplifying Covid19 were greater-Milan, the Italian skifields centred on Cortina and Livigno; though Torino in the northwest – host of the 2006 Games – probably experienced its share of the unchecked Italian Covid19 flow. From these places it spread to neighbouring countries: Austria, Switzerland, France, and Bavaria in Germany.

Who else was there at those resorts? The managerial class – the bureaucrat and technocrat nine-percenters of the most affluent cities of northwest Europe, especially those cities hosting international (Geneva, Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg) and national (eg Stockholm for one; and Paris and Berlin of course) governance organisations – were there with their older children. Fly-in, fly-out; a week’s break from the office with the family. In many cases parents on their own with the children while their spouses and ex-spouses enjoyed time apart from their children; elite parents and teenagers who would take the opportunities to socialise during the long après-ski evenings. They would mostly be back in their home countries by the first week of March.

Visitors from the Americas – from those same socio-business milieux – would have also been in these resorts at that time, and also in the capital cities of western Europe.

Covid19 didn’t stream into New York from China or from Seattle. It streamed in from the affluent centres of and close to alpine Europe, and from the business and political capitals of northwest Europe. Covid19 came into the Americas directly or indirectly from Italy to a much greater extent than it came from anywhere else.

Missing Maps

What was needed was good flow maps, much like those devised by John Snow, in London around 1850, to chart the cholera epidemics of 1849 and 1854. Instead, the statistics most available were nationally-compiled accumulations of cases and deaths; not international flow maps showing the sequences as Covid19 moved from some places and then on to other places. Individual countries were making their own imperfect maps, with their own make-believe boundary walls. In reality these European borders were for administrative purposes only. Herein lay the problem of visualising the flows of infection; unjoined maps. Further, these case-maps were often unadjusted for the population sizes of each country or province; many maps simply showed that there were cases where there were more people.

For flow maps, you must remove the dots which represent cases resolved by time or, for a small minority of cases, by death. And you must provide per capita data.

These administrators literally failed to join the dots between their own patches and their neighbours’ patches. A glance at any Europe-wide case-map would have shown, by April 2020, a large cluster of cases from Geneva north towards Strasbourg and Luxembourg, and then west towards Maastricht and Brussels; this cluster straddled six separate national borders. (Seven countries if you include Italy, which is close to Geneva.) The conclusions from such a map would have been as obvious as those revealed by John Snow’s case-map of Soho (London) during the 1854 cholera outbreak there.

In early 2020, it was senior public servants, their families including their elderly parents, their staff, and the people they had meetings (and eatings) with who had been most effectively spreading and succumbing to the virus.

First and Second Waves

By July 2020, the Covid19 outbreak was largely contained in Europe. But at a cost, not only in terms of disrupted income-earning opportunities to the small-medium businesses personnel who contracted the virus from the holidaying returnees and who were most disrupted by stay-at-home orders. And also, the latent cost of the first wave included the loss of those many natural immunisations that commuters in large cities experience most days of their working lives; especially cities with international airports.

Thus, the countries which had experienced multi-month shutdowns rebuffed the pandemic virus at a significant hidden cost; a weakening of the immunity of the population, increasing the susceptibility of the so-far uninfected to a new wave of respiratory contagion. Populations in urban centres – historically, and especially immigrants to those cities from the provinces – have always been vulnerable to transmissible diseases. By August 2020 this was especially so, especially in those countries in Eastern Europe (with older and poorer populations) which had been minimally exposed to both the first wave of Covid19 and the other pathogens they would normally have come into frequent contact with.

While the pandemic was contained in Europe by July 2020, it was far from contained in the United States. In the United States, the covid curve was flattened, but at a high plateau. The downside of flattening-the-curve is that you get an extended curve, creating a pathogen reservoir for a second wave of infections.

The Grand Tour and the second wave of Covid19

In the eighteenth century, a time of very high economic inequality in the British Isles and other parts of Europe, a tradition developed among the sons of the then one-percenters to do a Grand Tour. For a few, that tour was somewhat intrepid; Joseph Banks did his grand tour on the Endeavour with James Cook. Lord Byron was another, whose tour was somewhat intrepid and was never completed.

For the majority of these entitled young men, there was a tourist trail that developed; the grand tour became a kind of hedonist pilgrimage. Principal stops included Paris, the Rhine lands (including Heidelburg) and Switzerland. Some of these early bohemian tourists headed directly from Switzerland to Italy; others ventured into Austria (especially Vienna) and the Bohemian capital of Prague.

In Italy there were several must-visit cities, including Milan, Venice, Florence, Rome and Naples. The homeward journey likely included Sicily, southern France and places in Spain and Portugal.

Some grand tourists would also visit the ‘Near East’, the areas – including the Holy Land – defined by the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas.

The twenty-first (and late twentieth century) version of the grand tour is undertaken by the sons and daughters of American ten-percenters. In the United States in particular, working-life career-building requirements and surprisingly little annual leave strongly encourage this somewhat-elitist comparator to New Zealand’s OE. Young Americans have much less time than young Europeans to travel as tourists during their working lives.

In the modern Grand Tour, which lasts from mid-July to mid-September, young university-educated Americans with both left-elite (nine-percenter) and right-elite (one-percenter) backgrounds descend upon Europe. In 2020, this timing coincided with the re-opening of Europe after what the Europeans optimistically presumed was the end of the Covid19 pandemic. Further, European tourist hotspots were keen to welcome new waves of spending visitors, to help with their economic recoveries.

The second wave of the Covid19 pandemic began in August 2020, though this was not fully apparent until late September. The second wave was much more lethal than the first, and especially in Eastern Europe, where the (generally older) populations had largely escaped the first wave, but were particularly immunity-compromised as a result of the stay-at-home orders during the pandemic’s first wave.

The second wave began in places like Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona, Switzerland, Czechia (especially Prague). And in Israel, another popular destination for American grand tourists. It was the American Grand Tour which brought the pandemic back to Europe, and with a vengeance; and which in turn instigated the further lethal waves of Covid19 around the world in 2021.

Unfortunately, thanks to inadequate specific-location-mapping and flow-mapping of the abundant Covid19 statistics, this flow of infections was only apparent to those who looked under the bonnet. By then, the national Wikipedia sites for Covid19 had lost their energy, showing increasingly outdated maps, and misplaced emphases on first-entry cases during the first wave. The accessible information was either too technical or too stale.

Popular Lore

In popular lore, the Covid19 pandemic was essentially a 2020 phenomenon. TV dramas and documentaries still emphasise that early period of the global crisis.

It was from the lethal second wave that the nasty new variants evolved, in 2021; and spread into and then from India, as the most spectacular example. Remember the Greek Alphabet soup, with the (British) Alpha and (Indian) Delta variants having been especially problematic.

The older Swedish scientists who emphasised the need to take a path – a path which accentuated the need for natural immunity to facilitate an early and complete end to the pandemic’s most dangerous phase – were proved correct as the pandemic raged through its most serious phase in 2021. Though you wouldn’t know it, probably too many interests did not want to make comparisons. Sweden’s politicians had been too slow to address the Stockholm outbreak in early 2020, when that country had an especially vulnerable elderly population; so, it looked as if the world had little to learn from that country. (Sweden had had significantly less influenza than most other countries, in 2018 and 2019; meaning that Sweden had unusually low death rates in the winters of those two years; meaning that they had plenty of ‘fuel’ for a tragic pandemic ‘fire’ in the spring of 2020.)

2021 also became the year of the Covid19 vaccine race; whereas 2020 had been the year of the missing PPE. The public health industry tends to place too much emphasis on immunisation through intervention versus immunisation through monitored natural exposures. This emphasis is valid for the most lethal of infectious conditions; the conditions for which we routinely vaccinate today. But for the below the radar circumstances of categories of common respiratory viruses with high complexity and low lethality – including known circulating viruses such as RSV, coronaviruses (the descendants of previous lethal coronaviruses), rhinoviruses, and influenzas –medicalised immunisations came to be emphasised while, with little awareness, simultaneous processes were lessening immunity to these types of virus. It was like taking one step forward and two steps back.

In the end, the pandemic was resolved through a natural immunisation process. 2022 was the year of Omicron. In 2022 the non-lethal Covid-Omicron variant ‘ripped through’ New Zealand and other places with previous minimal coronavirus exposure. This was a direct result of the failure and subsequent redundancy of the border-quarantine and other barrier methods of protection which were still in force in January 2022. Most New Zealand residents were exposed to covid that year.

Omicron had evolved in southern Africa in late 2021, from the earliest strain of Sars-Cov2. It became a natural immunisation force. Omicron was the invisible cavalry coming to the rescue; favoured in evolutionary terms over the Delta nemesis because it was more highly transmissible while being much less lethal than the previous covid varieties. More like the familiar but under-studied ‘common cold’ coronaviruses. Omicron stopped Delta dead in its tracks; a more effective weapon than the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines.

Lessons

I don’t think that western society has learned very much from the Covid19 pandemic. The importance of good mapwork and monitored natural immunisation barely formed any part of the long but largely useless narrative. Sweden’s alternative scientific path was forgotten, or derided, rather than learned from.

The next pandemic will probably also catch us unawares. It will be as different from the contemporary preoccupations of epidemiology, as Covid19 was. It may already be ‘hiding in plain sight’, as the coronavirus threat was in the 2010s. Family doctors should be routinely testing for all the various ‘bugs’ out there, and passing-on data about the various pathogens and cross-immunities which keep us healthy in daily life. We could perhaps have knocked out Covid19 in its early stages, by facilitating natural exposures of healthy people to low doses of already-circulating non-covid coronaviruses.

I think that future government-overreach mandates around lockdowns and mask-wearing will be hard to enforce, given the huge rightwards shifts in western politics this decade. But there may be opportunities for short smart protective measures, undertaken at local levels and in places such as retirement villages and rest homes. In particular, making high-grade (ie the more expensive types of) facemasks available to the vulnerable, with the warning that these should be worn mainly in high-risk environments, and not everywhere all the time.

Meanwhile

It’s great that Milan and Cortina d’Ampezzo, still popular hangouts of the rich and the not-so-famous, have been able to host a magnificent sporting event. These places have not been tainted by their association with the still recent pandemic. Despite being the places from which an outbreak of a significant new coronavirus fanned out to create a three-year pandemic that changed the world. That outbreak was probably containable, if we had acted with more nous and more knowledge of the common pathogens of daily life.

But who was looking at the Italian Alps in those heady ski-holiday days of February 2020? We were transfixed by China.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

An increasing proportion of New Zealand’s immigrants are foreign citizens. In the 2010s – especially the later 2010s – a critical driver of immigration had been returning New Zealand citizens. As the headlines have indicated, that process of sourcing immigrants from the New Zealand diaspora has long finished.

Where have New Zealand’s post-covid immigrants come from? The following table shows immigration from the 31 countries which Statistics New Zealand follows. The estimates for the years-ended-August have just been released.

We note that not all intended migrations to New Zealand are successful. Most immigrants arrive on non-residence visas, and then have to apply for permanent residence or other long-stay visas. Unsuccessful immigrations arise both from failures to secure the desired permission, or from immigrants themselves having second thoughts. There are two possible outcomes of unsuccessful immigration: return migration, or onward migration.

Onward migration may take place following immigrants’ success in gaining New Zealand passports. But that is not unsuccessful immigration, and it’s not shown here. The data below looks at the 12-month period ending August 2023, and deducts the migrant departures for each nationality in the following 12 months (ending August 2024). For comparison, the table also shows 12-month period ending August 2024, deducting the migrant departures for each nationality in the 12 months ending August 2025.

These data are estimates for successful immigration (as defined above) by migrants’ nationalities:

It turns out that Philippines is the 2023 ‘winner’. Philippines consistently has few return or onward migrants. We note that the Philippines’ number dropped more in 2024 compared to India, probably reflecting the larger numbers of Indian migrants who arrived as tertiary students.

Two other stand-out immigrant countries – relative to their source populations – are Sri Lanka and Nepal.

The dominant groups of countries are our Pacific neighbours (Oceania); and South and East Asia. In this context we should note that a substantial majority of immigrants from Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are ethnic ‘Austronesians’, the same broad ethnic group as our indigenous Māori and most of our Oceanian immigrants. Immigrants from Philippines are a particularly good fit, because of their similar Christian culture and because they are ethnic cousins of indigenous Aotearoans.

That’s not to say that any other national group is a bad fit. Most of our immigrants seek to integrate sufficiently to become Kiwis, without being under pressure to assimilate into Euro-Kiwi norms. Interestingly, of the six top immigrant-source countries, New Zealand only has direct flights with two: China and Fiji.

We note that the richer Asian nations feature well down the list. And we note the disproportionately low representation of nationalities with mainly Muslim populations. Indonesia, with 2½ times the population of Philippines has only 2½ percent of the Philippines’ successful immigration. Indonesia, our near-invisible near-neighbour, is the fourth most populous country in the world, and may well have more people than the United States by 2050.

With slightly more immigrants than from Indonesia is Pakistan, the world’s fifth most populous country, and a country with strong sporting links to New Zealand. But Pakistan is way below India in the above table. A surprising omission from the table is Bangladesh, the world’s eighth most populous country, with more residents than Russia (the world’s number nine). Bangladesh does have a significant community in New Zealand, including my GP doctor. I suspect that Bangladeshis feature strongly in the ‘other Asia’ category, along with Cambodians who continue to operate small bakeries in Aotearoa New Zealand. Another country of importance missing from the list is Singapore, whose airline does bring many if not most of our South Asian immigrants.

Other countries not mentioned so far in the world’s top-ten by population are Brazil, Nigeria, and Mexico. Of these only Brazil features in the table above, although Nigeria may well have a significant presence in ‘other’, and Mexico has had some high-profile immigrants to Aotearoa New Zealand. Brazilian immigration, which appears to be dropping off, may return once China Eastern commences flights from Auckland to Buenos Aires.

We see the richer countries in Europe and the Americas (traditional sources of immigration), and Australia, feature in the bottom half of the ‘Top-31′; much more so for 2024 than for 2023. We note that the negative numbers in 2024 mean that more people with those countries’ passports departed in 2025 than arrived in 2024.

Ukraine doesn’t feature, though it might be a major part of ‘other Europe’. Czechia, which I am surprised Stats NZ have included, may be taken as a proxy for Eastern Europe. Also, ‘other Africa’ has held up while South African successful immigration has halved.

The data all reinforces the fact that New Zealand is a demographic turnover country, with the momentum of immigration coming from much poorer non-Muslim countries, and with a significant outflow of richer-country migrants.

For some up-to-date perspective, the table below shows estimated immigration for the featured countries in the year to August 2025. It shows an increase in migrant arrivals from some richer countries, such as United States, Australia, Japan, Germany and France; however, it is likely that similar numbers of these nationalities will leave New Zealand in the next 12 months as arrived in the previous 12 months. Many from France will actually be from New Caledonia; from Oceania rather than from Europe.

Finally, total arrivals of foreigner immigrants were 201,950 in the year to August 2023; 142,661 in the year to August 2024; and 112,591 in the year to August 2025; much lower than immediately post-covid, but still high. Total departures of foreigner immigrants were 35,972 in the year to August 2023; 46,099 in the year to August 2024; and 54,092 in the year to August 2025.

So, in the last year, foreigner migrant departures from New Zealand had reached almost half of foreigner migrant arrivals. This suggests that, for many, immigration to New Zealand is a fraught and often unsuccessful experience.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

SPECIAL REPORT: By Joe Hendren

Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon I can’t help but think of a friend I met in Beirut.

He worked at the Regis Hotel, where I stayed in February 2015.

At one point, he offered to make me a Syrian dish popular in his hometown of Aleppo. I have long remembered his kindness; I only wish I remembered his name.

At the time, his home city was being destroyed. A flashpoint of the Syrian Civil War, the Battle of Aleppo lasted four long years. He didn’t mention this of course.

I was lucky to visit Lebanon when I did. So much has happened since then.

Economic crisis and a tragic port explosion
Mass protests took over Lebanese streets in October 2019 in response to government plans to tax WhatsApp calls. The scope of the protests soon widened, as Lebanese people voiced their frustrations with ongoing economic turmoil and corruption.

A few months later, the covid-19 pandemic arrived, deepening the economic crisis and claiming 10,000 lives.

On 4 August 2020, the centre of Beirut was rocked by one of the largest non nuclear explosions in history when a large amount of ammonium nitrate stored at the Port of Beirut detonated. The explosion killed 218 people and left an estimated 300,000 homeless. The government of Hassin Diab resigned but continued in a “caretaker” capacity.

Tens of thousands of protesters returned to the streets demanding accountability and the downfall of Lebanon’s political ruling class. While some protesters threw stones and other projectiles, an Al Jazeera investigation found that security forces violated international standards on the use of force. The political elite were protected.

In 2021, The World Bank summarised the situation:

“The Lebanon financial and economic crisis is likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top three, most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century. This is a conclusion of the Spring 2021 Lebanon Economic Monitor (LEM) in which the Lebanon crisis is contrasted with the most severe global crises episodes as observed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) over the 1857–2013 period.

“In fact, Lebanon’s GDP plummeted from close to US$ 55 billion in 2018 to an estimated US$ 33 billion in 2020, with US$ GDP/capita falling by around 40 percent. Such a brutal and rapid contraction is usually associated with conflicts or wars.”

The Lebanon Poverty and Equity Assessment, produced by the World Bank in 2024, found the share of individuals in Lebanon living under the poverty line more than tripled, rising from 12 percent to 44 percent. The depth and severity of poverty also increased over the decade between 2012 and 2022.

To make matters worse, the port explosion destroyed Lebanon’s strategic wheat reserves at a time when the war in Ukraine drove significant increases in global food prices. Annual food inflation in Lebanon skyrocketed from 7.67 percent in January 2019 to a whopping 483.15 percent for the year ending in January 2022. While food inflation has since declined, it remains high, sitting just below 20 percent for the year ending September 2024. The World Bank said:

“The sharp deterioration of the Lebanese pound, which lost 98 percent of its pre-crisis value by December 2023, propelled inflation to new heights. With imports constituting about 60 percent of the consumption basket (World Bank, 2022), the plunging currency led to triple-digit inflation which rose steeply from an annual average of 3 percent between 2011 and 2018, to 85 percent in 2019, 155 percent in 2020, and 221 percent in 2023 . . .

“Faced with falling foreign exchange reserves, the government withdrew subsidies on medication, fuel, and wheat further fuelling rising costs of healthcare and transport (Figure 1.2). Rapid inflation acted effectively as a highly regressive tax, striking hardest at the poor and those with fixed, lira-denominated incomes.” 

The ongoing crisis of the Lebanese economy has amplified the power of Hezbollah, a paramilitary group formed in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon.

“Hezbollah is famous for entrenching its power in an elaborate social infrastructure of Islamic welfare. The social grip of those structures and services is increased by the ongoing crisis of the Lebanese economy. When the medical service fails, desperate families turn to the Hezbollah-run health service,” says Adam Tooze

As banks imposed capital controls, many Lebanese lost confidence in the financial system. The financial arm of Hezbollah, the al-Quad al-Hassan Association (AQAH), experienced a significant increase in clients, despite being subject to US Treasury sanctions since 2007.

The US accuses Hezbollah of using AQAH as a front to manage its financial activities. When a 28-year-old engineer, Hassan Shoumar, was locked out of his dollar accounts in late 2019, he redirected his money into his account at AQAH: “What I care about is that when I want my money, I can get it.”

While Hezbollah portrays itself as “the resistance”, as a member of the governing coalition in Lebanon, it also forms an influential part of the political elite. Adam Tooze gives an example of how the political elite is still looking after itself:

“[T]he Lebanese Parliament in a grotesque act of self-dealing in January 2024 passed a budget that promised to close the budget deficit of 12.8 of GDP by raising regressive value-added tax while decreasing the progressive taxes levied on capital gains, real estate and investments.

“For lack of reforms, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] is refusing to disburse any of the $3bn package that are allocated to Lebanon.”

While the protest movement called for a “technocratic” government in Lebanon, the experiences of Greece and other countries facing financial difficulties suggest such governments can pose their own risks, especially when they involve unelected “experts” in prominent positions.

One example is the political reaction to the counterproductive austerity programme imposed on Greece by the European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This demonstrates how the demands of international investors can conflict with the needs of the local population.

Lebanon carries more than its fair share of refugees
Lebanon currently hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, despite its scarce resources. This began as an overflow from the Syrian conflict in 2011, with nearly 1.2 million ‘displaced’ Syrians in Lebanon registered with UNHCR by May 2015.

When I visited Lebanon in 2015, I tried to grasp the scale of the refugee issue. In terms of population, Lebanon is comparable to New Zealand, with both countries having just over 5 million people.

I imagined what New Zealand would be like if it attempted to host a million refugees in addition to its general population. Yet in terms of land area Lebanon is only 10,400 square kilometres — about the size of New Zealand’s Marlborough region at the top of the South Island.

Now, imagine accommodating a population of over 5 million in such a small space, with more than a fifth of them being refugees.

While it was encouraging to see New Zealand increase its refugee quota to 1500 places in July 2020, we could afford to do much more in the current situation. This includes creating additional visa pathways for those fleeing Gaza and Lebanon.

#BREAKING
United States VETOES Security Council draft resolution that would have demanded an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, and the release of all hostages

RESULT
In Favor: 14
Against: 1 (US)
Abstain: 0 pic.twitter.com/BpUj5xhJHE

— UN News (@UN_News_Centre) November 20, 2024

On top of all that – Israeli attacks and illegal booby traps
Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the ongoing Israeli invasion of Gaza, Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged fire across Lebanon’s southern border.

Israel makes much of the threat of rocket attacks on Israel from Hezbollah. However, data from US based non-profit organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) shows Israel carried out 81 percent of the 10,214 attacks between between the two parties from October 7, 2023, and September 20, 2024.

These attacks resulted in 752 deaths in Lebanon, including 50 children. In contrast, Hezbollah’s attacks, largely centred on military targets, killed at least 33 Israelis.

Hezbollah continues to offer an immediate ceasefire, so long as a ceasefire also applies to Gaza, but Israel has refused these terms.

While the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) disputed these figures as an “oversimplification”, the IDF do not appear to dispute the reported number of Lebanese casualties. Hezbollah continues to offer an immediate ceasefire, so long as a ceasefire also applies to Gaza, but Israel has refused these terms.

In a further escalation, thousands of handheld pagers and walkie-talkies used in both civilian and military contexts in Lebanon and Syria suddenly exploded on September 17 and 18.

Israel attempted to deny responsibility, with Israeli President Isaac Herzog claiming he “rejects out of hand any connection” to the attack. However, 12 defence and intelligence officials, briefed on the attack, anonymously confirmed to The New York Times that Israel was behind the operation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later boasted during a cabinet meeting that he had personally approved the pager attack. The New York Times described the aftermath:

“Powered by just a few ounces of an explosive compound concealed within the devices, the blasts sent grown men flying off motorcycles and slamming into walls, according to witnesses and video footage. People out shopping fell to the ground, writhing in agony, smoke snaking from their pockets.”

The exploding devices killed 42 people and injured more than 3500, with many victims losing one or both of their hands or eyes. At least four of the dead were children.

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikatri called the explosions “a serious violation of Lebanese sovereignty and a crime by all standards”.

While around eight Hezbollah fighters were among the dead, most of those killed worked in administration roles and did not take part in hostilities. Under international humanitarian law targeting non-combatants is illegal.

Additionally, the UN Protocol on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices also prohibits the use of “booby-traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material”. Israel is a signatory to this UN Protocol.

Israel’s decision to turn ordinary consumer devices into illegal booby traps could backfire. While Israel frequently stresses the importance of its technology sector to its economy, who is going to buy technology associated with Israel now that the IDF have demonstrated its ability to indiscriminately weaponise consumer devices at any time?

International industry buyers will source elsewhere. Such a “silent boycott” could give greater momentum to the call from Palestinian civil society for boycotts, divestments and economic sanctions against Israel.

The booby trap pagers are also likely to affect the decisions of foreign airlines to service Israel on the grounds of safety. Since the war began in October 2023, the number of foreign airlines calling on Ben Gurion Airport in Israel has fallen significantly. Consequently, the cost of a round-trip ticket from the United States to Tel Aviv has risen sharply, from approximately $900 to $2500.

Israel targets civilian infrastructure in Lebanon
Israel has also targeted civilian organisations linked to Hezbollah, such emergency services, hospitals and medical centres operated by the Islamic Health Society (IHS). Israel claims Hezbollah is “using the IHS as a cover for terrorist activities”. This apparently includes digging people out of buildings, as search and rescue teams have also been targeted and killed.

Israel accuses the microloan charity AQAH of funding “Hezbollah’s terror activities”, including purchasing weapons and making payments to Hezbollah fighters. On October 20, Israel attacked 30 branches of AQAH across Lebanon, drawing condemnation from both Amnesty International and the United Nations.

Ben Saul, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism maintains AQAH is not a lawful military target: “International humanitarian law does not permit attacks on the economic or financial infrastructure of an adversary, even if they indirectly sustain its military activities.”

On top of all that — an Israeli invasion
In 1982, Israel attempted to use war to alter the political situation in Lebanon, with counterproductive results, including the creation of Hezbollah. In 2006, Hezbollah used the hilly terrain of southern Lebanon to beat Israel to a stalemate. Israel risks similar counterproductive outcomes again, at the cost of many more lives.

Yet on 1 October 2024, Israel launched a ground invasion of Lebanon, alongside strikes on Beirut, Sidon and border villages. The IDF confirmed the action on Twitter/X, promising a “limited, localised and targeted” operation against “Hezbollah terrorist targets” in southern Lebanon. One US official noted that Israel had framed its 1982 invasion as a limited incursion, which eventually turned into an 18-year occupation.

Israeli strikes have since expanded all over the country. According to figures provided by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Heath on November 13, Israel is responsible for the deaths of at least 3365 people in Lebanon, including 216 children and 192 health workers. More than 14,000 people have been wounded, and more than one million have been displaced from their homes.

Since September 30, 47 Israeli troops have been killed in combat in Southern Lebanon. Around 45 civilians in northern Israel have died due to rocket fire from Lebanon.

So, on top of an economic crisis, runaway inflation, unaffordable food, increasing poverty, the port explosion and covid-19, the Lebanese people now face a war that shows little signs of stopping.

Analysts suggest there is little chance of a ceasefire while Israel retains its “maximalist” demands, which include a full surrender of Hezbollah and allowing Israel to continue to attack targets in southern Lebanon.

A senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Mohanad Hage Ali, believes Israel is feigning diplomacy to push the blame on Hezbollah. The best chance may come alongside a ceasefire in Gaza, but Israel shows little signs of negotiating meaningfully on that front either.

On September 26, the Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah BouHabib summarised the mood of the country in the wake of the pager attack:

“[N]obody expected the war to be taken in that direction. We Lebanese—we’ve had enough war. We’ve had fifteen years of war. . . .We’d like to live without war—happily, as a tourist country, a beautiful country, good food—and we are not able to do it. And so there is a lot of depression, especially with the latest escalation.”

In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Māori phrase “Kia kaha” means “stand strong”. If I could send a message from halfway across the world, it would be: “Kia kaha Lebanon. I look forward to the day I can visit you again, and munch on a yummy Za’atar man’ousheh while admiring the view from the beautiful Corniche Beirut.”

Joe Hendren holds a PhD in international business from the University of Auckland. He has more than 20 years of experience as a researcher, including work in the New Zealand Parliament, for trade unions and on various research projects. This is his first article for Asia Pacific Report. His blog can be found at http://joehendren.substack.com

Where I ate my Za’atar man’ousheh – Pigeon’s Rock, Corniche Beiruit

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Post-pandemic economics and the rise of national populism – Wherever we look today, whether it be through a political, economic, or security lens, we can see the consequences of post-pandemic economic instability.

And politically, the rise of national populism is in evidence, as is an apparent anti-incumbent mood among voters.

In this podcast, Paul G Buchanan and Selwyn Manning assess the global Zeitgeist and what impact post-pandemic economics is having on geopolitics and geo-economics.

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Time is running out for media people and academics wanting to tell their innovative story or present research at the 2024 Pacific International Media Conference in July.

Organisers say the deadline is fast approaching for registration in less than two weeks.

Many major key challenges and core problems facing Pacific media are up for discussion at the conference in Suva, Fiji, on July 4-6 hosted by The University of the South Pacific (USP).

“Interest in the conference is very encouraging, both from our partners and from presenters — who are academics, professional practitioners and others who work in the fields of media and society,” conference chair Associate Professor Shailendra Singh of USP told Asia Pacific Report.

“Some very interesting abstracts have been received, and we’re looking forward to more in the coming days and weeks.”

The USP is partnered for the conference by the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) and the Asia Pacific Media Network (APMN).

“There’s a lot to discuss — not only is this the first Pacific media conference of its kind in 20 years, there has been a lot of changes in the Pacific media sector, just as in the media sectors of just about every country in the world.

Media sector shaken
“Our region hasn’t escaped the calamitous impacts of the two biggest events that have shaken the media sector — digital disruption and the covid-19 pandemic.”

Both events had posed major challenges for the news media organisations and journalists — “to the point of even being an existential threat to the news media industry as we know it”.

“This isn’t very well known or understood outside the news media industry,” Dr Singh said.

The trends needed to be examined in order to “respond appropriately”.

“That is one of the main purposes of this conference — to generate research, discussion and debate on Pacific media, and understand the problems better.”

Dr Singh said the conference was planning a stimulating line-up of guest speakers from the Asia-Pacific region.

Chief guest
Chief guest is Fiji’s Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica, who is also Communications and Technology Minister.

The abstracts deadline is April 5, panel proposals are due by May 5, and July 4 is the date for final full papers.

Key themes include:

• Media, Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
• Media and Geopolitics
• Digital Disruption and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
• Media Law and Ethics
• Media, Climate Change and Environmental Journalism
• Indigenous and Vernacular Media
• Social Cohesion, Peace-building and Conflict-prevention
• Covid-19 Pandemic and Health Reporting
• Media Entrepreneurship and Sustainability

Email abstracts to the conference chair: Dr Shailendra Singh

Full details at the conference website: www.usp.ac.fj/2024-pacific-media-conference/

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Surveillance and better vaccine coverage is needed to prevent another measles outbreak in the Pacific, says the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Western Pacific regional director.

Dr Saia Ma’u Piukala said many children missed out on routine vaccinations — including measles and rubella — during the covid-19 pandemic.

According to WHO, measles cases jumped by 225 percent — from just over 1400 cases in 2022 to more than 5000 last year — in the Western Pacific region.

“I think the health workforce were concentrating on covid-19 vaccinations and forgot about routine vaccinations, not only for measles, but other routine immunisation schedule,” Piukala told RNZ Pacific.

“People are going back to fill the gaps.”

From 2022 to 2023, 11 countries in the Western Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Papua New Guinea, conducted nationwide measles and rubella vaccination campaigns.

Catch-up successful
Piukala said the catch-up campaigns had been successful.

“That will definitely reduce the risk,” he said.

“No child should get sick or die of measles.”

In 2019, Samoa had an outbreak that killed 83 people off the back of an outbreak in Auckland.

Piukala said the deaths made people understand the importance of measles and rubella vaccinations for their children.

Fiji, Guam, French Polynesia and New Caledonia are the only countries or territories that have local testing capacity for measles, with most nations sending samples to Melbourne for testing.

Piukala said WHO plans for Samoa, the Cook Islands, and the Solomon Islands to have testing capacity by 2025.

“The PCR machines that were made available in Pacific Island countries during the covid pandemic can also be used to detect other respiratory viruses, including the flu, LSV, and measles and rubella.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The University of the South Pacific journalism programme is hosting a cohort student journalists from Australia’s Queensland University of Technology this week.

Led by Professor Angela Romano, the 12 students are covering news assignments in Fiji as part of their working trip.

The visitors were given a briefing by USP journalism teaching staff — Associate Professor in Pacific journalism and programme head Dr Shailendra Singh, and student training newspaper supervising editor-in-chief Monika Singh.

The students held lively discussions about the form and state of the media in Fiji and the Pacific, the historic influence of Australian and Western news media and its pros and cons, and the impact of the emergence of China on the Pacific media scene.

Dr Singh said the small and micro-Pacific media systems were “still reeling” from revenue loss due to digital disruption and the covid-19 pandemic.

As elsewhere in the world, the “rivers of gold” (classified advertising revenue) had virtually dried up and media in the Pacific were apparently struggling like never before.

Dr Singh said that this was evident from the reduced size of some newspapers in the Pacific, in both classified and display advertising, which had migrated to social media platforms.

Repeal of draconian law
He praised Fiji’s coalition government for repealing the country’s draconian Media Industry Development Act last year, and reviving media self-regulation under the revamped Fiji Media Council.

However, Dr Singh added that there was still some way to go to further improve the media landscape, including focus on training and development and working conditions.

“There are major, longstanding challenges in small and micro-Pacific media systems due to small audiences, and marginal profits,” he said. “This makes capital investment and staff development difficult to achieve.”

The QUT students are in Suva this month on a working trip in which students will engage in meetings, interviews and production of journalism. They will meet non-government organisations that have a strong focus on women/gender in development, democracy or peace work.

The students will also visit different media organisations based in Suva and talk to their female journalists on their experiences and their stories.

The USP journalism programme started in Suva in 1988 and it has produced more than 200 graduates serving the Pacific and beyond in various media and communication roles.

The programme has forged partnerships with leading media players in the Pacific and our graduates are shining examples in the fields of journalism, public relations and government/NGO communication.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

In the European Union at least, mortality data is now available until close to the end of 2023. In northern Europe, mortality has been markedly higher than it should have been in the ‘Fall’ – autumn – of 2023. The main exception is Poland. Respiratory illness is most likely the culprit.

My working hypothesis is that excess deaths since mid-2021 have been mainly due to reduced immunity – general and covid specific – and that the extent of deficient immunity is largely a function of the duration of ‘public health’ lockdowns and facemask mandates. Other contributing factors would be the severity of the viruses in circulation, and the numbers of people vulnerable due to age or pre-infective morbidity.

Finland seems to have been hit particularly hard and early, this autumn. The deaths suggest an outbreak of Covid19 or something else towards the end of September. Finland fits the working hypothesis, with little sign of a Covid19 impact until mid-2021, and then a consistent pattern of excess deaths. Finland’s population is looking distinctly unhealthy, and with no evidence yet that 2024 will be much better. Finland had probably the strictest public health barrier mandates (lockdowns and facemasks) of all the Scandinavian countries.

Sweden is the opposite of Finland, with substantial excess mortality in 2020 and January 2021. From February 2021, Sweden’s mortality has looked normal. There were 2022 mortality waves synchronous with Finland, but smaller and briefer (except December 2022 which was high throughout Europe). Sweden has caught the autumn 2023 wave, but later and not as seriously as Finland. We’ll watch to see if there was a mortality fall-off there in December. (We note Sweden had a particularly benign 2019, meaning that it had in 2020 a group of older people who would have died in 2019 had 2019 been a normal year.)

Germany looks much like Finland, except that it experienced the winter 2020/21 wave which Finland avoided due to its public health restrictions. Germany experienced a ‘spiral of death’ in the second half of 2022. While most of 2023 has been about normal in Germany, the autumn mortality wave was serious and possibly ongoing. Germany is a country with weakened immunity, at least according to my hypothesis (given its extensive and prolonged public health barrier mandates), and which seems to have been exposed to the worst of whatever viruses – or virus strains – have been circulating recently.

Poland appears to be an enigma, though it does fit my working hypothesis. Poland showed no significant Covid19 mortality until September/October 2020. Like other Eastern European countries, it suffered twice as much as Western Europe in the winter of 2020/21. This, I have hypothesised, is due to the substantially weakened levels of general immunity in East Europe in the fall of 2020. Poland also suffered severely from waves of Covid19 in the spring of 2021 and the winter of 2021/22. Then, in 2022, Omicron Covid19 seems to have acted as a natural vaccination, making its experience much less severe than the experiences of Germany and Finland. 2023 looks to have been particularly benign in Poland.

We should note that Poland’s elderly took a hammering in 2020 and especially 2021, so there were fewer of them in 2022 and 2023. But, all of Eastern Europe has an older population, especially of postwar baby-boomers, in large part because the has been a westward drain of younger people. Poland’s population remains ‘oldish’, despite the demographic ‘haircut’ faced by that country in 2021. It’s population now looks remarkably healthy; presumably with high restored levels of general immunity.

(Another problematic country of North Europe, not shown here, is Ireland. Ireland imposed greater public health restrictions than the United Kingdom, but, like Finland, has had a distinctly queasy time of it since July 2021. Before the British pillory their government too much over its Covid19 public health response, a good comparative analysis, looking at all four years from 2020 to 2023, might suggest that the excess mortality data in the United Kingdom may not have been much better had they adopted a different set of public health policies.)

For interest, I have added charts for Greece and South Korea.

Greece got Covid19 late, and had a bad 2021, though not as bad as Poland. Early 2022 was worse in Greece though. We also note that Greece is unusual, because it has substantial summer death waves. Most of this will be due to the numbers of people passing through Greece, in the context that its visitor-to-local population ratio is unusually high each summer. Then, in 2022 and 2023 there were the big wildfires, which also contributed to excess mortality. There is no sign of excess mortality in Greece this autumn. It may not have received much of the virus infectivity that has been apparent in the north. Or, Greeks may have better restored their levels of general immunity than have Finns and Germans.

Finally, South Korea has this remarkable picture of having been little affected by Covid19 – at least in the death data – from March 2020 until July 2021. (It did have a significant early outbreak, in February 2020.) Things started to go wrong in Korea after July 2021, followed by a fullscale deathwave from February to April 2022. This was the less-severe Omicron variant, so clearly the Korean population was not prepared; Koreans must have had very low natural and vaccination immunity, owing to excessive and prolonged facemask wearing (and an insufficiency of vaccination boosters). Further, South Korea has had significant excess deaths since August 2022. It’s too early to say how the northern hemisphere autumn wave has affected South Korea; that country is tardy in releasing its data.

For the most part the data fits my working hypothesis, although Sweden is starting to converge more with its Nordic neighbours, all of which followed more restrictive policies. Sweden continues to have large numbers of very old people, reflective of its early exit from the Great Depression and its neutrality in World War Two.

(And, just an aside, it’s remarkable how many very old people are still alive in Japan, given its World War Two experience. Indeed I have visited the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, which I thought gave a very fair representation of the events of the war in Japan. And I visited the ‘ground zero’ Hypocenter Park. Sobering. Many Japanese will have survived due to the lack of a protracted ground war in that country. Korea, on the other hand, has a demographic structure significantly more determined by both World War Two and the active historical phase of the Korean War. South Korea’s excess mortality might have been substantially greater had it had a full quota of octogenarians and nonagenarians.)

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Former broadcasting minister Willie Jackson has defended Aotearoa New Zealand’s public interest journalism fund that his government started during the covid-19 pandemic, after the new deputy prime minister characterised it as “bribery”.

Speaking to media on Monday after his swearing in, Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters accused state-funded media organisations of a lack of independence from the previous Labour government.

Peters was asked how quickly he expected government departments to take action on removing te reo Māori from their names.

“Well, we’ll see the speed at which TVNZ and RNZ — which are taxpayer owned — understand this new message. We’ll see whether these people, both the media and journalists — are they independent?,” he said.

“Well, isn’t that fascinating, I’ve never seen evidence of that in the last three years.” he said.

He then laughed, and said “you can’t defend $55 million of bribery, cannot defend $55 million of bribery. Get it very clear”.

That last remark was a reference to the Public Interest Journalism Fund, a three-year $55m contestable fund for journalists initially set up to shore up public interest media during the covid-19 pandemic, which was wound up in July.

Media jobs, development funded
This included funding for 219 jobs and 22 industry development projects. Political coverage was exempted from eligibility to benefit from it. The fund was administered by NZ On Air.

Jackson, who became broadcasting minister in the Labour government two years after the fund was set up, said it was for media around the country, not just state-funded organisations.

“It was introduced during covid because it was a disastrous time in terms of media and we were pressured by good people out there to say, ‘hey, you support financial institutions so how about supporting local media that’s struggling’.”

It was aimed at supporting New Zealand media to keep producing public interest stories, he said and was “not just for RNZ and for TVNZ”.

“What you saw was a great investment in support of media outlets, Māori, Pasifika, regional [outlets] … Gisborne Herald, Otago Daily Times, Asburton Guardian, they got support and an opportunity to rebuild, reset.

“I’m very proud of what we did.”

Influence denied
He denied the then Labour government had any influence over the media as a result.

“The rules are very clear, we can’t interfere, we can’t intervene . . .  You guys have to have your own independence.”

RNZ’s charter requires the broadcaster to be independent, including providing “reliable, independent, and freely accessible news and information”.

While the organisation is funded by the government, by law no ministers of the Crown or person acting on their behalf may give direction to RNZ relating to programming, newsgathering or presentation, or standards, and cannot have staff removed.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The traditionally blue seat is currently held by Labour — the election of 2020 was the first time it had been won by the left since 1938 — but polls suggest that won’t last much longer.

Five candidates took part in the live-streamed debate at the Homestead Tavern organised by right-wing lobby group the Taxpayers’ Union.

With a partisan audience and The Daily Blog editor/publisher Martyn “Bomber” Bradbury and libertarian Damien Grant as MCs — political commentators from opposite ends of the political spectrum — it was a rollicking, raucous ride, sometimes rude but never dull.

For Prime it was a foray into hostile territory with the Labour MP all but drowned out by shouts and jeers.

She had little chance to defend her party’s record or set out her priorities above the din.

The loudest reaction came after mention of the C word — that’s covid, of course.

Covid response ‘saved lives’
Prime defended the government’s response, saying it was one of the best in the world and had saved lives, but acknowledged some in the room did not agree with her.

There were angry shouts from some in the near-capacity crowd anytime she used a word in te reo Māori, such as Aotearoa or puku [belly].

The other candidates received a warmer reception, with Matt King — the former Northland MP who quit National and set up DemocracyNZ in protest at the party’s covid policy — having the loudest supporters.

New Zealand First candidate Shane Jones continued his campaign theme of describing himself as the politician who delivered for Northland when he held the purse strings for the Provincial Growth Fund.

He also said it was time Northlanders broke their habit of electing lions, only to find they turned into lambs as soon as they took their place in Parliament.

Jones promised a “laser-like focus” on Northland’s infrastructure deficit, especially when it came to roads, rail and shipping.

‘Squeezed middle’
National candidate Grant McCallum, a Maungaturoto farmer who won the party’s selection process to replace King, also promised a laser-like focus — but in his case it would be on costs and the “squeezed middle”.

He said middle New Zealanders had been hard hit by rising prices and interest rates.

King was initially denied a place in the debate, raising the prospect of a protest outside the venue by his supporters, with the Taxpayers’ Union saying he did not meet the criteria.

Those criteria included being a sitting MP or polling at least 5 percent in the electorate.

King was told on Monday he could join the debate after all because the weekend’s Taxpayers’ Union-Curia poll put his support in Northland at 5 percent, once undecided voters were excluded.

King promised to “fight back for farmers” against what he called a “climate change catastrophist narrative”.

ACT list MP Mark Cameron, meanwhile, just wanted less government, saying New Zealanders should be left alone to do what they did best.

Gun register dismissed
He was questioned by MC Martyn Bradbury about ACT’s plans to reverse a ban on high-calibre semi-automatic weapons, which Cameron did not address — but he did say bringing in a gun register had not worked overseas and would not work in New Zealand.

Between the serious politicking there was also plenty of humour.

When New Zealand First was accused of being less interested in real issues than in culture-war talking points such as the use of public toilets by transgender women, MC Damien Grant asked — with some trepidation — how Jones defined a woman.

“Matua Shane Jones has 19 mokopuna [grandchildren],” Jones replied.

“And he has his beautiful wife sitting right in front. Bro, that’s a woman.”

The last word went to Prime, who warned the crowd a change of government would lead to cuts in basic services.

It is not clear, however, if anyone heard her above the jeers.

‘Lot at stake in election’
“There is a lot at stake in this election, and I implore you all, to ask the questions and do the research,” Prime said.

Earlier in the evening, the organisers released the results of a Taxpayers’ Union-Curia poll conducted in the Northland electorate the previous weekend.

The poll showed McCallum had 43 percent of the electorate vote, followed by Prime on 18 percent and Jones on 13 percent.

Both King and the Greens’ Reina Tuai Penney, who did not take part in the debate, had 4 percent support with Cameron trailing on 2 percent.

However, the poll had a relatively small sample size of 400 and a margin of error of almost 5 percent.

The proportion of respondents who had not made up their minds was 11 percent. If they were excluded, McCallum’s share of the vote jumped to 49 percent.

The poll showed broadly similar trends when it came to the party vote, although personal support for Jones (13 percent) was much higher than support for his party overall in Northland (3 percent).

Situation reversed
The situation was reversed for Cameron who had just 2 percent support as a candidate while his party, ACT, polled 12 percent.

Cameron has, however, been campaigning for the party vote only and suggesting his supporters give their electorate votes to McCallum.

Respondents were asked what they believed was the most important issue facing Northland.

Unsurprisingly, given the state of the region’s transport network, 36 percent opted for roads, followed by the cost of living on 15 percent, health on 14 percent and law and order on 8 percent.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Analysis by Keith Rankin.

This chart shows total deaths in a number of comparable countries with high or highish life expectancies. The countries with most deaths have older populations.

New Zealand should perhaps be compared most with Ireland, Scotland, Denmark and Finland; all countries with just over five million people. And with Australia.

Australian mortality has been similar to New Zealand’s in recent years, though, as more New Zealand citizens migrate to Australia, in the next few years New Zealand will age faster than Australia.

Ireland is exceptional because of its relationship with United States’ high technology companies and its full membership of the European Union. Thus Ireland has many elite ‘tech’ workers at present. Further, in past years of difficulty – especially 2008 to 2014 – Ireland was able to unload much of its underclass to other countries. While the health and financial circumstances of Ireland’s sixty- and seventy-somethings requires further investigation, Ireland will neither have had as big a baby bust as New Zealand in the 1930s nor as intense a baby boom from 1946 to 1965. So, it is likely that the numbers of deaths in New Zealand will rise faster in coming years than the number of deaths in Ireland.

The high death numbers in Scotland, Denmark and Finland do not reflect lower life expectancies in those countries. Rather, they reflect populations with comparatively fewer younger people compared to older people. These countries’ mortality numbers in 2018-2022 are the best guide we have to what death numbers will be like in New Zealand in coming years, as the baby bust generation passes on and the 1940s’ and 1950s’ baby boomers reach the days in which they dominate death data.

Most importantly, the experience of these three countries suggests that we will see the demand for health care in New Zealand surge from now on – peaking in the 2030s and 2040s – at a time when current projections show that New Zealand’s healthcare workforce will trough. There seems to have been minimal, if any, demographic analysis of the implication in New Zealand of a baby bust generation giving way to baby boom generations. This is despite record numbers of policy analysts and cost analysts contracted by government.

Some Particular Comments about other countries

I have included Qatar and its near-neighbour Oman to show how low death numbers are at present in small Arabian countries with relatively large numbers of working-age residents. I think that this observation also applies to Israel.

We note also the death incidence in the higher life expectancy countries of Latin America – Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile – on account of their relatively low numbers of people in their eighties.

We note that Portugal and Japan have relatively high numbers of elderly people in their populations. Portugal has been a retirement magnet within Europe, with strong links to the United Kingdom. I have generally been puzzled as to why Japan has so many older people, though we should note that the generation which fought in World War II has largely passed on. I guess that, as in England, many Japanese children in the war were transported into the countryside so that they were not in the cities which suffered very intense bombing from the United States. Overall, Japan is one of the most age imbalanced countries; the low birth rates in recent decades contribute most to this.

Germany is a country which suffered particularly from Covid19 and similar diseases in 2022. But its high 2018 death tally suggests demographic causes which still need unravelling. Despite Germany being a major labour inflow country in Europe, it still has a median age about ten years higher than New Zealand’s (47 compared to 37).

On the flipside of Germany’s role as a labour-inflow country within the European Union, we have Finland and the other Baltic states as outflow countries. Hence the high death tallies in Finland and the Baltics relative to their resident populations.

Neither Finland nor Denmark look particularly happy in this chart. I predict that New Zealand’s death tally will soon be like Finland’s, given both countries’ propensities to lose labour to bigger neighbours. The situation of Greece is similar to that of the Baltic counties; too great a loss of their younger people to the employment centres of the European Union.

Re a few countries not in the chart, I can affirm that both England and Netherlands have population-adjusted death tallies very similar to the United States. And Canada’s adjusted numbers are very similar to Norway’s.

Finally, we should note Sweden, which was neutral in World War II. So Sweden does not have the extreme demographics of older people which New Zealand and other war participant countries exhibit. And, Sweden was less impacted by Covid19.

______________

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Parliament has ended for another term, shutting down ahead of the Aotearoa New Zealand election campaign with a debate where many focused on attacking their political opponents.

Labour Party leader and Prime Minister Chris Hipkins warned New Zealanders: “We can continue to move forward under Labour, or we can face a coalition of cuts, chaos, and fear: A National/ACT/New Zealand First government that would be one of the most inexperienced and untested in our history.”

Parliament typically rises at the end of a term with an adjournment debate, and Thursday’s seemed to confirm the coming election on October 14 would be full of negative campaigning.

Here is a brief summary of the political leaders’ speeches:

Chris Hipkins (Labour):

Labour’s leader and incumbent Prime Minister Chris Hipkins launched into the closing adjournment debate reflecting on the eventful past six years. He said his own tenure in the role had not broken that mould, with the Auckland floods sweeping in just two days after he was sworn in, followed by Cyclone Gabrielle.

“Ours is a government that has been forged through fire. Every challenge that has been thrown our way, we have risen to that,” he said.

He said Labour had achieved a lot, but there was more to do — and much at stake in the coming election.

“We can continue to move forward under Labour, or we can face a coalition of cuts, chaos, and fear: A National/ACT/New Zealand First government that would be one of the most inexperienced and untested in our history, a government who want to wind the clock back on all of the progress that we are making.”

He praised Finance Minister Grant Robertson’s handling of the economy, highlighting a 6 percent larger economy than before the covid-19 pandemic, record low unemployment, and wages “growing faster under our government than inflation”.

He soon returned to attacking political opponents, however.

“Now is not the time to turn back. Now is not the time to stoke the inflationary fires with unfunded tax cuts as the members opposite promised, and it is not a time to turn our backs on talent by introducing a talent tax,” he said, referring to National’s plan to increase levies on visas.

“National wants to turn the clock backwards; we want to keep moving forward.”

He finished by saying Labour had a positive vision for New Zealand, before his final parting words: “and I wave goodbye to Michael Woodhouse, too, because he’s guaranteed not to be here after the election”.

Christopher Luxon (National):

The National leader said Hipkins’ speech should be one of apology, “to the parents and the kids who actually have been let down by an education system …to all the people who have waited for endless times and hours in hospital emergency departments … to all the victims of ram raids in dairies and superettes … to all the people that are lying awake at night worried about how they’re going to make their payments and keep their house.”

He continued with the requisite thanks such speeches so often sprinkle on officials, staff, supporters and workers before thanking the man he had been criticising.

“I do want to thank, in particular, the Prime Minister Chris Hipkins for his services to the National Party, because he rode in very triumphantly in February, and he announced that he was sweeping away everything that Jacinda Ardern stood for-especially kindness. But I have to say it turned out it was all words and no action, because, as we expected, he just carried on doing more of the same: Excessive, addicted government spending.

He turned to the slew of Labour personnel problems of the past year and more, likening the government to a car with the wheels falling off; the Greens were “in this rally too, they’re on their e-bikes, and they’re pedalling along the Wellington cycle lanes,” while Te Pāti Māori were “in their waka, but, sadly, they’re not the party of collaboration that they once were”.

“Then there are the ACT folk. They’re off in their pink van, and it’s been wonderful. They’re travelling the countryside, and David’s reading Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom, which is a good read, as you well know, Mr Speaker.”

He lavished praise on his own team, singling out deputy Nicola Willis, then closed by promising National was “ready to govern, we are sorted, we are united, we have the talent, we have the energy, we have the ideas, we have the diversity to take this country forward”.

David Seymour (ACT):

ACT’s leader also honed in on his political opponents, targeting Labour’s polling.

“It’s been a long three years in this Chamber and it has been characterised by one fact that lays bare what has happened, and that is the fact that the Labour Party, in Roy Morgan, polled 26 percent. That means that half the people who voted for Labour at the last election have abandoned voting for Labour in three years. The question that they must be asking themselves is why that is.”

“I think the reason that we have so much change and support-Labour have lost half of their supporters in the last three years because, frankly, never has so much been promised to so many and yet so little actually delivered … New Zealanders overwhelmingly say this country is going in the wrong direction, and they also will tell you that their number one concern is the cost of living. That is Grant Robertson’s epitaph.”

He targeted housing, debt, inflation, victimisation, and child poverty before targeting the government for taking “a divisive approach to almost every single issue”.

“If you take the example of vaccination. Now, I’m a person who says that vaccination was safe and effective, yet by using ostracism as a tool to try and increase vaccination levels this government has eroded social cohesion and divided New Zealanders when they didn’t need to,” he said.

“New Zealand have had enough of that style of politics. They’ve had enough of Chris Hipkins going negative. They’ve had enough of the misinformation.”

He finished by saying the choice for New Zealanders now was not between swapping “Chris for Chris and red for blue”, but “we’ll actually deliver what we promise, we’ll cut waste, we’ll end racial division, and we’ll get the politics out of the classroom. Those aren’t just policies, those are values that we all share.”

James Shaw (Greens):

The Green co-leader took his own opening shot at Seymour, as “the leader of ‘New New Zealand First’”.

“Mr Seymour must be feeling quite grumpy right now, because last term he worked so hard to get rid of Winston Peters so that this term he could become Winston Peters, and now Winston Peters is calling and he wants his Horcrux back because that blackened shard of a soul can only animate the body of one populist authoritarian at once.”

He turned the hose on both major parties in one statement, saying it was odd National was proposing more new taxes than Labour while the Greens were promising bigger tax cuts than National. He criticised National over its plan to spend the funds from the Emissions Trading Scheme, before turning to climate change overall as — unusually — a source of positivity.

“Our greenhouse gas emissions in Aotearoa are falling, and that is because — and it is only because — with the Green Party in government with Labour, we have prioritised that work every single day.”

But positivity did not last long.

“Under the last National government, one in 100 new cars sold in this country was an electric vehicle. Last June, it was one in two … and National want to cancel all of that so that they can have an election year bribe.”

Rawiri Waititi (Te Pāti Māori):

The Pāti Māori leader Rawiri Waititi began with a fairy tale.

“It seems like this side of the House can find a grain of salt in a sugar factory. I just wanted to say, as I heard the story about Goldilocks — Mama Bear, Papa Bear, Baby Bear — I tell you, it’s been very difficult to sit next to a polar bear and a gummy bear, and it’s been quite hard to contain the grizzly bear in me.”

He spoke in te reo Māori before giving a speech which — unlike the other leaders — focused exclusively on his own party’s promises.

“We are the only movement that will fight for our people,” he said.

“What does an Aotearoa hou look like? It looks like how we would treat you on the marae. We will welcome you. We will feed you. We will house you. We will protect you. We will educate you. We will care you. We will love you.”

“Te Pāti Māori is a movement that leaves no one behind, whether you are tangata whenua or a tangata Tiriti, tangata hauā, takatāpui, wāhine, tāne, rangatahi, mokopuna — you are whānau.”

He spoke of the need to reduce poverty and homelessness, before making the second of two references to his suspension from Parliament this week, then said it was time to “believe in ourselves to be proud, to be magic, and to believe in your mana”.

“I am proud of you all, I am proud of our movement, and I’m proud to head into this campaign, doing what we said we would do.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

The Melanesian Spearhead Group Secretariat’s Director-General, Leonard Louma, says the Pacific region continues to be the centre of geopolitical interests by global superpowers.

The 22nd MSG Leaders’ Summit is taking place in Port Vila this week– the first full in-person meeting since the covid pandemic.

The prime ministers of Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and the president of the FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) of New Caledonia are confirmed to attend the leaders’ session on Wednesday.

Louma said the battle for influence “impels the region to take sides, but it does not protect Melanesia and the region”.

“There are some who would like us to believe that taking sides in that geopolitical posturing is in our best interest. May I hasten to add, I tend to defer — it is not in our best interest to take sides,” Louma said.

The director-general also took aim at MSG member countries for not moving with “urgency” on issues that have been on the Leaders’ Summit agenda.

“Certain decisions also made by leaders and the foreign ministers of past continue to languish on the shelf and there seems to be no real sign of a desire to implement.”

Free trade
Louma said the MSG Free Trade Agreement had “somehow been tethered to other training and commercial arrangements”.

“Our enthusiasm to cooperate appears to have waned. We need to rejuvenate this enthusiasm and appetite for industrial cooperation that once was the hallmark of MSG,” he said.

Vanuatu’s Foreign Minister Matai Seremaiah has urged Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea to sign up to the trade agreement which has already been signed by Fiji and Solomon Islands.

Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau told RNZ Pacific he shared the concerns of his deputy on the issue of the free trade agreement.

“Vanuatu must adhere quickly. If you look at the theme of the meeting it’s about being relevant and being relevant means that we’ve got got to participate as a core group so that we can advance all our interests together,” he said.

Leonard Louma said the MSG needed to make concessions where it was needed in the interests of MSG cohesion.

“The nuclear testing issue in the Pacific could not have proceeded the way we had proceeded without MSG taking a strong position on it.”

Declarations
On Monday, MSG Secretariat officials said there were up to 10 issues on the agenda, including West Papua.

In his opening statement at the Foreign Minister’s session on Monday, Seremaiah said there were two key draft declarations that would be put for the leaders’ consideration.

The first one would be on climate action and “urging polluters not to discharge the treated water in the Pacific Ocean,” he said.

“Until and unless the treated water is incontrovertibly proven to be safe to do so and seriously consider other options.”

The second was a declaration on a MSG region of peace and neutrality, adding that “this declaration is aimed at advancing the implementation of the MSG security initiatives to address national security needs in the MSG region, through the Pacific way, talanoa or tok stori and binded by shared values and adherence to Melanesian vuvale, cultures and traditions”.

The MSG Pre-Summit Foreign Ministers Meeting has concluded with recommendations to be submitted to this weeks’ 22nd MSG Leader’s Summit. It was chaired by Hon. Matai Seremiah, MP, Deputy Prime Minister & Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation & External Trade. pic.twitter.com/Xe87w27BtW

— MSG Secretariat (@MsgSecretariat) August 21, 2023

West Papua
This year’s agenda also includes the issue of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) application to become a full member of the sub-regional body.

The movement is present at the meeting, as well as a big delegation from Indonesia, represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

However, neither Seremaiah nor Louma made any mention of West Papua in their opening statements.

West Papua observers and advocates at the meeting say the MSG is like a “custom haus or nakamal” for the Melanesian people.

They say Vanuatu has the opportunity to make this more than a “normal MSG” if it can be the country that gets the MSG Leaders’ Summit to agree to make the ULMWP a full member.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

As of August 15, the mandates ended for the seven-day isolation period and masks in health settings, with the Health Minister Dr Ayesha Verrall saying wastewater testing showed little trace of the virus.

Dr Verrall acknowledged many would still feel vulnerable.

“So it is on all of us to think well if we’re visiting an aged residential care home for example, that we do follow the recommended procedures there.

“Te Whatu Ora will continue to encourage people to wear masks when they go to hospital — they won’t be mandated.”

Covid cases accounted for just over 2 percent of hospital admissions, Dr Verrall said.

Last step on wind down
Prime Minister Chris Hipkins told RNZ Morning Report this was the last step in winding down covid-19 restrictions.

“We waited until after the winter peak period. The health system overall, while it’s been under pressure and it’s still under pressure, had a much better winter this winter than last winter.”

He said it was on the advice of the director-general of health and there was never a perfect time to make changes to health settings.

General Practice New Zealand chair Dr Bryan Betty said practices like mask wearing and self-isolation should be encouraged for all viruses, not just Covid.

He told Morning Report people needed to continue with the lessons that were learnt from covid but which were applicable to all viruses that were spread from person-to-person such as influenza and RSV.

“Voluntarily staying at home if you do have a flu or a cold so you don’t spread it, and I think masking in public areas of health facilities voluntarily is something we should still keep in play.”

Health providers should consider ensuring masks were worn in places where sick people gathered such as hospitals or GPs’ waiting areas, Dr Betty said.

Vaccination still important
Vaccination would still play an important part in reducing infection and re-infection, he said.

“We do that every year for influenza, we are potentially going forward going to be recommending that for covid, especially for vulnerable populations.”

Employers should be considering how to support workers so they do not come into work sick, he said.

Employers should give people with colds, the flu or Covid the opportunity to work from home if they can to avoid spreading the illness around the workplace, he said.

University of Otago epidemiologist Professor Michael Baker also urged people to stay home when they were sick with covid-19, even though all of the health restrictions had been lifted.

Professor Baker told Morning Report that covid had transitioned from a pandemic threat to an endemic infectious disease.

“Unfortunately that means it’s there the whole time, it is still in New Zealand among the infectious diseases, the leading cause of death and hospitalisation and we know that those infections and reinfections are going to add to that burden of long covid.”

Still vital to isolate
People must remember that it was still vital to isolate when they were sick and not go to work or school or socialise which spread the virus, he said.

People should also continue to wear masks in medical facilities and in poorly ventilated indoor spaces, he said.

New Zealand had come through its fourth wave of infection for the Omicron variant, he said.

“We are going to see new subvariants or lineage of the virus arrive, they will be better at escaping from our immunity, our immunity will wane of course unless you get boosted.”

The government needed to look at how to reinforce those behaviours that prevented covid from spreading now that the mandates had been removed, he said.

“I mean this could be running media campaigns or developing codes of practice say with employers, Business New Zealand, I mean this is a chance for them really to show leadership about how they’re going to support the workforce in New Zealand, self-isolating when they are sick.”

Hospitilisations and mortality rates showed that covid-19 continued to have an impact and watching those rates would indicate whether the mandates had been removed too early, he said.

Integrated approach needed
New Zealand needed to develop a coherent, integrated approach to dealing with all respiratory infections which were the infectious diseases that had the biggest impact, he said.

“They have a big drain on our health resources and so we do need to look at better surveillance for these infections that will tell us what’s happening and also really it’s just having a culture of limiting transmission of these infections.”

That meant staying home when sick and using masks in indoor environments with poor ventilation, he said.

Auckland Council disability strategic advisory group chair Dr Huhana Hickey said getting rid of masks at health care centres was extremely dangerous for immunocompromised people.

“The problem for immune-compromised people is we’re frequent flyers, but we’re being asked to go into a situation that puts us all at risk of not just dealing with what’s making us sick but risking getting covid, which could kill us.”

Hickey said scrapping the seven-day compulsory isolation period could result in more workers returning while still infectious, which she believed would mean immunocompromised people were likely to stay home.

“If they cannot stay home and employers require them to work, they’re going to spread covid as well, so that means I don’t go to restaurants now because I don’t know if the waiter’s sick, I don’t know if the chef’s sick.”

Minimal impact of numbers
University of Auckland mathematics professor and covid-19 modeller Michael Plank expected the lack of mask and isolation requirements to have a minimal impact on case numbers.

He said the main drivers of infection were people who were asymptomatic cases or had not tested yet.

“I’m not sure than an isolation mandate is going to have a particularly large effect on infection rates in the long term.

“If we look at other countries that removed isolation mandates, like Australia, there’s really no evidence of a surge in numbers.”

Restaurant owners embraced the government’s decision.

The Restaurant Association surveyed more than 200 of its members, and 84 percent said they supported the idea.

But many planned to introduce their own requirements, chief executive Marisa Bidois said.

“Thirty nine percent of the respondents said they intended to mandate a five day isolation period for their employees,” she said.

“So that’s something they’re going to implement themselves as an internal policy.”

Many hospitality workers would also be expected to test themselves proactively.

“We also had 42 percent of respondents planning to require employees with any symptoms to undergo testing before returning to work.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

Analysis by Keith Rankin.

These three countries are very useful comparators because they have broadly similar demographics – especially population age structures – to each other. Further they have comparable living standards. The Republic of Ireland has a population the same size as New Zealand (and a similar climate); Australia has close to five times the population of each of the others.

Of the above charts, Ireland best shows the three main waves of mortality in the Covid19 Pandemic. [Note that I will capitalise the word ‘pandemic’ for a WHO-declared pandemic. Otherwise uncapitalised.] There are very clear covid mortality peaks in Ireland in April 2020, January 2021, and December 2022. Other than these peaks there are clear periods of elevated mortality, the second half of 2021 and most of 2022. 2023 also, from March.

Ireland’s population has been growing more slowly this century than Australia’s and New Zealand’s. Death tallies before the Pandemic years were not noticeably growing from 2015 to 2019; compare Australia below. There was an influenza pandemic from late 2016 to about April 2018; the high numbers of deaths in Ireland in January 2017 and December 2017 reflect this. (I have omitted 2016 and 2018 to avoid chart clutter. For Ireland, influenza pandemic deaths actually peaked in January 2018, and extended into March of that year.)

The most obvious difference in the New Zealand chart is the southern hemisphere seasons. The second most obvious difference in New Zealand is the lack of obvious Covid19 waves.

The scales of the two charts are fully comparable, because of the near-identical populations of each country. But a careful look will show that ‘normal’ – ie baseline – summer deaths in Ireland are lower than in New Zealand. Ireland’s population may have better baseline health than New Zealand’s. Or, New Zealand may have more deaths because it has a higher population of post-war ‘baby-boomers’ than Ireland; a population which is now starting to die in greater numbers.

The New Zealand data are worrying in other ways, however. While 2017 clearly shows the 2016-2018 influenza pandemic, with its July 2017 mortality peak, summer data for 2017 and 2019 don’t show large increases in deaths arising from population growth. The period from March to July 2019, in the absence of known epidemic illness, nevertheless looks like a protracted period of deaths triggered by early seasonal viruses. (Indeed, I recall from my former workplace that there were a lot of ‘bugs’ around for parts of 2019.)

If we regard the April to June periods in 2017 and 2019 as having elevated death tallies, then 2021 looks like a normal year in New Zealand, even allowing for population growth. Yet it wasn’t a normal year. It was the peak year of the Covid19 panic; the year of the most extreme public health mandates, with an effectively shut international border and with face-masking required in many settings. The big question is to ask why 2021 was not more like 2020. In the winter of 2021, New Zealand had no Covid19 to speak of, and no influenza.

Elevated death tallies reappeared in March 2022, continuing through to January 2023. While these were clearly linked to Covid19, there was no mortality peak anything like that which Ireland experienced in December that year. My guess is that the timing of mortality in New Zealand reflected the timing of booster vaccinations against Covid19, whereas Ireland was caught unawares that December.

A good check on these tentative conclusions for New Zealand is Australia. (The scale is five times higher, reflecting that Australia’s population is five times greater.) Australia shows most of the same features as New Zealand in the years before 2020, though in a muted way. Australia shows more consistently than New Zealand the impact of population growth before 2020 being reflected in more deaths each year than the previous year. We see that in the spring months (September to November) Australian deaths are generally lower than New Zealand’s; probably because winter lingers for longer in New Zealand.

Australia shows the same problem in 2021 as New Zealand; normal winter deaths despite highly abnormal circumstances. As in New Zealand, there almost certainly were ‘killer viruses’ in both countries that year. Deaths to some extent will have been people who would otherwise have died in 2020, but avoided viruses then because of the lockdowns and physical distancing. Also, weakened immunity arising from the lack of normal exposure to respiratory viruses in 2020 will have increased the chances of vulnerable people dying in 2021 after contracting such a cold virus. The 2021 mortality peaks were higher in New Zealand than in Australia.

Australia shows a classic Covid19 mortality peak in January 2022, before the ‘Omicron’ variant of Covid19 was discovered in New Zealand. Australia had covid exposure peaks in December 2021, much of that being the Delta variant, pre-Omicron. In the autumn and early winter of 2022, Australian mortality data show a shorter and lower ‘Omicron wave’ than New Zealand data.

All three countries continue to show elevated levels of mortality this year, though this is obscured in New Zealand by the problematic numbers of deaths in the autumns and early winters of 2017 and 2019. New Zealanders in the first four months of this year have had slightly more deaths (adjusting for population) than Australians. This may reflect New Zealand’s relatively more overstretched healthcare system, noting from having myself spent some time in Australia this year that Australians also see their healthcare system as overstretched.

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.